7
n ·CLASSIFI ·0 E.O. 12958. as ilt11 cndt:d . Sect J.S h5 .... "\ By £AL Date o/! z. <f/ o / T HE W H I T E H O U S E W A S H I N := T Q N Ja. nu a r 2.}. 19 69 M errlOra n dum ] Natio n al Se TO : T he S ecr etary of Stat e The Se cretar y of De fen se The Dir e ct or of C entral Int ellig en ce SU 13 JE CT: Situ ati on in V'i e t n arri In a n e ffo rt t o d e v e l o p an agre ed ev al ua t io n of th e s i tu a tio n 111 Vietn arn as a b asis fo r rna. ki n g p oli cy dec is io ns , th e Pr e si dent has di rec te d that e ac h a d dr es see of thi s rn e rn or a n u rn , t he U.S. A n b a s s a d o r il l S ai g on, the J oint Ch iefs of St aff, and MACV pr e- p a r e a s e p a r a t e r e s p o n s e t o th e att ac he dq ues tio ns . T he an sw rs .h ou ld in c lu d e a di s cus si on of un c er tainti es and pos sibl e alt ern ati ve i n tc rpr e t at.i o n s of ex is ti n g d at a. ':' he Pr e sident wis h e s t o r ec ei ve, as we ll , th e S e c r e t a r y o f .. t ate IS c orrr m e n t s o n the Arn bass ador I s r e s p o n s e , a n a t he c orn rn n 5 of th e Se cr et ar y of De f en s e o n t he re sp o nses of t h e J o i n t Cb i c I s of S t a ff: and MA C V. A l ' r c p l i cs sh ould be fo rwa r ded to th e P r esi d ent byFebruary 10 , 19 6 9. ---- 7 -&E € R-E-F-

National Security Study Memorandum 1

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n ·CLASSIFI ·0 E.O. 12958. asilt11 cndt:d . Sect J.S #SC /~*'~ h5....~ , "\ "' ''I/~ ,., Iz. n, z.. By £AL Date o/! z. <f/ o / T HE W H I T E H O U S E

W A S H I N := T Q N

Ja.nua r 2.}. 19 69

M errlOran dum ]Nation al Se

TO: T he Secr etary of Stat e The S e cretary of D e fen s e The Dir e ctor of C entral Intelligen c e

S U 13 JEC T : Situati on in V'i e t n arri

In a n e ffo rt t o d e v e l o p an a g r e ed evaluat ion of the s i tua tion 111 V i e t n arn as a b asis fo r rna.kin g p oli c y dec is ions , the Pr e sident

has d i rec te d th a t e ac h a d dr es s e e of thi s rn e rnora n u rn , the U . S . A n b a s s a d o r il l S ai g on, the J oint C h iefs of Staff, and MACV pr e ­p a r e a s e p a r a t e r e s p o n s e t o the a t t ac he d q ues tions . T he an s w r s . h ou ld in c lud e a di s cus si on of un c er tainti e s and p o s sibl e alternati v e i n tc rpr e t at.i o n s of exi s ti n g d ata.

':'he Pr e sident wis h e s t o r eceive, as we ll , the S e c r e t a r y o f

.. t a t e I S c orrr m e n t s o n the Arnb a s s ador I s r e s p o n s e , a n a t he c orn rn n 5

o f the S e cr etar y of Def en s e o n t he re sp onses of th e J o i n t Cb i c I s of S t a ff: and MAC V.

A l ' r c p l i c s should b e fo rwar ded t o the P r esi d ent b y F e b r u a r y 10 , 196 9.

---- 7

-&E € R-E-F­

--------- - -

8E C R £Lf

V I E TNAM Q UES T IO NS

Enviro n rn e n t of Neg o tia t i o ns

1. Why is t h e D R in P a r i s ? What i s th e e v ide nce?

(A mon g th e hypotheses :

a . O ut o f w e a.k ne s s , to accep t a face - sav ing f o r rnu l a f or defe a t.

b. T o ne got iate the w i t h d r awa l of U . S. (a nd NVA ) f or c e s , a n d /o r

a compro m ise p o l i t ica l set tle ment , gi ving a c hance f or N LF

v ic to r y in th e S o u th .

c . T o g ive t h U . S . a f a c e-sa vin g wa y t o w i t h d raw .

d. T o U1 d r rri i.n e t h e G V N and U . S . /GV N r elation s , a n d t o r e li e v e U . S . m ilit a r y pr e s sur e in both N o r t h and Sou t h V'i e t n a rn .

e . O ut; o f d e sire to end Lhe lo s s e s a n d c osts of wa r all th e b ss t t e r m s

a tt a ina b le. )

2. W h a t i s t h e at u r e o f e vid enc e, a n d h o w a.de quate is i t , underlying compe in g

v i ew s (a s in the rno st r e c ent I\TIE on thi s subj e ct , w ith i t s di ss e n ti n g f o o t ­

not es) of the i m p a c t o f va r ious OUtCOlll CS in V'i e t n a rri w i t hin S ou theast A sia ?

3. H ow s oundly-b a s ed i s th e cornman b elief that H anoi is u n der a ctiv e p ress ure

wi t h r e s p e c t t o t h e P ari s n e g otiati ons fr om Mo sco w (for) and Pe k in g

(a ga in s t ? Is i t. cle a r that eit he r Moscow o r P eking b e lie v e t.he y have, or

a re wi ll i n g t o u s e , s ign if i c a n t l e v era g e o n H a n o i ' s p ol i ci e s ? W hat i s the n a t u r e of e v i d 'n e e , oth e r .h a.n publi c o r privat e off ic ia l s t a t e rrie n t s ?

4 . Ho w sou n d i s ou r k no w ledge o f th e exis tence and s ig nifi cance of s t a b l e " M o s c o w ' ! a n d " P e k in g " f a ction s wi t h in tb e H a n oi l e ader ship, as d ist in ct ,

f or e x a.mp I e , fr om s ift i n g f a cti ons, a ll o f whom r e c o gni z e the nee d t o b a lance

o ff b o t h a llies? H ow. c h d o we k n o w, in gene ra l , o f i n t r a p a r t y dispu tes

a nd per s o n a Li.t i. e s w i t h in Ha no i?

NVA /V C

5. What i s th e e v i de nce s u p porting var ious h yp othe s e s , a n d the ove ra ll

a d e q u ac y of ev ide nce , re la ti ng t o th e f oll o wing que s t i o n s :

a . W .1Y d id NVA unit s l e a v e S outh Vi e t n arn l a st s rrirrr e r a n d f all ?

b . Di d the p r edicted "th ird-wave offe n s i ve " by the NVA/VC actua lly

-SE CR E T- 2.

tak e p l ac e ? If so, w h y did it not a ch ieve gre ater s uc ce s s?

c . W h y a re v e guerrillas a n d l o c a l f o rces now r e l a t i v e l y d or m ant ?

(Among the h ypothe s es: 1) r e spons e t o Ve/NVA b a tt l e l o s s e s , f or cing wit hdrawa l o r p as sivity; 2) t o p ut d ip lom a ti c p re ssu re on U . S. t o m ov e t o s u bs tan tive t a lks in Pa r Ls; 3) t o pr epar e fo r futur e ope ra ­tions ; a n d/ o r 4 ) pr e s su r e of U . S. a n d all i e d ope ration s . )

6 . W hat i ;; :: e of NV A/V e a t t r i t ion would outrun the i r a b il i t y t o r ep l enish by in fi lt rati o n a nd r e c r itm e nt , a s c u r r e n tly calc u lated? D o p re se n t op er a tion s a d i e v e th i s ? If n ot , what fo rce l e vel s a n d o t he r c o n d i ti ons w ould b e n e c es ­s a r y ? Is th e r e a ny evide nce the y a r e conce r ne d a b o u t c o n t i n u i ng h e a v y

l o s s es ?

7 . T o what r e l a t i ve e x te n t do th e U . S . / R V NAF a n d t h e NV A l v c: sha r e i n the c ont r o l a nd t he rate o f V C /NVA a t t r i t ion ; i , e ., t o w ha t e x tent , in t e r rrr s o f o u r t a ctical -e ;per i enc e , c a n h e a v y l o s s e s p er sistently be i m p o s e d on VC / N VA f o rces , d e s p it e t h eir p oss ib l e int ention t o li m it cas ualt ie s b y avo id i ng c on tact?

(A 10 n g th e ry pot h e s e s :

a . C o n t a c t i s p r e d o m ir.aruLv a t VC t a cti c al i nit i.a.t i ve , a n d we can n o t r e v er s e th i s ; VC n e ed s u ffe r high casua lt ies o n ly so l o n g as :n e y a re will i n g to accep t the m, i n seek i ng con tac t ; o r

b . Cur r e n t VC/NV A 10 s s r at e s can b e ma i n ta ine d b y p re s ent fo r ce s - - a s in c r e a s e d X% by Y a d d i ti ona l f o r c e s -- whateve r th e DR V / V C c hoose t o do, sho r t of f urt h e r majo r withdr awal. )

8. W h at con t r ove r s ie s pe r s is t o n th e es t imate o f VC O r de r of B a ttle ; i n p art i cu­l a r . 0 ' 1 t1 e va r iou s catego r ies of gue rr i lla f o rce s a n d infr a structur e ? O n V C r e c r u i t in g , a n d rn a n p o w e r p ool ? What is t h e e v idence for d i ffer e n t e s t i. rri at e s , a n d what is the ove ra ll a de q uacy of e v i de nce?

9 . W b a t a re NV A/ VC ca a b i l i t i e s fo r l a u n c h in g a la r g e -s c a.l e offe nsiv e, w i th " d r a m a t ic! ' r e s u lt s (eve n if t a k i n g high c a s u a lt i e s a nd with ou t holding o b ­j e c ti v es l o n g ), i n t h e ne x t six mo n t hs ? (e . g . , a n off en s i v e a g ainst oue or m o r e c i t ie s, o r aga in s t m ost n ewly " pac if ied " h amlets.) H o w a de qua te i s t h e ev ide nce?

10. What a r e t h e m a i n cha nne ls f or mil it a r y s u p p l ies for f: h e N V A / V C fo rces in : V N , (e. g . , Camb o d ia a nd/o r t h e L a oti an p a n ra n d l e } ? What portion o f tl e s e supp lie s c o rne i n t h r ou g h S ihanoukv i lle?

-8E GR := 3 .

R V N A F

l Oa , W h a d iff e r e n c e s o f 0p lnlO n exis t conce r n i ng extent of RVNAF i rnp r o ve rne nt ,

a n d wha t i s ev idence underlying differ ent v ie w s? (e . g . , compare r e c ent C IA

m e m o wi t h M ACV v iews . ) Fo r exa m p le :

a . W h ic h i s t ri e l e v el of e ffect ive , rrro b i Le , offe ns ive ope rat ions? What

r e s u lt s a re t h e y ach ievi ng?

b. W h a i s the ac t ua l l e v el o f ITg e nuine l1 s mall - u n i t ac ti o n s a n d " ight a c t i o n s

in ARVN , R F a n d PF: i. e. , act ions t hat wou l d typ ica lly b e classed as

s u c h w ith in Lh e U. S . A r rny , a n d in p a r ticular, offens ive arnbu s hes a n d

pat r o ls? H o w much ha s th i s c ha nge d?

c . Ho w muc h h a s the offi c er s ele ction a nd p romotion sys te m, and the qu al i t y o f l e ader ship , actually c hanged ove r the y e a r s (a s d i st i ri c t fr om c hange s

i n paper "prog rams II) ? H o w m any junior o ff icer s h old c o mrni ss ion s ( i n

p articula r, b a tt l efi eld comm is s ions fr om NC O r ank) d e s pit e l a ck of a

h i gh schoo l diploma ?

d. W h at k now n di s ciplina r y ac t ion h a s r e sult e d fr om ARVN l o o t i n g of c iv i lians in the pas t y e ar (f or exa mple , the w ide spread l o o t ing t h a t t o ok

place las t sp r ing )?

e . T o what e xtent h ave past "an t i vd e s e r-t i o n" d e cr e e s and effo r ts l es s ened th e

r ate of de se rt ion ; w h y h a s th e r a te r e c ently b e en i n c r e a s iri g t o n e w h i gh s?

f. What s uccess are t he RF and P F h aving in p rovidi n g l o c al secu ri t y a n d r e­

d u c i n g VC c ontr o l a n d influen c e in rural pop u Ia.r i on s ?

11. To \; hat exte n t cou ld R V N A F -- as it i s n o w - - h and l e t h e VC (M a in Force,

l o c al f or c e s, guer r i llas ), with o r with out U . S . c o m b a t s u pport to fill RV N A F de f ic ienc ies , if a ll VNA units we re w it h drawn:

a . if V C s t ill h a d N o r the r n fill ers.

b . If a ll No r h e r ne r s (b u t not r e gr oupe e s) we re w i t 1 r a w n .

12, To w hat exte n t cou l d RVNAF - - a s it is n ow -- a lso h a ndl e a s izeab le

l e v el of N V A f o rces :

a . W it h U . S . a i r a n d a r ti lle r y s u p p ort.

b . With a b ove a nd a lso U . S . g rou n d fo rces lTI r es e r v e.

c . W it hout U.S. direct s uppo rt , but w i th incr e a s ed R V N A F a rt i lle r y a n d

;} i t: capac i t y ?

4.

13 . Wha t , in va r ious v iews , a re the r equir e d c h a nge s in RVNAF comman d,

o r g a n i zat io n , e q u ip men t , tr a inin g and in c e ntiv e s , i n p olitic al e nv i r o nrnent . in l o g i s ti c al suppo r t , in U , S . m o d e s o f influenc e -- f or making R V N A F

ade q u a t e to the tasks cit e d in que stion s 9 a nd 10 above? H o w long wou ld

this t a 'k e ? W h a t a re the pr a cti c al obstac les t o t h e s e c ha nges , a nd what new

U . S . .m ov e s wo u ld be n e e d e d t o ove rcome the s e ?

P a c i fi c at ion

14. H ow rnu c h , a n d w h e re , h a s th e secu r ity s i t uation and th e b al a n c e o f in­flu e n c e be w e e n t h e VC a nd NLF ac tually c hange d in the cou n t rys ide ove r t irne , co n t ras ting t h e pr e s e nt t o s uch benchma rks as e n d -6 1, e n d - 63 , end ­65 , e n d - 6 7 ? W hat a re the best indi c ator s o f s uc h c hange , o r l a c k of i t ?

What f a ctors h ave been m ainl y resp o n sib le f or s uch c hange as h a s o c c u r r zd ?

W hy h a s the r e not b e e n rno r e ?

15 . W h a t a 1"8 the r e a s on s fo r expect i ng rno r e c hange i n th e countrys i de in the

n e xt t w o y e ar s t h a n in pas t i n t er v al s ? W hat are t e r e a s o n s fo r not exp ec ti ng

rrro r e ? Wha t changes in R V N A F, GVN, U . S., a n d VC p rac t ices and a daptive­

ne s s w ou l d b e n e ed e d 10 i n cr e a s e f a v ora ble c hange in secu r i ty a n d cont rol?

H ow lik e l y a re s uch c hanges, i ndividually a n d t og ether ; wha t a re the,

o b s t ac l e s?

16 . W h a t p r o p o r ti on of t he rural p opulati o n rnu st b e r e gard ed as I's ubjec t t o

s ign i f ican t \r c pre sence a n d influ enc e 1r ? (H o w sh ou l d h a m l e t s r at ed as ;, ... :1 ' in the H a m l e t E v aluation S ys te m - - th e l ar g e st catego ry - - b e r e g arded in

thi s r e s pe ct P ) In p a r ticular , what p ropo r tion i n the pro vin c e s s u r round ing

Sa igon? H o w muc h h a s thi s c ha nge d?

17. W h a t 11U b e l' o rverified numb er s of th e Co rnrrrun i.s t p ol.i.t i c a l a p pa r a t u s ( i, e. ,

People ! s Revo l u t ionary Party rne rnb e r s , the h ard - c or e Ilin f r a sl:ru ctll r e rl ) h a v e

bee n a r res te d o r k i lled in .h e p a s t y e ar ? H o w rn a n y o f the s e w er e cad re of

h igh e r t h a n v i llage l e v el ? W h at p r oportion d o t r e s e r epr e sent of t o t a l P R P

rrre m b e r sh ip , a n d h o w rnu c h -- a n d how long - - h a d the a ppara t u s b e e n di s­

r u p t e d ?

18 , W I at a r e t h e reasons fo r b elie ving that c ur ren t a n d fu h r e effo r ts a t

" z- o o t i g ou t" h a l' I - c o r e infra s t ruc tur e w i ll b e -- o r w ill n ot b e -- mo re succ e s s ful than p a st effo rts? For e xarrrp l e , fo r b eli e v i n g t h a t c o llab o r a tion amo n g IH~ n u m e r ou s V'i e t na rne s e int ellig e n c e age ncies w ill b e marke d ly more t h o r o ugh tha n in th e p a s t ? What a re the s ide -effe cts, e . g ., on V ie t na mese

cpi nio n , o f a n t i -inf ras t r uc t u re c a rrrpa i.g n s s uch as t h e c u r rent "a cc e l er- a te d

e ffor L, I I a lan w i t . h e i r l a sting e ffect on h ar d- c o r e a p pa a L s?

19. Ho w ade q u a te i s ou r infor m atio n o n t he ove ra ll sca le a n d i n cid en c e o f d arna g e

t o c iv ilians b y ai r a n d a r t i lle ry , a n d l o oting a rid m i s b e h a v io r by R V N A F ?

2 0 . To wh a t exte n t do r e c ent c hanges in c ornrrian.d and a d rn i n i s t r a t i o n affec t ing

5.

the cou n t r y-sid e r epres ent rnov es to i mp r o ve c o m p e te n c e , as dis t inct frorn r ep l a c e e n t o f o n e clique by a not he r? What is t h e basis of j u d g rn - n r? W h a t i s t h e i rnp a c t of the r e c ent r erno v al of m in or i t y -g rou p pr ovinc e and district officials (Boa H a o , C ao Dai , M o n tagna r d ) i n th eir r e s p e ctiv e a re a s?

P o l i ic s

21. H o w a d e q u a t e i s o u r inforrnation . a n d what is it b a s ed upon , c onc e r n i.ng :

a . A ttitu d es of V i e tna rnese e li te s n ot no w clo s ely a ligne d w i t h the G V N (t~ . g . , r eligi ous l e ader s , pr ofessors, youth l e aders, pr ofessionals, u n i o n l eaders , v illage n otable s) t o w ard s: P arti cipation -- if offe r ed in t h e GVN ; t h e c u r ren t l e gitimacy a n d a cc e p t a b i l i t y of th e G V N; lik e­w i se (given I;p e a c e " ) f or th e NLF or v ari ou s " n e utr alist " coali t i on s; tow ards U. S . int ent, as t h e y interpr et it (e . g . , u. ....:. plan s fo r e n d ing t h e w a r , p er c eiv ed U . S . a l ig n rnen t s with p a r t icula r individuals and for c e s within Vi etnam, U. S. COnce r n f or va r iou s V ie t na me se i n t e r e s t s ) .

b. P a tt e r n s o f e x i s t e n t politi c al a l i g nrrren t s within G VN I R V N AF a n d ou t s i de it - - re fle c t i n g Ia rn i .Ly ti es , c o r r u p ti o n , o ff ice r s ' c Ia s s , s e cr e t or gani­z a tion s a nd p a r t i e s, r eligiou s a n d r egional b ackgrou nd -- as the s e b e a r up o n b ell" v i o r w i t 1 r espect t o th e w a r , th e N L F , r e fo r m and b r o a d e n i ng of t h e VN, a nd r e spon s es to U. S. influenc e a n d i.n t e r v e n t: i o n .

22. W h a t is th e e v i dence on th e prospects -- a nd on w h a t c hange s in cond i t ion s ana U . S. p olicie s would incr e as e or d ecrea s e t h e rn -- for cha nge s in th e G VN t o w a r d : (a) br o ad ening o f th e g ove rnrnent t o include pa r t i cipa t ion o f a ll signif ic a n t non-i C o m rnu.ni sr r e gi onal a n d r eli gious group ings (a t p r ov ince and d istrict l evels , a s w ell a s c abinet) ; ~ L; strong er e rrrpha s i s , in sele ction a n d pro m o t ion of offic er s and official s , on c ornp et e n ce a n d pe r f o r mance (a s i n tl e C o rri rnu n i s t V ie t n a m.e se s y stem) a s distinc t f r o m c o n s ide r a ti o n s of fa rn ily, c or r u p t ion , a n d s ocial (e . g . , e d u cat iona l ) b a c k g r ou n d ; a n d (c) p o litic al rno b i. l i z a t i on of n on Cornrriun i s t s y rn pa t h ies and e ner g ies inv

supp ort of t h e VN, a s e v ide nce d, e . g., by r educ ed d e s e r ion, by willing align m .e n t of r eligi ou s , provincial a n d ot h e r l e aders e i t h the GVN , by wid e co ope rat ion wit h a n t i -co r r u p t ion and pro- e ff ic i e n c y d r iv e s.

2 3 . H ow c ri t i c a l , in va r i o u s v i e w s , i s each o f the changes in que s t i o n 22 a b ove to p r ospect s of a t a i .ni.n g -- at c u r ren t , r edu c ed o r incr e as ed l e v e l s of U . S . m i l ita ry e ffo r t - - e i t he r "victor y, !l or a s t r on non c Cornmuni s t political r ole a fte r a c o rnp r o m.i s e set tle rnent of h o s ti l i t i es ? What a re views of th e ri sks a t te n dan t t o rna.k i n g the s e chang e s , o r att e rnpt i n z th em ; a n d , t o t h e e x ten t that U. S . influenc e is required , on U . S. practi c al a bi1i l y to rnov e prud - n t l y a n d e ffe c t ive ly in h i s d irection ? What i s the evide n ce ?

-SE CRE T

U . S . O p e r ati on s

24. How do mili t a r y d e pl o yment a n d tacti cs t od a y differ fro m those o f 6 - 12 mont h s ago? What a re r e a s on s f or c hanges, a n d wha t h a s th i s i mpa c t b e e n ?

2 5 . In wh a t di ff er ent way s (including in n ov ati ons in org a l i zaLion) rn i g h t U. S . f o r c e -l e v e h b r e d uced t o va r ious l e v e l s , w h ile rn i n i rn i z i n g impact o n co m b a L capab i li ty ?

26. Wh a t. is th e evide nce on the s c ale o f e ffect o f B - 5 2 a ttacks i n pro du cin g VC!N V A casua lt ies? In di srupting VC!NVA o p er ations ? How valid a re e s t i rrr a.t e s of ov e r a l I e ffec t?

2 7. Wha l e ff e c t i s the Laot i a n int erdiction bombing h a ving:

a . In r e ducing t h e capac ity o f th e e nemy l o gi sti c s y stem?

b . I n d estr o y i n g ma te r ie l in tr an s i t ?

2 8 . W it h rega r d t o t h e bomb i ng of No r t h V ie t nam :

a . What evidence was there o n the s i g n if i c a.n c e o f th e p r incipal st r ai n s 11 p o s e d o n th e DRV (e . g . , in econo m ic d i s r u p t ion, ext ra m anp ower d e rria nd s , tr an spor t ation blo ck a g e s, pop u lation m orale) ?

b. Wha t was the l e v el of l o gi stic a.l t h roug h -pu t t h r o u g h t h e Sout h e rn pr o vin c e s of NVN ju st prior t o th e N ove m be r b ombin g h alt ? 'To wh a t exte nt did t h i s l e v el r efle ct the r e suIt s o f t he U . S. b ombing ca m pa ign?

c . To what exten t d id Ch ine se a n d Sovie t a id r elie v e pr e s s u re on H ano i ?

d . What a re c u r re nt v iews on the proportion of wa r -essentia l import s th a t cou l d c o rne int o NVN ave r' t h e r ail or r oad line s from ,hina, c v I i f a ll impo r t s by sea w er e d enied a n d a s t rong e ff o r t even m ad e to in t e r d i c t g r o u n d trans p ort ? What i s the evi de nce?

e . What actio n h as t he DRV taken t o r e du c e the v u lne ra b ilit y a n d impo r t a n c e o f H a n o i as a popula tion a n d ec o n o mic cente r (e . g . , th r ough p op u l a.t i o n e vacuatio n a n d econo m ic disp er s al) ?