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A REPORT •
fo TH£ ·
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
' ( TilE NSC PLAh11U:G BOARD
.. ' " . ··' . ,• UliiTED ST~ti'S· ~I.CUCS ncoiEDl.\t'EL'i' FOLLO'AIIIQ AN /JUIIST !CS ):N KCI\1!,\ . . .
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Ju."\• 15, 1953
·' WASIINCTON
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IISC lS'•
Juno 1>, 1953
IIOTE D~ l'llE EJC£CU1I'I£ S£CR&T IJW
to the
NA1IOKI.L StcUltiT'l CCUNCIL
Oft
(2)
• 1'he enclosed drf.l rt at a t cr:~ent Or polj.cy on th6 subject 1
propot'od by the N.SC Planning Boec-d ln r csponu to lJSC 1\cUon ~~o. '1?1-!1. ( 2 ), h stabctttotl here•.rith. tor conslderatio:'l by: the, ~lat.1onal Sec urity Council at !ts cneetlnr; on Juno 18. Al.so enclosed is lA NSC store stu4y to: co~cll 1nrorcat1~ 1n tbla connect.!or. .
tho enclosur e incorporates rel~~ant cou:~es ot oction Cr03 118/2 and 1$ tnttnd•a, it aCopted, to supersed~ pnrat~B,hs · and 2-~ or t4SC 11612.
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Tho Planni ng Bqara I• p~oparlng ror.Gub,cquent Council con:s1<loration o rcpor t on tho; _positibn: ~o·htoh· th'>. Ut11tod .stat-es shoul d toke during tho pol1t1cal ner;ot1utiOM v1th respect t o tho Republ ic or Korcn, ·os called tor~~ parocr0p~ l? or t no enClosed stat ement oC policy , • · _ ~ . . . · - , · . . : .. · .
' It 1s reco:::)ende<t th:~.t: it .tho'' enelo.std s~nte=ent ot poUey · ls •~opted, it be su~ltt~ ~ the Fres14cnt vlth the reco~•t1on that he approve it and 41rcet lt; !cploaentatton by ·all · npprcpr1c;t.!} cxe.c:uUvo dopart1:1ent s ~ .. nd aeoncios ort.he' u. s. COvorf! ... ~ent under the eoo:-d1nat1cn of t.ho Socrotar!es t;~!' Stato nnCS to;-ense. · '
co: The The Tho
.r1~c l $4
JAY.£$ S. LA'z', Jr, Exccut1vo S6eretery
Socrotar)' or tho 'l'rcasu.rr Ch:~irz:mn, Johlt Chlefs ot Storr Dir~ctor qr ConLr~l Int~lllccnoo
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( StA1DHEUT .O? POLICY
Proposo:l by the
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• IIA'I'IOllAL SECURI1Y. COUliCIL
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·1. An a.mlsUee ln Korto vould not indicate th.at ccX:.:.intst
' 'Ghina ha4 4bandoned 1ts · ba~1e objcetivos or its v1111~enooc to··
s eek thO.:IO objectl'105 by 8!'QCd t o ree.' 'i'ho d'on8er of neu'ress.1o:i~ veul4 ~onha.uc , p.art.tcul.arly' l n So\!tnea$t Ado , vh lle tho Co!s- ·
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... ·.:nunbts vould attEmpt to: explo1t t he arm1stice'•as ·a , tact.lcal.'' ..
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dovicG to w~oKcn and dl v!do thO !rea Worl d ( · : · · ·. ~: ..
'!·.:.: 2, ~ A!~er ~a armlSt iee' ~ht CilJ~t·~alHos of' the Uit.1i;d - \ . , 'f·: • States vould be 1ncrooslngly ur.vllllns to support tho UnJte1 - . . States '1,n...e~3.1nto1n'in& poUUcnl and e conomic :>ressuros :a&dns,t , : . . . '
Coaut~u.nht Chlna. Ao a re~ult, OxlstY~& d.itforenees bet•o'en the
Unit.ed St6tes ac.d .1\J. ci.a.Jor ~lUes over poUey to·.:a.r«fChln~
vo·.11d bo 1ntens1tlod1 and thls mltht le~d t.o a .Soriou' bnach
· · bot \.!Oon tho United ,States .. and, Ha m"Jor alllo:: ovor tho Pllr E:as t. . . . ,· . . ., .
•7h13 H~tC!:lcnt. or f10L\e>71~ ''baJtd en tho os:umptlon tN.: the Rc)ub\t~ or Xurea wJll coo~eTot.c S~l1SCnetot1ly vlth the ~ .in c.uryhlG o~.tt the tore:. or tho utn1H1ee, · ·
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J. It is important to our nati cnnl s ecurity-, ns '-'Oll o.s '
to the objectl'>'C of obt.t&1n1ne an acceptable settl Omont in Korett, ....----t hat pol1t 1cal and economic pr~ssutos ata1n~t Co~unlst China '
I • ' ,I be do•, oloped a.r'ld mnintaincd aurlng t he lr::o:~ed!a.tc post-ornhtieo
pe·rlod , o.nd that the ex'peoted opposition or our major "Cl l1os: ·to .. s uch ptoessur es be o\·e reome .• '
. IIlli.ll!M CC\!RS!lS CP ACTtO!!
(to be pursued during the pol i t ical negotiations ' ror a ~oaco
and u.nttl -o -rcvlc•,.r or basic u. s. P<?lietos tow::Jrd China an'd-
tow~rc1 Koroa is cocpletcd) ...
~(l!'!~UtS'i er..ups_t Communi_!;: b ChJ np .
• . t •• • • C~~t;nue 'to :.;c.eo~!to t n'o· ;~ve·~~o~~ .Ot .:t~a-. Repu~l.t_c: · : .,· ' '; • . .• ·.--:· :: • • ·, ~· : ·· : .':'.; . · . ·,.;: ._,: ... . ... · ••••• :.; .. \'7 ' ' , •1' ' • .. · · l::'·-:.; .
p f ·~China .ort t'o.r~Iosa C$ tho Gowornmcnt ·of au China;· ~antf-·as 'tho . · ·····. · : . . . :. , .. . o~ · ; ...... · · • sOle' :-optc:~cntat-Lv~ or Chin" 'tn .. thO ·uu and till otho'r·'i nt(>r-·. · ~· ............. ,.,·, ·: · · .. _:.·~ · :' {··: .':.:, .. ':· .. · :; ... ·.·~ . . · .. , ·. ;_,
nationa.l org~ns; cont. inc~ to ex.ten~ ·economi c 6nd' ~f.J:ltaTy aid ' . .' . .· ' ' ' ' . . . .
to: ~ho itopubJ:l c of Ctl1[1~ on' E'ormos&... . . · . ~ ':"
) .. _us~ all ,r~a.slble m~ans to p'~~vont ··~oatl~g o'( t ho
Ch1nosll COt>.ounlst rogimo in the UN and rolnted bodiOs • .. • "6. Continue the U.S. te>tal oab~rgo on trado with Com·
~unlst~China, prohibi tion or U.S. shlppi ns to · Co~~~ist China,
and our~cnt'r1noq~i~l ccnt r Ols Wit~ r~~poc t to' Commurtl$t,Ch1na . . . . ' . ...
"..:,_· 7.- ' Ne.ke every f e.:lsible ~·rtort t o induce Otl\cr tree ,world ·· ~-~~rlc~ ,; pcndtnc a s'ot tlcMnt regarding K~t-oa· :'· (aJ tO· ino1~- .
~ ' . .... . tol n tholr e urrent levels or control s and rcsyr1ct1cms o·,~·r
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trade 3nd $hlpp1nc v l t h Co~~1Jst ChJno ~~4 . Nortti Xore3 1 And ,
vhere po$$lblo, to extend their toboreo 11St$ to lnelude the
rcnna 1nt.n&•l :OC':IliS hitherto propos•d by tho Uottod Stoto, , ol.ther
b1lato~~lll or in mul tlloter al bcdi os ; a nd (b) t o t l chten en
rorce~e~t or such r estri ctions .
8 . Together wlth tho oth.or 15 co- s J.gnatort es, iuue the
~,reater saoettons• stat~ent• 1aa641atoly after an eraist1ee
1D s lgned 1 in order to d~roOn$tr~to' that tho 16 UN members now
portie lpa t inc ln ~h e J\oreon a ct l on illll . a galn be un1ted and ·
pr o=pt i n r es lst1ng a rer.ewal ot uaed Atttaek 1 4nd to '\.~ern tho
•8£TC$sor t hot 1n all proba~111ty 1t would net bo.poss i ble to •
eonr1ao hOSt111tlCS V1thin tho !ront1CT3 Of !Qroa 1! ther e '
is o r eneval or oraed aLtock.
9. lssu~, wHh F'ra."leo, t ho trt. , Aus tralio· o.n<l llcw Zeahnd,
and M ~:~a11y ot hor co-sign{'l: t or1os tit p~ss 1bl~ , o supplement al
~ 3tete111ent to tho etrt e t that any co~tn~pt.h t a(';t;rosslon else·.oh~ero . '
1n Asl~, tollcv1nt the a~st1co, vould be eons1dtre4 1r.c~~-
t 1stent , v1th it' terms and purposot . ; • ... . . ' 10.' ·cont'1nuc ti J)rog·r(l~t~ (l r· covert.,' opo~At1ons 4osicned to
C:t:Jls l in tt·.o a.chicvf! .:=ont of u.s . obJ,ectt;/et' u ~'s-a-v 1s CciP
aunlsl Chino o.t1d Korea. •.
11 . r.ta.ii.t aln UN m111t3:r y otrcrict.h in Korc~· at ~ l o \'el
• • c'on:;i :;~cnt '"'it.h U'.':). objce'tl 'J C!l ond ,·ith t h() t CtrrM of the
·.ornlst lee .
·r~r \CAt or SL3tccent , sec hnnox . r~ .iC 1S4 - ) -
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.. 12. Carty on ~ vlr;orous c:lcpat.cn. to se:<:uro addUlonl.l
armed rorcos fro.c othor UN n~ors tor scrt1Co ln Korea,. vlth
a \•lev to po~:>iblo llm l ted rctloploy!llont ot U.S. forces .
~csurlty tp lm Fprsra
13. Continue ;in. effect all portinent 1natruet1ons to the ·•
UlJ Command Jnvol1Jf ng tho lll31ntononce or tho uecu'Hty oC' Ull
forces in tho Korean or~a .
11~. On the ""'·uoptlon t ho.t tho Ropublic oC Korea v1ll
cooperoto :~ at1sractor1ly ..,.ith th~ tm 1n c'llr:y1ns: out tho t e ros
ot tho &tQ1st1~: ' .
A• .Co~tinuo to devel op and equip dopcndablo ROK . . ·. ,
. ;. ·. D111t.nry rorcc.s 1~ occordanco '-'~~~ tho P~f~4~~ -~roerum , _ . . ~·· - . . .. . -: ·.· vHh a vlev t o \he 4ss\1:lp~1on by the· Bopubl!.e or Xo·roa - .
Pr:V-~ct'~r rt>sponolbil.~Or. th~ liefoni~ .Ot r.ororl . . : '· :'~~·:;; •· - l' . ~ . 0 • • 0 I, 0 ~.~ 0 • • ~ ~: 0
· ·.'4· Conciuc!.o a treaty \lith tho Uot~u~lic oC' KoroD.
cyaraOteolnt 1L.5 pol!.t1ca:l 1r.dept!ndenee' and c.erri tor lt.i · .. . tnie-cPlty o Such a tre aty Jhould eever tho territor-y nov
or hereaf t er brouent peaeetully under tho ado l n1strot1on I •
of the Ae~ubl lc of Ko r~a.
~ g. W'o:oic.lnc 1n and thr-ouch the oreons o! tho ' VII
"'hero toaslble, 'eonttnu'> to s trcnc;.hcn t})o .eo•Jotn:Dont ond
dCinOCt'llUC l no tt.tution£' of thr1 £lcpubl1c o~. KO::'I)O• ~,n<l ,
oont lnuo to coatr.t.b:.~e e t(.l th'! Un1tod NotiOns effort tor
occnonlc rcc~~~ry and roh~bl l lta ~!on ln ihe Ropubl1e of t o rCia o -,. ,..
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£gl1tl~g1 Cpntgrtnc~
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lS. tntoovo.- ln the tr.r to obtain at;te('!I:Ont to the cstab ...
· ll:h=ent or a ~~ oore&atton to ~d~rteke necottot1ons lookinc
:ovnrd on event~al palittcnl sett1e~ent vhlch ~ould oJtobl1sh
h united, tndcponde~t ~nd dcaoerat!c Koro~ .
16. 1\dhere f1rolllly t~ t he 1;"1~ interpretation or tho O.t:Jh
t!ce acrccaont that onl y ' Ko,-oon problems· \/ill be dlscu,sed o.t
tho pol1tieul contcroncc tO . 1'ollow the armhtico . ·
., l?. Doveloy .lS n mottcr of urecncy the posit t on ~·hieh the
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Unltod Stato!J Vlll . to.J:o during the pol!tlca.l no&ottah.ons Vlth
rq:'lpoc t to tl~o ilcpublle ot Y.OT~:a .
p,.rtlt!psJon Ci" Alllf!3
'18. eo'oduct a b1gh-levor d!plcco.tte cus~ltn eo pors:u.ade
our ellie~ to ~cccpt u.s. courseJ or action.
19 . Y.akt en 1.n\•ento;)' or ecc~lc: aeasu:oes ve cOUld tak~ 1
tr necessary, to lndueo ou.r e.ll!es ,to accep't U.S • . eour:tu or.-
act. i on •
. . ~.gr ~pl!ey
20. 1Jnd0r ~akc 1 in tho light of t)\G PO'S t •llr.tt.1s t1c:o · s1 tuaw
tien . 4 tu.n(IOJMlntal rov1e1.1 and rcass~sroent ~ our boUc: policy·,.
toward Ccmr~lun1U Clll on 1 <JS voll a~ our pos ition vith 'rospeet. •
t o Korcio •. . . c ./
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·· ~·o the United Nations tt.em':>er.s wi:o:;c a:.Uittlry torcos ore partlc1p~tlng in the Korean action s~ppo~t tho docta1on ot .the Coc:~on<lor•ln•Chiet ot the Ull Ccrt:Jand.-to conclude a.n orc1~~1eo Asrooeont . We ~cr4by o£Ci~m our dotcrmlnotlon tully ond talth.tully t o eatry out tha ter m' of tMt nra1Dt1ce. ~.'0 oxpoct thl).t tho oth~r partie~ t o tt·.o taerocc.ont will Ukov.tso Dcrupul.ou:~ly obser'JO its termv.
" Tho tosk ohun.d is noJ; an etJs'y ono. Wo vill aupport tho e f for t:! ot t.he Vnitod l fAtion!l to br1r.g o.bout n.n oqu1.t4blo !Ottlo::~ont in Kc;ron bosed on t ho p:r1nc1plt:.s wh1cl\
.tl.)ve lone boon o!ltabliGhE!d by the United Nations, o.M which. e11ll !or o. u.nitod 1ndcpenC.ent .:.r:d dti:lccrat1c Korea-. \I.'G v•Ul support tho United t13't1o.ns i n its crrorts to ass1~:t tho pooplo ot Koro~ in r epa.1r1:.if'the ravag4~ or V:lr. r
·~c doclaro ata1n ou: !n!th 1~ t~h pri~ciplot anO ~pos.os or tho ·lTn1t.ed Uations , our- ccnsc1o-asnou ot our eon~1nuSnc resp.:>ru;lbllities 1n Koreo.
1 and ou.:-·detorfjJ.rAtlon
in cood toi th to SC!ok :a. $etUecmt o~ the Xo!"Can J.:cblo•. Y.c ettlJ'c, 1!l thO lr.terest.s or 'k"Ot-ld t:'eacel ~hst tf there is a :-on.o...a1 or tho are!d ::.tr;aek; ct>..llleng :lt ~catn t he pt1nc1p,l8). of •th'l United Rations, '-"O should. n;ain bo un1to4 and p.roc.pt ~· resist . Tht> conseauencos or sueh o broach .• ot tho 3r::~t ... t;'co. vould be so srJ::Ve tR."l t ~ in 311 pro~b1l1ty, !t would not be ~osstbl& to confine host111t1os within tho f rontJ.ou ot Korea . u
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IISC l$'t - 6 -C 1 "J P ! .rl ~;:> ~ ~ 5':' IW' F.1l Ul ·o·lof~UCti.U
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: l~C S~Af? STUDY
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mntrm STIITM TtlC1· Tc s W t:EDIAUJ.X [DUtltHNC· A.U 1\R'-fFS'I' lcyi ·TN ROO&.\.
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l . It on nr=lsttco 1~~eacht4 in Korc4, o chango tn the Jntvrnttt1on-ll ::1tunt1on may 'bo expected t o t:~ko • plot:o ot such \ . lt>)t;n1tudo ns t o justify b t'undt\men tal rov i u'll nr.d r eauossoent ·:· or u.::;. policy orA. coursQS or a ct!.on Yith TOIJ)CCt t o CoMU.'lis tY" Chi~ . 7h1s ch,nce vill orlse rroc tho reaction oc our ollio
-to :~n o.:-a1st1u rather tM.n !ro:~ :an,y eh3nge 1n 0\lneso Cc!:aU~ ~1s t policy or object ives . We bol1ove, in tact, thl). t concluslon or tin a.rni t> tico 1n }{or en by tho Co::~aunists on t e nns O.C$Optable to tho IJN •o~ould not rcpro~cnt n ba3.1c chant:o in Chinoab Comc'lJn1st Pplit;· , but \1-0uld 1r.orely r-oprucnt·a toct.!cal shift designed to CNat.e "~n ~tnosphel'Q: itt \.ilich rosistanc:o to Coc:Qunlsc a.-n Sov!ct 1t11J!C!'1ill1::m vHl bd veakened" .• A":l arm1st1eo 1n Y.oz-ca vould ~1&~1fy eoro ly th~t the co~untsts hnvo round 1t unprofita ble t o cont inuo t he \<1'~7' ,tho:-e , but the Cl:tneor of 1'~1\0!JCd • ~t&rt3:a1on 1,·ould be unrcUoved , p:.rtlc:qbrly in Soutl104St As1a.1, \lh:r<c Chines-e ~unut-~cked oiUtor-y opera\100$. acatnst dul1 eo:t.stlt.ut..,_ autborlty eont1nues 1n W oc01na and i1llo.ya . Ces~3Uon or host111 t ies in Korea ,. '"ihilo onc6ura&1ntl would not 1n itsolr ccnsUt uto S¥ffic.f<lnt evidence tho.t Co:runun :;~China has M:andone-~ its btlsic o\ljocUvos r.or, even more i!Ol)Ort:lntly , its vtll1ngnesG to seck thoso obJectives b~ or=cd toree .
2 , ?h.c ch:ln'o ant1c1pe tf-~ in the ! ntertls t10.'13l oi iuotiOn '"'ill ~a in tl'io n:.tu;c or an ! nt ens1(.J.ca t1on ol' d if!croncc5 bet.,.,·een thCt Un.ittod S tate~ and its rnojc r allies over policy tovard Chi...:la. It 1!:1 our t::::Utrwto t hat only ··"tho <:O:'\t1nuation or ·hOst U .. ities by t he COC'Ieun.irt~ a,:.1ns'; tho W. i n Korea h.as prevented a sc:r1o-..' breach bet.,.e.en the U:tit'ed StA-tes o.r.d' its 'ttlli·t5 ~Over . this iOJUC, Afttr t he CCS~3 tion of hostili~Jos in t.orce the a:aJot· ollie:. or the Un.it(ld Stnt(l!l will be 1ncrcas1nclY \1."'1...,111· inc t o nuppo:-t. the United. State s i n m::~.1riw!n1n& pol1t1cal .. &nd cc~,~~1c pressures nt~ inst C~1'~ China . As a rc~ult, the Uni:cd States vtll be eontronte~ v1th a nov 1nterzat1onal :;1 t.u:a t.len .
3· 'l'hu:; lt ITIU!lt bo ¢'t~tCd t l\:.t t hor'o h- a ronl d~n&cr t..'"lc ~ :he t~"l.!t.e<l S Ult~s vJU tJ.nod 1 :.self cfiplom.:l. t1c4lly lsoloHo4 ln. 1U postUJ"O t6W3-rds .cor~s:t ~1M 1 1n the e"•ont. there_.. !$ •!"
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11 Cur rcnt Coma~untst 1oc.t1<:S111 April 2\.1
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AreUtleo i n Korea . Chinese COt'..'DUI)1$t. l ntervepU.on in Xorea And t.he cont!nu.ine host1liUo6 lh9ro hi:I•Je os.:ll:ltecl u~ i n devolopi no und Dn1ntn1n1nt politicc l ~nd economic Isolat i on or . the Chinoso Coi!'!Ounist~, aM ht'VD :;rovld.ed l n tho~oye5 or eaey ot our ellhs jGst.lrtcatlon ror t he l.blted Stato pollclos ot pro~tlon ror Foroosa , economie and military •=~ nco to .. t.h& Ci~inoso ~1\\tionAll~ ts, and co:ttinuod lns!st.Qnco on Chlnese litHionnUtt reprosonttl tion in 1nt ornot1onal orcontrat1ons • . ! he tctm1n4t1on of hos t illtlO~ in Koro'B v l ll undoub ted·l.y brtng 1ncrea~e4 pressuro, troe co~ ot OQ~ allies tor rolaxetlon or rcstr1et1o~s on tr~de v!th C~lst China, tor further dcvolop~ent or political rol3t1on~ Yith Co~unist China , -~nd to~ o~aiSslon or Co:l\lnUQ.1st ch1ha i nto the UJf or othor i nter no. t1on~:~ l orvnnhat.lons . Undot these e l r.cuastoneos, '<~O O"JU.S t cstiCO.t.e that thoro will b~ inereaslnt oppo$1~1an o~ the part of our cll1es to UniUtd St..ates 1.,sl!Jtcnce on c011t1n:Uf'd represent.at1.on tor the Natioonlistc 1n t."lo Utt , and 1:'1 pa r tiel.lltl-r to any Chineso N:lt10tJ31Ut lnterforonce vi t h the ChinO trade or any typo or Chi nese t~n1.1cll011st ·D111-:4ry oet1on ~e;oinst tho mainlllnd •
4 . But t!>c .Unlted s·ta~s -~U$~ Und ,.,y; dnd ceans of over• eo:~!o;; ~hls oxpo:::tod oppoo1t1on to 1tc pol:!ciat . In tho race or CUI' ~U)'l•ont (:$t 1ma te tha t Chincoe C-o~u.nist n&reemen t to nn : or~1st1c::o vould bv c•leulato~ to v.eakcn resl st4nee to Co~~~ism or.d SoYiot !~;-er1alho1 th~ t.rn1."'eti. St.a.tes must cake every o!!'ort: to see th4t. sc.cb re:oiJtant.e is r.ot '-"Cake::ed . ln the absence or rurth~r evidence that t he Pe1pir~ rGai:o ba~ chance~ts stond-ords or interna t i onal eonduct. 1 ·anr :-ola xntion of pres.;uros
, dtu1nst it would only se:-vo os an encoQracemont for rurtho~ . C&bres sion, ,,;hUe restoration o ! .rU'll tr~de ·o~it."L the Chinese ~"''Ut.S \ICUld SCTVIl to increa.tc thelr e:J:pab1Ut1es for furt.!ler oU1tar-y a.c\1vit.1a.s, Fer tho 1t'.=Cd1oto pos:.-at:DUt1ce . period·, thorerorc , tho lini1.od State s f~CC-S: tho prob letl or dew v1:.1:-::; td"ctics t olt:trd Co:~munJ.st Chinn th::at llill m.nlnto.~n o.nd dc,•clop pollt kal ond c·:onomle pr essures n~;n inst. C.o1:Clun.1&t Chino withou~ erc~tint :oo acrl~~s n breach botve•n the united
' StAtes n~ 1U oajor ~ll!.es. • · r 5. Yhllc tho l':lintc:l:.ncc Ond dovolopment or .Pol1ticnl and
<:eonoro1c pl·t~sure:t c•ca:tns.t Co:r.·ounat China \dll u'ndoubtodl)' cnco:.Jntor 5C~1ou.:: op;'IO:>Hton 1'ro:n our t: l !ics, ~o~e• t e liev(l thal. for t.he shor.t- r-u_n nt least thh llno 'ot action con be e4hereC
• t.o vl:.hout per;s:~nont aam::co t.o :-ebt1cns \rt1th our dljor allies , nnd cru:~t. bu n.dhcl'C.'d to J.t va are not ttJ> pl.n.y 1(\tO Cot.tun1n1St }j,'l,"'dC, ln O!"<JCr i O d O thi:l, 0 C.3j0r Offort ~hOUld be !Oa\!C at tho h.lJ;hcst. levc ln to corwlncc C'Jl' nlUes t hat. to rel a x our c:an:-<1 ac;:li~st Coo:a\lni't acerc$~1o.."l in the Far &a:.t-, oaroly
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.--o tcc~use t~e C~1st~ h3ve ntreed to Jto~ killin& UN $oldi cTS, ~ould d!3,lay ~c3kness on L~e pert ar the.treo vorld vh1eh tho Co:r.t~\!ni=ts could be cxpoc t.ed t o er.ploH t-o •tho utCioH. It, :~hould bo empha oUcd t o our o.lUcs th~ t vhilo wa OelJ:cv& it . vould bo folly to rel3X our do!enses ot31nst tho Cot=un!s ts ; ne ither do we havo arJ lntentlon or roncvlnG hOJ~111t1es ~1~ the c~~~untst3 'o l one os t hey rcs~cct the t erms or the a~u1-
. oucc nnd rcCr::s in fr<ln~ nll other og£rcu1on. \fo · should oxplain to. our ullio~ th3t our ~on t inuod ~upport pt t ho Chlnest tla ::tona l Govc:-ru:tnt Coos not Jo-.ave U\0 objectivo or buJld1ng on U".at Govcrn .. "llnt' :;: QIUU.:!ry strc:tgth tor a Nconqc.ost or the o~lnlond , but l s b3$Cd upon tho sttAtc~ie ~ocess1ty or kcop1ne Forcnoso O\lt. of' COI!'..cUnht. hlnds, es .,..ell as tho ncc·d L'or a:a1nt.otnln&" r~Uyin, point. for non ... Coc:J:~u.n tst ChJneso c'unU•t fo!". thct pol1t1ul Strt:Ctlc oc,atnst Coo:u."lisa 11'1 the; Far ~s\, ~~leh ve believe vl ll ~~tl~uo 1n1eCJn1~ly~e&a!dlo::~ or tho arm1st1~c. I•Jc should l)Oin~ out to our olUes thnt vhilc vc' do not doslro th<! jndcf1nitc pcrpctuot'1on of1 tho · +~ cold .vor" strucclt' vlth the COc.."\\ln hU, thoro is no aafe or hoc1orablo alternative so len: a.Q they ere dcdlcot:ed .to i t::: porpetut:ltion. All of the cvlaonco . .,.bich, \.'e o.ro abl<Q to obtain dot.'lcn~tro.tos beyond doubt th.J.t t!le~· nro so do<l ica..tcd, a nd t htlt t.hol vill unhooJ.tnttn,ly resort to rorce vhenevcr and vt:crever t hey cstl~~e their Objoe~ivos con best be obtlll~ed at reaslblo t:C!H· il..."ld. ris l: . Ur.dcr thctc cl:-cu~:~staneos, t:O 3h0\1ld or.plsL"\, ~Jo nO\.' 3Ce no tenable ht1.5l!l t or an ovct·-all pence scttle;;;en~ • ln th2 i"3r tas t. Oil" tho otl.e~ h.'U"td , "''0 intend t o Q.;,;lnuir. a ·· ,o$tut:'b ot W11l 1!\;rtas s t.o c-all o:'C tho e0ld V3:" it a.4cQuat4 ~~s aJ·~ ;!rov14c-!! tot o sound bc11et t.h~t t ho' Co:nmu:11sts '11.T·O re~c~y t~ do· so. · · ··.
• • •• 1 6'. One or th.e se ·\lases YOuld ~ 'o satis!actory peace
. .. ::.u.t..Ieoq_nt lr. Ko:--ea . It. h our 1n·tent1o:t, therefpr e , td sec)( a · pol1~1c~l settlo~ent l n Y.~rea 1n the politi4bl c~nferonce pro-. vidod tor by tl1c :.r ,'l'l1stlcc t Ol 'tll' • Thic conferoncc ' ou!lt 'be con
.. ·.fined cXc'lusiva:ly to Xotcon !:t.ltters. Ctlineso C~un.Ut ag-reocent to tel. CN.:l o! ~oro3 end ollw t ho :<oreans rreel.)' l.o c.ho~e
.. t.ho1:- Go\lern;:)C:lt I::!USt not 00 bou&ht at t.he price of cOncessions ols<Hihcro . l t f!IUSt bo motte a t e st oi' the' willlnr;ncs:; ·qr: t ho
, Chino ~c Co?l!il-.:n1r.ts to a l>Orxlon ncnr~!lt:ion and resp~ct. thc''rlthts ·or thei r n<l i tiJOOrs . f':Jilurc o! the Comll\lnlst.£ to tteet 'th1~ tost
• uculd ln our op1n:.on. dc:::onnr-:l\.o u ·.ttt. ther t't:lvo ' not yet given · ~P tho pollc le::.·which 1~12 to t.hc:ir Qr.z resslon 1n. 'Koren, nnd con~
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f l rrJ tho nccc5::1ty <If rn::.J.nt~lnint prcc~u:cs O(lt)inst thoo deslcned .to WNkcr. t.."telr .t1bJ:U t y ,to brook out 1n r oilcvcd 3.tcross1on .· . · . ~
1 . A,h1t:h·le\•el Un1tcd -:aat..c~ d1pi0oauC cam;ib.icn •Hone t.l.:~ fo:-cr.oinr. llne$ ·~oula s ocrn to off()rd t ho hO:lt chOncc of a:a lnt.'td.nlr.e c :.scnti:)l i"roo uorld prcs.su1•o .:~ r,o.11'ist the •Cilino~a Coq:;.:UJ i i~ t rccti~C 1n U1o· 1=.-:lc01Gtc. J)0st-a7tt>1~t1ec. pc:-Jod .. •
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