NATO CONTENTS Nº2 Summer 1998 - Volume 46 · Minister of Defence of the Hellenic Republic Apostolos Tsohatzopoulos, Defence Minister of Greece (left), ... moment and act decisively?

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NATO

Letter from the Secretary General

3 NATO and WEU: Turning vision into reality

Apostolos Tsohatzopoulos

4 WEU’s challenge

Lluis Maria de Puig

6 The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO

Lt. General Nicholas Kehoe

10 Sustaining a vibrant Alliance

Rob de Wijk

14 Towards a new political strategy for NATO

Jan Petersen

18 NATO’s next strategic concept

George Katsirdakis

22 Albania: A case study in the practical implementation of Partnership for Peace

Greg Schulte

27 SFOR continued

David Lightburn

31 NATO Security Cooperation Activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina

Focus on NATO11 Exercise Strong Resolve 98

16 New partnership wing opens — Diplomatic missions established

25 New Italian PermanentRepresentative to NATO

30 NATO tests SFOR back-up capability

35 The role of NATO civilians in former Yugoslavia

Cover: NATO Graphics Studio

CONTENTSreview Nº2 Summer 1998 - Volume 46

Letter from the Secretary General

NATO and WEU: Turning vision into reality

ifty years ago, in the aftermath of the Second World War, a group of European nations signed the Brussels Treaty and paved the way for the creation of the Western European Union.

Shortly afterwards, NATO came into being. Through NATO, Europeans became partners of the United States andCanada in safeguarding the stability and security of the West from the Soviet threat.

Today, the Cold War belongs to the past. The very principles of integration and cooperation now span across all ofEurope. We have adapted our institutions accordingly, defining new missions and reaching out to the new democracies ofCentral and Eastern Europe. But most importantly, the new realities have allowed NATO and the WEU together to turn thevision of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) into reality.

The newly gained momentum towards developing a European Security and Defence Identity should not come as asurprise. First, an enhanced ESDI complements the wider process of European integration. It responds to the legitimateaspirations of European nations to expand their countries’ political and economic integration to the field of security and defence.

Second, ESDI is not just a matter of European self-assertion. It has also become the prerequisite for a more maturetransatlantic relationship with the North American allies. The end of the East-West conflict has underscored the need forEurope to become a full-fledged strategic partner of the United States in managing today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges.

Building ESDI within the Alliance is a practical, workable answer to both requirements. The steps taken by NATOForeign Ministers in Berlin in 1996 set the stage in this regard. In Berlin, the decision was taken to build ESDI within NATOand with the WEU, as fundamental elements of a transformed Alliance.

Where do we stand with ESDI today? At the political level, regular NATO-WEU Joint Council meetings have alreadybecome a permanent feature of our institutional relationship. In practical terms, the WEU itself has increased its ability toconduct peacekeeping and crisis management operations. NATO has enhanced its support for ESDI by taking a number ofmeasures, aimed at:

• taking account of WEU requirements in NATO-force planning arrangements;

• offering NATO assets and capabilities case by case in support of WEU-led operations;

• developing arrangements to support the planning and conduct of such operations.

Work is also well in hand to prepare for joint exercises to test and develop further the concept of WEU-led operations withNATO support.

We are thus well on track in developing practical ways by which the Alliance can help build a European Security andDefence Identity. This achievement underscores a fundamental truth. In today’s security environment, both organisations —NATO and the WEU — share the same strategic interest: enhancing securityand stability throughout Europe.

In the months to come, we will see the promises made at the 1994 BrusselsSummit come to fruition in political and practical terms. The arrangements forsupporting potential WEU-led operations will be in place. I am looking forward tothe Alliance’s 50th anniversary celebration next year. It will also be a time tocelebrate how close our two organisations — NATO and the WEU — havebecome, on the basis of a new, redefined relationship.

F

NATO review Summer 1998

Javier Solana

José Cutileiro,WEU SecretaryGeneral (left),and Javier Solanaon the occasionof WEU’s50th anniversary.(AP photo)

he signing of the Brussels Treaty on 17 March1948 by five European states — Belgium, France,Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United

Kingdom — led to the founding of the WesternEuropean Union (WEU). The treaty initially providedfor extensive cooperation in the economic, social andcultural fields, as well as for collective defence. Sixyears later in Paris, with the addition of new membersGermany and Italy, the initial treaty was amended tobecome the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, reflect-ing the European nations’ hopes for peace, cooperationand security combined with social and economicdevelopment. Portugal and Spain subsequently joinedWEU in 1988, and in 1995, the accession of my owncountry, Greece, brought the number of WEU mem-bers to ten.

At the outset, the Brussels Treaty granted vast com-petences to WEU, reflecting the European will for

cooperation, security and prosperity.During much of the Cold War period,however, WEU remained dormant andthese powers were transferred to otherorganisations which had been createdin the meantime. Thus, WesternEurope’s defence activities wereplaced under the umbrella of NATO,while competences related to socialand cultural questions were handledby the Council of Europe and econom-ic matters became the domain of theEuropean Economic Community (nowthe European Union).

WEU’s reactivationAt the peak of the Cold War, WEU

was reactivated, reflecting the growingdesire to strengthen the Alliance’sEuropean pillar. In October 1984, dur-ing the celebration of the 30th anniver-sary of the Modified Brussels Treaty,European Foreign and DefenceMinisters adopted the RomeDeclaration which lays down theorganisation’s new political objectivesand structural changes. These includ-ed the definition of a European securi-

ty identity and the gradual harmonisation of WEUmember states’ defence policies. WEU’s evolution wasfurther reinforced in June 1992 with the adoption of the“Petersberg tasks”, its peace support missions, in addi-tion to the core collective defence function.

For its part, NATO has substantially reorganiseditself since the end of the Cold War, adding new mis-sions and opening its membership to new democraciesin Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Animportant aspect of this internal and external restruc-turing is the development of a European Security andDefence Identity within NATO, in cooperation withWEU. This ever-closer association between the twoorganisations is manifest in regular joint committeeand Council sessions, exchange of information, practi-cal and material support for possible WEU-led opera-tions and involvement of WEU in NATO’s defenceplanning processes.

4NATO review Summer 1998

On the occasion of WEU’s 50th anniversary, Greece’s Defence Minister, whose country holds the Presidency of WEU until the end of June,writes that we should take stock of achievements, learn from disappointments, and make the most of the opportunities now to create a

Europe of security and defence. The credibility of WEU and of Europe are at stake, but he believes they will rise to the challenge.

WEU’s challengeApostolos Tsohatzopoulos

Minister of Defence of the Hellenic Republic

ApostolosTsohatzopoulos,Defence Ministerof Greece (left),whose countrycurrently holds therotating Presidencyof WEU, speakingto NATO SecretaryGeneral JavierSolana at lastAutumn’s WEUMinisterial.(Belga photo)

T

At the same time, WEU is an essential and inherentaspect of the European Union’s developing commonforeign and security policy.

These institutional developments are taking placein the context of the changed security situation inEurope, which is no longer characterised by a singleclear external threat, but by multifaceted and oftenunforeseen risks and crises, arising to a large extentfrom the difficult transition processes which the soci-eties in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe aregoing through.

New crisesIn South-Eastern Europe crisis situations are aris-

ing with growing regularity. First the crisis in Bosnia,then the crisis in Albania and now, even before thesehave been overcome, we are witnessing a third crisisdeveloping in Kosovo. In the first two cases, EU andWEU were not able to play a role commensurate withexpectations. They could neither prevent these crisesnor put an early end to them through appropriate polit-ical initiatives.

What will happen with the third crisis which poten-tially threatens peace and security throughout theSouth-Eastern part of Europe? Will Europe seize themoment and act decisively? Will it manage to speakwith one voice and convince Serbia and the Kosovarsto resolve the problem peacefully,through the establishment ofa new balance that wouldrecognise the KosovoAlbanians’ human rights inthe framework of the NewYugoslavia?

The EU’s ability or failure to rise to the occasion inKosovo, and in the Balkans in general, will have a last-ing impact on its and WEU’s future credibility in thefield of security.

WEU, the EU and NATOFifty years after the signature of its founding

Treaty, WEU has developed a clear and pivotal role asa linchpin between the EU and NATO, with a political-military character that affords unique flexibility ofaction at both political and military levels. It providesthe institutional context for the development of a col-lective European crisis management capability throughthe interoperability and transparency which govern itsrelations with the EU and NATO, as well as through itsmultilevel cooperation with other international organi-sations.

Progress achieved so far on the development ofWEU’s military structure, including the establishmentof its Planning Cell and Military Committee, provide itthe structure which can be activated to undertake“Petersberg tasks”, within the framework of aEuropean security policy, thus giving concrete form tothe Europeans’ contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.

Similar progress has also been achieved at the polit-ical level, thus creating the necessary conditions for theorganisation’s unity of action by enabling the participa-tion of associate members, observers and associatepartners in the WEU’s activities. Through this mem-bership structure, WEU brings together 28 Europeancountries in one broad forum for the exchange of ideasor concerns on defence and security issues.

This process is develop-ing in parallel and as a com-plement to the processes


Hansvan den Broek,

EU Commissionerfor Foreign Affairs

(left), JoséCutileiro, Secretary

General of WEU(centre) and NATOSecretary General

Javier Solana posefor a photo at the

WEU conferencein Brussels on

17 March 1998marking the 50thanniversary of itsfounding treaty.

(Belga photo)


Lluis Mariade Puig (right)speaking to NATOSecretary GeneralJavier Solana atthe meeting inBrussels to markthe WEU’s50th anniversary.(Belga photo)

of integrating new members from Central and EasternEurope into both NATO and the EU. It simultaneouslyhelps strengthen the transatlantic link and contributesto the construction of a stable and secure environmentin Europe.

A new eraThe success of our common efforts to integrate

WEU into the developing new European security struc-ture will depend on decisions taken in the immediatefuture and solutions we might bring to the critical andcomplex issues related to the development and full util-isation of Europe’s defence capabilities. But most ofall, it will depend on the determination of the peoplesof Europe to accept their share of responsibility on the

political, economic and military levels for our collec-tive defence and security.

Such issues involve the ways and means of imple-menting the WEU’s cooperation with the EU andNATO, as well as the promotion of the aim, principlesand content of a Common European Defence Policy,within which all European nations will find their com-mon defence denominator.

I firmly believe that, as we celebrate WEU’s 50years, we are about to enter a new era of Europeanunity in the field of security and defence. I hope thatthe coming years will confirm this most propitiousforecast for the future of European security and ofWEU and pledge to do my part to ensure we do not letthis opportunity slip our grasp. ◆

In Berlin and again in Madrid, the Alliance recognised the benefits of building a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO andendorsed the practical steps to achieve this aim. WEU, in close cooperation with NATO, is playing a central role in making ESDI a reality.

However, for this endeavour to succeed, argues the Chairman of the WEU Assembly, the Europeans will have to demonstrate their commit-ment by devoting adequate resources, while the Americans will have to cede a greater role to Europe in NATO as part of a rebalancing in

transatlantic relations.

The European Security and Defence Identity within NATOLluis Maria de Puig

Chairman of the WEU Assembly

he formula of building a European Security andDefence Identity (ESDI) within NATO aims to

reconcile greater European autonomy in security anddefence matters with the maintenance of the transat-lantic link. This formula, adopted by Alliance ForeignMinisters in Berlin in June 1996 and given furtherimpetus by Heads of State and Government at NATO’sMadrid Summit last July, gives the Europeans more

clout in Alliance decision-making and provides theWEU the tools it needs to carry out its own missions.

The essential elements of the ESDI formulaendorsed by Alliance leaders in Madrid include:

■ NATO’s full support for the development of ESDIwithin NATO by making available NATO assetsand capabilities for WEU operations;

T

■ Providing for the support of WEU-led operations asan element of the Combined Joint Task Force(CJTF) concept;

■ Provision within the future new command structurefor European command arrangements able to pre-pare, support, command and conduct WEU-ledoperations;

■ Creation of forces capable of operating under thepolitical control and strategic direction of theWEU;

■ Arrangements for the identification ofNATO assets and capabilities thatcould support WEU-led operationsand arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the con-text of such operations;

■ Commitment to full trans-parency between NATOand WEU in crisismanagement, includ-ing through joint con-sultations;

■ Strengthening of theinstitutional coop-eration between thetwo organisations;

■ Involving WEU inNATO’s defenceplanning processes;

NATO’s role The primary role of the

Atlantic Alliance in thepost-Cold War era is still toguarantee peace in Europe, butthis is no longer achieved somuch by military deterrence as bythe political cohesion of its members.The countries of Central and EasternEurope are seeking membership in the Western securi-ty system largely because the stability it providesallows them to pursue their internal reforms. At thesame time, the prospect of NATO, EU and WEU mem-bership has provided the incentive to resolve regionalproblems peacefully.

Thus, the political role of the Alliance has to someextent taken precedence over the military role, whichmay explain why some European countries seek evenfurther institutional reforms of the Alliance in thisdirection. However, American influence and stature inNATO does not result from institutional design; rather,it reflects the reality of overwhelming United States

power and capabilities in all defence-related areas. TheUS has unparalleled means for satellite and remoteobservation, intelligence-gathering, communications,transport, logistics, nuclear deterrence and effectiveair-land action, all of which have ensured the Alliance’seffectiveness in the past and are essential to action onany scale today. This was evident in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Europe was unable to stop thefighting before the American decision to play a full partin the operations to restore peace.

However, Europe will not be able to achieve paritywith the US in defence capabilities without substantialeffort, which it is does not yet seem to be prepared tomake. While European states have shown an increas-ing desire to combine their defence resources over thelast few years, this has been motivated more by budgetconstraints than a wish to equip Europe with the meansnecessary for an active policy.

Some countries have sought a rebalancing intransatlantic relations, trying to achieve this either byproviding the EU’s Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy (CFSP) with military capabilities, by encourag-ing the development of such capabilities within the


Foreign MinisterJaroslav Sedivy

(centre) andVelem Holan,Chairman of

the InternationalCommittee ofthe Chamber

of Deputies ofthe Czech

Republic, applaudthe lower houseof Parliament’s

approval on15 April of the

country’s pendingaccession to NATO.

(Belga photo)

“The Europeanswill have tomaintain asufficient level offorces to justifya reasonableinternationalprofile.” Here,a Matador II(Harrier) jet istaking off fromthe Spanishaircraft carrierPrincipe deAsturias.(NATO photo)

WEU framework or even by bold new approaches suchas a European satellite observation system. However,the future of the more ambitious programmes is indoubt due to budgetary shortfalls.

These realities cannot be ignored. They explain thedifficulties encountered by the Europeans in obtaininga better sharing of responsibilities within NATO, aswell as a measure of independence in military actionthrough the CJTF concept. However much goodwillmay exist on both sides, there will be no real sharing ofresponsibilities between Europe and the United Statesas long as the inequality in the means to act continuesto increase.

There is another factor which makes creation of aEuropean defence identity within NATO uncertain.This is simply the fact that the European states are find-ing it extremely difficult to agree on a definition oftheir common objectives. Threat perceptions and pri-orities vary a great deal, depending upon one’s situa-tion in Europe. There would be no point in giving aninstitutional structure to a European defence identitywithin NATO if there were no common “European”view of defence and security issues.

The EU’s roleMost of the European members of the Alliance are

seeking to work out a common policy in the context ofthe European Union’s CFSP. While the EU hasachieved undeniable results in the fields within itscompetence — essentially in the economic realm alongwith some elements of a common external policy —security and defence policy remain above all a nationalprerogative. The fact that four countries among theFifteen have not joined the Atlantic Alliance and arepursuing varying policies of neutrality, while threeEuropean members of the Alliance are not in theEuropean Union, prevents any wholesale integration ofthe European identity into the Alliance. The decisiontaken at the European Summit in Amsterdam in June1997 not to give the EU responsibilities in defencematters further emphasises this fact.

The WEU’s roleThe WEU is the only organ-

isation which can fulfilthis role because allof its members aremembers of theAtlantic Alliance,because the Modified Brussels Treaty which founded itestablishes a legal relationship with NATO and becausethe Treaty respects state sovereignty in the area of itscompetence. Moreover, the WEU’s European dimen-sion is further strengthened through its close associa-

tion with the European Union and the CFSP, as set outin the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.

Whether in future WEU will be integrated into theEuropean Union and whether the Modified BrusselsTreaty will have to be revised to meet the requirementsof an enlarged Europe are questions that may not beanswered for many years. The development of aEuropean security and defence identity is not a prereq-uisite for this. However, the point at issue is what canwe do today within the WEU framework to give sub-stance to this identity and enable it to better reflect thecollective interests of Europe in the context of NATO.

The first precondition for progress along these linesis for the European states to maintain, at least collec-tively, a sufficient level of forces and assets to enablethem to justify a reasonable international profile.Defence spending levels below three per cent of GDPare not adequate for Europe to play an important role ina system of collective defence. A professional army,armaments modernisation and access to new technolo-gies require this level of spending. Failing this, Europewill be incapable of carrying out any independent mil-itary operations.

Europe must also equip itself with decision-makingmachinery that does not paralyse all action at the out-set. The decision-making procedures presentlysketched out by the European Union and the WEU forcommon undertakings are excessively complex in thisrespect. In today’s world quick and firm decisions areneeded.

In the operational area, there have been encourag-ing developments in the WEU over the last five years,with the recent creation of a Military Committee, theincrease in the capabilities of the Planning Cell andof the Satellite Centre and the establishment of alogistics programme. The WEU is still farfrom being able to take responsibilityfor the management of large-scale operations, par-ticularly due to


Europe’s lack of strategic transport capabilities.However, it can rely on a number of multinationalforces which can direct operations on the ground bycontingents made available to them by member states ifnecessary.

In addition, the Joint Armaments CooperationStructure (OCCAR), created in 1996, provides theframework for a European armaments agency intendedto promote European policy in this area. At themoment, it only has freedom of action in the field ofresearch, but current negotiations to bring the OCCARwithin the WEU should lead to a considerable increasein its scope and efficiency.

The more WEU’s capacity for independent actiongrows and enables it to respond to security challengesand protect the vital interests of Europe, the moreclearly this identity will be recognised in the world.The creation of the multinational naval force EURO-MARFOR has shown that the military reality ofEurope is beginning to take form. At the same time, wemust take care that institutional developments, in par-ticular the enlargement of NATO, the European Unionand the WEU, should not increase the distancesbetween these three organisations.

For its part, the WEU has consistently applied theprinciple that only countries that were

already members of the EuropeanUnion and NATO could be accepted

for accession to the ModifiedBrussels Treaty, while grantingspecial status to European coun-

tries that did not meet thesetwo conditions. “Associate

Members”, that is, mem-bers of NATO but not ofthe European Union, can

also participate in WEUmilitary activities

in whichNAT O

is involved. This status should be granted to the futureNATO members Hungary, Poland and the CzechRepublic, until their admission to the European Unionallows their full and complete accession to the WEU.

However, the key will be in the degree of indepen-dence and support that NATO will actually grant tounits under the WEU in a CJTF operation. An under-standing on this point has not been easy to reach. TheAmericans are wary of letting themselves be commit-ted by their European partners to matters outside theircontrol. But if a conclusion is not reached soon, therewill hardly be any room left for a European identitywithin NATO.

It is also important for the WEU Council to makeeffective use of the independence in decision-makingconferred upon it by the Modified Brussels Treatywhich frees it from having to refer systematically to theCFSP in order to define its missions. Insofar as fivemember countries of the European Union havedeclined joining the WEU and NATO, they must not beallowed to exert too much influence on the decisions ofan organisation to which they have chosen not to com-mit themselves. Moreover, the prospect of the WEUmerging into the European Union can be contemplatedonly insofar as all members of the Union demonstratetheir readiness to accede to the objectives and obliga-tions imposed on the signatories of the ModifiedBrussels Treaty.

The realities of tomorrowThe concept of a European security and defence

identity within NATO can certainly be developed fur-ther. No one can predict NATO’s fate in the comingdecades or at what rate a united Europe will develop areal foreign policy or a common security and defencepolicy. Neither do we know how the enlargement ofeach institution will turn out or what the consequenceswill be. However, the ESDI concept may give way toother formulas in future which will hopefully have abetter grasp of the realities of tomorrow.

Nevertheless the ESDI concept, as it currentlyexists, is most useful as it calls for a realistic

approach to the European vocation indefence. Certainly there can be no

European defence withoutclose cooperation with

the United States,for which NATO

is the only con-ceivable framework.

But this cooperationcalls for a rebalancing in the

Alliance, which can only be done if the Europeans givethemselves the military and political assets necessaryfor independent action. ◆


o one could have imagined a decade ago the mag-nitude of change that would affect NATO follow-

ing the epic fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent dis-integration of a communist system built up over theprevious 40 years. These and associated events sincecan be compared to a great political earthquake thatshook the world and set in motion a series of after-shocks that have dramatically altered the security land-scape of Europe. The effects of these lingering tremorsand those we could yet experience provide ampleincentive to ensure the NATO house is in order for ahopeful but still uncertain future.

The Alliance has responded vigorously to the post-Cold War challenge. The ongoing NATO-led operationto establish a concrete, self-sustaining peace in Bosniaand Herzegovina is a vivid example. Bosnia representsmany “firsts” for the Alliance and has paid big divi-dends on our long-terminvestment in standardi-sation, interoperabili-ty and partnership.Notably, our effortsthere reflect key ele-ments of most of theinitiatives NATO has

undertaken as it adapts to a new and evolving Europeansecurity environment with increased confidence andcertainty.

Internal and external adaptationThe focus of NATO’s current work, of course,

extends far beyond operations in Bosnia. Internally,we are well along the way to adapting the NATO com-mand structure to better meet new demands. After suc-cessful completion of two trials, we are ready to imple-ment a Combined Joint Task Force concept which willembed a deployable contingency command and controlcapability into our command structure.(2) And, we havemade much progress in establishing a European securi-ty and defence identity that will enable the WesternEuropean Union todraw on NATOcapabilities fora European-ledoperation.


A little less than one year from now, NATO will celebrate its 50th anniversary. If all goes as planned, we will see the formal inauguration ofan updated strategic concept, the accession of three new Alliance members, and the implementation of a more flexible, streamlined com-mand structure. According to General Kehoe, this celebration of our “Pride in the Past, Faith in the Future”(1) will cap nearly a decade of

transition and momentous change in the Alliance and launch a transformed NATO into the new millennium.

N

Sustaining a vibrant AllianceLt. General Nicholas Kehoe

Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee

General Kehoe(left) with GeneralOwe Wiktorin,SupremeCommander ofSwedish ArmedForces, at themeeting of Chiefsof Defence Staffof EAPC countriesin Brussels lastDecember.(NATO photo)

(1)“Pride in the Past, Faithin the Future” is the titleof a well-knownAmerican painting com-memorating the transi-tion from propeller avia-tion into the jet age.

(2)For more on this, seeGeneral Klaus Naumann,“NATO’s new militarycommand structure”,NATO Review, No.1, Spring 1998.

▼

Our work on adapting the Alliance externallythrough the projection of stability has been particularlysignificant. We are working hard to prepare the threeinvited countries to assume their responsibilities as fulland productive Alliance members, pending completionof the parliamentary ratification process. Meanwhile,we have implemented an enormously successfulenhanced Partnership for Peace programme which isinvolving partner nations more directly in Alliancebusiness, from “inside the fence”. And rounding offour interrelated outreach initiatives are an extensiveengagement programme with Russia, a distinctive rela-tionship with Ukraine and an active dialogue withselected Mediterranean nations. All are aimed atincreasing trust and confidence.

Work on these internal and external adaptation ini-tiatives has proceeded throughout the NATO structureat an accelerated pace. While some would say we havespent the decade of the 1990s reacting to the end of theCold War, I would suggest that we have spent that timelooking forward, posturing an Alliance that will perse-vere through its next 50 years.

In any case, NATO will enter the next millenniumon a successful and exciting note. To guide it into the


Strong Resolve 98, which took place from 9 to 21 March 1998, was the first major exercise in which multiple crises within the spectrum of NATOmissions were staged simultaneously in separate geographical regions. Involving 50,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilians from25 countries, this was the first large-scale NATO exercise jointly planned and executed by the two major NATO commanders, Supreme AlliedCommander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

Strong Resolve 98 comprised two main scenarios: Crisis North, conducted in Norway, was an Article 5 collective defence exercise; and Crisis South,which was a peace support operation conducted in the South-Eastern Atlantic, Western Mediterranean and Portugal and Spain. Strong Resolve 98,inter alia, allowed NATO to further develop and evaluate the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, NATO’s new approach for planning and con-ducting peace support tasks with possible collective defense applications.

The exercise also helped promote interoperability between NATO and its partners through participation of Partnership for Peace (PfP) partnernations in Crisis South. Among participating partner nations were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1),Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. They were involved in every aspect of Crisis South, with forces on land, at seaand in the air.

Exercise Strong Resolve 98

FO

CU

S

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic ofMacedonia with itsconstitutional name.

future, we will be able to draw upon an updated strate-gic concept that provides an overarching sense ofdirection and focus. It will provide the strategic vectorthat defines our purpose and provides the frameworkfor a spectrum of activities the Alliance could beinvolved in, from existing core functions to the so-called new missions. We should not be complacentthat the road ahead will be free of barriers. From apractical standpoint, there are a number of fundamentalconditions that will be instrumental to NATO’s contin-ued success.

Spirit of consensusFirstly, and perhaps foremost, is the need to sustain

a “spirit” of consensus. This means a willingness tocompromise, to give and take for the overall best inter-est. It does not mean every nation will agree with everyaspect of the rationale for every decision, but that theyare willing to join a consensus so that the Alliance canact and demonstrate resolve and solidarity. The alter-native would be gridlock, accompanied by a commen-surate loss of the credibility and stature NATO enjoystoday.

(AP p

hoto)


“We mustcontinue topromotemultinationalityand we needto preserve thetransatlantic link.”(AP photo)

It should go without saying that NATO can only beas effective as the willingness of its members toachieve consensus. That can be a real challenge whenone considers the great diversity of languages, culturesand historical backgrounds of the nations which makeup the Alliance. Although NATO’s diversity willincrease as it expands from 16 to 19, its decision-mak-ing ability should not be diluted as long as it retains aspirit of consensus when the time comes for toughdecisions.

Military effectivenessSecondly, military effectiveness is essential. It is a

fundamental prerequisite for a security alliance whosecredibility relies, not only on the political will to act,but on the capabilities of its military structure. Militaryeffectiveness means having a clear-cut, accountablechain of command with unambiguous responsibilities.In this regard, it is important that nations have respectfor the integrity of the NATO military command struc-ture and trust in its ability to protect their vital interestsas well as the forces they provide for mission taskings.Unity of command is an essential ingredient; welearned that lesson during NATO’s early air operationsover Bosnia under the so-called “dual key” arrange-ment with the United Nations. Essentially, we handedto another organisation a decisive vote affectingNATO’s expression of will and capability.

Military effectiveness also means continuedemphasis on standardisation and interoperability sothat several nations’ forces can act more effectively asone under NATO. Furthermore, it includes the mod-ernisation of capabilities to keep pace with technologi-cal advances. This is particularly critical in the area ofConsultation, Command and Control (C3) since theessence of NATO’s military capability in peacetimerevolves around its military command structure. Wemust have effective C3 to operate with credibility. Andfinally, military effectiveness means being able to pro-vide clear military advice in order to get clear politicalguidance and direction.

MultinationalityThirdly, we must continue to promote multination-

ality. We need to operate as an Alliance, all nations, allservices, reading from the same sheet of music. Again,different languages, cultures and professional or histor-ical backgrounds make it a daunting challenge to meldtogether the efforts of the NATO structure from top tobottom into a coherent, clearly focused capability.Everyone needs to contribute in some way to the out-put, bringing a valuable perspective to the table. Thisis how we project cohesion and solidarity.▼

Individuals assigned by their nation to multination-al staffs, wherever that may be in the NATO hierarchy,serve in an international capacity and must see through“NATO eyes”. Although we certainly draw from ournational experiences and benefit from knowing howour respective nations view the broad range of issueson NATO’s plate, we need to respect organisationalintegrity and the established chain of command. Thereis nothing more divisive to a staff than an individualserving in an international capacity who pushes anational agenda. That must be left to national repre-sentatives.

In this regard, we all could benefit from a little bitof sensitivity awareness. In a multinational environ-ment, how we interact together makes a big difference.There’s a right way and a wrong way to put the difficultmessage across and, like a doctor at a patient’s bedside,we must watch our “bedside manner”. Moreover, theimportance of consultation, both between nations andthe Alliance and within the Alliance structure, takes ona new dimension.

Transatlantic linkFourthly, we need to preserve the transatlantic link.

The relationship between Europe and North America isbased on a long heritage butthe landscape is changing.We need to balance this cru-cial linkage with aspirationsfor a European security anddefence identity. They bothcan and must co-exist. In a

nutshell, NATO needsNorth America, and

North America needsNATO. Europe is inextri-

cably linked to North


America’s vital interests, both economic and security.The logic goes something like this: peace and stabilityin Europe create the conditions for economic growthand economic growth is what creates the opportunityfor prosperity. Peace and stability are fundamental pre-requisites for prosperity.

So, the transatlantic link equates to mutual interests.

Structure and resourcesFifthly, we need to look at NATO’s structure. As

has been pointed out, we have taken on an enormousamount of challenging and interrelated work. Whatwas previously focused in one body, the North AtlanticCouncil (NAC), now takes place in four bodies: theNAC, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, theNATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-RussiaPermanent Joint Council, all supported by one sub-structure of military and politico-military committeesand working groups. Harmonising the work of allthese bodies into a coherent and consistent output willcertainly test our mettle in the years to come.

Finally, I must mention resources. As the sayinggoes, security is not free. We need to do a better job ofmatching resources to requirements and we need to doa better job of explaining and justifying requirements.Over a number of years now, the spending power of theNATO budget has been reduced significantly. We havelived with zero growth in absolute terms and a declinein terms of not adjusting for inflation while, at the sametime, dramatically expanding our activities. Logic tellsus there is a train wreck looming ahead — we just don’tknow when.

The bottom line is we will continue to be successfulonly if nations remain committed to paying their sharefor the requirements that make NATO credible.Current trends raise concern, particularly in light ofcostly mobility requirements, modern C3 capabilities,enlargement, etc.

A vibrant AllianceIn summary, we are well along the way to meeting

the challenges of the 21st century. The updated strate-gic concept will provide an overall sense of directionand continued refinement of our adaptation work willhelp us avoid the bumps in the road. Moreover, contin-ued attention to the prerequisites enumerated above,which have brought NATO to the stature it currentlyenjoys as the world’s preeminent security organisation,will cement a successful future for subsequent genera-tions and ensure vibrancy that will carry us to a centen-nial celebration of peace, stability and prosperity inanother 50 years. ◆

The 1991 Alliance Strategic Concepthe formal initiative for NATO’s present politicalstrategy, the Alliance Strategic Concept, came atthe July 1990 London Summit of heads of state

and government. Although there was much optimismand talk about a “new world order” following the“European revolution” of 1989, the preparation of thenew strategy took place in an atmosphere of greatuncertainty. The fundamental changes taking place in

security as “multifaceted in nature, which makes themhard to predict and assess”. At the same time, the doc-ument concluded that “even in a non-adversarial andcooperative relationship, Soviet military capability andbuild-up potential, including its nuclear dimension,still constitute the most significant factor of which theAlliance has to take account in maintaining the strate-gic balance in Europe”. It then listed “preserving thestrategic balance within Europe” as one of the four fun-damental security tasks of the Alliance.(1)

Nevertheless, with the dramatic changes in thesecurity situation the opportunities for achievingAlliance objectives through political means weregreater than ever. The new strategy introduced a broadapproach to security with three mutually reinforcingelements of Alliance security policy; dialogue, cooper-ation, and the maintenance of a collective defencecapability. The new guidelines for collective defencewere based on premises such as longer warning times,reduced and adapted forces, multifaceted security risks


Meeting in Madrid in July 1997, NATO leaders announced that the Alliance Strategic Concept would be reviewed in linewith “Europe’s new security situation and challenges”. In this article, Dr. de Wijk argues that, in revising its strategy, the

Alliance should not be bound by traditional thinking. Not only must the Alliance’s strategy be adapted to reflect thereality of NATO’s new missions of crisis management and conflict prevention, but a bold step should be taken to linkthese new missions to an initiative to give greater substance to the concept of cooperative security within the OSCE.

The alternative, he suggests, may be obsolescence of the Alliance.

T

Towards a new political strategy for NATORob de Wijk

Netherlands Institute for International Relations “Clingendael”

NATO ForeignMinisters endorsedthe terms ofreference forthe review of theStrategic Conceptat their meetingin Brussels lastDecember.(NATO photo)

Rob de Wijk washead of theConcept Divisionof the DefenceStaff at theNetherlandsMinistry ofDefence and advi-sor to the Chief ofthe Defence Staffon matters relat-ing to strategicplans and policy.In September1997, he acquireda secondment atthe NetherlandsInstitute forInternationalRelations“Clingendael”.Dr. de Wijk is theauthor of NATO onthe Brink of theNew Millennium:the Battle forConsensus.London: Brassey’sAtlanticCommentaries,1997.

Central and Eastern Europe — the dissolution of theWarsaw Pact, the independence of the Baltic states, thecollapse of Yugoslavia, and the unsuccessful coup inMoscow — as well as the Gulf War, had a profoundimpact on the development of this document, whichwas approved at NATO’s Rome Summit in November1991.

The Alliance Strategic Concept recognised the newstrategic environment, describing the risks to Allied

(1)For the text of theAlliance Strategic Conceptsee NATO Review, No. 6,December 1991, p.25,or consult the NATO Website atHTTP://WWW.NATO.INT/.

and the residual Soviet threat. Consequently, key ele-ments of NATO’s new defence posture were enhancedmobility and flexibility and an assured capability ofaugmentation, so that its forces would be in a betterposition to be deployed in an uncertain environment,possibly a long way from home.

The eroding basis of the strategySoon, two developments undermined much of the

argument which had formed the basis of the politicalstrategy. First, only weeks after the Rome Summit thedemise of the Soviet Union marked a new revolutionin the security situation. It was now unclear how toimplement the fundamental security task of preserv-ing the strategic balance in Europe since the collapseof the Soviet Union had indisputably left NATOforces the strongest military power on earth. A strictinterpretation of this security task might require fur-ther reductions in the armed forces of NATO mem-bers. Closely connected with the demise of theSoviet Union was the consequences the removal ofthe risk of a strategic attack might have on the con-tinued existence of NATO as a traditional collectivedefence organisation.

Against the background of the 1990-1991 GulfWar and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, theNorth Atlantic Council decided on 5 June 1992 inOslo “to support, on a case-by-case basis in accor-dance with our own procedures, peacekeepingactivities under the responsibility of the CSCE,(2)

including by making available Alliance resourcesand expertise”. In December 1992, in order tostrengthen its relationship with the UnitedNations, the Council made a similar declarationof its readiness to support peacekeeping opera-tions under the authority of the UN SecurityCouncil. Thus, a new mission for NATO wasborn.

This development shed new light on the StrategicConcept’s chapter on crisis management and conflictprevention. Until then, crisis management had beenfocused on aggression against NATO and the role ofthe armed forces was defined purely in the context ofcollective defence: “The role of the Alliance’s militaryforces is to assure the territorial integrity and politicalindependence of its member states, and thus contributeto peace and stability in Europe.” Moreover, the docu-ment stated that “The Alliance is purely defensive inpurpose: none of its weapons will ever be used exceptin self-defence.”

However, due to NATO’s increasing involvement incrises outside the treaty area, crisis management couldno longer be seen only in the context of Article 5 of theWashington Treaty. This would have a profoundimpact on NATO’s defence posture. The use of

weapons could no longer be restricted purely to self-defence and further changes in NATO’s command andforce structures were required.

In the spirit of its broad approach to security,NATO’s new missions would also be carried out incooperation with non-NATO countries. There is nodoubt that cooperation with Russia and other partnersin the former Yugoslavia was an enormous break-through that contributed immensely to the transforma-tion of the Alliance. Representatives of the formerWarsaw Pact countries became familiar faces atNATO’s headquarters in Brussels and at the SHAPE

military headquarters in Mons.

Towards a new Alliance Strategic ConceptNATO’s successful adaptation has no precedents.

History shows that traditional military alliances disap-pear once victory has been won. But NATO did notdisappear. Over almost five decades, the Alliance hasevolved from a traditional military alliance for collec-tive defence into a political-military organisation forsecurity cooperation, with an extensive bureaucracyand complex decision-making processes. Rather thandying off, large organisations usually go through aprocess of functional transformation. During the1990s, NATO has evolved to the extent that crisis man-agement and conflict prevention are now its primarymissions.


(2)Now the OSCE.

Updating NATO’s Strategic Concept■ The Alliance is examining and, where necessary, updatingthe 1991 Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully con-sistent with Europe’s new security situation and chal-lenges.

■ In launching this examination at their meeting in Madridin July 1997, NATO Heads of State and Governmentdirected that it confirm their “commitment to the corefunction of Alliance collective defence and the indispens-able transatlantic link”.■ Terms of reference were approved by Foreign andDefence Ministers at their meetings in Brussels lastDecember. The Ministers specified that the results of theexamination and updating should be ready in time forthe Alliance Summit meeting in Washington in April1999.

■ National representatives are now exchanging views onthe most important conceptual issues that are posed bythe revision of the Strategic Concept. Detailed draftingwill begin once this phase has been completed. Source: DPAO, NATO


However, the Alliance Strategic Concept has beenleft behind by the reality of this transformation. As aresult, the Strategic Concept no longer serves its polit-ical purpose, namely expressing what the Alliancestands for at the present time. Alliance leaders andplanners have recognised this and launched a review ofthe Strategic Concept at the July 1997 Madrid Summit,the terms of reference of which were endorsed byNATO Foreign and Defence Ministers last December.

In addition to bringing its strategy into line withreality, a new political strategy could help to clarifyNATO’s transformation in the eyes of the RussianFederation, thus making the accession of its formersatellites more palatable. In this context, the funda-mental security task of “preserving the strategic bal-ance” needs to be replaced. A new fundamental secu-rity task could emphasise NATO’s shift fromthreat-based to capabilities-based planning. NATOcould express its willingness to preserve sufficient mil-itary capabilities for conflict prevention and conflictcontrol, that is for regional collective defence, carryingout peace support operations under the authority of theUN security council or the responsibility of theOrganisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE), and supporting Western European Union(WEU) operations undertaken by the European alliesin pursuit of their Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy. Consequently, a new political strategy should

contain new guidelines for the development of thedefence posture of NATO member states. To this end,it is important that a distinction no longer be madebetween capabilities and structures for regional collec-tive defence and those for all other operations.

The cohesion of the AllianceThe review of the Alliance Strategic Concept

should not only reflect NATO’s successful transforma-tion, but should especially deal with the future cohe-sion of the Alliance. During the Cold War it was themagnitude of the threat that kept NATO together. Inthe future NATO will have to deal with limited riskswhich will require limited responses. These limitedrisks will be a continuous test of unity within NATObecause the question is whether all the allies would beprepared to make a contribution to regional collectivedefence and crisis management or peace support oper-ations outside the treaty area.

There is also a danger that some member statesmight become “free riders” by not maintaining ade-quate force projection capabilities, undermining thepolitical cohesion of the Alliance. This could pose agrave threat to an alliance which is based on mutualsolidarity. NATO’s dilemma is that the greatest politi-cal commitment exists for the least probable threat

FO

CU

S

New partnership wing opens – 24 partners establish diplomatic missions to NATO

The Manfred Wörner building, a new annex to NATO headquarters, was offi-cially inaugurated on 7 April by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and ElfieWörner, widow of the late Secretary General Manfred Wörner. The building willhouse diplomatic delegations of non-NATO partner countries — members of theEuro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

In addition, 24 out of a total of 28 EAPC partner countries havenow named ambassadors and established diplomatic missions toNATO under the 1994 Brussels Agreement. These include:

Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia,Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia,Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the for-mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1),Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Azerbaijan has announced itsintention to establish a mission toNATO but no date has been set.

(1)Turkey recognises the Republic ofMacedonia with its constitutionalname.

Ambassador Anatol Arapu of Moldova presents his credentials to the North Atlantic Council on 18 March 1998. (NATO photo)

To this end, NATO should expressly link its newmissions of crisis management and conflict preventionto an initiative to give greater substance to the conceptof cooperative security within the OSCE. NATO shouldstrive to carry out all military operations within theOSCE area under its own command. The IFOR/SFORcoalition in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents a worthyprecedent in this regard. Thus NATO enlargement toinclude other OSCE countries, possibly even theRussian Federation in the long run, would be advanta-geous. The new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

BronislawGeremek, OSCE

Chairman in Officeand Foreign

Minister of Poland,addressing the

press in Albaniaon 20 March

where he heldtalks on

the Kosovo crisis.(AP photo)

(Article 5 security threat), and the least commitmentfor the most probable threat (non-Article 5 regional cri-sis). The future of NATO will largely be determined bythe ability of the member states to solve this dilemma.

Mutual interests are the cement which will holdNATO together in the future. These are defined interms of internal and external security, that is to saypeaceful and stable relationships both inside and out-side the treaty area. Crises which result in floods ofrefugees and ensuing social and economic conse-quences are more likely in future than direct threats tomember states. Because of increased interdependence,crises elsewhere can have a profound impact on allmember states. A clear definition of common interestsand the political will to defend them can generate themutual political solidarity neces-sary to guarantee NATO’s viabilityin the long term and should bespelled out in the revised StrategicConcept.

As security and stability havepolitical, economic, social, cultur-al, environmental and defence ele-ments, NATO’s role in relation toother institutions should also beexpressed in the new political strat-egy. Further efforts must be madein implementing the concept ofinterlocking institutions, withNATO playing a central role in asystem of cooperative security. Theheart of this system must be mutualpolitical, economic and militarycooperation between an expandinggroup of countries.

Cooperative securityThe objective of cooperative

security is to anticipate potentialconflicts and prevent them frombreaking out, or to take active mea-sures to suppress conflicts oncethey have broken out. This conceptwould not mean that member statesare treaty-bound to offer assistance, except for thosecountries within the cooperative security system thathave the Article 5 obligation of collective defence.

The concept of cooperative security does notassume that all crises can be controlled or that wars canalways be avoided. Rather, it is intended to give direc-tion to anticipatory actions. Besides a willingness tocooperate closely in all possible areas, the conceptdemands that within the system there are commonnorms and standards of conduct and countries must beanswerable for failing to observe these.

The basis of this system already exists in the formof the OSCE which has developed a comprehensive setof norms and standards of conduct. These include con-duct between nations, the development of democracy,the market economy, the constitutional state, humanrights, minority rights and military rules of conduct.Observation of these elements is closely linked withstability and the prevention of conflict. Since 1990 theOSCE has worked on instruments designed to enableaction to be taken in situations where there is inade-quate implementation or non-implementation of thesenorms. Since the OSCE does not have its own militarymeans it would have to call upon NATO as the only rel-evant military organisation within the OSCE-area ifsuch a cooperative security system were to be effective.



(EAPC), the enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) theestablishment of PfP staff elements at various NATOHeadquarters and the NATO-Russia Permanent JointCouncil also represent crucial steps in this direction.The EAPC could develop into the principal platformfor military-operational cooperation, where partnersdiscuss with NATO the modalities of coalitions of thewilling and able for operations within the OSCE area.Through PfP’s Planning and Review Process the inter-operability of partners with NATO will be improved,thus facilitating effective execution of such operations.

Rethinking NATOThis concept of NATO requires a radical rethink by

traditionalists who consider the Alliance only in termsof deterring external threats and the need for collectivedefence. If NATO is to avoid obsolescence in thefuture, forward-looking ideas such as those presentedhere should be incorporated in a new version of theAlliance Strategic Concept. Failing this, in the longrun, without a large-scale threat, the Alliance will haveno raison d’être. ◆

NATO has begun the process of reviewing its 1991 Strategic Concept which presents an excellent opportunity to clearlyarticulate to the public its new missions as they have evolved. But in this exercise it will have to address a question offundamental importance and on which no allied consensus yet exists, according to the author: Should the fundamental

strategy document of the Alliance recognise common interests beyond collective defence and the geographic boundaries ofthe NATO area, or should it merely reemphasise its core mission?

ith a mandate from Alliance Heads of State andGovernment and in accordance with the terms

of reference endorsed by NATO Foreign and DefenceMinisters in December 1997, NATO’s PolicyCoordination Group (PCG) is currently examining the1991 Alliance Strategic Concept with a view to updat-ing it “as necessary”. This is an exercise with poten-tially far-reaching repercussions on the Alliance andwhich must therefore be handled with great care. But Ibelieve that a fresh look at its strategy and future direc-tion will boost support for NATO in both its current andfuture member states, and confirm, as the then NATOSecretary General Manfred Wörner predicted earlierthis decade, that NATO “will become the core securityorganisation of a future Euro-Atlantic architecture inwhich all states, irrespective of their size or geographiclocation, must enjoy the same freedom, cooperation,and security”.(1)

Foundation for stability and securityThe first of the four fundamental security tasks list-

ed in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept is to provide“one of the indispensable foundations for a stable secu-rity environment in Europe, based on the growth ofdemocratic institutions and commitment to the peace-ful resolution of disputes, in which no country wouldbe able to intimidate or coerce any European nation orto impose hegemony through the threat or use offorce.”(2)

Some critics have charged that NATO’s role is tohedge against a large-scale threat and that it has nobusiness in “building democracy”. But this simplymisreads history. The Alliance has always been farmore than an insurance policy against a threat from theEast. It provided the indispensable counterpart to theMarshall Plan in reconstructing and reconcilingWestern Europe and in linking the United States toEurope in a historic — and wise — departure in USforeign policy. The Alliance has sought, through polit-ical means, to spread those values to the East, notablythrough the 1967 Harmel Report’s fundamental com-mitment to defence plus détente and through its role inthe creation of the Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE).

It is not surprising, therefore, that NATO emergedas such an intense pole of attraction to the new democ-racies after the end of the Cold War, seeking the samebenefits of full participation in the political and securi-ty transatlantic community. Through enlargement andenhanced partnership, NATO can now do for Centraland Eastern Europe what it has done and continues todo for Western Europe. Such an extension of securityand stability is in the direct national security interestsof all NATO member states.

The question now is whether there are any limits toenlarging that “indispensable foundation”. Last year atMadrid, when the Czech Republic, Poland andHungary were invited to join NATO, Alliance leaders

W

NATO’s next strategic conceptJan Petersen

Chairman of the Conservative Party of Norway and Head of Delegation andChairman of the Political Committee, North Atlantic Assembly

(1)Speech to the NorthAtlantic Assembly,Madrid, 21 October1991.

(2)Paragraph 21 of theStrategic Concept,November 1991. SeeNATO Review, No. 6,December 1991, p.25,or consult the NATO Website atHTTP://WWW.NATO.INT/.

reaffirmed that NATO’s door would remain open toother qualified European states in a position to furtherthe principles of the Treaty and contribute to security inthe Euro-Atlantic area. Yet, some have urged aprolonged “pause” after the first round of accession,perhaps because they maintain an outdated view ofNATO as a threat-based organisation, as if its destinyshould be inexorably linked to the ebb and flow ofevents in Russia. Some even seem to believe in thelegitimacy of spheres of influence into which NATOshould not stray, instead of working towards an undi-vided Europe.

Such thinking is short-sighted. Article 10 of theWashington Treaty has always foreseen the possibilityof a wider Alliance, and this must apply to anyEuropean nation that meets our criteria and is able tostrengthen the Alliance without sacrificing NATOcohesiveness. All candidates, regardless of geography,must be judged along the same lines. Otherwise, we doindeed risk recreating barriers the Alliance has strivenfor so long to overcome.

Consultation and coordinationThe second task of the Alliance, as defined in the

Strategic Concept, is to serve as a “transatlantic forum

for Allied consultations on any issues that affect theirvital interests, including possible developments posingrisks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordi-nation of their efforts in fields of common concern”.

This builds on the provision in Article 4 of theWashington Treaty for Alliance members to consult onsecurity matters in the event of a perceived threat, andis now complemented by paragraph 8 of the PfPFramework Document which provides for similar con-sultations with partners. The task put forward by theStrategic Concept adds the possibility of “coordina-tion” to that of consultation and no longer talks of“threats” but “risks”.

As we have seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereis no reason why NATO, with its unique integrated mil-itary structure, cannot also perform collective securitytasks while maintaining a robust collective defencecapability. Rather than diluting NATO into a “nebu-lous collective security arrangement,” as some criticshave charged, pursuing peace support exercises andoperations with Russia and all other partners can helpshape a cooperative European security order that wouldreduce the need to undertake large-scale crisis manage-ment — or even collective defence operations — in thefirst place. Moreover, such cooperation provides awider basis for responsibility-sharing. As NATO


“The Allianceserves as

a transatlanticforum for Alliedconsultations.”

Here, USSecretary of State

MadeleineAlbright, in Romeon 24 March for

talks on theKosovo crisis, is

greeted by ItalianForeign Minister

Lamberto Dini.(Belga photo)


Secretary General Javier Solana stated in Washingtonlast year, “No longer will the Alliance be caught in afalse choice between US engagement or no engage-ment in a crisis.”(3)

Yet, the precise guidelines for NATO peace supportoperations have not been clarified. For example, theNATO-Russia Founding Act speaks in general termswhereby “Any actions undertaken by NATO or Russia,together or separately, must be consistent with theUnited Nations Charter and the OSCE’s governingprinciples.”(4) In contrast, the “basic elements” docu-ment of July 1997 in the CFE Treaty adaptation negoti-ations states that equipment thresholds in Europe canbe temporarily exceeded by “missions in support ofpeace under a mandate from the United Nations or theOSCE,” suggesting a stricter interpretation and a vetoby non-NATO members over Alliance action. Thisshould be clarified if we are to avoid an UNPROFOR-type debate among nations and their parliaments.Hence, it would be desirable for a revised StrategicConcept to clearly address NATO’s need for a mandateas well as the rationale and requirements for new mis-sions.

Another area concerns risks beyond traditionalnotions of security. For example, the NATO-RussiaFounding Act and the EAPC Basic Document mentionterrorism as an area for consultation or cooperation.How prepared is NATO for this challenge? And whatabout illegal arms trading, drug trafficking, or ecologi-cal security? Should NATO only exchange counter-intelligence in its Special Committee(5) or take counter-measures? All of these areas are important, butNATO’s resources are limited and priorities will haveto be assigned.

Collective defenceThe third task restates Article 5 of the Washington

Treaty, “to deter and defend against any threat ofaggression against the territory of any NATO memberstate”. Although Russia routinely urges NATO to de-emphasise this core function, this would amount tosaying that national security is no longer important. Tothe contrary, Article 5 is the glue of our common secu-rity. From it flow all the benefits of joint planning,transparency, non-renationalisation of defence andcooperative behaviour. However, there are at leastthree areas where action is imperative and on which arevised Strategic Concept should provide some guid-ance.

The first is maintaining adequate capabilities.NATO has reduced its air, land and naval forces by anaverage of 37 per cent and its defence expenditures by22 per cent in recent years, but simultaneously, it hastaken on new responsibilities in the operational fieldand must finance enlargement. The IFOR/SFOR oper-

ations have already demonstrated the difficulties someallies have had in maintaining troop commitments. Thegrowing transatlantic technology gap poses a furtherproblem in terms of interoperability between currentNATO members, let alone future members.

Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) can provide apartial solution. But aspirations to a European securityand defence identity and simultaneously a robustNATO may not be mutually consistent. If currenttrends continue, we risk heading towards an unbal-anced Alliance of warriors versus peacekeepers, withsome nations no longer capable of supporting collec-tive defence functions. One of the basic principles ofthe Alliance, that risks as well as benefits of member-ship must be shared, should not be forgotten.

US President BillClinton signing theNATO enlargementprotocol inWashington on11 February,before sending itto the Senate forconsiderationwith a view toratification.Behind PresidentClinton is GeneralHenry Shelton,Chairman of theUS Joint Chiefsof Staff.(AP photo)

▼

(3)“The New NATO:Mandate, Members andPartners for Peace,”speech by NATOSecretary General JavierSolana, AmericanUniversity, 24 July 1997,Washington DC.

(4)See “Founding Act onMutual Relations,Cooperation and Securitybetween NATO and theRussian Federation”, 27 May 1997, in NATOReview, No. 4, July-August 1997, or consultthe NATO website, op.cit.

(5)NATO’s SpecialCommittee, an advisorybody of the Council onespionage and terrorist orrelated threats, bringstogether the Heads ofsecurity services of NATOmember nations.

Russia’s newAmbassador to

NATO, SergeiKislyak (centre),

is presented tothe North Atlantic

Council foraccreditation on

18 March.(NATO photo)

Moreover, non-US allies should ask themselves: Whatwould happen if a CJTF is not authorised in a situationof perceived security importance to one or more ofthem?

The second area concerns the threat posed by theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. NATOaddressed this issue in the 1991 Strategic Concept, butoperational results remain to be seen. It is obviouslyinsufficient simply to urge compliance by rogue stateswith arms control agreements, or adopt only passivemeasures. NATO’s efforts against proliferation are akey test of its relevance to emerging security chal-lenges, and should be implemented on a commonNATO basis.

The third area concerns “responsibility-sharing”.This can be measured in many ways: NATO bases inEurope support non-NATO US missions; Norway,Belgium, Portugal, Canada and Denmark provide dis-proportionately large shares of support in peacekeep-ing personnel and funding; and the US percentage offoreign assistance is in the bottom third of NATOallies. Nevertheless, a key indicator for the USCongress is that collectively Europe spends on average60 per cent of what the United States does on defencewith, again, a wider gap in weapons research, develop-ment and acquisition.

While the issue of burden-sharing and the relativecosts of enlargement to be borne threatened to be anissue during the enlargement ratification process, for-tunately this did not become a show-stopper in the USSenate.

Strategic balanceThe fourth fundamental task of the Alliance listed

in the 1991 Strategic Concept is “to preserve the strate-gic balance within Europe”. Clearly, NATO needs nostrategic threat to endure or indeed to flourish. For thesame reason, we have not plunged into general andcomplete disarmament because the Warsaw Pact disap-peared. NATO will remain an insurance policy shouldthe stability of Europe be put at risk.

At the same time, the Concept’s reference to“Soviet military capability and build-up potential”,constituting the “most significant factor of which theAlliance has to take account in maintaining the strate-gic balance in Europe,” is obviously anachronistic.Given the Alliance’s cooperative relationship withRussia, the continued existence of this paragraph inNATO’s operative strategy statement is understandablyhighly surprising to Russians. Moreover, the argumenthas been made that maintaining a “strategic balance”should no longer serve as a fundamental task becauseNATO is stronger than any potential aggressor and“balance” might imply that Alliance forces should besubstantially reduced to obtain a one-to-one ratio withRussia.(6)

But those searching for a threat to justify NATOand its enlargement display a rather alarming lack ofunderstanding of our original political purpose: to linkthe United States to Europe in a transatlantic commu-nity of shared values and cooperation. They also risk,for no reason, disrupting all that we have been trying toachieve with Russia. Our planning should be based on


(6)Rob de Wijk, NATO onthe Brink of the NewMillennium: the Battle forConsensus. London:Brassey’s AtlanticCommentaries, 1997,p.141. See alsoThomas-Durell Young,Command in NATO afterthe Cold War: Alliance,National, andMultinationalConsiderations. CarlisleBarracks, Pennsylvania:US Army War College,1997.


a vision of security integration for all of Europe andshould replace the notion of “strategic balance” in arevised concept, or be added to NATO’s first task ofproviding a foundation for a stable security environ-ment in Europe.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act represents a hopefor the future. Russia already has a “special” partner-ship with NATO, linking our destinies and bringing uscloser to our ultimate political purpose: a just and last-ing peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appro-priate security guarantees, based on democratic values,as indispensable for the whole of Europe as it has beenfor Western Europe.

Towards 2000Alliance governments, parliamentarians, and policy-

makers must highlight more effectively several issueswhich are not receiving the attention they deserve if weare to pursue NATO’s internal and external adaptationcoherently. I welcome the challenge of a new StrategicConcept that must clearly set out NATO’s missions asthey have evolved. For in the final analysis, it is the cit-izens of the Alliance nations who will determine itsfate. We must, as before, maintain their confidence aswe approach the next millennium in search of a betterpeace.(7) ◆

(7)This article is an adaptedversion of the author’spreliminary contributionto the study “NATO in the21st century”, PoliticalCommittee, North AtlanticAssembly, September1997. NAA reports areavailable on the internetat http://www.nato.int/related/naa.

Last year, a series of protests led to armed rebellion, plunging Albania into internal turmoil. While the crisis was overcome with the help of amultinational force and the holding of democratic elections, its effects will nevertheless be felt for years to come. This article focuses on theimpact of the crisis on the armed forces of Albania and the contribution that NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) are making to help thecountry recover. According to the author, the case of Albania has broken new ground in the evolution of PfP and has confirmed its position

as a key element in the new European security structure.

Albania: A case study in the practical implementation of Partnership for Peace

George KatsirdakisSenior Officer in the Defence Partnership and Cooperation Directorate

of NATO’s Defence Planning and Operations Division

n the years of isola-tion under the post-

war Communist dictator-ship, Albania had sub-scribed to a system of“total defence” withmany thousands of pill-boxes sprinkled all overthe country, a large pro-portion of the populationequipped with arms, anddisproportionately largearmed forces for the sizeof the population and theresource capabilities ofthe country.

The post-Communistgovernment of Albaniacommitted itself todemocratic reform andbegan immediately toorient itself towards Western institutions, includingjoining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council(NACC) in 1992.(1) Albania was one of the first coun-tries to join Partnership for Peace (PfP), in February1994, stating that its ultimate strategic goal was mem-

bership of the Alliance. It undertook a radical restruc-turing and reorganisation of its armed forces and sentmany officers to Western military institutions. Albaniaalso made facilities available to support UN and thenNATO-led operations in former Yugoslavia.

IThe NATO fact-finding team sentto Tirana lastAugust, led byMr. Katsirdakis(third from the right).

▼

(1)Now the Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council(EAPC).

Albanian soldierstraining onthe border

with Kosovolast March.

(Reuters photo)

The crisisIn early 1997, Albania underwent a profound crisis,

sparked off by the frustration of hundreds of thousandsof people who lost their life’s savings by investing in“pyramid” investment schemes. The violent outburstsin many parts of the country gradually led, especiallyin the south, to the collapse of state authority and theestablishment of revolutionary committees in localcommunities. Many criminal elements also tookadvantage of the chaotic situation.

A large part of the population was equipped witharms as part of the total defence concept and open con-frontation with the armed forces, often themselves vic-tims of the collapse of the pyramid schemes, graduallyincreased. In many cases military units were aban-doned by conscripts who simply went back home, leav-ing most military installations prey to the theft of armsand ammunition.

In April 1997, Italy led a multinational protectionforce to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid toAlbania. With a mandate from the UN SecurityCouncil, Operation Alba included troops from Austria,

Denmark, France, Greece, Romania, Spain and Turkey,in addition to Italy.

This cleared the way for elections to be called inMay and a new government took office in July. One ofthe first steps of the new government was to seek allpossible forms of assistance to pull the country out ofthe crisis and rebuild state institutions, including thearmed forces. At the end of July, a conference was heldin Rome with a number of NATO and non-NATOnations and international organisations, setting thestage for a wide-ranging international assistance pro-gramme covering economic aid and help in restructur-ing various state functions, including the military.

Developing a programme of assistanceAn official request from the Defence Minister,

Sabit Brokaj, for NATO support in rebuilding thearmed forces was received on 1 August 1997. NATOhad already been monitoring developments and wasable to respond immediately, having previously decid-ed to make use of PfP as the framework to provide themuch-needed assistance should Albania make such a



request. Preliminary work started at once on a special-ly tailored assistance programme focused on the imme-diate requirements for rebuilding the Albanian armedforces. Following the practice of PfP, this was calledan Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) though itwas an altogether unique case and should probably bemore accurately called an “Action Plan”.

As a first step, the Council agreed to send anexpert-level Fact-Finding Team (FFT) to Tirana, whicharrived on 18 August. Its immediate objective was toidentify the requirements for assistance and prioritisethem on the basis of information received from theAlbanian side. The findings of the FFT indicated thescope and urgency of the assistance required andNATO was quick in responding with a programme ofassistance that was the first of its kind. The Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace(PMSC) — the Alliance body which coordinates PfPon behalf of the Council — worked closely withAlbanian representatives throughout the summer toensure that the draft IPP reflected the findings of theFFT and the priorities that NATO and Albania attachedto the various forms of assistance to be provided. Thenew IPP was finalised and approved at a special sessionof the North Atlantic Council on 10 September 1997with the participation of the Albanian Prime Minister,Fatos Nano.

The first pillar: NATOThe IPP consisted of two pillars, the first of which

referred to the forms of assistance that NATO, as anorganisation, was to provide. This included an inten-sive programme of 12 expert teams that would visitAlbania over a period of four months, from October1997 to the end of January 1998. These expert teamswere tasked to discuss the whole range of priorityissues involving the reconstruction of the Albanianarmed forces and to provide expert advice on whatcould be done to remedy the situation. Led by NATOpersonnel, the teams also included experts provided byNATO nations and, in some cases, partner nations, thusbroadening the scope of assistance and directly involv-ing the nations in this effort. Their aim was not to pro-vide a single model for Albania to adopt, but rather tooffer a range of expertise which Albania could use oradapt according to its own requirements. Their workwas concentrated in three areas:

■ Conceptual issues: National security concept,national defence concept, military doctrine, consti-tutional issues, legal framework for the armedforces, democratic control of forces and civil mili-tary relations;

■ Structural issues: Reorganisation and functioningof the MoD, general staff and senior commandstructures of the armed forces, restructuring ofarmed services down to the lowest echelon with pri-ority given to structures with immediate positiveimpact, advice and training in military medicine,leadership, functional and language training, devel-opment of basic logistics structures, development ofan essential Command, Control, Communicationsand Information (C3I) system, movement and trans-port structures; and

■ Technical issues: Storage and handling of ammuni-tion and ordnance disposal, security of militarydepots, assessment of the state of existing basic mil-itary infrastructure, defence planning and budgeting.

Another important element of theAlbanian programme of assistance wasthe inclusion of a modest set of militarycooperation activities, specially select-ed from the Partnership WorkProgramme, to assist the Albanians inmaintaining their contact with activi-

ties such as PfP exercises and train-ing. Other activities entailing par-ticipation in major committeemeetings and other PfP eventswere also included as a means of

keeping Albania in touch withthe mainstream PfP pro-

gramme.

Thousands ofethnic Albanianstaking part in ananti-governmentrally in Pristina,the capital of theSerbian provinceof Kosovo, on10 April.(Belga photo)

The second pillar: nationsThe second pillar of the assistance pro-

gramme was aimed at channelling bilateralassistance from allies and partner nationsto Albania in a coordinated way. Severalnations had active assistance programmesbefore the crisis which were then suspend-ed. The initiation of the NATO assistanceprogramme enabled these programmes tobe resumed within a cooperative frame-work. The first step was to identify areaswhere assistance from nations might berequired. Secondly, it was necessary toprioritise these requirements and, thirdly,to encourage coordination of these effortsby nations. A special forum for the coordi-nation of their assistance activities, theClearing House on Albania (CHA), wasagreed by nations.

Clearing House on AlbaniaThe PfP Clearing House is a well-

established forum where allies meet twicea year to discuss their national cooperationprogrammes, in the context of PfP. They exchangeinformation on each other’s programmes, thus increas-ing transparency and enabling nations to better priori-tise their cooperation activities vis-à-vis the pro-grammes of other allied nations.

In the case of the CHA, the aim was to focus dis-cussion specifically on Albania in order to assistnations in coordinating their efforts and to avoidunnecessary duplication and waste of resources. Thisproved to be a great success, keeping participantsfocused on the priority requirements and helpingAlbania get most value added from the programme.Albania of course participated in this forum andoffered valuable feedback. Partners were also involvedin the work of the Clearing House, includingSwitzerland which restarted a previously suspendedprogramme of assistance in the field of transport equip-ment. Other partner nations offered experts to take partin the various expert teams alongside their colleaguesfrom NATO nations.

The contribution of nations to the programme wasof crucial importance. Not only did they provideexperts for the various teams but also teams of theirown on specific issues where advice and transfer ofexpertise was required, thus complementing the workof the NATO-led teams. They also provided materialassistance, technical assistance, specialised trainingand other forms of assistance not necessarily directlyrelated to the effort for the reconstruction of theAlbanian armed forces.

The resultsThe programme for 1997 has now essentially been

completed and most of the major activities foreseen init have been implemented, even if some extended wellinto 1998. Based on an assessment of the work doneunder the 1997 programme, the main achievements towhich the IPP has contributed could be summarised asfollows:

■ The new constitution will explicitly refer to the roleof the armed forces and will define the role of thecommander in chief.

■ A range of laws concerning the defence structure,military personnel and other related issues are inpreparation and the Parliament intends to considerthem as priority items on its spring 1998 agenda.

■ A national security concept and a national defenceconcept, the first ever for Albania, are in anadvanced stage of preparation.

■ A new structure for the senior command of thearmed forces has been endorsed. The next step willbe to secure legal confirmation.

■ Military units are being re-established in step withthe gradual repair and reconstitution of supportfacilities.

There are many other improvements in the fields ofammunition storage, repair of basic infrastructure and


FO

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SNew Italian Permanent Representative to NATO

Ambassador Amedeo de Franchis (59) has succeeded AmbassadorGiovanni Jannuzzi as Permanent Representative of Italy to the NorthAtlantic Council.

After receiving his law degree Mr. de Franchis entered the diplomaticservice in 1962. He served in New York and Teheran, and then headed theNATO Desk at the Foreign Ministry inRome. In 1979, Mr. de Franchis wasassigned to the Italian delegation toNATO and four years later was pro-moted to Deputy PermanentRepresentative of Italy to NATO.

In 1984 Mr. de Franchis wasappointed Ambassador to Pakistan,before returning to NATO as DeputySecretary General in 1989. In 1994Mr. de Franchis was named DirectorGeneral of Political Affairs at theMinistry of Foreign Affairs, a post heheld until taking up his position onthe North Atlantic Council in May1998.


training of personnel to deal with the multitude ofproblems the Albanian military is facing. Most impor-tant, however, is that the process of rebuilding is underway and the morale of the forces has improved consid-erably. Conscripts and NCOs that had left their units atthe height of the crisis are now rejoining them. Theeffects of the generous bilateral assistance offered bynations are already visible.

The way aheadWhile the situation in Albania was improving, an

additional complication appeared in early 1998, whenthe Kosovo crisis erupted. If not settled peacefully, thiscould have grave consequences for the whole Balkanregion. It has added a new dimension to the problemsfaced by Albania since 90 per cent of the inhabitants ofKosovo, which borders Albania, are ethnic Albanians.This has also given increased urgency to the task ofrebuilding the Albanian armed forces.

At the same time, although significant progress hasbeen made, other critical problems still remain whichwill take several years to resolve. These new chal-lenges have led to the preparation of a new IPP forAlbania for 1998, which retains a similar structure to

that of 1997. It is again targeted to meet the urgentrequirements of getting the Albanian forces up and run-ning in the relatively short term. There is once again anintense programme of NATO expert teams, focusedbilateral assistance and an increased set of cooperationactivities for Albania.

An additional requirement is to improve the coordi-nation of the programme-related activities both inAlbania and at NATO headquarters in Brussels, andvarious options are being considered to help Albaniansin the effective implementation of the new anddemanding programme.

In the longer term the aim is to gradually movefrom a “first aid” programme to one of consolidation,laying the foundation for the development of theAlbanian armed forces while gradually engaging thecountry more in the mainstream PfP programme.

Through this trial by fire in Albania, PfP has proveditself to be an effective vehicle for focused and spe-cialised assistance to a partner nation in crisis. Theoperational capabilities of PfP were put to the test andhave emerged with flying colours. In rising to the chal-lenge, PfP has reinforced its position as a permanentfeature of the new European security architecture. ◆

Ammunition storage and disposal: “Hot spots” remain

A NATO Expert Team, undertaking a follow-up visit to Albania in April, found some evidence of improvement in Albania’sammunition storage situation since its last visit in October 1997 (see “NATO and partner experts assist Albanian Ministry of Defencewith ammunition storage and disposal problem”, box on p. 29 of NATO Review, No. 1, Spring 1998). However, a critical problemremains to be resolved urgently: a number of so-called “hot spots” dotted around the country where unstable ammunition and

other explosives lie exposed.

The presence of thousands oftonnes of unexploded munitionsin the open at various unprotectedsites poses a serious threat to peo-ple living nearby. Many peoplehave already been killed andscores more injured as result ofthese “hot spots”. Due to a criticallack of resources and expertise,Albania will need further assis-tance from nations, other organi-sations such as the UN, and non-governmental organisations if it isto resolve its ammunition storageand disposal problems, includingeliminating these “hot spots”.

Source: Defense Support,NATO International Staff


commitment to the establishment of Bosnia as a single,democratic and multi-ethnic state and to the PeaceAgreement’s full implementation. They agreed that theNATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) should carry outits mandate to its fullest in order to help accelerateimplementation of the Peace Agreement.

SFOR’s contributionJust one day after the Summit, SFOR demonstrated

its resolve to carry out its mandate “to its fullest” byacting to detain in Prijedor two individuals indicted ofwar crimes. One was killed as SFOR soldiers sought todetain him, but the other was successfully transferredto the International Criminal Tribunal for formerYugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. Subsequently,

t last July’s Summit in Madrid, NATO Heads ofState and Government met privately, without

advisors or notetakers, for a frank discussion about thestate of the 1995 Peace Agreement for Bosnia andHerzegovina. The peace was intact, but there were stillmajor hurdles to be overcome: hardliners includingindicted war criminals were obstructing progress,Bosnian institutions could not agree on such basicissues as flags and currency, and refugees and dis-placed persons were not returning to their homes.Some observers were beginning to suggest that aban-doning the Peace Agreement and partitioning Bosniawas the only way to prevent further fighting.

However, those advocating partition failed to assessthe real costs and risks. In their declaration followingthe Madrid Summit, Alliance leaders reaffirmed their

The Alliance’s determined commitment to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was reconfirmed by last February’s decision tocontinue SFOR’s mission beyond its initial mandate which ends in June. However, while SFOR’s presence is still necessary inthe short term, the author argues that long term peace and stability depend on substantial progress in a number of areas,

including democratisation and public security. Eventually, with NATO’s assistance, the goal is to bring Bosnia into thecommunity of Euro-Atlantic nations.

A

SFOR continuedGreg Schulte

Director, Bosnia Task Force, NATO International Staff

NATO SecretaryGeneral Javier

Solana, arriving atan SFOR base

near Brcko lastMarch, is met byUS General Ellis

and GeneralEric Shinseki,

SFOR Commander(right).

(Belga photo)


SFOR has detained or accepted the voluntary surrenderof a series of additional indictees, bringing to 13 thenumber that SFOR and its predecessor IFOR havehelped bring to justice.

Following the Summit, SFOR also took control ofparamilitary police, some of whom had been protectingindicted war criminals, and stepped up its support forUN efforts to reform and restructure the civil police.SFOR assisted the UN’s International Police TaskForce (IPTF) in inspecting hundreds of police stationsand confiscating thousands of unauthorised weapons.Moreover, SFOR’s close cooperation with the IPTF inremoving unauthorised police checkpoints has sub-stantially enhanced freedom of movement throughoutBosnia.

At the request of Carlos Westendorp, the HighRepresentative, SFOR took control of the transmissiontowers used by Srpska Radio Television (SRT) to prop-agate messages aimed at undermining the PeaceAgreement. Thanks to its action, SRT has now beenput under international supervision and is being reori-ented and restructured to conform to democratic stan-dards of broadcasting. SFOR has also assisted theOffice of the High Representative (OHR) with creatingalternate sources of news and information for the localpopulation.

SFOR played an important supporting role inSeptember’s municipal elections and November’sRepublika Srpska assembly elections, both supervisedby the Organisation for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE). It helped the OSCE with communi-cations and logistics and brought in additional troops toensure a safe environment. It has also assisted with theinstallation of officials elected in those elections.

In addition to these activities, SFOR has continuedits primary tasks associated with implementing the mil-itary aspects of the Peace Agreement. In a typicalmonth, SFOR inspects 300-400 weapon storage sitesand monitors up to 900 training and movement activi-ties by the armed forces of the two Bosnian entities (theBosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska).Through the provision of training and the threat ofsanctions, SFOR has also encouraged the entity armedforces to step up their clearance of mines; over the lastyear, over 23,000 mines and unexploded ordnance havebeen cleared under SFOR supervision. Since March,SFOR assisted in organising an amnesty for mines,explosives and war-like materiel which has led to thevoluntary surrender of over 6,000 mines, 4,500artillery and mortar shells, over 2,000 assortedweapons and over 500,000 rounds of ammunition.

SFOR’s active engagement, closely coordinatedwith the activities of the High Representative and otherinternational organisations, has helped to re-energisethe peace process and to isolate those hardliners who

had obstructed progress toward the realisation of theDayton agreement. A major breakthrough came inJanuary with the swearing in of a new government inRepublika Srpska committed to cooperation with theinternational community. Other signs of progressinclude the introduction of a common currency, pass-ports and licence plates, the resumption of train trafficacross the inter-Entity boundary on railroads repairedby SFOR and continued progress in restructuring thecivil police.

Continuation of SFORIn February, the North Atlantic Council (NAC)

reviewed the status of the Peace Agreement. Whilethere were distinct signs of renewed progress, thepeace remained fragile. It was clear that withdrawingSFOR in June, when its initial 18-month mandate isscheduled to end, would reverse the peace process andeven create the risk of renewed hostilities. NATOpolitical and military authorities were concerned inparticular about the “public security gap” caused by theinability or unwillingness of many local police, not yetfully reformed and restructured, to act effectively in

An SFOR patroltaking up positionduring aninspection in Pale,Bosnia-Herzegovina,last April.(AP photo)

▼

such fields as supporting the return of refugees andinstalling elected local officials.

Based on this assessment, as well as on optionsdeveloped by the NATO Military Authorities, the NACagreed that NATO would continue to organise and leada multinational force in Bosnia after June, subject tothe necessary mandate from the UN Security Council.The NAC agreed that the force would retain the well-established name “SFOR” and have a similar mission:

to deter renewed hostilities and to contribute to asecure environment for implementing the civil aspectsof the Peace Agreement, thereby helping to stabiliseand consolidate the peace.

Specialised unitIn order to help close the public security gap, the

Council agreed that SFOR should incorporate a multi-national specialised unit trained and equipped torespond to civil unrest and thereby to help prevent it inthe first instance. This specialised unit will allowSFOR to help promote public security, but withoutundertaking civil police tasks. The unit will operate

under SFOR’s command and rules of engagement andderive its authority from the military annex to thePeace Agreement which allows the force to preventinterference with refugee movements and to respond todeliberate violence.

Of course SFOR alone cannot guarantee publicsecurity. Thus the incorporation into SFOR of a spe-cialised unit must be part of a wider approach that alsoincludes continued IPTF-led training of the local policeand pressure on local authorities to ensure that the localpolice and judiciary assume their responsibilities.

No permanent presenceWhereas SFOR was initially planned as an 18-

month mission, its continuation is not connected to aspecific end-date. Instead, it will be complemented bya transition strategy linked to developments in thepolitical and security situation and to progress in civilimplementation. The North Atlantic Council, in con-sultation with non-NATO contributing countries, willreview SFOR’s force levels and tasks at regular inter-vals beginning later this year, with the aim of achievingprogressive reductions in the size, role and profile ofthe force against the background of developments inthe political and security situation. Progress in theimplementation of the civil elements of the PeaceAgreement and the elections in September will also beimportant considerations. The desired end-state forthis transition strategy is a secure environment ade-quate for the consolidation of the peace without thefurther need for a NATO-led military force in Bosnia.NATO, the allies and its partners have no interest in ordesire for a permanent military presence in Bosnia andHerzegovina.

In overseeing SFOR operations and consideringfollow-on options, the NAC has consulted with the 20non-NATO countries contributing to SFOR through themechanism of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council ina special “SFOR format.” The non-NATO participantshave expressed their support for SFOR’s continuationas well as widespread willingness to continue to con-tribute to the force.

Priorities for 1998The continuation of SFOR is a necessary but not

sufficient condition for creating an enduring peace inBosnia. Progress is required in four main areas, asNATO Secretary General Javier Solana clearly spelledout to Bosnia’s collective Presidency last January.

First, there must be progress toward democratisa-tion, leading to and resulting from next September’selections. The politics of war and ethnic division mustbe replaced by the politics of peace and reconciliation.



SFOR will assist through its support for the elections,by helping the OHR and OSCE to ensure that Bosnianmedia coverage meets democratic standards, and by itscontinued actions against indicted war criminals andthose who stand in the way of the Dayton agreement.The Secretary General has used his regular visits toBosnia to meet with the leaders of various political par-ties in order to demonstrate that political oppositionand pluralism have a legitimate and healthy role in anydemocracy.

Second, there must be greater progress in the returnof refugees and displaced persons, particularly to areasin which they will be in the minority. Sadako Ogata,the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has present-ed an ambitious plan to NATO for this year, aimed atdoubling the number of refugees returning compared tolast year and making 1998 “the year of minorityreturns”. A major tool of the UNHCR in promotingminority returns is its “open cities” initiative, designedto reward those local communities that encourage thereturn of refugees and displaced persons. SFOR willhelp to provide the secure environment necessary forthe success of the “open cities” initiative and is alsoactive in collecting information on local conditions tofacilitate returns.

Third, there must be major improvement in publicsecurity at the local level. The reform and restructuringof the civil police is crucial to the return of refugees,the protection of human rights, and the success ofBosnia as a multi-ethnic state. This must be comple-mented by a reform of the judiciary and penal systemsin Bosnia. SFOR will continue to support the UN’sIPTF in restructuring civil police and will improve the

level and character of that support through the intro-duction of the specialised unit described above.

Fourth, the foundation must be laid for long-termmilitary stability. In the short-term, the continuation ofSFOR will help to ensure this stability, but ultimatelythe responsibility for maintaining peace must shift tolocal institutions as well as regional arms control andsecurity regimes. As its contribution to this transition,NATO has established an initial set of SecurityCooperation Activities with Bosnia and Herzegovinawith the aim of promoting confidence and cooperationamong the Bosnian armed forces and encouraging thedevelopment of democratic practices and centraldefence mechanisms such as the Bosnian government’sStanding Committee on Military Matters.(1)

Making progressMaking strides in all of these areas is essential to

making the peace endure and to making the PeaceAgreement succeed. And progress in areas of publicsecurity and long-term military stability is particularlyimportant to creating the conditions that will allowNATO to draw down and ultimately withdraw its mili-tary presence.

Implementation of the Peace Agreement, whilesometimes painstakingly slow, is advancing. NATO’stask is to continue to assist in consolidating the peace,in the short term by SFOR’s continued engagement andin the longer-term by helping to bring Bosnia into theEuro-Atlantic community, including its security structures. ◆

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SNATO tests SFOR back-up capability

Exercise Dynamic Response 98, which took place from 24 Marchto 7 April 1998, tested NATO’s capability to deploy itsStrategic Reserve Force (SRF) into Bosnia andHerzegovina to augment SFOR forces on the groundthere. Four NATO nations (Italy, the Netherlands,Turkey and the US) and two partner nations (Poland andRomania) make up the SRF and took part in the exercisewhich involved air, land and maritime forces.

The Strategic Reserve Force is an “over the horizon”force stationed outside Bosnia and Herzegovina which canbe ordered to reinforce the 32,000 SFOR troops in theatre,if required. It is a mobile, flexible unitdesigned to deal with any foreseeable military contin-gency. The exercise, which allowed the SRF to gain first-hand experience in Bosnia, demonstrated that theReserve Force can be counted on to respond to anythreat to peace in the region.

(1)For more on this subject,see next article: DavidLightburn, “NATOSecurity CooperationActivities with Bosnia andHerzegovina”.

(Reu

ters p

hoto)


Accordingly, they endorsed an initial set ofSecurity Cooperation Activities between NATO andBosnia and Herzegovina, to involve representationfrom both Entities and all three ethnic groups.(1)

Building on the trial Security Cooperation Course con-ducted by NATO in June 1997, these activities willinclude additional such courses, seminars, visits and anassessment of how NATO can assist the Bosnian gov-ernment’s central defence institution, the StandingCommittee on Military Matters (SCMM), in becomingfully effective.

The aim of the Security Cooperation Activities is tocontribute to regional stability by:

■ promoting confidence and cooperation among thearmed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and

■ encouraging the development of democratic prac-tices and central defence structures such as theSCMM.

ince the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR)entered Bosnia and Herzegovina in December

1995, it has concentrated on developing and maintain-ing a secure environment, not only to prevent furtherhostilities, but also to support the efforts of the manyinternational organisations which are contributing to areturn to normality and to the development of Bosniaand Herzegovina as a democratic state within Europe.While IFOR and its successor Stabilisation Force(SFOR) have been successful in accomplishing themilitary aspects of their missions, civil implementationwill be a long-term process requiring long-term securi-ty if sustainable peace is to be achieved.

Against this background, NATO Foreign andDefence Ministers, meeting in Brussels last December,noted that “Securing the peace over the long-term willalso require further steps to promote confidence andcooperation among the armed forces of Bosnia and toencourage the development of democratic practicesand central defence mechanisms.”

NATO’s Security Cooperation Activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina, endorsed by Ministers last December, are intended to contribute tolong-term stability in the country. In this article, Mr. Lightburn, responsible for coordinating the programme and for developing and

implementing the series of Security Cooperation Courses, describes the course’s achievements to date as well as NATO’s plans for the widerset of security cooperation activities.

S

NATO Security Cooperation Activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina

David Lightburnof NATO’s International Staff Bosnia Task Force

Mr. Lightburn(front centre) with

participants inthe first Security

Cooperationcourse in

Oberammergau,Germany,

which included15 members

from each ethnicgroup and

representativesfrom both Entities.

(1)The two Bosnian Entitiesare the Bosniac-CroatFederation and theRepublika Srpska. Thethree principal ethnicgroups are the Bosniacs,Bosnian Croats andBosnian Serbs.


It should be emphasised that these activities are notpart of Partnership for Peace (PfP). While they mayappear conceptually similar in approach, they are man-aged apart from the PfP programme and are clearlygeared to Bosnia’s unique political and military cir-cumstances.

The Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM)In agreeing to the set of security cooperation initia-

tives, a principal requirement of NATO Ministers wasthat the programme be coordinated through theSCMM, making clear to the Bosnian government theimportance the Alliance attaches to this institution.The SCMM is one of the common institutions set up bythe Peace Agreement to govern Bosnia andHerzegovina and, since the Peace Agreement leavesresponsibility for defence to the two Entities, theSCMM is designed to coordinate the activities ofarmed forces in the country. In addition to the Bosniac,Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb Presidents, theSCMM consists of the Ministers of Defence and Chiefsof Defence of the two Entities, a Secretariat comprisingthe military advisors to each of the three Presidents,and a number of national and international observers.

The SCMM’s agreed rules of procedure set outthree purposes for the committee: to coordinate theactivities of the armed forces of the two Entities; toconsider and coordinate the military response of theEntities in the event of an attack on Bosnia andHerzegovina; and, to enhance stability and mutual con-fidence and trust between the Entities by serving as aforum for the discussion of military issues and the res-olution of disputes arising from military issues. The

Committee has also agreed on a strategy for its futurework.

The SCMM has begun to address issues of sub-stance; for example it is considering the matter of mil-itary representation abroad and the implementation ofthe Ottawa Treaty banning land mines. The SCMM isalso working closely with SFOR to ensure the successof “Operation Harvest”, the weapons amnesty wherebyprivate citizens are encouraged to turn-in weapons,ammunition and explosives left over from the conflict.

Such progress notwithstanding, the SCMM is notyet on a solid footing. It lacks its own staff support,regular meeting facilities, and working-level sub-struc-tures. It depends heavily on staff support from theOffice of the High Representative to arrange meetingsand to conduct any type of business.

Based on the report of the NATO assessment teamwhich visited Bosnia last January, the North AtlanticCouncil has agreed on an approach for strengtheningthe SCMM, initially with NATO officials workingclosely with the SCMM secretariat and other membersof the Committee, as well as with the Office of theHigh Representative and others. A first step will be avisit to NATO and SHAPE by the SCMM Secretariatfor discussions with key NATO officials and represen-tatives of NATO nations. Eventually, once the SCMMhas agreed on its military representation in Brussels,NATO will be able to use that representative to facili-tate contact with the SCMM and day-to-day businessassociated with conduct of the Security CooperationActivities.

The Security Cooperation CourseThe most prominent of the initial set of Security

Cooperation Activities is the Security CooperationCourse. To date NATO has conducted three suchcourses (June and December 1997, and January 1998)at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau,Germany. A further four courses are planned for 1998,including a senior officers’ version in June. Each reg-ular course has included 45 Bosnian participants: 15from each ethnic group, including both military andcivilian defence officials from each of the two Entities.In the first three courses, the ages ranged from the late20s to mid-50s, and the ranks from Captain throughMajor-General, all participants having directly experi-enced the conflict in their country.

The course introduces the participants to NATO —its structure, political agenda, crisis management con-cept and Partnership for Peace. It also covers topicssuch as democratisation, reconciliation, the PeaceAgreement and the role of SFOR, and an introductionto key international organisations. More than half ofthe six day programme is devoted to discussion of the

The initial set

of Security Cooperation Activities

■ Security Cooperation Courses

■ Senior Officers Security Cooperation Course

■ Participation in other NATO Courses

■ NATO Information Seminars

■ Seminars on specific issues

■ Visits to NATO and SHAPE

■ Support for development of the Standing

Committee on Military Matters

range of current issues in Bosnia, through presenta-tions and working group discussions. Such issuesinclude refugees, public security, the economy, policereform, the SCMM, the media, de-mining, reconstruc-tion, democratic control of the military and regionalstabilisation. In addition, Bavarian State officials andlocal Oberammergau officials address the course on themanner in which a state fits into a federal system andhow a small democratic community functions.

In the classroom there is a mix of ranks and mili-tary and civilian officials, and each course member isflanked on either side by colleagues from the other twoethnic groups. Working groups also include represen-tation from each ethnic group. Accommodation isarranged in a similar fashion and an active social pro-gramme is another key feature of the course, designedto further dialogue beyond the classroom, to build con-fidence and to promote personal reconciliation.

All of these aspects have proven to be particularlysuccessful in breaking down barriers and inhibitionsstraight away, on day one of the course, and allowingcourse members to experience a taste of life in a demo-cratic society in the relatively short time available.Discussion in the classroom between col-leagues of the other ethnic groups comesalive on the very first morning. Atsocial events many course membersactively seek to sit beside someone froma different background. Towards theend of the course business cards,addresses and telephone numbers,photographs and other memorabiliaare exchanged between individualsand between the three ethnic groups.

The rewards from this initiative todate have surpassed our expectations.By way of illustration, after a longflight from Bosnia, thecourse membershad a

two-hour bus ride from Munich airport during whichone could literally hear a pin drop, such was the silenceand uncertainty. This was contrasted by a similar jour-ney just three days later to hold discussions withBavarian State officials, where one could barely hold anormal conversation due to the sounds of the singing oftraditional folk songs, animated discussions and gener-al fine camaraderie. It has also been heartening to seeold friends rediscovering colleagues they had not seenfor years, from days in the former Yugoslav army, ormilitary college in Belgrade. It has also become clearfrom the many interventions and discussions duringeach of the courses that these military professionalshold both a healthy respect for the professionalism ofthe IFOR and SFOR, as well as a clear understandingof what the NATO-led forces must do in order to bringpeace and lasting stability to the country. A commonconclusion and request from all three courses has beenthat more such courses and activities should be held tobetter inform politicians and others in Bosnia.

Perhaps the most significant measure of success isreflected in the public and heart-warming remarks ofthe senior representatives of each group made towardsthe end of each course, in front of both their peers andthe members of the other two ethnic groups.

At the close of the January course, one representa-tive stated that “the only way to repay NATO, for pro-

viding such a valuable opportunity and for showingsuch friendship and professionalism, was to

demonstrate it with actions once back inBosnia”. Another, representing a differ-ent ethnic group, noted that “NATO wasa healthy, growing family. Perhaps atthis early juncture, Bosnia could beconsidered as an orphan in the family,

eager to gain respect and tojoin.” The representative

of the third ethnic grouprecounted a personal

story, the bottom line ofwhich was to expresshope on behalf of the

children of Bosnia forlong-lasting peace. Each of

these public pronounce-ments was widely andloudly applauded and,perhaps, offers some

indication of the valueof the NATO initiative to a

small cross-section of thosewho in the past had to prosecute

the conflict.

Participants to date have included boththe Bosniac and Croat members of the SCMM

Secretariat, the Defence Adviser to RS President


Grenades andother explosivesturned in during

“OperationHarvest” aredisplayed in

an Entity barracksin Central Bosnia

in April.(David Taylor, SFOR

PIO photo)

▼


In the classroomeach Bosnianparticipant isseated betweenmembers of theother two ethnicgroups toencourageinteractionand discussion.

Biljana Plavsic, and many other high-ranking militaryand civilian defence officials. There are now 135Bosnian defence and military personnel with whomNATO, SFOR and other international officials cancommunicate on a more solid footing; people who bet-ter understand the efforts of the international commu-nity in their country and who better appreciate the needfor Bosnia to develop democratic traditions for eventu-al integration into Europe.

Other activitiesLooking ahead and building on the concept of the

Security Cooperation Course, a number of diverseactivities are planned. A two-day NATO informationseminar is scheduled for Sarajevo in July this year,aimed at bringing together local politicians, media,academics, defence and other officials from each of thethree ethnic groups and from both Entities. NATOSecretary General Javier Solana will open the seminarwhich will provide information on NATO with a viewto explaining that there is more to the Alliance thanSFOR. It will also indicate what Bosnia must do inorder to become closer to NATO and to become ademocratic state within Europe.

Planning is also under way for seminars this yearand next on such topics as “democratic control of themilitary” and “civil disaster assistance”, where it ishoped to involve the OSCE, a number of NGOs andother organisations and agencies. In addition, begin-ning later this year, two other regular courses conduct-ed at the NATO School in Oberammergau will be

opened to Bosnian candidates — the EuropeanSecurity Cooperation Course and the NATOPeacekeeping Course. In each case participation mustbe in multiples of three, i.e., one from each ethnicgroup, and will be organised through the SCMM.Visits by a variety of Bosnian groups to NATO andSHAPE will also be arranged this year.

To assist the programme, the NATO-led SFOR maybe called upon to provide selected support. It should beemphasised however that the Security CooperationActivities are quite distinct from SFOR operations.NATO’s interaction with the SCMM in no way dimin-ishes SFOR’s mission or authority or the function ofthe Joint Military Commission (JMC) chaired bySFOR to ensure compliance with the military aspectsof the Peace Agreement.

A contribution to sustainable peaceExperience to date has been promising. Much

remains to be done to return the country to normalityand to achieve a sustainable peace. NATO, togetherwith others in the international community, can con-tribute to the security dimension of Bosnia’s future.The initial set of Security Cooperation Activities, ifsuccessful, could evolve as part of a strategy for bring-ing Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic security structures andcreating a self-sustaining peace in which the presenceof international military forces will no longer be neces-sary. This will require not only continued dedicationon the part of NATO and others but, more importantly,Bosnians themselves. ◆

While initial planning did not foresee extensive deploy-ment of civilians as part of a NATO operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the combined civilian element for NATO and othertroop contributing nations has now grown to some 6,000 menand women. Among these are civilians from NATO and non-NATO national administrations, as well as NATO internationalcivilian staff members from a number of NATO Agencies andCommands — the first time NATO international civilian staffhave been deployed in significant numbers outside the bordersof the Alliance. As testimony to the scale of their contribution tothe success of the Implementation Force (IFOR) andStabilisation Force (SFOR), a total of more than 1,400 civilianshave been awarded the NATO Medal.

The NATO Medal, the first of its kind, was instituted by theNorth Atlantic Council in December 1994 and it was decided toaward it to military and civilian personnelactive in operations, or in direct supportof operations, relating to the formerYugoslavia. In May 1996 eligibility wasextended to personnel from non-NATOmember troop contributing nations.

Cast in bronze, with a blue and whiteribbon and the clasp “Former Yugoslavia”,the medal bears the NATO star and thewording “in service of peace and freedom”.Under the terms for the award of the NATOMedal, potential recipients must haveserved for a minimum of 30 days in the the-atre of NATO operations, or 90 days in adja-cent areas in direct support of operations.

Many of the civilian recipients of the medalhave been international civilian staff members fromNATO Commands and Agencies, such as SHAPE,AFSOUTH, NC3A and NAMSA, who have served inand around the theatre of operations.

There have been 25 NATO civilians fromHeadquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe(AFSOUTH) who have served in theatre, includ-ing the AFSOUTH Chief of Civilian Personnel,who put in 169 days as Civilian Personnel Officerfor IFOR, and four of his colleagues who served inthe area for over 80 days. Another 40 NATO civiliansfrom Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)have been deployed for periods ranging from a few days toseveral months. They include engineers, technicians, lawyers,financial advisors and personnel administrators. Of the nineNATO civilians from Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe(AFCENT) and Headquarters Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) whohave served in theatre, three spent more than 120 days in thearea. NATO civilians have also been deployed fromHeadquarters Allied Forces North West (AFNORTHWEST) in HighWycombe.

The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), basedin Luxembourg, has been present in theatre since 4 December

1995, when 14 civilian staff members were deployed as part ofthe enabling forces for Operation Joint Endeavour.Contracting/Liaison Officers were deployed to Zagreb,Sarajevo, Tuzla and Ploce, and a contracting cell of nine wasestablished in Split. NAMSA’s initial task was to perform NATOcontracting for the set-up and sustainment of NATO headquar-ters (e.g., accommodation rental, food and fuel), coordinatecontracting for scarce in-theatre resources and provide assis-tance to individual nations upon request. Subsequently NAMSApersonnel became heavily involved with the NATO SecurityInvestment Programme, including contributing to railways andbridge repairs. By the end of 1997, 41 NATO Medals had beenawarded to NAMSA personnel, 38 of which were for tours ofthree months’ duration.

The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency(NC3A) is providing a broad range of scientific

and acquisition support for the SFOR in formerYugoslavia. This support is provided both on-site through the Agency’s field office located atSFOR headquarters in Ilidza, manned by civil-ian scientific staff volunteers, and remotelyfrom the Agency’s scientific laboratories inThe Hague and the acquisition division inBrussels. The primary on-site technical sup-port is in the Operations Research area(modelling/data analysis of compliance withPeace Accords; balance of power assess-ments) and information system development

and support. In addition, ad hoc specialistsupport is provided in the areas of communica-

tions, electronic warfare, recognised air picture,and information security. The SFOR Command and

Control network has been built on use of NATOowned and operated systems provided by the

NATO C3 Agency. Twenty-six NC3A staffmembers have already earned the NATOMedal.

The NATO Airborne Early Warning E-3A Component, based in Germany, flies

aircraft in direct support of NATO opera-tions in areas adjacent to the former

Yugoslavia and has many staff, particularlyin the maintenance area, who are constantly

deployed to its forward operating bases in Italy andGreece. Since July 1996, 213 NATO civilian staff from theComponent have been awarded the NATO Medal.

There are strong arguments for the use of civilians in suchoperations, which range from pure economics, through needsfor non-military skills, to the requirement for continuity. Thecontribution of NATO international civilian staff has been recog-nised as an essential element in the success of IFOR/SFOR, asthey have played a critical role in many important areas in sup-port of the force. In doing so they have accepted the same con-ditions, made the same sacrifices and enjoyed the same suc-cesses as their military colleagues.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIAFORMER YUGOSLAVIA

FO

CU

S“In service of peace and freedom” — the role of NATO civilians in the former Yugoslavia


Source: NATO Office of Management

Documents

NATO CONTENTS Nº2 Summer 1998 - Volume 46 · Minister of Defence of the Hellenic Republic Apostolos Tsohatzopoulos, Defence Minister of Greece (left), ... moment and act decisively?