Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Support for SWAPO's War of Liberation in International Law

Support for SWAPO's War of Liberation in International LawAuthor(s): Christos TheodoropoulosSource: Africa Today, Vol. 26, No. 2, Namibia: Crisis for the International Community (2ndQtr., 1979), pp. 39-48Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185854 .

Accessed: 15/06/2014 06:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 188.72.126.55 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:12:31 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=iupress

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185854?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Support for SWAPO's War of Liberatmon

in International Law

Christos Theodoropoulos

It is notable that recent developments, both in theory and in fact, concerning the laws of armed conflict have aroused considerable legal interest everywhere.

One of the most comprehensive efforts to develop theory in this field with specific relationship to the conflict in Namibia is Professor John Dugard's article "SWAPO: The Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello".' The article must be welcomed as an important step toward clarification of the academic issues involved. It is the contention of this paper, however, that Dugard's views provide an inadequate and misleading interpretation of international law in relation to the conflict. An alternative analysis will therefore be offered.

Before proceeding with this analysis, however, a general methodological remark is necessary. Professor Dugard justifies his conclusions with arguments based upon "the traditional rules of international law". This notion presupposes that the raison d'etre of those rules, adopted within the political and economic order of the past few and early 20th centuries, remains in essence unchanged and that the contemporary different practice of the subjects of international law has not had any substantial effect upon them.

The International Court of Justice has rejected this reasoning categorically. For example, referring to the mandates system embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the court emphasized that the relevant concepts were "not static, but were by definition evolutionary" and concluded that

viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system

1. The South African Law Journal. 93 May. 1976. pp. 144-158.

Christos Theodoropoulos is a Lecturer in the Facutty of Law, University of Ife, lIe-Ife, Nigeria and was Field Researcher, U.N. Institute for Nambia, Lusaka, Zambia, 1977.

Vol. 26 (1979) No. 2 39



prevailing at the time of the interpretation.2 It cannot be denied that the Court's assessment has wider

implications embracing all institutions of international law and especially those which were most transformed during the decolonization process. As Judge Ammoun correctly pointed out

If there is any 'general practice' which might be held, beyond any dispute, to constituite law within the meaning of Article 38. paragraph 1 (b) of the Statute of the Court, it must surely be that which is made up of the conscious action of the peoples themselves, engaged in a determined struggle.3

The above general comments persuasively explain why it is generally accepted today that those "traditional laws" have been overcome by reality, are insufficient to regulate current problems and are in an urgent need of up-dating.4 Dugard's conclusion that "the traditional rules of international law relating to the use of force and the conduct of hostilities do not support the arguments advanced by SWAPO" (p. 157) cannot find much support in law, primarily for methodological reasons of legal analysis (supra). What SWAPO argues today could be erroneous but surely this cannot be judged on the basis on the old criteria which prevailed in an epoch that knew nothing about the contemporary forms and methods of armed conflict. One cannot lay current legal developments on the Procrustean bed of the old doctrine. The "traditional rules of international law" could perhaps be regarded as valid, but only in connection with the period to which they refer. The following analysis of some specific issues is Intended to justify this interpretation.

The Just War

Like certain other international lawyers,5 Dugard speaks for a "revival" of the "just-war doctrine" (p. 146). This conclusion stems from a schematic historical retrospection which is unable to trace the systemic developments which had profound consequences upon the content of the said concept at successive historical epoches. Thus, while the medieval bellum justum was a profoundly subjective doctrine based on arbitrary criteria (recta intentio, necessity, etc.), the contemporary just war concept

2. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwitkhtanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971, ICJ Reports 16. p. 31.

3. Separate Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun, ibid. p. 74.

4. See, f.i., Resolution XXIII, adopted during the 1968 Teheran Conference on Human Rights. G.A. Resolutions 2674 (XXV). 2677 (XXV), 2852 (XXVI), 2853 (XXVI), 3032 (XXVII), 3319 (XXIX) and 3500 (XXX); See also S. Suckow, 'The Development of International Humanitarian Law", ICJ Review, No. 12, p. 50; D.P. Forsythe, "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law: Some Observations", 69 AJIL, 1975, p. 78.

5. E.g., J. Pictet, "The Need to Restore the Laws and Customs Relating to Armed Conflicts," ICJ Review, No. 1, p. 35.

40 AFRICA TODAY




is founded upon objective norms of international law, generally recognized by the international community (e.g. Articles 1/2, 2/4 and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations). By the same token, while the justness or unjustness of a war meant nothing in traditional international law, either for the conduct of war or for its consequences,' it is today of decisive importance for determining the aggressor as well as the victim of the aggression and, hence, for the qualified application of the laws of armed conflict.7 The use of the word "revival" could perhaps indicate similarity of the terminology between the old and the new concepts, but is totally misleading with.regard to their lego-historical meaning. Clearly then, the only common element between the two concepts is the term employed.

The Use of Force in International Relations

(a) The argument that the "colonial aggression ... does not constitute an unlawful use of force in terms of article 2(4) of the Charter, which only prohibits the use of force against States" is based, en demier lieu, upon an absolutist construction of the domestic jurisdiction reservation clause of Article 2/7 of the Charter. However, this construction has been rejected in law on many occasions. Suffice it to recall that the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relaftons and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with Charter of the United Nations," reaffirmed, in unequivocal terms, that

The territory of a colony or other non-self-goveming territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it. Moreover, when a colonial people legitimately resorts to armed

struggle in order to restore their sovereignty, they assert, on the basis of their right to self-determination, their intemational personality. Liberation war has thus appeared within the contemporary legal framework of international law and has acquired all the requisites and characteristics of international conflict, i.e., a conflict between two distinct legal entities.'

6. G.l. Tunkin, Theory of International Law, 1974. p. 394.

7. Q. Wright, The Outlawr' of War and the Law of War", 47 AJIL, 1953, pp. 365ff, E.A. Korovin, The Second World War and International Law", 40 AJIL, 1946, p. 742.

8. G.A. Res. 262.5 iXXV) of 24 Oct. 1970. Annex.

9. It has been observed that international conflict is not synonymous with interstate conflIct" and that "the law of war does not presuppose . . . that the belligerent collectivities must be states'. In R.A. Falk fed.) lihe Viutnam War and International Law, 1969, Vol. 2, p. 533. See also the 3rd principle contained in G.A. Res. 3103 *XVll) of 12 Dec. 1973 arnd Dec. CDDH/1/71 of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian l ew Applicable in Armed Conflicts (first session held at Geneva from 20 Feb. to 29 March 1974).

Vol. 26 (1979) No. 2 41



The international status of Namibia, and hence the international character of its relations with South Africa, has been reaffirmed by successive rulings of the International Court of Justice. It has been consolidated by General Assembly's Resolution 2125 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, as recognized by Security Council's Resolution 264 (1969), which brought the Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

Article 2/4 of the Charter, to which reference was made, reads: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (emphasis added). The weakness of Dugard's argument, purporting to cast aside the

relevance of Article 2/4, is thus connected with the somewhat anachronistic assumption that relations between the colonial power and the colonial people are not international, but purely domestic (and the conflicts "internal", "police actions", etc.), which debar the U.N. from any intervention. 0 As for the use of the term "State" in Article 2/4, it has been correctly pointed out that the said Article

Speaks here of the 'political independence', and not of 'the existing' political independence as the Covenant of the League of Nations did. This would mean that the Charter bans the threat and the use of force also against that political independence which is still in the process of emerging through the implementation of the right of self-determination. "

Accordingly, Article 2/4 does not permit the use of force by South Africa directed against another international person, the Intemational Territory of Namibia in particular, which, through no fault of its own, is not as yet a Member of the U.N. but which is under its direct responsibility.

Moreover, Article 2/4 in prohibiting the use of force "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations", clearly refers to Article 1/2 which aims "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- determination of peoples". Consequently, use of force in international relations, contrary to this principle, is unlawful under the Charter,'2 and as such constitutes a violation of Article 2/4. Dugard's exercise neither re- flects the law of the Charter, nor promotes international peace and security. Attempts at "internalizing" existing conflicts in Southern Africa, and hence at "legalizing" the suppression of the liberation movement cannot find much support in contemporary international law.

(b) The legal inconsistency in Dugard's argument (supra) necessarily

10. E.g., this was also the case with France (Morocco, 1952; Tunisia, 1952; Algeria, 1955), Portugal ("overseas provinces" since 1956) etc.

11. D. Nincic, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and the Practice of the United Nations, 1970, p. 73.

12. G.A. Res. 2908 (XXVII), 1514 (XV), 2625 (XXV}, 3314 (XXIX) (Definition of Aggression).

42 AFRICA TODAY




leads him to state that Self-defence against colonial domination in the exercise of the right to self- determination has nothing to do with self-defence as it is traditionally understood or as it is described by article 51 of the Charter . . . a sine qua non for such a right is . . . a 'victim State'. In the case of self-defence against colonial domination this necessary requirement is absent. (p. 149) This opinion lacks a persuasive foundation because, in addition to the

reasons given already, the categorical language of Article 51 does not and could not leave any doubt that the inherent-right to self-defence belongs to a wider range of subjects of international law under general international law (e.g., non-member states). Article 51, although confining itself, and rightly so, to recognizing this right primarily in respect of member-states of the U.N., nonetheless marks the general applicability of the relevant principle which also embraces colonial peoples fighting against the forcible denial of their independent existence. The said Article does not purport to restrict the colonial peoples' right to self-defence against unlawful colonial domination in any way.13

Acceptance of Dugard's thesis would lead to an obvious legal antinomy: While the right of colonial peoples to self-determination is universally recognized, their rights to defend it, when it is forcibly denied, is firmly ruled out. This thesis however, is clearly tantamount to rendering meaningless the right of self-determination. Of course, this thesis cannot attract much support either in the law of the Charter or in general international law. We may thus conclude that his argument that a "war of self-determination" does not constitute legitimate self-defence on the proposed basis, i.e. that "the victim of colonial or racist aggression is not a State, but the nationals of the aggressor State, and they are attacked within the boundaries of the aggressor State" (p. 149), fails to take into account all the relevant points of law. In the case of Namibia this is even more glaring.

(c) The argument is also expressed that Article 51 of the Charter (right to self-defence) cannot be invoked in the case of Namibia on the ground that

While the Security Council is taking action ... designated to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute, any unilateral action under Article 51 must surely be suspended. (p. 151-2)

This argument is ab initio fallacious. The Charter bans the use of force, except in two cases: action undertaken by the Security Council under

13. See the Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States UN Doc. A/5746, pp. 42-43; see also Article 7 of the Definition of Aggression, G A Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex.

Vol. 26 (1979) No. 2 43



Chapter VII, and legitimate self-defence. The co-relation between Article 51 and the rest of the provisions of Chapter VII is that the said Article does not impair the exercise of the right to individual self-defence until the Security Council has taken enforcement action, i.e. action under Chapter VII. This is why Article 51 has been placed in Chapter VII.14 However, the setting into motion of the collective security machinery provided for in Chapter VII has not as yet been possible, despite persistent attempts to do so.'5 As is known, some of the Security Council's permanent members having financial and other interests in Namibia have vetoed or threatened to veto such action, thus blocking the Organization's defensive reaction. In view of this situation, therefore, Namibians are legally entitled to defend themselves"6 as this is presently the only alternatve left under the Charter.

Ironically, the threats to veto, as well as the vetoes actually exercised, have contributed to the strengthening of the individual right of the people of Namibia to self-defence. Thus, the Security Council, in recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Namibia,"' asserts the applicability of Article 51 of the Charter in this case, without prejudicing of any peaceful initiative which might be taken under Chapter VI. 8 In other words, the Security Council's action in recognizing the legitimacy of the Namibian struggle on the one hand while attempting to achieve a peaceful settlement on the other, cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the Namibian defence is legally authorized to continue for as long as the aggression persists and, in any case, until enforcement action is taken by the UN.

This, we think, is the correct interpretation of the action taken by the Council so far in the Namibian conflict, rather than the one alleging that SWAPO's action "must surely be suspended". Nonetheless, it is true that, in the opinion of the international community, a need to suspend hostilities has pressingly arisen, but only in respect of the initiator of the illegal use of force.

14. J. Dugard seems to accept this indirectly when stating that "either they [the Western permanent members of the S.C.] will be manoeuvred into lending their support to mandatory sanctions under Chapter VIl of the Charter or they will acquiesce in the acceleration of violence directed at the South African administration in South-West Africa" (p. 157).

15. E.g. because of the negative vote of three permanent members (France, U.K., U.S.A.) the S.C.. in its meeting of 9 June 1975, failed to adopt a five-Power draft resolution which would have had the Council, acting under Chapter VIl. that the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa constituted a threat to intemational peace and security. See UN Monthly Chronicle. Feb. 1976, p. 18.

16. See also Art. 11/6 of the Charter of the O.A.U.

17. S.C. Resolutions 269 (1969). 282 (1970X, 301 (1971) etc.

18. As for Dugard's comment that the S.C. "has adopted a series of more constructive resolutions, (S.C. Resolutions 309 (1972), 319 (1972), 324 (1972)1 aimed at either a negotiated or a non-violent settlement of the dispute" (p. 152) it must be noted that they were also adopted "without prejudice to other resolutions adopted by the Security Council".

44 AFRICA TODAY




The Application of the Laws of Armed Conflict

It is further argued that the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 1949 "apply only to intemational conflicts, that is, to conflicts between States . . . Consequently, the Conventions, except for article 3 [relating to non-international armed conflicts] are not applicable to internal wars, into which category wars of national liberation fall" (p. 153).

The allegation that wars of national liberation are "intemal" wars, as opposed to international wars, stems from the same absolutist concept of domestic jurisdiction discussed earlier and implies that liberation conflicts taking place in the colonies should be treated simply as acts of "internal disorder" which have no international significance. This argument fails to see the international character of the national-liberation war because it (a) still regards the colony as an integral part of province of the metropolis, hence (b) considers the national-liberation war as a domestic matter within artificial colonial boundaries, and (c) bases itself upon the arbitrary and discriminatory criterion of the "level of violence," which, allegedly, "only States can produce". Seeking to minimize the broadening of the scope and the extension of the material field of application of the laws of armed conflict brought about by contemporary practice,"9 the whole argument naturally results in a vicious circle and a double standard.

Dugard's reasoning leads him to state, in what appears prima facie as a liberal interpretation, that the recognition of SWAPO as the authentic representative of the people of Namibia by the General Assembly "might arguably be seen as recognition of SWAPO's status as a belligerent in an international conflict" (p. 156).

However, if this view seeks to establish (and it seems to do so) that this recognition of belligerency "transforms" the conflict in Namibia into an international one, then it is also erroneous. For it originally presupposes an internal conflict which, on the basis of the "traditional" categories of insurgency, belligerency, scale of violence, score of sufficient military success etc., only eventually was so developed as to be regulated as if it were international.

The aforesaid Assembly's action, coupled with the recognition of the legitimacy of the national-liberation war of the people of Namibia, does not transform the hostilities into an international war but simply reaffirms their international character. This is thought to be the correct interpretation of the action taken so far in this respect by the UN. Support for this interpretation can be seen by the fact that the Assembly has called for the

19. See ante, p. 3, n. 9.

Vol. 2611979) No. 2 45



application of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 1949 in their entirety20 and not for the limited protection of Article 3, common to all Conventions, relating to the protection of victims of non- international armed conflicts.

It is alleged, however, that Article 4A(2) of the Prisoners of War Convention indicates that the Geneva Conventions "are not capable of application in their entirety to wars of national liberation" (p. 155).

This allegation, which in the final analysis leads to the rejection of the combatant status of SWAPO's armed forces, stems from a mechanical and unduly restricted reading of the relevant provisions. It holds that it would be difficult or impossible for the liberation forces to comply with the four requirements set out in the above-mentioned Article,2' and hence to acquire prisoner-of-war status when falling into the power of the enemy.

However, as regards the requirement of responsible leadership for SWAPO's People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), Sam Nujoma has been widely recognized to be such a person. As for the other requirements it has been correctly pointed out that

The contemporary uniforms of regular armed forces are designed to provide effective camouflage, and guerrillas may, consequently, wear a similar uniform with 'a fixed distinctive sign' which may, for example, consist of a particular type of cap of headgear. In the same way, guerrilla forces may carry weapons such as automatic pistols and hand grenades attached to belts under coats and comply with the requirement of 'carrying arms openly'. With respect to the requirement concerning complying with 'the laws and customs of war', it should be recognized that guerrillas have the same obligations as regular armed forces. 22

PLAN Freedom fighters are thus entitled to the privileged status of lawful combatants, regardless of whether they operate from inside or outside their occupied territory. They are also entitled to be held, if captured by the enemy, as prisoners of war. This interpretation of the relevant provisions of the P.O.W. Convention is confirmed by the General Assembly Resolution on the Basic Principles on the Legal Status of Combatants Struggling against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, the fourth Principle of which reads:

20. G.A. Resolutions 2396 (XXIII) of 2 Dec. 1968, 2547 (XXIV) A of all Dec. 1969, 2674 (XXV) and 2678 (XXV) of 9 Dec. 1970, 2871 (XXVI) of 20 Dec. 1971, etc.

21. Article 4A(2) reads in part: Members . . . of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such . . . organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly: (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

22. W.T. Mallison, Jr. and S. V. Mallison "An International Law Appraisal of the Juridical Characteristics of the Resistance of the People of Palestine: The Struggle for Human Rights" in International Terrorism and Political Crimes (ed M. Cherif Bassiouni, 1975), p. 175.

46 AFRICA TODAY




The combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes captured prisoners are to be accorded the status of prisoners of war and their treatment of them should be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.23

It should be added here that the right to be treated as prisoners of war, if captured, is not confined to SWAPO's combatants, but extends to all Namibians who participate actively in the struggle for the restoration of the independence of their Territory. Accordingly, the P.O.W. Convention can correctly be seen as granting to every Namibian freedom-fighter or to a member of a spontaneous uprising (levees en masse) exactly the same status of privileged combatant under international law which it accords to regular armed forces or organised resistance movements, provided that the last two requirements specified in Article 4A(2) of the P.O.W. Convention are satisfied.

Are the Laws of Armed Conflict "Neutral" in Character?

Although Dugard rejects the applicability of the P.O.W. Convention to wars of national liberation, he nevertheless suggests, ostensibly on political or moral grounds, that "prisoner-of-war status should be accorded to combatants captured by either [S.A. or SWAPO] belligerent'"' (p. 156) By seeking, however, to extend the life-span of the "traditional" doctrine, this notion primarily safeguards in fact the long-term war interests of South Africa. In addition, it has little relevance to present-day legal reality. In this connection, a brief comment is deemed necessary.

The "traditional" doctrine defended the applicability of the laws of war upon aDl parties engaged in hostilities, irrespective of who was the aggressor or who had a just cause on his side in going to war. However, this attitude, which attributes a "neutral" character to the laws of war, has lost its legal persuasiveness since the universal outlawry of aggression, especially after the adoption of the Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals,24 and the UN Charter. In the light of these developments, a party to a conflict guilty of crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity cannot successfully claim the applicability of the Conventions for the protection of its captured forces. 25

23. G.A. Resolution 3103 (XXVII) of 12 Dec. 1973. Failure by the Detaining Power to comply with these provisions entails serious consequences. See C. Theodoropoulos, "The Namibian National-Liberation War and Intemational Law", The Eastern Africa Law Review, vol. 10 (forthcoming).

24. For the text of the Nuremberg Charter see 39 AJIL, 1945. Suppl. pp. 258-261. See also the Judgements of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals, the G.A. Res. 95 (I) which reaffirmed the Nuremberg Principles, the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1954, G.A. Res. 380 (V), and the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal, formulated by the ILC, 1950.

25. Of course, any implication that the captured criminals could be treated non-humanely must be rejected beforehand.

Vol. 26 (1979) No. 2 47



Moreover, in such a case, the question of international state responsibility for aggression and its consequences and, possibly individual international criminal responsibility could also arise.2' If contemporary international law requires that aggression must not go unpunished, then, the aggressor cannot possibly be subject to the application of the Geneva Conventions and derive from it benefits or rights which are irreconcilable with the need for punishment of international crimes under general international law.27

The traditional modus operandi of the laws of war, separating the casus belli, or, generally, the jus ad bellum, from the jus in bello and providing equal rights for the perpetrator and the victim alike, is no longer supported by contemporary practice. It is today well-established in law that the enemy parties to a conflict (also to a colonial conflict) are not accorded equal legal status, and that a distinction should be made against the aggressor and in favour of its victim.28 This clearly constitutes a great departure from the traditional, a-moral doctrine of the "neutral" character of the laws of war.29 For instance, South Africa cannot claim the normal rights of belligerent occupation in Namibia,30 and therefore she does not have the right to institute a military or any other government in the Territory.

In conclusion, the totality of the concept of the jus in bello does not exclude the consideration of the initiation of war and its causes, but, on the contrary, presupposes it.

In other words, the unlawful use of force in international relations does not empower its perpetrator to claim any kind of benefits with regard to jus in bello, at least today when aggression and colonialism have been outlawed.3' There cannot be any reasonable doubt that this especially applies to South Africa in respect of her illegal warlike presence in Namibia, inasmuch as the usurper is under a legal obligation to withdraw immediately.

26. See Q. Wright. "The Law of the Nuremberg" 41 AJIL, 1947, pp. 38ff. This arguably could also apply to the various Namibian "quislings" whom a future Namibian Govemment might try in accordance with the post-war practice.

27. A significant contribution towards this direction, though of a limited scope, was the adoption of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII) of 26 Nov. 1968; see also R.H. Miller, "The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity", 65 AJIL, 1971. pp. 476 ff.

28. Q. Wright. "War Criminals", 39 AJIL, 1945, p. 267.

29. For example, the Assembly has dedared that any attempt on the part of South Africa to suppress the national-liberation movement of the people of Namibia, that is, even if this attempt is in conformity with the rules concenmng the conduct of the hostilities, is incompatible with international law; see G. A. Resolutions 2326 (XXII), 2189 (XXI) etc.

30. See the third part of the Civilian's Convention especially Articles 47 et seq.

31. Q. Wright, "The Outlawry of War and the Law of War," ibid, p. 370.

48 AFRICA TODAY



Documents

Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Support for SWAPO's War of Liberation in International Law