NDT 2016- Security Kritik - NAR

8/18/2019 NDT 2016- Security Kritik - NAR

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1NC

The 1ac sustains the referent object of security - this makes warfare, threat

construction and human insecurity inevitable. Be suspect of their specific scenarios -

national security is a ploy created throuh a culture of fear.

!al " - Master of Arts in International Relations (Preerna, 2007,http://gwu.acae!ia.eu/Prerna"al/Papers/#$#%%&/'ritical)ecurit*)tuies+econstructingtheational)ecurit*)tate

#nder the lens of critical theory, there are many problems with the current framework of national security. $irst, security is a

parado% for the more we add to the national security aenda, the more we have to fear . &sBarry Bu'an (1))1, *"+ points out in eople, tates and $ear, the security parado% presents us with a cruel irony in that to be secure

ultimately, would mean bein unable to escape./ Thus, to secure oneself, one would need to be trapped in a

timeless state, for leavin this state would incur risks. The current neo-realist reali'ation of

national security is 0uite narrow and does not take into account threats to human welfare,

health, social problems, and domestic sources of insecurity. owever, in ecurity2 & New $ramework of &nalysis,several C theorists put forward the case for widenin the field of security studies and separatin these into five different sectors under

state control2 military, politics, environment, society and economy (Bu'an, 3e 4ilde and 4aever 1))5, 61-6*+. But, since these

wideners leave the referent object of security as the state, widenin the field of security studies becomes even

more troublin because it risks more state control over our lives, the militari'ation of social issues

such as drus and crime, which would further leitimi'e and justify state violence , leavin us all the

more insecure. &ccordinly, it becomes clear that a mere re-definition of security/ away from its current neo-

realist framework does not solve the security dilemma if the referent object of security is left

unchaned. This oes to prove that it is the state as the referent object that re0uires 0uestionin in

terms of its supposed provision of security rather than the problems with widenin the field of security. 4ithout

a state-centric concept of security, there would be no national security aenda left to widen, as

our security concerns would be human-centered, hence , the parado% of security would dissipate. & second

part of the security parado% is that security and insecurity are not binary opposites. 7n a micro-level, if security

is the state of bein secure, than insecurity should be the state of not bein secure. owever, what we do feel secure about is neither partof the national security aenda nor a conscious thouht or feelin. The state of bein secure is thus, not conceptuali'ed as an absence of

insecurity. 7n a policymakin level, 8obert !ipschut' (1))9, 6"+, &ssociate rofessor of olitics at #niversity of California, anta Cru',

notes in 7n ecurity that our desire to achieve security throuh the ac0uisition of arms and a national

missile defense/ system, serves to insecure those whom we label and treat as threats.

This encouraes the proliferation of w eapons of m ass d estruction and

offensive posturin by those we wish to secure ourselves aainst, causin us to

feel more insecure as the end result of our search for security. :ore recently, when ;eore4.Bush included North ra0, North


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not hold up under scrutiny. 7ur perception of what and from whom we need to be secured is not based on the actual threats

that e%ist, but on the threats that we are told to perceive by the state. Thus, terrorists, drus, illeal immirants, Third

4orld/ dictators, roue states, blacks, non-Christians, and the 7ther, are considered as threats to

the national security apparatus, and conse0uently, as threats to the individual &merican.

This state construction of threats pervades our minds, causin a trickle-

down effect that encouraes a culture of fear, where the only limit to the

comin daner is our imaination. !ipschut' (6AAA, -9+ concludes in &fter &uthority2 4ar, eace, and;lobal olitics in the 61st Century, the national security state is brouht down to the level of the household, and each one arms itself

aainst the security dilemma posed by its neihbor across the hede of fence./ !ipschut' seems to be sayin that it is national

security that eventually encouraes the creation of a dichotomy between the self and the

7ther in our everyday lives. >ndeed, it is the discourse of security by the rulers and elites, which creates and

sustains our bipolar mindset of the world . & final dilemma presented by the current security framework is thatsecurity is ontoloically unstable, unable to e%ist on its own, re0uirin the creation of certain conditions and cateories, specifically, the

creation of the 7ther. ames 3er 3erian (1))9, 69+, &ssociate rofessor of olitical cience at # :ass (&mherst+, notes in 7n ecurity

that we are tauht to consider security as an a priori arument that proves the e%istence and necessity of only one form of security

because there currently happens to be a widespread belief in it./ ?et, national security is a hihly unstable

concept and chanes over time, with the construction of new threats and enemies. 3ue to its

unstable nature, security can then, be considered as a constant fluid that is constructed and

re-defined by the discourse of the state and security elites. 7le 4aever, a senior researcher at theCenter for eace and Conflict 8esearch, contends that the very act of utterin security/ places it on the security aenda, thereby ivin

the state and its elite, power over the issue. >n 7n ecurity, he notes that in namin a certain development

a security problem, the state can claim a special riht, one that in the final

instance, always be defined by the state and its elites/ (1))9, 99+. This process is termed assecuriti'ation ,/ which simply means treatin an event or issue as a problem of national security

rather than first 0uestionin whether it should even be treated as a security issue. uch an

act serves the interests of the state and its elites, startin with security discourse by the

state, which constructs and perpetuates state identity and e%istence .

Their presencin of apocalypse is a necessary techni0ue of control which coloni'es

the debate and makes debatin the merits of their policy fundamentally a non-

starter.

de ;oede D 8andalls EA) (Mariee, +epart!ent of uropean )tuies, ni1 of A!stera!,an )a!uel, +ept of eograph*, ni1ersit* 'ollege "onon, 3Precaution, pree!ption: arts antechnologies of the actiona4le 5uture, n1iron!ent an Planning +: )ociet* an )pace 2006,1olu!e 27, pages &6-&7&

If hu!ans are the ones to 4la!e, then hu!ans can also attain control through reucing e!issions or speculati1e geoengineering strategies.eoengineering approaches are clai!e to 4e necessar* as a precaution (eg 'onnor an reen, 2006, !aing a1aila4le a set of e!ergenc*

technologies in case the unthina4le starts to occur (5le!ing, 2007. Fuestions of politics and ethics are fre8uentl* swept

aside by a banal, technocratic focus on risks . These Gultimate solutionsH, whilst not new ieas especiall*

in !ilitar* circles (5le!ing, 2007, are enlivened by the dramati'ations of apocalyptic futures in which

the only way to act seems to be to adopt spectacular techni0ues of Ifor control. The

possibility of annihilation is made banal throuh its institutional preparation and


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routini'ed imaination (Masco, 200#. This technoloical response is also eepl* redemptive in its

potential to recover perfection (o4le, %667. 9ne of the political 8uestions to 4e raise in relation to this new 4analit* ofcatastro- phe, as we will iscuss 4elow, is whether it is a4le to foster enchant!ent, unerstoo as the profoun an e!powering attach!ent to

life;; that, accoring to a!ple, "onon scenarios of aterrorist strie an cli!ate change through the search for criteria to !easure cli!ate change prepareness across the worl. =his is 4olstere 4*,

for e>a!ple, the %-in-%000- *ear tial floo e1ent e>ercise (>ercise =riton hel in the ? in 200$ or the A="A=I) pro@ect le 4* =ho!as

+owning at the )tochol! n1iron!ent Institute 4ranch in 9>for. These calculations and imainations produce

citi'ens sensiti1e to the concerns of the polic* !aers, 4ut, at the sa!e ti!e, desensiti'ed to thinkin critically a4outthese issues. "ocal councils ha1e seie on the opportunities to use *stopic i!ages to engage citiens in 4roaer agenas of rec*cling anreuctions in energ* consu!ption.(7 Bhilst there is not space in this paper to iscuss in !uch etail the wa*s in which su4@ects are constitutethrough conte!porar* terrorist an cli!ate change policies, this is nonetheless a critical point. Isin (200$, for e>a!ple, iscusses the neuroticcitien; as one who is constitute as neurotic, insecure, an an>ious 4* the rational an affecti1e go1ern!ental politics within a 1ariet* ofo!ains incluing securit* an the en1iron!ent. Be 4eco!e terrorist-conscious or cli!ate-change-conscious consu!ers, encourage to eschew

war ia!ons, oil, or air-freighte goos ('a!p4ell, 200C "e a!ple, 4usiness s*!posiu!s offer !areta4le opportunities for financial proucts such as catastrophe 4ons orhurricane eri1ati1es (Ranalls, 2006 an a1ertising opportunities for co!panies as i1erse as oil giant

ploite. +rawing authorit* fro! percei1e cli!ate science (whether warrante

or not, these crises become opportunities that must be continually releitimated by further

warnins of crises to eep the !aret 1alue of cli!ate sufficientl* high. In other wors, these imainaries do not just

enerate environmental or overnment responses@ they represent commercial opportunities

too. Bhilst uncertaint* !a* ha1e 4een isa4ling in the sense of generating coorinate international action on reucing e!issions, cli!ateuncertainties, as with terroris!, ha1e successfull* generate 4usiness inno1ation, go1ern!ental regulation, an !anifol sur1eillance practices.Politics Be ha1e argue that pree!ption in conte!porar* securit* practice, an precaution in conte!porar* en1iron!ental practice ispla*i!portant affinities an historical entan- gle!ents, through the wa*s in which the* i!agine apocal*pse an eplo* arts an technologies thatrener this i!agination 4anal.Be now turn to e>a!ine !ore e>plicitl* the political i!plications of the i!portance of precautionar* principlesan the resulting 8uests for nowlege. Be argue that three 4roa political outco!es can 4e consiere. 5irst, terrorist an cli!ate change

policies !a* 4e perfor!ati1e, 4ringing into 4eing the 1er* realities the* see to a1oi. )econ, the imaination of apocalypse

may depolitici'e debates , smulin other policies in under their rubric@ and , thir, they maydeleitimate positions in the debates. >f apocalypse is also about the imaination of a

paradise (nens4erger, %67&C ?u!ar, %66, an emerent new order, then the irony of contemporary

debates is that they fail to enae in sinificant political imaination. =hus, we suggest that the

banality of apocalypse in these e4ates fosters a disenchantment that is itself depolitici'in. Masco

writes: Bhat does it mean when the Gstate of emerencyH has so e%plicitly become the rule

when in order to prevent an apocalypse the overnmental apparatus has prepared so


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meticulously to achieve itJHH (200#, page %2, e!phasis in original. 5irst, then, it is important to emphasi'e

that overnments not only are anticipatin the worst , but also, in tryin to prevent that

nihtmare, act in ways that increase the possibility of its occurrence. This phantasmaoria

is thus imained and made real. =hus, with reard to the politics of security preemption, Massu!i

(2007, E%# recounts its logic as follows: >t is not safe for the enemy to make the first move. ?ou have to

move first, to make them move ... .?ou test and prod, you move as randomly andunpredictably and ubi0uitously as they do... .?ou move like the enemy, in order to make the

enemy move.;; =hat such reasoning is not purel* theor* was e!onstrate 4* the e1ents surrouning the arrest of si> ew Ferse* !enaccuse of plotting to ill soliers at 5ort +i> in 2007. Reports of the arrest unco1ere that the isrupte plot; was acti1el* encourage 4* a

police infor!er, posing as an g*ptian raical. It was the infor!er who offere to 4roer a planne weapons purchase, an who, accoring to ew Gor =i!es @ournalist ?ocieniewsi (2007, see!e to 4e pushing the iea of 4u*ing the ealiest ite!s, startling at least one of the

suspects.;; In another e>a!ple of the perfor!ati1it* of securit* pree!ption, it is now widely acknowleded that the

preemptive strike on >ra0 fostered alliances between al Faeda and >ra0i violent roups that

did not e%ist before the war. Inee, terroris! e>pert Richarson (200#, page %## calls the iscursi1e conflation of the threats of

)aa! Dussein an 4in "aen a GGself-fulfillin prophecyHH.

The alternative is to embrace our untimely intervention into the 1&C K refuse the0uestion of what we should do, and instead embrace a counter-discourse.

Calkivik 1A.Ph+ in Poli )ci H ni1 Minnesota (!ine Asli, %0/20%0, +I)MA="I )'RI=G, Ph+ issertation su4!itte to ni1 Minnesota forRa*!on +u1all, http://conser1anc*.u!n.eu/4itstrea!/66$76/%/'ali1iu!n0%J0%%7#.pfIt is this self-e1ience of securit* e1en for critical approaches an the antino!* ste!!ing fro! issient 1oices reproucing the language ofthose the* issent fro! that constitutes the starting point for this chapter, where I ela4orate on the !eaning of is!antling securit* as unti!el*

criti8ue. As !entione in the 1ignette in the opening section, the suestion to dismantle security was itself deemed

as an untimely pursuit in a world where lives of millions were rendered 4rutall* insecure by poverty,

violence, disease, and ongoing political conflicts. 'olore 4* the tone of a call to conscience in the face of the ongoing

crisis of securit*, it was not the ti!e, interlocutors argue, for self-inulgent criti8ue. I will argue that it is the element of bein

untimely, the effort, in the wors of Balter icall* calls on critical thought to 4e3on ti!eK in that it cha!pions a particular unerstaning of what it !eans for critical scholarship to 4e rele1ant an responsi4le for its ti!es.

This notion of the untimely demands that criti0ue be strateic and respond to political

e%iency, that it pro1ie answers in this light instea of raising !ore 8uestions a4out which 8uestions coul 4e raise or what presuppositions unerlie the 8uestions that are ee!e to 4e waiting for answers. After ela4orating in the first section such strategic conceptionsof the unti!eliness of critical theoriing, in the secon section I will turn to a ifferent sense of the unti!el* 4* rawing upon Ben* isting efforts thatengage with the 8uestion of what it !eans to 4e critical apart fro! rawing the episte!ological an !ethoological 4ounaries so as to thina4out how one is critical.26 Bhile I o not en* the i!portance of episte!ological 8uestions, I conten that taing ti!e to thin a4out the


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!eaning of criti8ue 4e*on these issues presents itself as an i!portant tas. =his tas taes on aitional i!portance within the conte>t ofsecurit* stuies where an* real! of in1estigation 8uicl* 4egets its critical counterpart. =he rapi e!ergence an institutionaliation of criticalterroris! stuies when stuies on terroris! were proliferating uner the auspices of the so-calle lo4al Bar on =error pro1ies a striinge>a!ple to this tren. 26# )uch instances are i!portant re!iners that, to the e>tent that episte!olog* an !ethoolog* are reifie as the soleconcerns in efining an assessing critical thining267 or 3wrong heae refusalsK26& to get on with positi1e pro@ects an e!pirical research gets

4rane as e4ilitating for critical pro@ects, what is erase fro! sight is the political nature of the 8uestions ase an what is lost is the chance toreflect upon what it !eans for critical thining to respon to its ti!es. In his !eitation on the !eaning of responing an the sense ofresponsi4ilit* entaile 4* writing, Fean-"uc anc* suggests that 3all writing is co!!itte.LK 266 =his notion of co!!it!ent i1erges fro! the

progra!!atic sense of co!!itte writing. Bhat unerlies this conception is an unerstaning of writing as responing: writing is a response tothe 1oice of an other.In anc*Ls wors, 3NwOhoe1er writes responsK J00 an 3!aes hi!self responsi4le to in the a4solute sense.KJ0%

)uggesting that there is always an ethical commitment prior to any particular political

commitment, such a notion of writing contests the notion of creati1e autono!* pre!ise on the iea of a free, self-legislating su4@ect whorespons. In other wors, it iscreits the iea of an original 1oice 4* suggesting that there is no 1oice that is not a response to a prior response.Dence, to respon is configure as responing to an e>pectation rather than as an answer to a 8uestion an responsi4ilit* is cast as an 3anticipateresponse to 8uestions, to e!ans, to still-unfor!ulate, not e>actl* preicta4le e>pectations.KJ02 choing anc*, +a1i 'a!p4ell !aes ani!portant re!iner as he suggests that as international relations scholars 3we are alwa*s alrea* engage,K although the sites, !echanis!s an

8ualit* of engage!ents !ight 1ar*.J0J The 0uestion, then, is not whether as scholars we are enaed or not, but

what the nature of this enaement is. )uch a re-fra!ing of the 8uestion is intene to highlight the political nature of allinterpretation an the i!portance of e1eloping an 3ethos of political criticis! that is concerne with assu!ptions, li!its, their historical

prouction, social an political effects, an the possi4ilit* of going 4e*on the! in thought an action.KJ0$ =aing as its o4@ect assu!ptions anli!its, their historical prouction an social an political effects places the rele1anc* of critical thought an responsi4ilit* of critical scholarship

on new groun. >t is this ethos of criti0ue that dismantlin security hopes to recover for adiscipline where security operates as the foundational principle and where critical thinkin

keeps on contributin to securityEs i!pressing itself as a self-evident condition. 'ritical =heor* an Punctualit*Bithin the conte>t of International Relations, critical thoughtLs orientation towar its ti!e co!es out strongl* in ?i!4erle* DutchingsLs

for!ulation.J0 Accoring to Dutchings, no !atter what for! it taes, what distinuishes critical international

relations theory from other for!s of theori'in is its orientation towards chane and the

possibility of futures that do not reproduce the heemonic power of the present .KJ0# Bhat thisi!plies a4out the nature of critical thought is that it nees to 4e not onl* iagnostic, 4ut also self-refle>i1e. In the wors of Dutchings, 3all criticaltheories la* clai! to so!e in of account not onl* of the present of international politics an its relation to possi4le futures, 4ut also of the roleof critical theor* in the present an future in international politics.K J07 ot onl* anal*ing the present, 4ut also introucing the 8uestion of thefuture into anal*sis places political ti!e at the center of critical enterprise an !aes the pro4le! of change a core concern. It is this 8uestion ofchange that situates ifferent for!s of critical thining on a share groun since the* all atte!pt to e>pose the wa* in which what is presente as

gi1en an natural is historicall* prouce an hence open to change. Bith their orientation to change, their efforts to o aainst

the dominant currents an challenge the hege!on* of e>isting power relations by showin how contemporary

practices and discourses contribute to the perpetuation of structures of power and

domination, critical theorists in general an critical security studies specialists in particular take on an untimely

endeavor. It is this unerstaning of the unti!el* aspect of critical thining that is e!phasie 4* Mar Neufeld, who reards the

e1elop!ent of critical approaches to security as one of the more hopeful intellectual

developments in recent *ears.KJ0& +espite nurturing fro! ifferent theoretical traitions an therefore har4oring 3funa!entalifferences 4etween !oernist an post!oernist co!!it!ents,K writes eufel, scholars who are in1ol1e in the critical pro@ect ne1ertheless3share a co!!on concern with calling into 8uestion pre1ailing social an power relationships an the institutions into which the* are

organie.LK J06 The desire for chane through 4eing unti!el* an !aing the wa* to alternati1e futures that woul no longer

rese!4le the present have led some scholars to emphasi'e the utopian element that must

accompany all critical thinkin. Quoting 9scar BileLs aphoris! a map of the world that does not

include #topia is not even worth lancin at, ?en


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security studies is no e%ceptionK to this enterprise.J%J Accoring to the authors, the function of critical approaches

to security is to problemati'e what is taken for ranted in the disciplinary production of

knowlede about security by resistLinM, transcendLinM and defeatLinM Otheories of security ,

which take for ranted who is to be secured (the state+, how security is to be achieved (by

defendin core nationalE values, forcibly if necessar* and from whom security is needed (the

enemy+./J%$ Bhile critical theor* in this wa* is figure as unti!el*, I want to suggest that this notion of unti!eliness gets construe parao>icall* in a 8uite ti!el* fashion. Bith a percei1e is@uncture 4etween writing the worl fro! within a iscipline an acting in it place atthe center of the e4ates, the perfor!ance of critical thought gets e1aluate to the e>tent that it is punctual an in s*nch with the ti!es. +oescritical thought pro1ie concrete guiance an prescri4e what is to 4e one 'an it !o1e 4e*on !ere tal an !ae ti!el* politicalinter1entions 4* pro1iing solutions +oes it ha1e answers to the strategic 8uestions of progressi1e !o1e!ents +e!aning that criticaltheoriing co!e clean in the court of these 8uestions, such conceptions of the unti!el* e!an that criti8ue respon to its ti!es in a responsi4lewa*, where 4eing responsi4le is unerstoo in star contrast to a notion of responing an responsi4ilit* that I 4riefl* iscusse in theintrouctor* pages of this chapter (through the wors of Fean-"uc anc* an +a1i 'a!p4ell. "et !e 1isit two recent con1ersations ensuingfro! the eclarations of the conte!porar* crisis of critical theoriing in orer to clarif* what I !ean 4* a ti!el* unerstaning of unti!el*criti8ue. =he first con1ersation was pu4lishe as a special issue in the Re1iew of International )tuies (RI), one of the !a@or @ournals of thefiel. Pro!inent figures too the 2th anni1ersar* of the @ournalLs pu4lication of two e* te>tsregare as canonical for the launching ane1elop!ent of critical theoriing in International Relationsas an opportunit* to reflect upon an assess the i!pact of critical theor* in theiscipline an interrogate what its future !ight 4e. J% =he te>ts in 8uestion, which are epicte as ha1ing shaen the pre!ises of the static worlof the iscipline, are Ro4ert 'o>Ls %6&% essa* entitle on 3)ocial 5orces, )tates, an Borl 9rersKJ%# an Richar Ashle*Ls article, 3PoliticalRealis! an Du!an Interests.KJ%7 In their introuctor* essa* to the issue, Rengger an =hirell-Bhite suggest that the essa*s 4* 'o> an

Ashle*followe 4* Anrew "inlaterLs Men an 'itiens in the =heor* of International RelationsJ%& represent 3the 4reach in the *eK ofthe three o!inant iscourses in International Relations (i.e., positi1ists, nglish )chool, an Mar>is!, unleashing 3a torrent Nthat woulO soon

4eco!e a flooK as 1ariet* of theoretical approaches in conte!porar* social theor* (i.e., fe!inis!, eo-ra!scianis!, poststructuralis!, an post-colonialis! woul get introuce through the wors of critical scholars.J%6 After ela4orating the 1arious responses gi1en to an resistanceraise against the critical pro@ect in the iscipline, the authors pro1ie an o1er1iew an an assess!ent of the current state of critical theoriing inInternational Relations. =he* argue that the central 8uestion for !uch of the ongoing e4ate within the critical ca!p in its present statea8uestion that it cannot help 4ut co!e to ter!s with an pro1ie a response toconcerns the relation 4etween critical thought an political

practice. As the* state, the 3funa!ental philosophical 8uestion NthatO can no longer 4e siesteppeK 4* critical International Relations theor* isthe 8uestion of the relation 4etween 3nowlege of the worl an action in it.KJ20 9ne of the points allue to in the essa* is that for!s ofcritical theoriing, which lea1e the future 3to contingenc*, uncertaint* an the !ultiplicit* of political pro@ectsK an therefore pro1ie 3lessguiance for concrete political actionKJ2% or, again, those that pro4le!atie unerl*ing assu!ptions of thought an 3sa* little a4out the potential

political agenc* that !ight 4e in1ol1e in an* su4se8uent strugglesKJ22 !a* rener the critical enterprise i!potent an perhaps e1en suspect.=his point co!es out clearl* in 'raig Murph*Ls contri4ution to the collection of essa*s in the RI)Ls special issue. J2J choing Billia! BallaceLsargu!ent that critical theorists ten to 4e 3!ons,KJ2$ who ha1e little to offer for political actors engage in real worl politics, Murph* arguesthat the pro!ise of critical theor* is 3partiall* eptK 4ecause of the li!ite influence it has ha outsie the acae!* towars changing the

worl.tent to which critical in8uiries a4out the conte!porar* securit* lanscape 4eco!e co!plicit in theworings of power an what criti8ue can offer to rener the worl !ore legi4le for progressi1e struggles.J2& 5or instance, warning criticaltheorists against 4eing co-opte 4* or aligne with 4elligerence an war-!ongering, Richar +e1eta asserts that critical international theor* hasan urgent 3nee to istinguish its position all the !ore clearl* fro! li4eral i!perialis!.KJ26 Bhile scholars such as +e1eta, tK of !oernit* (3an epoch, eli!ite

4* the capitaliation of social relations,K which i!poses its own philosophical pro4le!atic3that is, the atte!pt, following the socialconse8uences of capitalis!, to articulate the relation 4etween ini1iualit* an collecti1e spiritKJJ , A!erican unilateralis! in the after!ath ofthe attacs on )epte!4er %%, 200%, an the growing political ise!power!ent of people worlwie. Arguing that 3conte!porar* return ofreligion an new for!s of irrationalis! e!erge, in large part, out of the failure of the secon response of !oernit* to pro1ie a secular solutionto the ine8ualities of the nation-state an coloniation,KJJ# he for!ulates the awaiting political tas for critical enea1ors as constructing a worl

polit* to resist the isintegration of the worl uner the force of capital.It is with this goal in !in that he suggests that 3responsi4le scholarshipnees to rescue reason in the face irrational warKJJ7 an that intellectuals nee to pro1ie 3the fra!ewor for a worl ethical co!!unit* of law,enowe with political !echanis!s of i!ple!entation in the conte>t of a regulate planetar* econo!*.KJJ& De suggests that an aporetic for! ofthining such as Fac8ues +erriaLsa thining that 3ignores the affir!ati1e relation 4etween the eter!ining powers of reason an histor*KJJ6


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woul 4e an unhelpful resource 4ecause such thining 3oes not open up to where wor nees to 4e one for these new for!s of polit* toe!erge.KJ$0 In other wors, critical thining, accoring to igenc* in

a practical, efficient, an strategic !anner. In contrast to this pre1alent for! of unerstaning the unti!eliness of critical theor*, I will now turn toa ifferent account of the unti!el* pro1ie 4* Ben* perience with ti!e, with the present, that


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weight of ti!e (which woul a!ount to ahistoricit* nor 4eing weighe own 4* the ti!es (as in the case of teleolog*.J% It conceives

the present as historically contoured but not itself e>perience as histor* 4ecause not necessarily

continuous with what has been.KJ2 >t is an attitue that renders the present as the site of non-

utopian possibility/ since it is historicall* situate an constrained *et also a possi4ilit* since it is not historicall*

foreoraine or eter!ine.JJ >t entails contestin the delimitations of choice and challenin the

confinement of politics to e%istin possibilities . Rather than positing histor* as e>isting o4@ecti1el* outsie ofnarration, what plains as a power 3to estrange us fro! that which is !ost

fa!iliar, na!el*, the fi>it* of the presentK 4ecause 3what we believe to have happened to us bears concretely

on what we are prepared to do with ourselves 4oth now and in the future.KJ$ Mar Neocleous

concreti'es the political stakes entailed in such encounters with histor* with the dead from the

perspective of three political traitions: a conservative one, which aims to reconcile the dead with the

livin, a fascist one, which aims to resurrect the dead to leitimate its fascist proram , and

a historical materialist one, which seeks redemption with the dead as the source of hope

and inspiration for the future.J BrownEs iscussion of criti8ue an political ti!e is significant for highlighting thei!!eiatel* political nature of criti8ue in contrast to conte!porar* in1ocations that cast it as a self-inulgent practice, an unti!el* lu>ur*, a

isintereste, istance, acae!ic enea1or. Der attempt to trace criti0ue vis-P-vis its relation to political

time provides a counter-narrative to the conservative an !oraliing assertions that shun

untimely criti0ue of security as a lu%urious interest that is committed to abstract ideals rather

than to the reality/ of politics i.e., running after utopia rather than !oeling 3real worlK solutions. 3ismantlin

security as unti!el* criti8ue entails a si!ilar claim to unsettle the accounts of what the times are/

with a bid to reset time./J# >t aspires to be untimely in the face of the demands on critical

thouht to be on timeC aims to challene the morali'in move , the call to conscience that arrives in

the form of assertions that sayin noQ/ to security , that refusin to write it, would be

untimely . Rather than succu!4ing to the in@unction that thought of political possi4ilit* is to 4e confine within the fra!ewor of securit*,

dismantlin security aims to open up space for alternative forms, for a different lanuae

of politics so as to stop diin/ the hole politics of security have du us and start buildin

a counter-discourse. 'onclusion As an atte!pt to push a e4ate that is fi>ate on securit* to the li!it an e>plore what it !eans to

is!antle securit*, !* enaement with 1arious aspects of this !o1e is not intene as an anal*sis raise at the le1el of causal

interpretations or as an atte!pt to fin 4etter solutions to a pro4le! that alrea* has a na!e. Rather, it tries to recast what is

taken-for-ranted by attendin to the conceptual assumptions, the historical and systemic

conditions within which the politics of security plays itself out. As I trie to show in this chapter, it also

entails a simultaneous move of refus in to be a disciple of the discipline of security . This

implies overturnin not only the silent disciplinary protocols about which 0uestions are

leitimate to as, but also the very framework that informs those 0uestions. It is fro! this perspecti1ethat I e1ote two chapters to e>a!ining an clarif*ing the proposal to is!antle securit* as a clai! on ti!e. After e>plicating, in 'hapter $, the

te!poral structure that is enacte 4* politics of securit* an ela4orating on how securit* structures the relation 4etween the present an the future,in this chapter, I approache the 8uestion of te!poralit* fro! a ifferent perspecti1e, 4* situating it in relation to isciplinar* ti!es in orer toclarif* what an unti!el* criti8ue of securit* !eans. I trie to ela4orate this notion of the unti!el* 4* e>ploring the unerstaning of unti!eliness

that infor!s certain conceptions of critical theoriing in International Relations. I suggeste that such a notion of the untimely

parado%ically calls on critical thouht to be on time in the sense of bein punctual and

strateic. =urning to Ben*


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saturated by the infinite passion to secure and works toward takin apart the architecture

of security


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6NC K >mpact 7IR

The security politics of the 1&C alin alon national security lines which present the

state as the referent object who a.+ 3etermines who constitutes a threat, and b.+ acts

as the hori'on of possibilities in which bodies/ are counted as worth rievin for.

This releation of security to the level of the nation state is an epistemoloical

maneuver which

1.+ !eads to ;reat ower 4ar - because it renders the state the stae by which the

reat charade of warfare and power politics can take place, as opposed to simply a

useful heuristic to resolve the needs of the polis.

6.+ Creates a self-fufillin prophecy and creates the conditions for the spread of

weapons of mass destruction and the construction of 7ther states as actors whose

citi'ens have interests diametrically opposed to our own which causes lobal warand widespread structural violence, thatEs !al.

This impact calculous also effaces structural violence in the pursuit of the pure

functionin of the war machine, these impacts should come first bIc they are conflict

mulitpliers and are rountinely inored by policy makers..

Ni%on 1A (Ro4, Rachel 'arson Professor of nglish, ni1ersit* of Bisconsin-Maison, )lowWiolence an the n1iron!entalis! of the Poor, pp %-%$Bhen "awrence )u!!ers, then presient of the Borl port rich nation gar4age, to>icwaste, an hea1il* polluting inustries to Africa, he i so in the cal! 1oice of glo4al !anagerial reasoning.; )uch a sche!e. )u!!ersela4orate, woul help correct an inefficient glo4al i!4alance in to>icit*. nerl*ing his plan is an o1erlooe 4ut crucial su4siiar* 4enefit thathe outline: offloaing rich-nation to>ins onto the worl;s poorest continent woul help ease the growing pressure fro! rich-nationen1iron!entalists who were ca!paigning against gar4age u!ps an inustrial effluent thai the* cone!ne as health threats an founaestheticall* offensi1e. )u!!ers thus rationalie his poison-reistri4ution ethic as offering a ou4le gain: it woul 4enefit the nite )tates anurope econo!icall*, while helping appease the rising iscontent of rich-nation en1iron!entalists. )u!!ers; argu!ents assu!e a irect lin

4etween aestheticall* unsightl* waste an &frica as an out-of-sihl continent, a place remote from green

acti1ists; terrain of concern . In )u!!ers; win win scenario for the glo4al orth, the African recipients ot his plan were tripl*iscounte: iscounte as political agents, iscounte as long-ter! casualties of what % call in this 4oo slow 1iolence, an iscounte ascultures possessing en1iron!ental practices an concerns of their own. I 4egin with )u!!ers; e>traorinar* proposal 4ecause it captures thestrategic an representational challenges pose 4* slow 1iolence as it i!pacts the en1iron!ents an the en1iron-!entalis! of the poor. X =hree

pri!ar* concerns ani!ate this 4oo, chief a!ong the! !* con1iction that we urgentl* need to rethink S politically,

imainatively , and theoretically what % call slow violence.


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a host of other slowly unfoldin environmental catastrophes present formidable

representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobili'e and act decisively. The

lon dyins the staered and staerinly discounted casualties, 4oth hu!an an ecological that result

fro! war;s to>ic after!aths or cli!ate change are underrepresented in strateic plannin as well as in

human memory . X ad ummers advocated invadin &frica with weapons of massdestruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence andbeen perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. &dvocatin invadin countries

with mass forms of slow-motion to%icity, howe1er, re0uires rethinkin our accepted

assumptions of violence to include slow violence. )uch a rethinkin re0uires that we

complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a hihly visible act that is

newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. 4e need to account

for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond

to a variety of social afflictions from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and. in particular,

environmental calamities. A !a@or challenge is representational: how to e1ise arresting stories, i!ages, an s*!4ols ae8uate to

the per1asi1e 4ut elusi1e 1iolence of ela*e effects. 'ruciall*, slow violence is often not @ust attritional 4ut also e%ponential ,

operatin as a major threat multiplier @ it can fuel lon-term, proliferatin conflicts insituations where the conditions for sustainin life become increasinly but radually

deraded. X Politicall* an e!otionall*, different kinds of disaster possess une0ual heft . allin bodies,

burnin towers , e>ploing heas, a1alanches, 1olcanoes, an tsuna!is have a visceral, eye-catchin and pae-

turnin power that tales of slow violence, unfoldin over years, decades, even centuries,

cannot match. )tories of to>ic 4uilup, !assing greenhouse gases, an accelerate species loss ue to ra1age ha4itats arc all

catacl*s!ic, 4ut the* are scientificall* con1olute catacl*s!s in which casualties are postpone, often for generations. In an age when the

media venerate the spectacular , when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived

immediate need , a central 8uestion is strategic an representational: how can we convert into imae and

narrative the disasters that are slow movin and lon in the makin, disasters that are

anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest tothe sensation-driven technoloies of our imae-world ow can we turn the lon

emerencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enouh to rouse public sentiment and

warrant political intervention, these emerencies whose repercussions have iven rise to

some of the most critical challenes of our timeJ X =his 4oo;s secon, relate focus concerns the en1iron !entalis!

of the poor, for it is those people lackin resources who are the principal casualties of slow violence .

Their unseen poverty is compounded hy the invisibility of the slow violence that permeates

so many of their lives. 7ur media bias toward spectacular violence e%acerbates the

vulnerability of ecosystems treated as disposable by turbo-capitalism while simultaneously

e%acerbatin the vulnerability of those who! ?e1in t, has calle disposable people.2 It

is against such con@oine ecological an hu!an isposa4ilit* that we ha1e witnesse a resurgent en1iron!entalistYY of the poor, particularl*(though not e>clusi1el* across the so-calle glo4al )outh. )o a central issue that e!erges is strategic: if the neoli4eral era has intensifie assaultson resources, it has also intensifie resistance, whether through isolate site-specific struggles or through acti1is! that has reache acrossnational 4ounaries in an effort to 4uil translocal alliances. X =he poor is a co!penious categor* su4@ect to al!ost infinite local 1ariation aswell as to fracture along fault lines of ethnicit*, gener, race, class, region, religion, an generation. 'onfronte with the !ilitariation of 4othco!!erce an e1elop!ent, i!po1erishe co!!unities are often assaile 4* coercion an 4ri4er* that test their cohesi1e resilience. Dow !uchcontrol will, sa*, a poor harwoo forest co!!unit* ha1e o1er the !i> of su4sistence an !aret strategies it eplo*s in atte!pts at aapti1esur1i1al Dow will that co!!unit* negotiate co!peting efinitions of its own po1ert* an long-ter! wealth when the guns, the 4ulloers, anthe !one*!en arri1e )uch co!!unities t*picall* ha1e to patch together threa4are i!pro1ise alliances against 1astl* superior !ilitar*,corporate, an !eia forces. As such, i!po1erishe resource re4els can selo! affor to 4e single-issue acti1ists: their green co!!it!ents aresea!e through with other econo!ic an cultural causes as the* e>perience en1iron!ental threat not as a planetar* a4straction 4ut as a set ofinha4ite riss, so!e i!!inent, others o4scurel* long ter!. X =he status of en1iron!ental acti1is! a!ong the poor in the glo4al )outh has shifte


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significantl* in recent *ears. Bhere green or en1iron!ental iscourses were once fre8uentl* regare with septicis! as neocolo-nial. Besterni!positions ini!ical to the resource priorities of the poor in the glo4al )outh, such attitues ha1e 4een te!pere 4* the gathering 1isi4ilit* ancrei4ilit* of en1iron!ental @ustice !o1e!ents that ha1e pushe 4ac against an antihu!an en1iron!enialis! that too often sought (uner the

4anner of uni1ersalis! to i!pose green agenas o!inate 4* rich nations an Bestern 9s. A!ong those who inha4it the front lines of theglo4al resource wars, suspicions that en1iron!entas! is another guise of what Anrew Ross calls planetar* !anage!ent ha1e not. of course,

4een wholl* alla*e.% , often 1e>e figure of the environmental writer-

activist . In the chapters that follow % aress not @ust literar* 4ut !ore 4roal* rhetorical an 1isual challenges pose 4* slow 1iolenceChowe1er, % place particular e!phasis on co!4ati1e writers who ha1e eplo*e their i!aginati1e agilit* an worll* aror to help a!plif* the!eia !arginalie causes of the en1iron!entall* ispossesse. I ha1e sought to stress those places where writers an social !o1e!ents, often inco!plicate tane!, ha1e stralcgie against attritional isasters that afflict e!4attle co!!unities. =he writers I engage arc geographicall*wie rangingfro! 1arious parts of the African continent, fro! the Mile ast. Inia, the 'ari44ean, the nite )tates, an a!ple, is driven inward, somati'ed into cellular dramas of mutation thatSparticularly in

the bodies of the poorSremain larely unobserved, undianosed, and untreated. 5ro! a narrati1e perspecti1e, such in1isi4le, !utagenic theater is slow pace an open ene, eluing the ti* closure, the contain!ent, i!pose 4* the 1isualorthoo>ies of 1ictor* an efeat. X "et !e groun this point 4* referring, in con@unction, to Rachel 'arson;s )ilenl )pring an 5rant 5anon;s =heBretche of the arth. In %6#2 )ilent )pring @olte a 4roa international pu4lic into an awareness of the protracte, cr*ptic, an iniscri!inatecasualties inflicte 4* ichloroiphen*ltrichlo-roethane (++=. Get. @ust one *ear earlier, 5anon. in the opening pages of Bretche of the arth,ha co!forta4l* in1oe ++= as an affir!ati1e !etaphor for anticolonial 1iolence: he calle for a ++=-fille spra* gun to 4e wiele as aweapon against the parasites sprea 41 the colonials; 'hristian church. 5anon;s ra!a of ecoloniation is, of course, stue with the o1ertweaponr* where4* su4@ugation is !aintaine [4* int of a great arra* of 4a*onets an cannons or o1erthrown (4* the searing 4ullets an

4loostaine ni1es after a !urerous an ecisi1e struggle 4etween the two protagonists.; Get his te!poral 1ision of 1iolencean of whatAi!e 'esaire calle the rene1ous of 1ictor*was unco!plicate 4* the concerns thai an as-*et inchoate en1iron!ental @ustice !o1e!ent(catal*e in part 4* )ilent )pring woul raise a4out lopsie riss that per!eate the lan long ter!, 4lurring the clean lines 4etween efeat an1ictor*, 4etween colonial ispossession an official national self eter!ination.%% Be can ccr lainl* rea 5anon, in his concern with lan as

propert* an as fount of nati1e ignit*, retrospecti1el* with an en1iron!ental e*e. t*-se1en A!erican at!osphericnuclear tests, the largest of the! e8ual in force to %.000 I liroshi!a-sic 4o!4s. In %60 the Ato!ic nerg* 'o!!ission eclare theMarshall Islans 4* far the !ost conta!inate place in the worl, a conition that woul co!pro!ise inepenence in the long ter!, espitethe islans; for!al ascent in %676 into the rans of self-go1erning nations. =he islan repu4lic was still in pan go1erne 4* an irraiate past:


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well into the %6&0s its histor* of nuclear colonialis!, long forgotten 4* the coloniers, was still eli1ering into the worl @ell*fish 4a4ies healess, e*eless, li!4less hu!an infants who woul li1e for @ust a few hours.%% X If, as )ai notes, struggles o1er geograph* are ne1er reuci4leto ar!e struggle 4ut ha1e a profoun s*!4olic an narrati1e co!ponent as well, an if, as Michael Batts insists, we !ust atten to the 1iolent

geographies of fast capitalis!. we need to supple!ent 4oth these in@unctions with a deeper understandin of the

slow violence of delayed effects that structures so many of our most conse0uential

forettinZ. Riolence, a4o1e all en1iron!ental 1iolence, needs to be seen an eepl* consiere as a contest not

onl* o1er space, or 4oies, or la4or, or resources, 4ut also over time. Bc nee to 4ear in !in 5aulner;s ictu! that the past isnever dead. It;s not e1en past. Dis wors resonate with particular force across lanscapes per!eate 4* slow 1iolence, lanscapes ofte!poral o1erspill that elue rhetorical cleanup operations with their sanitar* 4eginnings an enings.%;% X ?wa!c Anthon* Appiah fa!ousl*ase. Is the ;Post-; in Postcolonia5 the ;Post-; in ;Post!oern; As en1iron!entalists wc !ight as si!ilarl* searching 8uestions of the postin postinustrial, post 'ol Bar, an post-conflict. 5or if the past of slow 1iolence isne1crpast. so too the post is ne1er full* post: inustrial

particulates an effluents li1e on in the en1iron!ental ele!ents wc inha4it an in our 1er* 4oies, which cpic!iologicall* an ecologicall* arene1er our si!ple conte!poraries.; )o!ething si!ilar applies to so-calle postconflict societies whose leaers !a* annuall* co!!e!orate, as!are on the calenar, the official cessation of hostilities, while ongoing intcrgcncrational slow 1iolence (inflicte 4*, sa*. unc>ploclan!ines or carcinogens fro! an ar!s u!p !a* continue hostilities 4* other !eans. X 9urs is an age of onrushing tur4o-capitalis!, whereinthe present feels !ore a44re1iate than it use toat least for the worl;s pri1ilege classes who li1e surroune 4* technological ti!e-sa1ersthat often co!poun the sensation of not ha1ing enough li!e. 'onse8uentl*, one of the !ost pressing challenges of our age is how to a@ust ourrapil* eroing attention spans to the slow erosions of en1iron!ental @ustice. If, uner ncoli4eralis!, the gult 4etween encla1e rich an outcast

poor has 4eco!e e1er !ore pronounce, ours is also an era of encla1e ti!e wherein for !an* spee has 4eco!e a sell @ustif*ing, propulsi1eethic that reners une1entful 1iolence (to those who li1e re!ote fro! its attritional lethalit* a wea clai!ant on our ti!e. =he attosecon paceof our age, with its restless technologies of infinite pro!ise an infinite isappoint!ent, pro!pts us to eep flicing an clicing istractel* inan insatia4le an often insensate 8uest for 8uicer sensation. X =he o>*!oronic notion of slow 1iolence poses a nu!4er of challengesC

scientific, legal, political, an representational. In the long arc 4etween the e!ergence of slow 1iolence an its ela*e effects, 4oth the causesan the !e!or* of catastrophe reail* fae fro! 1iew as the casualties incurre t*picall* pass untallie an unre!e!4ere. )uch iscounting in

turn !aes it far !ore ifficult to secure effecti1e legal !easures for pre1ention, restitution, an reress. Casualties from slow

violence are !oreo1er, out of sync not onl* with our narrati1e an !eia e>pectations 4ut also with the swift seasons of

electoral chane. Politicians routinel* aopt a last in, first out stance towar en1iron!ental issues, a!itting the! when li!es areflush, u!ping the! as soon as ti!es get tight. re4ate chec in the !ail ne>t Augusten1iron!ental pa*outs see! to lur on a istant horion. Man* politicians

an inee !an* 1otersroutinel* treat environmental action as critical yet not urent. An so generation

after generation of two- or four-*ear c*cle politicians a to the pileup of eferra4le actions eferre. 4ith rare e%ceptions, in

the domain of slow violence yes, but not now, not yet becomes the modus operandi. X ow

can leaders be oaded to avert catastrophe when the political rewards of their actions will

not accrue to them but will be reaped on someone elseHs watch decades, e1en centuries, from nowDow can en1iron!ental acti1ists an stor*tellers wor to counter the potent political, corporate, an e1en scientific forces in1este in i!!eiateself-interest, procrastination, an isse!4ling Be see such isse!4ling at wor, for instance, in the afterwor to Michael 'richton;s 200$en1iron!ental conspirac* no1el, )late of 5ear, wherein he argue that we neee twent* !ore *ears of aia gaihcringon cli!ate change 4eforean* polic* ecisions coul 4e 1enture.%Z Although the ational Acae!* of )ciences ha assure for!er presient eorge B. posing the new, unplottc an !*sterious angers wc insist upon creating allaroun us, while 'arson herself wrote of a shaow that is no less o!inous 4ecause it is for!less an o4scure.%0 =o confront slow 1iolence

re8uires, then, that we plot an gi1e figurati1e shape to for!less threats whose fatal repercussions are isperse across space an ti!e. The

representational challenes are acute, re0uirin creative ways of drawin public attention

to catastrophic acts that are low in instant spectacle but hih in lon-term effects. To

intervene representation-ally entails devisin iconic symbols that embody amorphouscalamities as well as narrative forms that infuse those symbols with dramatic urency. X )e1en*ears after Rachel 'arson turne our attention to ihe lethal !echanis!s of eath 4* inirection, Fohan aining, the influential orwegian!athe!atician an sociologist, coine the ter! inirect or structural 1iolence.;; aung;s theor* of structural 1iolence is pertinent here 4ecauseso!e of his concerns o1erlap with the concerns that ani!ate this 4oo, while others help throw inio relief the rather ifferent features I ha1esoughi to highlight 4* introucing the ter! slow 1iolence. )tructural 1iolence, foraltung, stans in opposition to the !ore fa!iliar personal1iolence thai o!inates our conceptions of what counts as 1iolence per sc. altung was concerne, as I a!, with wiening the fiel of whatconstitutes 1iolence. De soughi to foregroun ihe 1ast structures thai can gi1e rise to acts of personal 1iolence an constitute for!s of 1iolence inan of the!sel1es. )uch structural 1iolence !a* range fro! the une8ual !or4iit* that results fro! a co!!oific health care s*ste!, to racis!itself. Bhat I share with al-tung;s line of thought is a concern with social @ustice, hien agenc*, an certain for!s of 1iolence that are

i!percepti4le. X In these ter!s, for e>a!ple, we can reconi'e that the structural violence embodied by a


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neoliberal order of austerity measures, structural adjustment, rampant dereulation,

corporate meamerers, and a widenin ulf between rich and poor is a form of covert

violence in its own riht that is often a catalyst for more reconi'ably overt violence . 5or ane>pressl* en1iron!ental e>a!ple of structural 1iolence, one !ight cite Bangari Maathai;s insistence that the s*ste!ic 4urens of national e4t tothe IM5 an Borl a!ple, in aung;s insistence that structural 1iolence is silent, it oes not showits is essentiall* static, it is thetran8uil waters.%Z In contrast to the static connotations of structural 1iolence, I ha1e sought, through the notion of slow 1iolence, to foregroun8uestions of ti!e, !o1e!ent, an change, howe1er graual. =he e>plicitl* te!poral e!phasis of slow 1iolence allows us to eep front an center the representational challenges an i!aginati1e ile!!as pose not @ust 4* i!percepti4le 1iolence 4ut 4* i!percepti4le change where4* 1io

lence is ecouple fro! its original causes 4* the worings of ti!e. Time becomes an actor in complicated ways, not

least because the temporal tern plates of our spectacle-driven, 6I" media life have shifted

massively since ;altun first advanced his theory of structural violence some forty years

ao. To talk about slow violence, then, is to enae directly with our contemporary politics

of speed. X )i!pl* put. structural 1iolence is a theor* that entails rethining ifferent notions of causation an agenc* with respect to 1iolent

effects. low violence, 4* contrast, miht well include forms of structural violence, but has a wider

descriptive rane in callin attention, not simply to 0uestions of aency, but to broader,

more comple% descriptive cateories of violence enacted slowly over time. =he shift in the relationship 4etween hu!an agenc* an ti!e is !ost ra!aticall* e1ient in our enhance unerstaning of the accelerate changes occurring at two scalar

e>tre!esin the life-sustaining circuits of planetar* 4ioph*sics an in the wired brainHs neural circuitry. =he iea ofstructural 1iolence preate 4oth sophisticate conte!porar* ice-core sa!pling !ethos an the e!ergence of c*4er technolog*. M* concept ofslow 1iolence thus sees to respon 4oth to recent, raical changes in our geological perception an our changing technological e>periences ofti!e. X "et !e aress the geological aspect first. In 2000, Paul 'ruten. the o4el Prie-winning at!ospheric che!ist, introuce the ter! theAnthropo-cene Age (which he ate to Fa!es Batt;s in1ention of the stea! engine. =hrough the notion of the Anthropocene Age. 'rutensought to theorie an unpreceente epochal effect: the !assi1e i!pact 4* the hu!an species, fro! the inustrial era onwar, on our planet;s lifes*ste!s, an i!pact that, as his ter! suggests, is geo!orphic, e8ual in force an in long-ter! i!plications to a !a@or geological e1ent.Z 'ruten;satte!pt to capture the epochal scale of hu!an acti1it*;s i!pact on the planet was followe 4* Bill )teffen;s ela4oration, in con@unction with'ruten an Fohn Mceill, of what the* u44e the reat Acceleration, a secon stage of the Anthropocene Age that the* ate to the !i-twentieth centur*. Briting in 2007. )teffen ct al. note how nearl* three-8uarters of the anthropogenicall* ri1en rise in '9t concentration hasoccurre since %60 (fro! a4out J%0 to J&0 pp!, an a4out half of the total rise ($& pp! has occurre in @ust the last J0 *ears.-7 =heAustralian en1iron!ental historian "i44* Ro4in has put the case succinctl*: Be ha1e recentl* entere a new geological epoch, theAnthropocene. =here is now consiera4le e1ience that hu!anit* has altere the 4ioph*sical s*ste!s of arth, not @ust the car4on c*cle . . . 4utalso the nitrogen c*cle an ulti!atel* the at!osphere an cli!ate of the whole glo4e. Bhat, then, are the conse8uences for our e>perience of

ti!e of this newfoun recognition thai we ha1e ina1ertentl*, through our unpreceente 4ioph*sical species power, inaugurate anAnthropocene Age an are now engage in (an su4@ect to the hurtling changes of the reat Acceleration X 91er the past two ecaes, this high-spee planetar* !oification has 4een acco!panie (at least for those increasing 4illions who ha1e access to the Internet 4* rapi !oificationsto the hu!an corte>. It is ifficult, 4ut necessar*, to consier si!ultaneousl* a geologicall*-pace plasticit*, howe1er relati1el* rapi, an the

plasticit* of 4rain circuits reprogra!!e 4* a igital worl that threatens to info-whel! us into a state of perpetual istraction. If an awarenessof the reat Acceleration is (to put it !ill* une1enl* istri4ute, the e>perience of accelerate connecti1it* (an the parao>ical isconnectsthat can acco!pan* it is increasingl* wiesprea. In an age of egrae attention spans it 4eco!es ou4l* ifficult *et increasingl* urgent thatwe focus on the toll e>acte, o1er ti!e, 4* the slow 1iolence of ecological egraation. Be li1e, writes 'or* +octorow, in an era when theelectronic screen has 4eco!e an ecos*ste! of interruption technologies.;; 9r as for!er Microsoft e>ecuti1e "ina )tone puts it, we now li1e inan age of continuous partial attention. 5ast is faster than it use to 4e, an stor* units ha1e 4eco!e conco!itantl* shorter. In this cultural!ilieu of igitall* speee up ti!e, an foreshortene narrati1e, the intergenerational after!ath 4eco!es a harer sell. )o to rener slow 1iolence1isi4le entails, a!ong other things, reefining spee: we see such efforts in tal of accelerate species loss, rapi cli!ate change, an in atte!pts

to recast glacial-once a ea !etaphor for slow-as a rousing, iconic i!age of unaccepta4l* fast loss. =fforts to make forms of

slow violence more urently visible suffered a setback in the #nited tates in the aftermath

of )I11, which reinforced a spectacular, immediately sensational, and instantly hyper-visible

imae of what constitutes a violent threat . The fiery spectacle of the collapsin towers was

burned into the national psyche as the definitive imae of violence , setting 4ac 4* *ears atte!pts to rall*

pu4lic senti!ent against cli!ate change, a threat that is incre!ental, e>ponential, an far less sensationall* 1isi4le. Condolee''a

8iceHs strateic fantasy of a mushroom cloud loomin over &merica if the #nite tates failed

to invade >ra0 ave further visual definition to cataclysmic violence as somethin e%plosive

and instantaneous , a recognia4l* cinematic, immediately sensational, pyrotechnic event . The

representational bias aainst slow violence has, further!ore, a critically danerous impact on


16/34

what counts as a casualty in the first place. Casualties of slow violence-human and

environmental-are the casualties most likely not to be seen, not to be counted. Casualties of

slow violence become liht-weiht, disposable casualties, with ire conse8uences for the wa*s wars are re!e!4ere,which in turn has ire conse8uences for the pro@ecte casualties fro! future wars. Be can o4ser1e this 4ias at wor in the wa* wars, whose lethalrepercussions sprea across space an ti!e, are tiil* 4ooene in the historical recor. =hus, for instance, a 200J ew Gor =i!es eitorial onWietna! eclare that uring our oen *ears there, the .). ille an helpe ill at least %. !illion people.;; in le1els in the 4loostrea!s of ins 4uil up in the fatt* tissues of pi1otal foos such as uc an fish an pass fro! the natural worl into thecooing pot an fro! there to ensuing hu!an generations. An Institute of Meicine co!!ittee has 4* now line se1enteen !eical conitions toAgent 9rangeC inee, as recentl* as 2006 it unco1ere fresh e1ience that e>posure to the che!ical increases the lielihoo of e1elopingParinson;s isease an ische!ic heart isease. ner such circu!stances, wherein long-ter! riss continue to e!erge, to 4ooen a war;scasualties with the phrase uring our oen *ears there is !isleaing: that s!all, see!ingl* innocent phrase is a powerful re!iner of how ourrhetorical con1entions for 4raceting 1iolence routinel* ignore ongoing, 4elate casualties.


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6NC K &lt 7verview

The alternative is a critical intervention characteri'ed by its untimeliness K this

functions as a critical rupture which is epistemoloically valuable. 3o not be held

hostae by case outweihs aruments K there are always times for reflection and it is

precisely votin neative for our alternative which renders the ability to say NoE tosecurity both possible and timely.

=ven if we lose the framework debate, donEt settle for the affEs tinkerin with

:ilitary olicy - instead affirm a #topian >nterruption.

$irst, this impulse is mutually e%clusive with withdrawal.

$ial, * -- ni1ersit* of +elaware histor* professor Neral, Ph.+ in ast Asian languages an histor* fro! the ni1ersit* of 'hicago, 3BagingPeace on 9inawa,K in Islands of Discontent , e.


18/34

three-!onth ca!paign (late March to Ful* %6$ that resulte in o1er two hunre thousan eaths, incluing a4out ninet*-four thousan9inawan nonco!4atants.$ =his preser1ation effort, supporte 4* the teaching an practice of 4attle ruin archeolog* (sensei )ogau, has

parallele s*ste!atic training an !o4iliation of a *ounger generation of peace guies (heiwa gaio in 9inawa to replace the ware>perience stor*tellers (senso taien atari4e, who will represent onl* a4out percent of the population in 9inawa Prefecture 4* 200. =hischapter reflects on the wa*s in which war-relate tours conucte 4* 1olunteer peace guies an catering pri!aril* to !ainlan high school stu*tours ha1e 4een fra!e in relation to histor* eucation an peace iscourses, on the one han, an popular co!!ercial 4attle site tours an

1eterans; group pilgri!ages, on the other. M* interest is not onl* in how war tourism is reconfiured as peace

tourism a la ts of peace guies. I will thus en with a 4rief report on thisissueone that e!erge, in a sense, as an 9inawan 1ersion of the histor* wars fought at the )!ithsonian;s Air an )pace Museu! in %66

4etween cani historical representation an selecti1e patriotic co!!e!oration of the ato!ic attac on Diroshi!a carrie out 4* the


19/34

se%ism have been e%amined and e%posed. Fust as opponents of racis! an se>- is! consier the oppression of nonwhitesan wo!en, respecti1el*, to 4e wrong, an thus to re8uire funa!ental changes in societ*, so opponents of waris! pacifists of 1arious sorts consier war to 4e wrong, an thus to re8uire funa!ental changes in societ*.

Third, it solves the aff2 Le%plainM


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6NC K $ramework

The role of the jude should be an educator pushin students to propose #topia.

:ost predictable the majority of coaches and judes work in education,.

Their $I4 arument link to the k K it assume the same model of technical-orientedrationality which discounts epistemoloical in0uiry as not timely/ K the impact is

lobal warfare and structural violence thatEs above.

The permutation/ of lettin them weih the aff aainst the nternational 8elations in the 3epartment of 4ar tudies at t is not

simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playin on fears. The leadership itself is in the rip of a conjuation of

overnment and rule whose very enerative principle of formation is permanent

emerency . >n other words, fear is no loner simply an affect open to reular manipulation by leadership

cadres. >t is, but it is not only that, a nd not even most importantly that. :ore importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by Hthrowin

the rascals outH+, in the permanent emerency of emerence, fear becomes a enerative principle of formation for rule .

The emerency of emerence thereforeposes a profound crisis in western understandins of the

political , and in the hopes and e%pectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. ;iven the wealth, and iven the vastmilitary preponderance in w eapons of m ass d estruction and other forms of lobally deployed military

capability of the societies of the &tlantic basin, notably, of course, the # nited tates, this poses a world crisis as well. >n short, then,

this comple% adaptive emerent life e%ists in the permanent emerency of its own emerence. >ts politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational

politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emerency . ere, that in virtue of which a HweH comes to belon toether, its very

enerative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics+, has become this emerency. 4hat happens, we also therefore ask of the

biopolitici'ation of rule, when emerency becomes the enerative principle of formation of community and ruleJ 7ur answer has already been iven. olitics becomes

subject to the urent and compellin political economy, the loistical and technical

dynamics, of war. No loner a HweH in virtue of abidin by commonly areed rules of overnment , it becomes a HweH formed by the

rule of the emerency itself @ and that is where the political crisis , the crisis of the political itself in the w est, lies,

since the promise always invested in western understandins of the political is that a HweH

can belon toether not only in terms of areein to abide by the rule of its enerative

princiUples of formation but also by the willinness to keep the nature and operation of

those enerative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny . ?ou cannot ,

however, debate emerency . ?ou can only interroate the utile demands it makes on you, and all the epistemic challenes it poses, accedin to those demands

accordin both to how well you have come to know them, and how well you have also adapted your affects to sufferin them, or perish. The very e%iencies of

emerency thus militate profoundly aainst the promise of HpoliticsH as it has been commonly

understood in the western tradition@ not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the ood


21/34

for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of

life with species life. The only intellience , the only self-knowlede , the only culture which 0ualifies in

the permanence of this emerency is the utilitarian and instrumental technoloies said to

be necessary to endure it. 4e have been here before in the western tradition, and we have e%perienced the challenes of this condition as tyranny (&rendt

1)V5+. The emerency of emerUence, the enerative principle of formation, the referential

matri% of contemporary biopolitics lobally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiouslycomple%, soft totalitarian reime of power relations@ made all the more difficult to contest

precisely because , overnin throuh the continent emerency of e merence, it is a overnin throuh the transactional

freedoms of continency itself. Lae 5-5"M

$airness is only a means to an end. &dvocacy offense trumps their impacts. >tEs

better to have a slihtly worse debate about an important subject than a fair and

deep debate about one that doesnEt matter.

olicy relevance destroys scholarship- and turns any of their standards.

Wenakis 6 - 'hristopher I. ]enais Assistant Professor of Political )cience, =iewater'o!!unit* 'ollege Bhat Dappene to the )o1iet nion 20024hy did so many A!erican oviet e%perts fail to anticipate the possibility of reform takin place

in the #8 A nu!4er of pro!inent scholars, whose wor we ha1e e>a!ine at length in these pages, ha1e argue pointel* that Cold 4ar ovietoloy

was perversely influence, or co-opted, by totalitarianism model thinkin and the Cold 4ar

consensus. An it stans to reason that if )o1ietologists the!sel1es thought the* were co-opte, so!e of the! pro4a4l* were. =his e>planation accors with =ho!as ). ?uhn;s account

of wh* scholarly communities are often reticent to accept new and anomalous data. As Ale>aner +allin anail B. "apius recalle, the or4ache1 refor!s of the !i-%6&0s challenge the pre1ailing acae!ic paraig!s an con1entional wiso! regaring the )o1iet s*ste!. =he initial Besternreaction to the or4ache1 progra! was one of profoun septicis!, the two scholars note. =he wiel* hel 4elief a!ong .). )o1iet e>perts was that 4asic N)o1iet change was i!possi4lean coul not 4e carrie out 4* people who ha the!sel1es grown up in an 4enefite fro! the s*ste!. 1entuall *, with the elegiti!ation of 'o!!unis! in %6&6 an the collapse of the )o1ietnion in %66%, a scienti fic re1olution occurre in western )o1ietolog*, as )o1iet e>perts saw !an* of the fa!iliar realities the* ha taen for grantenota4l*, the 'ol Bar an the ))R

changing or e1aporating. )tephen 5. 'ohen as that ovietoloy was politici'ed from its inception as a result of its

dependence on overnment fundin an the for!ation of an unhealth* scholarl* consensus aroun the totalitarianis! !oel. Bee to this !oel,

!an* ovietoloists eliminated everythin diverse and problematic from LtheirM subject. an

)o1iet stuies 4eca!e, in 8uic orer, a in of ?uhnian nor!al science that foun it ifficult t o assi!ilate new infor!ation a4out the )o1iet nion. 4hat belatedly

infused new ideas into )o1ietolog* was less its own intellectual dynamic than political chanes in

(:oscowM that the profession had not anticipated and could hardly e%plain or ignore, 'ohen sai. =heiscipline of )o1ietolog* ca!e into 4eing uring the worst *ears of t he ast-Best conflict. 'ohen ae, at a ti!e when .).-)o1iet relations intrue into acae!ia 4othO politicall* an

intellectuall* The Cold 4ar put a premium on usable scholarship that served 4ashintonHs

policy interests and diminished more detached academic pursuits. If !ost earl* )o1ietologists were honora4le anwell-intentione scholars, !an* ca!e to Ntheir iscipline throughO warti!e e>perience an NtheirO interest in ;national securit*,; an not out of an intellectual passion for )o1iet stuies. =hese

were @oine 4* e>-'o!!unists who ha !ore political eal than e>pertise. 5ounations su4siie general Russian stuies, 4ut the entaon, the tate

3epartment, and the C entral > ntellience & ency asked forSand only fundedSpolicy-

related research. cholars established !an* open an reasona4le relationships with go1ern!ent uring this ti!e, 4ut also so!ethat were covert and troublesome. As a result, acae!ic oviet studies became, a hihly politici'ed

profession imbued with topical political concerns, a crusadin spirit, and a know-the-

enemy raison dHetre. 'ohen conclue. It tauht its basic HlessonsH in a sinle voice, which fostered

consensus and orthodo%y. This practice narrowed the rane of LacceptableM

interpretations, and minimi'ed intellectual space to be critical-minded an wrong%% )i!ilarl*, Ale>anerMot*l re1eale that uring !uch of the 'ol Bar, the influ> of go1ern!ent !one* into acae!ic political science epart!ents an Russian stuies institutes went han in han with the

go1ern!ent;s atte!pt to set )o1ietolog*;s research agena along polic*-anal*sis lines.Z&


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universities, 4ecause notwithstandin its importance for e!ocratic go1ern!ent, policy analysis inclines

ovietoloists to eschew the very stuff of theorySbi 0uestions with no simple answers.

Analogousl*, 5reeric F. 5leron an ric P. Doff!ann argue that far too many .). scholars were focusin on short-term policy-

oriented research uring the 'ol Bar *ears. uch analyses were neither historically rounded nor far-

sihtedC they placeLdM heavy emphasis on current political personalities, top-level power

relationships , and international and domestic crises and skimped on the thinkin andbehavior of counter-elites and citi'ens@ on underlyin socioeconomic and scientific-

technoloical trends @ and on policy options, policy implementation, and policy outcomes at

the national, reional, and local levels.Z6 In aition, such research was more focused on means

than ends , more speculative than analytical, more partial to simplistic than comple%

e%planations, more eaer for 0uick fi%es than durable solutions , more acceptin of official

than independent views, and more coni'ant of immediate than eventual political costs and

conse0uences. Accoring to scholar Ra*!on '. =aras, Cold 4ar scholarship simply followed eopolitics and

followed the money. ince the overnment was payin universities and think tanks for

research pertainin to the oviet threat, little attention was focused on the Baltic states or

on the individual oviet republics.60 1en as late as %662, western uni1ersities haNO traine few stuents in the languages spoen in the 4reaawa*repu4lics, !aing prospects for incisi1e e!pirical research not pro!ising. =he e>istence of a per1asi1e co-optati1e relationship 4etween acae!ic )o1ietolog* an the go1ern!ent is alsosuggeste 4* the career !o4ilit* !an* scholars en@o*e 4etween these two en1iron!ents. Accoring to Ferr* 5. Dough, there e>iste, throughout the 'ol Bar perio, a 1irtual re1ol1ing oor 4etween A!erican uni1ersities, thin tans, an go1ern!ent foreign polic* an national securit*-relate agencies an epart!entsan a nu!4er of )o1iet e>perts !o1e repeatel* an often

fro! one of these professional en1iron!ents to another.6% ot onl* i )o1ietologists !o1e freel* fro! acae!ia to go1ern!ent an 4ac againC this stu* argues, !ore perversely,

that there was an insidious homoeneity of scholarly opinion within these settins . Bhile there weresignificant istinctions 4etween realist, po litical cultural-historicist, an pluralist points of 1iew, the scholarl* ifferences 4etween professors, researchers, an polic* !aers of the sa!e)o1ietologiest school were relati1el* slight. =hus, political cultural-historicists tene to thin alie, whether the* taught at a uni1ersit* or sat at a polic* es at the )tate +epart!entan the

sa!e was true of realists an pluralists. Bhat this suggests is that ovietoloical co-optation by overnment was endemic 4oth inthe earl* 'ol Bar *ears an in the %670s an %6&0sif for no other reason than that all )o1ietologists, regarless of the professional setting in which the* wore, neee goo ata, an thego1ern!ent 4oth supplie !uch of this ata (for e>a!ple, in unclassifie 'IA an +epart!ent of +efense stuies an controlle scholars ; a4ilit* to ac8uire it on their own (through the tacitthreat of en*ing research grants an passport renewals to researchers who stirre up trou4le. If it is true that !an* scholars 4eca!e polic* !aers, an i n turn, that a significant nu!4er ofgo1ern!ent officials were also scholars, then we shoul e>pect that these professional co!!unities courte an cooperate with one another as !uch the* co!pete against each other. An it

shoul co!e as no great surprise that acae!ic )o1ietologists were co-opte 4* polic*-!aing interests, o r that, as 'ohen argue, this co'y relationship between

overnment and the academy was as deleterious to ood scholarship as it was

commonplace. (p. %#-7


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&62 ermutation

ermutation is either severance or intrinsic K both are votin issues. :akes it

impossible for us to be neative.

erm is impossible K The aff is a pramatic deliberation, the alt is a #topian ruptureto the architecture of securiti'ation K the two are necessary distinct.

&ll our links are 3&Es to the permutation2

National ecurity 3& K An* net 4enefit to the per!utation presu!es a top-own !oelof eli4eration an polic* construction, the i!pact is the nation securit* apparatus, thatLsa4o1e.

&pocalypse 3& K =he e!ergenc* fra!e of the aff necessitates crowing out eli4eration with a politics of pre-e!ption, thatLs +e-oo, Ranall, +illon an Rei. =he i!pact is serial polic*failure.

hift 3>&3 K the emerency frame of the aff means withdrawal will lead to a

renewed call for military presence.

?oue &kibayashi, ) researcher at the Institute for ener )tuies, 9chano!iu ni1ersit*,an )uu*o =aaato, co-chair of 9inawa Bo!en Act Against Militar* Wiolence an one of thefore!ost Fapanese peace acti1ists an fe!inists who criticall* e>a!ines .). 4ases on 9inawa,t of e!ilitariation of the entire securit* s*ste!. As the iscussions ofthe !o1e!entLs international networing re1eal, closing or ecreasing the capacit* of one Asian 4ase has often leto the reinforce!ent of other !ilitar* 4ases in the region as a !eans of !ini!iing the negati1eeffects of the closure on the .). !ilitar*Ls glo4al strategies. 5or instance, when the 4ases in thePhilippines were close in %662, those troops pre1iousl* assigne there were transferre to 4ases in9inawa an ?orea . More recentl*, 3lessening the 4uren of people in 9inawa,K a phrase in the )ecurit*'onsultati1e 'o!!ittee (200# ocu!ent, will 4e achie1e 4* 4uil-up on ua! . 5ro! the perspecti1es of the international co!!unit* an of the .). !ilitar*, whichli!its access to such 3highl* classifieK infor!ation on securit* policies to a hanful of people, there4* creating a new hierarch*, this !a* 4e an o41ious ta ctic. It has 4een 1er* ifficult for grassroots peace act i1ists to !ae such anal*ses an preictions ue largel* to the lac of resourcesan infor!ation. In recent *ears, howe1er, this t*pe of o4ser1ation of glo4al strategies has 4een !ae possi4le through international soliarit* an th e e>change of infor!ation a!ong areas. =hrough these networs, !e!4ers of grassroots !o1e!ents in Asia an in other parts of the worl arenow connecte an are 4etter e8uippe to cope with the warfing infor!ation giant of the .). !ilitar*. People ha1e to unite with each other. =here is an in creasing unerstaning a!ong people in the struggle against the .). !ilitar* e!pire that securit* of people can ne1er 4e achie1ewithout e!ilitariing the securit* s*ste!. 5e!inist international scholars ha1e alrea* argue that a gener perspecti1e effecti1el* re1eals an une8ual ichoto!* 4etween the protector an the protecte on which the present securit* s*ste! has 4een 4uilt (Peterson %662. =he 9BAAMW!o1e!ent illustrates fro! a gener perspecti1e that 3the protecte,K who are structurall* epri1e of political power, are in fact not protecte 4* the !ili tarie securit* policiesC rather their l i1elihoos are !ae insecure 4* these 1er* policies. =he !o1e!ent has also illu!inate the fact that3gateK 4ases o not confine !ilitar* 1i olence to within the 4ases. =hose hunres-of-!iles-long fences aroun the 4ases are there onl* to assure the reainess of the !ilitar* an !ilitar* operations 4* e>cluing an e1en oppressing the people li1ing outsie the gate 4ases. =he practical

aspect of anal*sis, connection, an soliarit* a!ong fe!inist acti1ists worlwie has not 4een the onl* e!powering e>perience for wo!en in the struggle. As has happene so !an* ti!es in the past, people in co!!unities hosting .). 4ases ha1e 4een i1ie o1er such issues as pu4licecono!ic support for the financiall* istresse localities, an thus ha 1e felt isolate an ise!powere, una4le to !ount or !aintain protest actions. 9BAAMW wo!en ha1e also, at ti!es, 4een lone 1oices against a patriarch* that is, the* argue, the source of the !ilitarie securit* s*ste!.

ot onl* people in the local co!!unities 4ut also !e!4ers of co!!unities across 4orers share nowlege, anal*sis, an eep rage against in@ustice, as well as a 1ision of a e!ilitarie worl with gener @ustice. Dere, we see possi4ilit* an hope for transfor!ation. =hose who struggle forthe achie1e!ent of a e!ilitarie securit* s*ste! !a* ha1e a long wa* t o go, 4ut the* ne1er lose hope.


24/34

!inks


25/34

!ink K &ssumin the 4orst

Their jump from potentiality/ to actuality/ is a form of worst-case scenario

plannin that causes serial policy failure and pre-emption.

:ueller D tewart E11 NFohn, Boo* Da*es ational )ecurit* )tuies an Professor of Political )cience H 9hio )tate ni1ersit*, Mar, Professor of 'i1il ngineering an +irector of the'entre for Infrastructure Perfor!ance an Relia4ilit* at the ni1ersit* of ewcastle in Australia, 3=error, )ecurit*, an Mone*K, page nu!4ers 4elow, 'MRO

$ocusin on 4orst-Case cenarios Cass unstein , who seems to have invented the phrase probability nelect , assesses the version

of the phenomenon that comes into bein when emotions are intensely enaed. #nder that circumstance, he arues, people Es attention is focus ed on

the bad outcome itself and they are inattenti1e to the fact that it is unliel* to occur . :oreover, theyare inclined to demand a substantial overnmental response-even if the manitude of the

risk does not warrant the response. >t may be this phenomenon that Treverton e%perienced. layin to this demand,

overnment officials are inclined to focus on worst-case scenarios , presumably in theknowlede , followin unsteinHs insiht, that this can e!otionall* @ustif* @ust a4out an* e>peniture , no Lend pae1M matter how unlikely the prospect the dire event will actually take place. &ccordinly@ there is a

preoccupation with low probabilityI hih conse0uence events , such as the detonation of a si'able nuclear device inmidtown :anhattan. The process could be seen in action in an article published in 6AA5 by ecretary of omeland ecurity (3+ :ichael Chertoff. e felt called upon to respond to

the observation that the number of people who die each year from international terrorism, 4hile traic, is actually e>ceeingl* s!all . This fails to consider, he pointed out, the much reater loss of life that 4eapons of mass destruction could wreak on the &mericanpeople. That is, he was justifyin his entire budet-only a limited portion of which is concerned with 4eapons of mass destruction by the 4:3 threat, even 4hile avoidin assessin

its likelihood. >t is sometimes arued that conventional risk analysis 4reas own uner e>tre!e conitionsbecause the risk is now a very lare number (losses+ multiplied by a very small number (attack

probability+. But it is not the risk analysis method oloy that is at fault here, but our a4ilit* to usethe infor!ation o4taine fro! the anal*sis for ecision !aing . & hih conse0uence event has been defined to be adisaster or catastrophe resultin in reat human costs in life, property environmental damae, and future economic activity owever, dependin on how one 4eihs the

words in that definition, there may have been only one terrorist event in all of history that 0ualifies for inclusion. :oreover,the vast bulk of homeland security

e%penditures is not focused on events that fit a definition like that, but rather on comparatively low-conse0uence ones,

like e%plosions set off by individual amateur jihadists. &nalyst Bruce chneier has written penetratinly of 4orst-case thinkin . e points out that it ,

involves imainin the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certaint* >tsubstitutes imaination for thinkin , speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason . >t

fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and !agnifies social NgrilocO . &nd it !aes us !ore1ulnera4le to the effects of terroris!. >t leads to 4a ecision !aing because itHs only half ofthe cost-benefit e0uation . =very decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculatin about what can

possibly o wron, and then actin as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinkin focuses

only on the e%treme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessin outcomes . Lend pae 19M

>t also assumes that a proponent of an action must prove that the nihtmare scenario is

impossible, and it can 4e use to support an* position or its opposite . >f we build a nuclear power plant, it couldmelt down. >f we donHt build it, 4e will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy &nd worst, it validates inorance because, instead of focusin on what 4e

know, it focuses on what we donHt know-and what we can imaine. >n the process, ris assess!ent is e1alue and probabilistic

thinkin is repudiated in favor of possibilistic thinkin . &s chneier also notes, w orst-case thinkin is the drivin force behindthe precautionary principle, a decent workin definition of w hich is action should be taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the harm

has already occurred. >t could be seen in action less than a week after )I11, when resident ;eore 4 Bush outlined his new

national security stratey2 4e cannot let our enemies strike first . . . Lbut must takeM

anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place

of the enemyHs attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the # nited

tates, will , if necessary act pree!pti1el* X . . &merica will act aainst such emerin threats 4efore the* are full* for!e . The 6AA* invasion of >ra0, then, was justified by invokin the


26/34

precautionary principle based on the worst-case scenario in which addam ussein miht

strike . >f , on the other hand, any worst-case thinkin focused on the potential for the destabili'in

effects a war would have on >ra0 and the reion, the precautionary principle would uide

one to be very cautious about embarkin on war. &s unstein notes, the precautionar* principle offersno guiance -not that it is 4ron, but that it forbids all courses of action, includin reulation. Thus , taken seriously it is paral*ing ,

bannin the very steps that it simultaneously re0uires. ) >t can be invoked in e0ual measure to act or not to act. There are

considerable daners in applyin the precautionary principle to terrorism2 on the one hand, any action taken to reduce a presumed risk

always poses the introuction of counter1ailing riss, while on the other, larer, e%pensive counterterrorismefforts will come accompanied by hih opportunity costs. :oreover $or public officials no less than the rest of us, the

probability of harm matters a reat deal, and it is foolish to atten e>clusi1el* to the worst case scenario . & morerational approach to worst-case thinkin is to establish the likelihood of ains and losses

from various courses of action , includin stayin the current course. This, of course, is the essence of risk assessment. 4hat is

necessary is due consideration to the spectrum of threats, not si!pl* the worst onei!agina4le, in order to properly understand, and coherently deal with, the risks to people, institutions, and the economy The relevant decision makers are professionals,and it is not unreasonable to suest that they should do so seriously. Notwithstandin political pressures (to be discussed more in chapter )+, the fact that the public has difficulties

with probabilities when emotions are involved does not relieve those in chare of the re0uirement, even the duty to make decisions about the e%penditures of vast 0uantities of public

monies in a responsible manner. Lpae 1-1"M


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!ink K !eitimacy

Their tactic of leitimacy is a uise to provide the #nited tates with a velvet

coercive love. Not only do nationEs see throuh the charade, but the politics

produce violent pre-emption.

;ulli 1*. n truth, they rest on violence and terror , or the threat

thereof . This is an obvious and essential aspect of the sinularity of the present crisis. Inthis sense, th

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NDT 2016- Security Kritik - NAR