New port developments and balanced regional growth: a Taiwan example

Geoforwn, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 421433. 1990 0016-718590 $3.00+0.00

Printed in Great Britain 0 1990 Pergamon Press plc

New Port Developments and Balanced Regional Growth: a Taiwan Example

DANIEL TODD,* Winnipeg, Canada, and YI-CHUNG HSUEH,? Yangmingshan, Taiwan

Abstract: Ports are very visible manifestations of economic activity. Not only are they vital systems of infrastructure, indispensable to the smooth operations of international trade and, hence, the nation’s well-being, but they can also serve as industrial complexes in their own right. They are, in effect, symbols of integrated growth centres enjoying both service and manufacturing sectors. Mindful of these critical attributes, planners have attempted to render them into positive elements of economic development, not excepting regional economic development. This study examines one such rendition, the port of Taichung, Taiwan, founded as a deliberate act of government to fulfil two objectives; namely, to facilitate the island’s export- promotion strategy by avoiding trade disruption stemming from anticipated port bottlenecks and, secondly, to spearhead formal commitments to balanced regional growth. The approach adopted in this paper is essentially one of qualitative evaluation; that is to say, it examines the degree to which Taichung Harbour has conformed to the demanding expectations set for it. Serious structural limitations are elicited, limitations which have prevented the port from realizing its full potential. By the same token, the port’s role in advancing balanced regional growth has also been disappointing. As the study shows, the latter result is almost inevitable given the exigencies exposed in the former. This paper concludes by stressing the need for clear formulation of growth-centre functions in conjunction with urging a determi- nation on the part of planners to evade the trap of goal conflicts.

Introduction

In its role as a transfer point between land and sea transport networks, a port serves as a pivotal element in the circulation of trade flows. Being break-of-bulk points, ports have traditionally been well placed to attract those industries which are sensitive to traffic disruption and alive to the penalties exacted by undue terminal costs. Some ports have been likened to industrial foci on account of the proneness of the manufacturers of chemicals and petrochemicals, steel, refined non-ferrous metals, timber products and cereals to locate in them (TAKEL, 1974). Others have grown to greatness on the strength of generous

* Department of Geography, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada. t Department of Geography, Chinese Culture University, Yangmingshan, Taiwan.

endowments of the so-called general port industries; that is, those requiring no special handling facilities for raw materials and products nor extensive areas for storage. Hong Kong, for example, owes its prelimi- nary post-war industrialization to the establishment of food-processing operations such as flour milling, vegetable-oil refining and sugar refining, not to speak of tobacco processing and tanning: all fairly unde- manding in their port requirements and so conform- ing to this broad category (CHIU, 1973). A host of ports-actuated by the desire to process and thereby add value to commodity throughput-rely on the inception of manufacturing enterprises able and will- ing to trigger the economic development which will see them transformed into industrial complexes. In the past, coastal steel-works have cropped up in South Wales, the U.S. Eastern Seaboard and along the Pas de Calais shore when industrialists have forsaken inland coalfields in exchange for the con-

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venience of acquiring imported ore at the point of docking (WARREN, 1975). More recently, steel- works representing the vanguard of economic growth have been erected at coastal sites from the outset, as the examples dotting the Inland Sea of Japan, Pohang in South Korea or Kaohsiung in Taiwan bear ample testimony. Today, the mantle of propulsive growth has been extended to incorporate entire aggregations of port-based industries, and ports are frequently construed as industrial complexes replete with agglomeration economies. This conception has not been lost on the governments of LDCs. For their part, they have enthusiastically embraced the idea of nourishing zones of port-related industry in order to foster national and regional development alike (HILLING and HOYLE, 1984). The port, in effect, is visualized as furthering two vital functions: on the one hand it is a visible manifestation of the country’s commitment to trade and the earnings that stem from trade while, on the other hand, ensuring (if judiciously managed) that economic activities will cluster in and around it with the upshot of fomenting spread-effects into adjoining territories.

The object of this paper is to examine the port of Taichung on the island of Taiwan. Of recent genesis, Taichung Harbour was founded as a deliberate act of government. Mindful of the need to accommodate burgeoning trade and counter anticipated congestion at existing ports, Taichung new port was conceived with a view to promoting the island’s development strategy; a strategy firmly rooted in the merits of export-led industrialization. Yet, at the same time, it was infused with a regional-development purpose. The aim of the authorities, in short, was to establish balanced regional industrial growth throughout the island, and the new port was dedicated to that end. A location roughly equidistant between the northern core-region centred on Taipei and the southern heavy-industrial complex anchored on Kaohsiung was a critical factor in site selection for the new trade gateway (Figure 1). Conceived in the mid-1970s and brought to fruition within a decade, Taichung Har- bour has been, ever since its formulation, bracketed in controversy, inveighed against by critics for its expense and berated for its misguided planning and, worst of all, had levelled against it charges of being totally redundant. Its advocates-not least of which are regional planners-have been subdued by the barrage of disparagement and, in order to justify this major public works project, have been compelled to resort to feeble apologies along the lines of attempt- ing to bolster regional equity. It is thus a timely juncture to pause and take stock of the situation

Geoforum/Volume 21 Number 40990

through a measured appraisal of Taichung Harbour’s contribution, both as a port in comparison with other ports, and as an agent of balanced regional development. To be sure, financial data of a complexion necessary to make cost-benefit calculations are con- spicuous by their absence and so a detailed economic evaluation must be eschewed here; but Taichung’s performance as a cargo-handling facility and its poss- ible impact on various yardsticks of regional development are subjects well worth the inquiry. Before addressing them directly, however, some comments on ports and development (and Taichung’s conception, in particular) are called for.

Ports as Development Instruments

Rather confusingly, the role of ports in regional development is somewhat equivocal. Insofar as the LDCs are concerned, the sanguine approach holds that ports serve as the funnels through which the impulses of ‘modernization and development’ are channelled along with imports. What is more, in their function as executors of commodity and raw material exports, ports are vital to national well-being. In fact, they are construed as being nothing less than the fulcra through which the entire economic develop-

. Harbour

- -- RaIlways

- Sun Yat-Sen Merncmal Expressway

Figure 1. Disposition of Taichung Harbour.

GeoforumNolume 21 Number 4/1990

ment process must be made to operate; a process which arises in the manner stipulated by export-base theory (NORTH, 1955; TAAFFE et al., 1963). Un- fortunately, however, this view has been challenged by those development theorists who dismiss the be- nign role of ports and opt for a more malign and dysfunctional one instead. According to the revi- sionist stance, LDC ports merely serve as tools for economic colonialism, do little other than entrench the strictures of a dual economy and, in consequence, mar any moves undertaken to promote equitable regional development (HOYLE, 1983: SEIDMAN, 1972). While seemingly less evocative, the role of ports in the regional development of advanced countries also has its share of ambiguity. Set within the terms of growth-centre thinking, the supposition here is that ports will trigger internal and external economies of a nature compatible with the mechanisms of circular and cumulative causation. Those mechanisms, in turn, should be forthcoming with the blessings of development, both within and without the growth centre (BIRD, 1980). Indeed, the widely- espoused MIDA (Maritime Industrial Development Area), taken up with gusto in the U.K. and Europe some two decades ago, was conceived as ‘a planned and co-ordinated port and industrial complex’ pre- cisely because it would be engineered to achieve economies of scale in infrastructure investment, economies in cargo handling (necessitating the location of material-using industries close to the port) and bulk economies in transport (realized through the provision of facilities of sufficient stature to attract optimally-sized bulk carriers and tankers) (TAKEL, 1974, pp. 15-17). Missing was the Isardian-style industrial complex of interdependent manufacturing activities, a cornerstone of latter-day growth-centre thinking, but that omission was remedied in due course through the practical examples of such ven- tures as Taranto in Italy and Fos in France. Yet, in the event, port-industrial complexes in Europe fell far short of expectations (TUPPEN, 1984), and the pro- ponents of this use for ports were forced to look further afield for modest indicators of success (WIESE, 1984). In truth, such sobering results are the likely corollary of an inability of planners to induct suitable ports into their schemes or, alterna- tively, to formulate sound schemes for those at their disposal. Inadequate funding and poor co-ordination often constitute hindrances to effective planning, frustrate port users and nullify promising schemes: a fact of life in port planning as in spatial planning as a whole. Equally responsible for this sad state of affairs, though, is the fuzzy thinking associated with the growth-centre concept, especially where it comes

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to bear on the formulation of an integrated industrial complex. A major difficulty confronting the designers of industrial complexes is the need to ensure that the device can fulfil its duty of disseminating spread- effects as well as furnishing its backers with profits commensurate with a viable business undertaking. Failure to satisfy the former is all too frequent whereas failure to discharge both requirements is not unprecedented.

Compounding these conceptual shortcomings is the issue of technical change and the way that it impinges on port activities. Inability to allow for such elemen- tary considerations as growing ship sizes can preju- dice the success of any port. Large-vessel economies were seized upon with great avidity by shipowners in the 1960s and 1970s: much to the consternation of cramped and congested ports. Experts aver that between 1960 and 1970 the cost of transporting 1 ton of iron ore fell by 30-55% purely in consequence of growing ships sizes, and savings in operating costs of comparable magnitude were reaped by shipowners (CHRZANOWSKI et al., 1983, p. 137). Similar productivity improvements arising from substitution of larger ships were extended to port activities. For example, shipowners were swayed by the fact that the average terminal handling rate for ore carriers of 35,000 deadweight tons (dwt) was 3150 tonnes per hour, but for vessels of twice that size the rate increased to 3500 whereas for lOO,OOO-dwt carriers it climbed to 4800 and reached no less than 8650 tonnes per hour for ships in the 150,000-dwt class. Econo- mies of size in the coal trades witnessed average handling rates progressing from 1195 tonnes per hour for 35,000-dwt vessels to 2700 for 150,000-dwt carriers, and the story can be repeated for other dry and liquid cargoes (CARGO SYSTEMS, 1984). Much accelerated turnaround times in ports enabled shipping operators to squeeze more voyages into their trading schedules and, hence, boost revenues. With a view to meeting such operator needs, harbour authorities must guarantee deepwater berths of at least 16 m without excessive dredging and make available a minimum of 2000 ha of land abutting onto the berths so as to house terminal plant and cater for cargo storage. Ports handicapped through site limitations may be obliged to concede cargoes to competitors better equipped to accommodate larger vessels. Cer- tainly, unitization of cargoes has effected a severe rationalization among ports in as much as those sites able to establish container terminals and attract round-the-world liner operators have prospered at the expense of their less fortunate counterparts. As in the bulk trades, the “container ship is highly capital

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intensive and, therefore, depends on fast voyage turnaround” (BENNATHAN and WALTERS, 1979, p. 158). In addition to deepwater berths and large storage yards to hold the boxes, the container terminal must have installed a full range of heavy-lift cranes just to assure the shipowner of fast turnaround (ATKINS, 1983). In fact, scale economies in con- tainerization enforce a system consisting of a few major port nodes, a larger number of feeder ports serving these nodes, and the consignment of an even larger number of general cargo, break-bulk ports to minor importance. In essence, the nodal ports become the gateways to entire clusters of regions or, indeed, nations. Singapore, for example, acts as a transshipment centre for a whole host of ports in the Bay of Bengal while simultaneously acting, along with Hong Kong and Kaohsiung, as a feeder for Tokyo Bay and Osaka. The suggestion that large profitable ports are becoming scarcer as a result of the advent of bigger bulk and container terminals does not in itself destroy the case for port-industrial complexes as regional-development instruments. On the contrary, it offers the promise of great rewards if the port can be made to slot into the new patterns of trade. It is as well to remember, though, that aspirant ports are faced with heavy start-up costs for the plant and equipment required to entice the operators of modern cargo vessels to utilize them.


Taichung New Port

Taichung Harbour was envisaged from the outset as a system drawing together port and industries into a regional growth centre (Figure 2). Ideally, it would couple the functions necessary for stimulating export industries in the central region of the island-and these included container-handling capabilities-with those consonant with the import of bulk cargoes. This last function afforded the harbour a niche market that was relatively underdeveloped in the two premier ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung. To cap it all, the new port would host an industrial complex, only partly reliant on traditional port industries, which was committed to transforming the Taichung district into a manufacturing core able to match the dynamic growth of the Taipei-Taoyuan industrial corridor and the heavy-induistrial concentration round Kaoh- siung. In not so many words, Taichung Harbour was concocted along MIDA lines, but with express account taken of the container revolution. Since commodity shipments of the staple LDC kind are not conducive to its operations, container export traffic rests on diverse industrial products and so a growing manufacturing base is all but indispensable. Conse- quently, the industrialization of Taiwan’s central region and the new port’s justification were bound up from the beginning.

.A:., . u I’P.,J

Figure 2. Layout of the Taichung port-industrial complex.

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What made the port imperative was the island’s extremely rapid economic growth on the backs of the twin pillars of industrialization and export expansion. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the annual cargo handling capacity of Taiwan’s two international harbours-Keelung and Kaohsiung+doubled every 4 years but still was unable to keep up with demand. A new harbour to share the burden and avoid congestion costs became a matter of some urgency. Initially, a site at the mouth of the Tansui river close to Taipei received official approbation; but the government rejected Tansui in favour of a location near the city of Taichung when the regional-development argument was invoked. The selection of Taichung meant the building of an artificial harbour at great expense (the Japanese had tried, and failed, to convert the same site-then Wuchi fishing village-into a commercial port during their occupation of Taiwan), and yet the persuasiveness of the regional lobby was such as to override any scruples entertained by the government. The strong suit of Taichung was not only that it would supposedly solve the problem of overcrowding in existing ports, but that it would save shippers in central Taiwan from the burden of transporting their goods to the erstwhile two gateways: savings, one might add, which would rebound to bolster the export competitiveness of the central region (CEPD, 1979, p. 43). Incorporated into the government’s Ten Major Construction Projects (enlarged to 12 and 14 in subsequent years) launched in 1973, the port was also calculated to have a ‘propulsive’ role in its own right. Industrial parks were commissioned as an integral part of the harbour, some expected to contain activities supplementary to port activities and positioned alongside the berths-special zones for fish processing, the manufacture of food and animal feedstuffs, wood processing and shipbuilding and repair-while others were pledged to more diversified manufacturing and located in the surrounding Special District. Steps were taken, using forward and backward hnk- age techniques, to identify the candidates that might stimulate agglomeration economies, and they rested on a bedrock of basic metals, petrochemical products and electronics (HSUEH, 1983). A new town designed to service the needs of the anticipated work- force for the port and the incipient industries was not overlooked.

To exercise some measure of control over the puta- tive growth centre, the authorities generously pro- vided infrastructure in the port itself. After a 2-year spell of construction, handling capacity for 2 million tonnes of cargo per year was put in place, a figure which had been doubled 2 years later in 1976 and

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doubled again by 1980. By 1983, annual cargo handling capacity in excess of 11 million tonnes had been attained. No fewer than 28 deepwater wharves were constructed and dredged to a depth of 13 m (a depth, note, below the MIDA-recommended threshold) so as to take vessels in the 60,000-dwt class, and they were complemented by 11 storage sheds and 23 tanks and a paved open storage area of 407,454 m*. Be- sides, a number of shallow-water berths were built, including those assigned to a fishing harbour geared to fulfilling the requirements of 2.50 vessels. Among the main items of plant were a bulk terminal with a 60,000-ton grain silo and two cement silos of 12,000 tons capacity, not to mention an oil terminal for use by the state’s Chinese Petroleoum Corporation. A container terminal embodying two wharves, a freight station and two 35ton gantry cranes was installed at the same time. Rail and road connections to the electrified main line and North-South Expressway, respectively, were also implemented. In the planning for the second half of the 1980s funds were set aside to improve cargo-handling infrastructure, expand the harbour entrance to allow entry and egress of bigger vessels, and service more land for the port’s industrial area (CEPD, 1985). At that juncture, however, the port entered a period of hiatus which was manifested through the shelving of ambitious follow-up schemes which would have entailed digging a second port entrance, expanding the wharfs to embrace 83 deepwater berths and developing 1480 ha of water-front industry.

This occurred, ironically, because at least two other elements of the government’s Major Projects pro- gramme conspired to work at cross-purposes with the Taichung endeavour. In the first place, provision was made in the Ten Major Projects for transport improvements (electrification of the Keelung to Kaoh- siung railway as well as construction of the 373 km long North-South or Sun Yat-sen expressway linking the same two places) which largely obviated the need for a central-region port outlet since factories throughout western Taiwan could ship containerized cargoes to the two big container ports at each end of the new transport artery. By the same token, machinery imports could enter Taiwan through either Kaoh- siung or Keelung and quickly join the arterial networks instituted by container forwarding firms, with the effect of bypassing Taichung Harbour once again. Secondly, creation of a major integrated steel mill at Kaohsiung, along with a shipyard of massive pro- portions, transformed that city into a vast bulk- handling port-and thereby undercut Taichung’s niche-in addition to confirming its attractions as an

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industrial complex: an act which, to boot, enhanced its status both as a source of, and a destination for, genera1 cargo. As if that was not enough, substantial investments in container facilities at Kaohsiung simply to accommodate its booming general-cargo status resulted in the inauguration of two extra terminals to add to the original pair. Keelung, mean- while, was not idle on the container front, instituting several specialized facilities. Together, these under- takings effectively nipped Taichung’s infant container trade in the bud. Even a tentative plan to open a large shipbuilding establishment in the Taichung Harbour Industrial Area was scotched when the insti- gator, the highly-successful Evergreen container line, was alerted to the fact that the Kaohsiung shipyard remained underutilized and the island could scarcely sustain a second huge shipbuilding complex (GOLD- STEIN, 1987). Indeed, the only sizeable adjunct of the port-industrial complex to materialize in the latter part of the 1980s was the Taichung Thermal Power Plant, a IO-year project initiated in 1984 comprising four S50-MW coal-fired units that is sited on 2X1 ha of reclaimed land at the southern end of the harbour (CEPD, 1988). The port planners could at lcast take solace in the expectation of a substantial coal import trade starting in the 1990s.

Comparative Performance of Taichung Harbour

To all appearances, Taichung Harbour enjoyed more than a modicum of success. In the decade 1977-1987,


for instance, it registered an average annual growth in cargo transactions of 21.2%, as against 20.43% for Suao-another byproduct of the Major Projects pro- gramme intended as an overspill port for Keelung- 14.62% for Kaohsiung. 13.74% for Keelung and 9.45% for Hualien. In absolute terms, Taichung’s first complete year of business, 1977, oversaw the handling of 1,397,OOO tonnes of incoming cargo and a meagre 96.000 tones of outgoing cargo. Ten years later, the volumes had climbed to 9,350.OOO and 507,000 tonnes respectively (Table 1). From the beginning, Taichung’s trade comfortably exceeded that of Hualien, the port founded in 1961 to deal with the bulk requirements of the eastern region. but it was rapidly overhauled as an export centre by the even younger neophyte, Suao. All three, though. were greatly overshadowed by Keelung and, especially. Kaohsiung: this latter accounting for fully two-thirds of Taiwan’s incoming traffic and 54% of its outgoing cargoes. However, not all indicators bode well for Taichung in comparison with other ports. A glance at Figure 3 evinces a more than fourfold increase in the number of incoming ship movements into Taichung between 1977 and 1987. a respectable growth rate relative to the 48% growth applying to Kaohsiung, 7 1% growth rate for Keelung and a decline of 1 I ‘% for Hualien (note, Suao did not commence operations until 1979). Yet, the tally of vessel movements mask a more telling phenomenon: the failure of Taichung to lure vessels as large as those entering Kaohsiung and Keelung. In 1977 the average size of ship using Keelung, Kaohsiung. Hualien and Taichung had

Table 1. Grand tonnage of cargo handled at Taiwan‘s tivc ports”

Keelungi Kaohsiung Hualien Taichung S11ao _______

I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0

2468 5135 6004 6114 6627 6665 7928 6692 5902 8596

10,197 8969

125 133 518 703 71s 832

1243 1006 1040 1151 940 988

11,717 4700 48.756 11,970 1250 13,936 5576 55,394 12,543 1373

1184 1470 1698 1959 2255 2418 2370 2335 2381 3227 4016 3524

5019 11,098 22,857 24,350 30.388 32.443 33,808 32,005 33,010 39,919 41,616 43,222

1847 4320 6062 6700 8770 9497 89.58

10,294 10.247 11.842 12,205 12,017

1967 1971 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

239 ‘32 562

1021 1365 1493 2019 2528 3018 3122 2698 2852 3221 3057

40 1 1397 996 2539 156 3441 218 3978 222 4868 167 4057 312 5519 3.58 6145 706 6147 635 7560 431 9350 507

628 45 1064 204 1053 770 91x 1006

1472 1399 1549 1598 1756 1775 1931 1530 2293 1544

*Source: Monthly Statistical Report on Taiwan Transportation. Department of Communications, Taiwan Provincial Government, various issues. tin thousands of tonnes: I = incoming, 0 = outgoing.


been, in turn, 7058 gross registered tons (grt), 6995

grt, 4743 grt and 4328 grt. A decade later, Taichung was catering for ships of an average 9272 grt, a size considerably larger than Hualien’s 4965 grt, but sub- stantially smaller than the average 12,484 grt for the vessels using Keelung and the 12,992 grt for those trading into Kaohsiung. In other words, Taichung was not accommodating the larger-and more efficient-vessels that a MIDA port would aim for.

To make matters worse, its container role-that other mainstay of ports wishing to adhere to MIDA rank-was not proving to be the propulsive factor of supposition. Ostensibly, a soaring growth (measured in 20 ft long box equivalent units or TEUs) in container throughput from the 4242 units of 1977 to the 53,699 units of 1987 was scarcely indicative of a faltering trade, but this record paled into insignifi- cance when considered against the remarkable expansion at Kaohsiung and Keelung (Figure 4). Tai- chung handled 1.1% of Taiwan’s containers in 1987, not much better than the 0.6% it handled in its very first year. In fact, none of the major round-the-world or transpacific container lines had deigned to make the port a regular stopover, and Taichung had to settle for their crumbs as a feeder port to Hong Kong, Pusan and the leading Japanese ports (although, to be sure, Hong Kong Island Line began in 1988 to call at

Figure 3. Vessel movements at Taiwan’s ports, 1977 and 1987.

-KAOHSlUNG KEELUNG HUALIEN TAICHUNG SUAO

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the port en route to South Korean, Japanese and

American destinations). Perhaps the port’s inability to match the volumes of cargo prevailing in the two bigger gateways goes some way towards explaining its lack-lustre performance in terminal productivity. A gang of longshoremen mustered at Taichung was able to load or discharge 200 tons of cargo per day which, while falling slightly below the productivity of an equivalent group of workers at Hualien (200-250 tons), appeared distinctly at a disadvantage when set against the standards of Kaohsiung (350 tons) and Keelung (480 tons). A better gauge of productivity is the volume of cargo (in tonnes) handled per man- hour of labour. As of December 1987, the ratio stood at 33.5 for Keelung, 29.0 for Kaohsiung, 14.2 for Taichung, 10.9 for Hualien and 12.9 for Suao. Tai- chung’s labour efficiency, therefore, was hovering at a level less than half that achieved by the two principal ports. Nor could consolation be taken from the promise of machine economies. Indeed, machinery efficiencies in Taichung were significantly worse. The volume of cargo handled per hour of machinery operation in Taichung Harbour reached 77.3 tonnes whereas Keelung managed 344.2, Kaohsiung attained 355.6, Hualien accomplished 136.9 and even Suao stretched to 94.1 tonnes.

Besides throttling economies of scale in unitized modes of transport, the feeble record of container transactions at Taichung tended to dampen the port’s versatility as a transshipment centre for manufactured goods. Rather than markedly broadening the

TAICHUNG 0 *...*............................................. / I I I I I I

1977 1979 1981 1983 1985

Figure 4. Containers handled in Taiwan’s ports.

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range of general cargoes in emulation of Kaohsiung and Keelung, the port was forced to rely more and more on its resources as a bulk-cargo node. In truth, that policy has evidently paid off. Concoction of a port diversity index gives substance to this assertion. Defined as the reciprocal of the sum for a11 cargo categories of the squared ratio of the tonnage of each cargo type in relation to total cargo volume, the index provides a yardstick for port comparisons irrespective of variations in aggregate volumes of traffic. An index value of unity denotes complete port specialization in a single cargo type, for example the shipment of manufactured goods from a pure container port or the discharging of iron ore at a purpose-built ore terminal. Index values greater than 1 imply increasing diversification, and the larger the value the greater the diversification. Hence, a port combining container terminals for dealing with manufactured goods, a bulk terminal dealing with grain, and an oil tank-farm and jetty would record an index exceeding unity, an index which would mount in proportion to the expansion of multiple-user terminals in the har- hour.

At any rate, indices of this kind were derived for the import and export trade of Taiwan’s five ports and, what is more, were construed for December 1977 as well as December 1987 in order to assess relative changes among the ports. In respect of imports, the situation in 1977 clearly pointed to Keelung as the most diversified facility (with an index value of 7.25), and it was followed by Kaohsiung (4.41), Taichung (2.87) and Hualien (1.51). The relative ranking remained immutable in 1987 with the exception of Suao’s emergence to usurp Hualien (2.93 vis-li-vis 2.24), although the signs for Keelung (11.36) and Taichung (4.51) pointed to further diversification whereas Kaohsiung’s import pattern (at 4.98) con- tinued fairly steady. In terms of imports, at least, Taichung was on the brink of equalling Kaohsiung’s diversity. Its broadening of export cargoes is even more spectacular. In 1977 Taichung scored 1.64 on the diversity index, bested by Keelung (6.54) and Hualien (2.29) but hardly by Kaohsiung (1.67). Admittedly, it could not prevent Kaohsiung from eclipsing it by 1987 (when this latter registered 6.90), nor hope to rival Keelung (11.76) but, nevertheless, with an index value of 5.75 Taichung incontestably surpassed Hualien (2.17) and Suao (1.20). Like the two leading international ports, Taichung had ben- efited enormously from the comprehensive growth of Taiwan’s exports in the interim. The diversification of port cargoes indicates that it was definitely participat- ing in the trade boom. Whether that trade partici-

Geoforum/Volume 21 Number 411990

pation effected palpable development impacts on Taichung’s region is a subject to which we now turn.

Regional-development Comparisons

On the whole, Taiwan enjoys the luxury of moderate regional disparities in well-being, at least by Third World standards. Fairly uniform indicators of per capita income-that most cogent symbol for regional disparities-are attributed to a combination of the effects of growth in non-agricultural employment opportunities in rural areas and the general upgrad- ing of agricultural prosperity permitted by industriai- urban advances. Under government tutelage, an efficient mechanism, for transferring surplus labour from the land to the factory was instrumental in fostering overall well-being (HO. 1979: KUO, 1983; RANIS, 1978). Of course, this is not to say that significant regional disparities have been overcome altogether, but it does suggest that aggregate policies derived to promote economic growth have been equally successful in dispensing ‘trickling-down’ effects to places outside of the island’s core of Taipei city and county, Government enthusiasm for tackling pockets of spatial disadvantage has been nourished partly on the supposition that the rapid growth embraced by the major urban-industrial centres can be duplicated elsewhere through induced development of exp~~rt-producti~?n complexes. In other words, the government is infused by a belief in balanced regional development so that the island in its entirety can rejoice in ‘developed’ status. As we have remarked, Taichung Harbour spearheaded this induced growth-centre thinking, promising to eradi- cate operational problems anticipated in the national ports system as well as contributit~g towards balanced regional growth.

Despite very real progress in eliminating regional disparities, grave disparities persist. Figure 5 depicts indices of average family income for Taiwan’s 16 counties and five metropolitan areas pertaining to both 1976 and 1986 (and also, incidentahy, coinciding with the first decade of existence for Taichung Har- bour). Holding 100 as the island average, Taipei city topped the list in 1976 with an average income fully 39.8% greater than the national norm. Yet, a decade later, its dominance had stretched to a 41% edge over the national average. At the other end of the scale, Hualien county in the east, remote from the Taipei- Taoyuan industriat corridor, recorded an average income almost 20% less than the island average in 1976. Some 10 years later, Hualien registered a value


scarcely 10 points below the national average and had been replaced by Taitung-another remote eastern county-as the worst offender (with an index more than 25% below the national average). In fact, the coefficients of variation for these data had enlarged slightly between 1976 and 1986, from 15.71 to 16.03, leading one to infer that regional income disparities were stuck fast rather than converging in a desirable manner. While somewhat at odds with the official claim of moderating regional disparities, the coefficients underscore the uphill task faced by the government in its goal of spreading development impulses, a task not made any easier by the difficulty of dislodging the principal metropolitan areas from their propensity to capture inordinate amounts of growth activities.

As is evident from Figure 5 and Table 2, the principal metropolitan areas overshadow the counties in terms of average incomes. This occurrence has been linked to their command of major industrial assets, a command which works very much to their advantage in spite of the much-touted dispersal of non-agricultural occupations into the rural areas. In the 1970s for instance, the city of Taipei alone accounted for one- third of all factories employing more than 500

1976

INDEX VALUE

,.‘.‘.‘x~y~.:.:. Taichung:< ~AICHUNGI~

n

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workers, and the three cities of Taichung, Tainan and Kaohsiung together hosted another 20% of them (RONDINELLI, 1983, pp. 78-79). Reputedly, the hogging of industrial establishments by the metropolitan areas is tending to diminish. CHANG (1984) has computed Williamson-style measures of regional disparity for employment opportunities which purport to show that the summary disparity between the metropolitan areas and the counties had steadily decreased from 0.48 in 1966 to 0.26 in 1981 (though a careful study of Table 2 hints that much of the decrease can be ascribed to the diffusion of Taipei industry into the adjoining Taoyuan County). Never- theless, on its own admission, the government re- mains perturbed by the shadowy core-periphery structure which continues to shape employment opportunities on the island and, in consequence, has invested heavily in Kaohsiung in the south in an attempt to upset its resilience (WILLIAMS, 1986). Certainly, the coefficients of variation for regional differences in secondary-sector employment opportunities are much more pronounced than those applying to average family income. While the 1976 coef- ficient of 41.57 had been reduced to 31.02 10 years later, this latter value still represented a scale of disparity double the divergence of regional incomes.

1966

Figure 5. Regional income disparities, 1976 and 1986.

Table 2. Disparitites in income and secondary-employment opportunities”

Average family income (100 = Taiwan)

1976 1986

Secondary employment (100 = Taiwan)

1976 1986

Taipei City 139.8 141.0 121.5 92.5 Keelung City 109.3 109.9 129.4 102.0 Taichung City 97.7 125.6 123.2 117.6 Tainan City 108.3 102.0 155.7 136.2 Kaohsiung City 116.6 114.0 147.9 108.0 Taipei County 127.2 110.7 171.4 147.0 Ilan County 89.1 97.3 106.7 114.7 Taoyuan County 99.3 107.8 133.1 145.8 Hsinchu County 115.2 114.9 140.9 135.0 Miaoli County 113.1 100.6 122.0 133.1 Taichung County 95.2 102.1 123.2 122.6 Changhwa County 92.8 98.6 82.8 103.3 Nantou County 93.7 86.6 59.7 67.3 Yunlin County 86.0 77.9 37.1 52.0 Chiayi County 97.7 89.6 66.7 67.2 Tainan County 82.8 84.7 OS.2 98.2 Kaohsiung County 99.8 93.5 85.7 99.8 Pingtung County 88.2 91.5 4Y.4 68.8 Taitung County 83.9 74.6 40.4 55.4 Hualien County 80.2 90.9 73.8 80.5 Penghu County 84.2 85.4 34.2 52.3

*Source: calculated from data in Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China. Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Various issues.

430 Geoforum/Volume 21 Number 4/1990

Moreover, this rather alarming finding can be affirmed through statistical analysis, albeit with an interesting twist. A comparison of the indices of income and secondary employment displayed in Table 2 by means of Snedecor’s F-test produced results (7.00 for 1976 and 3.75 for 1986, both with 40 degrees of freedom) which implied that the spatial patterns of the two phenomena were not statistically alike. To be specific, the results elicited the fact that industrial development was more localized than economic development in general (i.e. as reflected through average family incomes), but that the degree of localization had become less acute by the later date.

Concerted action to dismember the industrial overde- velopment of the Taipei core also actuated the government to prosecute the Taichung Harbour Scheme, and, while that project’s qualified success as a functioning port has been acknowledged (notwithstand- ing ongoing financial liabilities), its effectiveness in implementing balanced regional development is much less discernible. On reverting to the average family income dimension as a point of departure, it is apparent that both Taichung City and County dem- onstrate marked relative improvements in the decade

concurrent with the emergence and consolidation of the new port in their midst. The former witnesses a dramatic change from registering an index slightly below the national average to basking in one posi- tively 25% greater. The latter, for its part, climbs up the scale to just exceed the national average. At the same time, however, the relative changes exhibited by Taichung City and County on the secondary- employment front are hardly auspicious. Both units enjoyed a disproportionate endowment of such jobs in 1976, and both saw their comparative positions slip by 1986. Of course, none of this is to say that income and employment changes in the city and county have been occasioned by developments under way at Tai- chung Harbour. To be sure, the port-industrial complex would launch a wave of spread-effects on the adjoining city and county should it graduate into a fully-fledged growth centre. and these impulses likely would be discernible in the sort of income and employment indices under review. However, since the growth-centre trappings of Taichung Harbour fail to live up to those exalted standards, one must settle for more nebulous indications of its presence.

Some clues as to the impact of the port on the community can be got from a disaggregation of the


spatial scale to the level of ‘hsiang’ or township; that is, the basic local government jurisdiction. The six townships encompassing or abutting on the port’s Special District (and all townships are of roughly equal size) can be abstracted from Taichung County and treated as a distinct spatial unit. Subsequently, the performance of this unit can be distinguished from that occurring at the county and city levels (although, regrettably, income data are unavailable at the township level). In that light, it is worth noting that location quotients for employment in the transport sector-the immediate beneficiary of new-port inception-scored 0.44 for the harbour zone in 1976 and 0.52 for 1986 in contrast with the respective 0.83 and 0.92 for Taichung City and 0.50 and 0.57 for Taichung County. Clearly, this swathe of territory in central Taiwan retains an underrepresented status for employment in the transport sector despite the inauguration of Taichung Harbour. Nor is the presence of the new port instituting major upsets in the localization of manufacturing employment. The 1976 location quotient of manufacturing for the harbour zone suffers a degradation over the succeeding decade. The 1.12 quotient for 1976 is replaced by a 1.06 figure for 1986, a relative change contradicting the trend experienced by the city (up from 0.87 to 0.94) and the county (boosted from 0.90 to 1.01). In truth, while the new port has stimulated expansion in transport- related jobs in its host township from 3164 to 4307 and in manufacturing from 40,060 to 55,901, these addi- tions have not materially altered the relative disparity of central Taiwan on the two counts in question.

A further insight is forthcoming from a comparison of the Taichung Harbour zone with equivalent spatial units containing other growth centres. For our purposes, we have spotlighted the Kaohsiung-Tainan corridor in the south, the Hsinchu area approxi- mately halfway between Taichung and Taipei, and the Taoyuan zone at the southern tip of the development axis extending from the Taipei core-region. In all three instances, growth has soared as a result of government-induced programmes (e.g. the science- based industrial park at Hsinchu and the petrochemicals and chemicals industrial districts on the flanks of Kaohsiung) coupled with the spread of privately- sponsored industrialization. Six townships outside of metropolitan areas are chosen to reflect the spatial extent of each growth centre, and transport and manufactu~ng location quotients pertaining to 1976 and 1986 are obtained for each of the three composite growth zones. Recalling Taichung Harbour zone’s transport location quotient of 0.44 for 1976, the comparable standings for the three benchmark cases

431

are: Kaohsiung-Tainan 0.61, Hsinchu 0.70 and Taoyuan 0.69. All these indicators of underepresen- tation are faithfully mirrored in .the 1986 values of 0.52,0.63,0.66 and 0.70, respectively. Regardless of year, it is noteworthy that Taichung Harbour zone compares badly with the others, an undistinguished performance not redeemed by the evident failure of all four growth centres to gain a ‘fair share’ of employment on this category. However, it is in the manufacturing category where a vivid distinction can be made between the Taichung Harbour zone and the others. As related above, the new port zone slipped from 1.12 to 1.06 over the decade, in striking contradistinc- tion to Koahsiung-Tainan, which spurted from 0.14 to 0.83, Hsinchu, which advanced from 1.08 to 1.19, and Taoyuan, which jumped from 0.95 to 1.33. It would seem, then, that the others are more effectual than Taichung Harbour in righting the serious imbal- ance in the island’s distribution of manufacturing employment opportunities.

Conclusion

This provisional evaluation of an instrument of balanced regional growth has served a valuable purpose in as much as it permits broad conclusions to be drawn about both the effectiveness of the growth centre as a tool for regional development and the usefulness of a specific example, Taichung Harbour, in overcoming the particular constraints besetting balanced development in Taiwan. Attention to detail in growth-centre planning, commitment of enough resources to bring the project to fruition, and proper co-ordination among the parties instigating development programmes are among the critical elements which displayed shortcomings in the actual Taichung Harbour experience. Consideration of better growth- centre planning extends far beyond the intricacies involved in delving into linkage analysis in order to configure apposite bundles of interlinked activities for a port-industrial complex. At the most fundamen- tal level, it requires careful sifting of potential sites with the object of selecting one that fulfils the growth- centre function at minimal cost. In this respect, Tai- chung Harbour can certainly be found wanting. An artificial harbour constructed at great expense (using resources which might otherwise have been spent on attracting industry) and subject to serious silting, it imposes restraints on the operations of large ships which may rebound to deny the port future growth opportunities. If the priority was to provide a new port (i.e. a non-‘regional’ goal), the island might have been better served by the choice of Tansui or, indeed,

432

the choice of no new site at all but rather the rede- veloping of the existing ports (a strategy which, in the event, was pursued even after the Taichung go- ahead). On the other hand, a non-port growth centre could have been more appealing if the development of central Taiwan was the main priority. Unfortu- nately, the absence of an unequivocal statement of priorities at the outset prevented the derivation of clear guidelines for subsequent development planning.

An equally glaring omission was the failure to follow the project through to fruition. True, port facilities were lavished on the site, but the same cannot be said for the industrial component of the port-industrial complex: a component which could have built on the base established by those facilities and vindicated their cost. A visit to the port is salutary in highlighting the large tracts of land reserved for industrial developments-planned and spontaneous-which remain unused in part because of an apparent retreat by the government from its pledge to overseeing their enactment as functioning units. Like numerous examples elsewhere in the world of promising growth-centre programmes undermined through faltering official backing, Taichung new port’s credi- bility as a crucible for manufacturing expansion has been severely eroded as a consequence of increas- ingly hesitant government support. It should come as no great surprise, then, that the diffusion of spread- effects, a process incumbent on a buoyant source of growth generation, should appear somewhat ineffec- tual. At any rate, obvious indicators of regional well- being monitored in this study could not be readily tied to the introduction of the new port. For the purpose of overcoming regional development imbalances, Taichung Harbour has fallen far short of expectations.

Finally, the spectre of conflicting goals in development planning also shows itself in the Taichung Har- bour case. While the new port has managed to carve out a niche for itself as an international gateway with a semblance of container traffic-albeit hemmed in and circumscribed by a number of curbs-it is con- ceivable that the port may have prospered even more if other government projects had not been implemented. Simultaneous expansion of its two competitors, Kaohsiung and Keelung, not to mention massive improvements in arterial transport links which con- solidated their competitive edge, may appear per- fectly justifiable in terms of aggregate economic development, but there is no denying that they have also acted to obstruct Taichung Harbour’s endeav-


ours to create, and profit from, a natural hinterland in central Taiwan. National development, here as elsewhere, takes precedence over the more local con- cerns of regional-development advocates, but, even within those terms of reference, efforts should be made to ensure that development projects comp- lement, instead of detract from, regional aspirations.

Acknowledgements-The authors acknowledge the support extended by the Pacific Cultural Foundation and the co-operation afforded by the Taichung Harbour Bureau.

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New port developments and balanced regional growth: a Taiwan example