Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma

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NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL

PARANOIA IN BURMA


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NATIONALISM AS

POLITICAL

PARANOIAIN BURMA

An Essay on the Historical

Practice of Power

by Mikael Gravers

CURZON


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NIAS Report series 11

First published in 1993by the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledgescollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

Second edition, revised and expanded,

published in 1999by Curzon Press15 The Quadrant, Richmond Surrey TW9 1BP

Mikael Gravers 1993, 1999

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataGravers, Mikael

Nationalism as political paranoia in Burma : an essay on thehistorical practice of power. - (NIAS reports ; no. 11)

1 .Nationalism - Burma 2.Buddhism - Burma 3.Burma - Ethnic

relations 4.Burma - Politics and governmentI.Title

320.9'591

ISBN 0-203-63979-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67899-0 (Adobe eReader Format)ISBN 07007 0980 0 (Hbk)

ISBN 07007 0981 9 (Pbk)ISSN 1398-313x


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CONTENTS

Preface to the 1993 Edition vii

Preface to the 1999 Edition ix

Acknowledgements xii

Abbreviations xiv

Introduction 1

1. The Colonial Club: Natives Not Admitted! 5

2. The Violent Pacification of Burma 9

3. Buddhist Cosmology and Political Power 154. The Colonisation of Burmese Identity 21

5. Buddhism, Xenophobia and Rebellion in the 1930s 33

6. Two Versions of Nationalism: Union State or Ethnicism 43

7. Buddhism and Military Power: Two Different Strategies

Two Different Thakins

55

8. Ne Wins Club 69

9. Aung San Suu Kyis Strategy 75

10. Nationalism as the Practice of Power 81

11. The Rules of the Myanmar Club since 1993 87

12. Buddhism and the Religious Divide among the Karen 89

13. U Thuzana and Vegan Buddhism 99

14. Buddhism, Prophecies and Rebellion 103

15. Autocracy and Nationalism 117


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16. Historicism, Historical Memory and Power 127

17. A Final WordBut No Conclusion 135

Epilogue 143

Appendix 1: Theoretical Concepts 149

Appendix 2: Karen Organisations 155

Glossary 157

Bibliography 161

Index 171

MAPS

1. Burma xv

2. Exduded Area 1946 28

3. Karen and Mon States 60

4. Myit Szone 92

vi


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PREFACE TO THE 1993 EDITION

This essay is an elaborated version of a paper presented at a seminar in

honour of Nobel Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at LundUniversity, Sweden, on 9 December 1991. It is part of a research

project aiming at an identification and analysis of those historical

processes in Burma which have made ethnic opposition escalate into an

unending nationalistic strugglea struggle that has reduced politics in

Burma to extreme violence.

*****

As preparation for anthropological fieldwork in Thailand from 1970 to

1972 I spent two months in intensive learning of the Pwo Karenlanguage at the Baptist mission in Sangkhlaburi near the Burmese

border. I had three teachers. One was Ms Emily Ballard, a long-time

missionary in Burma and a brilliant linguist. The other two were a well-

known Christian Karen politician Saw Tha Din and his wife. They came

to Thailand as refugees and worked for the mission. After the sessions

with the Pwo Karen spelling book and grammar, Saw Tha Din

explained Karen nationalism during the colonial era and after

independence. He gave a vivid and strong impression of how potent themixture of ethnic self-consciousness, religious affection and nationalism

can be in a colonial situation.

The endeavours of the Karen National Union, a visit to one of the

Burman guerrilla camps belonging to forces loyal to U Nu and under

the command of Bo Yan Naing (one of the famous thirty comrades),

and a meeting with Mon leader Nai Shwe Kyin came to mind whilst I was

working at the India Office Library and Records in London (now called

the Oriental and India Office Collections) in May 1988. Amnesty

International had just published a report on Burma, documenting the

torture and killing of Karen civilians, and Rangoon was about to

explode in anger and repression. Whilst reading secret reports on

religious and ethnic rebellions in the middle of the last century, it struck


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me how the conflict and the violence in Burma have been ingrained in

social relations and their cultural expression during the last two centuries.

History in itself cannot explain the violence of today, but the tragic

developments since 1988 have made the need for an analysis of the

roots of Burmese nationalism even more urgent This essay is, however,a preliminary contribution based primarily on the works by renowned

scholars on Burma and its focus is more on theoretical explanation than

on a detailed historical account. Except for information collected during

my stay in Thailand and a short visit to Burma in 1972, I have relied on

written sources and documents, mainly in English. Hopefully, I have

not misappropriated the insights of the valuable works on Burma to

which I am referring.

I am grateful to NIAS for inviting me as a guest researcher in May1992it was a very stimulating visit. I am indebted to the India Office

Library and Records, London, and especially to dr Andrew Griffin for

his kind and valuable assistance in locating important documents. The

Department of East Asian Languages at the University of Lund inspired

me to continue this work by the very timely celebration of a genuine

non-violent nationalist (Aung San Suu Kyi). Last but not least, I must

express my thanks to the Research Foundation at Aarhus University,

Denmark, for financially supporting the English-language editing of thismanuscript.

May peace soon strike the peacock in Burma!

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PREFACE TO THE 1999 EDITION

Since the initial publication of this book, I have been pleasantly

surprised by the interest and the positive assessments that it hasreceived, although it wasand remainsa brief and incomplete sketch

of Burmas history and a preliminary analysis of nationalism.

I was even more surprised and delighted when the Journal ofAsian

Studies (vol. 5, no. 3, 1994) published a review of the book by

Professor James F. Guyot. He rightly concludes that my analysis of

nationalism does not come through clearly in the text. Nationalism and

theories of nationalism are indeed difficult to handle in a brief

presentation, especially when the history concerned is as complex asBurmas. I have added six new chapters in an attempt to take the

analysis one step further. But it is clear, as I stated in the first edition,

that my view is one from afar. Although I have recently collected

additional information along the Thai-Burmese border and have had

intensive discussions with Burmese people living in Europe as well as

with colleagues, this book is not an attempt to write a history of modern

Myanmar/Burma or to assess the complexity of the changes since 1988.

It is an analysis of nationalism, ethnicity and power in the history ofBurma from an anthropological perspective.

A Burmese friend, Brenda Pe Maung Tin (Daw Tin Tin Myaing), has

kindly drawn my attention to the term kala (South Asian, Indian)

which I have used to mean foreigner or Westerner. In the beginning

of the colonial period the term was used for everyone who came from

India, including the British. This usage is found in English literature

written during and immediately after the colonial period and has a

highly problematic connotation in the modern context. Today kala

refers to a person of South Asian ethnic origin. But it was also used as a

derogatory term for Aung San

Suu Kyi in an article in the official New Light of Myanmarentitled

Feeling Prickly Heat, Instead of Pleasant Cool: Pretty little wife of the


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white kala (U Phyo 30 May 1996). I apply it metaphorically as a

simplification of cultural differences within a nationalistic discourse.

However, this simplification and the negative connotations are

misleading when interpreted as a common modern expression. In the

first edition, the term appears as a historical concept as well as ananalytical concept. I should have emphasised this. In this revised edition

I shall replace kala with more appropriate terms when necessary.

In her review published in the journal Crossroads (vol. 8, no. 2,

1994), Mary Callahan rightly criticises my use of the word kala. Dr

Callahan states that I have used the term to comprise the ethnic

minorities. That is, however, not true. Although the Christian Karen, in

the opinion of many Burmese, became a divisive force allied to

foreigners, and lost their original identity through adopting a foreignreligion, they were not collectively called kala. Dr Callahan fails to

recognise that the aim of my book is to analyse nationalism and power

in their historical context. I did not argue, as Dr Callahan states, that the

xenophobic rhetoric of the State Law and Order Restoration Council

(SLORC, renamed the State Peace and Development Council, SPDC, in

1997), is shared by the majority of the population. However, the

rhetoric, still applied by the SLORC, cannot be dismissed as a mere

bravado having no effect on civil society. The often xenophobiclanguage contains a strong symbolic violence. It is the strategy of the

SLORC to gain support and simultaneously to create fear by this

dominating discourse of nationalism. It is unfortunate that in this context

resistance releases more repression in the name of the Myanmar nation.

As another Burmese friend, Dr Khin Ni Ni Thein, explained to me:

During Ne Wins rule, I did not think of the difference between Burma

as the nation, as the state, and as the military regime. The three

elements melted into a single identity not to be questioned. This isprecisely how the interpellation of xenophobic propaganda works in

Burma and in other places where nationalism is appropriated by

autocratic regimes. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991) has a clear understanding

of this mechanism and its effects: it derives from fear and it generates

fear. The memory of past resistance generates fear and releases

violence; the memory of past violence is the fear of new violent acts, ad

infinitum. The result of the nationalistic policy and its

repressive character is that social practices in Burma move into a grey

zone of dissemblance: neither compliance nor genuine participation;

neither direct dissent nor open resistance. The grey zone is ruled by

fear, distrust, rumours and gossip. It is probably filled with secret

imaginings that are beyond the reach of this analysis; we cannot know

x


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who listens to the rhetoric, what is internalised by whom and who

remains indifferent. A dialogue between the military and the opposition

seems extremely difficult after ten years of confrontation. Dialogue

without a belief in compromise and reconciliation is futile.

I have not had the opportunity like Dr Callahan to study theMyanmar military (Tatmadaw) and its history from inside its archives in

Rangoon. However, the SLORC seems to control the Tatmadaw and

also has supporters outside the army. Although the SLORC suffered a

spectacular defeat in the 1990 elections, they obtained about 25 per cent

of the votes (albeit a mere nine or ten seats) in the countryside. The

open economy may also have turned some of the new entrepreneurs into

at least tacit supporters. Otherwise, without some support amongst

civilians as well as within the army, it would be difficult for the SLORCto preserve its totalitarian control. Of course, a tacit support in

performing daily duties to earn a living and out of fear of reprisals is not

the same as ideological consensus.

Further, in her review Mary Callahan claims that there is a Gravers

pro-democracy project in the book. However, it has to be appreciated

that the democracy project belongs exclusively to the people of Burma!

As regards the fate of democracy in Burma since 1948, the reviewer,

perhaps unintentionally, confirms my point that even during thedemocratic period after independence, politics turned violent due to the

complexity of ethnic conflicts, religion, nationalism and rivalries within

the Myanmar political parties. Despite the turmoil, the Burmese have

participated in four elections between 1948 and 1962. No one, including

the present author, would blame the violence and all other misfortunes

in Burma on the colonial era. On the other hand, no one would deny

that the colonial policy and practice are extremely important to self-

perception and historical interpretations in Burma.The new chapters include an update of events and an assessment of

the role of Buddhism in recent developments, which also include the

split within the Karen National Union and the formation of a Buddhist

Karen organisation. The analyses of nationalism, ethnicity, resistance

and violence are related to a recent anthropological discussion of social

and historical memory to demonstrate the importance of the past on the

present. I have made a few changes to the original text; I have also

added new references and data.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

By courtesy of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Frederik of Denmark,

who awarded me a grant from his Research Fund, I was able to visit theKaren people in Thailand and collect information on the role of religion

in the present context. I am very grateful for this support. It was with

great kindness and and with patience that many Karens in Wa Ga Gla of

Uthaithani province and in the town of Sangkhlaburi in Kanchanaburi

province, as well as in other places, answered the questions posed by

the anthropologist. I shall always be indebted to them for their

friendship and help.

Unfortunately, I arrived in Sangkhlaburi six months after Saw ThaDin died in 1995 at the age of 99. His daughter, Olivia, kindly received

me in his house and shared her memories of her father since 1970. Saw

Tha Din was a genuine representative of the Karen nation as it

developed in colonial Burma and in the days of Independence when

cooperation and mutual tolerance were still possible.

At the British Library Oriental and India Office Collections, London,

Patricia Herbert, the Curator, helped me to locate interesting documents

and shared her profound knowledge of Burma and its history.Suggestions and advice from Brenda Pe Maung Tin, a former lecturer

in French at the Foreign Languages University, Rangoon, have been

crucial to the revision. Dr Khin Ni Ni Thein, Executive Director at the

Water Research and Training Centre for a New Burma, Delft, Holland,

has supplied valuable information to update the book.

I am, as well, indebted to Thomas Lautrup from the Department of

Ethnography and Social Anthropology at the University of Aarhus for

his critical review of the manuscript.

Thanks are also due to the staff of NIAS Publishing who helped to

bring the present revised edition to its completion.


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Last but not least, I am grateful to Anders Baltzer Jrgensen for his

cooperation and the exchange of knowledge and anecdotes during our

fieldwork in 197072, and in 1996, because

[in doing fieldwork] a high level of linguistic competence isobviously an advantage but a flair for friendship is more

important than an impeccable accent or a perfect lexicon (Edmund

Leach 1982:129).

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABKNA All Burma Karen National AssociationAFPFL Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BIA Burma Independence Army

BNA Burma National Army

BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party

CPB Communist Party of Burma

DDSI Directory of Defence Services IntelligenceDKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

DKBO Democratic Karen Buddhist Organisation

DSI Defence Services Institute

GCBA General Council of Burmese Associations

KCO Karen Central Organisation

KNA Karen National Association

KNDO Karen National Defence OrganisationKNLA Karen National Liberation Army

KNU Karen National Union

KYO Karen Youth Organisation

NLD National League for Democracy

OIOC Oriental and India Office Collections

PVO People's Volunteer Organisation

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration CouncilSPDC State Peace and Development Council

UKO United Karen Organisation

USDA Union Solidarity and Development Association

YMBA Young Men's Buddhist Association


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Map 1: Burma

xv


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xvi


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INTRODUCTION

Since 1988 Burma has gained notoriety for the extreme violence used

by its military regime. The country has long been in AmnestyInternationals spotlight, while refugees tell of unimaginable torture,

rape and killing of civilians. The Nobel Peace Prize of 1991 was therefore

a well-placed tribute to Aung San Suu Kyi and the fight for democracy

through non-violent methods. Unfortunately, it was also a reminder of

the widespread breaches of human rights which take place in Burma.

We are sadly reminded of George Orwells description of the colonial

era in his 1936 novel,Burmese Days, which includes scenes that point

prophetically to the present situation with foreboding accuracy.But why has this beautiful country, synonymous with Oriental

exoticism, turned away from the world and isolated itself in gratuitous

violence which, in the media, has been compared to Sadam Husseins

Iraq, Pol Pots Kampuchea and Ceausescus Romania?

In many of their reports, observers have referred to the fact that the

countrys problems are self-created. These problems are defined in such

stereotypical terms as military dictatorship, socialism, and totalitarian

one-party rule. The comparison made with the above-mentionedregimes is telling and simple, yet explains nothing about the specific

conditions in Burmas historical, social and cultural development that

have brought about the current situation. Many wondered how

Buddhists, with non-violence as their ideal, could perpetrate so many acts

of cruelty. Typically, reporting has focused on pseudo-psychological

explanations in the treatment of how nonviolence and non-confrontation

bring about an accumulation of aggressive feelings, which in turn find

expression in an almost volcanic eruption of violence.1 On the basis of

such theories and superficial comparisons with other violent regimes,

there is a pressing need for a detailed examination of the background of

this development, especially at this point in time when nationalism,


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ethno-religious conflict, and the division of states capture our attention

through the carnage left in their wake.

The initial explanation of Burmas present situation must be sought in

the legacy of the colonial era, or rather in the nationalistic paranoia

which was generated by developments following independence in 1948a politically orchestrated paranoia linking fear of the disintegration of

both union and state with the foreign takeover of power and the

disappearance of Burmese culture. In this way the legacy of the colonial

era has been used as the rationale for isolation and the use of violence.

Burma has been gripped by a strong, almost religious nationalism

which has retained the expunging of the colonial heritage as its key

motivating force. This belief, which has legitimated the armys

autocratic regime under General Ne Win since 1962, has not allowedthe creation of a more democratic society. Foreign influence must be

kept out with force and violence. Thus, the colonial eras model of

society seems to have stunted the countrys development since the

regime has focused on this model in a manner bordering on paranoia.

During the last thirty years of military rule, this strategy has equated all

foreign presences with colonialism and imperialism, as reflected in state

propaganda. At the same time the regime has sought to keep Burmese

traditions within what could be called a modern version of thetraditional autocratic political structure.

This strategy has generated fear of change and fear of all foreign

influences and imported ideas. Aung San Suu Kyi describes this

deadlock: [the] fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it, and

adds that the populations fear and feelings of humiliation must be

counteracted if change is to be possible. She uses Buddhist concepts in

her criticism of the regime, such as the four selfish qualities (agati)

which corrupt thought and thereby obstruct the correct path:corruption by desire, hatred, aberration due to ignorance, and fear.

Corruption and fear are important elements in the relations of power in

Burma, and Aung San Suu Kyi says that these negative qualities must

be fought by all and in all individuals. She tries to inculcate civil courage

in a population that has been subdued by 3,0005,000 killings,

imprisonment, violent torture, and the forced removal of entire areas of

1. For example, D. D. Grays article in the Danish newspaperInformation (9September 1988), entitled De fredelige buddhister kan vaere bde politiskaktive og voldelige [The peaceful Buddhists can be both politically active andviolent] (Associated Press).

2 NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA


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Rangoon.2 She is therefore seen as the politician who stands purely in

her nationalism in opposition to Ne Win the Culprit (as she describes

him) who is the symbol of corruption, the abuse of power and violent

oppression. She symbolises the spirit of her father, Aung San. The

regime accuses her of being in collusion with foreigners, namely theBritish colonial power amongst others.

In this book I shall attempt to identify the relationship between some

of the factors contributing to this complex historical process: Burmese

nationalisms fear of foreigners; a colonial era marked by violence; the

role of Buddhism in nationalism; the ethnic minorities; and an

autocratic political tradition. In analysing these historical conditions, I

intend to apply a simplification in the form of abstract models and

condensed descriptions. (The theoretical concepts are outlined inAppendix 1.) This is at the risk of repro ducing colonialisms and

nationalisms one-sided understanding of the essence of development.

Essentialisation is precisely the primary function of nationalism by

producing a simplification of a historical process. Its theory and

historical memory collapse complexities into a monolithic and

primordial model of the past in the present. Repeating the rhetoric of

nationalism runs the risk of making the same simplification. But there is

need for a more abstract, theoretical analysis of the generative elementsand contradictions of the processes. Such analyses are often absent in

the typically voluminous works on Burma, wherein the dominant

elements of Burmese development tend to be buried by detail.3

Whether or not it is possible to pin down some of the ingredients of

nationalism and the strategies of power will become evident on closer

examination of the countrys history. Initially the social hierarchy can

be considered by using the club as a symbol of colonial society. The

club was not only a representative symbol, it was also a model of thefundamental properties of the colonial system: a division of labour and

power based on race, class and culture as natural criteria of division.

2. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:180185).

3. See M. Smith (1991:492)an extremely important and very detaileddocument.

INTRODUCTION 3


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1.

THE COLONIAL CLUB:NATIVES

NOT ADMITTED!

In any town in India the European club is the spiritualcitadel, the real seat of the British power, the Nirvana for

which native officials and millionaires pine in vain.1

Whilst one of Orwells characters in Burmese Days says that he hates

Orientals and that any hint of friendship towards them is an instance of

horrible perversity, the Burmans themselves were not too fond of these

foreigners from the West2 who had conquered them and excluded them

from any share of power. In Rangoon, which the British hadtransformed into the capital with straight streets and Victorian

architecture, there were three influential clubs: the Pegu, the Boat and

the Gymkhana. The Pegu Club was dominated by senior officials from

the Civil Service and the other two by the mercantile establishment.

Neither money nor high status could assure a Burmans access to one of

the leading clubs in the capital. Race was the unavoidable criterion.3 To

the male colonisers the club and not the home was the centre of social

life.

4

When Burma closed its borders to the outside world following the

1. G. Orwell (1977:17).

2.Kala pyu, white kala or English kala. The term was used in the beginningof the colonial period and referred to the fact that the colonisers came fromIndia. See Ni Ni Myint (1983:42) and Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:4). A modern termfor foreigner or foreign national is nyaing-gan khar thar, alien or outsideris ta zein.

3. See N.F. Singer (1995) on the clubs in Rangoon, and C. Allen ed. (1987:116), for a broader discussion of the relevance of club life for the colonial

power. There were clubs which admitted native members, but this alwayscreated controversy. As a criterion, class was subordinate to race. Anglo-Indianshad their own clubs.


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military coup of 1962, this logic was turned on the foreigners from the

West: The club is only open to Burmese.5

British colonial policy was based upon the notion of the colonial

powers determining role in keeping the country together with its many

different ethnic groups: Burmans, Mon, Shan, Karen, Kachin, Chin,Rakhine, and immigrant Chinese and Indiansa multi-ethnic society

which the British believed that their Pax Britannica had served to gather

and save from despotism and ethnic conflict.

In Orwells book, the Indian doctor Veraswami praises the Pax

Britannica which Flory, the books main character, dismisses as Pox

Britannica. We steal from Burma, says Englishman Flory, whereas

the Indian admires the white mans burden. The Burman protagonist

inBurmese Days, U Po Kyin, is portrayed as a parasite who exploits thesystem through unbelievable intrigues. The Englishman has lost his

innocence and has become the reluctant imperialist, whilst the Indian

doctor and the Burman aspire to membership of the club with thepukka

sahib (the real gentleman). The Indian states (with his kala accent): In

the club, practically he is a European, no calumny can touch him. A

club member is sacrosanct.6 He considers the Orientals to be inferior:

we have no humour; the British on the other hand modernise the

country. But he loses the battle for membership in the local club to theunscrupulous scoundrel, U Po Kyin, who sees the Indian as a foreigner

hindering Burmese participation in the struggle for power. This cocktail

of apartheid, ambivalence and unscrupulous use of all avenues of power

has never been portrayed with more precision than in Orwells

masterpiece. The tragedy of Burma is that these contradictions still

occupy centre stage, long after the British went home.Pukka sahib and

his white mans burden continue to haunt Burmaor more correctly,

are used as a spectre to legitimate tyrannyand isolation.A couple of grotesque examples illustrate this. Ambivalence in

attitudes to the English language, which was absent from the school

4. Furnivall (1956:307).

5. The term Burmese is used here to signify a citizen of the Union of Burma,regardless of ethnic origin. ABurman is a member of the ethnic majority group.See Glossary for further explanation.

6. G. Orwell (1977:45). Florys pessimistic view of Burma does not offer theBurmese much hope for the future, and in fact strikes a chord with those who

blame all problems on the colonial era: In fact, before weve finished wellhave wrecked the whole Burmese national culture. But were not civilising them,were only rubbing our dirt on to them. (Ibid: 40.)

6 THE COLONIAL CLUB: NATIVES NOT ADMITTED!


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curriculum for many years until reintroduced in 1981 when Ne Wins

daughter Sanda failed an English universitys entrance exam - if the

rumours in circulation are trueis one such case. Foreign culture,

especially Western, is largely kept out. This applies also to individual

persons, for example Aung San Suu Kyis husband, who is English. Theregime dismisses the claim that Burma can be ruled by someone

married to a foreigner, one whose children therefore cannot be

considered Burmese.7 The constitution of 1982 defines citizenship as

one-dimensional: one has to prove that his/her ancestors lived in Burma

before the colonisation began in 1824, and that they belonged to one of

the indigenous ethnic groups. Indians, Chinese and Eurasians can only

obtain associate citizenship and cannot hold high office. This attempt

to exploit the fear of foreign influence and the ambivalence still foundin relation to the former colonial power and to ethnic or national identity

form one clear symptom of Burmas problematic condition.

Important incidents in Burmas history show how the fear of losing

cultural identity, combined with the use of violence in the battle against

colonialism and for independence has developed. However, in order to

place these examples in the context of modern nationalism and the

present regime, it is necessary to outline how the Burmans regarded the

intrusion of colonialism into their lives. They saw the British as a threatnot just against their culture and religion, but also against the unity and

totality of the universe itself with its central tenents based on Buddhist

cosmology. Within this view of the world, to lose ones religion,

language and culture is symptomatic of a loss of control of political,

economic and social relations. The universe is literally thrown askew. In

other words, Burman ethnic identity is not only culturally defined, but

also refers to an existence in a cosmological totality and in accordance

with its laws. This is a unified model, where all parts are largelymutually dependent in direct relations of cause and effect. Without

central control there would be chaos.

The British colonial modelplural societywas based on the

principle of divide and rule, where racial, ethnic, religious, social and

economic differences and contradictions were allowed to develop. The

central power controlled these contradictions via India, and the unity in

this world was found in the Empire and its global market. The local

7. In the colonial era it was considered almost treason for a British person tomarry a Burmese.

NATIONALISM AS POLITICAL PARANOIA IN BURMA 7


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society and culture were rendered subordinate to a common division of

labour.

These two models and their collision connect some of historys most

important generative contradictions. Such models can also function as

heuristic aids in analysing and identifying the central tendencies inBurmas nationalistic strategies.8

8. In the description above, there is, of course, no suggestion that all Burman

and British actions in practice were and still are governed by reference to suchmodels and their rationale. The models are analytical tools to explainstrategiesand strategies are expressions of the rationale in the producdon of

practice and in the perception and representation of historical processes (cf.Bourdieu, 1990:131).

8 THE COLONIAL CLUB: NATIVES NOT ADMITTED!


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2.

THE VIOLENT PACIFICATIONOF

BURMA

The confrontation between the Burman world and British imperialism,

which escalated through incompatibility and intransigence, culminatedin the British conquest and pacification of the last remnants of the

kingdom.

Pacification was an important concept in the language of

colonisation. The British believed that the country could only become

civilised and attain a democratic constitution, through which the

population would learn how to rule themselves, if the colonial power

was successful in introducing peace to the country and in quelling all

armed resistance. This was brought about by the abolition of theOriental despotism in 1886, exemplified by the kingdom according to

the colonial power. King Thibaw and his family were driven into exile

in India. He and his queen Supayalat - nicknamed soup-plate by

British soldierswere taken in a narrow bullock carriage to the navy

steamerThoorea whilst the British soldiers waved cheerfully and sang.1

Thibaw remained in exile until he died in 1916.

Great Britain had already conquered half of the kingdom in 1826 and

in 1852, and had taken over trade in rice, teak, precious stones, etc.During the 182426 war, the British took over the great Shwe Dagon

pagoda in Rangoon and permitted their soldiers to enter while still

wearing their bootsa blatant act of profanity as Buddhists remove

their footwear when entering religious areas and their homes as a mark

of respect. In 1852 the British again attacked the fortified pagodathe

central and unifying symbol for both Buddhism and the kingship. As the

soldiers swept across the countryside they ransacked pagodas for their

gold and silver Buddha statues.

1. E.C. V. Foucar (1946) gives a detailed, although somewhat antiBurmese,description of the humiliating end of the monarchy.


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The British continued to insist on wearing shoes when entering

monasteries and pagodas, which they used to garrison soldiers during

pacification. In 1886, the palace in Mandalay was renamed Fort

Dufferin and part of the palace, which had been a Buddhist monastery,

became the Upper Burma Club for the British officers. In the words ofFoucar: The hall of audience would serve admirably as the garrison

church[the] altar before the Lion throne (1946:160). A monk who

proclaimed himself as the ruler of the universe (setkya mn), in

accordance with the Burman tradition of resistance, attempted to

overthrow the foreign occupation of the palace, but to no avail. The

centre of the state had now ceased to exist and the peacock throne was

transferred to Calcutta and placed on exhibition in a museum there.2

The British thereby concluded the political and cultural humiliationof the Burman people, whose conceptual system was endorsed by the

all-dominating Buddhist cosmology. The removal of the king and his

throne signalled the end of the Burman kingdom and of Burman

Buddhist culture as everlasting and universal entities. According to the

cosmology, Buddhism and dhamma rule will decline before the new

Buddha arrives. The lack of recognition given to a leader of the Sangha

(thathanabaing) by the British was an obvious sign of imbalance in the

sacred-profane universe.During the pacification programme of the 1880s the British met

with tough resistance from the guerrilla forces, which in some cases

were led by monks. The monastic orders (Sangha) did not participate

directly in the rebellion, insofar as monks are not permitted to

circumvent the principle of non-violence. A monk, as a member of the

Sangha, must refrain from taking part in secular activities. But restraint

was not possible in situations where the monastic order was left without

influence due to a lack of royal protection and regular gifts from theroyal court and officials. The rebelling monks were therefore seen as

defending Buddhist teachings and the world order against collapse.3

Hence the Burmans considered them to be legitimate rebels. This

cosmological order was, as we shall see, based to a large degree upon

harmony between the religious and political spheres. The colonial

2. The peacock is still an important national symbol. It was used by the rebels

on their flag in 1886; the nationalists used the flag in the 1930s; and it is stillused by demonstrating students. Originally the dancing peacock was a symbol ofroyal authority and an emblem on the throne in the informal audience hallwhilst the lion was the emblem on the throne in the official hall (Htin Aung,1965: xi).

10 THE VIOLENT PACIFICATION' OF BURMA


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forces regarded the rebel monks as criminals, so-called dacoits, an

Anglo Indian term for gangs of armed robbers. In the colonial

perception the resistance was not a planned or even conscious act of

rebellion but dacoity: The Burmese had a traditional and hereditary love

of desultory fighting, raiding, gang robbery; and their inordinatenational vanity preserved vivid recollection of the time when they were

a conquering race.4

If the monks had to reject the ideal of non-violence in order to

resurrect the cosmos, then the British in turn employed the scorched-

earth policy in order to bring about pacification. Villages and stocks

of rice were burnt daily and the rebels were executed. A single military

unit was able to report the burning of forty-six villages, 639 houses and

509 Ibs of rice. Rewards were given for the capture of the monksleading the rebellion. The rebels relatives were rounded up and

interned. The colonial power used the Christian minority, amongst

others the Christian Karen, to fight against the rebels. The Christians

presented the heads of monks and pocketed the reward.5 Hundreds of

dacoitsresistance fighterswere executed, including women and

children, in a village near Bassein. Rudyard Kipling visited the British

troops in 1889 and narrated the atrocities in his poem The Grave of a

Hundred Heads. It is based on the soldiers recollections of themassacre in the village of Pabengmay. These selected verses should

suffice to give an impression of the barbarism of the head-hunting

during pacification:

They made a pile of their trophies

High as a tall mans chin,

Head upon head distorted,

Set in a sightless grin,Anger and pain and terror

Stamped on the smoke-scorched skin.

3. The opposition between the withdrawn holy order of Buddhism and itssecular political dimension is thoroughly analysed in Tambiah (1976) and Ling(1979). The main work on the Sangha and state in Burma is Mendelson (1975).

4.Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, 1907, vol. 5, p. 176. Orientaland India Office Collections, British Library, London.

5. The pacification has been described by Chief Commissioner Sir CharlesCrosthwait (1968 [1912]), who participated; see also D. Woodman (1962), M.Adas (1982), and M. Aung-Thwin (1985).



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The heretic, savage, and lawless kalas have now entered Burma

and are destroying religious edifices, such as pagodas,

monasteries. And the kalas are using in the profane way the white

umbrellas and other insignia which belong only to royalty.8

This period entered Burman historical representation as the complete

humiliation of their society, a literal trampling upon their religion and

culture, and the distortion of their universe. Religion and violence

combined as a representation of colonial subjugation. This violence in

the broad sense of the word is both the destruction of life and property

by force and the act of intervention using the freedom of some to

deprive others of their freedom and identity. The memory of the

historical experience from the colonial pacification is crucial to ananalysis of the present nationalism. It is thus relevant to compare the

above-cited proclamation with a recent one from the SLORC. Although

the context is different, the rhetoric points indirectly to history:

Not only the Tatmadaw [army] but also each and every citizen is

dutybound to safeguard independence, sovereigntyMyanmar

exercising basic rights most suited for custom, culture of [the] national

peoples.9

7. See Ni Ni Myint (1983:42). She writes from a Burmese point of view andemphasises the invasion not merely as a territorial and political annexation butas an attempt to destroy culture and society.

8. Ni Ni Myint (1983:194) shows that the resistance was organised beforeThibaw was exiled. Myinzaing Prince, a son of King Mindon, included Shan,Kachin, Palaung and Karen in his force and fought under the peacock banneraround Mandalay. Monks were crucial in organising his resistance.

9.New Light of Myanmar, 6 June 1997.



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14


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3.

BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND

POLITICAL POWER

In Buddhist cosmology, secular power protects Buddhism as a religious

order. The monastic order (Sangha) cannot exist without the statesprotection and gifts. In return, the monks secure king and laymen access

to religious meritthe accumulation of which improves theirkamma

(karma). This is realised through ceremonies and gifts to monks or,

better still, through the building of pagodas. However, the ruling power

is hot1it may be necessary to use violence in the defence of the

country. The king might autocratically order the execution of rebellious

relatives and officials. In return, the monks must keep the precepts

regarding ahimsa (non-violence); that is, they must not kill livingcreatures. Then, like now, monastaries and monks protected against

arbitrary tyranny. Monasteries were a source of sanctuary, and monks

could intercede for someone who was condemned or who had to pay an

inordinately large amount of tax.

The cosmos is thus divided into a sacred and a profane sphere, which

are closely linked and mutually dependent. Both are subordinate to

dhamma2 or the law or teaching of existence, its beings, its order and its

physical and metaphysical powers, as recognised by the Buddha. But itis important to emphasise that the state and the exercise of power do not

in themselves have a religious character.

On the contrary, they can be seen as being antithetical to Buddhist

ethics, expressing one of the worst evils of existence.

1. Secular power can be described as hot compared with the religious sphere,

where Buddhism is a means to avoid violence and anger.2.Dhamma covers several different conceptual areas and can only be translatedin context. Its content embraces the following: correct behaviour, morality,doctrine, the law of nature and its conditions, as related in the teachings of theBuddha.


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Buddhist cosmology is a total model, which covers all aspects of

existence, including ethical and ontological principles.3 But in the

process of institutional elaboration, the Sangha is, in a manner of

speaking, a sanctuary from secular society. Here, men live in celibacy

and obey the 227 disciplinary rules and the optimal practice of ethicalrules. Laymen, on the other hand, can make do with five to eight basic

rules. The monks within the Sangha maintain justice so that the

monasteries do not become sanctuaries for criminals, swindlers or

usurpers. However, it was quite normal that a new king would try to

secure control of the Sangha. This took the form of the application of

more stringent rules, whereby disobedient or opposing elements were

purged. The next step was to build pagodas and raise spires on the top

forming an umbrella-like crown (ht). Thisis a sign of glory (hpn) andpower and can be compared with the kings crown. But the concept of

hpn is also included in the Burman word for monk (hpngyi- great

glory). In this case the word implies, on the contrary, a spiritual and

moral honour achieved through asceticism and knowledge ofdhamma.

The monastic order and kingship were thus two separate parts of the

cosmos. The kings hpn, as a sign of great kamma, can be read in his

personal abilities and behaviour. This also applies to political leaders to

this day. The monastic order, on the other hand, is an unchallengeableand open zone with equal access for all laymen who seek to attain

religious merit (kutho) regardless of rank, wealth and power. The

Sangha is divided up into different sects with different views on dhamma

and rules for their monks, whilst each separate monastery possesses a

great deal of autonomy.4

Prior to the colonial era the monastaries functioned as schools where

boys learnt to read and write. Learning was synonymous with learning

dhamma and being indoctrinated in the Buddhistic cosmological andontological principles. Earlier, monks enjoyed great respect locally.

They were wise men who knew astrology, alchemy and medicine. Such

a hsaya (teacher) was an important person in the local society.

3. See Appendix 1 concerning the following concepts: cosmology, ideology,model and ontology.

4. Mendelson (1975:58) describes the Sangha as an aggregation of individualascetics rather than a church. Monks belong to monasteries (kyaung) and branchmonasteries (taiks) dominated by six main sects.



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Royal Power

The monarchy was absolutist and dynastic. It was based upon

endogamy; the queens were often the kings half-sisters. There was also

a harem, where daughters of officials and tributary vassals lived. Someof the concubines came from minority groups. Accession to the throne

was often accompanied by a palace revolution which tended to be a very

bloody affair, where queens and concubines sought to get their sons into

power.5

The king and his council (hluttaw) controlled trade in all important

produce such as rice, timber and precious stones. They also made

decisions on war, peace and the moving of the capital. But to gain and

retain power, the king had to administer his absolutist monarchy in

accordance with Buddhistic cosmology and ethics which dictate a

number of attributes. He must be a dhammaraja and rule in accordance

with dhamma and the ten royal attributes.6 The kings most important

task was to protect Buddhism, to ensure welfare and prosperity, and to

show charity. Peace, prosperity and the absence of natural catastrophes

depended upon the laity and monks being content with their lot.

Harmony in the universe provided the laity with the possibility of

accumulating religious merit. As mentioned earlier, this underlined the

view that the king possessed honour (hpn-dawroyal glory) as anexpression of good merit both in earlier incarnations and his present

existence.

A person became a mn (king or leader) because he had a kamma

(kan) which made him leader. The king was Lord of glory and Lord of

Kamma (hpn-shin-kan-shiri). Through his prestigious status as a

cakkavatti (ruler of the universe orsetkya mn in Burman), the king

could maintain law and order in the cosmos. Conversely, dissension and

lack of welfare were indicators of declining hpn and kamma. The

5. The last king, Thibaw, executed eighty members of the royal family on hisaccession to the throne in 1879. In 1884 he executed the rest of the royal family(around 200), who had been imprisoned. In this way European historicalrepresentations of oriental despotism were confirmed. The Burmans gained areputation as a gruesome and violent people. See for example Jesse (1946).

6. The ten rules, or rather ideals, relevant for a dhammaraja are as follows:

almsgiving, observance of the Buddhist precepts, liberality, rectitude,gentleness, self-restriction, control of anger, avoidance of the use of violence inthe relationship with the people, forbearance, and non-opposition against

peoples will (Maung Maung Gyi, 1983:21; Michael Aung-Thwin (1983:54);Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:171173).

BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND POLITICAL POWER 17


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driving force of the cosmos was not conceptualised as an autonomous,

self-centred ego, but ratherkamma was the result of earlier and present

interactions. These human interactions are in turn connected with

individuals knowledge of dhamma, their intention and practice in

relation to the ethical rules. Whilst kamma follows on from earlierincarnations, it can be increased/decreased in accordance with changing

conditions. The state, the king, officials, peasants, men and women are

all subordinated to the lawbut in a hierarchy of accumulated reward.

Kamma is thus the central ontological principle. Nevertheless, a stable

economy and peace were the fundamental criteria ensuring the

collective possibilities for the individual accumulation ofkamma. The

king was at the top of the hierarchy, a natural auto crat, but, as with

everything in the cosmos, he was subject to its law of impermanence.Furthermore, the king was the lord of the land and the water, that is

the lord of all living things. He also stood at the head of the thirty-seven

natsspiritual ancestors, often of royal descent and including a Shan

king and a prince from the Mon people. These spirits, which also

include the victims of the palace revolutions, can disturb the living if

they are not included in the sharing of religious merit. The nats presided

by Thagya Mn (Indra) are guardians of the royal household (the state)

and of the households of commoners. The Shwezigon Pagoda in Paganis the ceremonial headquarters of the thirty-seven nats and thus the

most important royal symbol.7 By including local spirit cults and their

leaders in some instances, Burmese dynasties maintained a formal

hegemony over the minorities. Conversely, these local cults and their

leaders often borrowed elements from the dynastic model and Buddhist

cosmology. In times of decline, princes, monks or peasants could claim

to possess the royal attributesas long as they could convince others of

the righteousness of their claim. These pretenders to the throne, calledmn lang (king in the making), sought to prove that they had

potential as cakkavatti, dhammaraja and kammaraja, that is, that they

possessed the necessary religious merit. Burmas history is alive with

individuals calling themselves mn lang and seeking to legitimate

rebellion by applying Buddhist cosmology and its rules.

The model thus contains two genealogical principles, both of which

incorporate relations with spirits/forebears and kinship relations with

persons of dynastic birth. And yet it is important to stress that ethnic

origin was not a significant factor in relation to a mn langs credibility.

7. Htin Aung (1959).



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Mon, Karen and Shan have all performed this role. The important factor

in relation to power was whether or not the individual declared himself

to be a Buddhist, namely one who pays respect to the Buddha by trying

to live in accordance with ethics (sila) and the giving of alms (dana).8

The cosmology could always credit or discredit a ruler or a rebel. Asituation with deteriorating welfare as well as higher taxes, conflicts and

violence, or famines and natural catastrophes can signal the end of a

dynasty and the approach of a new era of peace and prosperity. The

concepts and ideals of the Buddhist cosmology are universal and

everlasting, and they constitute a total model of the society and for its

future development. The cosmology implies a utopian vision of a

coming Buddha (bodhisattd), who is to appear approximately 5,000

years after Gautama (i.e., within the next 2,500 years). The comingBuddha is calledAriyametteya.

During the last part of this era the Buddhist ethics ofsila and dana

will degenerate, and war and misfortune will prevail. Asetkyamn has

to clean the immoral and chaotic world and prepare the revival of

dhamma before the coming Buddha can enter the world.

Both kings and mn lung rebels have ascribed to themselves the

attributes ofsetkya mn and bodhisatta. Secular power and the universal

ethics of Buddhism are thus closely interrelated in this model. Theseelements could be interpreted as support for an autocratic ruler who has

the ability to re-establish the world order ofdhamma, including ethics

and communal welfare. The autocratic element in this model inhered in

the fact that all central practice of power can in principle be legitimised

as necessary for the maintenance of the dhamma kingdom as a unified

entity, with regards to kamma and harmony, so that the kingdom can

receive the coming Buddha. Individuals, regimes and their attributes can

thus be brought into dispute, whereas the above-mentioned regularities,which both connect and disconnect the sacred and profane parts of

existence, legitimise the use of violence when the dhamma kingdom is

threatened.

8. Until recently, most of the scholars writing on Burmas history havemaintained that ethnicity was the main contradiction in pre-colonial society, andthat Burmans were becoming culturally dominant. Analyses by Lieberman

(1978) and Taylor (1982) have shown that ethnic oppo sitions were subordinateto that between Buddhist and non-Buddhist, i.e. whether or not the population inquestion held a position in relation to religion and state, or were not included inthese tributary relations. However, there were some cultural differences inceremonies and rituals between ethnic groups in their practice of Buddhism.

BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY AND POLITICAL POWER 19


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This model for a total cosmic-ontological-political unity has survived

despite the attempt by a foreign power to destroy it, thereby making it

the quintessence of both Burman (ethnic) cultural identity and a part of

modern Burman nationalism. We shall return to this at a later point.

The British made radical inroads into the universe ofdhamma, asthey abolished the monarchy and withdrew official support for

Buddhism and the Sangha. Thus, a foreign power intervened directly in

dhamma and kamma and therefore in the conditions that facilitated the

existence of society, culture and individuals, as laid down through

cosmology and ontology. Colonialism usurped not only power but also

the order of the world itself. This intervention was a key influence on

the construction of Burmas modern social identity.



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4.

THE COLONISATION OFBURMESE

IDENTITY

To be Burman (bama) today refers to language, literature, tradition,

history, etc. This summarises a modern sense of nationality more or lessin the form of an imagined community (Anderson 1991). But in the old

state and kingdom the dominant identity was determined by (a) whether

one was a Buddhist, and (b) whether one was a member of an alliance with

the ruling dynasty, that is, the place one occupied in the tributary

hierarchy. This could be as part of the kings court (officials, craftsmen

and soldiers), or as supplier of tribute via local officials, or as a more

distant vassal, who supplied a symbolic tribute from afar. Finally, a

large part of the population were bonded slaves.1

Most were bonded(indentured) labourers, who could buy their freedom, unlike the

prisoners of war. The population around the capital was often ethnically

mixed: Burmans, Shan, Mon and other minorities, as well as prisoners

of war from Siam (Thailand). Identity and status within the tributary

system were inseparable.

The character of the regime was experienced by the population

entirely through local officials and how these officials patronised their

clients amongst the peasants. Most of the kings men liable to corvelived around the capital whilst, for example, the Karen in the mountains

paid tribute only occasionally in natural resources or as suppliers of

provisions to the army. They held a peripheral position but not because

of ethnic identity; the Buddhist Pwo Karen held a prominent position in

the southern kingdom dominated by the Mon people until 1750.

1. Hierarchy of commoners (following Aung-Thwin, 1984):Ahmudan: bearerof duty, conducted Crown service, which included military service (corve);

Hpaya kyun: glebe bondsmen working for the monasteries; Athi: non-bonded;they paid capitation tax in natural resources or money; Kyun: bondedindividuals (slaves).


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The individuals place in this system was therefore dependent on the

following criteria: kamma from earlier lives and present accumulated

religious merit, combined with tributary status and rank. As stated

above, there was a connection between kamma and status in this life.

Therefore status as a Burman would be unthinkable withoutacknowledging Buddhism as a shared frame of reference. Howand

how muchone practised ones religion was, on the other hand, not as

decisive as accepting the Buddhist dhamma and subjecting oneself to

cosmology and recognising its legitimacy. But what of culture as a

criterion for identity? Culture was apparently subordinate to religion

and tributary status. This did not prevent Burmans from considering

certain minorities such as some of the Karen, as wild and uncivilised,

but this status was assigned predominantly to non-Buddhists.The teachings and cosmology of Buddhism are universalistic and, to

my knowledge, do not discriminate on the basis of ethnic differentiation.

It is a modern phenomenon to elevate culture as the dominant and

exclusive marker of identity. In Burma, the Buddhist cosmology was

decisive for social, political and cultural identity. This identity was

revealed when threatened by external forces, namely when the harmony

between the sacred and the profane worlds was broken and when a

foreign religion (and power) contested the indigenous model of theuniverse. Therefore, the important role of Buddhist cosmology in

defining the dominant identity as based on Burman cultural values is

best explained through the confrontation with the Christian

missionaries. Whilst Buddhism and Christianity both claim to be

universalistic systems of ideas, their confrontation in the colonial

context expressed a particularistic cultural clash. This paradox seems to

be extremely important in understanding the present xenophobia in

Burma.

Christian Intervention

American Baptist missionaries came to Burma in 1813. They did not

receive permission to convert Burmans and had no success until the

intervention of the British. King Bagyidaw would not allow conversion

because the Baptists demanded a total break with Buddhist thought, not

just with ceremonies and the monks and Buddhas teachings but also

with cosmology and ontology themselves. In such circumstances,

Christian Burmans were not simply people who broke with Burman

culture and religionthey were disloyal citizens of the Buddhist

kingdom of Burma. Foreigners could certainly practise their own



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religion but on condition that they did not intervene in the dhamma-

ruled universe.

This is extremely important for understanding the Burmans self-

identification in relation to the surrounding world, not because the

notions of the last century persist unchanged but because reference tothis tradition is woven into present political strategies and models.

According to Father Bigandet, Christian Burmans were labelled kala

(foreigners); the comparatively few Burmans who converted were

permanently placed outside of society as aliens: they lost their

nationality after they turned away from the religion of their ancestors.2

The king asked the Missionary Judson about the Christian Burmans:

Are they real Burmans? Do they dress like other Burmans?3 The king

quickly perceived that Christian fundamen-talism and its absolutedemand for subjugation were a forewarning of attempts to conquer

Burma by both usurping the cosmological order itself and changing the

culturally defined content. The Baptists would not allow any reverence

for monks, be it in the form of gift-giving in return for religious merit or

education in the monasteries. This was regarded as idolatry and meant

expulsion from the Baptist sect. For missionaries, Burma was controlled

by an idolatrous despotism and tyranny, which inhibited salvation and

civilisation. They did not hide their intention to convert the wholeworldinto the disciples of Jesus. Whilst demanding total subjugation, the

missionaries also began to reorganise everyday life and work. Work

was measured by time and the sabbath was to be observed. This was

followed by the teaching of European culture, from learning the English

language to ideas on order and cleanliness and shaking handsan

important part of the Christian, civilised identity.4 This identity was

based on an auto nomous self, subjugated to a belief in salvation, and

marked by morality and hard work. In this way, Burman culture becamesynonymous with paganism and something less civilised, which was

incompatible with Christian identity.

2. The few natives that became converts were calledKalas, because in theopinion of the Burmese they had embraced the religion of theKalas and had

become bonafide strangers, having lost their nationality (Bigandet, [1887]1996:4). See also H. Trager (1966).

3.Baptist Missionary Magazine, 1823, vol. 4, p. 215.

4. See Comaroff and Comaroff (1989), where a similar process in South Africais portrayed and precisely analysed; and Asad (1993), who ties togetherChristianity and power.

THE COLONISATION OF BURMESE IDENTITY 23


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Seen from a Buddhist Burman perspective, Christianity was, and still

is, intolerant, arrogant and absolutist. Christian conversion thus

generated fear of estrangement from what defined Burman identity as

well as the foundation of the kingdom and its subjects among other ethnic

groups (Shan, Mon, Karen and others). If large sections of theseminorities now became like the foreigners, the Europeans could easily

assume power. This is exactly what happened in the three colonial wars

of conquest in 1824, 1852 and 1885. Even though the king forbade

missionaries from handing out books and missions from operating in the

areas of the country he controlled after 1826, this could not prevent the

conversion of those Karen who were not well versed in Buddhism.

These Sgaw Karen from the delta of the Irrawaddy River in the south of

Burma held the lowest position in the dynastic hierarchy. Apparentlythey had no direct protectors amongst state officials and as such they

saw not only deliverance but also advancement through the ranks of

power in their alliance with the Baptists.

When the British invaded the kingdom in 1852, which was an event

brought about in part by intrigues created by some missionaries, the

Christian Karen aided the army, killing or capturing many Burmans.5

The Burmans took revenge by burning many of the Christian villages

and crucifying a Karen pastor. Such events prefaced a religious waranimportant part of the colonialisation process. Thus religion was brought

into politics as something irretrievably connected with ethnio-national

identity, and which had to be protected through the use of violence. The

anti-colonial struggle developed into a fundamentalistic nationalism,

and a struggle for survival which legitimised the use of violence. The

following decades bore witness to constant clashes between Christians

and Buddhists. Missionaries disrupted Buddhist cere monies by

arrogantly undermining the monks authority and entering intoarguments with them, while Christians were abducted and their villages

were ransacked.

In 1856 a large rebellion was started around Bassein in the Irrawaddy

Delta by a Karen mn lang(king in the making). The rebellion spread

and thousands of Buddhist Karen from the mountains in the Salween

area joined forces with some Kayah and Shan. The Karen built a pagoda

5. See Pollak (1979). Immediately before the war the Burmese governor ofRangoon and the American missionary Kincaid had a flerce argument. Thegovernor said: Christianity is aimed to destroy every other religion. You aregetting all people over to your side, for you make them think well of you andyour doctrine,Baptist MissionaryMagazine, 1852, vol. 32, p. 69.



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in the mountains on top of which they raised the symbol of royal power,

the spire (ht). It was to be the end of foreign rulersa Karen was to be

king. According to prophecy, a Karen king would come to rule over

Pegu, an old royal city northeast of Rangoona king who would, it

must be stressed, follow dhamma and the cosmological principles. TheBritish were thus forced to enter a difficult and bloody guerrilla war

against the Buddhist Karen and their allies, who also attacked the

Christian Karen. The colonial power described this mn langas an

adventurer and evilly-disposed person,6 a bewildered and ignorant

Karen who exploited the weakened state of the Burman kingdom in

order to achieve personal power (see Chapter 14).

The religious violence culminated in 1887 during the final conquest.

As mentioned previously, an exceptional event occurred after KingThibaw was sent into exile: monks in their yellow robes engaged

directly in the organisation of guerrilla troops. The foreign element was

to be hunted and driven out. In return the missionaries requested and

received weapons from the British: We are belligerent, God is with

us, tyranny and Buddhism are a dying monster, they enthusiastically

exclaimed. The rebels killed Christians and burned villages. The army

reciprocated and Christian Karen captured monks or delivered their

heads for a reward of 25 rupees. Many heads were delivered, includingthat of a leading monk (Mayangyung hpngyi), whose head alone

fetched a reward of 5,000 rupeesa small fortune. It is Buddhism in

arms against Christianity, a missionary said.7

This mixtureexpressing itself as a religious war with ethnic

connotationsconstituted a monstrosity that in later years, right up

until independence, was a permanent element of Burmese nationalism.

Religion and ethnicity were, as mentioned above, not excluded from the

Burman understanding of self-identity prior to the arrival of the Britishand the missionaries; however, they were not exclusive criteria.

Furthermore, ethnicity was not connected with political independence

6.Burma Gazetteer, 1910, Salween District, vol. A, p. 2. The same source callsthe rebellion a most formidable insurrection. On the other hand, somemissionaries and officials denounced the leader as yet another Karen prophetavulgar impostor, making a lot of noise. There was no evidence supporting the

notion that the Burman king was behind the rebellion, or that there was generaldiscontent in relation to the tax system. Only the most insightful of colonialofficials and missionaries located the roots of this strategy in the cosmology andunderstood the meaning and seriousness which was underlined by asimultaneous rebellion in India, the so-called great Sepoy mutiny.



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as in the European construction of ethnic and national identity,

synonymous with an autonomous and nation-state. However,

colonisation in Burma brought with it the developments occurring

within European nationalism.

Karen Nationalism

The Karen National Association (KNA) was founded in 1881 as an

association of Baptist churches.8 It was the forerunner of the present

Karen National Union (KNU), and sought the leading role in a pan-

Karen nationalist movement. It played a key role in the run-up to

independence, with the aim of attaining an independent state protected

by the colonial power. The KNU organised the 1949 rebellion, whichnow seems to have entered its final phase after fifty years of fighting.

During the 1880s, Christianity gained a foothold amongst the Kachin

of northern Burma. This was the beginning of the Kachin independence

movement. Following pacification, the British began to govern Burma

in different areas, whereby Kayahs small principalities were conceived

of as independent states (called Karenni)? formally placed outside the

colonial administration; Shan, Kachin and part of the Salween district

came to be known as the excluded area in relation to MinisterialBurma (see Map 2 overleaf showing excluded frontier areas in 1946).

This model was based on ethnic pluralism, that is to say, joint economy

and politics in conjunction with the British Empire, but with cultural

segregation as the criterion of internal political administration.

This division was argued by reference to indirect rule via the Shan

princes (sawbwas) and Kachin duwas (chiefs). In 1922 the Shan princes

agreed to combine their principalities (mng or muang) to form a

federation. By entering into a federation, thesawbwas lost control overeducation and the police. Nevertheless they agreed because they were

7. SeeBaptist Missionary Magazine, 1886, vol. 66.

8. See Appendix 2 on the Karen organisations. See further Gravers (1996b), onthe history of Karen nationalism.

9. According to Crosthwaite (1968:202), who headed the administration ofpacification in the 1880s, Eastern Kayah had to accept a tributary status under

the British queen, in accordance with established custom. The territoriesclassified as excluded by the British previously enjoyed a high degree ofindependence, although they were part of the Burmese kingdom at the time ofannexation, and thus considered part of the royal domain. The British stillregarded these as independent states.



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worried about losing their hereditary rights and being totally integrated

into Burma proper.

The colonial power thus divided the country according to a mountain-

valley dichotomy, which was both political and cultural. The mountains

comprised the frontier areas with their tribal peoples, who had notyet reached a sufficiently civilised state to be included under the same

administration policy as Ministerial Burma, which was a part of India.

The mountain peoples were under the direct rule of the British

governor.10

Following pacification, the flow of immigrants from India and China

increased significantly. The Indians were soldiers (sepoys),

moneylenders and casual labourers. The Indian moneylenders increased

their landownership in the rich Irrawaddy Delta during the 1930s worldcrisis, as low prices on the world market forced the Burmans into

irrevocable debt. Prior to the Second World War there were

approximately one million Indians in Burma and over half of the

population of Rangoon was Indian.11 Between one-third and a quarter

of the Indian population fled from the Japanese whilst those remaining

adjusted themselves to their newsahib, with a willingness not approved

of by the Burmans.12 The Chinese population, in turn, numbered

approximately 350,000 prior to the war. They were involvedparticularly in trade.

Thus the Burmans could easily ascertain with bitterness that other

ethnic groups dominated many areas of employment: doctors, nurses

(often Karen women who were also preferred as nannies), soldiers and

seasonal farm workers. British firms employed Indians and Karen rather

than Burmans. This trend in immigration, together with the colonial

powers use of Indians in many of the lower administrative positions,

created yet another ethnic andin partreligious opposition, whichcan still be felt, for example, in the great upsurge of anti-Muslim

agitation and conflict in Arakan since 1991, which sent 300,000 people

into Bangladesh as refugees.

Constant strikes and demonstrations against the colonial power took

place in 1938. Tensions between Indians and Burmans also appeared in

10. See Silverstein (1980) on the British policy of divide and rule.

11. Taylor (1987:127).

12. According to U Maung Maung (1989:6970), a general feeling of delightpervaded the country on the forced departure of the British and their Indianservants in 1942.



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Map 2: Excluded Area 1946 (Source: Tinker, 19831984)



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the form of an unpleasant mixture of religious and racial/ethnic

opposition. Newspapers expressed the fear that mixed marriages

between Indian Hindus or Muslims and Burman women would lead to

the women being forced to renounce Buddhism. Such marriages came

to be regarded as a threat to religion and racial identity. However,inter-marriages were quite rare, but the mixture of economic

exploitation by Indian chettyar or chetti-kala (moneylenders), race,

religion and culture challenged the population with an alarming force

and during the ensuing riots more than 1,000 people died.13

In 1931 Burmans numbered approximately 17,000 in the public

administration while there were 14,800 Indians and 1,644 Eurasians. The

Indians and Eurasians (descendants of the British and Burmese)

dominated the middle ranks under the British in the rail and postservices. The Karen played a comparatively prominent role within the

military, police and health services, and as teachers -especially the

Christian Karen, who comprised approximately 15 per cent of the Karen

population. Eurasians numbered approximately 20,000 and were

dependent upon the charity of the British to procure education and

employment. On the whole they were better educated than Burmans but

they were nevertheless social outcasts. Orwell describes these half-

castes and their social position in Burmese Days (p. 117), when Floryhas to answer to whether or not one socialises with them: Good

gracious, no. Theyre complete outcasts. They could be used to guard

Burman prisoners or as clerks but they were looked down upon by both

sides.

This multi-ethnic colonial model has been labelled the plural

societyand has been defined and critically assessed by colonial official

J.S. Furnivall:

Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and

language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but

only in the market-place. There is a plural society, with different

sections of the community living side by side, but separately,

within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there

is a division of labouralong racial linesthe union cannot be

dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy.14

13. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:10) has commented upon the significance of thisfear. She says that mixed marriages were a blow against the very roots ofBurmese manhood and racial purity. See also KhinYi (1988:96).



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Thus, the colonial power established its hegemony with an inbuilt

doomsday prophecy: when the colonial union model disintegrates,

everything collapses into chaos. It is precisely this fear which has

fuelled the last thirty years of military rule. This model contained an

acknowledgement of cultural differences, due to different stages on theevolutionary ladder, leading necessarily to a division of labour based on

race. As we shall see later on, race still plays a role in nationalist

political rhetoric.

The pluralistic models division of labour was also reflected in class

relations. The middle classes were dominated by Indians, while

prominent Burman political leaders in the 1930s were often dependent

on Indian financial backing of their political ventures. These leaders

were usually lawyers and rarely independent businessmen. In addition,the Indians were interested in allying themselves with Burman

politicians in order to assure their influence in banking and trade

circles.15

The wholesale trade in provisions and medicine was dominated by

Indians (as was banking and moneylending). Obviously the Europeans

controlled the large oil, timber, mining and transport firms. This

unequal class relationship can be proved by examining the taxation

system in Rangoon, where the Indians contributed 55 per cent of alltaxes, the Europeans 15 per cent and the Burmans 11 per cent.16 The rest

came from all other groups. This distorted development is an important

factor that has augmented the ethnic race-related oppositions and

emphasised that the kala controlled everything. This was also

demonstrated by the composition of the student body. The educational

system favoured Christians via the mission schools. In the 1930s two-

thirds of university students came from the minority ethnic groups,

including Indians, who, for example, comprised one-third of themedical students.17

In the nineteenth century, the British attempted to use the monastic

schools to teach English, geography and mathematics, but many monks

were opposed to this as they considered these subjects as anti-Buddhist.

14. Furnivall (1956:304, my emphasis). Furnivalls Fabianism inspired some of

the young Burman nationalists. He was U Nus advisor in the 1950s.15. Taylor (1981, 1987) proves the political importance of the poorly developedBurman middle class and the Indian influence on Burman politics, at timesunderlined by economic support. The disclosure of this connection cost Ba Mawhis position as prime minister in 1939.



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The primary goal of the Christian schools was to promote conversion to

Christianity and only thereafter to educate and civilise. The colonial

power, however, wanted education to be a part of the division of labour

and colonial rule. The missionaries created deeper ethnic divisions by

favouring those minority groups they converted, namely the Karen,Kachin and Chin. In the 1930s, they realised that if Buddhist Burmans

acquired greater influence or even independence, this policy could work

against their interests. Futhermore, educational policy became the

fundamental issue of the Burman national movement, which was led by

students. Thus the colonial power realised quite early on that the

division of labour along racial lines resulted in unintended opposition.

In order to create a united identity out of this plurality, a committee to

ascertain and advise how the imperial idea may be inculcated andfostered in schools and colleges in Burma was founded in 1917. This

consisted of eight British senior officials, four missionaries and only

two Burmans. Symbols such as the Union Jack and the national anthem

were to be promoted, as was Burmas own history and literatureas

part of the Empire. A sense of unity of Empire was to be created: one

Empiremany cultures; one hegemonic identity above the many.

This political and economic policy of divide and rule, with its total

opposition between the club mentality notion of segregation and theunification of the pluralistic society within a single union, expressed

itself in the form of a hegemonic set of conventions and stereotypes

whereby ethnic, religious and cultural differences became the yardstick

of national identity and political power. Some examples taken from the

period preceding the Second World War will show how xenophobia and

fear ingrained themselves in the ruling mentality.

16. Taylor (1987:13336).

17. The division of students in Rangoon University according to religionindicates the following: Buddhists 32.2%, indigenous Christians 14.5%,Europeans and Anglo-Burmans 9.9%, Hindus 29.8%, Muslims 5.3% and others(encl. Sikhs) 8.0% (Bless, 1990:252). His book includes a well-documentedanalysis of the division of labour under colonial rule.



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32


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5.

BUDDHISM, XENOPHOBIAAND

REBELLION IN THE 1930S

Following the pacification and its humiliation of the Burman social

order, Buddhism returned as a political medium in 1906 when theYoung Mens Buddhist Association (YMBA) was established in

response to Christian dominance.1 The YMBA was an imitation of the

YMCA but it was a political organisation meant as an alternative to

Christian influence. It was especially attractive to young Burmans who

had been educated in the West. The YMBAs goal was to halt Western

influence and to regain respect for Burman culture as well as for

Buddhism. This was achieved through no footwear in the pagodas

campaigns, for example

Documents

Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma