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1975

Neo-conservatism and Educational Excellence1918-1970Norman PhillipsLoyola University Chicago

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NEO-CONSERVATISM AND EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE

1918-1970

by

Norman R. Phillips

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

February

1975

ACKNOHLEDGMENTS

For their many helpful suggestions, the writer would like to take

this opportunity to thank the members of the dissertation committee.

The members include Professor Gerald L. Gutek, chairman of the committee;

Professor Rosemary V. Donatelli; Rev. Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J.; and

Dean John M. Wozniak. This writer has benefited considerably from their advice and labors.

i i

VITA

The author, Norman Robert Phillips, is associate professor of

social sciences at the t1ayfair campus of the City Colleges of Chicago.

A native of Chicago, he previously received the Bachelor of Arts degree

from Roosevelt University, the Master of Arts degree from Northwestern

University and the Certificate of Advanced Study from the University of

Chicago.

After some experience in the publishing field, he served as a

teacher of history and the social studies in the Chicago Public High

Schools from 1959 until 1963. In 1963, he became an instructor of social

science at the City Colleges of Chicago. He now holds the rank of

associate professor and is active on various faculty committees. During

his career, he was elected to Tau Sigma Tau (college honor society), Phi

Delta Kappa, and the Philadelphia Society.

Among the scholarly publications that he has written are the

following:

11Biological Foundations of Hellenic Civilization. 11 r~ankind

Quarterly (1967)

11

The Conservative Implications of Skepticism. 11 The Journal of Politics (1956).

11

Genetics and Political Conservatism." The Hestern Political Quarterly (1959).

11

An Historical Understanding of Conservatism. 11 The National Review (1969). Reprinted in Canadian and Japanese periodicals.

"The Question of Southern Conservatism." The South Atlantic Quarterly (1955).

11The Role of Conservatism Today." ~lodern Age (1963).

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

LIFE . .

Chapter

I. THE RATIONALE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

. . . . . . . . . . II. FOUNDATIONS OF NEO-CONSERVATISM

III. TRADITIONALIST HUMANISM

IV. POSITIVE HUMANISM .

V. RELIGIOUS HUMANISM-.. ·.

VI. THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE THEORY OF EDUCATION

VII. SUNMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

i v ..

. . . .

Page

ii

iii

1

22

48

93

132

148

166

173

CHAPTER I

THE RATIONALE

Much of contemporary American educational theory is dominated by

liberal and progressive viewpoints which include several varieties of

unmodified and unmodified experimentalism, social reconstructionism,

and current versions of Rousseauistic naturalism. Educational conser­

vatism is today very much on the defensive. This situation makes an

examination of the educational implications of conservatism an espe­

cially valuable exercise. A consideration of conservative educational

theory may aid in broadening the range of alternatives available to

educators in dealing with educational problems. At the same time, it

may enable them to see the regnant educational philosophies in greater

perspective. Since both the assumptions and implications of conserva­

tism differ from those of liberalism and progressivism, the conclusions

based upon those assumptions should also be different. Additional crea­

tive possibilities would thereby presumably become apparent.

Specifically, this study seeks to ascertain the implications of

neo-conservatism, the dominant contemporary form of conservative

thought, with respect to educational values and methods of imparting

these values. For the purposes of this study, values will be construed

to mean goods which can act as guides and goals of human endeavor. We

will be especially concerned with intellectual and moral values and with

those criteria of values which neo-conservatives employ to evaluate

educational outcomes. We will also consider the neo-conservative

recommendations that are designed to bring educational procedures in

closer conformity with these standards.

Essentially, this study examines the writings of representative

neo-conservative writers in historical perspective. As such, it is a

work of intellectual history. By analyzing neo-conservative thought,

the conclusions we will reach will be based on the literature of the

major theorists rather than on mere conjectures. By relating our

conclusions to the various historical trends of the twentieth century,

2

we can make important inferences concerning the causes and significance

of neo-conservatism as a movement. To explain the method to be utilized,

it seems advisable to first depict the author's conception of intellec­

tua 1 hi story.

Intellectual history is, to begin with, a branch of history. The

latter subject has usually been defined in terms of the study of the

human past. The subject shou~d however be delimited further lest we

include such fields as cultural and physical anthropology within history.

More specifically, history pertains to the literate human past. It must

be so limited because, to a large extent, the historian is trained to

work with such written materials as documents, books, letters, diaries,

and inscriptions. Where non-written materials are concerned, we generally

rely on the services of archeologists, anthropologists, and other such

specialists.

Even more distinctive than the kind of material with which the

historian deals is the method which he pursues. The historian views

developments in relationship to the perspective of time. Thus, when

de a 1 i ng with ide as, he does not consider them 1.!! vacuo_ but rather in

relationship to the attitudes and problems characteristic of the age in

which the ideas exist. The constellation of ideas which constitute the

New Deal viewpoint would, for example, be considered in relationship to

the particular problems of the 1930 1 s such as the Great Depression and

its accompanying political unrest. A consideration of New Deal ideas in

vacuo would not be considered history in the sense in which the writer

has used the term because of the lack of such a time perspective.

Intellectual history can be briefly defined as the application of

the historical method to the study and interpretation of ideas. Three

methods of approaching intellectual history can be distinguished. The

first of these is the study of the ideas and attitudes of the common

people as revealed through popular magazines, newspapers, comic books,

and memorabilia of all sorts. To do this work effectively, the histori­

an must be a capable cultural anthropologist and sociologist as well as

3

a competent historian. Second, there is the study of the attitudes and

ideas of the dominant elites (in all the major areas of human endeavor)

and of the rival minorities striving to displace them. Finally, we study

those ideas which form part of the Weltanschauung of any well-educated

person. To perform capably on either of the two latter levels, the

historian should be acquainted with relevant branches of philosophy and

sometimes with the arts as well. The first form of intellectual history

is chiefly important because it pertains to matters which affect large

numbers of people and through them the cultures to which the people be­

long. The second and third forms pertain to matters affecting the elites

4

~"hich pm'lerfully influence the destiny of man and nations.l

The dissertation will deal with intellectual history in the latter

two senses of the term. Since conservatism has been one of the major

philosophies espoused by members of many of the dominant elites of

history, it would qualify for consideration by those historians who ad­

here to intellectual history in the second sense of the term. Conserv-

atism would also qualify for consideration by those who adhere to

intellectual history in the third sense of the term; for an acquaintance­

ship with conservative ideas has generally been deemed essential to an

understanding of the political and social conflicts of the recent past.

No attempt will be made to analyze the popular usage of 11 conserva-

tism 11 which has been confused and often very inconsistent in character.

There apparently has not been a discernible common thread in the varied

ways in which 11 conservative11 has been applied. It is hoped that this

dissertation will contribute to a more precise formulation of the meaning

of conservatism.

This study will consider the educational implications of neo­

conservative thought by surveying those conservative writers who have

done a substantial analysis of educational issues to enable us to form

some conception of their general educational viewpoint. In addition,

only those writers will be discussed whose writings are on a level above

lThe classification of intellectual history given above is based on H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 9-10. I have however drastically modified his treatment.

5

that of invective, vituperation, and mere polemics. The following con­

servative writers will be treated in this study: Irving Babbitt, G. H.

Bantock, Bernard I. Bell, T. S. Eliot, and Russell Kirk. To judge by the

number of citations in works on conservatism, three of these writers,

Babbitt, Eliot, and Kirk, have had a greater influence on the neo-con­

servative movement than any other neo-conservative writer.

Since an essentially historical approach will be used, the ideas

to be analyzed will be viewed in relationship to the particular problems

of the age in which they were expounded -- both in respect to the causes

which led to the advocacy of these ideas and the significance thereof.

Where adequate material is available, the historical influences which

have been of importance in the formation of the views of neo-conservative

writers will be identified. To demarcate the boundaries of this inquiry,

it is necessary to define conservatism and to know how neo-conservatism

differs from other forms of conservatism.

To define a concept adequately, a writer should first give some

indication of his method for arriving at a definition. One could take

common usage as the basis for one•s definition but this immediately leads

to difficulties. Most people do not possess the background needed to

formulate careful definitions nor to use concepts with precision and

care. There has been little consistency in the way the term "conserva­

tive" has been applied in common discourse. Alternative definitions may

be derived from the usage of persons trained in fields where conceptual

discrimination is important, but, as we will see shortly, such definitions

have generally been inadequate. A much more promising technique is to

examine the contextual usage of the term 11 Conservative 11 and of cognate

terms by scholars to discover the logic behind their usage. Historical

evidence will also be cited but since the meanings of general concepts

tends to vary with the Zeitgeist, this evidence will not be emphasized.

The most common definition of conservatism used by scholars is the

disposition to preserve whatever has been established. This common

definition lacks discriminative value because if it is applied consist­

ently, then the Marxist in Russia, the Fascist in Spain, and the liberal

in the United States would all have to be labelled 11 conservative. 11 Such

imprecise usage tends to make conservatism synonomous with either

conformity or opportunism. This is so contrary to the way political and

social theorists generally use the conservative appellation that it

scarcely merits serious consideration. In fact, contemporary conserva­

tives in the United States are generally very dissatisfied with the

general liberal character of American society. The ounce of truth in

this definition relates to the conservative advocacy of tradition, but,

as we shall see later, this traditionalism pertains only to those

elements of the cultural heritage which have survived for many centuries

and only when these elements harmonize with other aspects of conserva­

tism.

Another definition which has gained wide currency was originally

offered by Russell Kirk. Unfortunately, Professor Kirk did not give us

an analytical definition but rather a list of symptoms of conservatism.

By analyzing this definition, we should however be able to arrive at a

more precise conception of the essence of conservatism; especially if we

consider how widely his definition has been accepted by intellectuals.

Kirk's definition consists of six planks which we will give in order and

6

7

then analyze.

(1) A belief in an order that is more than human which has im­planted in man a character of mingled good and evil, susceptible of improvement only by an inner working, not by mundane schemes for perfectability. This conviction lies at the heart of American respect for the past, as the record of Providential purpose. The conservative mind is suffused with veneration. Men and nations, the conservative believes, are governed by moral laws, and political problems, at bottom, are moral and religious problems. An eternal chain of duties links the generations that are dead, and the generation that is living now, and the generations yet to be born. We have no right, in this brief existence of ours, to alter irrevocably the shape of things, in contempt of our ancestors and of the rights of posterity. Politics is the art of apprehending and applying the justice which stands above statutory law. (2} An affection for variety and complexity and individuality, even for singularity, which has exerted a powerful check upon the political tendency toward that Tocquevi1le calls "democratic despotism." Variety and complexity, in the opinion of conserva­tives, are the high gifts of truly civilized society. The uni­formity and standardization of liberal·and radical planners would be the death of vitality and freedom, a life-in-death, every man precisely like his neighbor - and, like the damned of the Inferno, forever deprived of hope. (3) A conviction that justice properly defined, means "to each the things that go with his ovm nature," not a levelling equality; and joined with this is a correspondent respect for private property of every sort. Civilized society requires distinctions of order, wealth, and responsibility; it cannot exist without true leader­ship. A free society will endeavor, indeed, to afford to men of natural abilities every opportunity to rise by their own efforts, but it will resist strenuously the radical delusion that exact equality of station and wealth can benefit everyone. Society longs for just leadership, and if people destroy natural distinctions among men, presently some Bonaparte wi11 fill the vacuum - or worse than Bonaparte. (4) A suspicion of concentrated power, and a consequent attach­ment to our federal principle and to division and balancing of authority at every level of government. (5) A reliance upon private endeavor and sagacity in nearly every walk of life, together with a contempt for the abstract designs of the collectivistic reformer. But to this self-reliance in the mind of the American conservative, is joined the conviction that in matters beyond the scope of material endeavor and the present moment, the individual tends to be foolish, but the species is wise; therefore, we rely in great matters upon the wisdom of our ancestot·s. History is an immense storehouse of knowledge. We pay a decent respect to the moral traditions and immemorial customs of mankind; for men who ignore the past are condemned to repeat it. The conservative distrusts the radical visionary and the planner who would chop society into pieces and mold it nearer to his

8

heart's desire. The conservative appeals beyond the fickle opinion of the hour to what Chesterton called 11 the democracy of the dead .. - that is, the considered judgment of the wise men who died before our time. To presume that men can plan rationally the whole of existence is to expose mankind to a terrible danger from the collapse of existing institutions; for, conservatives know that most men are governed, on many occasions, more by emotion than by pure reason. (6) A prejudice against organic change, a feeling that it is un­wise to break radically with political prescription, an inclina­tion to tolerate what abuses may exist in present institutions out of a practical acquaintanceship with the violent and unpredictable nature of doctrinaire reform.2

Although Kirk's definition contains much impassioned rhetoric and

imprecision, it nevertheless reveals fundamental conservative attitudes.

These attitudes become more evident when his six points are rearranged

into two broad general categories: the first of which pertains to man's

weakness and irrational nature and his consequent need for traditional

authority; the second, to the desirability of an aristocratic, elitist

social order. Points two and three relate to the second category; the

other four points of Kirk's definition to the first category.

Concerning the first category, Kirk began his definition of

conservatism with an expression of skepti~ism concerning schemes for the

perfection of humanity. He felt that men could not plan rationally for

the future of other men because of their own irrationality which he

blamed on their alleged emotionalism. Because of this doubt, Kirk

preferred to rely on private endeavor with respect to matters of limited

scope, and on traditional wisdom, with regard to matters of greater

scope. Evidently, because of this same basic distrust of human nature, he

2Quoted from Russell Kirk, A Program for Conservatives (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), pp. 41-43.

9

advocated the division and balancing of political powers.

With regard to the second category, Kirk advocated the encourage­

ment of variety because of his evident fear of a dead-level equalitarian­

ism and advocated proportionate rather than equalitarian justice because

of the need for true leadership. He felt that men must have leaders,

and, if these are not selected consciously, leaders would arise anyway

but a rather undesirable type.

It seems evident from the preceding analysis that the essential

features of Kirk's conservatism were the advocacy of an aristocratic

elitism and of traditional authority. In these respects, Kirk was

typical of conservative thinkers as a group. Ultimately, the aristo­

cratic side of conservatism was based upon a conception of the universe

as rationally ordered in a hierarchical pattern of superordination and

subordination. This conception was in fundamental accord with the

British Tories' insistence that each individual should find the place

in the social hierarchy most suitable to him and should be content with

it. Traditional conservatism was based partially on an acute conscious­

ness of the moral and intellectual limitations of the individual and

partially upon a belief in the superiority of tradition as a standard of

judgment based upon the collective experience of generations of human

beings. These points will be discussed in greater detail in the second

chapter where the conservative viewpoint will be analyzed and its

implications developed.

Conservatism therefore should be considered to be that social

philosophy whose advocates espouse an aristocratic elitism and also

stress the value of traditional authority. The adjective, aristocratic,

10

refers in this instance both to a hierarchical conception of values and

to a hierarchical conception of humanity. Because of this viewpoint,.

conservatism is elitist in the sense that conservatives traditionally

have advocated rule by a select group and have stressed the importance of

the careful selection and training of elite groups in all the major realms

of human endeavor. Conservative traditionalism in turn has been based

upon an acute consciousness of the limitations of the individual to­

gether with a belief in the value of the collective experience of peoples

and nations. Ultimately, the most essential ingredient in the conserv­

ative constellation of beliefs is the hierarchical conception of reality.

Not only is the aristocratic nature of conservatism based upon hierarchy

but also, in part, the traditional as well. Has not the conservative's

consciousness of human limitations been based to some extent on his con­

ception of the place of humans in the hierarchy of the universe? Also,

as we shall see later, traditional authority was considered to be a means

whereby the fruits of excellence could be portected against the menace of

revolution. The term 11 0rder11 more than any other word symbolizes the

uniqueness of conservatism. Order stands for the hierarchical arrange­

ment of the universe and for the emphasis upon the importance of authority

in human affairs.

It is important to distinguish conservatism from classical liberal­

ism with which it is often confused. Indeed, classical liberalism is

in many respects opposed to conservatism. It has·become customary to

equate classical liberalism with conservatism-- especially in the United

StJtes but also to a lesser degree in other countries. Such a confusion

of labels can only lead to a neglect of the peculiar excellences of each

of th2se philosophies. To the classical liberal, the primary objective

11

of government is the protection and enhancement of the liberties of the

people. In contrast, although the conservative recognizes the value of

freedom, he considers it to be secondary to the attainment and preserva­

tion of order in both senses of the term that is to say both the pre­

servation of peace and the protection of the hierarchical order of soci­

ety. In addition5 the classical liberal is committed to the advocacy of

a free market economy while the conservative would either favor such an

economy, as in the case of Edmund Burke, or favor a considerable amount

of government contro15 like Oswald Spengler. But5 perhaps the most

salient differences between classical liberals and conservatives relate

to their attitudes toward tradition and toward the aristocratic view­

point. While conservatives tend to be champions of traditional authori­

ty, classical liberals are more likely to advocate the removal of tradi­

tional barriers to the expansion of business enterprise. Furthermore,

classical liberals tend to be democratic rather than aristocratic in

their social philosophy. Even when they evince elitist tendencies, as

in the case of the social Darwinians, they tend to have faith in the

processes of natural selection in the recruitment of elites while con­

servatives have no such trust in natural processes. The latter are much

more likely to favor selective education and the development of elite

training schools. Finally, conservatives are more likely to favor the

encouragement of organized religion while classical liberals either op­

pose such encouragement or keep their religious and political viewpoint

separate from one another.

To a considerable extent, the differences between classical

liberals and conservatives relate to their differing views of human

12

nature. Traditionally, the leading expositors of classical liberalism

have tended to view man as essentially selfish but rational. Because of

their selfishness, men could be depended upon to strive for their own

self-interest. Because of their alleged rationality, they would be

considered to be consistent in striving for this goal. Thus, if they

were to be left alone to strive for their own selfish goods, the good of

society as a whole would be advanced. On the other hand, because of

human selfishness, governments must be limited in their powers for govern­

ments are made up of human beings, all of whom possess this type of

character. In contrast, while the conservatives would agree that human

beings are selfish, they would also maintain that most people, at least,

are irrational. Hence, they would evince less faith in the automatic

workings of a free society.

If classical liberals like Herbert Hoover and Barry Goldwater are

today often confused with conservatives, this confusion is probably due

to the fact that both groups have tended to unite on certain issues in

common opposition to the doctrines espoused by adherents of doctrines of

both the extreme and moderate Left. This unity is based upon the common

opposition of both groups to schemes of collectivistic social reform.

Classical liberals oppose these plans because they consider them to be

meances to freedom; conservatives, because they consider them to be

equalitarian in tendency.

Historically, conservatives and classical liberals were on opposing

sides until well into the twentieth century. In fact, the term 11

COnservative 11 acquired its present meaning in the early nineteenth

century when it was used to designate those individuals and groups which

13

opposed the principles associated with the French Revolution. These

conservatives were aristocratic, traditionalist, and generally favorable

to the mercantilist economic principles that were still dominant in much

of Europe. Their chief opponents were the liberals who at that time

championed progressivism and laissez-faire. These liberals would now be

regarded as adherents of classical liberalism in contradistinction to

the adherents of the social democratic liberalism of today, who are

prepared to accept a considerable amount of government control in the

pursuit of their objectives. Conservatism is, of course, much older than

the French Revolution for essentially the same principles were expounded

by Pythagoras.3

It is of considerable significance that modern conserv­

atism was originally directed primarily in opposition to classical

liberalism, a philosophy with which conservatism has recently been fre-

quently confused.

It is symptomatic of the confusion of terms that is so prevalent

today that Michael Oakeshott has been frequently labeled a conservative.

Yet, if we examine his interpretation of conservatism carefully, we can-

not fail to notice how divergent it is from the views of the major

expositors of conservatism and how similar it is to the views of clas-

sical liberal writers in general. As far as Oakeshott was concerned,

3For a discussion of the place of Pythagoras in the history of

conservative thought see Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations (New York: MacMillan, 1961), pp. 186-188, 196-197.

14

conservatism was purely a political doctrine without any entailments

pertaining to the nature of man. This in itself would have astonished

such distinguished conservatives as Edmund Burke, Prince Metternich, and

Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Oakeshott placed the essence of conservatism in

the belief that government should confine itself to keeping the peace and

regulating the currency. It was not to indulge itself in social reform.

As far as he was concerned, happiness could only come through the volun­

tary and free choices of the individual. On the basis of this position,

Oakeshott should be classified as a classical liberal rather than a

conservative. His paramount political value was obviously freedom

rather than order. He should therefore be placed in the same ideological

camp with Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek rather than in the camp of

Edmund Bruke and Benjamin Disraeli. 4

To establish the precise parameters of this study, it is important

to consider briefly other viewpoints \'lhich have sometimes been confused

with conservatism. They include the views of Admiral Hyman Rickover

whose educational elitism would link him to the conservative position

but whose main-concern has been to recruit academic talent suited to

grapple with contemporary problems rather than to reassert the values of

the past. In American educational history, there has also been a con­

siderable number of influential thinkers who have espoused the values of

a traditional liberal arts education and, at the same time, have

rejected the aristocratic viewpoint which has traditionally been

4For evidence of Michael Oakeshott's views on conservatism see his Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London: Metheun, 1962), especia11y pages 183, 189, 191. Incidentally, in spite of his denial, his political views most certainly entail certain definite views per­taining to bqth human nature and the nature of the universe.

15

associated with this kind of education. They include the rationalistic

humanists, Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler. Hutchins, in

particular, has publicly taken an anti-Burkean position and has attached

T. s. Eliot because of the aristocratic proclivities of the latter.S

Russell Kirk was undoubtedly at least partially correct in viewing

Hutchins as a democratic rationalist; for Hutchins has tended to

emphasize critical independent thought combined with a strong faith in

democratic values, both in politics and in education.6 Mortimer Adler

has evinced a similar reliance upon democratic values in education in

contradistinction to the aristocratic values espoused by conservatives,

even to the extent of advocating mass college education.? Neither indi­

vidual has been commonly regarded by conservative intellectuals as

representative of their viewpoint; for, like the classical libera-ls, the

rationalistic humanists resemble the conservatives in some respects but

differ greatly from them in other equally important ways. These two

schools appear to be allied only when contrasted to those schools which

are characterized by a more relativistic and less academic approach than

either. In much the same manner, the similarities between conservatives

and classical liberals become vividly apparent when contrasted with the

5Russell Kirk has listed the writings by Hutchins in which these views \-Jere expressed in Kirk's Eliot and His Age {New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 357-358.

6Kirk's characterization of Hutchins can be found in Kirk•s

Academic Freedom (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), p. 74. 7see Adler's essay in Robert Hemenway, ed., A Great Books Primer

(Chicago: Great Books Foundation, 1955), pp. 25-27.

socialists and other variants of the political Center and Left. But we

must not let the similarities blind us to the differences lest we over­

look the peculiar values of each viewpoint.

In addition to Hutchins and Adler, there have been many other

16

writers on education who have eagerly espoused the benefits of an academic

liberal arts education and, at the same time, have shied away from the

aristocratic ethos with which such an education has been traditionally

associated. This has been especially true of American writers. Such

primary figures as William Chandler Bagley and Arthur Bester have

exhibited this combination of attitudes and, unlike Hutchins and Adler,

they have also opposed traditionalism -- preferring to justify their

educational programs on utilitarian grounds.B In this respect, Bester

has not exhibited the same faith in the educability of the masses as has

Bagley but his antipathy to traditionalistic concepts of education has

been no les~ unequivocal. In general, the American cultural atmosphere

has not been very conducive to the emergence of an aristocratic tradi­

tionalism; for a landed aristocracy that might have served as a model and

support for this viewpoint has never become firmly established on American

soil. In addition, in so new a nation, sufficient time has not elapsed

for a strong traditionalism to become firmly established. Seen in such a

light, the neo-conservative movement is a radical departure from the

established American way of life.

Bsagley's general position is generally familiar to students of his philosophy. For examples of Bestor's viewpoint see his The Restoration of Learning (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 48, 87, 94.

There has been at least as much confusion concerning the question 17

of how neo-conservatism differs from conservatism proper as there has

been over the meaning of conservatism itself. Some writers have failed

to detect any difference and thus classify neo-conservatism as merely a

revival of traditional conservatism. 9 Others, including a number of

writers on education, have drawn a distinction between the humanism of

Irving Babbitt and his associates in contrast to the alleged "new conserv­

atism11 of the Council for Basic Education which in turn has been linked

to the old theory of formal discipline. 10 The humanists were allegedly

exponents of ideals while the neo-conservatives were more interested in

training mental faculties by emphasizing the most valuable courses of

study. Actual1y, the facts do not support such a distinction. As we

shall see later, humanist ideals are as important to contemporary neo­

conservatives as these ideals were to Irving Babbitt and his supporters.

Furthermore, instead of Babbitt's humanism being deemed to be separate

from contemporary conservatism, it would be more correct to view both as

part of one single movement in response to the same kind of pressures,

the gap having been bridged through the existence of two short-lived but

highly influential magazines; The American Revi~ (1933-1937) and Measure

(1949-1950). Furthermore, the Council on Basic Education has hardly been

9see ~r example Edward M. Burns and Philips L. Ralph, World

CiVilizations (2 vo 1 s. New York: li. W. Norton Company, 1968), Vo I. 2, p. 699. In this generally excellent college text, the authors have also made the mistake of classifying the classical liberal economist, Friedrich Hayek as a conservative.

I Osee for ex amp I e, John P. fly nne, Theories of Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 401, 492, 498-499.

18

confined to conservatives but has actually included people representing

a wide range of educational opinion, such as the disciples of William

Bagley and of Admiral Hyman Rickover.

In actuality, the distinctiveness of the new conservatism does

not consist of any new or unique doctrines but rather of a difference

in emphasis as compared with traditional conservatism. In its modern

form, conservatism arose in response to the excesses of the French

Revolution. As the first influential spokesman of modern conservatism,

Edmund Burke defended the status quo against what was primarily a

political menace. In the twentieth century, conservatives can no longer

defend the status quo for their principles no longer dominate any

important Western society. Instead, they are the spokesmen of reform;

-- but reform in a vastly different direction from what the liberals and

radicals recommend. Furthermore, the neo-conservatives are today

primarily concerned with educational and intellectual rather than

political matters. They are therefore primarily cultural critics of the

contemporary age. Two trends have particularly aroused their fears. One

of these has been the gradual erosion of religious and moral beliefs in

response to the apotheosis of science which became important in the

nineteenth century and to the twentieth century trends toward meta­

physical skepticism and moral relativism. The second tendency has been

the gradual replacement of academic values and high standards of

selective education by an increasing stress upon mass culture which has

apparently, in itself, been a by-product of both the decline of tradition

and the spread of democratic, as against aristocratic values, throughout

the Western world. The latter trends have been most pronounced in the

19

United States, which factors in turn might explain the high proportion of

Americans among neo-conservative ~'/riters. The high percentage of

academics and intellectuals found within this group might well be an

indication of their fear of trends which would undermine the status of

intellectuals and of the values which they represent, for the dis­

interested pursuit of intellectual excellence is sometimes difficult to

maintain in a milieu in which mass appeal is the touchstone.

Among contemporary conservative thinkers, the views of tvvo writers

on the causes of the perplexities of the contemporary age have been

especially influential.ll One of these was the late Richard Weaver, a

professor of English at the University of Chicago. He felt that the

present decline in moral and intellectual standards began in the late

fourteenth century when William of Ockham denied the reality of the

Platonic universals. This rejection was to lead ultimately to the denial

of the existence of a source of truth higher than man. The consequences

have included the spread of ethical relativims, metaphysical skepticism,

and the concomitant repudiation of cultural standards. For Weaver, the

problems of the contemporary period was that of enabling humans to

perceive again an ordered hierarchy of values.l2

llAs evidenced by the spate of articles on both of these writers which have appeared in the past two decades in such conservative journals as Modern~ and The Intercollegiate Review. A Richard t•l. Weaver Fellov1ship A\t~ards Program has been established by the right-wing Intercollegiate Studies Institute.

12Richard Weaver, Ideas have Conseauences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 2-3, 19-20.

An especially outspoken critic of contemporary thought was Eric

voegelin, who has been Director of the Institute for Political Science

20

at the University of Munich. Central to Voegelin 1 s approach to

contemporary problems, as shown in his previous publications, has been the

contrast he made between the political 11 Science11 of Plato and Aristotle

and the so-called gnostic approach of recent writers. Plato and

Aristotle were characterized as engaged in the search for the order of

being while the 11 gnostics 11 were seen as dissatisfied with this order.

The latter have therefore sought to replace the order of being with a man­

centered one, thereby implicitly denying the existence of a transcendent

source of being and order. Among the movements which Voegelin character-

ized as being gnostic were national socialism, fascism, Marxism, Freud-

ianism, progressivism, and positivism. The adherents of all of these

movements had in effect denied the validity of faith, preferring to rely

on their own special brands of "knowledge" and on earthlyforms of

salvation. The remedy that he recommended was to somehow restore faith

in a transcendent order of being.l3

In spite of their obvious differences in approach, both Weaver and

Voegelin saw the ills of the modern world as due fundamentally to the

repudiation of the existence of a hierarchical order of goods and the

remedy thereof in the revival of belief in such an order, although

neither writer was very explicit on how this was to be attained. The

13see especially Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1968), pp. 15-18, 86-88.

writings of both of these men provides an insight into the neo-conser­

vative approach to contemporary problems. In their hopes and fears,

weaver and Voegelin were typical of many neo-conservative writers.

In brief, our task will be to analyze the writings of those neo-

21

conservatives who have written extensive and serious expositions of their

educational views and who have had some influence on other conservatives.14

The purpose wi 11 be .to uncover the education a 1 va 1 ues of the neo­

conservative movement. By treating this matter historically, on the

basis of past writings in relationship to the Zeitgeist, it is hoped

that a better understanding will be obtained of the ultimate signifi-

cance of neo-conservative educational thought. Before we can deal

directly with this matter, we should, however, first analyze the

fundamental theoretical assumptions of neo-conservative writers

concerning the nature of the universe and of man's place therein.

l4sy influence is meant the power of producing an effect upon another person. In the sense in which this writer has used the term, he has reference to effects produced on the political, social, and educational ideas of others. The primary criterion for measuring this influence are citations by those who have been affected -- both by specific references in footnotes and in the texts of writings of those presumably influenced. The work of all the figures selected for study have been cited in the writings of other influential authors. In addition, figures like Babbitt, Eliot, and Kirk are generally familiar to educated laymen while Bell and Bantock are well-known to those who have done research on the progressive education movement and its critics; for the reputation of the figures involved, while not necessarily an indication of outstanding ability, certainly bears some relationship to the amount of influence exerted. An unknown is generally unlikely to exert much influence. To a historian, influence must be important consideration due to his interest in the Zeitgeist.

CHAPTER II

FOUNDATIONS OF NEO-CONSERVATISM

In essence, neo-conservatism should be considered a social

philosophy in the broadest sense of the term. It is a philosophy which

describes the nature of society including man's place therein and also

prescribes certain policies for the good of man and of society. It also

implies a characteristic viewpoint pertaining to the nature of being and

of the universe. This chapter will explore the fundamental neo-conserv-

ative concepts pertaining to the nature of the universe, man, and society

as a means of preparing a foundation for the explication of the neo­

conservative educational viewpoint to follow. Since, as was pointed out

in the first chapter, neo-conservatism differs from traditional con­

servatism only in emphasis, the basic doctrinal assumptions of both are

identical. Therefore, the terms "conservatism" and "neo-conservatism"

will be used interchangeably.

Perhaps the most fundamental concept for understanding the conserva­

tive metaphysics is hierarchy; for the conservative tends to conceive of

the universe in terms of a gradual unilinear graduation in contrast to

both the single-level equalitarian viewpoint and the two-layer elite-mass

dichtomy. Historically, the conservative concept of hierarchy, as employ­

ed by writers belonging to Occidental cultures, was largely derived from

and stated in the terminology of Aristotle. Through two British

Aristotelians, Richard Hooker and Edmund Burke, this concept became

fundamental to the conservatism of the English-speaking countries. It

22

23

is therefore important to discuss Aristotle's views on hierarchy.

Although Aristotle has given us several systems of gradation, the

one which most fundamentally influenced Western thought pertained to the

powers of the soul. All living things were considered to have nutritive

powers. In addition to these powers, animals also possessed the abili­

ties of movement and of sensation. Such cognitive powers as imagination

and memory were considered outgrowths of the sensitive soul. Finally,

humans possessed, in addition to all the powers characteristic of plants

and animals, the faculty of reason. All living things, with the

exception. of God, were characterized as being imperfect in the sense

that none fully actualized all the potentialities of all living things.

Aristotle believed, however, that living things belonged to several dif­

ferent levels of development in accordance with the degree to which they

actualized all the potentialities displayed by living things. Finally,

happiness for each living thing was deemed to consist of performing well

the characteristic function by which it was distinguished from the other

creatures in the scale of nature.l

Not all conservatives have, of course, accepted Aristotle's pre­

cise classification of the powers of the soul. Yet, the basic outlook

which this classification symbolized has become an essential feature of

the conservative viewpoint. Conservatives today conceive of hierarchy

in the same functional manner as did Aristotle -- in accordance with

the powers of the psyche. Furthermore, there is a strong tendency to

1Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, l. 7. l098a.

view the scale of nature in accordance with the degrees of perfection

of the creatures involved. Finally, there is the same stress on the

diversity of means in achieving happiness in accordance with the na­

ture of the individual creature.

Among the many implications of the concept of hierarchy is that

24

of a rationally ordered universe in which an ascending gradation ordered

in terms of the superordination and subordination of its inhabitants

clearly suggests the existence of universal purpose and of a rational

agent to bring that purpose to fruition. Order implies rationality and

rationality implies purpose. This viewpoint is quite congruent with the

acceptance and espousal of religious beliefs and values. Therefore,

while conservatives undoubtedly have a tendency to be pessimistic about

human nature, their essential metaphysical viewpoint implies a strong

confidence in the meaningfulness and ultimate goodness of the cosmos.

In addition, since hierarchy implies diversity and since such

diversity is accepted as part of some great overall plan, then diversity

itself must be good and every effort should be made to encourage it.

Furthermore, since the universe contains .beings .at various stages of

perfection, this implies that they are also at various stages of im­

perfection. Implicit in such a view is a theodicy; for evil as well as

good are thereby necessary to the fulfillment of the universal plan.

Metaphysical materialism is fundamentally antithetical to the

general hierarchical viewpoint; for the concept of a universe as consisting

of matter in motion implies either a tychist or a mechanistic view of

causation both of which would exclude purpose as an integral feature of

the cosmos. The inclusion of final causation as an ultimate explanation

of universal phenomena would clearly imply the existence of factors

transcending the operations of the physical universe. It is therefore

hardly surprising that conservative thinkers have generally been quite

hostile to materialism and the other forms of metaphysical naturalism.

In this particular~ their attitude has been consistent with their basic

metaphysical assumptions.

With regard to education~ a quotation from the writings of Paul

Elmer More~ a literary critic and associate of Irving Babbitt, should

give us a vivid comprehension of the viewpoint of the conservative

intellectual.

The scheme of the humanist might be described as the disciplining of the higher imagination to the end that the student may behold in one sublime vision, the whole scale of being in its range from the lowest to the highest under the divine decree of order and subordination, without losing sight of the immutable veracity at the heart of all development which is only the praise and surname of virtue.2

In more commonplace language, More was in effect advocating that

the student learn to discriminate between the higher and the lower, the

better and the worse, utilizing the great universal hierarchy as the

foundation of va 1 ues. As to the 11 praise and surname of virtue," ~1ore

explained this as being synonomous with the quality of nobility.3

25

In more general terms, an emphasis upon hierarchy would obviously

lead to a stress upon human differences, with different kinds of training

offered in accordance with differences in the abilities and interests

2Paul Elmer ~lore, Aristocray and Justice (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915), p. 56.

3Ibid., p. 54.

of the students involved. Furthermore~ the view of the believers in

hierarchy that the nature of happiness varies with the faculties and

functions of the individuals under consideration would apparently

strengthen the position of those who believe that a considerable amount

of formal education is not necessary for the happiness of all.

26

Hierarchical views are also conducive to aristocratic conceptions

of education. Since all creatures are not of equal potentialities, there

should presumably be a tendency to stress the education of those with

the greatest manifest potentiality on the ground that to do otherwise

would result in the neglect of those most able to contribute to civil­

ization. The emphasis upon unequal potentialities is crucial in this

respect; for one could acknowledge that men are not equal in actuality

but still maintain that all or most men are equal in potentiality. Such

an individual could then easily advocate mass education through the col­

lege level with attention focused on the development of students of only

average manifest academic potentiality. Once one accepts the existence

of important differences in potentialities between students, one is almost

certain to advocate selective education with emphasis upon the training

of the superior.

The religious implications of the concept of hierarchy should be

encouraging to those concerned with religious and moral training in the

schools. Also, the fact that conservatives tend to ground their values

in certain characteristics of nature would apparently lead to an approach

wherein the natural sciences would be studied before the student begins

to study religion and ethics. As has already been observed, an essential

aim of education \>JOul d be the deve 1 opment of the ability of the students

27

to discriminate between the relative worth of the different constituent

parts of the universe in terms of their position in the universal hier­

archy. This acknowledgment of differences in intrinsic worth would

obviously lead to a stress on philosophy, especially on those branches

which pertain to value -- such as ethics and aesthetics. In addition,

since hierarchy is a relational concept which implies the existence of

an integrated universal order, the educator who accepts such a viewpoint

should tend to emphasize the enhancement of the ability of his students

to interrelate the facts that they learn. This emphasis would clearly

imply the utilization of those kinds of tests whereby a criterion of

student performance· would be the ability to integrate facts into

coherent and orderly whole.

The educational counselor who accepts the validity of the concept

of hierarchy would deem it to be one of his major functions to guide

students toward finding their proper positions in the human hierarchy

with regard to vocation, avocations, and recreations. Henc~, such a

counselor would emphasize the importance of differential psychology

together with such tools as tests and other forms of measurement in an

effort to clarify the proper role of the student in relationship to

society. Furthermore, the counselor would be very unlikely to expound

universal conceptions of the satisfactory adjustment of students to

society. Each student would presumably be evaluated in accordance with

his own distinctive characteristics, to the degree that the counselor

understands the nature of these characteristics.

An important consequence of acceptance of the view of the universe

as an orderly rational system is the advocacy of natural law, a doctrine

which was of immense importance in the history of Occidental thought.

In essence, the advocates of natural law ground the rules of moral

obligation either in the structural and functional characteristics of

the individuals involved or of the world in \vhich they live. There are

various conceptions of natural law. In the past, natural law theories

were propounded which were based on such diverse criteria as human

reason, the moral sentiments of the individual, the conditions of human

28

survival, and the Darwinian theory of evolution. There is, however, only

one kind of natural law theory which has in the past appealed to con­

servatives -- the theory by which natural law is grounded on the concept

of universal metaphysical order. By this theory, the good of each thing

is conceived of in terms of the fulfillment of its function in the

universal hierarchy. This theory contrasts sharply with other theories

by \'lhich natural law is based on the existence of single faculties and

those which stress natural rights to the neglect of duties.4

It is today a well recognized fact that the dominant influence in

the development of metaphysically-based natural theories originated with

Cicero, although Plato and Aristotle have expounded similar opinions.

Cicero's views were subsequently enlarged and made much more explicit

through the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and Richard Hooker. As thus

reinterpreted, these ideas have strongly influenced the thinking of more

4For a collection of writings on natural law by conservatives, see Robert L. Schuettinger, ed., The Conservative Tradition in European Thought (New York: Putnam's, 1970), pp. 117-174.

29

recent conservative writers such as Edmund Burke and Leo Strauss. One of

Cicero•s most important contributions was to popularize the concept of

nright reason11

by which he meant reasoning in accordance with natural law

for the purpose of distinguishing between right and wrong conduct. This

is an essentially practical ability, although based upon metaphysical

principles. Through this doctrine, adherents of traditional natural law

doctrines have implicitly emphasized the importance of reason as the

means of comprehending what was for them an essentially rational universe.

From the seventeenth century, metaphysical conceptions of natural

law, based upon assumptions of the existence and knowability of a

rationally ordered universe, have been under continuous attack by

adherents of other views. During the seventeenth and the eighteenth

centuries, human nature replaced the order of the universe as the

primary touchstone of natural law doctrines. Either basic human drives

were stressed as in the writings of Thomas Hobbes or the alleged nature

of early man as in the writings of John Locke and of Jean Jacques

Rousseau. Finally, in the nineteenth century, advocates of hedonistic

utilitarianism and positive law attacked natural law itself. The

deliquescence of natural law reflected the diminution of belief in

traditional and mataphysical doctrines which has been a dominant feature

of recent Hestern intellectual history. Needless to say, conservatives

have consistently opposed this trend.

Implicit in the acceptance of natural law based upon a hierarchi­

cal conception of the universe is the existence of a system of values

v1hen~by the universe is ordered. These values possess ontic status be

cause they exist independently of the mind of the observer as part of

30

the intrinsic character of the universe. Since such an order is conceived

of in objective rather than subjective terms, it is generally held to be

absolute -- that is to say possessed of universal validity independent

of relative circumstances. Although the precise criteria for the ranking

of values vary with the individual thinker, such standards as scope, com­

plexity, and effectiveness are accepted quite generally by writers advo­

cating the validity of the hierarchical concept of nature.

The educational implications of the conservative viewpoint on

natural law are much the same as those entailed by acceptance of the

conservative viewpoint on hierarchy since the concept of hierarchy is the

essential foundation of the conservative interpretation of the nature of

natural law. Yet the fact that conservatives believe that an entire

system of moral obligation can be derived from the objective nature of

the universe would tend to lend great urgency to one of the previously

noticed educational consequences of conservatism ~- the stress upon

developing in students a comprehension of the axiological order of the

universe. One of the primary problems of educational counseling and

teaching from the conservative perspective pertains to the need to

develop in students a comprehension of the meaning of their lives in

relationship to the universal design. This might well transcend in

importance the other main function of the conservative counselor the

guidance of students toward their proper places in the human hierarchy.

Conservatives tend to view men as being weak and imperfect. Men

are inclined to be dominated by their emotions rather than their reason.

It is only by the exercise of considerable self-restraint that men are

able to act constructively. In fact, Burke attributed most of the

miseries which humans have inflicted upon themselves to such attitudes

and passions as "pride., ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition,

hypocri cy, ungoverned zea 1 ~' and a 11 the other "disorderly appetites 11

which trouble the lives of people. 5 Both the selfishness and the

emotionalism of men must be curbed by the civilizing influences of

society if they are not to revert to barbarism.

31

In \'lriting of the decline of chivalry, Burke exemplified this atti-

tude in a famous quotation;

But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions which made power gentle and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life and which, by a bland assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns and the understanding ratifies as necessary to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion.6

The preceding quotation contains the essence of the fundamental conserv-

ative view of human nature; for Burke viewed human problems from the

perspective of one who wonders how institutions can restrain men from

manifesting their intrinsic animality. The answer that Burke gave was

in terms of appeal to the insights obtained through intuition as ratified

by reason for he felt that reason alone was insufficient since the stock

of reason in each man was limited. He especially emphasized the

SEdmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1955), p. 162.

6Ibid., p. 87.

32

importance of the moral imagination, a concept which was to play an

important role in the thinking of Irving Babbitt and of Paul Elmer More.

By imagination, Burke meant the power of mentally reproducing the images

of things and of combining them.? By moral imagination, he evidently

referred to the power of combining images in terms of moral ideals. In

other words, it apparently was conceived in terms of the ability to view

things in ethical perspective. Like many other conservatives, Burke

considered man a creature whose actions were dominated by his imagination.

As such, he viewed the mind of man as not simply a tabula rasa at birth

but rather as an active and creative instrument. In this view, as in so

much else, Burke presaged the dominant attitudes of conservatives in both

the nineteenth and the twentieth centures.

Although conservatives have been slow to recognize it, a strong

linkage exists between the conservatives'viewpoint and the inheritance

theory of human development. Specifically, the problem of how much of

the variability of humans can be attributed to nature as against nurture

is one that is pregnant with political implications. It has been common

practice to assert that the factors of heredity and environment are so

closely intertwined that it is impossible to separate the two. Regard­

less of the problem of the validity of that assertion, writers have

tended in practice to stress one or the other of these factors. Liberals

have emphasized environmental causation since at least as far back as the

7surke had defined imagination in his On (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1937), p. 16. traditional definition of the term dating back Aristotle.

the Sublime and Beautiful His was, of course, the at least to the time of

33

of John Locke. While the conservative position on this matter has

been less clear, most of the prominent eugenicists have advocated

essentially conservative views. Certainly, the inheritance theory has

been more in accord with the conservative view of the rigidity of human

nature than with the confidence in social reform generally characteristic

of the social-democratic liberals and the radicals. Furthermore, an

emphasis upon heredity is more consonant with the aristocratic dimension

of conservative thought than environmentalism for once the assumption is

made that most of the important differences between individuals are the

products of external causes, a basic obstacle is removed from the

advocacy of equalitarian policies.8

Although, as we have seen, the aristocratic aspect of conservatism

is congruent with a stress upon biological factors in explicating the

causes of human differences, it also leads to an emphasis upon the social

factor as well in the sense of the orientation of people toward group

life. The hierarchical ontology implicitly involves a stress upon

interrelationships. The individual in a hierarchical structure acquires

his essential significance by standing in a certain relationship to others

in what is regarded as a single scale of being. Conservatives similarly

regard society as a single unified organism in which they believe that

one of the basic problems of the individual is to find his proper place

in accordance with his general level of being. Hence, when conservatives

discourse on politics, they are likely to view problems from the per­

spective of society as a whole rather than in terms of the particular

goods of separate groups within the social nrganism.

Another important cause of the social emphasis of conservatives

was the influence of Aristotle's Politics. As previously noted,

34

f\ristotle's writings have exercised considerable influence upon conser­

vative thought. Aristotle believed that humans were gregarious in nature

and could therefore find their good only as members of communities. The

state was deemed to be a positive good rather than a necessary evil. It

was believed to be an outgrowth of the family. As such, it was conceived

of as existing not simply to provide police protection but more broadly

for the purpose of contributing to the virtue and well-being of its

inhabitants. It is therefore not surprising that while individual

conservatives like Burke may have been advocates of laissez-faire, the

general tendency of conservatives has been to accept a considerable amount

of state control. The shock of many Americans in viewing the number of

controls that British conservatives are willing to accept is thus

explicable. Most American "conservatives" are, as we have seen,

classical liberals with a confidence in the self-reliance and self-

sufficiency of people which is conspicuously lacking among authentic

conservatives. The differences between these two groups regarding the

extent and desirability of state controls is therefore ultimately reduci-

ble to dissimilar conceptions of human nature.

Conservatives have been for quite some time disturbed about the

increasing alienation of individuals from society. Three forms of aT-

ienation have been of special concern: alienation from moral and

religious values; from cultural values; and from meaningful inter-

personal relationships. The sense of alienation from moral and religious

35

values was widely attributed to the growing skepticism of anything which

could not be demonstrated within the narrow confines of the laboratory.

The result has been a lack of sense of direction among large numbers of

people combined with a concomitant sense of the meaningless nature of

life. With regard to cultural values, Eric and Mary Josephson have

expressed the situation concisely and well;

Although mass society is a political as well as a cultural phenom­enon, many of its critics, among them Ortega y Gasset and T. S. Eliot, have concentrated their attack chiefly against what they regard as its vulgar values, its sameness, its threat to "high" culture. While one may share their concern about the danger of standardized tastes, or about the threat which mass behavior in politics or in culture poses for individual expression, there is far more to the problem than this - indeed, far more than many aristocratically inclined critics of mass society (and of democ­racy) want to see.9

The Josephsons then went on to describe the atomization of society from

meaningful social relationships, but they were quite wrong in their con­

tention that the aristocratically inclined have not been aware of this

situation as we shall see later.lO The Josephsons were however correct

in their view that the basis of the aristocratic opposition to mass

culture was the threat posed by this type of culture to individual

creativeness. Mass culture appeals fundamentally to a composite average.

While to a certain extent, it satisfies the tastes of most individuals,

it does not really satisfy anyone's tastes completely. The tendency of

9Eric and Mary Josephson, editors, r~an Alone (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 41-42.

lOsee especially the discussion of R. A. Nisbet in this chapter and of Russell Kirk in the next chapter.

36

the mass media has been to routinize culture while reducing its appeal to

a fairly low common denominator.

The third type of alienation to arouse conservatives is the

alienation of the individual from society. The most primary and

ubiquitous social associations have been the family, the community and

the church. It has been within these institutions that individuals have

largely sought the satisfaction of their needs for affection, friendship,

and a sense of purposefulness. Yet the functions of these institutions

have been gradually eroded through the expansion of mass large-scale

institutions, especially that of the state. The transformation of the

family is an example of this process. The educational functions have

been largely taken over by the public schools; the vocational functions,

by factories and offices; the entertainment formerly provided through

the cooperation of members of the family, by television and other mass

media. The problem now existing centers on how the family can efficiently

discharge its functions when these other activities have largely been

taken away from it. Some of these trends have of course been unavoid­

able but to admit this does not in itself mitigate the deleteriousness of

many of the consequences.

The sociologist, Robert A. Nisbet, has probably written more ex­

tensively_ on the social implications of conservatism than any other

conservative writer. In common with many other conservatives, Nisbet

believed that one of the gravest dangers confronting Western culture

has been the emergence of a mass of fundamentally rootless individuals,

bereft of those social and cultural relationships through which humans

obtain their sense of community with others and with society as a

11 v1hole.

events.

He attributed this consequence to a long chain of historical

The strong emphasis upon individualism at the time of the

37

Reformation led to the relative neglect of man•s social nature. Further­

more, the rise of modern capitalism with its implicit stress upon

competition in preference to cooperation, and upon workers as economic

commodities to be bought and sold on an open market has greatly exacer­

bated the trend toward the atomization of the individual. Since the out­

break of the French Revolution, the state has added steadily to its powers

thereby undermining those intermediate associations, such as guilds and

the charitable associations, through which people have sought companion­

ship and a sense of unity with society as a whole. In common with a

number of other sociologists, both conservative and non-conservative,

Nisbet has attributed to the state the primary role in bringing about the

atomization of society; for the state has in addition to a monopoly of

force, control over education; supervision over the family; power over

property; and even some measure of control over personal habits. In fact,

Nisbet has characterized the fundamental conflict in modern history as

being not between the state and the individual but between the state and

the social group. 12 The contrast between Nisbet•s view and classical

liberalism can be most clearly brought out by considering the following

llRobert A. Nisbet, Community and Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 198-199.

121Qid., p. 108.

I ''I 1

1i 1

I ··I I'

quotation;

I cannot help thinking that what we need above all else in this age is a new philosophy of laissez faire. The old lais­sez faire failed because it was based on erroneous premises regarding human behavior. As a theory it failed because it mistook for ineradicable characteristics of individuals quali­ties that were in fact inseparable from social groups. As a policy it failed because its atomistic propositions were in­evitably unavailing against the reality of enlarging masses of insecure individuals. Far from proving a chetk upon the growth of the omnicompetent state~ the old laisses faire ac­tually accelerated this growth. Its indifference to every form of community and association left the State as the sole area of reform and security. . . . To create the conditions within which the autonomous individuals could prosper~ could be emancipated from the binding ties of kinship, class, and community~ was the objective of the older laissez faire. To create conditions within which autonomous groups may prosper must beA I believe, the prime objective of the new laissez faire.lj

38

The foregoing quotation not only serves as an illustration of a concrete

application of the conservative philosophy of human nature but also high­

lights the fact that while conservatives generally prefer that the powers

of the state extend well beyond the narrow confines of law and order

advocated by laissez-faire liberals~ they believe that state powers ha.ve

become much too broad in scope.

The social philosophy of conservatives has been based upon a con­

ception of human nature as lacking in autonomy and self-sufficiency. As

is well-known, such conservatives as Nisbet and Russell Kirk have viewed

humans as creatures constantly beset by anxiety. The fundamental human

needs are considered to be security, status, and meaning. The first two

categories, and to a lesser extent, the third as well~ relate to needs

13Ibid., p. 278

39

that must be satisfied in society rather than in individual isolation.

Neuroses are not viewed as fundamentally outcomes of early childhood

experiences nor of conflicts between human emotions and repressions but

rather much more frequently as the results of disturbed relations

between the individual and his social environment. To conservatives,

humans are not adventurous souls ready to cast asunder all the ties

binding them to their companions but are rather weak beings, constantly

in need of emotional reassurance. To contemporary neo-conservatives,

the most pathetic of all human types is the. rootless proletarian, bereft

of all the familiar ties of religion, class, and community. Marxists

attribute alienation to largely economic factors; Freudians, to

repressions; liberals, to social institutions; but to conservatives, the

fundamental root of contemporary alienation is contained within the

confines of the emotional nature of man.

It was partly because they viewed human nature as being weak and

emotional in character that conservatives from Edmund Burke to Russell

Kirk have strongly emphasized the value and importance of tradition. In

the commonly accepted meaning of the term, tradition designates the

process of transmission from generation to generation of knowledge,

beliefs, and attitudes as well as the content of that inheritance. To

conservatives, it has more particularly designated the inherited political,

moral, religious, and intellectual values of a culture that are the

products of centuries of collective experience. When the weakness and

irrationality of the individual is contrasted with the time tested

experience of the race, conservatives contend that unless the evidence

is oven<Jhelmingly to the contrary, tradition should prevail. A

quotation from the writings of Edmund Burke, perhaps the most vigorous

nen t of tradition, should make this position abundantly clear. expo

40

You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess that we are generally men of untaught feelings, that instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice with its reason, has a motive to give act1on to that reason and an affec­tion which will give it permanence. 14

Burke believed that tradition should be based upon the long-term

experience of the race communicated over countless generations; for the

ultimate consequences of events seemed to him to be seldom immediately

apparent. It was this attitude which prevented Burke's defense of tradition

from becoming an apology for either opportunism or for the passive

acceptance of whatever short-term traditions there might be which were in

the ascendent. Burke has confidence that, given sufficient time, all

traditions would tend to conform with conservative standards.

The science of constructing a commonwealth or renovating it or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori. Nor is it a short experience that can in­struct us .in that practical science, because the real effects of moral causes are not always immediate; but that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation, and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces

l4surke, Reflections, pp. 98-99.

in the beginning. The reverse also happens: and very plausible schemes with very pleasing commencements have often shameful and lamentable conclusions. In states there are often some obscure and almost latent causes, things which appear at first view of

41

little moment, on which a very great part of its prosperity or adversity may most essentially depend .. The science of government being therefore so practical in itself and intended for such practical purposes -- a matter which requires experience and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, how­ever sagacious and observing he may be -- it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again without having models and patterns of approved unity before his eyes.l5

In addition to this essentially empirical justification of tradition,

tradition also inspired respect for authority; for through tradition the

values of a culture are transmitted to the people. Given the essential

conservative attitude of the selfish and irrational nature of mankind,

the upholding of tradition could be considered an important means whereby

civilization could be protected against the weaknesses of human nature.

Burke has expressed this point of view very vividly;

Who would insure a tender and delicate sense of honor to beat al­most with the first impulses of the heart when no man could know what would be the test of honor in a nation continually varying the standard of its coin? No part of life would retain its ac­quisitions. Barbarism with regard to science and literature, un­skillfulness with regard to art and manufactures, would infallibly succeed to the want of a steady education and settled principle; and thus the commonwealth itself would, in a few generations, crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of individ­uality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven. 16

Tradition is, after all, the means whereby the religious, moral and

cultural values of mankind, accumulated through millenia of effort and

15Ibid., pp. 69-70.

16Ibid., p. 109.

42

experience, are communicated from generation to generation. To advo­

cate and emphasize the value and importance of past experience is ul­

timately to stress the importance of history and at the same time to

evince skepticism in the ability of human reason, unaided by experience

to effectively order human affairs. Thus, while conservatives stress

the importance of metaphysical principles, in the application of these

principles, they also believe in the importance of experience because

they have an acute consciousness of human 1 imitations.

The educational implications of the conservative conception of

human nature are on the whole congruent with the implications of the

conservative conception of the universe. The emphasis upon heredity

would, for example, lead to the same concentration upon the education of

the gifted and the same stress upon different kinds of curricula in

accordance with differences in the intrinsic natures of students.

Selective education, at least beyond the level of instruction needed for

minimal vocational functioning in our complex society, would be a

logical consequence of the stress on the importance of the innate genetic

potentialities of students; for if students do not possess the needed

potentialities, efforts to significantly elevate their abilities through

education would in the end prove fruitless and would presumably detract

from attention to the gifted.

The conservative belief in the emotional and selfish nature of man­

kind clearly implies an educational approach characterized by a strong

emphasis upon discipline and obedience to authority. It would hardly be

~lise to leave students to their own devices if they were not to be

trusted. Furthermore, if one believes that men are essentially

irrational, it would seem to follow that the curriculum that one would

find acceptable would consist of required rather than elective courses, ' ' both because of a lack of confidence in the ability of individuals to

43.

make rational choices and of a desire to expose them to material w~ich

would presumably give them the needed guidance in order to enhance the

rational elements of their natures. In addition, the freedom to teach

students whatever one desires would hardly be promoted by adherence to

an essentially irrationalist psychology. Consistent conservatives might

well be reluctant to teach anything which might undermine the morality

of their students except possibly where student bodies are highly select;

the confidence that the students themselves would be able to correct any

wrong impressions which the material might convey would very.likely be

absent.

Yet the conservative conception of education is not quite as

teacher-centered as the foregoing might indicate. As we have seen

earlier, the conservative Niew of the student as a learner is one of an

active and creative individual. This viewpoint is clearly implicit not

only in the conservative stress on the moral imagination but also in the

emphasis upon the innate pattern of abilities which each individual

student is believed to possess by virtue of his heredity. From the

conservative viewpoint, the teacher must uphold authority and at the same

time guide students because of his presumably superior competence. In

addition, he should adjust his educational procedure to take account of

the ~niqueness of each pupil. Therefore, the c~nservative conception of

education would be neither of an active nor of a passive nature but

rather would properly be interactive in character. There would ideally

44

constant interchange bet\'ieen educators and their charges .17

If, as conservatives believe, men are dominated by an anxiety for

companionship and status among their associates, it would seem to follow

that school counselors of conservative views would be anxious to provide

students with the means to satisfy these emotional needs. The means

would presumably include extra-curricular social activities involving

students of compatible tastes and interests. In addition, the importance

of man's emotional nature implies attention to the aesthetic as well as

the strictly academic subjects; for it cannot be denied that one of the

several aims of aesthetic endeavor pertains to the feelings of both the

artist and the audience. The importance of training the feelings is

clearly implicit upon a recognition of the paramount importance of the

emotional aspect of human nature.

The advocacy of tradition as a means of overcoming some of the

imperfections of human nature also involves important educational entail­

ments. One of the arguments offered by conservatives in the past was, as

we have seen, that long-term traditions represent the distilled \'lisdom of

countless generations. It would appear to follow that traditionalist

educators would tend to emphasize the teaching of those works which have

survived the test of time. In addition, such subjects as history and

literature, which consist in large part of content which reflects past

experience, would be stressed. These fields would presumably be taught

17This conclusion was reached on the basis of the logical entail­ments of conservative thought. We shall see later whether the thought of individual conservative writers will enable us to substantiate this generalization.

45

in such a manner as to convey the moral and intellectual values which are

products of past experience; for another of the major arguments used by

conservatives to justify traditionalism was that tradition was a superior

means for the transmission of these values. Imitation has certainly been

a major means whereby traditions have been transmitted. It is therefore

to be expected that in their teaching conservatives would utilize the

lives of great personages as well as the great classics as models for imi­

tation, although conservatives would presumably adapt this technique to

the nature of the children involved.

The conservative approach to man and the universe has in the past

been primarily an ontological approach, based upon an essentially

hierarchical conception of being. The fundamental method was to seek the

rational principles which determine the nature of being. Although con-

servatives have utilized experience as an important auxiliary determinant,

their basic approach has been primarily metaphysical. In this connection,

the conservative distrust of human nature has been based as much on the

irrationality as on the selfishness of mankind. This attitude is the key

to much of conservative educational theory; for many of the character-

istics mentioned in this chapter as educational consequences of conserv-

atism are actually means rather than ends. These consequences include the

emphasis upon discipline, selectivity, interaction, human differences,

imitation, and other such features. The foregoing are essentially

methods of increasing the efficiency of instruction. The fundamental

end of conservatism in view of the hierarchical metaphysics basic to

conservative thought is the training of potential leadership through the

nurture of their reasoning abilities so that they might discern the

46

rational design of the universe. By this means, it is hoped that they

can acquire the ability to discriminate between the noble and the petty,

the refined and the vulgar, the right and the wrong, the sacred and the

profane, the intelligent and the stupid. To put it somewhat differently,

education from the conservative point of view is essentially a matter of

understanding the nature of the universal hierarchy for the purpose of

realizing the axiological significance thereof. Education would there­

fore be ultimately instruction in value discrimination in accordance with

the concept of a universal value hierarchy.

In this chapter, the fundamental assumptions of conservative edu­

cational theory have been discussed together with their educational en­

tailments. In the following three chapters, historical evidence will

be examined to determine the actual educational effects of the acceptance

of the conservative viewpoint. If some of the consequences that have

been named in this chapter are not supported by evidence from the writers

that we will discuss, this would not, of course, necessarily imply that

the inferences made are incorrect but that quite possibly these entail­

ments may be real but unrecognized. If, on the other hand, these writers

do provide us with evidence for the characteristics named, this material

should make us more certain of the generalizations made. In addition,

unforeseen consequences may also become apparent.

In the next three chapters, neo-conservative writers on education

will be divided into three schools: those who have combined humanism

with traditionalism; those humanists who while favorable to tradition­

alism have not made it a major element in their systems; and finally

those who have a basically religious approach to educational problems.

47 As examples of these three schools of thought, T. S. Eliot and Russell

Kirk will represent the first school; Irving Babbitt and G. H. Bantock,

the second; and Bernard Iddings Bell, the third. We will begin with

traditional humanism because, although Babbitt's neo-humanism may have

been the first of the neo-conservative movements to appear, traditional

humanism is the closest neo-conservative approximation to the original

form of modern conservatism -·- the Burkean conservatism of the eighteenth

century.

CHAPTER III

TRADITIONALIST HUMANISM

Classical humanism has historically been an important influence on

the development of Western education .. As we shall see later, a high

proportion of neo-conservative writers still apply humanistic standards

in expressing their views on educational and cultural issues. It is

therefore important to define what is meant by humanism as a doctrine or

viewpoint. This will be accomplished by focusing on those character­

istics which the various classical humanistic movements of the past had

in common.

The ultimate aim of the classical humanists was the improvement of

the individual. person. 1 Instead of attempting to elevate men collective-

ly, the humanists preferred to work on an individual basis .. In general,

humanists did not believe that men were completely perfectible but they

had confidence in the improvability of mankind.

The means that humanists advocated for attaining this goal of im­

proving the individual were predicated upon the value of harmony. By

harmony, they had reference to the ideal of the perfect articulation and

integration of parts to produce an agreeable whole. This involved a

combination of symmetry, balance, and proportion. As such, it was funda-

mentally an aesthetic ideal. Humanists have therefore stressed the value

lpaul 0. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 30.

48

49

of the study of literature and the fine arts for, among other reasons,

the development of a sense of harmony. More broaqly, they have aimed at

the development of the versatile individual in whom the various academic

and personal excellences would be blended into a decorous and harmonious

whole. 2

Historically, the humanistic viewpoint was developed in ancient

Greece. Such ancient Greek and Roman writers as Plato, Aristotle,

!socrates, Cicero, and Quintilian laid the foundations of the movement.

Humanism was also an important intellectual influence during the Italian

Renaissance. In addition, classical humanism influenced the development

·of the traditional liberal arts education of Europe. Contemporary

humanism can be divided into two schools: one which is elitist in

character; the other, more democratic in orientation. 3 The more

democratic school is exemplified in the writings of Mark Van Doren,

Gilbert Highet, and Jacques Barzun. This school of thought is obviously

not conservative in any discriminating sense of the term because of the

absence of the fundamental aristocratic dimension of conservatism. It

is therefore aristocratic or elitist humanism that will command our at-

tention.

Those neo-conservatives who have a humanistic approach to educa-

tion can be divided into two groups. One group has combined humanism

with the espousal of the value and importance of cultural traditionalism.

The second group, while favorable to traditionalism, has not given it the

same degree of attention as the first group. The members of the second

2rbid., p. 41.

3Clarence J. Karier, Man, Society, and Education (Glenview Ill: Scott, Foresman, 1967), p. 207.

4

50

group have preferred to state their position in more modernistic terms.

The most influential neo-conservative writers on education to adhere to

the first view of cultural traditionalism were T.S. Eliot and Russell

Kirk; to the second or more modern view, Irving Babbitt and G. H. Bantock.

This chapter will analyze the views ·of the cultural traditional neo­

conservatives. The following chapter will deal with the more modernist

group.

The approach of the traditionalistic humanists was partially socio­

cultural and partially aesthetic since they were concerned with preserv­

ing the unique values of their culture and society -- especially with

regard to the traditional way of life of the people. This was combined

with the aesthetic emphasis characteristic of humanism which implies the

importance of culture in another sense of the term -- aesthetic and intel­

lectual cultivation. A prime example of this combination is T. S. Eliot.

The Work ofT. S. Eliot

Eliot has probably been one of the more influential poets of the

twentieth century. His influence as a social and cultural critic has al­

so been considerable. It is his role as a critic that will be of prime

concern to us for the influence that he has exerted on neo-conservatives

stemmed primarily from his role as a critic of the times.

Eliot was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 26, 1888, the

scion of a prominent and cultured family. His grandfather, a Unitarian

minister, was the founder and later chancellor of the George Washington

University of St. Louis. T. S. Eliot's father was the president of a

brick manufacturing company and a patron of the arts. The poet's mother,

Charlotte Champe Stearns Eliot, was a writer and poetess herself. It

can be assumed that T. S. Elior had, as a child, the inestimable

advantage of growing up in a highly cultivated household.

Eliot received a traditional classical education in the prepara-

51

tory department of Washington University and later at Milton Academy,

affiliated at that time with Harvard University. He entered Harvard in

]906 where his studies consisted primarily of courses in literature and

philosophy. Eliot received the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1909 and the

Master of Arts degree in English literature from Harvard in 1910. Before

returning to Harvard for further study, Eliot spent a delightful year in

Paris, studying French literature and philosophy. In 1911, Eliot began

his work toward the Ph.D. degree. Partially under the influence of one

of his Harvard professors, Irving Babbitt, Eliot enrolled in Indic

studies but later switched to philosophy. The poet did not complete the

requirements for the doctorate since other concerns overshadowed his

academic plans. He did complete his dissertation which pertained to a

conservatively-inclined philosopher, F. H. Bradley. Eliot planned to

present his dissertation to his committee but, at the time that his

thesis was completed, he was living in England and missed the boat back

to the United States. One cannot help wondering why he did not board

another ship. In any case, it was evident that by this time some very

fundamental changes had occurred in Eliot•s way of life.

In 1914, Eliot went to England to study philosophy at Oxford, pre-

sumably in connection with his dissertation on F. H. Bradley. He

evidently decided to remain in England. In 1915, he married Vivienne

Haigh-Wood of London and became a schoolteacher. Eliot first taught at

High 1~ycombe and later at Highgate Junior School in London. He found

I "' !

52

teaching to be very strenuous and especially disliked the task of main­

taining discipline. He left teaching for a position in the Foreign and

Colonial Department at Lloyd's Bank while working during evenings and

weekends on his poetry. In 1925, Eliot met Geoffrey Faber who was

interested in hiring a writer with a reputation who could attract young

writers to work for Faber's publishing company. Eliot eventually became

a director of Faber and Faber and utilized his position to encourage

individuals with strong poetic talents. In 1948, Eliot was awarded the

Nobel prize in literature. In 1957, long afte~ the death of his first

wife, Eliot married his secretary, Valerie Fletcher. He found the

happiness in his second marriage which had eluded him during his first

marriage. Eliot died in London on January 4, 1965. As is well-known

Eliot announced his conversion from the Unitarian to the Anglo-Catholic

faith in 1928. At the same time, he proclaimed himself a classicist in

literature and a royalist in politics.

Eliot was primarily a philosophical poet. His two most influential

poems were probably The Waste Land (1922) and Ash Wednesday (1930). The

earlier poem dealt with the spiritual aridity of the twentieth century;

the later poem with the Christian answer to the problems of the age.

Both of these poems were highly abstract and symbolic in nature and

helped to stimulate revolutionary changes in twentieth-century poetry.

During the last half of his life, Eliot developed a considerable

concern regarding sociological and cultural problems. His most

influential work in this area was Notes Towards the Definition· of Culture

(1949) which examined the meanings of the term "culture" and the conditions

needed for cultural creativity. Only slightly less influential was

~Idea of a Christian Society (1940) in which he dealt with ~'lhat he

53

l ·eved to be the desirable structure and aims of a society based upon be 1 .

Christian values. Although other works will be used in examining Eliot's

social and cultural thought, these two works probably contain a greater

amount of relevant material than any of the other publications of Eliot;

50 that our analysis will be based largely on these works.

While we can speculate on the nature of the influences upon Eliot,

it is certainly safer to rely on Eliot's own testimony as to the individ­

uals who influenced him in the writing of these two important works. In

the writing of the Notes, Eliot has indicated that he was influenced pri­

marily by the writings of Canon V. A. Demant, Mr. Christopher Dawson,

Professor Karl Mannheim, and Mr. Dwight McDonald. 5 Canon Demant and

Christopher Dawson were well-known writers on the social implications of

religious thought. Karl Mannheim was of course the famous sociologist

whose views on elite and class were of particular importance to Eliot.

Dwight McDonald is known primarily as a critic of mass culture. Among

those who influenced Eliot with regard to the views expressed in The

Idea of a Christian Society were Canon Demant, Dawson, Middleton Murry,,

and Jacques Maritain. 6 Both Murry and Maritain \'/ere vigorous advocates

of social reconstruction based upon Christian principles. In general,

most of the writers who influenced Eliot as a social and cultural critic

r:: • ~T. S. El1ot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (New York:

Harcourt Brace, 1949), preface.

6T. S. Eliot, The Idea of a Christian Society (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940), pp. 3-4.

54

re either Roman Catholic, Anglican, or secularist writers with aristo-we . .

cratic tendencies. Curiously, Eliot did not mention his former teacher,

Irving Babbitt, with whom he shared many opinions.

The central concept of Eliot's entire social theory is "culture"

which is considerably broader in scope than the political context of

much existing social theory. Culture is also a more fundamental concept

than 11 society" which is based upon culture rather than the reverse. It

is therefore of considerable importance to inquire into Eliot's meaning

and use of the term "culture."

To begin with, Eliot veered back and forth between two general

meanings of culture. ·One meaning pertained to the general way of life

of a people. The following is an example of this usage:

Taking now the point of view of identification, the reader must remind himself, as the author has constantly to do, of how much is here embraced by the term culture. It includes all the char­acteristic activities and interests of a people: Derby Day, Henley Regetta, Cowes, the twelfth of August, a cup final, the dog races, the pin table, the dart board, Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections, beetroot in vinegar, nine­teenth century Gothic churches and the music of Elgar. The reader can make his own list.?

In addition, Eliot also sometimes employed culture to mean what has

generally become known as cultivation. In the following quotation,

he gave a detailed account of this type of culture.

There are several kinds of attainment which we may have in mind in different contexts. We may be thinking of refinement of manners -­or urbanity and civility: if so, we shall think first of a social class, and of the superior individual as representative of the best of that class. We may be thinking of learning and a close acquaintance with the accumulated wisdom of the past: if so our man is the scholar. We may be thinking of philosophy in the widest sense -- an interest in and some ability to manipulate abstract

7Notes, p. 104.

55

ideas: if so, we may mean the intellectual (recognizing the fact that this term is now used very loosely, to comprehend many persons not conspicuous for strength of intellect). Or we may be thinking of the arts: if so, we mean the artist and the amateur or dilettante. But what we seldom have in mind is all of these things at the same time.8

Eliot reconciled these two meanings of the term culture as a general

way of life and as cultivation by viewing them as different aspects of

one phenomenon. Cultivation referred to the culture of the individual and,

to some extent, of the group or class. However, the culture of the

individual and the culture of the class both reflect to a considerable

extent the general way of life or, in other words, the culture of the

whole society. In fact, cultivation refers to aspects of the whole

culture. Realizing this, Eliot criticized Matthew Arnold for giving

attention in Culture and Anarchy to the individual and class aspects of

of culture to the utter neglect of the societal aspect. In this respect,

Eliot exhibited the emphasis on the group which has been characteristic

of conservative thinkers in contrast to the stress on the individual of

the classical liberals.

In addition to defining the meaning of culture, Eliot was also

interested in the problem of what conditions would be essential for

maximum cultural creativity. He believed that there were at least three

such conditions: the existence of social classes, cultural regionalism,

and a balance between unity and diversity in religion.9 Before the writer

explains each of these conditions in detail, it should be emphasized

that all of the conditions which Eliot named were based upon the assump-

tion that balance is of the utmost value in encouraging intellectual

Brbi1., pp. 94-95. 9Ibid., pp. 87-88.

! ,,

56

and aesthetic achievement. By balance, Eliot had in mind combinations of

unity with diversity and of harmony with dissonance. The following

discussion of these conditions is designed to explain Eliot•s view.

To Eliot, each social class represented a distinct way of life.

In fact, he considered the chief function of each class to be that of

passing its culture, strengthened and revitalized, to future generations.

The primary agency for transmitting this social class heritage was the

family which Eliot thought more important than the school in transmitting

culture as a whole. An especially vital function of the family was its

transmission of a standard of civility and manners.lO

When intellectuals such as Karl Mannheim advocated the dominance

of elites who possessed outstanding abilities, Eliot believed that they

overlooked the equally vital role of social classes since the cultural

heritage consisted of much more than facts and techniques. Instead,

Eliot favored a combination of elites and social classes, which were to

be internally arranged in a hierarchical pattern. In describing this

hierarchy, Eliot wrote:

What I have advanced is not a 11 defense of ari stocracy 11 - an empha-

sis upon the importance of one organ of society. Rather it is a plea on behalf of a form of society in which there will be, from 11

top11

to 11 bottom," a continuous gradation of cultural levels: it is important to remember that we should not consider the upper levels as possessing more culture than the lower, but as representing a more conscious culture and a greater specialization of culture. I incline to believe that no true democracy can maintain itself unless it maintains these different levels of culture. 11

Eliot believed that a people should be neither too united nor too

lOJbid., p. 115.

lllbid., p. 121.

57

divided if culture is to flourish. Either extreme could lead to tyranny.

On the one hand, a graded social hierarchy is desirable. On the other

hand, members of different classes should possess a community of common

culture which would enable them to mix freely. In other words, classes

should exist but should not become rigidly stratified into castes. 12

Eliot also favored the encouragement and preservation of local

regional cultures since he believed that cultural diversity enriches

the cultures of the world. On the one hand, cultures need to attract

each other to affect one another; on the other hand, a certain degree

of repulsion is also needed for particular cultures to survive. An

example of what he desired is the 11 satellite culture. 11 He felt that this

was well exemplified by the cultures of the Irish, the Scots, and the

Welsh which he regarded as satellites of the allegedly more dominant

English culture. As satellites, these cultures have greatly enriched

English culture and, by the same token, have played a greater role in the

world than would have been true had they preserved their cultural

independence. By using the English language, Irish, Welsh, and Scottish

writers have reached a larger audience than if they had written in the

languages which once were their native vernaculars. The range of thought

and feeling represented in English literature has been greatly enlarged

not only because these vlriters used English, but a 1 so because many of

these writers have chosen to express and reflect the distinctive charac­

teristics of their native cultures. To reduce all the cultures of Great

Britain to one would, in Eliot's view, have restricted the range of

12rbid., p. 123.

58

h . t 13 1 ;terarY ac 1 evemen .

The same combination of unity and diversity was characteristic of

Eliot's position on the relationship of religion -to culture. He believed

that those religions were most culturally stimulating which were capable

of winning acceptance by people of widely diverse cultures. Such

religions provided a pattern of common belief which stimulated cultural

interchanges between peoples. On the other side, religious diversity was

needed to avoid petrification which would, depEnding on the natures of the

peoples affected, lead to either torpor or chaos. In f~~t, he feared

that a reunion of Christian churches might result in a general lowering

of the cultural level through the disappearance of much religious

diversity. 14

A constant struggle between the centripetal and the centrifugal

forces of religious unity and diversity was deemed by Eliot to be highly

desirable for without such a struggle, no balance could be maintained.

Christendom should, he felt, be one but, within it, there should be an

endless conflict of ideas; for truth is clarified and enlarged by

intellectual struggle. 15

Eliot's emphasis upon variety and diversity was, as we have seen,

consistent with the general direction of conservative thought. 16 He had,

however, a confidence in the eventual triumph of truth through discussion

and struggle which far exceeded what has been usual among conservatives.

13rbid., pp. 128-129.

14rbid., pp. 144-146.

1 5r b; d. , p. 1 57.

16see page 24 of this study.

II

I

59

The conservative view of men as being irrational by nature would tend to

mitigate such confidence., Evidently, Eliot's view of human nature was

somewhat more hopeful than the views of his philosophical allies.

Eliot's emphasis upon diversity obviously implied the cultivation

and encouragement of cultural diversities in the schools. Freedom of

discussion was also clearly implied; for rigorous censorship tends to

undermine diversity by restricting the range of individual exposure to

diverse views. The emphasis upon the encouragement and retention of a

class differentiated society also entail~d a multi-track system of

education with different types of education available to suit individuals

of correspondingly varied social backgrounds; for the existence of

different social classes clearly implies a difference in functions which

entails a need for different kinds of training to fulfill those functions.

To Eliot, social issues were clearly subordinate to cultural

questions. When discussing different types of society, he distinguished

between them on the basis of the cultural ideals which they exemplified.

He believed that there existed three significant kinds of society in the

contemporary world. The Christian society was characterized as the type

of society where behavior was regulated in accordance with Christian

principles. 17

The pagan society was described in terms antithetical to

Christian ideals. While Eliot was not very specific concerning the

attitudes inculcated by pagan societies, he cited Fascist countries as

examples of paganism. 18

l7Eliot, The Idea of a Christian Societx, p. 10. 1Brbid., p. 15.

60

The third type of society was the one in which Eliot believed him­

self to be living -- the negative society. This type of society has not

been guided by any ideal -- unless one could consider liberalism to be

an ideal. He considered liberalism to be a movement defined by its

starting point more than by ends. Eliot believed liberalism to consti­

tute a trend away from rather than towards something definite.l9 What

he possibly meant was that liberalism was essentially ~he emphasis upon

freedom, which should not be considered an end but only a means to an

end. Eliot did not attempt to explain his assertion at all; but the

interpretation we have given seems to be the only meaningful one.

Eliot felt that the inefficiency of liberal society would lead to

its eventual disappearance and replacement by a society that would be

either Christian or pagan. Eliot commented on the malaise of liberalism:

By destroying traditional social habits of the people, by dissolving their natural collective consciousness into individual constituents, by licensing the opinions of the most foolish, by substituting instruction for education, by encouraging cleverness rather than wisdom, the upstart rather than the qualified, by fostering a notion of getting~ to which the alternative is a hope.less apathy, Liberalism can prepare the way for that which is its own negation: the artificial, mechanised, or brutalized control which is a desperate remedy for its chaos.20

As is evident, Eliot viewed liberalism as a movement characterized by

equalitarianism, an excessive emphasis upon freedom, and a hopeless ab-

sence of standards. Unless replaced by a Christian society, liberalism

could only lead to tyranny. In presenting his views about the Christian

society, Eliot was not concerned either with the means of bringing it

19rbid., p. 12

20Ibid., p. 12.

into existence nor about defending it. He wanted primarily to show how

it vwuld differ from the negative, liberal society in which he lived.21

Of special concern to him was its 11 idea 11 or ends.

61

The aims of a Christian society \tould be the virtue and well-being

of the people and the attainment of beatitude for those who would be

capable of it.22

A Christian society would consist of two basic elements:

the masses and the elite 11 Community of Christians. 11 The Community of

Christians would consist of those clergy and laity who possess suffi­

cient spiritual and intellectual development to understand Christian

doctrines and to live consciously by them. 23 As for the masses, their

adherence to Christianity would be largely behavioral and would be ex­

pressed both in their behavior towards their neighbors and in customary

religious observances. Eliot believed that the masses had only a mini-

mal capacity for reflecting on the objects of faith. Instead of attempt­

ing to inculcate an understanding among them of the most abstruse con­

cerns of theology, it was far more important to convey to them a reali­

zation of how far their lives fell short of the Christian ideal.24 This

position clearly implied that beyond a certain minimal level of attain-

ment formal education should be selective in applicability. If the

differences in intellectual understanding were, as Eliot apparently as­

sumed, largely due to differences in innate potentialities, there was

21 Ibid., p. 6. 22 Ibid., p. 27.

23lli1·' p. 34.

24Ibid., p. 23.

Tittle use in attempting to train individuals beyond the limits of their

abi.lities.

Eliot believed that a nation's educational system was far more

important than its government. In attempting to delineate the outline

of his Christian society, Eliot devoted some attention to schooling as a

means of bringing about the conditions needed for the smooth functioning

of that society. The primary aim of education in such a society would

be to train people. to think in Christian categories. Eliot considered

such Christian· thought to be more important than the encouragement of the

outv1ard manifestations of Christian piety which was not necessarily a

reliable indicator of the possession of Christian faith. The beliefs of

the rulers of a nation were, to Eliot, of 1ess significance than the

beliefs of the population over which they ruled since the practical

necessities of political life necessitated their conformity to the ideals

of the citizenry of their country.25

Eliot believed it to be essential that there exist a certain cul-

tural uniformity based upon agreement concerning what everyone should

know. This uniformity was considered necessary to provide cultural

continuity and to promote communication. In a Christian society, the

content of education would in large part be determined by Christian

principles. In the United States, according to Eliot, there was such

pervasive permissiveness that one could not assume that any two under-

graduates had read the same books or taken the same courses unless they

had attended the same school and had studied with the same teacher at

-.):

25 Ibid., p. 22.

62

63

the same time. To Eliot, education differed from instruction in that

there was some principle of selection of the knowledge which any educa­

ted person should possess. In a negative society, the ideal of wisdom

was displaced by uncontrolled experimentation and permissiveness.26 In

his opposition to the elective system of education, Eliot typified con­

servative opinion. The conservative assumption of the existence of a

natural hierarchy of value clearly implies the existence of a hierarchy

of subjects which embody these values. It follows that the selection of

subjects to be studied should be based on this hierarchy rather than on

the personal desires of the students involved. Eliot did not make clear

his reasons for opposing the elective system, but his stand is consistent

with his general educational position.

As to his views concerning education in the democratic, secularist

society in which he found himself, Eliot took a different approach; for

he was confronted by a different set of questions than when he concerned

himself with the structuring of a Christian society. On the whole, Eliot

found himself in sympathy with C. E. M. Joad's statement of the purposes

of education.27 Joad believed that education should prepare people to

earn a livelihood, to become good citizens, and to develop and use their

26Ibid., pp. 32-33.

27Joad was a British philosopher and a contemporary of Eliot. He is known today for his conversion from religious skepticism to religious traditionalism which occurred during his old age. See Eliot's discussion of Joad's educational ideas in Eliot's To Criticize the Critic and Other Essays (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1965), pp. 69-70.

64

abilities. Although generally sympathetic to Joad's educational views,

Eliot would have preferred the implementation of somewhat different

objectives. To Eliot, one of the most important purposes of education

was 11 to preserve the class and to select the elite." 28 While Eliot did

not specify a particular program of preservation and selection, it is

possible to extrapolate on these matters from his general philosophy.

Education was to be a means whereby the cultures of the various classes

would be transmitted to future generations. It would also be a means of

selecting the intellectual elite. In an article on T. S. Eliot's views

on education, Robert M. Hutchins expressed the opinion that the existence

of class and elite were irrelevant to human improvement because members

of social classes could be both wicked and stupid while members of the

elite could be wicked but apparently not stupid. 29 For his position to

possess much cogency, Hutchins would have to show why men would not be

more wicked or more stupid without classes or elites; for to argue con-

vincingly against the existence or encouragement of classes and elites,

one would have to prove that they do at least as much harm as good. To

say that classes and elites have not attained perfection is not equiva-

lent to a denial that they do some good. Eliot did not maintain that

classes and elites would make men perfect. In fact, Eliot wanted to

improve classes and elites by appropriate educational reforms. He would

probably view Hutchin's strictures as indicative of the need of improving

the education of members of social classes and elites -- not for ignoring . these groups.

28Eliot, Notes, p. 177.

29R.M. Hutchins, "T. S. Eliot on Education,t' f1easure l (Hinter, 1950), 3.

65

In any case, Eliot wished to diminish the occurrence of both

wickedness and stupidity. In addition to the function assigned to educa­

tion with respect to class and elite, Eliot believed in the importance of

schooling as an agency both for cultural continuity and the development

of the moral and intellectual faculties of mankind. In fact, he con­

sidered cultural continuity to be a major factor in the elevation of

those faculties. The subjects which Eliot believed to be of special

value in fostering cultural continuity were history and foreign lan­

guages.30 Among the languages, Eliot believed that Latin and Greek were

of special importance; for much of the Western Christian heritage was

originally communicated through these languages.31 In essence, Eliot

sought to justify traditional humanistic education.

Like most other conservative writers on education, Eliot believed

that general education was more important than vocational training.

Before one can become a good citizen, one must learn how to be a good

man.32 Learning should be primarily for the purpose of acquiring wisdom.

Other considerations should be secondary.33 Even when pursuing other

purposes, it was vital that students concentrated on the strictly

academic subjects. To become a good citizen, for example, Eliot

30Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, p. 119.

31T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Horld, 1960), p. 459.

32Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, p. 85.

33Eliot, Notes, p. 175.

66 recommended the study of history, economics, and government. History was

to be studied not primarily as a foundation for the acquisition of

familiarity with the technical aspects of government but rather as a means

of developing critical thinking and ethical consciousness.34

Eliot was especially concerned with what he regarded as the._headlong

rush to educate everyone. He believed that mass education would inevi­

tably lead to the lowering of academic standards and to the abandoning of

those subjects which transmitted the essence of culture. 35 Presumably,

the latter consequence would result from the pressure to simplify educa­

tion to enable the masses to understand what they are asked to study.

Eliot believed that to educate above the level of the student's abilities

would be disastrous by both creating discontent and mental strain.36 In

answer to Eliot, Hutchins denied that men could have too much education;

for if wisdom is a major aim of education, who could question the

position that men should have as much wisdom as possible? 37 The obvious

reply from Eliot's point of view would be that if a man is not capable of

absorbing with some understanding the educational material meted out to

him, than he would be getting too much education for his abilities.

Ultimately, this difference in viewpoint between Eliot and Hutchins was

34Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, p. 89.

3SEliot, Notes, p. 185.

36Ibid., p. 176.

37Hutchins, 11 T. S. Eliot on Education, 11 p. 2.

arently based upon a strong difference of opinion pertaining to the app

67

educational potentialities of the masses. This difference might possibly

be based upon differences in judgment concerning the relative efficacy of

environment as against heredity. Unfortunately, Hutchins was not very

explicit in stating his views so that it is difficult to untangle his

assumptions. Also, Eliot might have been somewhat more explicit as well.

Eliot devoted considerable attention in his educational writings to

the "equality of education" argument which he believed was based upon

three erroneous assumptions: (1) superiority is always superiority of

intellect; (2) there is an infallible method of detecting intellect; (3)

it is possible to devise a system that could infallibly nourish intellect.

From these false assumptions, there has arisen the ideal of an education­

al system that would sort out everyone according to his intellect. 38

Eliot's usage of the concept of equality of opportunity was more

applicable to British than to American conditions. During the twentieth

century, especially since World War II, there has been a concerted effort

to replace Britain's class system of education by a meritocracy. This

replacement has been done in the name of "equality of opportunity." In

the United States during the late nineteenth century and continuing into

the early part of the btenti eth century, equa 1 i ty of opportunity had the

same connotations as the present British usage. It commonly meant the

opportunity of the poor and disadvantaged individual to rise in the social

and occupational hierarchy through a combination of abilit,x,, ene_r_gy, hard

work, and good moral conduct. The stress was at that time upon

opportunity rather than upon equality, although no such concerted effort

38Eliot, Notes, pp. 177-179.

made to put it into effect as in present-day Britain. Today, the was

68

l·n the United States is upon equality including the utilization of stress

racial and ethnic quota systems and the relaxing of educational standards.

This would probably have alarmed Eliot more than the British usage; for

an equalitarian education is obviously more antithetical to conservative

ideals than a meritocracy. The essential conservative stress upon

hierarchy is in direct opposition to the current American trend. The

difference in attitudes toward opportunity is one of many possible illus­

trations of the fact that despite the alleged socialism of the British

economic system, its educational system is more conservative than the

American counterpart.

Although Eliot thought that the exceptional individual should have

the opportunity to rise in the social scale, the aim of sorting out every­

one in accordance with his or her abilities was unattainable and would

disorganize society by the substitution of elites of intellect for classes.

He believed that tests were not necessarily accurate indicators of the

most important abilities. Rigid conformity to the educational system

might actually be the real criterion of selection instead of intellectual

ability. The education of everyone capable of receiving a higher educa­

tion must, he thought, lead inevitably to a lowering of academic

standards through the concomitant overcrowding of the schools. Mass

education would also enlarge the powers of the state since it would

acquire control over the means of selection which control would ultimately

lead to making the ends of the state the most important consideration in

higher education. Eliot believed that education could function best when

I

existed some balance between privilege and opportunity.39 there

Eliot's fear of overcrowding as a consequence of providing higher

69

education for all those capable of receiving it was apparently based upon

the assumption that admission standards would be sufficiently generous so

that massive enrollment would be an inevitable outcome. This does not,

however, necessarily follow .. Standards might be set at a sufficiently

high level to avoid that outcome. Perhaps, Eliot thought that political

pressures would militate against raising standards, but the truth of this

assumption would depend on the degree of political supervision over the

agencies that would regulate academic admissions standards. In any case,

the level at which individuals are deemed to be capable of profiting from

a university education is to some degree relative to the standards of

judgment so that some leeway is possible.

To understand the full significance of Eliot's viewpoints, it is

important to view his entire philosophy from a broad perspective. He

was, as we have seen, reacting primarily against two contemporary trends.

One of these was the decline of Christian influences together with the

concomitant rise of the negative society, bereft of dedication either to

religious faith or to moral standards. The other was the pressure to

lower academic standards. He believed that the latter trend was the re-

sult of both pressure from the educational equalitarians and from the

advocates of an educational meritocracy.

Eliot's reaction to these trends was largely the consequence of his

belief in the importance of cultural creativity and of religious belief.

----------------------------------------------------------------39rbid., pp. 177-178. See also Eliot, To Criticize the Critic,

p. 103.

.II.

70

f l t that the negative society would undermine cultural activity by ~ e .

destroying the traditional social habits of the people and by undermining

the class structure of society. He was a 1 so fearful of the consequence of

mass education-- especially, the pressure .to lower academic standards

and to neglect those subjects which he considered most important for

cultural creativity. He also believed that the negative society was a

symptom of growing religious and moral skepticism which, if not arrested,

would lead to the growth of an aggresively pagan society.

Eliot's educational concerns were directly related to his general

socio-cultural viewpoint. One of the major aims of education~ as con­

ceived by Eliot was cultural transmission; for he believed that cultural

creativeness would decline if the various cultures of the world were to

lose their individuality. Another of his aims, wisdom, pertained to the

transmission of the insights of the past. This aim could likewise be

considered as a kind of cultural transmission; for Eliot conceived of

culture in such a way as to unite the anthropological and aesthetic senses

of the term. The intellectual and aesthetic cultivation of the intelli-

gentsia was, to him, only a more conscious form of the basic culture of

society. In addition, he was concerned with education as an instrument

for training in citizenship and for class and elite recruitment. The last

function was an expression of his basically aristocratic orientation. In

general, Eliot's views can be characterized as expressions of a combination

of cultural and religious concerns:

71 The Views of Russell Kirk

One of the most famous figures in the neo-conservative movement is

Russell W. Kirk, who has written many well-known works on conservatism

and was one of the founders of both Modern Age and the National Review,

pe-rhaps the two most influential magazines published in the United States

which are devoted to matters of interest to conservatives. Professor

Kirk is a graduate of Michigan State University (1940). He subsequently

received theM. A. degree from Duke University (1941) and the doctorate

from St. Andrews University in Scotland (1952). From 1946 until 1953, he

taught history of civilization at Michigan State. From 1957 to 1969, he

was Research Professor of Politi~s at C. W. Post College. During the same

period, he also was University Professor at Long Island University. He

writes and lectures extensively and makes his home, as befits a true con­

servative, at the domicile of his ancestors, Mecosta, Michigan. To judge

by the academic posts that he has occupied, Kirk's chief academic in­

terests are apparently history and political science.

His best known works are probably The Conservative Mind (1953),

A Program for Conservatives (1954), Academic Freedom (1955), and Eliot

and His Age (1971). The Conservative Mind is a history of Anglo-

American writings on conservatism from Burke to Santayana which, in the

revised edition, was extended to include the writings ofT. S. Eliot. 40

40The propriety of including Santayana as a conservative is highly questionable. Santayana did not adhere to the hierarchical metaphysics characteristic of conservatives, but exhibited instead strong material­istic tendencies.

72

In A Program for Conservatives, Kirk sought to show how conservative

principles can be applied to the social, educational, and political

problems which concern us. The title, Academic Freedom, is self-explan­

atory. Eliot and His Age is devoted to the 1 i fe of T. S. Eliot and to

the people and ideas which influenced Eliot. As a writer, Kirk is un­

doubtedly an accomplished literary artist, although quite neglectful of

the systematic and sustained argumentation characteristic of the skilled

philosopher. As is well-known, Kirk derived the essentials of his con­

servative viewpoint largely from the writings of Edmund Burke. 41

In what is perhaps the most explicit statement of Kirk's general

philosophy, A Program for Conservatives, Kirk has named what he consid­

ered to be the ten most crucial problems which should concern the people

of the United States. As will soon be evident, these are long term

problems, not evanescent in character, and were stated in Burkean terms.

In viewing these questions, we can obtain a clear understanding of the

nature of the Burkean approach to contemporary American problems ..

The problem of the heart is one of these. Specifically, Kirk meant

the question of how to enable the will to again act in accordance with

ethical and spiritual precepts.42 By 11 Spiritual, 11 he was evidently

referring to religion; for his prescription involved both the restoration

of belief in intrinsic moral values and in religious faith. The basic

reason for the existence of the problem of the heart was deemed to be the

decline of tradition. The fundamental criterion and source of values was

4lsee Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 6.

42Russell Kirk, A Program for Conservatives (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962). pp. 16, 80.

1 I

d d to be the universal order of nature, established by a means co11s i ere

"more than human. u43 Kirk had in effect grounded rightness of wi 11 on

73

the natural law doctrine of :'right reason .. -- obedience to the values

derived from a nature conceived to be rationally ordered and therefore

understandable by reason. In essence, this view implied the subordination

of will to reason.

Kirk identified the spread of boredom among the masses as another

problem. The causes for this problem were multiple. The decline of

religion undermined the faith of the people in meaningful ends and pur­

poses. This problem was exacerbated by industralization which led to a

wide-spread intoxication with machinery and to an insatiable desire for

sensations. Add to these factors the undermining of individual and

family responsibilities by the steady extension of the powers of the

state, and the individual was thus condemned to an empty and rudderless

existence. 44

Kirk exhibited little confidence in the ability of the masses to

find satisfactory substitutes for religious faith and a sense of indivi­

dual responsibility. His remedies were closely tied in with the causes

stipulated. He believed that religion must be revived and that indivi-

dual self-reliance must be restored if existence was to recover its sig-

nificance. Through religion, the individual would acquire the sense of

purpose needed to make life meaningful, while by the experience obtained

through the exercise of individual responsibility, additional meaning

~;auld be procured. 45 To Kirk, the primary exemplification of boredom

was the rootless man, dispossessed of both traditional supports and

--· 44Ibid., pp. 105-107. 45rbid., pp. 12o-121.

! I

i.

74

enduring convictions.

Kirk clearly linked boredom to the related problem of the decline

of the community spirit which referred to the loss of the feeling of

identity with the groups to which one belongs. The communal spirit was

deemed to be highly desirable both for the sense of personal security and

comradeship which it produced among individuals, and because of the

relatively unselfish striving for the common good which was a consequent.

causes for the decline of communal spirit were, according to Kirk, the

gradual subversion of the autonomy of local groups through the diffusion

of the powers of the state and the modern overvaluation of the importance

of economic factors in contributing to human contentment. Kirk

recommended the revival of autonomous groups and institutions. He

especially insisted upon encouraging private schooling for he felt that

public education was becoming much too dominant, thereby undermining the

variety and independence of the schools.46

Several implicit assumptions supported Kirk•s position. An obvious

one was that humans as social animals find their happiness in groups.

For communal loyalties to be meaningful, they must focus on local groups

rather than on some abstract concept such as "humanity .. or 11 World peace."

Kirk was obviously very much aware of the limitations of human nature,

not the least of which was the strong need for emotional security.

When we turn to Kirk•s.discussion of the problem of social justice,

we are confronted by a question of a somewhat different character. As

far as Kirk was concerned, the model for social justice was a hierar-

chical society in which each individual would be found in the place

46Ibid., pp. 155-161-162.

best suited .to his intrinsic nature. The chief obstacle to social

justice was believed to be rooted in the widespread resentment of

excellence which Kirk considered a meance to both culture and society.47

75

Thus, when dea 1 i ng with the concept of soci a 1 justice,_ Kirk was concerned

primarily with differentiation in contrast to the stress on identity

implicit in his concept of community._ To Kirk, the ideal society must

possess the right balance between identity and differentiation. In their

proper contexts, both factors were deemed to be important.

Kirk's concept of social justice can be contrasted with the view

that equates social justice with equality .. The contrasts in the views

of social justice can be stated in terms of divergent conceptions of

human nature and of human welfare. For the conservative, men are innately

unequal. For the equalitarian, men should be considered equal in at

least the most important aspects of their nature. For the conservative,

the uplift of the most able is most important for progress; but for the

equalitarian, it-is the uplift of the masses. The conservative educator

is therefore strongly inclined to concentrate on developing the talents

of his most gifted students; the more equalitarian, on raising the

average level of his class.

To Kirk, the fundamental cause of the pervasiveness of the resent­

ment against excellence was the increasing dominance of the mass mind

and the consequent pandering of the purveyors of culture to mediocrity.

He also indicted the universities for subordinating liberal learning to

the aims of utility and of sociability. To achieve social justice, in

47Ibid., p. 175.

76

Kirk's sense of the term, there must, he thought, be an elevation of the

standards of achievement.48 Kirk's prescription seems, to this writer,

to be grossly inadequate. If resentment against excellence is to be

reduced, a respect for excellence must be created. This would involve an

inculcation of a sense of qualitative excellence through an emphasis upon

developing the tastes- of young people, both in the schools and in their

homes.

The problem of wants is closely related to that of social justice.

Specifically, the problem is how to enable people to want the right

things from the standpoint of justice. The excessive stress on material

wants to the neglect of spiritual needs implicitly involves the problems

of excellence and of the inversion of values. By spiritual values, Kirk

meant moral values and the ideal of qualitative excellence. His remedies

included a revival of such traditional goods as justice, mercy, honor,

charity, and fine craftsmanship. Decentralized industry was believed to

be an important means of stimulating more people to engage in creative

and responsible activity.49

The next problem to engage Kirk's attention~ that of order, is just

barely distinguishable from that of social justice, for both pertain to

the concept of hierarchy. Social justice, as conceived by Kirk, pertained

to the attainment of an ideal condition in which each individual would

ccupy the place proper to his nature. Order, as such, referred to the

harmony and balance which were believed to be consequences of the

48Ibid., pp. 175-176, 180.

49Ibid., pp. 17, 194, 201-202, 219.

77

attainment of social justice. Kirk believed that the harmonious arrange­

ment of funtions and ideals would guard justice. He did not directly

explain the connection between harmony and justice, but he presumably

meant that the spirit of harmony would produce the tranquility which would

limit the development and exercise of envy. The decay of order was

attributed to the decline of the spirit of community which was essential

to developing social harmony since identification with the social good

presumably lessens individual presumption. 50 The cure was obviously

implicit in the cause -- the revival of community by application of the

suggestions previously made. 51

The decline in social order \-Jas, according to Kirk, paralleled by

a similar decline in the sense of order between the various subjects

offered in the curricula of educational institutions -- especially those

concerned with higher education. According to Kirk, most university

administrators have accepted the view that all studies were of equal

value. For example, a class in fly-casting might be considered as equal

in value to one in Greek. A consequences has been a shift in emphasis

from the thorough mastery of a few subjects to a superficial acquaintance

with many. Kirk•s own rating of the fields of study will be discussed

after an analysis of his general views on education. 52

Kirk viewed the problem of power in terms of the restraint of

might by 11 right reason. 11 As a concept, power had, to Kirk, negative

50The speculation on how community contributes to order is my own based upon inferences from Kirk•s line of thinking.

51Kirk, A Program for Conservatives, pp. 229-233.

52rbi_Q_., p. 229.

, I

implications; for it denoted the absence of restrictions on arbitrary

human actions, and his primary concern was with limiting power out of

solicitude for the preservation of traditional moral values. He also

justified the restriction of power by pointing to the rise of the dic­

tators and the two world wars as political and military consequences of

the arbitrary human actions of the past. The remedy prescribed was to

limit and decentralize power, although one might well wonder how the

holders of power could be persuaded to part with some of that precious

commodity. 53

78

Perhaps-part of the answer can be found in Kirk•s discussion of the

next problem which pertained to loyalty. The decline of loyalty to the

nation and to the family was attributed to a combination of factors such

as the decline of faith in religious and moral values, the general neglect

of liberal education, the rise of the "gutter" press (Kirk did not explain

what he meant by that), and the rise of equalitarianism. Our chief con-

cern in this regard is with Kirk•s strictures on schools and the press

since newspapers are obviously educational agencies. The decline of lib­

eral education helped to undermine loyalty since with it came a neglect

of history, especially the history of one•s own country. Concurrently,

the literature enshrining loyalty to family and nation, such as moralistic

writings and biographies of respected national figures, was also neg­

lected. Regarding the press, Kirk may have had reference to the

critical attitudes of many journalists tm·1ard traditional American values.

53Ibid., pp. 17, 251, 255-256.

II

I I I li

79

In any case, his use of the term "gutter" indicates a strong emotional

reaction. Kirk•s suggestions for the revival of loyalty included the

increased teaching and study of history and a greater stress upon

religious values. Furthermore, Kirk would prefer to see a nation of

people characterized by civility of manners, a political system where

justice is fairly administered, and safe conditions so that citizens are

secure against criminals. It is difficult to love a nation whose people

are not lovable. Therefore, the need to elevate the manners of the

people can be as pressing as the need to obtain inspiration from the

American past. 54

One of the primary problems mentioned by Kirk pertained to the need

for the revival of tradition. The need was justified on several grounds.

Like Burke, Kirk maintained that the principal source of our social

wisdom was the experience of the race as forged through triumph and

tragedy over thousands of years. Tradition was deemed to be far superior

to the wisdom that any one human being could accumulate on his own; for

it involved the accumulated experiences of untold numbers of people in

diverse situations, confronting a fantastic range of problems. Further­

more, our moral values have traditional roots, and Kirk was convinced

that these values could be much more effectively communicated through

such traditional institutions as the family and the church than through

formal classroom instruction. Although traditions were deemed to be in

need of periodic revisions, Kirk warned that these revisions should not

54on his viei<JS concerning loyalty, see ibid., pp. 17, 282, 290.

be undertaken heedlessly or too boldly. The presumption must always be

in favor of tradition unless the case to the contrary is overwhelming.

80

Implicit in this position is a distrust of the sole or predominant

reliance upon abstract reason in the apprehension and solution of human

problems. Educationally, this distrust of the exclusive reliance on

reason would encourage the non-intellectual aspects of human nature-­

such as the aesthetic and the experimental -- not to r.eplace the intellec­

tual but to add to it. It also implies an emphasis upon those fields of

study which can serve as vehicles for tradition -- such as religion,

history, and literature. To Kirk, the methods of the more abstract and

intellectualized studies were not universally applicable. For him, there

was no universal model of general applicability. Epistemology was in

truth a multifaceted study.55

Lastly, we come to the problem of the mind, the problem most

closely related to educational concerns. Kirk viewed this problem in

terms of redeeming intellectual life from the 11 sterility and uniformity

of the mass-age. 1156 We can discern his meaning by examining the charges

which he leveled against current educational and cultural practices that

neglected manners and morals in favor of an unmitigated sensuality and

emphasized mediocrity at the expense of the naturally talented in

academic and cultural areas. Kirk•s opposition to the stressing of

mediocrity rested upon his contention that only the few were capable of

absorbing the liberal arts with full comprehension and that future social

55on tradition, see Kirk ibid., pp. 298-299; 303-305.

56Ibid., p. 16.

progress would depend largely on the development of leadership. In

specific reference to education, Kirk saw the current pressure to lower

academic standards as an instance of the confusion of quantity with

quality.

As a remedy, Kirk proposed that ethical sensibility be cultivated

81

by the study and imitation of the lives of great individuals and by

examples of elevated human character depicted in the writings of such

authors as Plutarch, Dante, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Burke, and Ruskin, so

that the student could acquire a sense of moral and intellectual excel­

lence. The values attained would in turn be based upon the hierarchical

order which Kirk believed to prevail throughout the universe. 57 In

addition, Kirk stressed a liberal education, with high standards of

selective excellence applied to all who sought to undertake such a program.

To Kirk, the essential basis for the existence of schools was to attain

and disseminate the truth -- not to mollify the community. Anything

which might interfere with this goal was to be condemned. 58

The basic aim of the dissemination of truth, as Kirk conceived of

it, can best be given in Kirk's own words.

By the spirit of a gentleman, Burke and Newman did not mean simply the deportment of superior rank. They meant, rather, that eleva­tion of mind and temper, that generosity and courage of mind, which are the property of every person whose intelligence and character have been humanely disciplined. They meant that liberal education

57rbid., pp. 59-61.

58Russe11 Kirk, Academic Freedom (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), pp. 11-12.

I 1,,,

',11

1

1.\. 'I'

and that habit of acting upon principles which rise superior to immediate advantage and private interest, which distinguish the

82

free man from the servile man .... Lacking this, Burke says,.all the schooling in the world is of no avai1.59

To Kirk, a humane education therefore had primarily a moral sig­

nificance. In fact, he conceived of humanitas as a whole in terms of

ethical discipline. The virtues which he identified are primarily

aristocratic virtues -- those that have been traditionally associated

with the nobility.

In considering educational questions, Kirk has devoted considerable

attention to the meaning of academic freedom. He adopted W. T. Couch's

definition of academic freedom as the protection of teachers from any

hazards that would prevent teachers from fulfilling their obligation to

pursue the truth. 60 The pursuit of truth involved the freedom of both

teachers and students to express their views but excluded attempts to

indoctrinate students. Kirk did not define indoctrination, but presuma-

bly he meant the systematic attempt to convert students to a particular

ideology regardless of the truth of particular statements made in pursuing

that objective. It would have been of considerable aid in understanding

how he differentiated between freedom of expression and indoctrination

had he explained his meaning of 11 indoctrination. 11

To Kirk, academic freedom pertained both to the finding and to the

limited dissemination of the truth. Kirk's adherence to freedom was

sharp1y mitigated by his lack of confidence in the old liberal view that

59Kirk, A Program for Conservatives, pp. 58-59.

60Kirk, Academic Freedom, p. 1.

I

'1.

truth would eventually prevail in competition with falsehood on the open

He believed that this vie~v had been based on the "foolish" con­market.

viction of the goodness and the rationality of men. In fact, Kirk be-

lieved that the ordinary citizen was often unable to distinguish between

what was beneficial ·and what was harmful. 61 Kirk •s adherence to freedom

was therefore limited and qualified. For example, he felt that commu-

83

nists should be tolerated for the time being because they did not consti- . I

tute a major threat, and because more harm would be done by censorship

than by permitting them to freely express their views. He added, however,

that changing circumstances could alter his stand on the matter.62 He

did advocate the censorship of pornography because he believed that

·pornographic literature undermined the tastes and morals of the communi­

ty. 63 In subscribing to these views, Kirk \'tas being quite consistent

with his general conservative position on human nature. Since he favored

curbing freedom in general, it may be very likely that his view of

academic freedom was similarly limited.

It is important that we consider the general significance of his

selection and treatment of the problems confronting conservatives. First,

his choices of problems are interesting. The questions he asked were all

of a long-term character -- not ephemeral problems such as those which

61Russe11 Kirk, Beyond the Dreams of Avarice (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), pp. 105, 109, 114.

62Ibid., pp. 123-124.

63Ibid., pp. 127-128.

84

usually interest journalists. Furthermore, the problems chosen were not

basicallY of a financial or economic character but were rather questions

which pertained to the human needs for emotional security, responsible

activity, and acceptance of a set of cogent values. To Kirk, man was a

creature driven primarily by the needs of the spirit-- not by economic

needs nor by biological urges. In agreement with Sigmund Freud, Kirk

depicted man as weak, but unlike Freud, Kirk has. viewed human problems in

a spiritual rather than a physical context. Furthermore, Kirk consid­

ered human nature to be an amalgam of good and evil, although he empha­

sized aspects of human nature which some people would regard as signs

of evil but which he preferred to view as signs of weakness. To Freud,

man was unequivocally evil in the sense that he conceived of man as

guided primarily by selfish emotional needs. In Kirk's opinion, humans

were governed more by their appetites than by their reason but he ex­

hibited more confidence in their improvability than had Freud. Through

guidance and the cultivation of a sense of emotional security, Kirk be­

lieved that men might obtain the strengths so conspicuously lacking in

their nature.64

Of the ten problems specified by Kirk, every one with the excep­

tions of social justice, order, and tradition was directly based upon

and was an expression of the need for moral and religious values to

provide the needed guidance. Indirectly, even the three problems ex­

cepted were linked to this basic need. Two of these problems, social

justice and order, were based upon the need for a clearly defined hier­

archy in which each individual would find his proper place. Can it be

64Kirk, A Program for Conservatives, p. 191.

I 'I

85

denied that a just hierarchy must be based on a system of ordered values?

Furthermore, the other problem excepted, tradition, pertained to what was

in essence a means for the inculcation of values.

The causes named by Kirk for the problems confronting mankind can be

reduced to four: the rise of equalitarianism, ·the decline of belief in

moral and religious values, the extension of the power of the state, and

industrialization. From a broader perspective, equalitarianism could

be considered a manifestation of an implicit denial of the reality of

objective values, at least with regard to the qualities of human beings.

If such values exist, humans must differ in their approximation to those

values; for the existence of values implies the existence of disvalues.

Otherwise, we could not be aware that these values exist. If all men are

equal, this implies that valuational judgments pertaining to them cannot

be valid, beyond our own purely subjective preferences. This viewpoint,

if valid, would also weaken the case for the existence of objective values

in general. The power of the state might well be viewed as a consequence

of the decline of the integrity of statesmen; the deleterious effects of

industrialization might well be considered one of the contributing causes

of the decline of values, with the stress on sen~ations, characteristic

of industrialized countries, blurring the efficacy of values.

Kirk•s suggested remedies can likewise be reduced to a few essential

ones -- the revival of faith in religious and moral values, the elevation

of the standards of human achievement, and a greater reliance upon

individual initiative in contrast to the present emphasis upon the state.

The emphasis upon the individual would be expressed not only in greater

personal responsibility but also in the encourc.gement of local groups and

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86

private institutions. On the \<Jhole, he was not very specific as to how

to implement these remedies. Perhaps this vagueness was intentional, but

at the very least a systematic discussion of the precise values which he

had in mind would have been helpful. Nevertheless, Kirk's vie\'1point is

clear in its general purport; an emphasis upon the principle of

objectively ordered moral and intellectual values, apprehended primarily

through traditional usage.

Kirk's views on social problems were certainly consistent with his

general metaphysical position. Though Kirk's metaphysical views were

given only in fragments, it is clear that he believed in the existence

of an orderly universe based upon divine foundations. He thereby

implicitly assumed the existence of a dichotomy between nature and con­

vention, with the former conceived of as universal order and the latter

conceived of in terms of violation of that natural order. 65

To Kirk, the major purpose of education was, as we have seen,

ethical in character. This purpose was to be achieved through the

inculcation of understanding of the moral and intellectual order of the

universe as set forth primarily in the great literary classics of the

past. Such an education would presumably be based upon the coherence

theory of truth since Kirk believed in the existence of an ordered inter­

related universe. The student would presumably be expected to show the

logical coherence and consistency of facts in relationship to one

another; for order implies coherence and consistency. With regard to

the organization of the curriculum, it would seem to follow that this

would be based upon a prescriptive rather than an elective ordering of

choices; for Kirk believed in the existence of objective values, over

65Ibid., pp. 41-42, 59; Kirk, Academic Freedom, p. 4.

87

and beyond the personal preferences of the students involved. By applica­

tion of these values, the curriculum would be determined. 66

Before stipulating the specific subjects to be comprised in the

curriculum, we should give some attention to the illative sense, a con­

cept \·Jhich Kirk borrowed from the \vritings of John Henry Cardinal Newman~

The illative sense was described as the product of the interaction of

intuition, instinct, imagination, and experience as sifted by critical

reasoning. This sense, when properly exercised, contributed insights

into first principles and into the ultimate foundations of authority.

Kirk valued the illative sense even more highly than reason; for through

its use, one could attain insight, a means of apprehension which he be-

lieved to exceed in depth the products of reason alone. This view obvi­

ously impli~d a stress upon those subjects through which insight could

be obtained such as the arts, literature, and the drama. History could

likewise provide the student with insightful experiences, especially when

events are viewed in relationship to the general principles determining

human conduct and their consequences. With regard to methods, imitation

was of importance; for many insights cannot be adequately communicated

through formal instruction.67

Kirk recommended that on the primary and secondary levels of

education, students should concentrate on learning the techniques by

which knowledge is acquired and by which the mind is prepared to reason

66The content of this paragraph was based upon direct inferences from Kirk's writing rather than explicit formulations by Kirk himself.

67Kirk, The Conservative Mind, pp. 249-250.

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logically. Although some attention would be given to content subjects,

the emphasis would be on the acquisition of skills. When students reach

the university level, he felt that they should concentrate upon the study

of the liberal arts; for the education of the whole man was considered to t be of greater importance than the training of the specialist. Overall,

Kirk was intensely interested in the imposition of higher standards of

academic performance on all levels of academic instruction; for hP.

believed that educators have tended to emphasize mediocrity and

inferiority at the expense of superiority. 68

Typical of the reactions of the critics of Kirk's views were those

found in the comments of Gordon K. Lewis of Brandeis University and C.

Wright Mills of Columbia University. Both writers questioned the

practicality of Kirk's suggestions. Lewis maintained that the difficulties

inherent in attempting to bring a viable conservatism into existence in a

non-traditional society like that of the United States would be virtually

insurmountable. Besides, to Lewis, arguments based upon tradition seemed

to be mere disguises for privilege.69 Mills believed that conservatism

was irrelevant to American problems; for the United States had no

aristocracy. He doubted whether one could be created.70 He maintained

68Kirk, Academic Freedom, p. 181.

69Gordon K. Lewis, 11 The Hetaphysics of Conservatism, .. The Western Political Quarterly 6 (December, 1953), pp. 737, 741.

70c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 329.

that the American elite lacked the cultivation and the moral elevation

of a true aristocracy. According to Mills, the dominant value of the

American elite was predatory successJl

89

Both Lewis and Mills repudiated conservatism on practical grounds,

although Lewis also had strong doubts concerning conservative principles.

As we have noted, to Lewis, conservatism was an apology for privilege

whereas Mills saw several points of tension between the conservatives

and the actual elite of the United States. It is evident that for Kirk

to procure a sympathetic response from the American-intelligentsia, he

would at the very least have to specify in detail just how conservative

ideals would be put into operation in a largely non-traditional society.

With the exceptions of a few vague indications, he has not done this.

He might well protest that he was concerned more with theory than with

practice and that therefore these objections are irrelevant. This

argument does not, however, change the fact that he is much more likely

to see his ideals effectuated if he would deign to enter the arena of

prudence and practice.

Eliot and Kirk: A Comparison

Both Eliot and Kirk have reacted to the same fundamental his-

torical trends: the decline in religious faith and in moral standards

combined with the existence of strong pressures to lower academic and

cultural standards. In seeking to counter these trends, both Eliot and

Kirk implicitly accepted a conception of personality development based

upon the importance of the interaction of the individual with society.

Neither writer accepted the classical liberal faith in the autonomy of

71Ibid.

the individual. The individual must look to society as the source of

his standards of behavior as well as the chief course of whatever

emotional satisfactions that the individual would ever attain.

In seeking to counter what they viewed as the deleterious trends

characteristic of their times, Eliot and Kirk utilized somewhat differ­

ent approaches. Eliot stressed the basic anthropological concept, cul­

ture, while Kirk emphasized the basic sociological concept, society.

Eliot wanted to know what conditons would be conducive to cultural con-

tinuity and creativity. He also wanted to uncover the aims and some of

the characteristics of a Christian culture which he conceived as a

society guided by Christian ideals. Kirk was intent upon dealing with

the major ills which plague contemporary society. He defined most of

these ills in terms of the alienation of the individual from society.

Eliot and Kirk were both, however, in agreement in stressing the

importance of human collectivities rather than the isolated individual.

Both Eliot and Kirk espoused traditionalism. In both cases, the

traditions emphasized were primarily related to the culture and the

social institutions of the group. Eliot justified tradition primarily

in terms of cultural creativity; Kirk, in terms of wisdom and the in­

culcation of values. Both writers believed in the importance of

cultural continuity as a function of education. Both writers also

believed in the importance of education as an instrument for the in­

culcation of moral values. They emphasized the special value of human­

istic studies in the inculcation of both cultural and moral values.

Both Eliot and Kirk adhered to humanism, but they expressed their

adherence in somewhat different ways. Eliot stressed the humanistic

90

91

;deal of balance and applied it chiefly to cultural concerns. He also

stressed literary culture which stress was quite consistent with his aes­

thetic emphasis. Kirk also stressed the importance of literature, but in

addition accorded an important place to intuitive insight as a function

of literary studies, as evidenced by his vigorous advocacy of the exis­

tence and importance of Newman's illative sense. As a poet, Eliot un­

doubtedly recognized the importance of insight but scarcely alluded to it

in his writings on cultural and social issues.

Both writers were concerned about the trend of educators to con-

centrate on the education of students of mediocre ability. Eliot and

Kirk opposed this trend because of their belief in the limited poten­

tialities of these students. Neither writer favored an easing of aca­

demic standards to bring higher education within the range of more

students. They were both implicitly interested primarily in achievements

rather than in the gratification of desires. Anything that might tend to

reduce educational achievements would be liable to arouse their dis-

approval.

The conservative school counselor, imbued with the ideals of Eliot

and Kirk, would encourage students to acquire a set of moral and religious

values so that they could achieve a sense of emotional security and so

that they might be better able to solve their own personal problems. He

would also give special attention to the problem of providing adequate

social integration for his charges. Finally, he would seek to guide the

students along varied educational and vocational paths in accordance with

their interests and abilities.

We will next turn to another branch of neo-conservatism, the

positive humanists. A contrast between them and their more tradition­

alistic colleagues should be of some interest.

92

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:Ill

CHAPTER IV

POSITIVE Hut1ANISM

Among influential neo-conservative thinkers, several have espoused

humanistic doctrines without a corresponding emphasis upon traditionalism.

In general, these writers have favored tradition and have encouraged it

whenever and wherever they believed that people could still be signifi­

cantly influenced by it ..... ·They have, however, preferred to rely on other

means of improving society; apparently on the assumption that Western

civilization has proceeded too far in the direction of the repudiation

of _tradition to make any large-scale reversal of the trend possible.

The positive humanists have been concerned with the problem of

finding a satisfactory means of transmitting the values generally associ­

ated with tradition which would possess the cogency that was once

associated with the various cultural traditions of the world. This

writer has borrowed the term, positive, from the writings of Irving

Babbitt who utilized it to designate the reliance upon critical reason­

ing which has generally characterized the representatives of this school

of thought. 1 The most influential neo-conservative writers on education .

who have utilized the positive humanist approach have been Irving

Babbitt and G. H. Bantock. In fact, there can be little doubt that

Babbitt has been one of the most influential neo-conservative writers

on social and cultural issues in general.

1 Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism (Ne'.'t York: ~leridian Books, 1953), p. 5.

93

94

The Views of Irvinq Babbitt

Irving Babbitt has occupied an enigmatic place in American thought.

Ont the one hand, he has urged what has amounted to a return to the tradi­

tional American puritan ethic; on the other hand, he has vigorously op­

posed those American traits which have commonly been considered to be

outcrnoes of the acceptance of the puritan outlook, i.e., the emphasis

upon commercial success and business values. In his attitudes toward

religion, Babbitt also exhibited conflicting tendencies. He was sympa­

thetic with religious goals but skeptical of the knowability of absolutes.

To exaoine these various positions, we will consider both Babbitt's life

and viewpoint. In a sense, Babbitt was both a traditionalist and a revo-

lutionary -- albeit an aristocratic right-wing revolutionary. Hhat he

rebelled against were certain characteristics of American culture.

Babbitt was anything but a conformist although the biographical material

can give us only a few hints as to the origins of that non-conformity.

Babbitt was born in the summer of 1865 in the middle-western city

of Dayton, Ohio, the son of Dr. Edwin Dwight Babbitt and Augusta Darling

Babbitt. At the time of his son 1 s birth, Dr. Babbitt was a partner in a

business school. The elder Babbitt associated with friends of

decidedly radical views. Irving later came to detest these friends of

his father. One cannot help wondering whether Babbitt's subsequent

hostility t01vard vocational education and commercialism might not have

had its roots within his family. Mrs. Babbitt died when Irving was

eleven years of age. His father subsequently remarried and moved to

Cincinnati where Irving and a younger sister were raised.2

At the age of twenty, Irving entered Harvard University where,

with the exception of one year at the University of Paris, he spent his

entire university student career. At the University of Paris, he

studied Sanskrit and Pali with the distinguished Indic scholar, Sylvain

Levi. Pali was the language in which the early Buddhist sacred writings

were written. In his general viewpoint, Babbitt was to be strongly

influenced by Buddhist thought, especially the emphasis upon the Middle

Path between asceticism and indulgence and by the Buddhist espousal of

the doctrine of non-attachment to material goods.

After teaching in several colleges, Babbitt settled down to a

95

permanent position at Harvard University. He eventually became a

professor. of French and comparative literature and held that position

until his death in 1933. Babbitt's most famous works include Literature

and the American College (1908) which examines problems of American

education; Rousseau and Romanticism (1919) which is essentially a work of

literary criticism, and Democracy and Leadership (1924) which is a work

on political theory. The same basic themes can be found in all his major

works. A group of distinguished associates and disciples including Paul

Elmer More, Norman Foerster, Stuart P. Sherman, and W. C. Brownell have

diligently propagated the views that Babbitt espoused. 3 These people,

known collectively as the neo-humanists, exercised an important influence

2see the account given by Dora Gabbitt in Frederick manchester and Odell Shepherd, eds. Irving Babbitt: Man and Teacher (New York: Putnam•s, 1941), pp. ix and x. The entire books 1s a gold mine of informa­tion on Irving Babbitt.

3Perhaps the most influential work produced by members of this· group was Paul Elmer More's Aristocracy and Justice (1915).

96

upon American thought during the first half of the twentieth century.

With regard to the intellectual influences which affected Babbitt,

we can obtain an intimation of what these were by recalling that the four

personages whom Babbitt named as espousing the wisdom of the ages were

Aristotle, Confucius, Buddha, and Christ. 4 Of these great sages, it is

highly probable that Aristotle exercised the greatest influence upon

Babbitt since Aristotelian ideas closely resembled his own views.

Babbitt adopted such Aristotelian views as the conception of morality as

the disciplining of the passions and appetites by reason as well as

Aristotle's conceptions of the golden mean and of contemplation. In

fact, these Aristotelian views were central to Babbitt's entire

philosophical approach.

Historically, Babbitt's philosophy represented a reaction against

certain widespread American characteristics which were important during

the early twentieth century and in some respects are even more signifi-

cant today. He be)ieved that the American people suffered from a lack

of standards in some instances and, in other instances, from the con-

fusion and inversion of standards. Babbitt attributed this situation to

the American repudiation of tradition. Babbitt viewed tradition as

valuable since it was a means of transmitting certain vital intellectual

and moral values. 5

The American aversion to traditionalism led to certain moral con-

sequences which Babbitt thought to be highly undesirable. These

4Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924), p. 163.

51Qid.' pp. 240-241.

97

consequences included the general spread of luxury, self-indulgence, and

the increasing selfishness and avarice of special interest groups. He

especially denounced the American adulation of the business community.

This adulation was much more widespread before than after the Great

Depression but is obviously still evident. To Babbitt, commercial avarice

and cupidity undermined both intellectual and moral values.6 The neg­

ative attitude of Babbitt and many other conservative thinkers might well

surprise most Americans, many of whom have regarded conservatives as being

especially favorable to commercial values but, as we have seen earlier,

this widespread view was the result of confusing classical liberalism with

conservatism.

Babbitt believed that the prevailing emphasis on commercial success

had deleteriously affected American colleges. The tendency toward an

aristocracy of money must, he felt, be counteracted by the development of

an elite of wisdom and character. Yet college administrators seemed to be

more interested in developing a leadership dedicated only to service and

power. 7 He was also alarmed about the lack of selectivity of students in

American colleges in comparison to their European counterparts. 8 He

believed that this could only detract from developing what he felt the

democracies needed most of all -- a superior quality of leadership.

6Jbid., pp. 19, 272.

?Irving Babbitt, Literature and the American College (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), p. 71.

srbid., pp. 53, 71.

98

The America in \'lhich Babbitt lived was already beginning to repudiate

the puritanical traditions of its past in favor of an increasing permis­

siveness. He felt that this nation was in dire need of standards or

criteria of action if its ethical and intellectual integrity was to be

salvaged. Since traditions no longer had the force that they·once

commanded, he believed that standards must be arrived at critically and on

the basis of human experience. His concern to establish such standards

was the fundamental motivation for his writing. His writings were ad­

dressed primarily to those who have broken with traditional forms but felt

themselves still very much in need of standards. 9 Babbitt believed that

the Classical and the Christian traditions were our only visible sources

of standards; but in view of the predominant skepticism of the twentieth

century, he reluctantly felt that these standards must be arrived at

critically to be convincing today. 10

Babbitt considered the infinite to be beyond the grasp of man.

The realms of being and becoming are so inextricably mixed that humans

could not isolate one from the other. 11 However, he implicitly recog­

nized the existence of the Absolute even though he denied that we could

know its nature. His mataphysics, skeptical as it was, necessitated an

9Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 34.

lOrrving Babbitt, Criticism in America: Its Function and Status (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1924), p. 164.

11Irving Babbitt, On Being Creative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1932), pp. xxvii-xxviii.

99

emphasis upon psychological rather than ontological factors, if his quest

for standards was to be fulfilled.

The most important distinction that we should consider in arriving

at a clear understanding of Babbitt's philosophy is that between the

natural self of man, which he defined in terms of impulse, and the human

self, which consists of those factors which act to control impulsiveness.

These factors were described in terms of separate mental faculties which

were clearly indicative of Babbitt's acceptance, in at least a muted form,

of faculty psychology. 12 Babbitt believed that to arrive at a condition

of effective self-control, the individual should be directed by the "higher

imagination" which is the faculty whereby one seizes likenesses and forms

conceptions. This faculty is in contrast to the "lower imagination" which

is synonomous with sense perception. By means of the higher imagination,

the individual can view his experiences against a backdrop of ethical

values. These impressions are then tested critically through the utiliza­

tion of analytical reason. The combination of the higher imagination and

reason was collectively termed "insight11 --a form of cognition which

Babbitt rated as superior to unaided reason just as the latter was rated

superior to the automatic operations of the instinctive faculty. 13 By the

12rrving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, pp. 26-27, 51; Democracy and Leadership, pp. 11, 14.

13For the nature of the higher imagination see Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 10; on the nature of insight see Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 47.

100

employment of insight, values are discriminated through reference to those

constants of human history and experience which have proven themselves by

their consequences. 14 The "higher will" then imposes limits on one's

desires so that the insights attained can be acted upon. In contrast to

the higher will, the lower will acts in accordance with desires and

;mpulses.l5 The violation of these insights must, Babbitt maintained,

eventually bring on retribution.

A basic assumption underlying his voluntaristic emphasis was that man

possesses freedom of will. Otherwise, Babbitt's strictures concerning the

importance of self-control would be meaningless. An important implication

of his stress on personal insight into experience as the criterion for

evaluation was an emphasis upon the study of history and literature, with

special attention to the normative aspects of those subjects. According

to this view, history is the record of the collective experience of the

human species and literature consists of the imaginative reconstruction

of that experience. Finally, Babbitt's faculty psychology entails a

stress upon the training and discipline of one's faculties. Before we can

verify these implications, we should inquire into the nature of the values

which Babbitt believed that experience discloses.

Babbitt believed that the virtues of.moderation, decency, and common

sense worked best. 16 Fundamentally, these virtues were all characterized

by Babbitt as manifestations of \vhat he regarded as the supreme humanistic

14sabbitt, On Being Creativ~, p. xxxviii.

15Ib"d . __ 1_., p. XlX.

l6Ib"d _1_.' p. xxx.

l 01

virtue, decorum-- the disciplining of impulses to the proportions dis­

cerned by the ethical imagination.l7 These proportions would be obtained

in turn by reflection upon past human experiences.

In political affairs, the supreme virtue was considered to be justice

which Babbitt defined in terms of rendering to each individual what was

due him in accordance with the amount and the quality of his endeavor. 18

This is essentially a proportionate or relational concept of justice

which is based on the assumption that men contribute unequally to the

welfare of society. In addition, an implied assumption seems to be

present that equality is undesirable or unattainable. To Babbitt, it

seemed obvious that justice could not be attained until people learn to

act in accordance with standards for determining how things should be

apportioned. Humility was therefore considered to be the root of justice

and all other virtues; for humility, as Babbitt employed the term, con­

sisted of the willingness to look up to and to imits;~te standards. In this

regard, he had great respect for religious creeds and religious institu-

tions. To Babbitt, the chief virtue of the churches was the peace that.

they instilled in their congregations through teaching the submission to a

higher win. 19 ·Thus, Babbitt, an ardent skeptic, approached the Christian

conception of Grace. As to the end of moral behavior, Babbitt posited no

l7sabbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 162.

l8sabbitt, Democracy and Leadership, pp. 196-197.

19rbid., pp. 163, 257-258.

102

supernaturalistic goal since this would be inconsistent with his epistemo­

logical skepticism. He posited instead the limited goal of temporal

happiness. Unfortunately, he did not define happiness. Since he held

that happiness could only be obtained by the disciplining of the impulses,

we can assume that he referred to the Aristotelian conception of happiness:

a sense of satisfaction obtained by doing one's work well. As is well­

known, Aristotle meant by doing one's work well activity of the soul· in

accordance with moral andjntellectual virtue which in the case of man

pertained to the activity of reason. Hence, happiness for human beings

would consist ultimately of living in accordance with reason. To live in

this way, it is essential that feelings and impulses be kept under control.

In Babbitt's opinion, primitivism, the arch-enemy of humanism, was

especially exemplified by the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau. 20 . Babbitt

equated primitivism with spontaneity which he considered to be the anti­

thesis of discipline.2l Babbitt's attitude toward spontaneity is

exemplified by his classification of the-forms of knowledge which were

distinguished in terms of the psychological faculties involved. Babbitt

rated instinct, which pertained to impulse and feeling, below reason which

was deemed to be primarily an analytical faculty. Both instinct and

reason were rated below insight which pertained to the immediate apprehen­

sion of reality. This apprehension was attributed to the imagination which

ideally worked in collaboration with reason, the latter faculty being

20whether Rousseau actually was a primitivist has of course been disputed.

21Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 44.

employed to scrutinize the apprehensions obtained. Since Babbitt con­

sidered the imagination to be the faculty which governs mankind, he

believed it to be vitally important that the imagination agree with

reason rather than with the expansive desires. He believed that the

latter situation caused most of the evil existing in the world.22 In

spite of his disclaimers, it can be argued that Babbitt was really a

disguided rationalist. For reason should, according to Babbitt, act as

the final judge regarding the truth of our ethical perceptions. To

Babbitt, instinct was associated with primitivism, and reason without

imagination was linked to a pedantic rationalism. For educational

theorists, one of the most important implications of Babbitt•s general

position was his anxiety to avoid confusing the planes of being. He

103

was especially concerned about the primitivists• confu~ion of instinct

with insight which had, Babbitt thought, resulted in their most grievous

errors, such as the equation of beauty with lust and of awe with wonder.

As we shall see later, Babbitt was vitally concerned with developing the

powers of discrimination of college students so that they could avoid this

confusion.

For Babbitt, the primitivistic dichotomy between the individuals•

natural goodness and the repressiveness of society was erroneous. Like

Aristotle, Babbitt believed that the individual reaches his perfection in

society. Because of his skepticism concerning the natural goodness and

wisdom of the individual, he condemned the child-centered curriculum so

eagerly propounded by the educational naturalists and their allies. He

22Jbid., p. 145; Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 10.

--------------------~-----~--

104

maintained that instead of being guided by youthful whims, the educational

process should be directed toward the super-personal goals of wisdom and

character--wisdom, in the sense of standards of moral and intellectual

value; character as expressed in the will to act in accordance with those

standards.23 In common with the Buddhists, Babbitt believed that human

nature was not so much depraved as lazy. Give the individual the power to

determine the nature of the curriculum, and then see how many elect the

least demanding courses.24 In his opinion, no satisfactory substitute

existed for the imposition of the disciplinary activity of the higher will

upon the recalcitrant desires of youth.

Babbitt was most concerned with collegiate instruction. It was at

the level that, he felt, the essential effort should be undertaken to

develop the discriminatory powers of the individual student. In contrast,

the function of the lower schools was to transmit knowledge and the

graduate school was to be devoted to productive scholarship. 25 Hence,

Babbitt would certainly have been hostile toward the recurring suggestion

that the American college be abolished by integrating the first two years

with the high school and the last two years with the graduate school. To

Babbitt, the college had a unique function which transcended in importance

the services of both the secondary school and the university. In such a

perspective, the abolition of the college would obviously be a major

tragedy.

To Babbitt, the college had to be selective in its admissions

23Babbitt, Literature and the American College, p. 46.

24rbi~., pp. 35-36. 25rbid., p. 69.

105

policies if it were to perform properly its function. The expertise of

relating ideas well is rare, and wastefulness would be the consequence of

attempting to educate individuals of insufficient potential. Implicit in

this position is the assumption that the cultivation of leadership is of

greater importance than the uplift of the masses. Where the interests of

the two conflict, those of the individuals who exhibit the greatest

pote~tiality must be held paramount. To Babbitt, the development of

superior leadership was of crucial importance; for upon this process de­

pended the future welfare of society. When considering the aims of the

college, Babbitt was quite explicit:

Even though the whole world seem (sic) bent on living the quantita­tive life, the college should remember that its business is to make of the graduates men of quality in the real and not the conventional meaning of the term. In this way it will do its share toward creating that aristocracy of character and intelligence that is needed in a community like ours to take the place of an aristocracy of birth, and to counteract the tendency toward an aristocracy of money. A great deal is said nowadays about the democratic spirit that should pervade our colleges. This is true if it means that the college should be in profound sympathy with what is best in democ­racy. It is false if it means, as it often does, that the college should level down and suit itself to the point of view of the average individual .... But from the standpoint of the college one thoroughly cultivated person should be more to the purpose than a hundred persons who are only partly cultivated.26

Regarding his views on the college curriculum, it is important to

emphasize that Babbitt rejected the elective system that was so enthusi­

astically championed by Charles Eliot, President of Harvard University

where Babbitt taught. To Babbitt, the notion that all subjects are of

26Ibid., p. 71.

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equal value was anathema. Furthermore, unlike his superior at Harvard,

Babbitt had little confidence in the ability of late adolescents to make

judicious choices. Instead, as we have previously noted, he felt that the

native human indolence of the teen-ager would assert itself in the selec­

tion of courses to the detriment of academic standards. 27 In this respect,

Babbitt consistently applied his general views on human nature to an

important educational issue. Yet, on this as on so many other issues,

Babbitt was exceedingly vague. He neglected to specify in detail the

studies that he would require. We can, however, obtain a few indications

by examining his arguments for the teaching of the Greek and Roman classics.

Perhaps the most important justification given by Babbitt for the

study of the classics was that ancient Greco-Roman literature represented

the most perfect fusion of reason with imagination and therefore appealed

to what is the most universal and eternal in human nature.28 What he

meant by this remark can be grasped by reference to his general philosoph­

ical position. Babbitt desired the fusion of reason with imagination for

the purpose of discerning the ethical universals and their influence upon

human nature. As was previously observed, this viewpoint leads implicitly

to a stress upon the study of history and literature with special emphasis

upon the general normative principles inferred therefrom. To Babbitt, the

primary criterion for the selection of courses of study was their value in

bringing to students a knowledge of those constants of human experience

Which have proven to be of the greatest worth as guideposts of human

conduct. Therefore, the teacher imbued with the ideals of Babbitt would

stress the importance of general ideas and would treat historical events

---------------------------------------------------------------27Ibi~., pp. 35-36, 47. 28Ibi~., pp. 120-121.

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and great works of literature in relationship to normative principles.

It might occasion some surprise to find that another justification

given by Babbitt for the study of classical literature was that it exhibited

greater objectivity than modern writings; for Babbitt's prescriptions

appear to sanction subjectivity. 29 Yet, when Babbitt's value theory is

fullY comprehended, this justification no longer seems to be inconsistent

with other statements made by Babbitt for he felt that ethical standards

should be arrived at by a dispassionate and critical consideration of human

experience. The important consideration pertaining to academic objectivity

was the means whereby the teacher reached his conclusions, not whether a

partisan view was presented to his class, for Babbitt implicitly sanctioned

the latter.

To Babbitt, modern literature was marred by the indulgence of its

practitioners in 11 sentimental and romantic revery rather than in a resolute

and manly grappling with the plain facts of existence ... 30 In contrast,

classical literature was valued for its ethical insights, supposedly

arrived at by the cooperation of the higher reason with the imagination.3l

What Babbitt meant by the 11 higher reason 11 was the analytical facu1ty which

acted upon the imagination. It is quite evident that to Babbitt the axio­

logical aspects of education were paramount.

Of nearly equal importance among Babbitt's motivations for emphazing

classical literature was the disciplinary value derived from mastering the

precise meanings of the words of the ancients. This process promotes the

29Jbid.' p. 116. 30 Ibid.

3lrbid.

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habit of serious intellectual effort while the drill in style obtained

from translating classical writings was felt to be a superior means of

mastering English. 32 This stress upon discipline and drill is congruent

with Babbitt's basic psychology which was based upon the assumption of the

existence of distinct faculties which had implicitly to be trained to

function well. Therefore, Babbitt emphasized the value of the classics

for the skills which they engendered as well as for the ethical insights

which they conveyed.

Finally, by viewing contemporary events in the perspective of the

distant past, the individual could become more sensitive to the dangers of

the present. In particular, the fatuous optimism which still pervaded

America during most of the duration of Babbitt's life might thereby be

corrected. 33 By the stress upon the value of the study of the classics in

viewing the present, Babbitt probably had in mind that phase of Roman

history \'/hen the Roman republic was being transformed into the tyranny of

the Caesars. It is common knowledge that conservative writers have been

concerned about a possible reoccurence of this trend through such tenden­

cies as the mounting disrespect for law and the spread of socialism.

Liberals and radicals have on the whole been much more sanguine about the

future. The differences which exist on this issue stem from basically

different assumptions concerning the flexibility of human nature.

Babbitt characterized his general position by contrasting it with

the two chief antithetical viewpoints: those of the "philologists" and

32Ibid., pp. 108, 163.

33Jbid.' p. 114.

of the "dilettantes." The former delight in the minute accumulation of

facts with little or no concern for their significance. The latter

109

stress the thrill obtained through cultivating aesthetic sensations and

sanction a kind of emotional indolence. Babbitt believed that the phi­

lologists constituted the most serious menace because they dominated the

departments of history and literature in American colleges. In contrast

to both these groups, he mentioned the "humanists" whom he characterized

as the advocates of disciplining students in the intell_igent utilization

of ideas -- especially, of the relationships between literary concepts and

normative values.34 As an example, he esteemed the French doctorate as

the embodiment of humanistic ideals in contrast to the American doctorate

which, according to Babbitt, fundamentally-embodied philological values.35

Only by the adoption of standards on a par with the French doctorate or

the Oxford first-class honors degree could American higher education have

a constructive impact upon contemporary problems.

Babbitt was fundamentally a very repetitious writer, dealing with

the same themes in book after book with minor differences in expansiveness

and in sequence. His writing is studded with brilliant insights but is

htghly unsystematic in character. In particular, he had the annoying hab­

it of making assertions without expanding upon them, either by careful

formulation of definitions or by sustained step by step argumentation.

34rbid., pp. 85, 88-89.

35Ibid., p. 90.

~ese practices have resulted in a Widespread misunderstanding of his

basic thesis. This misunderstanding has been most unfortunate; for he

had focused on one of the most Important problems confronting American

education today -- the need to develop and Inculcate standards of moral

and Intellectual evaluation. He has also realized that If standards are

to be living realities, there must be discipline and selectivity in ac­

cordance wl th these standards. ~lhether hIs prescrl p t Ions are adequate

is another question; but his ability to focus on the centra] problem and

to free himself from the effects of the indoctrination which Americans

generally undergo from their early youth make him, In the opinion of this

writer, a highly significant figure even though his writings may not be models of systematic scholarship.

no

In his general educational position, Irving Babbitt was more than

anything else a humanist. For him the fundamental goal of education was

to develop among students the ability to discriminate among moral and

Intellectual values In terms of their varying degrees of excellence and

to thereby achieve a sense of harmony and proportion. His concern was

even more with the ethical than with the Intellectual although his

standards for judging the ethical were both aesthetic and rational. His

stress upon harmony and proportion was fundamentally aesthetIc wh 11 e the

role that he assigned to reason as the final arbitrator of the Insights

established by the ethical Imagination mark Babbitt as a rationalist,

even though he considered himself to be primarily a voluntarist.

Babbitt's view of man as primarily guided by the imagination is

very significant; for it Indicates that he believed that human knowledge

originates, either primarily or exclusively, from sense perception. As

111

earlier noted, he defined imagination as sense perception (the lower

imagination) or as the faculty which stores and relates sense perceptions

(the higher imagination). This is an educationally significant position;

for it implies that the classroom teacher should begin instruction with

concrete materials, even when he is dealing with abstract concepts.

Babbitt's emphasis upon literature in the teaching of normative concepts

is easily explainable from this viewpoint as providing the needed concrete

exemplifications to form a basis for value judgments. In contrast~ the

teacher who believes that normative judgments are based primarily upon

innate ideas, would be more likely to convey th~ nature of normative

judgments in the form of abstract principles. One would thus be more

likely to teach normative judgments directly rather than through liter­

ature.

In his emphasis upon literature and the imagination as well as in

his stress upon harmony and proportion, Babbitt was most definitely a

humanist. He was also humanistic in his emphasis upon the development of

the individual rather than the group. The major problem here is how to

reconcile this position with the fact that like most other conservatives

Babbitt considered the individual to be fundamentally a social creature

and not an autonomous entity. Although, as far as this writer is aware,

Babbitt has not dealt with this problem, it can be resolved easily on the

basis of Babbitt's general philosophical position and that of Aristotle,

the fundamental source upon whom Babbitt apparently relied in the formula­

tion of his viewpoint. t1an is a social animal in that he requires society

in order to reach his perfection. However, the fundamental problems which

interfere with the happiness of the individual are primarily individual

112

rather than social in character. The individual must first accept a

standard of values and then abide by them before he can contribute mean­

ingfully to the solution of social problems. In essence, Babbitt's

criterion of individual excellence pertained to the individuals' willing­

ness to view things in ethical perspective and to act on the basis of the

insights obtained. To do this intelligently, the individual needed to

acquire the competency of discriminating between values with facility and

dexterity. After he accomplished this task, he could then worry about his

own adjustment to society and about the improvement of society.

Although Babbitt viewed tradition favorably, he felt, as we have

seen, that Americans had moved too far from their traditional roots to

resort to tradition on any but the most limited basis. Instead, he

preferred to rely upon the development of an elite characterized by the

understanding and application of standards of critical judgment. He

believed that such an elite could provide the reliable value standards

that had once been provided through tradition.

The general reaction to the ideas of Babbitt and his colleagues

mirrored the prevalent climate of opinion among the intellectuals of the

period between the two world wars. Although Babbitt had been writing for

several decades previously, his work was not subjected to widespread

written criticism until about 1930. Some critics, such as Allan Tate and

T.S. Eliot were generally sympathetic to his views but they felt that the

values which Babbitt espoused required a religious orientation to be

convincing. They were thus questioning the cogency of combining Babbitt's

ethical humanism with his well-known religious skepticism.36 Other

critics, such as Edmund Wilson and Malcolm Cowley, reacted against

Babbitt•s constant emphasis upon the will to refrain from and to control

the passions. Both Wilson and Cowley found this viewpoint to be lacking

in warmth and compassion. Cowl€Y, in particular, typified those writers

who rejected what they felt to be the aristocratic snobbery and priggish

moralism of Babbitt and his allies.37

The most frequent reaction of Babbitt•s critics was to reject his

113

philosophy on the ground of Babbitt•s hostility toward scient,ific natu­

ralism. As is well-known, Babbitt had insisted on a sharp separation be­

tween humans and the lower animals on the ground that humans possessed

the ability to control their impulses. Because of this position, Babbitt

maintained that the methods of the physical and the biological sciences

were not fully applicable to human beings. Such famous writers as Lewis

Mumford, Henry Hazlitt, and C. Hartley Grattan were outspokenly hostile

toward Babbitt•s separation of humanity from the other aspects of nature.

Lewis Mumford felt that Babbitt•s emphasis upon 11 the will to refrain 11 was

really an attempt to protect people from vigilence and responsibility by

dodging the risks involved in expressing one•s emotions. 38 Hazlitt denied

36see Tate•s remarks in C. Hartley Grattan, ed., The Critique of Humanism (New York: Brewer and l1arren, 1930), p. 150. See also Eliot•s remarks in Norman Foerster, ed., Humanism and America (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1930), pp. 105-113.

37Edmund Wilson•s reaction is given on page 46, and Malcolm Cowley•s reaction on pages 73-75 of Grattan, The Critique of Humanism.

38 Ibid., p. 346.

114

that the ability to control one•s impulses was something peculiarly human.

He also denied that humans could separate themselves absolutely from other

creatures in their ordinary habits of life. Hazlitt maintained that a

man cannot be even a humanist unless he has recently done something so

bestial as eating a mea1. 39 Grattan denied the cogency of Babbitt's

separation of humans from other forms of animal life on the ground that

the mind, presumably the basis of human acts, was a biological organ.40

Grattan had evidently confused the mind with the brain. The brain is

certainly a biological organ but the mind, insofar as it differs from

the brain, is obviously not a biological organ. To make his argument

convincing, Grattan would have to prove that the mind and the brain are

synonymous. Beyond making an assertion of their equivalency, Grattan has

not even attempted to prove this point. In any case, it is evident that

naturalism dominated the thinking of most of Babbitt's critics. It is al-

so evident that few of them presented reasoned arguments against Babbitt's

views. Reactions, such as those of Wilson and Cowley, seem to this writer

to be at least as emotional as intellectual. To say that Babbitt was cold

or snobbish really amounts to mere name--calling unless the namers specify

precisely what they mean, give evidence to substantiate their charges, and

show why such traits are undesirable.

Roman Catholic writers and scholars were one group that came to

Babbitt's defense. The ideas of Babbitt that had antagonized so many

intellectuals elicited a sympathetic response among many Roman Catholics

\vho were attracted by Babbitt 1 s condemnation of naturalism and his belief

39Jbid., pp. 97-100.

40Ibid., p. 23.

115

in absolute moral standards.41 There were some strong affinities that

existed between some of Babbitt's views and those of the Thomists.

Babbitt shared the same Aristotelian heritage as did St. Thomas. How­

ever, Babbitt was apparently more influenced by Buddhism and by religious

skepticism than by Christianity. In spite of the wide divergence between

Babbitt and the Thomists on religious beliefs, striking similarities can

be found in the dimension of values such as the common emphasis of both

on temperance and humility. However, Thomists ultimately grounded values

on supernatural foundations while Babbitt utilized a basically positiv­

istic approach.

The marked tendency of educational writers to distinguish between

Babbitt and contemporary neo-conservatives has no basis in fact. Babbitt

was reacting against the same fundamental tendencies which have alarmed

contemporary conservative intellectuals: the undermining of traditional

standards and the spread of equalitarianism. The educational and social

reforms advocated by Babbitt would also generally have the assent of

present-day conservatives. The period in which Babbitt wrote was not

really very different from the present period of history. The basic

problems, such as the spread of moral and religio~s skepticism and of

equalitarianism, are today much the same as they were fifty years ago but

with the important difference that today they are much more pressing.

The problems that Irving Babbitt concerned himself with are still very

much with us.

41For a more extended discussion of the reaction of Roman Catholic intellectuals to Babbitt's views see Louis J. A. Mercier, The Challenge of Humanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 177-183.

The Views of G. H. Bantock

Like Babbitt, the British educational philosopher, G. H. Bantock

exemplifies the same basic combination of the humanist with so-called

upositiVe 11 ideas. As will be indicated later, there were some basic

differences between the views expressed by Bantock and Babbitt.

A faculty member of the University of Leicester in England, G. H.

116

Bantock was originally trained in philosophy and literature. He has

attributed his close attention to the intricacies of language to his

training in those disciplines.42 A prolific writer on educational

problems, his best known works include Freedom and Authority in Education

(1955), Education in an Industrial Society (1963), Education and Values

(1965), and Education, Culture, and the Emotions (1967).

The particular historical trends which most influenced G. H. Bantock

were similar to those which have had an impact on other neo-conservative

writers. He believed that the most serious educational and social problem

was the need for an authority that would give meaning to life. He main­

tained that since World War I there has been a concerted effort to sub-

stitute individual desires for objective moral values. The latter were

transmitted by tradition while the movement to undermine these values was

-basically a reaction against the war. 43 While we might quarrel with

Bantock's chronology and rationale for the existence of this trend, there

is little doubt that such a tendency exists and that it became especially

widespread after World War I.

42G. H. Bantock, Education in an Industrial Society (London: Faber & Faber, 1963), p. 11.

43G. H. Bantock, Freedom and Authority in Education (London: Faber & Faber, 1955), pp. 184-185.

117

Bantock was also alarmed by the spread of both meritocracy and equal­

itarianism. As we pointed out previously, the trend toward meritocracy,

or the policy of providing responsible positions and advanced schooling

solely on the basis of evidences of competency, has been much more wide­

spread in Great Britain than in the United States where educational equal­

itarianism has had a greater impact. Bantock objected to meritocracy

since it led to the apotheosis of the narrow specialist type and to the

consequent decline of the broadly educated and highly cultivated gentle­

man.44 This has led directly to the lowering of the tone of society and

to the decline of noblesse oblige.45

Alongside the trend to meritocracy and often confused with it has

been the tendency toward educational equalitarianism. Universal literacy

was, Babbitt believed, one of the basic causes of equalitarianism since

it created an enormous mass culture. The consumers and students in a mass

society include a large proportion with little intellectual ability and

interest. The combined pressure of the intellectually unqualified has

tended to lower cultural skills. 46 The spread of progressive education,

the comprehensive secondary school, and other related movements have,

Bantock believed, shifted the emphasis in education from the encourage­

ment and fostering of excellence to the encouragement of mediocrity.

Bantock had thereby implicitly taken the position that the education of

the academically talented was more important than the education of the

relatively untalented. He had also implied that the intellectual uplift

44santock, Education in an Industrial Society, pp. 66-67.

45~iJ!., p. 84. 46Ibid., p. 77.

of the masses to a level where they would appreciate and contribute to

high culture was either impossible or could be_accomplished only by an

enormous expenditure of ~ffort.

In his reaction against these trends, Bantock was influenced

strongly by the writings of Cardinal Newman, Matthew Arnold, D. H.

Lawrence, and especially, T. S. Eliot.47 He has written brief studies

of Cardinal Newman and of Matthew Arnold. He especially praised

cardinal Newman for his emphasis on the importance of objective values

118

and Matthew Arnold for his attack on the degeneration of standards caused

by the impact of mechanistic and materialistic philosophies.48 The means

whereby Bantock was influenced by the two twentieth century aesthetes,

Lawrence and Eliot, can be gleaned from the comments of Bantock himself.

For example, Bantock praised Lawrence's emphasis on affective education

and emphasized the same aspect himself. Bantock also praised and was

influenced by Eliot's emphasis upon education as a cultural rather than

a political phenomenon.49 In his general methodology, Bantock was also

influenced by two British literary critics, I. A. Richards and F. R.

Leavis, from whom he learned to be suspicious of abstractions divorced

from the concrete realities of 11 the human situation.u50 In general, the

47santock pointed out these influences in a letter to the writer dated August 7th, 1974.

48santock, Freedom and Authority, pp. 86-88, 130.

49santock, Freedom and Authority, p. 143. See also G. H. Bantock, T. S. Eliot and Education (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 64.

50This information was obtained from Bantock's letter to the writer previously mentioned.

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sources cited by Bantock consisted chiefly of British conservatives with

a great concern for educational and cultural quality. Most of these

writers were critical of both the philosophical and common forms of

materialism.

In identifying the aims of education, Bantock used a basically

cultural approach. He began by defining the nature of culture which he

conceived of as the social, emotional, and intellectual 11 Structures 11

inherited from the past. These structures, transmitted in the forms of

conventions, patterns, and models, function to enhance the opportunities

for expression and to make explicit what is permissible so as to inhibit

11 exhausting hankerings and time-absorbing aspirations. 1151 Bantock's

terminology is significant; for it indicates his desire to order both

academic learning and affective experiences so that students could learn

to perceive the underlying patterns. The emphasis upon patterns indicates

that Bantock probably accepted a coherence theory of truth; for the

essence of this theory is consistency which implies an integration of

parts with one another (pattern).

In the most general terms, Bantock defined the School as an agency

whose primary function was cognitive in character. The test of the

excellence of the school was considered to be the degree to which it

increased the knowledge and understanding of the students. Since he

viewed feeling as an avenue of cognition, his attention to emotional

education was not in conflict with his primary concern. 52 To Bantock,

51G. H. Bantock, Education, Culture, and the Emotions (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), pp. 13-14.

52santock, Education and Values, p. 37.

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120

the school \<Jas essentially a cultural institution whose primary function

was to release thought and thus facilitate individual expression. In

the performance of these functions the school has to impose constraints

upon individual freedom. These constraints were however justified as

necessary if the school was to perform efficiently the specific tasks of

imparting understandings, developing important skills, and cultivating

"some refined modes of feeling. 1153

To demarcate the functions of the school more clearly, it is essen­

tial to discuss Bantock's opposition to those who have sought to over­

extend the area of academic endeavor. He especially resented the efforts

of educators who sought to include mental hygiene among the functions of

the teacher since he believed that teachers are generally incompetent to

practice psychological therapy. Furthermore, mental therapists are

primarily concerned with the pathological while teachers should be more

concerned with the problems of children in the real world. Even more

disturbing to Bantock was the tendency toward permissiveness which has

resulted from confusing the roles of the teacher and the therapist. Like

Eliot and other conservative writers, Bantock believed that tension is a

positive and desirable state in maximizing achievement. Therapists are

concerned with the problem of reducing tension, but, when teachers attempt

to do the same thing by reducing academic requirements, the consequence

is to lower the quality of scholastic endeavor. He admitted, however,

that equalitarian and anti-authoritarian factors have also undermined

53Bantock, Education, Culture, and the Emotions, p. 15.

121

standards. 54

Some American college professors have invoked the mental health of

the student as a justification for avoiding the awarding of low grades to

students who would otherwise have received them. The usual explanation

given is that students would suffer unnecessarily from the receipt of

low grades. 55 On Bantock's principles, this argument would be fallacious

since not only are most educators unqualified to render such judgments,

but they also undermine an important incentive to achievement and actually

contribute to the current erosion of academic standards. The difference

between Bantock and those that have disagreed with his position can to a

large extent be attributed to differing views as to what motivates most

students to achieve academically. Furthermore, to Bantock and other

conservatives, achievement is more important than contentment. In fact,

achievement often brings contentment.

Bantock did not, however, repudiate the utilization of emotions in

the classroom. Quite the contrary! He wanted a greater emphasis upon

emotional education but definitely not in the manner of the Rousseauistic

naturalists. What Bantock wanted as not spontaneous self-expression but

rather "a mode of structuring, a means.to order, an elaboration and a

54see Bantock's discussion on mental therapy in ibid., pp. 34-35.

55The writer of this study based this characterization on discus­sions with college faculty members when he was on the admissions and standards committee of a college.

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making'' with the emphasis placed upon the product rather than the self. 56

To comprehend just exactly what Bantock meant, it is important to

understand his conception of the nature of the emotions; for he viewed

them not just as passive states but rather as active acts of conscience.

To Bantock, emotions were outward expressions of one's assessments of situ­

ations. There, therefore existed both correct and incorrect responses to

a situation .. Bantock merged the emotional with the cognitive and by so

doing implied that emotional problems could, at least to some degree, be

dealt with academically??

The teacher's role in the education of the emotions was to instruct

students to discriminate between the various kinds of emotion. 58 The

teacher would do this partly by example through refraining from indulging

in coarse or vulgar emotions. Furthermore, students would learn to dis-

criminate between different kinds of feeling by the study of literature

and the fine arts. In fact, Bantock felt that literature and the arts

are more important than the sciences since they are concerned with values

and passions -- matters ~hich are more basic than those which pertain to

the sciences. He recommended that some acquaintanceship with literature

and the arts be required of all educated men but that the only scientific

knowledge that educated laymen really needed pertained to the scientific

method.59

56santock, Education and Values, p. 22.

57santock, Education, Culture, and the Emotions, pp. 72-73.

5Slbid., pp. 82-83.

59Bantock, Education in an Industrial Society, pp. 174-175.

,II

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Bantock•s attitudes toward the emotions are very significant in

exemplifying the essential contrast between educational conservatives and

Rousseauistic naturalists on the scope of formal schooling. To assert

as many writers have, that conservatives favor an exclusively academic

type of schooling while their opponents place greater stress upon non­

intellectual factors is to overstate the difference that actually exists

on this matter. Every conservative thinker that we have dealt with in

this study has been concerned not only with formal academic education but

also with the broader implications and functions of the educational

process. Conservatives do obviously stress academic education to a

greater extent than do either the adherents of the naturalistic wing or

the experimentalist wing of the progressive movement. However, affective

education also concerns them. The true contrast is between an emphasis

upon a highly structured academic situati-on and one in which spontaneity

is emphasized. As a group, conservatives have no wish either to extirpate

or to ignore emotions. Their concern is with disciplining and ordering

emotions to the values discerned by the intellect. They are quite willing

to deal with emotional problems but only to the degree that these problems

can be handled cognitively. They have no wish to broaden the scope of

formal education to include therapeutic functions of the kind which are

normally performed by psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychiatric social

workers. Some progressives believe that greater spontaneity would be

highly desirable in education. Conservatives emphatically disagree with

this view. They look upon the stress on spontaneity as tending toward

permissiveness. As a group, they feel that there is far too much permis­

siveness in education already for the good of either the student or the

124

large1~ community of which he is a member.

In common with many other conservatives, Bantock has expressed

strong disapproval of the child-centered concept of learning. He believed

that this concept rests upon the assumption of the natural goodness of

man when left to develop uncontaminated by society. He criticized this

view on tv1o grounds: that isolation of the individual from social pres­

sures is not possible and that children are not competent to make the

important decisions needed to determine the methods and content of

academic instruction. In determining what to teach children, their powers

and potential should be considered, but most children are not fully aware

of what potentialities they do possess, nor do they have a clear idea of

how these powers can be utilized by society. The individual child should

be nurtured to broaden the range of his experience and to quiet his

rebellious nature. In Bantock's view, interest should not be an

important consideration. A task in which a child might not be interested

might prove to be very interesting once the child begins to do it. The

teacher should definitely be the expert and the guide. Nevertheless, the

powers and potentialities of the individual child should be taken into

account so that in substance Bantock was urging not a one-sided teacher

centered system but rather interaction between teacher and students.60

Bantock felt that the educational progressives have been so

zealous in promoting the happiness of children that they have overlooked

the value and importance of academic learning. In contrast, Bantock has

expressed a preference for achievement over immediate happiness.6l

60For Bantock's views on this subject, see his works, Education, ~ ture, and the Emotions, p. 138, and Freedom and ;'\uthori ty, p. 120.

6lsantock, Education, Culture, and the Emotions, p. 139.

125

In the end, he confidently believed that achievement will prove to be more

satisfying than immediate gratification. 62 Like Aristotle, Bantock be­

lieved that reason is the supreme characteristic of man and that life lived

in rational terms is necessary for the best life.63 To the charge that

control over children would undermine their freedom, he opposed a positive

·conception of freedom as the following quotation clearly indicates:

Just, then, as social freedom springs out of the acceptance of the moral law, so the freedom to pe~form various skills and to make sense of the world around us so that we can move about it, springs from the acceptance of and submission to the authority inherent in the various bodies of human learning. And it is a fact of human experience that the 11 Subjects 11 within which, in the course of time, we learn to move with the greatest assur­ance and freedom are not necessarily those which we are at first most 'interested' by or 11 enjoy ... 64

Bantock, therefore, viewed freedom not simply as the absence of controls

but rather as the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks. For this,

restraint is required rather than permissiveness. In addition, the fore­

going quotation is also indicative of Bantock's acceptance of the tradi­

tional subject-matter boundaries in preference to the more integrated

approaches advocated by the educati ona 1 progressives. ··Elsewhere, he

defended subject-matter de1imiations as imposed by the nature of the

material although he did not enlarge very much on this bare assertion.65

62 Ibid., p. 140.

63santock, Education and Values, pp. 98-99.

64Ibid., p. 100.

65Bantock, Freedom and Authority, p. 198.

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Although Bantock tended to emphasize the cognitive functions of

ducation even when dealing with affective approaches, he did not feel e .

that a single set of educational aims should be applied throughout the

educational system. He believed that the level of intelligence and the

degree of motivation varies too much to render a single set of educa­

tional aims practical. 66 Apparently, he assumed that efforts to change

intellectual and motivational levels to any significant degree \'muld be

doomed to failure. Presumably, this doubt was based on both the influ­

ences of heredity and early home upbringing. 67 The educator must, there­

fore, study the nature of his students and adjust his teaching according­

ly. The utopian hopes of some educational thinkers would evidently seem

to those inspired by Bantock's ideas to be visionary and impractical.

Unlike such other conservatives as Irving Babbitt and T. S. Eliot,

Bantock devoted special attention to the education of the less gifted.

Other conservatives had, by not prescribing any special academic program

for the less academically inclined, tacitly assumed that beyond the level

of basic literacy, the needs of these children could best be met by

practical experience. As a group, conservatives most definitely favored

selective admissions policies on the higher, and, in some instances, even

the secondary level of education. Bantock certainly agreed with his

fellow conservatives that access to the universities and to academic

curricula in general should be restricted to the academically gifted and

66santock, Education in an Industrial Society, pp. 119-120; 185-186.

67 In his book, T. S. Eliot and Education, Bantock was quite explicit on the importance of early cultural upbringing. See page 111 thereof.

127

motivated. On the other hand, he believed that classroom teaching could

be meaningful for the less gifted provided that ample provision is made

for taking into account the intellectual characteristics of these chil­

dren. In general, this approach seems quite different from that of the

educational equalitarians who are now especially influential in American

education. The latter believe that the masses have the capacity for under­

standing and profiting from an academic type of education and that their '

relatively poor performance is due either to poor teaching, deficient

early cultural upbring·ing, or discrimination. Therefore, they have

developed various different kinds of plans to equalize educational oppor­

tunity through providing special attention for the "culturally deprived."

It is common knowledge among educators that children have shown some

improvement as a result of special teaching, but there is considerable

doubt concerning the permanence of the changes made. 68 The conservative

contention in this regard is that the effort, time, and money expended

would have produced greater and more lasting dividends if greater atten­

tion had been given to the academically promising. In essence, this

difference in attitude is based upon a striking difference of opinion

pertaining to the relative flexibility of human nature.

Bantock believed that efforts made to transform the less gifted into

intellectuals were doomed to failure; for the non-academic child lives in

a different world from his more scholarly counterpart. Th~ crux of the

68see the claims made by Carl Bereiter and Siegfried Engelmann, ~hing Disadvantaged Children in the Preschool (Englevmod Cliffs, Nev>J Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), passim and by George Dennison, The Lives

.2f...S:_b_·1_J_dren (New York: Random ROuse;-1969), passim. Using diametrically 0PPosite approaches, the authors of both these works claimed considerable success.

128

difference pertains to the degree of ability and understanding manifested

in the utilization of abstract concepts and the written word. From the

point of view of Bantock, the less able child was believed to be living

in a predominantly oral world. The interests of this child were believed

to lie in matters relating to his local environment and the marvelous.

\~hen the child reads,_ it is for the story and not for either self-improve­

ment or explanation.

The kind of education suitable for this type of child should differ

fundamentally from that of the academically gifted child. On the

secondary level, the education of the less able forty percent, excluding

the "sub-normal, .. must be centered on the practical and the concrete if

it is to be meaningful. Such academic-subjects as foreign languages,

formal history, and geography should be dropped from the course of study

that this type of child should pursue. In addition, the amount of time

devoted to mathematics would be diminished. English would be taught as

well as good citizenship but the latter would be learned by cooperative

activity rather than through formal instruction. l~hat history and

geography that Bantock would retain would be incidental to the teaching

of other subjects.

The non-academic child would learn art by proceeding from the study

of "pop" culture to more academic matters. The study of music might ·

begin with calypso; of the visual arts, with the study of films. The

chief purpose of teaching art and music to the non-academic children

would be to enable them to employ their leisure constructively.

A large portion of the time spent by these children in school would

be devoted to vocational purposes. The boys would learn such tasks as

Plumbing, paper-hanging, boot mending, and gardening while the girls

I'

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129

uld study dietetics, mothercraft, cooking, needlework, and kindred wo .

subjects. In other words, Bantock felt that the school should prepare

these children for the vocations that they would be most likely to pursue

. ll·fe. 69 later 1 n

In general, Bantock had recommended that many of the practices ..

associated with progressive and vocational education be applied to the

needs of the less gifted children. Where he differed with John Dewey was

in the latter•s insistence that an essentially practical type of educa­

tion be given to children on all levels of ability. Bantock was highly

critical of Dewey•s emphasis on the practical; for one•s immediate needs

tend to be fleeting, and Dewey had apparently forgotten that the detec­

tion of a problem is dependent on anterior assumptions which are often

non-empirical in character. 70 Bantock did not therefore prefer practical

education but felt compelled to advocate it for the less gifted because

of the educational limitations of the latter.

With regard to children on the high-average level of academic

development, Bantock recommended the pursuance of a technical education

although some general education courses would also be included. The

latter would pertain essentially to literature and the arts.?l Students,

on the higher levels of academic ability, would attend training colleges

69For Bantock•s views on the education of the less gifted, see his Education in an Industrial Society, pp. 212, 216-220.

?Osee Bantock•s views on De~IJey in ibid., pp. 37, 47-48.

71 Ibid. ~ p. 199.

130

if they lack motivation while those who possess both motivation and

ability would be prepared for entrance into the universities. The train­

ing colleges would differ from the universities in that the former would

devote themselves exclusively to teaching without the research function

of the university.72

In essence, Bantock advocated ~ class system of education but one

which was not based on the class affiliations of the families of the

students but rather on the academic capabilities and the motivations of

the individuals involved. Yet, he was not really advocating a pure

meritocracy; for elsewhere in his writings one finds that he deplored the

rise to power of individuals of high intelligence without cultivated

manners and refined morals. 73 In any case, he recommended, in substance,

that the schools serve as agencies of selection for the various occupa­

tional levels of society. This position clearly implies the prime

importance of academic ability as the selective factor. Those who possess

the requisite amount of this ability would qualify for the most pres-

tigious positions. Others would be prepared for less demanding positions

based on their relative performance on various measures of academic

ability and motivation. One might well wonder whether these other occupa­

tions do not demand special talents as well for the efficient performance

of duties. An academic incompetent is not necessarily mechanically

competent.

72Ibid., pp. 185-186. 73Jbid., pp. 180, 195.

Babbitt and Ba~tock Compared

Both Babbitt and Bantock \'Jere reacting pr_imarily in opposition both

to the decline of traditional authority and the permeation of contemporary

culture by equalitarianism. Of the two, Babbitt showed a hostility

toward business values which Bantock failed to exhibit. This contrast

may reflect differences between the British and American social climates;

for business values have generally been more widely influential in the

United States than in the United Kingdom.

Both of the protagonists of positive humanism believed that

traditional values could be restored through an educational system in

which the most important aim would be to teach students to discriminate

between values. Bantock emphasized in particular the discrimination

between the passions in terms of the values which they exemplified.

As humanists, both Babbitt and Bantock emphasized literature and the

importance of imaginative insight. In addition, Babbitt stressed the

worth of harmony and proportion as social ideals. Both men recognized

the value of tension. Bantock openly espoused this characteristic as a

value while it was an implicit assumption of Babbitt's stress on volunta­

ristic discipline. Both writers were definitely achievement oriented~

The striking similarities which existed between Babbitt and Bantock

clearly indicate how artificial is the separation by educational writers

of Babbitt's nee-humanists from the neo-conservatives of today.

CHAPTER V

RELIGIOUS TRADITIONALISM .

An important variant of neo-conservatism can be designated as

"religious traditionalism11 ltJhich is characterized by the view that the

fundamental problems of contemporary education are primarily axiological

and can only be solved by a belief in God and dedication to religion.l

While neo-conservative thinkers have generally recognized the value and

importance of religion, they have not given it the centrality of position

that it occupies in the thinking of the religious traditionalists. For

the latter, religious concerns are primary while the aesthetic emphases

of the humanists occupies a merely secondary position. A writer closely

identified with the predominantly religious strain of neo-conservative

thought was Canon Bernard Iddings Bell (1886-1958).

An American adherent of High Church Episcopalianism, Canon Bell was

ordained a priest in the Episcopal Church in 1910. After serving in a

variety of clerical capacities, he became president of St. Stephens

College at the age of thirty-four. He served in this position for

fourteen years. When St. Stephens was absorbed into Columbia University,

111 Religious traditionalism" is my term for this movement. The term vias chosen because adherents of this position be 1 i eve in the primary importance of returning to the religious traditions of the past as a remedy for the ills of contemporary society.

132

133

he severed his connection with the college out of disagreement with the

liberal educational ideas prevalent at Columbia. From 1930 to 1933, he

did serve however as a professor of religion at Columbia University. He

later acted as counselor to Episcopal students at the University of

Chicago. Subsequently, he was afflicted with blindness but continued to

lead a productive existence as a canon attached to the Episcopal Cathe­

dral of Chicago. During his most productive years, he wrote a consider­

able number of works on religion and also two books of interest to educa­

tors. Crisis in Education (1949) pertains to educational problems not

only concerning the school but also the home· and the church. In Crowd

Culture (1952), Canon Bell concerned himself with both educational and

religious problems.2

The primary problem identified by Canon Bell in his educational

writings was the immature and emotionally impulsive nature of the

American people. To a far greater extent than other peoples and than

Americans of an earlier time, the people of the United States suffered

from an inversion of values. The primary interest of most Americans. was

to make money to provide themselves with pleasure and entertainment.

Pleasure consisted of enjoying the use of a large and ornate house, a

motorcar, expensive clothes, and other material possessions. Entertain­

ment included reading literary "trash" which described acts of brutality

2since the details of Canon Bell's life are not generally known, the reader is referred to the introduction by Russell Kirk to the paperback edition of Bernard Iddings Bell, Crowd Culture (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), pp. xi -xvi.

1111

134

and iust as well as listening to or viewing similar material on radio and

television. The average American, suffering from religious impoverish-

ment, had long ago lost the concomitant sense of moral dedication which

could give life meaning. 3

If the average American is to obtain happiness, Bell believed that

work rather than pleasure must become the center of attention. When

pleasure is long pursued, it becomes boring. Unless Americans learn the

joys of work, they wi 11 "remain petulant children, dangerous, predatory ."4

Work should not be considered an unpleasant burden but rather as an

opportunity for creativeness and service to others. Every man is made to

give others understanding, tolerance, and clemency. Only through con­

structive work and moral dedication can men find peace. 5

According to Bell, that which distinguishes the. gentleman from the

common man is not money since not all gentlemen are rich nor are all

common men poor. What the gentleman has which the common man lacks is a

liberal education. By "liberal education, 11 Bell meant an education

through which students could learn to discriminate between values and to

identify the true ends of living. According to Bell, the common man has

received an essentially utilitarian and vocational type of education. As

a direct consequent, the common man has shown himself to be incapable of

ruling himself or society. Yet, in spite of his evident incapacity to

3on the nature of the American people, see Bernard Iddings Bell, Crisis in Education (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949), pp. 12-24.

4rbid., p. 23. 5rbid., pp. 22-23.

135

rule, the common man has been given the authority and prerogatives which

once belonged to the gentleman. 6 Is it any wonder that the common man is

immature? While lacking the wisdom that he might have procured through a

liberal education, the common man has responsibilities far exceeding his

accomplishments.

If the causes of this inversion of values were believed to be

educational, the remedies were also believed to be educational. Bell

believed that the major emphasis should be placed on reforming elementary

education since, by the time children reached high school, their charac-

ters have already been shaped. To accomplish the task of educating the

child, the resources not only of the school but also of the home and the

church as well should be enlisted. Children should be taught decent

manners, the value of craftsmanship, some knowledge of the basic wisdom

of the species, religion, and skill in handling the tools of education.

Manners were considered important because a courtesy was deemed essential

to the safety and welfare of civilization. Manners should be taught

primarily in the home but with the assistance of both the church and the

school. Craftsmanship was essenUa.l. to happiness; for to be happy humans

must take pride in their work. Craftsmanship would also be taught

primarily in the home. Wisdom was needed to enable people to conduct

their lives intelligently. Religion was considered to be the essential

foundation of morality as well as indispensible if people are to face up

to the frustrations of life. Finally, children should learn how to use

the educational tools of reading, writing, listening, and speaking if

there is to be a competent interchange of ideas. 7

6~id.' pp. 25-26. 7Tb•d _1_1_.' pp. 31-35.

136

In general, Bell viewed American problems in fundamentally axiolo­

gical terms. Americans were emotionally and intellectually immature be­

cause they suffered from an inversion of values. The fundamental task of

American education was to be a combination of the inculcation of values

and of the ability to discriminate between values. The most important

function of education was to be the moral one. By this function, Bell

meant that through education the individual should learn how to live with

himself which knowledge involved learning how to live with others

(manners). To learn these things, it was considered necessary that the

individual be trained in the nature and application of values. As we

shall see later, Bell believed religion to be the indispensible founda­

tion of morality so that ultimately religion was of central importance in

Bell's educational philosophy.B

The most important traits needed by the student to fulfill his role

in Bell's educational plan was intelligence. The term "intelligence" was

derived from the words inter (between) and legere (to choose). Intelli­

gence properly pertained to the ability to discriminate or to differen­

tiate between the permanent and the transitory, the good and the bad, the

valuable and the worthless, the beautiful and the ugly. Intelligence was

therefore applicable to intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and prudential

judgments.

The possession of high intelligence would not necessarily make the

possessor rich, popular, or happy. On the contrary, he might be hated

BFor Bell 1 s definitions of morals and manners, see ibid., p. 83; with regard to the role of religion, see jbid., pp. 227-2-zs.-

137

and envied by others. Yet intelligence was essential if proper choices

were to be made to enable our civilization to be 11 Safe and free. 119

While Bell considered intelligence to be basically an innate

ability, he believed that education was needed for the full development

of this power. While everyone should be taught to discriminate values to

the fullest extent to which he or she is capable, it would be unreason­

able to expect much from most people. Instead, ~ducators should stress

the training and selection of the few who exhibited superior reasoning

abilities. From this superior group would come the nation's leaders.

According to Be11•s conception of intelligence, the elite would be

identified by the possession of a consideraule degree of analytical and

synthetical reasoning abilities -- especially with regard to the ability .

to understand the natures of values and concepts and to discriminate

between them. By exposure to a judicious curriculum, characterized by a

focus on the liberal arts, the humanities and religion, those who have

the potentialities would presumably be enabled to develop to the point

where they would be able to give sapient guidance to the nation. This

goal of national service was far more valuable than the treasuring of

learning for its own sake which Bell regarded as the dominant goal of

American higher education. Bell emphasized ideas rather than facts;

reasoning rather than memory.lO

Bell believed that the most serious deficiency in American life

was the absence of any generally accepted ethical standard. American

9Ibid., p. 62.

lOon the nature and purpose of intelligence, see ibid., pp. 59-67.

138 society lacked a generally accepted definition of the nature and

purpose of man. Although some theorists might seek to arrive at such a

definition by appealing to the will of the majority, Bell rejected this

approach as contributing to blind conformity and mediocrity. He also

rejected the uncritical acceptance of the traditions of the past as

deadly to critical and creative thinking. On the other hand, the re­

jection of the whole of tradition would lead to foolish behavior. If

people are to find meaning in life, they must look to what is beyond man

which means that 11 religion is involved, primarily involved, inseparably

involved in education.ll

To Bell, the essence of religion consisted of contact with and

adoration of God.12 Without the foundation of belief in God, morality

is liable to degenerate into mere expediency and finally into blind

obedience to those who use force.l3 Belief in God is of central impor-

tance to moral education. To a considerable extent, moral education is

coterminous with religious education.

Bell's view of the nature of religious education was largely based

upon Alfred North Whitehead's interpretation of the historical develop­

ment of the higher religions. According to Bell's account of Whitehead's

views, the various religions had originated as rituals which were designed

to stimulate emotions that were deemed to be beneficial to the group.

Later, people sought to explain rituals in terms of stories. As wor­

shippers continued to perform rituals and to expound the stories linked

to their observances, faith was born. When faith was formalized into

words, a creed was created. Finally the creed was correlated with other

11 Ibid., p. 228.

13Ibid., pp. 139-140.

12 I' . d _QJ_.' pp. 127-128.

I'

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I

139 facets of human experience. 14

Religious instruction should likewise begin with ritual since ab-

stract concepts are too difficult for comprehension by the very young and

even by most adults. As soon as the child is old enough, he should learn

the stories associated with his religious tradition. When the child

reaches the period between ten and fifteen years of age, the ritual

should be transformed from a formal into a vital element of his life. By

then, the stories would become more significant by being interpreted in

the light of the child's growing fund of experience. By insight, the

child would become aware of interrelationships between ideas and things

that he previously considered separately. Thus faith would emerge. When

this stage had been attained, the creed associated with the faith of

the child would become meaningful to him.15

In the teaching of religion as in the teaching of morals and

manners, the home should be the primary locus of learning although there

vwuld also exist ancillary activities in both church and school. ~Jhile

considering it neither possible nor necessary to teach the beliefs of any

particular denomination in the public schools, Bell believed the respect

for the Absolute and some knowledge of the various faiths should be

14Ibid., pp. 128-130. This reference should be contrasted with the original account by Alfred North Hhitehead, Religion in the t1aking (New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 18, 23. According to Bell, the four stages of religious development of ~~hitehead were ritual, myth, belief, and rationalization. In this characterization, Bell was in error. Whitehead's stages were ritual, emotion, belief, and rationalization. ·

15Bell, Crisis in Education, pp. 130-135.

140

imparted in the classroom. With regard to moral instruction, it would

be based on "supernatural demands and rest on supernatural sanctions." 16

It is significant that Bell's views on religious education made

the psychological nature of the child an important consideration. The

particular mode of progression recommended was from the concrete to the

abstract in accordance with the child's growth in experience. With

regard to his views concerning human nature, Bell did not believe that

people were infinitely flexible. Educational content must be congruent

with the native abilities of those being educated. The child should not

be introduced to the abstract concepts associated with the various

religious creeds until his abilities have matured sufficiently so that

he would be able to grasp these concepts. As we have seen, Bell doubted

whether most adults would be able to grasp such concepts. Seemingly

implicit in this position was the view that heredity was more important

than environment in explaining human differences. A staunch environ-

mentalist might well be expected to exhibit confidence that the ability

to grasp abstractions could be developed under the proper environmental

conditions.

With regard to the various stages of formal education, Bell be­

lieved that too much time was being spent in schooling children. He felt

it to be both unreasonable and wasteful to engage so many people for such

a long time in formal preparation for life. Instead of the conventional

eight years of elementary education, Bell recommended a program of six

years which would encompass all that was being customarily covered in

eight years. Elementary education would be follm'led by four years of

l61bid., p. 145. See also j_bi~., pp. 35, 83.

secondary schooling and then three years of college. Graduate or pro­

fessional training would consume four additional years of study.l?

141

Bell 1 s apparent assumption that an equal amount of education is

necessary for competent performance in all .the professions is somewhat

surprising considering the wide variation which exists in the kind of

abilities required for excellence in the various professions. An even

more important question is: how would Bell guard against the use of his

recommendation for reduction in the length of formal education by educa­

tional administrators to lower academic standards to expand enrollments?

For the answer to this question, Bell•s views on the content of education

at the various levels of instruction will be examined.

Although some attention should be given to content, Bell felt that

the primary function of elementary education should be to cultivate the

basic educational skills that developed the competency to read, write,

speak, listen, compute, and handle. The purpose of elementary education

was to give youngsters the tools needed for mental growth. This was

expressed graphically by Bell in the following quotation:

Most Americans cannot read anything more difficult than a pictu.re paper or a pulp magazine; they cannot write a letter and make their meaning plain; they rarely speak except in cliches; they are unable to follow an argument put in the simplest words, to understand what a speaker is driving at. What chance have people to mature when there is no competent interchange of ideas? Our lower schools may be ever so good at conducting classes in 11 Citizen­ship" and "nature study," though there are those who doubt it when they look at the product; but their main business is and will remain teaching boys and girls how to read, write, speak, listen, figure, and handle things. Unless the lower schools can do a far better job of work on these basic necessities, there will be less and less growing up among Americans.l8

17rb·iQ., pp. 205-209. lBrbid., pp. 32-33.

142

At the high school level, Bell recommended that there should be

additional teaching of the basic educational skills but on a more

advanced level than in elementary school. Specifically, he suggested a

revival of the trivium and the quadrivium for the purpose of inculcating

habits of 11 sound thinking 11 among the students. 19 In addition to training

in the basic skills and the liberal arts, vocational training would be

taught in tandem with the liberal arts. 20 In view of his concept of

intelligence and his thoughts on the kind of elite that would be best for

the nation, it is obvious that Bell held education in the liberal arts in

higher esteem than vocational education.

Bell believed that the primary responsibility for the weaknesses of

American education rested with the secondary schools. They have failed

to provide their students with the basic skills needed for intellectual

achievement. Because of the vast numbers of the academically incompetent

that yearly enter the secondary schools of the nation, it apparently was

decided to lower academic standards to make things easy for the students.

The consequence has been a neglect of drill in the basic academic skills.

The typical college entrant in the United States was therefore character-

~zed as 11 mostly an untried young cub 11 while his counterparts in England

and on the European continent were fully prepared for college instruc­

tion.2l

To Bell, the pressure to extend the alleged benefits of mass educa­

tion to the college level was exceedingly unwise. At the time when he

wrote Crisis in Education, the colleges were burgeoning with students as

19_Ibic!_., pp. 70-71. 20_Lq_is!_.' p. 52.

21Jcid., p. 47; Bell, Crm·1d Cultur~ p. 36.

143

a result of the enactment of the 11 G. I. Bill of Rights ... Bell was fear­

ful of the educational consequences of the enactment of this bill. To

expand the facilities of the colleges to accommodate a flood of new

students would entail an increase in the numbers of faculty and other

college personnel far beyond the competently trained supply. Furthermore,

concentrating on providing education and facilities for huge masses of

students constituted a grave danger that the colleges and universities

would neglect the individual student -- especially the student of supe­

rior academic potential who was precisely the kind of student that Bell

thought the colleges should make the center of their attention. 22 His

opposition to mass college education was however much broader in scope

than his reaction to one congressional bill. As we have seen previously,

Bell believed that the chief purpose of higher education should be the

training of an elite of ratiocinative intelligence. To admit a mass of

poorly prepared students would defeat the main purpose of college and

would create an irresistible pressure to lower academic standards and to

simplify instruction. To produce a worthy intellectual elite, it was

essential that the members of this elite be recruited from those of

superior innate intelligence and that those aspiring to membership in the

elite be required to survive a challenging program of academic studies. 23

Bell thought that in college everything should be studied which

would throw light on man and his behavior. He specifically mentioned the

social sciences, psychology, literature, history, the fine arts, and

philosophy. Through the study of these disciplines, it was hoped that the

22Ball, Crisis in Education, pp. 4-5, 65.

23Ibid., pp. 66-67.

144

student would learn the causes of human failure and would learn to emulate

those human successes \'JOrthy of emulation. In essence, Bell valued these

disciplines for their value in encouraging students to lead moral and

successful lives. Bell's conception of success pertained obviously to

happiness rather than money or fame. For him education therefore, had

essent~ally practical aims but not in the crass materialistic sense of

"practical. 1124

Religion should also be studied on the college level so that the

student might come to know and adore the Infinite and thereby acquire

humility. Bell felt that the student of superior native endowment and

education was especially prone to develop the undesirable traits of pride,

insolence, and effrontery. Such an 1 individual might have the intellec­

tual qualifications for leadership, but his deficiencies of character

would be so serious as to render him positively harmful in any leadership

role that he might undertake. To guard against this, it is important

that the student learn to look up to what is immeasurably superior to

him. 25

To illustrate what he felt to be important in higher education,

Bell recalled that in 1903, when he entered the University of Chicago,

he attended an orientation session for incoming freshmen at which the

president of the university, Dr. William Rainey Harper, spoke. As Bell

recalled it, Dr. Harper said:

24rbid., p. 21.

25Ibid., p. 72.

Young gentlemen, you have come here in hope of furthering your ed~cation. If you are to do this it would be well for you to have some idea of what an educated human being is. Then you will know what to aim at here, what this institution exists to assist you to become. An educated man is a man who by the time he is twenty-five years old has a clear theory, formed in the light of human experience down the ages of what constitutes a satisfying life,_ a significant life, and who by the age of thirty has a moral philosophy consonant with racial experience. If a man reaches these ages without having arrived at such a theory, such

145

a philosophy, then no matter how many facts he has learned or how many processes he has mastered, that man is an ignoramus and a fool, unhappy, probably dangerous. That is all. Good afternoon.26

Bell 1 s conception of higher education embraced study in the liberal

arts, the humanities, and religion. In his view, vocational education had

no place in the college and the university with the exception of profes­

sional study. The fact that he prescribed the same selection of studies

for all college students clearly implies that he did not favor reliance

upon the elective method of course selection, at least with regard to

higher education.

In contrast to Bell•s emphasis upon skill instruction in the lower

schools, he stressed content quite heavily in his conception of the

desirable college curriculum. College courses were not, however, to be

taught primarily for their factual content but rather for their value in

helping people to lead happier and more worthy lives. To accomplish this

aim, it was necessary to discriminate wisely between values and to know

the true ends of life. This view of the purposes of higher education was

both moral and intellectual in nature since it involved both the under-

standing of value concepts and their application to human conduct.

Bell believed that the chief enemy of education was the state.

26Ibid., pp. 57-58.

i,

146

This menace took the form of an attack on academic freedom to produce

conformity so that whatever class happens to control the state shall be

kept firmly in power. In the United States, this class was characterized

as consisting of 11 the managerial manipulators for the upper bourgeoisie 11

and might well include in the future the leaders of organized labor.27

Bell believed that the power of the state over education was due to

the fact that the state was the sole taxing agency. This power has

resulted in the situation where the state had become the dominant finan­

cial entity in education. State control could only expand the tyranny of

centralized power. It was folly to think it possible for men to wield

great power without tyranny as the ultimate consequence.28

The general significance of Bernard Iddings Bell as an exponent of

neo-conservatism can be viewed from the uniqueness of his approach to

contemporary educational problems. Unlike other neo-conservative writers~

he did not proceed from a feeling of dissatisfaction with the undermining

of certain cherished values such as selectivity or traditionalism but

rather from the outcomes of such undermining -- the producti~n of a pop­

ulation characterized by immaturity and discontent. The remedy for this

situation lay in an education wherein the stress would be on the dis­

crimination of purposes and values. Such an educational system would

produce an elite capable of guiding others to a meaningful existence.

In view of the fact that Bell emphasized moral and especially

religious concerns, he could hardly be correctly described as a humanist.

The aesthetic and literary aspects of education did not have in his

27rbid., p. 181.

28Ibicl., pp. 187, 191.

147

philosophy the dominating importance that they had for the genuine hu-

manists. Yet, in spite of this fact, education was to Bell as to the . .

most intense humanists that we have surveyed, primarily a matter of taste.

But the tastes that he wished to cultivate were based fundamentally on

religious rather than aesthetic foundations.

In the end, he believed that people should strive for happiness.

Although he neglected to explain precisely his conception of the nature

of happiness, it is plain from the way he used the term that he had in

mind the sense of satisfaction which is a consequence of a life that has

been lived in accordance with moral and ultimately religious values. In

the end, man must find his salvation in religion or not at all.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE THEORY OF EDUCATION

Chapter II, 11 Foundations of Neo-Conservatism, .. was devoted to an

analysis of the basic philosophical foundations of neo-conservatism and

to its educational implications. Chapter VI will examine the general

characteristics of neo-conservative educational thought and will compare

them with the inferences made in chapter II. The conclusions should be

of some significance since they are based on the ideas of the neo-conserv­

ative writers whose works were analyzed earlier; for such theorists as

T. S. Eliot, Irving Babbitt, and Russell Kirk have been among the most

influential of all the writers who have been active proponents of neo­

conservatism.

Specifically, the present chapter will be devoted to bringing

together and relating the findings that we have made with regard to indi­

vidual neo-conservative writers on education with the purpose of giving

the general educational characteristics and implications of the neo­

conservative movement. We will begin with a summary of our findings

pertaining to the historical influences upon neo-conservative educational

thought. This analysis will be followed by a consideration of the nature

of neo-conservative values as such. We will then consider in order the

aims and content of education; methods of instruction and learning theory;

and the agencies that should be involved in education -- all of these

topics to be viewed from the perspective of the neo-conservative stand­

point. A comparison will then be made with the inferences given in the

148

149

second chapter and then certain general conclusions will be reached. In

essence, this chapter will be devoted to a summary and integration of the

material presented in all the foregoing chapters of this study related to

educational thought.

Neo-conservative educational thought has derived many of its

characteristics from-the historical period in which it flourished. The

contemporary period, which in its essential intellectual characteristics

began shortly after the end of World War I, represents an advanced stage

in the decline of belief in traditional moral and cultural standards.

Without exception, the neo-conservative writers, whose works were dis­

cussed earlier, have viewed the problems of the contemporary era as

fundamentally axiological in nature. These writers have protested against

what they have considered to be a condition that has arisen from a combina­

tion of a lack of standards in some areas of endeavor and an inversion of

standards in other areas. Two trends have been particularly disturbing

to neo-conservatives: the decline of belief in objective moral standards

and the spread of cultural and educational equalitarianism. From the neo­

conservative perspective, the rejection of objective moral standards was

a symptom of the decline of standards; equalitarianism was a result of the

inversion of standards. To restore a climate of intellectual and moral

integrity, neo-conservatives called for the reversal of these trends.

The primary means for reversing these trends was considered to be educa­

tional.

Contrary to popular opinion, the writing of Edmund Burke was not

the primary source of inspiration for the views of the neo-conservative

writers under consideration. Of the writers surveyed, we have sufficient

150

data to reach conclusions on the sources of inspiration of all of them

with the single exception of Bernard Iddings Bell. These writers include

the three most frequently mentioned neo-conservative writers in American

and British literature on conservatism -- Babbitt, Eliot, and Kirk. Of

the writers surveyed, only Russe 11 Kirk 1 ooked to Edmund Burke as the

chief inspiration for his work. The influences upon the other writers,

including Babbitt, Bantock, and Eliot, were so varied as to discourage

any meaningful general1zations beyond the bare fact that these influences

were chiefly conservative in nature. While neo-conservative writers on

education generally agreed with the views of Edmund Burke, they apparent­

ly did not derive their views directly from his writings.

A more fruitful means of ascertaining the historical influences

upon the neo-conservatives would be to compare the views of the neo­

conservatives with the various preceding schools of educational thought.

From this historical persp.ective, contemporary conservative educational

thought has clearly been predominantly humanistic in nature.l With the

exception of Bell, all the writers whose works have been analyzed have

exhibited the aesthetic emphasis characteristic of humanism. Babbitt,

Bantock, Eliot, and Kirk shared a common emphasis upon the study of

Titerature. Babbitt, Bantock, and Kirk also believed in the superior

efficacy of insight-- an ability which was based to a considerable ex-

tent upon imagination which was a faculty commonly stressed by the

lfor the sense in which we are using the term "humanism" see pages 48-49 of this study.

151

humanists. Since T. S. Eliot was an imaginative poet, it is probable that

he, too, believed in the importance of insight even though he was not very

explicit on this topic in his educational writings. In addition, both

Babbitt and Eliot stressed the aesthetic ideals of harmony and proportion.

Babbitt, Eliot, and Kirk also exhibited a common emphasis upon the impor­

tance of ancient Greco-Roman literature.

In general, neo-conservative educational thought can be considered

an outgrowth of a tradition which began with the aesthetic aspects of the

philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and was continued and further devel­

oped through the work of such individuals as Isocrates, Cicero.

Quintilian, John of Salisbury, and numerous personalities of the Renais­

sance. In addition, several neo-conservative writers, especially Eliot

and Bell, were also strongly influenced by Christian ideals. In histor­

ical perspective, neo-conservatism, at least in its educational aspects,

can be considered as a reaction against contemporary nihilism and equal­

itarianism and as a re-emphasis upon the humanistic and sometimes the

Christian ideals of the past. On the whole, neo-conservatism represents

an elitist type of humanism.

The particular values which neo-conservatives have stressed were

moral, intellectual, and religious in character. Economic values and

those values which are generally associated with physical comfort and

well-being were generally ignored. A strong achievement orientation was

common to the thought of the neo-conservatives. As a group, the neo­

conservatives were quite willing to sacrifice a considerable degree of

psychological freedom in favor of the discipline and of the restraints

which they believed necessary for individual achievement. The ideals of

craftsmanship and cultural achievement were strongly emphasized in the

152

writings of Babbitt, Bantock, Bell, Eliot, and Kirk. In general, the

neo-conservatives espoused an ethical perfectionism in which spiritual or

non-material, non-physical aspects of excellence were strongly emphasized.

This perfectionism was presented in terms of the development of the

individual rather than the uplift of society as a whole. The various

values emphasized by the neo-conservatives can be linked together through

the implicit ideal of the highly cultivated gentleman characterized by

the qualities of discretion, restraint, intelligence, refinement, and

good taste. This ideal is in accord with the basic humanistic virtues of

harmony and proportion; for restraint and discretion are obviously con­

ducive to harmony, and good taste involves the ability to perceive what

is proportionate and harmonious.

The fundamental aim of education,. as perceived by the neo-conserv­

atives, was deemed to be the development of an elite characterized by the

ability to discriminate between ideas and between values in terms both

of the nature and relative worth of the concepts and values involved.

This elite would be distinguished by the possession of a high degree of

analytical and synthetical reasoning powers. To be able to grasp the

nature and interrelationships of general concepts, it is obvious that one

must be able to analyze and combine ideas intelligently. Therefore, the

emphasis would be on those subjects, such as the humanities and the social

sciences, which relate to general ideas and values.

To a certain extent, admission to an academic education would be

based on a person's intellectual abilities. As a group, the neo-conserv­

atives believed that the ratiocinative potentialities of the vast

majority of people were very limited. For this reason, the neo-conserv-

153

atives advocated selective education on the college and university levels.

They generally felt that mass higher education would result inevitably in

the lowering of educational standards since colleges would be forced to

simplify instruction and expand their facilities far beyond the limits

that could be considered qualitatively desirable. These consequences

would tend to deflect the colleges from developing an intelligent and

discriminating student body which might help to form the basis of a

cultivated elite.

To understand what is at issue pertaining to the conservative

advocacy of selectivity in education, it is helpful to survey the argu-

ments that have been employed by the advocates of mass higher education.

These arguments have generally been based on grounds of either individual

excellence or of good citizenship. On individual grounds, mass college

education has been justified as enabling people to improve their

abilities, to enhance their occupational efficiency and to lead happier

lives. On political grounds, mass education has been defended as being

essential to enable the electorate to exercise the duties of citizenship

intelligently. 2 For example, the President•s Commission on Higher Educa-

tion, 1947-1948, used both the individual and political arguments to

recommend that American college courses be made less verbal and less

intellectual in order to bring them within the range of more people. 3 To

2for the arguments in favor of mass higher education see Gail Kennedy, ed., Education for Democracy (Boston: Heath, 1952), pp. 78-80.

3The Kennedy anthology contains, among other selections, the report of the President•s Commission. For pertinent passages, see ibid., pp. 8, 13.

154

a conservative, this recommendation is a clear illustration of how the

advocacy of mass education can lead to a demand for the lowering of

standards. Of course, it is doubtful that the members of the President's

ommission would concur with the view that their recommendation would lead

to a lowering of standards.

The essential crux of the controversy between the advocates of

selective education and those of mass college education deals with the

ability of the masses of people to benefit from higher education. The

benefits cited by the proponents of mass higher education could not, for

the most part, be obtained by students unless they possessed the ability

to understand and utilize the knowledge conveyed by their professors.

The neo-conservatives have evinced a lack of confidence in the ability of

the majority to grasp the understandings conveyed in colleges and

universities in their full implications. As we have just seen, the con­

servative criterion of academic competence pertained primarily to the

ability to analyze and interrelate ideas and values. In other words,

neo-conservatives regard a good student as one who can comprehend the

pattern of abstract concepts in relationship to one another. Academic

achievement is not simply a matter of absorbing information but rather of

structuring knowledge; for to the neo-conservatives, information is not

truly knowledge unless it has been integrated with other information into

a patterned structure so that interrelationships are apparent. Neo­

conservatives have been skeptical of the educational efficacy of attempt­

ing to instruct those individuals who have evinced little interest and

competence in intellectual areas. This skepticism seems to be based on

the assumption that heredity or early upbringing have been more important

than educational and other environmental efforts to alter the academic

155

ompetencies of students. Had the neo-conservatives looked upon education

as basically a .process of passively absorbing information rather than of

understanding and structuring it, they might have been more sanguine

concerning the potentialities of students since the mere learning of

isolated facts is probably easier than the integration of those facts into

a meaningful whole. Those opposed to conservative educational views have

not all necessarily considered education as a matter of learning facts,

but they have generally stressed the importance of the environment in

explaining human.differences.

The advocates and opponents of selective admissions policies in

higher education disagree on the primary focus of education on the

college level. The opponents of selective education are concerned with

the uplifting of the vast majority of students while the proponents of a

selective policy wish to devote their efforts to those of the greatest

inte 11 ectua l potential. When the President • s Commission on Higher Educa­

tion recommended that higher education be made less verbal and less

intellectual, it revealed a propensity to alter the nature of higher

education to make it available to a greater number of people. 4 It is

highly probable that some of the members of this group had implicitly

assumed that the common welfare depended more on raising the average

level of academic attainment than on the development of highly competent

leadership. On the other hand, the neo-conservatives assumed that the

welfare of the nation was more dependent on the development of an elite

of wisdom and character. One of the reasons for this disagreement rested

on a difference of opinion concerning the academic potentialities of the

4I' . d '3 ____Q2_. • p . I •

156

majority of students. Another possible basis for disagreement might have

been a difference of historical interpretation concerning the role of

selective leadership in contrast to the power of mass movements in shaping

the course of history.

Neo-conservatives have generally emphasized the transmission of the

wisdom of the past to present and future generations. Implicitly assumed

in this emphasis on cultural transmission was the existence of certain

verities which would not alter with historical change. In contrast with

John Dewey and other pragmatist educators, the neo-conservatives did not

stress change but rather focused on what they regarded as the eternal

values.

Neo-conservatives have agreed on the desirability of transmitting

the traditional social values. They have generally argued that tradition

is an efficacious and worthwhile vehicle for the transmission of values

since it contains the funded wisdom of the past. In contrast to writers

such as Hutchins and Adler who have advocated only the imparting of the

wisdom of famous authors and scholars, the neo-conservatives have also

advocated the transmission of the values of the various folk cultures of

the world. Certain neo-conservatives, such as T. S. Eliot and Russell

Kirk, have emphasized the importance of tradition as a remedy for the

ills of the twentieth century; other neo-conservative writers such as

Irving Babbitt and G. H. Bantock, have emphasized other remedies in addi­

tion to acknowledging the value of tradition.

Concerning the content of education, the neo-conservatives have

all quite clearly stressed the importance of the liberal arts. Neo-

conservatives have especially emphasized the importance of instruction in

literature which they have valued primarily as the means whereby

157

students learn the nature and use of ethical values. Of the two quali­

ties emphasized by the neo-conservatives, wisdom and virtue, virtue was

generally considered to be primary. By focusing on literature as the

major means of moral instruction, the neo-conservatives implicitly relied

upon the utilization of concrete situations rather than on abstract

principles as the preferred method of approach. Their method therefore

tended to be more inductive than deductive. One exception to the general

advocacy of the literary method of value instruction was the position of

Bernard Iddings Bell who espoused a fundamentally religious approach.

As a group, the neo-conservatives preferred a prescribed curriculum

to the elective principle of selection. The most common reasons given

for opposing the elective principle were that young people lacked the

needed competences to make sensible selections and that studies differed

from one another in intrinsic value. Conservatives preferred to

prescribe subjects on a hierarchical basis with those subjects believed

to embody moral, religious, and intellectual values placed at the summit.

For the purpose of contrast, the widely known defense of the elective

principle by Charles W. Eliot, former president of Harvard University,

can be cited. Eliot was confident that all studies if pursued with vigor

and efficiency would be of equal value. Motivation was deemed to be an

important factor in determining how efficiently studies would be pursued.

Therefore, Eliot felt that students should have the opportunity to select

the subjects of the greatest interest to them. The mature student was,

he believed, competent to make wise choices.

In general, the neo-conservatives did not stress the importance of

interest as much as Charles Eliot. They felt it to be more important to

158

choose subjects of intrinsic worth than to minister to the desires of the

students. The neo-conservatives were not so confident of the competency

of even mature students nor of the purity of their motives in choosing

subjects. As we have seen, Irving Babbitt exemplified this skepticism

when he suspected that indolence might prove to be more important than

interest as a guide to the selection of subjects. The neo-conservative

attitude toward the elective principle resembled their view of mass higher

education. On both issues, a strong consciousness of human limitations

was manifested.

Regarding the views of neo-conservatives concerning teaching

methods, instructional procedures are ultimately based upon learning

theories. We must therefore inquire into the learning theory which under-

lies the neo-conservative view of education. Since none of the neo-con-

servative writers considered in this study was an educational psychologist,

it is hardly surprising that no one of these writers has given us a

systematic theory of learning. We do however have certain indications of

their fundamental attitudes and from these instances should be able to

extrapolate the outline of a learning theory.

To this writer, the most striking fact about neo-conservative

attitudes toward learning is their strong resemblance to Gestalt views of

learning. 5 Like the Gestalt psychologists, neo-conservative writers have

viewed learning as primarily an interactive process in which both the

teacher and the student play important roles. In accordance with the

5For a general explication of the Gestalt theory of learning see Morris L. Bigge, Learning Theories for Teachers (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 278-285.

159

conservative principle of respect for authority, neo-conservatives have

emphasized the role of the teacher as the leader and guide in the class-

room. In addition, neo-conservatives have also stressed the importance of

considering the abilities of the child. When directing a class, the

teacher should, therefore, modify his own plans to suit the nature of the

students before him. 6

Like the Gestalt psychologists, the neo-conservatives also stress

the importance of insight. With the exception ofT. S. Eliot, all the

neo-conservative writer considered in this study underscored the educa-

tional importance of insight regardless of whether they termed it the

11 illative sense, .. 11 Seeing patterns, .. or simply 11 intuition." Generally,

they conceived of insight as the power to integrate separate details into

meaningful wholes. Insight was generally considered to be the product of

a combination of the functions of the faculties of the imagination and

reason although Kirk, following Newman, included other faculties as well.

Generally, reason was to be employed by the individual as the final judge

of the generalities arrived at through the use of the imagination. Of

particular concern to the neo-conservatives was the utilization of in-

sight to abstract and interrelate general ideas and values.

What method should a teacher employ to teach insightfully? The neo-

conservatives have not given us a clear answer to this question but

enough experiments have been performed by Gestalt psychologists to give

6rhe view of the Gestalt psychologists regarding students was similar to that of the neo-conservatives. however to view teachers more as guides than leaders. further details.

the role of the The former tended

See ibid. for

160

us some important clues.? Since insight is a process which occurs largely

in the mind of the student, it would seem to be obvious that the teacher

would have to rely on the discussion method rather than on telling the

student the answer to a problem. It is important that the discussion take

place in a structured situation where the teacher leads the student

sequentially to the attainment of the particular insight that the teacher

is seeking to convey. This sequential procedure would presumably begin

with a review of all relevant material because insight is fundamentally <

the power to integrate what has previously been learned into a structured

whole. The teacher would then presumably ask the student questions

designed to focus attention on those aspects of the whole which are rele­

vant to the attainment of the desired insight. The Socratic method of

questioning has frequently been utilized for eliciting insights.

To the neo-conservatives, learning at its best pertained to under­

standings more than to factual information and skills. The basic academic

skills were to be acquired in the lower schools in preparation for the

integrated understandings to be obtained in the colleges. The neo-conserv­

atives have therefore emphasized the content of learning. The techniques

were considered important primarily as instruments for the acquisition of

the understandings. In this respect, they diverged from the mental

disciplinarians who stressed learning skills more than content and from

the educational realists who placed greater stress on factual information.

In general, the neo-conservatives advocated a primarily academic

program of instruction since their concern was largely with ideas and

values although they were, as we have seen, quite ready to utilize

7Ibid., The Gestalt psychologists were of course not necessarily conservative themselves but they shared the conservative's emphasis on insiqht.

161

aesthetic and affective approaches to education for their cognitive

value. With regard to those individuals who did not exhibit superior

academic talent, most neo-conservatives believed that after these students

have acquired enough formal education to function. usefully in the non-

I I

I I

academic world, they should be permitted and indeed encouraged to pursue \ '

their education through practical experience. Bantock differed from the \ '1

others in that he had greater confidence that these students would benefit

from further instruction which would be primarily practical rather than

academic in nature. Nevertheless, the neo-conservatives as a whole empha­

sized the importance of human differences in ability in planning learning

programs.

With regard to the agencies to be utilized in the educational

process, the neo-conservatives agreed that while the major function of

the school should be educational, other institutions should also play

their parts. The family was especially emphasized as an agency ideally

suited to convey instruction in morals, manners, and in the cultural

traditions of society. The church was also considered important for

supplying the basic religious instruction which all the neo-conservative

writers under consideration so strongly emphasized, including even the

skeptic, Irving Babbitt. 8 They were also concerned about the educational

effects of such tools of popular culture as books, magazines, paintings,

and musical compositions. This concern was especially evident in the

writings ofT. S. Eliot and B. I. Bell but was to some extent true of

all the writers under discussion. Although the school was considered to

be the primary agency of formal education, other agencies of both

formal and informal education were also therefore deemed to be important.

Bsee page 101 of this study.

162

As proponents of the unique value of tradition, conservative writers

would be expected to stress the educational importance of those agencies

which have been the primary conduits of tradition -- especially the

family and the church. In this respect, the neo-conservatives were

being consistent with their basic philosophicat viewpoint.

In the second chapter, the basic philosophical presuppositions of

neo-conservatism were given and certain educational implications were

inferred. On the whole, the exponents of neo-conservative educational

thought have fulfilled our expectations concerning the educational entail­

ments of the conservative viewpoint. There is however one major area

which they have neglected. Our inferences concerning the attitudes and

methods of approach of the conservative school counselor have not been

confirmed by our study of neo-conservative writers because the neo-con- .

servatives have largely neglected the whole area of school counseling.

Yet this is an important area of educational endeavor. By the study of

the implications of neo-conservatism concerning school counseling, we

can infer the general neo-conservative attitude on the nature of the

individual student and his fundamental needs; for the counselor is con­

cerned to a considerable extent with the personal desires and problems

of the student.

As was pointed out in the second chapter, the conservative view

of human nature has been characterized by an emphasis upon the weakness

and irrationality of mankind. 9 Humans were not considered to be free

and autonomous but were pictured as continually beset by anxieties.

9see pages 39-40 of this study.

163

Their needs for security, status, and meaning were believed to be

especially strong. Most of these needs could only be satisfied by. satis­

factory relationships between the individual and society. These anxieties

have been increased during the twentieth century by the steady undermining

of the traditional institutions of society. 10 The neo-conservatives have

been especially concerned by the erosion of belief in traditional

standards of value and by the rising tide of equalitarianism.

These views obviously have many ramifications with regard to school

counseling. 11 To the conservative school counselor, the importance of

helping the student to find a meaningful philosophy of life which would

enable the student to make satisfying choices cannot be gainsaid. This

attitude is entirely consonant with the general neo-conservative stress

upon the finding and discrimination of values.

In addition, the conservative counselor would be concerned with

enabling the student to find his proper place in the vocational, intel­

lectual, and social hierarchy. To a considerable extent, the work of

the conservative counselor would be focused on helping the individual

student to ascertain his vocational and educational assets and limita-

tions including a realistic understanding of what the student should and

should not strive to achieve. In this respect his position would be in

sharp contrast to his more equalitarian counter parts whose confidence in

lOThe causes of this situation, as set forth by R. A. Nisbet, were analyzed on pages 37-38 of this study.

llsee in particular pages 27, 30, and 44 of this study.

t l

I ~ '

164

the efficacy of environmental influences would tend to make them more

responsive to the desires of the students than to their capabilities. If,

for example, a student expresses interest in a profession apparently un­

suited to his abilities, the more equalitarian type of counselor would be

inclined to try to overcome the deficiencies of the student while the

conservative counselor would be more inclined to suggest that the student

change his goal. This difference in approach is based on a difference in

estimation of the effectiveness of environmental influences.

In view of the importance that the neo-conservatives have imputed

to the relationships of the individual to society, it would seem to

follow that the conservative counselor would seek to involve students in

cooperative social endeavor as a means of relieving the anxieties that

might interfere with schoolwork.l 2 This practice should not however,

be interpreted as implying that the conservative would necessarily prefer

cooperation to competition. The strong achievement orientation of the

conservative would presumably militate against an indiscriminate

acceptance of cooperation as a desirable value; for the conservative

stress on selective excellence entails a certain amount of competition

to meet standards of excellence if selection is to be an effective device

for enhancing excellence. Other things being equal, whether competition

or cooperation would be acceptable would depend upon which practice in a

given situation would most enhance achievement. With regard to the

school, cognitive achievements would be emphasized by the neo-conserv-

atives.

l2see the discussion on pages 44-45 of this treatise.

165

In general, the values which the conservative school counselor

would seek to effectuate would not be permissive in character but would

include the hardier virtues which have figured so prominently in conser­

vative educational thought such as discipline and restraint. The con­

servative view of happiness has not been couched in terms of pleasure

and relaxation but rather in terms of challenge and achievement. Yet the

conservative ideal of happiness was not completely individualistic in

nature; for while the individual was considered to be in need of striving

for achievement, he was also deemed to be in need of sociability with his

fellows. Above all, the individual was considered to be in need of a

coherent philosophy of life.

The two greatest deficiencies in neo-conservative educational

thought are probably the absence of a systematic presentation of the

educational dimensions of conservatism, and the absence of speculation

pertaining to the implications of neo-conservatism with regard to

guidance and counseling. It is hoped that this study will contribute

toward alleviating these deficiencies.

The greatest deficiency which exists in neo-conservative thought

considered as a general whole is probably the absence of a detailed

integration of conservative metaphysical thought with the findings of

modern science. The importance of this task is obvious; for the con­

servative remedy for the perplexities of the contemporary age in the last

analysis may be the truly viable one -- an emphasis upon the eternal

verities and upon high standards of personal and social achievement.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The concluding task of this study will be a general overview of the

structure of the study with attention to be given to some of the more

salient highlights. By this means it is hoped that we may obtain a

retrospective insight into the nature of conservatism in general and of

neo-conservative educational theory in particular.

In the first chapter, the general design of this study was given

and the parameters thereof were clearly indicated. The need for a clear

definition of conservatism was established. A definition was formulated

based upon an analysis of scholarly usage of 11 conservatism11 and cognate

terms. The essential elements of conservatism were identified as the

advocacy of an aristocratic elitism and of the value of traditional

authority. Both positions were seen to be ultimately based upon a

hierarchical conception of values and of the nature of humanity. The con­

servative position therefore was predicated upon both the existence of

and the desirability of hierarchy. 1

In the subsequent section of the first chapter, the conservative

position was contrasted with related views with which it has frequently

been confused. The probable cause for this confusion was the lack of a

clear conception of the nature of conservatism. Finally, near the end

lsee pages 9-10 of this study.

166

167

of the chapter, the distinctive nature of neo-conservatism was discussed.

The distinguishing characteristic of neo-conservatism was seen to consist

not in the espousal of any unique doctrines not previously adhered to by

other conservatives, but rather in an emphasis upon cultural (including

both educational and intellectual) concerns in strong contrast to the

primarily political concerns of eighteenth century conservatives. This

change of emphasis was seen to be a response to the decline of belief in

religious and moral values and to the rise of mass culture. 2

The second chapter was devoted to an analysis of the fundamental

neo-conservative concepts pertaining to the nature of the universe, man,

and society as a means of explaining the basic reasons for the positions

taken by neo-conservatives on educational and other issues. It was

considered important to establish the neo-conservative position on these

issues because some writers have chosen to deny that there was a general

conservative philosophy. 3 In this study, an effort was made to extra­

polate the educational consequences of acceptance of the conservative

viewpoint which would, it was hoped, be confirmed by the historical

survey to follow. Such basic conservative concepts as hierarchy,

natural law, and the inheritance theory of human-development were

brought into the discussion as well as the conservative view of the

psychological nature of humanity. 4

2see pages 16-20 of this study.

3see for example the reference to Michael Oakeshott on page of this treatise.

4It should not be inferred that the writer was implying that only conservatives necessarily held each of these positions.

168

In the following three chapters, the neo-conservative writers on

education were divided into three schools, those who have combined

humanism with traditionalism; those humanists who while favorable to

humanism have not made it a major element in their systems; and the

basically religious approach to educational problems. T. S. Eliot and

Russell Kirk represented the first school; Irving Babbitt and G. H.

Bantock, the second; and Bernard Iddings Bell, the third school. The

third, fourth, and fifth chapters were devoted respectively to these

divisions of neo-conservative opinion. An analysis was undertaken in

each of these chapters of the views and the historical significance of

the writers who exhibited the characteristics of the three wings of neo­

conservative educational thought.

In general, this classification of the subdivisions of neo-conserv­

atism was based upon the particular values which were emphasized by the

writers in question. Most of these writers espoused classical humanism

but some of these writers combined it with an equally marked emphasis

upon traditionalism while other writers, although favorable to traditional­

ism, tended to emphasize more contemporary approaches. In the case of

Bernard Iddings Bell, the approach was traditionalist without being

especially humanistic in character. The particular traditions which

Bell emphasized were religious in character, while Eliot and Kirk

emphasized the traditions of the various cultures of the world as well as

the intellectual and religious wisdom of the past. On the whole, the

neo-conservative writers agreed as to the value of traditions that have

been passed on through many generations, although they were far from

agreement as to the efficacy of traditionalism in the contemporary

' J

169

world.

The sixth chapter was devoted to a summary and integration of the

material presented in the preceding chapters relating to.neo-conservative

educational thought. To put it more broadly, an effort was made to

present the basic characteristics of neo-conservatism as a distinct school

of educational thought. This overview was based upon an integration of

historical, philosophical, and psychological methods of approach.

Historically, neo-conservative educational thought represented a

reaction against two marked trends of Western civilization in the twenti-

eth century -- the decline of belief in objective moral standards and the

spread of cultural and educational equalitarianism. Contrary to the

popular impression, Edmund Burke was not the primary source of inspira­

tion of the neo-conservative educational writers. Instead, the influences

upon the neo-conservatives were varied in character although, among all

the preceding schools of educational thought, that of the cultural human­

ists exhibited the strongest affinities to the thinking of the nea·-

conservatives. In fact, at least with regard to their educational think-

ing, the neo-conservatives can be regarded as representing a predominantly

elitist type of cultural humanism.

The major aim of education from the neo-conservative standpoint was

the development of an elite characterized by the ability to discriminate

between ideas and between values in terms of their nature and their worth.

Such an aim implied the stressing of the analytical and synthetical

reasoning abilities in the educational process. Also implicit was the

emphasis upon the study of those subjects which most closely pertained to

ideas and values - the humanities and the social sciences.

r 170

The neo-conservatives were also concerned about the transmission of

traditional values. Tradition was considered to be a superior means of

transmitting values, and long-term traditions were believed to embody a

superior wisdom as the end products of the experiences of many genera­

tions. The neo-conservative advocacy of tradition not only covered the

wisdom of the thinkers and writers of the past, but also includeq the

values associated with the various folk cultures.

To the neo-conservatives, learning was an interactive process which

the teacher directed but in which the abilities of the students were

among the determining influences. The attainment of insight was strongly

emphasized. Insight was conceived of as primarily an integrative com-

petency whereby, through what was generally considered to be the coopera­

tion of the reason with the imagination, the individual would be able to

11 see11 facts in relationship to a general holistic pattern. To induce

the attainment of an insight, a teaching method which, in many of its

characteristics, is similar to the Socratic method of discourse is

clearly implied. With regard to the implementation of such a method, a

considerable degree of student participation would obviously be necessary.

In the implementation of conservative educational aims, the neo-

conservatives felt that the existence of high selective standards of

admission and promotion, at least with regard to higher education, was

essential. This attitude was based primarily upon the conviction that

the ratiocinative potentialities of most individuals was too limited to

make any attempt to train a mass population of sages very practical. To

attempt to do so would inevitably lm,ter educational standards; thereby

resulting in the neglect of the training of competent leadership.

I il

r An attempt was also made in the sixth chapter to depict the aims of

the neo-conservative school counselor. On the basis of general conserv­

ative principles, it was believed that the counselor would have three

basic aims: to help students to find a meaningful philosophy of life; to

aid them in finding their proper places in the social, intellectual,

and vocational hierarchy; to promote cooperative social activities among

students. In general, the conservative counselor and teacher would both

show an orientation to achievement values. Happiness would be considered

more a matter of challenge and endeavor than of pleasure and relaxation.

To the neo-conservatives, the value of creative tension far exceeded that

of bland contentment.

In the conventional history of educational thought, there has been

a strong tendency to divide the educational right into the perennialist

and the essentialist schools. One might well wonder if neo-conservatism

can be fitted into either of these two categories. The answer must be in

the negative. Aside from the fact that most of the prominent advocates

171

of both perennialism and essentialism fail to exhibit the aristocratic

tendencies of the neo-conservatives, there are other reasons for this

conclusion. The perennialists certainly emphasize the wisdom of the

intellectuals and aesthetes of the past, but do not exhibit the emphasis

upon the traditions of the various folk cultures of the world character­

istic of the neo-conservatives. Furthermore, the essentialist emphasis

upon adaptation to the contemporary world does not find a counterpart in

neo-conservative thought. While, in neo-conservative philosophy, there is

some stress upon adaptation, as there is in most educational philosophies,

it is not emphasized as much as adherence to values and ideas because of

their own intrinsic worth. In fact, the neo-conservatives seem to be

more interested in reconstructing society in a conservative direction

172

than in adapting to it. To this writer it seems evident that neo-conserv­

atism should be considered a distinct school of educational thought in

its own right. To do any less would be to overlook the distinctive

characteristics of the neo-conservative movement.

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APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Norman R. Phillips has been read and approved by the following Committee:

Dr. Gerald L. Gutek, Chairman Professor, Foundations of Education, Loyola

Or. Rosemary V. Donatelli Associate Professor and Chairman, Foundations of Education, Loyola

Rev. Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J. Professor, Foundations of Education, Loyola

Dr. John M. Wozniak Oean,.School of Education, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date 4~~/.J. ~ ffw· ?.t.,b.) Director's signature 7