Letter from the Director

Welcome Delegates to the fifth annual &MUN conference at William & Mary!

My name is Venu Katta and I am the Director for the Colombian Council of Ministers. I am

currently a final year Master of Public Policy student at William & Mary, where I also was an

undergraduate. Originally from the Richmond, Virginia area I’m quite the fan of Williamsburg

and I hope you’ll enjoy your time down here as well!

This will be my 2nd &MUN Conference and likely my final MUN Conference as a student,

having joined William & Mary’s International Relations Club last year. Since then I’ve had the

opportunity to dive head first into MUN, having staffed William & Mary’s Middle and High

School conferences and competed at multiple Conferences on the Collegiate circuit, including

WorldMUN (where this year I’ll also be serving as an Assistant Chair).

Between a borderline unhealthy obsession with Narcos, general current events interests and

academic classes, I am interested in the events in Colombia during the time period we’ll be

dealing with and am excited to see what direction the committee will move in to address these

issues!

Please don’t hesitate to reach out to myself or your Crisis Director, Andie Powers, for any

questions or concerns leading up to the Conference!

Sincerely,

Venu Katta

vrkatta@email.wm.edu

Letter from the Crisis Director

Welcome Delegates to &MUN V!

I am Andie Powers, your crisis director for this weekend. I like to think of myself as a cruise

director, just with violence and drugs instead of bingo and early-bird dinner specials. I am a

junior at the College, majoring in Government with a focus on intrastate conflict. Born and

raised in Austin, Texas, my parents relocated a couple years back to Northern Virginia and I

have since become familiar with the wonders of the East Coast. Most of these wonders are

seafood related and I just cannot complain about that.

&MUN V is my third time around, having crisis directed last year and staffed the Ad-Hoc the

year before. I have worked in some crisis-related capacity for seven of the eight conferences I

have staffed at the College. I am looking forward to staffing a collegiate-level conference

again, as I get a few more liberties than with the middle and high schoolers. To say I am

excited for this committee and to see what y’all may get up to is an understatement.

When not either traveling for MUN or staffing, I participate in a number of research projects

on-campus. With whatever free time that leaves me, I like to map out the best places to nap

on campus.

Please do reach out if you have any questions or concerns regarding this committee. I want it

to be as reactive as possible, so I look forward to the ideas y’all can bring to the table.

Sincerely,

Andie Powers

ampowers@email.wm.edu

Introduction

The end of the 1980s marked one of the most violent periods in Colombian history. In 1989,

leading presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan was assassinated, followed by two other major

party nominees also murdered prior to balloting. The bombing of Avianca Flight 203 and the

attack on the headquarters of the nation’s security services, among other conflict incidents, had

killed hundreds – often civilians – and exposed Colombia’s fragility and instability.

Against this backdrop, constitutional reform efforts in the early 1990s aimed to integrate

political actors into a viable government. In early 1991, Colombian voters authorized and

elected members to a Constitutional Assembly to retool the institutions of power within the

country to be more democratic and responsive.

On July 4, 1991 the newly promulgated Colombian Constitution restructured the government

in several key ways. Extradition of Colombian citizens (a key policy prerogative of the United

States to fight the War on Drugs in Latin America) was constitutionally barred, while more

decentralized autonomy was given to individual Colombian states at the expense of the federal

government. Other changes included the establishment of a Constitutional Court to hear cases

involving judicial review as well as a ban on presidential reelection. Taken together, these

changes were designed by the Assembly to meet the diverse interests of the Colombian people

and to encourage guerrilla movements to demobilize and enter the political arena.

At the beginning of 1992, however, key challenges remain for the Colombian government to

face. Despite supporting constitutional reforms, the country’s largest guerrilla movement – the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – refused to demobilize and continues to

wage armed conflict against government forces. Additionally, the Medellin Cartel - led by

narco trafficker Pablo Escobar – has unleashed a wave of violence to assert its dominance

following Escobar’s escape from prison. Meanwhile, concerns over public corruption and the

trustworthiness of Colombian officials permeate the country, as the reach of cartels, vigilantes,

paramilitary groups, and revolutionary guerrilla movements extends deep into the State.

This committee will be forced to steer Colombia through these troubled waters and support the

presidency of Cesar Gaviria. Juggling security concerns of handling the FARC and the cartels,

the Council of Ministers must simultaneously be mindful of corruption as well as concerns

over the collateral damage of the paramilitary and vigilante groups who are also fighting

against these public enemies.

Topic 1: The FARC

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is an armed Marxist guerilla

group. Founded as the paramilitary wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC has

galvanized many rural swaths of the country to support their insurgency against government

forces. the FARC’s aims are, generally, the support of a Marxist-Leninist Revolution against

what they perceive as an oppressive government in Bogota which, in addition to embodying

the excess of Capitalism, allows American imperialism in the region and the economic

deprivation of rural communities.1

While FARC primarily holds territory and launches hit-and-run style attacks on

government forces, they have also engaged in limited political involvement. In the early 1980s

during an agreed three-year ceasefire, the FARC – along with other leftist activists – formed

the Union Patriótica (UP) Party to contest municipal and regional elections. Despite its early

successes, UP soon fell to a campaign of terror from right-wing paramilitary groups and

government security forces leading to the assassination or imprisonment of most of its

1 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769

members.2 UP’s failure by the early 1990s had only furthered FARC’s resolve to return to

waging a military campaign from its strongholds.

Having formed in the mid 1960s, the protracted war between the government and

FARC neared its third decade by 1992. Tens of thousands of individuals, from civilians to

political activists to soldiers, had been killed in the fighting, with little end in sight. Continued

negotiations with the new Gaviria government occur in Venezuela and Mexico.3 However,

multiple events make FARC sceptical of entering a peace framework with the government.

Firstly, the large-scale murder of UP activists in the 1980s makes FARC members doubtful

that they would be able to meaningfully participate in the political process were they to lay

down their weapons. Secondly, government forces have frequently launched largescale

offensives against the FARC during negotiations - mostly recently in 1990 with a major attack

on the FARC’s Casa Verde stronghold. This has made FARC weary of coming to or staying at

the negotiating table. Finally, FARC’s current position of relative military strength – they

currently possess upwards of 10,000 armed fighters with strong operational capability across

the country – only increases a desire within the movement to continue fighting and exacting

concessions from the government. Additionally, FARC’s financial resources are considerable,

in no small part due to their tolerating and taxing of cocaine production and trafficking which

occurs through territory which they hold.

With violence spiralling out of control, the Colombian people wish the government to

find a resolution to the conflict. The Council may take two broad paths towards resolution,

though the specifics of each may vary considerably and they may be employed simultaneously.

The first is a military solution. Colombia’s military, numbering in the millions with

superior firepower and technological capabilities to the FARC, would easily win an armed

2 http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-09-02/colombias-farc-rebels-face-dangers-possible-return-politics 3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/spanish/specials/1441_farc/page8.shtml

confrontation in the open. However, the FARC’s guerrilla tactics, ability to blend in with rural

communities, and inaccessible outposts has made a military victory difficult. Nonetheless, a

continued campaign can build off of successes such as the attack on Casa Verde.4 Crucial to

the military strategy is continued support from the United States, the largest weapons supplier

to the Colombian government. The removal of extradition per the new Colombian Constitution,

however, has slightly worsened relations with Washington.

A second, diplomatic solution would be to return to the negotiating table and build a

sustainable framework in which the FARC agrees to either lay down their weapons or at least

enter a long-term ceasefire arrangement. Such an outcome would require the government to

guarantee effective participation in the political system for the FARC as well as require some

reigning in of the militia and paramilitary groups which also fight against FARC – often with

unrelenting savagery and severe human rights abuses.

However the Council of Ministers chooses to approach the FARC situation, it is of

paramount importance to focus on reducing the level of violence in the country and maintaining

public support. Some key questions the Council should consider in dealing with the rebels are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Should diplomatic negotiations be continued in Venezuela and Mexico or would

terminating them signal greater willingness to fight FARC?

Is the prohibition on extradition a policy which Colombia should continue to enshrine

in its Constitution and even if not should specifically extradition with respect to the

FARC be supported?

Are there any military strategies that the government could pursue to cripple FARC?

How much should the government tolerate paramilitary groups acting on their own

against the rebels?

4 http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/14/world/colombia-presses-drive-on-rebels-smashing-base.html

Topic 2: Cartels

Even though Colombian National Police destroyed over 200 cocaine laboratories in

1992, the country still managed to rank 3rd in global production of the drug, with an estimated

37,100 hectares of cultivation.5 Worth billions of dollars and flooding markets across the world,

particularly in the United States, cocaine has had a major impact on the domestic power

structure of Colombia. The influx of narcotics dollars has financed the growth of two rival and

violent groups who control most or all of Colombia’s cocaine production: the Medellin Cartel

and the Cali Cartel (based out of their eponymous cities, respectively).

The Medellin Cartel, based out of Medellin and led by ruthless drug lord Pablo Escobar,

is in its death throes by 1992. Having once been Colombia and the world’s largest drug supplier,

its influence has waned against a targeted campaign against it by the government as well as

vigilante groups. Escobar himself has recently escaped prison – following government efforts

to transfer him once it was discovered that he continued to direct his business – and is currently

on the run.6 Meanwhile, a rogue group of rival drug traffickers and victims of Escobar’s

indiscriminate violence who have termed themselves “Los Pepes” have begun to target

Escobar’s associates (and those even tangentially linked to him) in a campaign of terror and

murder.

While these trends seemingly point to the Medellin Cartel as a spent force, Escobar has

turned to a show of force to demonstrate that his organization has not been defeated. Multiple

high-profile assassinations and bombings have swept Colombia and have been traced back to

5 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/150299NCJRS.pdf 6 http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/23/world/colombian-drug-baron-escapes-luxurious-prison-after-gunfight.html

the Medellin Cartel.7 Additionally, Escobar has become a public face of the violence, leading

many citizens to consider his apprehension or killing to be a leading priority.

On the other hand, the Cali Cartel is on the rise, overtaking Medellin in terms of cocaine

market ownership. Cali, free from the intense pressure of government and vigilante crackdown,

has begun to increase its profile. With more financial revenue and assets, the Cali Cartel has

begun to infiltrate more sectors of government through a prolific bribing operation and has

amassed a significant amount of firepower to protect its large cocaine supply chain.

Both of these organizations ultimately present problems for the Colombian state and

for the Council of Ministers. Creating a peaceful and stable Colombia entails an end to the

present instability and violence, whether that violence traces back to the FARC or to cartels.

Additionally, the cartel battle has an international dimension given the United States’ keen

interest in the War on Drugs. As a result, American cooperation has, up until now, been

essential to battle narcotraffickers. The recent decision to halve extradition of criminals to the

United States (which had been a longstanding policy of the War on Drugs in order to allow

drug traffickers to face stiff jail terms in American prisons where they would be less likely to

escape or manage their business) has blocked some of that cooperation.8

Furthermore, the Council must consider how to prioritize the threats which are

developing on the narco front. While the Medellin Cartel is no doubt the most publicly known

as well as currently the most violent, the Cali Cartel continues to grow its cocaine empire and

present a threat to governmental legitimacy. Further complicating matters is the degree to

which Los Pepes ought be tolerated in the short run, given their penchant for collateral damage

7 http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/04/world/a-car-bomb-kills-14-in-medellin-in-attack-laid-to-the-drug-cartel.html 8 http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1232&context=ilr

and heavy-handed tactics in fighting Escobar. Some key questions the Council should consider

when dealing with the Cartel issue:

1.

2.

3.

-

4.

Should cooperation with the U.S. War on Drugs be continued or should Colombia

relax some of its anti-drug stances?

Is the prohibition on extradition a policy which Colombia should continue to enshrine

in its Constitution and even if not should specifically extradition with respect to drug

crime be supported?

If Colombia continues fighting Cartels/narcotraffickers, which one - Medellin or Cali

should be prioritized?

How much should the government tolerate vigilante groups acting on their own

against the Cartels?

Topic 3: Public Corruption

While Colombia’s precarious situation may prevent complete ethical perfection,

various scandals regarding the government have proved troubling and threaten to undermine

the President and the Council’s position.

In its campaign against the FARC, the military has undertaken questionable tactics such

as arming and collaborating with drug-running paramilitary groups. Additionally, military

squads have murdered peasants in the countryside to artificially inflate the number of FARC

members they can claim to have engaged to their commanding officers.9 The full extent of

these stories remains largely concealed from the public in 1992, though their existence could

be exposed and do serious damage to the government.

Other corruption incidents involve the seemingly lax treatment Cartels have received

from local law enforcement. Despite being surrounded in a government operation, Pablo

9 http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB266/index.htm

Escobar was able to escape from his prison undetected, while the Cali Cartel is able to traffic

its cocaine nearly unhindered. These incidents seriously question whether the Colombian

government – either at the federal or local level – is serious in its efforts to tackle the problems

facing Colombia.

Devolution of power from the federal level to regional government in the new

Constitution carries with it its own possibility of corruption. Many local politicians in the

country have historically taken sides in the armed conflict – evident from the examples of the

UP and paramilitary groups. Various interests of local leaders, particularly without strong law

enforcement or anticorruption presence, may weaken the effectiveness of federal policy and

decrease citizens’ trust in government.

Rather than necessarily requiring affirmative action, Public Corruption is an

omnipresent concern the Council must grapple with while formulating its actions in response

to the unfolding crises around them. Engaging in illicit activities may prove fatal to Ministers

if they are exposed to the public. Additionally, the Council must consider what level of corrupt

actions are warranted given the unprecedented situation the country finds itself in. Some key

questions the Council should consider when dealing with the Cartel issue:

1.

2.

3.

Should the government take steps to distance itself for paramilitary and vigilante

groups?

Should the government attempt to punish or attempt to cover up unseemly actions by

the Colombian military?

Are there any methods the government might use to crack down on local-level bribery

and corruption?

Cabinet Portfolio Minister of Finance & Public Credit Oversees the Colombian public treasury

and the allocation of funds. Minister of Justice Oversees investigations and prosecutions

with agents independent of the National Police force

Minister of Health & Social Security Oversees health care system, hospitals, and public health campaigns

Minister of Labour Oversees labour regulations, pension management, and union relations

Minister of Agriculture & Rural Development Oversees agricultural policy, meets with farm leaders, and encourages anti-cocaine

production efforts Minister of Foreign Trade Oversees trade policy and negotiates with

foreign governments on economic policy Minister of National Education Oversees primary, secondary, and

university level education policy Minister of Mines & Energy Oversees state-run energy companies

Minister of Transport Oversees infrastructure and transport systems, including rail, air, and roads

Minister of Communications Oversees telecom policy, including licensing and broadcasting

Minister of Economic Development Oversees encouragement of private investment and of public works projects

Minister of Foreign Affairs Oversees foreign policy, diplomatic missions abroad, and communications with international

representatives Minister of Government Oversees Interior policy, including local

administrative divisions and indigenous affairs.

Commander of the Colombian Army Oversees operational planning and logistics of the Army of Colombia.

Commander of the Colombian Navy Oversees operational planning and logistics of the Navy of Colombia

Commander of the Colombian Air Force Oversees operational planning and logistics of the Air Force of Colombia

Chief of the Colombian National Police Oversees the bulk of Colombian law enforcement and the investigative and

peacekeeping missions of said law enforcement

Mayor of Bogota Oversees local administration within Bogota, with significant personal and political

connections to the implementers of Ministerial policy within the city.

Mayor of Medellin Oversees local administration within Medellin, with significant personal and political

connections to the implementers of Ministerial policy within the city.

Mayor of Cali Oversees local administration within Cali, with significant personal and political connections to the implementers of

Ministerial policy within the city.

Committee Position

Committee Positions

The following Ministers serve in the Council to advise the President as well as manage their own departments. They may advocate for collective action by the Council and President or use the resources at their own command to publicly or secretly take certain actions.

Concluding Thoughts

This background has by no means exhaustive and is meant to be supplemented by your own

original research into the situation in Colombia and the individual ministry you represent. Keep

in mind the significant divergence our Committee may end up taking from events in the real

world and be mindful of what you would do in the event of various contingencies and detours

from that real world path.

I wish you all the best of luck in preparing for the conference and hope you enjoy your time in

Williamsburg for &MUN! It’s sure to be a worthwhile and eventful weekend and I can’t wait

to get the chance to meet you all!