MUSLIM MINDANAO POLICY REPORT: Transition Mechanisms

Prepared by the Senate Economic Planning Office Page 1

POLICY REPORT

Transition Mechanisms and Timelines on the Proposed Bangsamoro: Perils and Opportunities

Sixth of a Seven-Part Roundtable Discussion Series on Muslim Mindanao Autonomy

INTRODUCTION

“Life is pleasant. Death is peaceful. It’s the transition that’s troublesome” – Isaac Asimov, writer

istory has shown that in the change-over from one form of government to another,

peace and stability does not usually come overnight. In many cases, it takes a few

generations even for a new status quo to take root, and the implementation of

transition mechanisms is imperative to ensure that the needs of citizens are met during this

potentially rough period.

On August 17, 2015, the sixth of a seven-part series of roundtable discussions on autonomy

in Muslim Mindanao was held in the Senate of the Philippines. The focus of this particular

round of discussions was on transition mechanisms and timelines of the proposed

Bangsamoro. The series of discussions was organized jointly by a number of institutions,

specifically the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG), the Local Government

Development Foundation (LOGODEF), the Senate Muslim Advocates for Peace and Progress

(SMAPP), and the Senate Economic Planning Office (SEPO).

Panelists for this session included Fr. Eliseo Mercado, from civil society group Kusog

Mindanaw, Atty. Mohammad Al-Amin Julkipli, Legal Counsel of the Office of the

Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), Atty. Laisa Alamia, Executive Secretary

of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and Mr. Samuel Chittick,

International Advisor for the Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Capacities

(FASTRAC).The various speakers provided a wide range of perspectives on experiences and

models of transition mechanisms pertinent to the ongoing peace process in parts of

Mindanao, drawing from historical perspectives and international experience and practices

as well as from the experiences of observers and participants of the current peace process.

Also attending the roundtable discussion were representatives from the academe, civil

society and indigenous peoples in the affected areas, representatives of a number of

Senators, and officers and technical staff from the Senate of the Philippines.

As with the rest of the roundtable series, these discussions were meant to be academic and

non-partisan in nature. The discussions were meant to explore context, historical

perspectives and frameworks that drive the provisions or the different versions of the

proposed Bangsamoro Law. Participants were expected to come away from the discussions

with a greater understanding of the issues and the diverse and conflicting opinions, and

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ultimately with “more tools in their toolkit” for advising decision makers on matters relating

to the BBL.

SUMMARY OF PRESENTATIONS

Historical Perspective on Peace Agreements in Muslim Mindanao Fr. Eliseo Mercado, Chairman, Kusog Mindanaw and Director and Senior Policy Adviser, Institute

for Autonomy and Governance

r. Eliseo Mercado, OMI, is a civil society leader and academic in the region who has

been a longtime observer, adviser and participant to the peace process in Muslim

Mindanao. He presented a historical perspective on the different transition

procedures and mechanisms in the Mindanao peace process, dating back to the Tripoli

Agreement up to the current efforts with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Before delving into the history of peace agreements in the region, Fr. Mercado briefly

discussed the importance of the change in terminology from “peace talks” to “peace

process”. From the earliest peace negotiations leading to the Tripoli Agreement in the 1970s

all the way up to 1992, parties involved referred to “peace talks” or “peace negotiations”.

The unspoken implication of this terminology was that as soon as the talks or negotiations

are completed, violence and conflict in Muslim Mindanao would disappear, almost

overnight. Sometime around 1992, the term “peace process” entered the parlance as

parties began to realize the that ultimate goals of the peace negotiations would not

materialize, as if by magic, upon the completion of peace talks and that an extended period

of transition between the current status quo and the desired state would more likely be the

case.

Fr. Mercado began his review of the history of the peace negotiations with the Tripoli

Agreement of 1976, during the Marcos administration. Under the agreement, a provisional

autonomous government for the Southern Philippines was first established, covering 13

provinces and all cities within. As President Marcos had both executive and legislative

powers at that time, the issuance of a Presidential Decree was enough to establish, initially

the Regional Commission, and later on, the Office of the Regional Government in Region IX

and XII. This was followed by the setting up of what was called the Lupong Tagapagpaganap

ng Pook (LTP) or Regional Executive Council, which was the executive branch of the

autonomous government and the Sangguniang Pampook or Regional Assembly which

served as the legislative branch both in Regions IX and XII. Fr. Mercado described the

establishment of this provisional autonomous government as largely unilateral, given the

tremendous power wielded by President Marcos at that time.

After the end of the Marcos dictatorship, a new Constitution was put into place in 1987.

Article X of the 1987 Constitution called for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim

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Mindanao. The process for creating this new autonomous region was initially through the

establishment of a Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) which then drafted RA 6734 and

which eventually gave birth to the ARMM. RA 6734 was put to a referendum in 10 provinces

and all the cities therein and Fr. Mercado recalled that it was a shock that in the end, only

four (4) provinces and no cities voted to join the newly created ARMM. From his

observations at the time, he believes the law was rejected as many of the citizens objected

to the use of the term “Muslim Mindanao”, with non-Muslims in the affected provinces

fearing the new autonomous government would be exclusionary to them.

Fr. Mercado also characterized the process leading to this as largely unilateral as well, due

to the fact that Nur Misuari and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) had objected to

Article X from the start, did not participate in the RCC, and rejected RA 6734.

The next major development in the history of the peace negotiations came under the Ramos

administration. It was during this period when General Almonte, who was one of the main

figures on the side of the government at the time, introduced the idea of the “peace

process” which is still the paradigm being used today, and the concept of linking peace with

development. Another feature of the peace process in this time was to reject the idea of

tying it to arbitrary political boundaries such as provinces and cities and instead creating

what was called the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). The plan was to

bring intensive economic development to the 14 provinces and 9 cities falling under the

SZOPAD while creating a body called the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and

Development (SPCPD) which would monitor, facilitate and coordinate all these

developments. This time, Nur Misuari was heavily involved, holding three key positions at

that time, specifically, as Regional Governor of ARMM, Chairman of the SPCPD and speaker

of the Consultative Assembly. Unfortunately, all of these ultimately failed to bring peace and

development as, according to Fr. Mercado, there was very little in the way of interfacing

between these new structures and institutions and the traditional national government line

agencies which were also operating in the affected zones.

As a final point, Fr. Mercado wanted to share an important lesson he learned from

observing peace processes in the Philippines and abroad. He stressed the fact that there will

always be differences between the content of negotiated peace agreements and the

corresponding legislation; and there will also be differences between the legislation and

actual implementation. He said that aspiring for perfect one-to-one correspondence in each

case is not rooted in reality. But rather than letting this fact hamper any forward movement,

stakeholders should see it as part of a transition and continue to aspire towards their ideal

situation.


Overview of the GPH-MILF Transitional Process, Structures and Timelines Atty. Mohammad Al-Amin Julkipli, Legal Counsel of the Office of the Presidential Adviser for the

Peace Process

r. Julkipli is the legal counsel of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the

Peace Process (OPAPP) and is a member of the legal team which assisted the

government peace negotiating panel for talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF). He presented an overview of how the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (SB

2408), and the substitute bill (SB 2894) envisioned the transitional processes, structures and

mechanisms for the peace process. He further noted though that several provisions

pertaining to the transition mechanisms were originally encapsulated in the Framework

Agreement of the Bangsamoro (FAB) particularly in the Annex on Transitional Arrangements

and Modalities (ATAM) and were subsequently adopted and/or modified in the two Senate

Bills.

Mr. Julkipli pointed out that there are essentially two layers of transition under the

Framework Agreement. The first layer is a transition process wherein parties are moving

towards full implementation of the various provisions of the agreement. This layer of the

transition process began after the aforementioned ATAM was concluded and signed but

while the other annexes of the agreement were still being negotiated. The second layer of

transition deals with the entrenchment of a new autonomous region to replace the current

autonomous set up. Essentially, this transition process is with regard to the change from the

current ARMM to the proposed Bangsamoro.

There are two key mechanisms which are relevant to the first layer of transition. These are

the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) and the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT).

The BTC is composed of 15 members and was created by Executive Order 120 in 2012 and

its key function was nothing less than to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law itself. In

connection with this, the BTC is also tasked with continued coordination with the Legislature

in the passage and enactment of the BBL. The BTC is also tasked to work on proposals to

amend the Constitution whenever necessary to accommodate and entrench the terms of

the agreements in the country’s fundamental law. Lastly, the BTC is also tasked to

coordinate whenever necessary the development efforts in the region with the help of allied

institutions.

There remains some debate on when the BTC is supposed to terminate. There appear to be

conflicting or confusing provisions in the ATAM which would indicate whether the BTC

should cease to exist upon the passage into law of the BBL or upon ratification of the said

Law. Mr. Julkipli is of the opinion that termination of the BTC should only happen upon

ratification.

The other key transition mechanism is the Third Party Monitoring Team, which is composed

of five members from various independent organizations. The two key functions of the

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TPMT are as follows: 1) monitor and evaluate the implementation of all agreements, and 2)

review and assess the progress of the implementation process. The TPMT will continue to

exist until the so-called “Exit Document” or “Exit Agreement” is signed, signifying that all

agreements have been complied with, as determined by the TPMT with the participation of

all parties as well.

With regard to the second layer of transition, which is the change from the current ARMM

setup to the proposed Bangsamoro, the key mechanism to consider is the Bangsamoro

Transition Authority (BTA). The key function of the BTA is to serve as the interim

government or governing body of the Bangsamoro during the transition period. This

particular transition period begins as soon as the BBL is ratified and ends upon the

qualification of the Chief Minister under the first regular Bangsamoro Parliament as

provided for in SB 2408. The BTA will be composed of 50 members, all of whom will be

appointed by the President, provided that there shall be sectoral representatives especially

from the non-Moro indigenous communities, women, and settler communities among

others. As per the provisions of the peace agreements, at least 26 out of the 50 members of

the BTA must come from nominees of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

While the exact details and scope of powers and responsibilities of the BTA will be

ultimately determined by the final provisions of the BBL as passed by Congress, (such as the

creation or phasing out of certain government offices, for instance), the main purpose of the

BTA is to ensure the smooth transition from the ARMM to Bangsamoro and to continue to

provide basic services to the affected population so that there is no vacuum in governance

during the transition period.

From ARMM to the Bangsamoro: Issues, Opportunities and Perils Atty. Laisa Masuhud Alamia, Executive Secretary, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and

co-founder, Nisa Ul Haqq fi Bangsamoro

s. Alamia is the current Executive Secretary of the ARMM and the co-founder of

the civil society group Nisa Ul Haqq fi Bangsamoro which translates as “Women

for Justice in the Bangsamoro”. Her presentation aimed to provide context by

discussing the situation in the ARMM and providing some insights and possible reasons for

the persistent social, political and economic issues in the region.

In trying to answer the question “Why create a special autonomous Bangsamoro?”, Ms.

Alamia suggested that the situation in Muslim Mindanao is unusual and different from

anywhere else in the country. The ARMM is the poorest region in the country with a poverty

incidence of 48.7 percent as of 2012. In two of the five provinces in the region, more than

half of the population is poor. Specifically, Lanao del Sur, the poorest province in the

country, has a poverty incidence of 67.3 percent and Maguindanao is at 54.5 percent. In

addition, several municipalities in the region are extremely vulnerable with 30 municipalities

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considered as prone to armed conflict and 36 municipalities prone to hazards. Further

exacerbating the already volatile situation in the region is a history of conflict, insecurity and

natural disasters which result in waves of displacement.

Focusing on the issue of displacement in recent history, Ms. Alamia noted that nearly a

million people (982,000) were displaced during the 2000 “all-out war” campaign of the

military in the region. In 2003, renewed military operations in the Buliok Complex resulted

in a net displacement of around 400,000 people. In the aftermath of the aborted

Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which resulted in more

violence in the region, the then National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) reported an

estimate of 728,659 persons were uprooted because of the fighting. And most recently,

controlled special operations against the MILF breakaway group known as the Bangsamoro

Islamic Freedom Front (BIFF) in the aftermath of the Mamasapano incident in January 2015

has caused the displacement of 125,000 people in the second district of Maguindanao. The

province of Maguindanao has been particularly vulnerable to this problem as a large

proportion of the hostilities have focused on this area. It has been estimated that between

2000 and 2010 alone, displacement has affected four out of every five households in the

province. She points out that no other region in the country has experienced these waves of

displacement, at this scale and in this frequency. She also stresses that these are just the

statistics for displaced persons and this does not include the deaths, the damage to property

and to agriculture, and the social costs of the situation. Even as the government continues

to implement programs and anti-poverty measures in the region, meaningful change does

not happen overnight and even then, all the gains from these programs are undone by the

recurring violence and displacement.

A sub-issue arising from the conflict and displacement is the increase in cases of human

trafficking and gender-based violence in the area. The most number of human trafficking

cases in the country are found in the ARMM as syndicates tend to operate in areas with a

high number of vulnerable population. There were around 300 reported cases of human

trafficking in 2014 and around 100 cases in the first semester of 2015.

Aside from the history of violence and conflict, the ARMM also suffers from bureaucratic

problems. Ms. Alamia pointed out that critical government programs in agriculture, health

and education are not properly implemented in ARMM due to regular delays in the release

of funds for the concerned agencies. Even worse though, many program activities and

projects (PAPs) of these critical agencies do not receive fund allocations at all. As an

example, she cites the case of the Department of Education (DepEd) in the 2015 national

budget. Of the 23 national program activities and projects of the DepEd in 2015, 14 did not

receive any fund allocation at all for the year and the remaining 9 PAPs either experienced

delayed fund releases or had their budgets released through adjacent regional offices in

Regions IX, X, and XII. Delays in releasing of funds to the ARMM also naturally result in

delayed or even unimplemented PAPs and also result in unliquidated funds, some even


dating back to the very first ARMM regional government. Government rules disallow the

release of funds to agencies with unliquidated funds and this leads to further delays. Ms.

Alamia believes that the proposed “block grants” under the BBL would help solve these

funding issues.

Another issue which Ms. Alamia believed was also a contributing factor to the governance

problems of the ARMM was the incomplete devolution of government services . She points

out that several key agencies such as the Department of Transportation and Communication

(DOTC) and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) were not fully devolved in

ARMM. This hindered the operations of the regional government almost as much as the lack

of funds did. She also points out that there was intended to be a structure, the so-called

Oversight Committee, which was supposed to monitor and evaluate the implementation of

the ARMM law that would have identified and possibly addressed these issues early on.

Unfortunately, the Oversight Committee, which is supposed to be under the office of the

Executive Secretary of the President, was not working and was never convened at all in the

current administration.

The current ARMM administration has instituted a number of reforms to address

governance issues in the region. Foremost among these reforms are what she calls “ghost-

busting” – specifically, identifying and eliminating ghost projects, ghost employees and the

like. Much progress has also been made in terms of completing the cadastral survey of the

region. Other areas of improvement in recent years have been in the areas of public

infrastructure, attracting investments, employment and livelihood programs and education.

However, she also stresses that despite all these reforms, there remain structural defects in

the ARMM that can only be resolved through the passage of a Bangsamoro Law that will

respond to the aspirations of the people.

Political Transitions after a Peace Agreement: Opportunities for the Bangsamoro Mr. Sam Chittick, International Advisor for the Facility for Advisory Support for Transition

Capacities (FASTRAC)

r. Chittick is the advisor for FASTRAC, which is a joint initiative of the United

Nations and the World Bank specifically for the Philippines in support of the

government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s Peace

Process. FASTRAC was launched in 2013 with funding support from the governments of

Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom as well as the United Nations and the World

Bank. Mr. Chittick’s presentation focused on international experiences with regard to

political transitions and the lessons from these experiences that may be relevant to the

Bangsamoro political transition.

Historically, political transitions refer to the process of democratization, or moving towards

more democracy. While the Bangsamoro transition is a shift from one democratic political

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arrangement to another, it will still require a new political arrangement (as reflected in the

Framework Agreement).

Mr. Chittick pointed out that international experience on political transitions have shown

that there is no fixed formula for successful peace negotiations. Comparative international

studies demonstrate that the most important factor is context. These include the economic

environment, the security situation, the political equilibrium and the relationships of the

parties involved to each other and to the society and affected communities.

Mr. Chittick enumerated some of the most common characteristics of political transitions,

specifically: 1) Transitions are turbulent, as violence in most communities does not tend to

end overnight and there is a high chance for violent incidents to recur during transition

processes; 2) The process is non-linear, meaning the society will experience varying degrees

of instability and upheaval at different points; 3) The process is long term in nature, usually

in several phases before momentum for real changes is achieved; 4) Transitions are

complex, containing difficult challenges in sociocultural, economic, security and political

fronts; 5) Transitions are joint, in the sense that they must be founded on core principles

agreed on by all parties; and 6) They present a fantastic opportunity as some examples have

shown that political transitions and new political settlements have ushered in periods of

greater peace and stability in affected regions.

A number of studies have tried to trace the origins of the conflict in Mindanao and the

results have shown that the root of all of the issues can be traced to injustice. A 2005

assessment by the World Bank highlighted injustice in sociopolitical, economic, cultural and

environmental terms. These are manifested as marginalization and deprivation of basic

amenities, extreme poverty in affected regions, perceived suppression of

religious/traditional/indigenous practices and dispossession of land and natural resources,

among others. These findings were echoed in the Mindanao 2020 report which was released

in 2011. A broader study by the Asia Foundation in 2013 on “The Contested Corners of Asia”

noted that most subnational conflicts are fueled by perceived injustice over governance,

political and economic marginalization and threatened identity of minority populations.

The result of decades of injustices is that the “social contract” between citizens and the

state is broken or damaged. As such, part of the transition process is a deliberate effort to

renew or secure this social contract and a 2012 UNDP study identifies three key building

blocks for doing so. These are: building responsive and accountable institutions, promoting

inclusive political processes, and, fostering resilient state-society relations.

Elaborating further on the key building blocks, another UNDP study from 2013 cites a few

important points which help bring about successful transitions. First, institutions should

reflect the new political settlement (in terms of responsiveness and accountability as

mentioned earlier); otherwise it will just be transferring existing political culture to the new

status quo. Second, human security is of critical importance during the transition. Third,


economic conditions affect political stability and the potential success of the transition.

Fourth, a focus on growth without inclusive development will just maintain the status quo.

Fifth, public participation in policy development is essential; the more people are engaged,

the better the end result will likely be. Lastly, finding new ways of engaging citizens and

addressing exclusion is very important.

The 2011 World Development Report also offers lessons from international experience

which may be helpful to the Bangsamoro transition process. The relevant key finding in the

report is that in order to break the cycles of violence, one must strengthen legitimate

institutions and governance to provide three key things: security, justice and jobs. Security is

the most basic measure that conflict-affected citizens will have in determining whether the

new situation is good for them. Addressing historical injustices and providing access to

justice for those previously excluded is also important. And lastly, jobs and economic

opportunities for the citizens, while not necessarily sufficient to end political conflicts, are

also essential elements towards building peace in affected communities.

The study however also points out that meaningful and lasting institutional change can take

a very long time. Research and experience shows that there is a limit to the amount of

change that a societies can absorb, and that reforms need the right amount of time to

ensure successful transformation. Even the most successful examples take roughly 15 to 30

years to raise institutional performance, whether in terms of bureaucratic quality, control of

corruption, rule of law, and other indicators.

OPEN FORUM

Question: The peace agreement and the proposed BBL seem to cater primarily to the MILF as opposed to other groups such as the MNLF who are still active in the region. How will the BBL bring peace to the region if these other groups are not involved in the process?

Atty. Julkipli: One of the changes introduced in the substitute bill is a mandate to include

representatives of the MNLF in the transition authority and the interim government. This

has always been the intention of the parties in drafting the BBL but perhaps it was not

articulated or expressed clearly enough in the original bill. This has been remedied in the

substitute bill.

Question: What are the differences between the original BBL and the substitute bill that the government negotiators find worrisome?

Atty. Julkipli: Concerns include the following:

a. The substitute bill makes reference to the security of tenure of civil servants that

may be affected by the transition. This is not so worrisome though as both parties

have agreed to elaborate and work on reforms in this regard.


b. The substitute bill calls for a transition period of six months while the agreement

called for a one year transition period.

Fr. Mercado: Concerns include the following:

c. There is no preamble in the Senate bill. The House version will be more inclusive as

the preamble enumerates the various peoples in the Bangsamoro area.

d. The Senate version removed 39 barangays in North Cotabato and 6 municipalities of

Lanao del Norte who voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 referendum. This

is consistent with jurisprudence wherein inclusion in the autonomous region should

be by province or by city. The draft BBL endorsed by Malacañang and House version

are more ambiguous in allowing the inclusion of individual barangays and

municipalities.

e. Parliamentary composition. The draft BBL and the House version have 50 percent of

the BTA from party-list system and 40 percent from district representation. Senate

version has 40 members from district representation and only 8 members from party

list. Senate version also mentions a reserved seat for the Sultanate.

f. Senate and House versions make specific mention of indigenous people’s rights and

self-determination. This is absent in the draft BBL.

g. Draft BBL and House versions have a provision wherein the Bangsamoro Parliament

may interfere in law-making in the local government level. The Senate version

ensures that the powers and privileges enjoyed by LGUs under the Local

Government Code are not diminished.

Atty. Alamia: Another major concern is that some of the powers already granted to the

ARMM have been removed in the Senate substitute bill. The new bill should not result in

diminished powers for the new autonomous government as compared with the ARMM.

Some concerns include the following:

h. The Senate substitute bill removes the powers to create economic zones and free

ports and to grant tax incentives and other incentives within the region. These

powers are already present under the ARMM,

i. Currently, the ARMM is allowed to receive grants and donations and enter into

agreements with multilateral agencies and other funding institutions without

seeking approval from the national government. The substitute bill takes away this

power and requires national government approval for such actions.

Question: There seem to be vast differences between the House version of the BBL and the Senate version. What are the chances that these differences will be resolved and the BBL will be passed before the end of this Congress?

Fr. Mercado: Passing the BBL will certainly be difficult given the time constraints. Two major

events are coming up that will affect the debates. First, Congress will start discussing the

2016 GAA soon and this will become the immediate priority. Second, election season is


coming as well and many legislators will be running again, making the BBL a potential

campaign issue. While it is not impossible, it would seem very likely that even if the BBL is

passed during this administration, it will be next the administration that will end up

implementing the law.

Question: What are the panelists’ thoughts on the inclusion of the normalization process and decommissioning in the substitute bill considering that the Constitution prohibits the creation of a bill with more than one subject?

Atty. Julkipli: It is our office’s position that including the matter of decommissioning or

normalization to the BBL might cause a legal or constitutional problem. Furthermore,

legislating the decommissioning process might compromise the independent character of

the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB), which is tasked with overseeing this

procedure. In other words, how independent would it be if some of its functions are now

being dictated by a law, enacted by one party which is the Philippine government? There is

also the question as to what extent can the government legislate over foreign members of

the IDB.

Atty. Alamia: Aside from the aforementioned reasons, we also believe that normalization

process should not be included because it is basically a political process.

Dean Bacani: The inclusion of normalization into the discussion of the law also introduces

other issues that could complicate the debates. A number of aspects of normalization will

need to be legislated. There could possibly be a need to have an amnesty law and perhaps

introduce amendments to the firearms law, for instance.

Mr. Chittick: As the normalization process is usually an agreement between a State and a

non-State, this is usually not subject to legislation. If the intention of the State is for that

armed group to decommission and join mainstream society, then there has to be some

mechanism for creating that. The elements of this may be negotiated for inclusion in the

legislation if possible. However, the way the current agreement is structured, it would seem

that not including normalization in the legislation would result in a smoother process.

Question: Can the peace process be implemented without legislation?

Fr. Mercado: There is no historical reference that can compare with this peace process;

hence it’s difficult to say. However, it’s always possible. The peace agreement with the

MNLF was signed in 1996 and the law was passed only in 2001. In the interim, then

President Ramos issued Executive Order 371 which created the SZOPAD and the SPCPD and

it was implemented between 1996 and 2001 effectively serving as a transition mechanism

that terminated with the passage of the law.

Atty. Julkipli: While there are certainly aspects of the final peace agreement that may be

implemented through executive action alone, the heart of the agreement, being the


creation of the autonomous region, can only be done through legislation. It’s possible that

partial implementation can be done in the form of a transitional phase.

Question: The sentiment of indigenous peoples living in the affected areas is that they stand to lose a lot if their rights are not recognized in the final peace agreement. Have there been cases in other countries where the stakeholders or rights holders were allowed to sit in the negotiating table even if they were not part of the armed hostilities?

Mr. Chittick: In terms of the actual process of agreements and negotiations, it’s not so

common as these things usually arise because there is an armed conflict that needs to be

resolved. However, it is not a completely foreign concept as there is precedent in different

peace tables around the world have been able to introduce and invite other (non-armed)

stakeholders to be direct participants in the process. In the Philippines, there have been

efforts over the last number of years to include these stakeholders in the talks between the

Government of the Philippines and the MILF. But it’s not the norm and it is difficult and

requires the consensus of the State and non-State actors to make it happen.

Question: How soon or how late should the BBL be passed by Congress so that it can still be implemented by the Aquino administration?

Fr. Mercado: The timeline proposed by the government for the passage and

implementation of the law is no longer realistic. Passing a very contentious and difficult law

such as the BBL will likely take more than the two months suggested by the government.

Rushing the passage now might result in a law that is unsatisfactory to all concerned.

However, the debates and discussion should proceed and continue on to the next

administration and extend even into the discussions on Constitutional reform in order to

craft the best possible instrument for the Bangsamoro. As there is precedent wherein a

transition phase is implemented by Executive Order prior to the passage of a law, this can

be considered in order that the current peace agreement is not wasted and things are not

left hanging.

SYNTHESIS

rofessor Edmund Tayao provided the synthesis of the day’s discussions. He stated the

importance of the element of time with regard to transition mechanisms in the

peace process. He mentioned that Fr. Mercado’s presentation on the history of the

Mindanao peace process served to emphasize the fact that it takes time to evolve a real

peace process that is able to achieve its true objectives. He pointed out that with Atty.

Julkipli’s presentation on how the current peace process is working in two layers of

transition, and how, with time running out on the current administration and the current

Congress, there is a possibility that the second layer of transition in the peace process will

not be achieved. He also referred to Atty. Alamia’s talk which provided a historical context

to explain the need to create an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and why this is an

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issue of national importance. Lastly, he mentioned how Mr. Chittick’s presentation of

international experiences shows that while there may be no magic formula for successful

transitions, the importance of building strong, responsive and accountable institutions, a

process that experience has shown could take an extremely long time in even the most

successful cases, might be the most important element of ensuring successful political

transitions.

Documents

MUSLIM MINDANAO POLICY REPORT: Transition Mechanisms