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  • 8/12/2019 Naming and Necessity by Saul KripkeReview.8

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    Royal nstitute of Philosophy

    Naming and Necessity by Saul KripkeReview by: T. L. S. SpriggePhilosophy, Vol. 56, No. 217 (Jul., 1981), pp. 431-433Published by: Cambridge University Presson behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3750287.

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    claimsmay ebeyondhe copeofordinarympiricalesting. he idea that nceempiricisms rejectedhere s no room or nyrealist nderstandingf truthsitself hangoverrommpiricism.Once science's retensionsrepunctured,t seems emptingor he ociologistto treat cience s one socialpractice mongstmany nd to give sociologicalexplanationsort.MaryHessebelieves hatmetaphysicss intrinsicallyelatedtosocial ife' ndcriticizesationalistrgumentsttackinghe ociologyfknow-ledge. The 'strong' hesis f the sociology f science s strong ecause t laysemphasisn social ausation. he wishes oweakentbydroppinghe ssumptionofdeterminism,ecause she holds thatotherwiseational rgumentsor hesociologyfknowledge ouldbe pointless. et oncedeterminisms rejectedt sdifficultoseethat he tronghesis anremain. he existencef ocial nfluencesis uncontroversial.hat s at ssue s whetherhey re so wide-ranginghatwehave o accept hat ruths relativeosocieties. nce moreMaryHesse nclinesto hermeneutics.nsteadof appealing o anynotion f universal ationality,shebelieveshat ocial nd historicalnalysisanprovide valid ritiquefourownpresuppositions.he concludes:Hermeneuticsepends. . on the ssump-tion hat ross-culturalnderstandingnd elf-reflexiveritiquereboth ossibleand lluminating'.et these rethebasicproblems. ow,fornstance,anwe besure hat ross-culturalnderstandingspossible? he more elativisms em-braced, he morewe are ocked p inour own cultures ithoutnymeans faccess oothers.fwedo understandhem, nly omeform f realismmaybeable to explain his.MaryHessewishes o allow certain reaoffreedomnthechoice fvalues,and tomake truth' consequencefprior ommitmento values nd goals.This exercisef freedoms not a matterfrationalhoice, o much,tseems,asanarbitraryelectionrom ifferentptions.Weare old hat riteriaf ccept-ability f theoriesrepluralist.his mustmean hat heresultimatelyoques-tionofbeingright rwrong.How then an it even matter hatwe choose?In thecontextftheologicalategories,he writes hat ntheend t s a matterof ayingHerestand , I cando no other'. uch a positionmasculatesheologysincereligionanno longer laimmetaphysicalruth,nditputsMaryHessefirmlyn the relativistoreventhesubjectivist)ideof thefence. he middlecourse proves llusory.Nevertheless,his admirable ook deserves nd willcommandwideattention.t cogentlyemonstrateshe difficultieshich esetempiricismndherwillingnesso ook odevelopmentsncontinentalermeneu-tics s itself timulatingnd mportant. Roger TriggNamingndNecessityBy Saul KripkeOxford: asilBlackwell,980, I72 pp-,/7.95This alreadylassicworks essentiallytranscriptf ecturesiven tPrincetonin I970 and first ublishedn SemanticsfNaturalLanguageed. Harman ndDavidson) n I972. Its now being vailable s a separatend price-wise orepurchasableook s mostwelcome. newprefacendbrief ddenda re ncluded.

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    Since generalharacterizationf worklreadyo wellknownshardlyalled orhere, turn o a few airlypecific oints.Kripke pposes heviewthat name s equivalent o,orgets ts referencedeterminedy,a cluster fdescriptionsletaloneone). His pictures ratherthat irst eople tart alling personsay)by name ndthat hen thers, hoseuseof thenamehascertainppropriateinkswith hat irstalling,re herebyalso referringo thatperson. his is offereds an improvementn thepicturethat, n theprivacy fone's ownroom-or mind-one decides o use a name omeanwhoever id such ndsuch'and eaves t to theworld o decidewhom,fanyone,hecap fits.Wittgenstein'sork uggests hatwhatone is affirmingy an utterance-externalr nternal-has ittle rnothingodowith ontentsfcurrent,ecent(or evenpossible?) onsciousness,ut that tis settled utside ll thatby factsabout he ocialnexus nwhich t occurred. nyonewhoholds hatwhat ne saffirmingasmore o do with ne's ownmental ontentshan hiswillbe evenmore esistanto Kripke's osition; or nstance othe dea that nemay ctu-allyaffirmo oneself hatCicerowas an orator nd thatTullywas an oratorand havenomeans f udging romelf-examinationhetherneaffirmedhesamething wice. Despite possible isclaimern theprefacehis eems o beimplied.) ndeedfrom ripke's iscussionfnames ornatural inds nd suchphenomenas heatone gathers hat t is not ust the socialnexuswhich ftendetermines hat unknownooneself,t least s I understandnowing)neisaffirming,ut lsounknowneaturesf henatural orld. he implications thatmodern cientistsnow etterhanAristotleimself idwhathewas affirminginsentencesncluding he Greekwordforheat.Surely n thisbasis onecouldfind astthinkersuilty f self-contradictionhenby usual criteriaheir ogicwas mpeccable.Kripke's iewdistinguishesetween rimordialse ofa namebya person'sfamiliarsnd thosewhoonlyknow fhimby name.But don't hose irstallersassociate sense or connotation iththe name,though ne functioningt aperceptualndempathicatherhan nabstractlyonceptualevel? he parentsmust ecognizehechild fter hebaptism-whetherr nottheykeephimforevernsight-and must osobyperceptiblendempathicallyevealedualities(unlessperhaps-as I do notbelieve-recognitions partofa causalprocessby-passingxperiencefthese ualities). ven fa proper ccountmust llowalso forspatiotemporalontinuitydoubtful) nd forchange true); thesequalities urely elong o thename's nitialmeaningr sense.Moreover,maynot hese ualitiesometimesvenbelong othereal ssencef henamed,nd tbe throughheir elatingosuch a primordialartiallyssence-specifyingensethat, hereafter,uch name sdirectlyor ome nd ndirectlyor thers defin-itedescriptionf rigidly esignatingype applyingo the ameperson n everypossibleworld)? o I cannot eel uitehappywithKripke's resh ersion ftheview hatnames ackmeaningrsense.I turn oKripke's trikinguggestionhat suchtheoreticaldentificationss"heat s molecular otion" renecessary,hough ot priori',ndthat cienceis typicallyoncerned ith heempirical iscoveryfnecessaryruth.The doctrinehat cience epresentskind foblique pproach o the ssencesof hingsndnecessaryruthserivingherefromepresentsfine radition ith,432

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    for xample, neale mong ts wentieth-centuryxponents. ut uch view anhardly e satisfactorynlessmeant o mply hat n omniscient indwhichwasaware fnature hroughnd throughperhaps y omethingike he intellectualintuition' ant peaks f)would ecome ware fnecessaryruthsf kindmuchmore xcitinghan hose ftheformF is F' or FG implies '. I fear hat nKripke'sview the necessary ruthswhichwould confrontmnisciencerans-parently-and onfronts, at first t least, s through cloud-would be dullenough ot o be grudged imevenbyHumeorAyer, ince hefact hat trictlynecessaryruthsboutnature an be a posteriorior s turns,orKripke, n thefact hatwedidn't ix he eferencef uch xpressionss heat'via confrontationwithwhatthe referentnherentlys, butby some markwhich t could havelacked.Evidently,hen, or beingwho fixed is referencesia a really irectconfrontationith hephenomenahese cientifictatements ould be meretautologies.Of course he xistenceatherhan elf-identityf uchphenomenais a different atter, ut Kripke s farfrom oldinghat his s necessary.)cannot eel hat cience s a method or rrivingt a curiously bliquekindofaffirmationftautologies.Buthoweverhismaybe, philosophersrecertainlyight o be gratefuloKripkefor so muchthought-provokingngenuity; lso, and without ronicintention, thank imforazzingup the traditionalnd decisive bjectionsoidentificationf the mental ndphysicalas the atter s ordinarilyonceived,at east) n a manner hich uts hem eyond ll accusationsffogydom.

    T. L. S. SpriggeMagic,Reason ndExperienceG. E. R. LloydCambridge niversityress, 979, xii 335 pp.,?2oThe Greeks aveus science nd philosophy:owonearth id they ome odoit? That (crudelytated) s thequestionwhichGeoffreyloyd setshimselfnthis plendid ook. The maintask s to delineate s carefullys possible henature f the developmentshat ookplace n earlyGreek hought uring hecrucialperiodwhen scienceand philosophy ereemergings recognizableinquiries.'The delineationalls nto hree arts. irst, herejectionfmagic ndsuper-natural xplanation:romarly n,some Greeks t least howed healthyon-tempt or he pretensionsfmagic-men;nd if their ontemptadsomewhatsandy oundations,t wasa generalontempt-magic asrejected holesale ndin principle. econdly,hegrowthf logic:hereDr Lloydrecords heslowbeginningsfthat cience,nd remarkspon tscloseconnection ith hetoric;butheproperlytresseshemost stonishingreek chievementnthisfield-thedevelopmentf thenotion f an axiomatizedystem. hirdly, mpiricale-search: gain hefeelingor esearch id not ome uickly; ut tcame urely,andthe ater dvancesn medicineand especiallyndissection)nd nastronomyprovidetrikingxamples f scientificork.n logic nd nempiricalesearch,Aristotle-its nosurpriseo earn-is thehero.

    433

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