LUHMANN, Niklas. Speaking and Silence

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Speaking and SilenceAuthor(s): Niklas Luhmann and Kerstin BehnkeSource: New German Critique, No. 61, Special Issue on Niklas Luhmann (Winter, 1994), pp. 25-37Published by: New German CritiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/488619Accessed: 24/05/2009 15:15

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26 Speaking and Silence

paradox. Within communication, he world is given to communicationonly as a paradox. The enactment of communication evers its unity. Itaffrms this unity implicitly by severing it. And it negates this unityimplicitly by reconstructing t. "Implicitly" s to indicate that only anobserver s able to see and describe things in this way.

Communication must be content with what it can do; but it can commu-nicate that it can only do what it can do. Just as one knows of theunknown at least that it is unknown,1 one can say of the incommunicablethat it is incommunicable. Statements about existence and negations

belong to the operators of linguistically constituted communicative sys-tems; but their operative use can take place only on this side of the bound-ary that is being renewed by such use, but not transgressed by it.

To repeat: he world can come into the world only as a paradox. Yet pre-cisely this is possible through he enactment of communication. For thisto happen, no logical analysis of the concept of paradox s required, andwe therefore refer to the tradition of this concept in rhetoric rather han inlogic. Logic observes itself as a paradox and as a tautology. It uses para-doxes and tautologies to delimit the space of its own operations, hat is, aswarning signs for the delimitation of a realm of communication hat canbe controlled by logic. In order to produce two boundaries, t must firstduplicate the problem of paradox, breaking t down into a paradox and atautology (here, the tautology which asserts the sameness of what is beingdistinguished in the statement is also a paradox). At both boundaries,however, logic can see its delimiting marks only from the inside, i.e., notas a form. Logic is therefore unable to arrive at a complete concept of par-adox and tautology, a concept which an observer could use who would

like to observe logic as well. For this reason - while disregarding ll his-torical particularities f the occidental radition of rhetoric we considerthe rhetorical understanding f paradox as more fundamental han the log-ical one. It is simply a matter of a communication hat wants to use simul-taneously what is incompatible and thereby deprives tself of the ability toconnect [Anschluffiahigkeit]. t is indeed a special case if one systemati-cally gathers arguments or the truth of both sides in order to prove anti-nomies that may be advantageous o theory, or if one proceeds with hastyarguments against the communis opinio in order o cast it into doubt. Forthe communication of paradoxes, he operative effect is decisive: it causescommunication o oscillate, because each position makes it necessary to

1. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1402a.






other operations of the same type, that is, only by virtue of a recursiveinterrelation within the concatenation f several phrases. This linkage canonly occur selectively, and thus always produces other possibilities whichare then disregarded by what follows. It produces victims. There are regu-lative rules for this procedure regimes de phrases and genres de dis-cours. None of these rules can avoid its own processual selectivity, eachmakes its own enabling ncision in the world, each makes sacrifices in itsown way, and each lives off its own differend. Yet despite this insight intothe operative inevitability of difference, for Lyotard the temptation

remains strong to think the unity of difference as well - no longer in thesense of "spirit" but in the problematization f normativity, n the ques-tion of justice (which, however, turns again into a selective discourse assoon as it deals with an actual dispute), and further n a rather hopelessappeal to politics, or finally in the historical elf-characterization s "post-moder." Thus, a defiant sadness rests on the renunciation f unity - thatold rhetorical unity of org/lly pe (iraltristitia) which at least in its moodholds on to what one knows to be lost.

The same can be formulated n a more optimistic fashion byusing

theterminology of "second order cybernetics," hat is to say, the cybernet-ics of observing systems.4 Cybernetics uses the metaphor of the "blindspot." An observer cannot see what he cannot see. Neither can he seethat he cannot see what he cannot see. But there is a possibility of cor-rection: the observation of the observer. It is true that the second-orderobserver, too, is tied to his own blind spot, for otherwise he would beunable to make observations. The blind spot is his a priori, as it were.Yet when he observes another observer, he is able to observe his blind

spot, his a priori, his "latent structures." And in doing so, and in thusoperatively ploughing through the world, he, too, is exposed to theobservation of observations. There is no privileged point of view, andthe critic of ideology is no better off than the ideologue. But at the levelof second-order cybernetics, there is a recursive network of observa-tions of observations; and with a term derived from mathematics,which, however, becomes questionable n the transfer, one can hope thatthis network will yield "eigenvalues" (theoreticians of evolution also

speakof

"attractors")which will

proveto be stable conditions.

Such aprocess, however, can be observed only in retrospect. Order owes its

4. Cf. Heinz von Foerster, Observing Systems (Seaside, California: IntersystemsPublications, 1981).






use of second-level forms. Especially significant communication s, in the

first instance, formed in such a rhapsodic manner, using the acousticmedium, and only its secondary encoding in phonetic writing makes pos-sible a certain distance. This, however, only leads to the development offurther media and forms that bind these media, forms that are only nowtruly built into the autopoiesis of society, namely, into the autopoiesis oflegally encoded political power and of property encoded as money.7 Therepeated reduplication of the difference between medium and form informs that in turn can be used as a medium makes possible the highlyselective construction of a social

systemwhich

finallyarrives at the

pointof reflecting upon its own selectivity. Reflection, at first cosmic, then cos-mopolitan (that of a "citizen of the world"), seems to have reached itslimit today. We therefore sum up all these dispositions toward paradoxol-ogy, the "postmodern" enunciation of the complete report, the observa-tion of observation, and the distinction between medium and form in thequestion: What has happened to difference? Where did the world go?Who are the victims? Are they the observed observers?8

At this point it may be helpful to consult systems theory. The conceptof system emphasizes more strongly the irrevocable simultaneity of sys-tem and environment than the concept of discourse does. (Reversingmatters, one could also say that the difference between system and envi-ronment defines what can be understood by simultaneity.) As opposedto the concept of discourse, the concept of system - at least in itsnewer versions - is concerned from the very beginning with differ-ence. Thus systems theory offers a certain schema to the observer thatcan help him observe others and himself, namely, the distinction

between system and environment. An observer who uses this distinctionin order to divide the world, cannot avoid seeing (is precisely therebyforced to see) himself, too, as a system in his environment. At the sametime the schema presents the formulation of a difference. Each system-forming operation (whether self-referential, recursive, connectable or

7. These examples do not at all exhaust he possibilities. Cf. also Niklas Luhmann,Love as Passion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986).

8. This is presumably how Lyotard might put the question he writes with refer-ence to

ethnologicalresearch: "The

heterogeneity between the cognitive genre and its ref-erent, the 'savage' narrative genre, is not to be doubted (and in no way does it prohibitcognition). There is an abyss between them. The savage thus suffers a wrong on accountof the fact that he or she is 'cognized' in this manner, hat s, judged, both he or she and hisor her norms, according o the criteria and in an idiom which are neither hose which he orshe obeys nor their 'result' "Lyotard 156.






identify itself in the world. But this remaining quantity s no "et cetera" ofother things and events given once and for all; it is different or each sys-tem. With each formation of a system and with each reduplication of theschema, it is multiplied n itself: an infinity that can be multiplied n itself(whatever mathematicians may think of it).

In consequence, the use of the distinction between system and environ-ment results, on the one hand, in the difference produced by its introduc-tion; in the wake of this difference t leads, for example, to controversiesabout systems theory. On the other hand, the distinction between system

and environment eads to the multiplication of observations and descrip-tions implied in this distinction, o the reconstruction f the universe as amultiverse, and to Gotthart Giinther's eorganization f logic into a multi-valent, polycontextural enterprise, o an epistemological constructivism- and all this perhaps yields the insight that, precisely because of thisdifference, something s excluded from communication s different.

In the main, an attempt is made to understand his exclusion histori-cally, as the difference between modernity and postmodernity or, evenmore

radically,as the

bidding-farewello old

Europe.This is a solution

out of embarrassment, which in regard o the present and the future makesdo with a blank that is only gradually illed with content. At an individuallevel as well, the (post)modern "biography" onsists of the search formeaning, of accidents, and omissions. Omissions, in turn, can be histori-cized and dismissed as something about which nothing can be done any-more. At any rate, nothing that is past can participate n communication- and this is reassuring. And if it is only a matter of speaking about it,there is no lack of suitable forms.

Writing, printing, and now also the electronic organization and storageof data break with this rule - and at the same time they reproduce theinsight contained in it. One can begin communication with the help ofthese media - and postpone its completion in understanding. Such apostponement changes the form created by a difference, ogether with thenon-form of the invisibility of what is uninvolved. In a strange way, therelationship o history thereby becomes selective, and any effort to reactu-alize the past increases this selectivity. The texts are accessible, yet the

accessitself

turns intoa

selection. The difference between speaking andsilence, between communication and non-communication annot be dis-solved. Every instance of speech reactualizes ilence.



Niklas Luhmann 33

III

Only for the system of society that ncludes all communication does thesilence produced along with it become a problem. Any other social sys-tem formed within society can start rom the assumption hat communica-tion also takes place in the environment. What is not said in the systemcan still be communicated by other systems on other occasions with dif-ferent words, concepts, metaphors. This does not apply to society. Itsenvironment remains silent. And even this characterization s "silence" sstill one of communication and one with reference o communication; orin

reality"silence" is not an

operationoutside of society but

onlya

counter-image which society projects into its environment, or it is themirror n which society comes to see that what is not said is not said. Inthis sense, the topic "Speaking and Silence" belongs to social theory, andcommentaries on Wittgenstein that address this issue are dealing withsocial theory.12 Society is the comprehensive ystem of meaningful com-munication as a selection from the possibilities of meaningful communi-cation projected by society itself. One could say that society"possibilizes" [possibilisiert] ts world in order to be able to comprehendand rationalize whatever occurs as selection by virtue of the fact that whatoccurs, occurs as society. But what occurs is a perpetual ncluding andexcluding; and this can still be formulated we are doing it right now) asthe realization of a possibility within the horizon of meaning of other pos-sibilities, just as if things were possible otherwise.

Inclusiveness also means closure. Society establishes ts own operationsin such a way that they can be produced and reproduced only on the basisof precisely these operations. In relation o the environment, hey are not

specified by stimuli, theyare encoded

indifferentlyand based on their

own, specifically marked physicality of sounds and signs. The languagethus established processes the ability to connect, not external contacts. Its"semantics" s a condensed practice [Gebrauch] worth preserving - nota sign for something else in the old semiological sense. Its operative prin-ciple is difference, not correspondence. Given all the structural ouplingwith the external world - we were talking about the physicality ofsounds and signs, and we could also mention human consciousness13

12. David Bloor, in Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Mac-millan, 1983) generally argues n this direction.

13. Cf. Niklas Luhmann, "Wie ist Bewufitsein an Kommunikation eteiligt?" eds.Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht nd K. Ludwig Pfeiffer, Materialitdt der Kommunikation Frank-firt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1988) 884-905.




"interna" an only be processed nternally; nd, in particular, isturbances

or perturbations Maturana) are conspicuous only as deviations fromexpectations produced by communication.14

As communication put into action, society can also include silencewithin communication - for example, in the sense of attentive silence,in the sense of an eloquent silence, or in the sense of "qui tacet consen-tire videtur" [one who is silent appears knowing]. It is of course alsopossible to speak about the difference between speaking and silence.This distinction, too, can re-enter what it distinguishes. In order toshow that this is possible it is sufficient to do it. ... One can observethis possibility, describe it, and push its representation to the paradoxof communication about incommunicability. Given all this, however,the fact has not been "sublated" hat every communication, includingthis one, produces a difference as an operation and that, because of therecursivity of its operations, every system includes something andexcludes something else. Every system coproduces that which, as envi-ronment, does not enter into the system, and this may then be called ( )"silence" -though silence in a second sense: silence without the abil-

ity to connect.What this means can be grasped somewhat more clearly if one takes

into consideration that any communication puts something at stake(enjeu), risks something - namely, rejection. The risk lies in focussingon one point (a sentence, a statement) and in selecting precisely this pointfrom among many other possible ones. One cannot avoid this risk, forcommunication requires self-determination. One can decrease the risk bymaking little of the themes, but one cannot always do so, and often onecannot do so without

silently communicating precisely the intention ofavoiding thorny topics.In determining tself, every communication generates a bifurcation; t

thus diversifies the possible links into acceptance or rejection. This alter-native is fully located within what can be linked up; even rejection s pos-sible only in linkage with a prior communication nd with regard o whatis determined by it. The alternative, brought about by the force of commu-nication and actualized n the understanding f communication, excludesthird possibilities. No communication s admitted hat does not want to be

14. To quote Lyotard again: "... the phrases hat happen are "awaited,"not by con-scious or unconscious "subjects" who would anticipate hem, but because, to speak as lin-guists do, they carry their own "set of directions" modes d'emploi) along with them"Lyotard 129.



Niklas Luhmann 35

either accepted or rejected.15 This restriction also stifles any attempt atcommunication which foresees that in the case of acceptance too muchwould be accepted, too much of a bond generated, while rejection woulddestroy something that matters, or the rejection would force us in turn toprocess the rejection itself as something capable of producing a connec-tion. Thus we are often unable to answer the question "Do you love me?"but we cannot answer it by silence either, which is why it is advisable notto pose the question in the first place.

Should one speak of a transcendental ilence? Not at all. For we are not

dealing with something that transcends he boundaries of experience. Atstake are only the boundaries of communication, he boundaries of soci-ety. As always, we are translating he question of the transcendental pri-oris in the subject into the question of the observer in society. Thequestion is then posed as follows: Who can observe with the help of thedistinction between speaking and silence, that is, who can communicateabout this distinction?

We can easily find interpreting observations which bring themselvesto understand silence, that is, to understand t as communication. Some-one who cannot speak must be connected to communication by some-one starting to speak to him. The hermeneut becomes a therapist. Theplace where no one speaks is regarded as an individual who could bemade to speak - like a baby by its mother. The interpretation f silenceserves the autopoiesis of communication, since it is recursively linkedup to the network, that is, included. An entire profession devotes itselfto cheering up old people who sit in their rooms and wait for death, tooffering them entertainment or even education, to doing something for

them, and to explaining to itself the difficulties of this task as the prob-lem of a profession and as a question of specialized knowledge - andin doing so, it no longer hears the silence. And it is not to be disputedthat this can make sense if we observe it under the aspect of the distinc-tion between speaking and silence and if we do so while exposing our-selves to observation. Under favorable conditions, there is money to behad for this.

Another practice uses the schema of speaking/silence n a normative oreven

commandingway. Others are reduced to silence. One can

simply15. An exception that pointedly orients itself toward this problem in order to dis-

tance itself from it is dealt with in Luhmann and Fuchs, "Vom Zeitlosen: Paradoxe Kom-munikation m Zen-Buddhismus," Reden und Schweigen 46-69.




order it. This isparadoxical,

or it isprecisely

the execution of an orderwhich turns silence into communication Mitteilung] even if one wouldnot in any case prefer to be silent in the face of such a presumptuousbehavior). Evading the communicative paradox, prisons obey the restric-tion of communication through the manipulation of bodies. Killingachieves the same goal more radically and with more certainty. The onekilled is then no longer capable of transgressing he prohibition and ofspeaking in spite of it. And finally Auschwitz - the end point of thisstrategy so far - together with the enormous effusion of emotionally and

financially profitable talk following the event because there is no otherway of coming to terms with it in society.

As a sociologist one can be tempted to say (to say ): This does notexhaust the possibilities Everyone who writes, writes on [beschreibt]paper and writes on it as something white. Everyone who describes[beschreibt] society, implicitly describes what it excludes and doomsto silence. Yet the classical mode of description which is orientedtoward a theory of objects has prevented sociology from seeing theexcluded and from

includingit

again- from at

least reintegrating itinto the description of society within society. From Marx to Lyotardthis has happened under the aspect of a victimology. The excluded isdetermined as a class or in some other way observed as human,mourned, and reclaimed for society. Were society to respond asdemanded to this complaint, it would still not become a society thatexcluded nothing. It would communicate out of other considerations,with other distinctions, and perhaps resolve the paradoxes of its com-munication differently, shift sorrow and pain and, by doing so, create adifferent silence. Once we are in a position to see and know this today,any intention to optimize the relationship between speaking andsilence in the direction of a positive evaluation of communicationbecomes an ideology and, no matter the reasons, a sustained illusion.This is certainly true for all the efforts that have insisted on settingcommunication free, on emancipating it from the given constraints ofviolence and time and from restricted linguistic codes. What else cancome of such efforts but the acceptance of new restrictions or, finally,

only noise?Instead, sociology can strive to improve its instruments of descrip-tion and to build a greater amount of controllable complexity into theself-description of society. As if by itself, more precision and rigor in



Niklas Luhmann 37

one's own communication makes visible what it excludes.16 Occupiedby a similar problematic, the French prefer the stylistic device ofsophisticated vagueness. In any case, this communication must then inturn be reflected upon from a theoretical perspective of difference, and itdoes not only need to be communicated as such but also must be capableof being understood as such.

Translated by Kerstin Behnke

16. Today the topic of "ecology" s suited as a paradigm or such a treatment. Cf.,as an act of balance between saying and not saying, Niklas Luhmann, Okologische Kom-

munikation: Kann die moderne Gesellschaft sich auf ikologische Gefdhrdungen ein-stellen? (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 986).

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LUHMANN, Niklas. Speaking and Silence