MSTP Pamphlet 1-0.1

MAGTF G-1

MA

GTF

STAFF TRAINING PROGRAM

DOCEMUS PRIMAM ACIEM

MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP)

U.S. Marine Corps May 2004

MSTP Pamphlet 1-0.1

MAGTF G-1 This pamphlet supports the academic curricula of the Marine Air-Ground

Task Force (MAGTF) Staff Training Program (MSTP).

U.S. Marine Corps May 2004

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS MSTP Center (C 467) MCCDC

2042 South Street Quantico, Virginia 22134

31 May 2004

FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE. MSTP Pamphlet 1-0.1, MAGTF G-1, is designed to assist the MAGTF assistant chief of staff (AC/S) G-1 and the G-1 staff officers in their operational and planning responsibilities. 2. SCOPE. This pamphlet was written with the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) and Marine expeditionary brigade in mind. The focus is on how the G-1 functions in preparation for and during operations. As such it is designed to supplement the information provided in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control and MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process. While the pamphlet is focused primarily at the MEF level, this information is applicable to all major subordinate commands (MSCs) and may be useful for MAGTFs of all sizes. The pamphlet is divided into four parts. The first is a short introduction. The second is an amplification of the G-1 responsibilities outlined in MCWP 3-40.1. The third is a description of how the G-1 participates in the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). The last part is a series of appendixes that include formats of the personnel estimate and annex (Annex E). 3. CAUTIONARY NOTE. The provisions of this text must be modified to meet the needs of particular units and particular situations, and to conform to current regulations and the desires of the commanders concerned. 4. SUPERSESSION. None. 5. CHANGES. Recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands and individuals. The attached User Suggestion Form can be reproduced and forwarded to:

USER SUGGESTION FORM From: To: Commanding General, Training and Education Command (C 467),

Quantico, Virginia 22134-5001 1. In accordance with the Foreword, individuals are encouraged to submit suggestions concerning this Pamphlet directly to the above addressee Page _____ Article/Paragraph No. _____ Line No. _____ Figure/Table No. _____ Nature of Change: Add Delete Change Correct 2. Proposed Text: (Verbatim, double-spaced; continue on additional pages as necessary. 3. Justification/Source: (Need not be double-spaced.) NOTE: 1. Only one recommendation per page. 2. Locally reproduced forms may be used for e-mail submissions to:

opso@mstp.quantico.usmc.mil

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_______________________________________________________________ MSTP Pamphlet 1-0.1

Record of Changes

Change No.

Date of Change

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Table of Contents

Part I Introduction 1

1001 The G-1 and the Commander 1 1001a The G-1 Advises 2 1001b The G-1 Plans 3 1001c The G-1 Coordinates 4 1001d The G-1 Supervises 4 1002 G-1 Organization 4 1002a Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 5 1002b Personnel Branch 6 1002c Personnel Operations/Plans Branch 7 1002d Adjutant Branch 8 1002e Other Subsections 9 1003 Other Responsibilities of the G-1 10

Part II Principal Functions 11

2001 Personnel Strength Management 11 2002 Personnel Replacement Management 12 2002a The Two Types of Replacement Systems 13 2003 Discipline, Law, and Order 14 2004 Prisoners of War 14 2004a Friendly Prisoners of War 15 2004b Enemy Prisoners of War 15 2004c Objectives of Enemy Prisoners of War Handling 16 2004d Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Rates 17 2005 Headquarters Management 18 2005a Functions 18 2005b Requirement for Coordination 19 2005c Classified Material Control Center 20 2006 Casualty Management 20 2006a Casualty Reporting 21 2006b Personnel Loss Estimation 22 2006c Factors that Influence Casualty Rates 24 2006d Mortuary Affairs 25 2007 Personnel Management (Administration) 25

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2007a Influence on Morale 26 2007b Awards 27 2008 Morale and Personnel Services 27 2009 Operations Plans and Orders 29 2010 Other Duties and Responsibilities 29

2011 Civilian Personnel Management 29 Part III Planning 31 3001 Mission Analysis 31

3001a Inputs 31 3001b Process 32 3001c Outputs 34 3002 Course of Action Development 34 3002a Inputs 35 3002b Process 35 3002c Outputs 39 3003 Course of Action War Game 39 3003a Inputs 40 3003b Process 40 3003c Outputs 41 3004 Course of Action Comparison and Decision 41 3004a Inputs 41 3004b Process 42 3004c Outputs 42 3005 Orders Development 43 3005a Inputs 43 3005b Process 43 3005c Outputs 44 3006 Transition 44 3006a Inputs 45 3006b Process 45 3006c Outputs 45

Appendix A Notional G-1 Organization 47

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Appendix B Joint Personnel Status and Casualty Report 49 Appendix C Personnel Estimate Format 55 Appendix D Personnel Annex Format 59 Appendix E References and Notes on References 65 Appendix F G-1 Lessons Learned From Operation 69 Iraqi Freedom I Appendix G Glossary 73 Figures

1-1 MAGTF Notional G-1 Organization 5 2-1 G-1 Battle Rhythm 19 2-2 Indicators of Morale 28 3-1 Mission Analysis 32 3-2 Examples of Essential Elements of Friendly Information Related to Personnel 34 3-3 Course of Action Development 35 3-4 Example Concept of Personnel Support 38 3-5 Course of Action War Game 40 3-6 Course of Action Comparison and Decision 41 3-7 Orders Development 43 3-8 Transition 45

Tables A-1 Example of Enemy Prisoners of War Capture Rates 17

A-2 Example of Comparison and Decision Matrix 42

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Part I

Introduction

For the strength of the Corps is the Marine, and the strength of the Marine is the Corps.

—Gen James L. Jones

The commander is responsible for the efficient use of all human and materiel resources to effectively accomplish assigned missions. The MAGTF AC/S G-1 is the commander’s principal staff assistant in the management of personnel as individuals. This, in part, distinguishes the G-1 from the G-3 who assists the commander with units. According to MCWP3-40.1, the commander assigns to G-1 those functions that pertain to the management of personnel—to include casualties, law and order, and prisoners of war. He may be charged with staff responsibility for the internal arrangement of the headquarters, its organization, its administrative functioning, and with other miscellaneous functions assigned by the commander or chief of staff. 1001. The G-1 and the Commander The G-1 assists the commander by: (1) Obtaining, organizing, and studying information pertaining to the personnel activities of the command.

(2) Furnishing estimates, advice, and information to the commander on personnel matters.

(3) Preparing personnel plans. (4) Translating decisions concerning personnel into orders for transition to the elements of the command. (5) Coordinating the personnel activities of the various subordinate

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units of a command. (6) Supervising, in the name of the commander, the execution of orders and plans pertaining to personnel as individuals. (7) Recommending changes to plans, policies, and orders to ensure the continuous efficient employment of the human resources of the command. The specific functions or responsibilities of the G-1 are listed in paragraph 1002a and discussed in Part II of this pamphlet. a. The G-1 Advises As an advisor to the commander on personnel matters, the G-1 must be concerned with a continuous analysis of the personnel situation. He must be prepared to contribute, on short notice, to the commander’s estimate of the situation. He, therefore, maintains an up-to-date personnel estimate and pertinent information on all personnel matters. He uses this information to advise the commander and other members of the staff of any personnel factors which may render a course of action impracticable or undesirable from a personnel point of view. Such action will assist the commander in selecting for final consideration only those tentative courses of action that are practicable. Once certain courses of action have been selected for study, the G-1 contributes by pointing out the important advantages and disadvantages in the personnel field of each proposed course of action. Usually, only strengths, replacements loss estimates, and morale will be likely personnel considerations in the commander’s estimate of the situation; however, on occasion, other G-1 matters—such as status of discipline, availability of certain key personnel services, and handling of unusually larger numbers of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs)—may become factors of importance. The extent of the personnel estimate should be as thorough as the time available will permit. Thus, it may vary from a short, almost instantaneous mental estimate to a carefully written document requiring hours of preparation and collaboration with other staff officers. Whether presented orally or in writing, in complete or fragmentary form, the same logical examination of personnel problems is accomplished to

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ensure adequate personnel support for the commander to accomplish the mission under consideration. In accomplishing the personnel estimate, the G-1 coordinates with other general staff sections, special staff sections, and other organizations as appropriate to get facts, circumstances, and evidence relative to intelligence, operational, logistical, civilian, and other matters that affect the current and projected personnel situation. He also seeks the advice and recommendations of special staff officers on the means of resolving significant personnel problems. b. The G-1 Plans During operations and the preparation for operations, the G-l is primarily concerned with providing the commander with the right mix of people to accomplish the mission. He is an active participant in the MCPP. Part III contains a detailed description of how the G-1 interfaces with the planning process. The personnel plan is based upon the commander’s concept of operations. In cases where time is a vital factor or where he can anticipate the decision of the commander, the G-1 may begin the preparation of his plan before the commander arrives at his decision. In such cases, the plan may require adjustment to conform to the decision when rendered by the commander. The personnel plan should be reexamined on completion to see that it adequately supports the current mission of the command, does not conflict with current policies, and is not in conflict with the general situation. When the plan has been approved by the commander, it may be disseminated to the command by means of:

• Operations order or plan (Annex E) • Standing operating procedures (SOPs) • Messages • General or special orders • Bulletins, letters, and memorandums

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c. The G-1 Coordinates

Coordination is the activity of securing and promoting the cooperation of all agencies contributing to an undertaking. Not only must the G-1 coordinate matters with other general staff sections, but he must coordinate those activities of the special staff sections. Special staff sections with numerous personnel issues include the disbursing officer; provost marshal; morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) officer; postal officer; surgeon; staff judge advocate (SJA); chaplain; and civil affairs officer. The G-1 should consult and coordinate with subordinate commanders when the matter being considered affects them.

d. The G-1 Supervises

The staff responsibility of the G-1 extends beyond planning and coordination. He must ensure subordinate units are intelligently and properly implementing the commander’s personnel plans, policies, orders, and instructions. Further, he must determine the adequacy of such plans, policies, orders, and instructions in order to suggest changes for improvement. The G-1 performs his supervisory functions in the name of his commander by personal visits, inspections, and careful study of reports. Only by maintaining constant surveillance over the operations of personnel matters can the G-1 properly supervise these activities and be aware of the effectiveness of the individual members of the command. Naturally, the G-1 or his representatives will provide as much advance notice as possible to the commander of any unit he visits and extend the professional courtesy of an official call to the commander’s office when he enters and exists the commander’s area.

1002. G-1 Organization Organization of the G-1 will vary depending on echelon, mission, and the commander’s requirements. Normally the G-1 will have personnel, operations/plans, and adjutant branches (see Figure 1-1). In addition, there may be other subsections as required. See Appendix A for a notional MEF G-1 organization based on tables of organization (T/O) maintained by Total

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Force Structure Division of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (not all MEFs have same T/O). G-1

Personnel (manpower) Operations (plans) Adjutant Branch

Branch Branch

Figure 1-1. MAGTF notional G-1 organization.

a. AC/S G-1. The AC/S G-1 is the principal staff officer for all personnel management, personnel administration, and headquarters management. Per MCWP 3-40.1, his specific responsibilities include—

• Personnel strength management • Personnel replacement management • Discipline, law, and order (may be assigned to SJA) • Prisoners of war ( EPWs may be assigned to G-3) • Headquarters management (in conjunction with the MEF headquarters

group (MHG) commander) • Casualty management • Personnel management • Morale and personnel services (in conjunction with the force service

support group (FSSG)) • Operations plans and orders (personnel input)

Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-1. The deputy AC/S G-1 is responsible for the administration of G-1 section functions assigned by the AC/S G-1. In the absence of the AC/S G-1, the deputy AC/S G-1 will assume the authority and responsibilities of the AC/S G-1. His responsibilities include—

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(1) Supervising the G-1 section. Specifically, he focuses on both current and future operations. (2) Assigning, tracking, and monitoring tasks of the G-1 section. (3) Ensuring communications and integration between all G-1 subsections.

G-1 Chief. The G-1 chief is the senior enlisted administrative advisor to the commanding general and the AC/S G-1. The G-1 chief is also the administrative advisor to the sergeant major. The G-1 chief maintains and assists the deputy AC/S G-1 in managing the tasks and office workforce in the G-1 section. His responsibilities include— (1) Serving as the senior enlisted advisor for the G-1 section. (2) Serving as the personnel and administration occupational field sponsor

for enlisted administration personnel within the MAGTF. (3) Overseeing, validating, and monitoring the G-1 section budget

execution. This execution is based upon the plan developed by the deputy AC/S G-1 and approved by the AC/S G-1.

(4) Overseeing the G-1 section embarkation. (5) Overseeing the G-1 section training requirements. (6) Manages and provides input for the G-1 portion of the time-phased

force and deployment data (TPFDD). In addition, the G-1 section may include the reserve liaison officer (if assigned), the Marine career retention specialist, and a Navy career planner (if assigned). b. Personnel Branch The personnel branch normally includes the personnel officer, personnel chief, and personnel clerks. There may also be an assistant personnel officer. The personnel branch tracks, monitors, and provides manpower administration to the commanding general and the assistant chief of staff, G-1. The personnel branch ensures the command and subordinate units are staffed appropriately and that critical military occupational specialty (MOS) shortfalls are highlighted to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC).

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The personnel officer’s responsibilities include— (1) Planning and supervising the procurement, classification, assignment,

transfer, and replacement of the unit’s personnel. (2) Developing SOPs and directives for personnel policy within the

command. (3) Analyzing current and projected strength data to determine personnel

requirements. (4) Assisting the G-1/S-1 prepare and maintain the personnel estimate. (5) Maintaining visibility of personnel status. (6) Coordinating personnel matters with other commands. (7) Submitting correct and timely input into the Marine Corps Total Force

System (MCTFS) and taking corrective actions required by reports generated by MCTFS.

c. Personnel Operations/Plans Branch The personnel operations/plans branch normally includes the personnel operations/plans officer, personnel operations/plans chief, and administrative clerks. In some instances the operations branch will be part of the Personnel Branch listed above. This branch can be also divided up into current operations, future operations, and plans. The personnel operations/plans branch is responsible for providing G-1 representatives to operational planning teams (OPTs) and monitoring interaction within the G-1 section These responsibilities can take many forms, but always exist in an environment requiring a global, external, and internal awareness of operations. The branch develops and implements administrative support in the field, aboard ship, and during contingencies and exercises for contingency operations. The personnel operations/plans branch performs the following tasks— (1) Identifies, sources, and coordinates individual augmentation and

assignments for global, internal and, at unique times, external requirements for personnel.

(2) Calculates, coordinates, and publishes casualty estimations.

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(3) Provides personnel estimates of supportability for course of action (COA) development.

(4) Develops, drafts, and approves operation plan/operation order documents.

(5) Publishes personnel status reports. (6) Participates on the OPT as the G-1 representative. Additionally, the

branch functions as the G-1 command center representative. (7) Creates and presents the G-1 portion of the command readiness brief

overview (these briefs are also known as “command briefs” and may be the responsibility of the staff secretary).

(8) Provides Tactical Exercise Employment Program (TEEP) planning and input. The branch provides personnel statistical data during the planning phase for the yearly TEEP development action.

(9) Conducts administrative liaison functions with higher, adjacent, and lower levels of command in order to maintain a firm grasp of operations plans and orders.

d. Adjutant Branch The adjutant branch normally includes the adjutant, assistant adjutant, adjutant chief, administrative clerks, and driver/courier. The assistant adjutant may be designated the classified material control center (CMCC) officer and be assigned a CMCC chief and clerk. The adjutant functions as the general administration advisor to the entire MEF and is a special staff officer under the cognizance of the AC/S G-1. The adjutant provides guidance and instruction to subordinate unit S-1/adjutants on general administration issues, such as postal, CMCC, and awards. The adjutant’s responsibilities include— (1) Supervising the flow of paperwork to ensure the correct staffing of all

documents. (2) Routing messages and monitoring those requiring action. (3) Establishing and maintaining a reports control system. (4) Maintaining directives and managing records and files.

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(5) Managing line-of-duty investigations, congressional inquiries, Freedom of Information Act requests, and special correspondence (if not performed by the SJA or inspector).

(6) Preparing duty rosters and the electronic command read board (if not performed by the staff secretary, the information management officer, or the MHG commander).

(7) Planning, coordinating, and supervising the conduct of ceremonies and funerals (if not performed by the sergeant major).

(8) Promulgating SOPs and directives for general administration within the command and supervising the command awards program.

(9) Coordinating, reviewing, and releasing personnel casualty report information. The adjutant serves as the focal point on all casualty related administrative requirements—to include claims, investigations, and casualty calls procedures (unless assigned to the staff judge advocate for responsibility by the commander).

(10) Controlling versions of operations orders and related documents (11) Managing the command fitness report monitoring program. (12) Planning and coordinating the movement of documents and reports

via mail, messenger, electronic means, and external guard mail. (13) Managing the CMCC. (14) Managing the reproduction budgets and functions. (15) Managing the master directive control list.

(16)Managing personnel and morning reports. e. Other Subsections Depending on the unit and its table of organization, the G-1 section could contain some or all of the following subsections:

• Casualty reporting • Orders • Temporary additional duty • Postal • Reserve affairs

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The specific responsibilities of the G-1 have been listed in paragraph 1002a and are outlined in MCWP 3-40.1. Although MCWP 3-40.1 does not specify as such, Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations, does assign the J-1 the responsibility for civilian personnel management (which can include contractors, civil service employees, and local national laborers) and retained staff cognizance over a variety of other duties that do not naturally fall to another staff section. This includes absentee voting program management, charitable fund drives, the savings bond program and other projects, programs, and initiatives that do not naturally belong to another staff section. The responsibilities or functions of the G-1 are explored in Part II of this pamphlet.

Part II

Principal Functions

Praise and commendation should be given freely; decorations should be promptly awarded and delivered immediately after withdrawal from the lines. Addresses to organizations that have distinguished themselves should be made. Replacements should be furnished promptly, and the thoughts of men immediately turned to building up their shattered organizations and preparing again to strike the enemy. Sulkers and cowards should be promptly and publicly punished so that all may see the great gulf that separates them from the gallant men who have served faithfully and courageously.

—MajGen John A. Lejeune on how to maintain the fighting spirit in Marines

Per MCWP 3-40.1, personnel strength management; personnel replacement management; discipline, law, and order; prisoners of war; headquarters management; casualty management; personnel management; morale and personnel services; and providing the personnel input to operations plans and orders are the principal functions of the G-1. Some of these duties are continuous by nature and will occur during war and peace at the home station or while deployed. The focus of others will ebb and flow with the deployment, employment, and redeployment phases of an operation. Still others, such as casualty estimation and prisoners of war, will only be a factor during the planning and execution of exercises and actual operations.

2001. Personnel Strength Management Personnel strength management is those tasks involved with maintaining personnel strength status, monitoring and analyzing personnel strength data

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to estimate combat readiness, coordinating with the G-3 (and other staff sections) to estimate casualties, projecting future manpower requirements, and developing plans to maintain organizational strength. During deployments, personnel accountability is essential. The G-1 section works closely with medical services, movement control coordinators, the joint reception center, and subordinate units to ensure procedures are in place to identify and track personnel movement. The new “smart” identification card currently issued and electronically encoded provide tremendous benefits in personnel strength management. Periodic personnel reports constitute a major portion of this function. If the MAGTF is operating as part of a joint force, personnel strength is reported in the Joint Personnel Status and Casualty Report (JPERSTAT). JPERSTAT reporting procedures vary amongst combatant and/or combined joint task force (CJTF) commanders. A brief introduction to the JPERSTAT is included in appendix B of this pamphlet. Additional information on the JPERSTAT is included in Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations. The authoritative publication on the JPERSTAT is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3150.13, Joint Reporting Structure – Personnel Manual.

2002. Personnel Replacement Management Personnel replacement management is one of the most operationally significant responsibilities of the G-1. It includes those duties related to determining replacement requirements; planning and coordinating the procurement and assignment of replacements; allocating replacements in accordance with priorities established by G-3; supervising the receiving, processing, and delivery of replacements; and providing advice on individual replacements and the replacement system.

Per JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Associated Terms, replacements “are personnel required to take the place of others who depart a unit.” They have been described as the life blood of a combat unit because they are essential to the maintenance of combat effectiveness. Personnel losses are a serious concern. The lack of the right number and types of people can make the difference between mission accomplishment

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and failure. Consequently, commanders need a mechanism to anticipate personnel losses and provide appropriate replacements. Personnel replacement management is very closely related to personnel strength management and casualty management. All three functions require close coordination with MSCs and attached medical planners.

Some principles related to replacement management are:

• Simplicity – procedures are as direct as possible with all nonessential actions eliminated.

• Flexibility – organizations can support large or small forces in amphibious or sustained operations ashore for short or extended operations.

• Existing resources – are fully utilized before creating special organizations or adding billets.

• Morale – gain and maintain the highest morale among replacements by building each individual’s sense of importance, responsibility, and self confidence and minimizing the duration of his status as a “replacement” by joining him to a unit as soon as possible.

a. The Two Types of Replacement Systems

Commanders can send replacements into combat as individuals or trained, cohesive units. Extensive analysis of combat operations throughout history has demonstrated that replacements employed as part of a cohesive unit perform better in battle and suffer fewer psychiatric casualties than replacements assigned to units on an individual basis. This is one reason for the creation of the unit deployment program after Vietnam and the insistence that Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) “lock on” deploying personnel at least 6 months before deployment.

In spite of the many advantages of a unit replacement system and some notable examples of unit replacement programs in the Marine Corps, individual replacements have been the norm for the American Armed Forces. This is because an individual replacement system is more flexible and easier to administer than a unit replacement.

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Understanding the distinction between individual and unit replacement is important. The G-1 manages the individual replacement system while the G-3 manages a unit replacement system. Even if the MAGTF relies on a unit replacement system, certain categories of personnel will continue to be replaced on an individual basis. These categories would include reservists, key personnel such as commanders, augmentees from sister Services and principal staff members, as well as low-density, high-demand specialists such a linguists, operational planners, system operators, and foreign area officers.

2003. Discipline, Law, and Order According to MCWP 3-40.1, the G-1 is responsible to the commander for matters related to discipline, law, and order, however, in many instances the MEF SJA promulgates orders for the enforcement of laws and regulations and the maintenance of good order and discipline. The MHG commander may do the same for regulations for troop conduct and appearance. The G-1 may be responsible for planning for the control and disposition of stragglers while preparing plans and orders pertaining to the administration of military justice—except court-martial orders. The G-1 may also plan for the location and supervise the operation of confinement facilities, as well as supervise and coordinate relations with civilian employees with respect to law enforcement.

There are many resources available to the G-1 in discharging this broad based and multifaceted function. The provost marshal (which may be assigned to the G-3) in particular provides indispensable assistance. Sergeants major or other senior enlisted advisors can also be very helpful. Discipline, law, and order are quite naturally a priority of all commanders as well. The G-1 will not be alone in his concern for this crucial responsibility.

2004. Prisoners of War According to MCWP 3-40.1,the G-1 is responsible for prisoners of war—enemy and friendly. His responsibility for EPWs primarily involves accounting, administration, and coordination. Responsibility for friendly

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prisoners of war (POWs) is limited to the tracking, to the greatest extent possible, those friendly personnel that fall into the hands of the enemy as well as the initial steps of repatriation for United States or allied personnel who are recovered from the enemy.

a. Friendly Prisoners of War The G-1 has general staff responsibility for coordinating and supervising the initial steps of repatriation of United States and friendly personnel whom the MAGTF recovers from the enemy. As a rule, such personnel are in poor physical condition. Their rehabilitation must include food, clothing, medical attention, intelligence debriefing, and psychological counseling. The G-1 must also arrange for prompt notification of the recovery of POWs and their evacuation from the combat zone. Returning POWs will also require the means to communicate with their families at home. The public affairs officer may provide assistance in this effort. Appendix 2 (Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained U. S. Personnel) to Annex E (Personnel) exists to help the G-1 promulgate instructions and information concerning repatriated POWs.

b. Enemy Prisoners of War

Although current Marine Corps doctrine states that the G-1 takes the lead in planning, coordinating, and supervising the collection, safeguarding, administration, and evacuation of EPWs, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I and II, I MEF EPW responsibility was assigned to the G-3. The following additional background information is provided on assigning EPW matters to the G-1:

• Joint doctrine specified in JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations, states that the “J-1 is responsible for reporting daily EPW numbers…”

• Marine Corps Order 1510.53C, Individual Training Standards, states that the 0180 adjutant MOS must be trained to “Develop estimates of supportability, to include…EPW handling…”

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• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.3A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, indicates that Appendix 1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and other Detained Persons, is part of Annex E, Personnel.

On the other hand, the current thinking at the MEF level appears to be leaning toward assigning EPW matters (along with oversight of military police) to the G-3. This pamphlet includes EPW information in spite of current practice because the commander may assign those responsibilities to the MAGTF G-1.

Commanders exercise supervision over EPWs on behalf of the United States and are responsible for their custody, administration, and treatment. The commander is responsible for accounting, processing, and tracking captured combatant personnel. This includes classifying the individuals into the proper Geneva Convention category, notification of the individual’s country, and prisoner pay. The G-1 does not have the assets to physically control EPWs with a small staff section. His role is to coordinate the contributions of the various staff sections to ensure a smooth functioning EPW operation. For example, the G-1 will coordinate with the G-2 for interrogations and interpreters; the G-3 for physical security and military police; and the G-4 for food, water, facilities, transportation, medical treatment, and other logistical matters. c. Objectives of Enemy Prisoner of War Handling The primary objectives of EPW handling are: (1) Prevention of escape and liberation. (2) Compliance with international law. (3) Gaining maximum intelligence value (without violating the law). (4) Conservation of resources. (5) Maintenance of as much good will as possible with the enemy (so that

they will, in turn, treat those of us they capture well). MCWP 4.11.8C, Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, provides detailed guidance on how to handle EPWs and civilian internees legally and

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morally. It is written expressly for those who will actually have to handle prisoners directly. d. Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Rates The G-1 must anticipate the numbers of EPWs the MAGTF will capture. This estimate is necessary to ensure the MAGTF is ready to receive, care, and secure EPWs. To properly do so, he must consider the following factors: (1) Enemy morale (2) Type of operations in which the MAGTF is engaged (3) Relative strength of the opposing force (4) Intensity and effectiveness of friendly information operations (5) Effectiveness of enemy ideological indoctrination The ground combat element (GCE) will capture nearly all EPWs. When the force opposing the MAGTF is approximately the same strength as the GCE, notionally the G-1 can estimate that the MAGTF will capture about 1.35 percent of the enemy’s strength each month. For example, if the GCE is a Marine division (reinforced) with an average strength of about 23,000 Marines and Sailors opposed by a like-sized enemy ground force in sustained operations ashore, it can anticipate capturing approximately 310 EPWs per month. If the GCE outnumbers the enemy two to one, historical EPW capture rates are determined by the type of operation being planned. Table A-1 shows the daily EPW capture rates for a Marine division by selected types of operations.

Type of Division Operation #of EPWs/day

Attack of a defensive position 50

Attack of defensive position preceded by night approach and with complete surprise obtained

700

Attack by an armored task force in an encirclement operation

1,000

Successful defense of prepared position against enemy attack

300

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(6) Establishing a G-1 battle rhythm. See Figure 2-1 for an example of the MEF G-1’s battle rhythm for OIF II.

Table A-1. Example of enemy prisoners of war capture rates.

G-1 planners must bear in mind that these are very rough planning figures based primarily on studies of major land campaigns in World War II published in Operational Handbook 1-1, Operational Role of the G-1. They will have to use their own judgment and experience in producing EPW capture estimates in future operations. Appendix 1 (Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons) to Annex E (Personnel) can be used to detail instructions and information related to this function. 2005. Headquarters Management According to MCWP 3-40.1, the G-1 is responsible for headquarters management. Headquarters management refers to the organization and supervision of administrative support activities relating to the operation of a headquarters. It is sometimes called interior management. To accomplish this he works with the MHG commander and the information management officer (IMO) to allocate space within the headquarters and assign billeting areas.

a. Functions

Headquarters management functions normally include: (1) Managing the G-1 section. (2) Coordinating and supervising the movement, internal organization, and internal operation of the headquarters with the MHG commander and IMO. (3) Coordinating and supervising administrative matters not specifically assigned to another general staff section. (4) Assisting the commander in supervising the personnel functions of the command to include duty rosters. (5) Recommending manpower economies wherever practicable.

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b. Requirement for Coordination

The G-1 consults extensively with the commander and other staff sections when discharging his responsibilities for headquarters management. Issues such as headquarters location and arrangement necessarily involve all staff sections—especially the G-3 for position and security, the G-4 for support and services, the G-6 for connectivity, and the headquarters commandant.

Time Event 0530 G-1 SWO to MEF aid station to update wounded info 0600 G-1 SWO turnover 0700 Daily update from SWO to all G-1 day watch 0730 COC battle staff update to CG 0800 G-1 taskers meeting; PCR validation 0900 Patient Admin Teams (PATS) Update reports due 1000 JRC comms check 1130 SWO training to day watch 1230 Prep SWO turnover in COC ( G-1 does not turnover same

time for SA purposes) 1330 COC turnover brief with battle watch 1500 Patient Admin Teams Update reports due 1630 Comms checks with PATS/JRC/MSCs/BUG; PCR

Validation 1800 G-1 SWO turnover brief (all hands) 1900 Daily update from SWO to all G-1 night watch 1930 Principal staff meeting with CG 2100 Data update with COC SWO; PATS patient updates; tour

medical facilities, check WIA 2330 Refine mail routing; validate master dbase 0000 Comms check with CONUS support units; PCR validation0300 SWO training to night watch

Figure 2-1. G-1 Battle Rhythm.

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c. Classified Material Control Center The adjutant is normally responsible for operating the CMCC. The CMCC is the central control point for classified material within the command. The organization’s classified files, although an extension of the directives control point, are not located with the directives control point. Strict control and accounting for classified material is vital for national and operational security. The adjutant must maintain close coordination with the G-2/S-2 staff to ensure the smooth functioning of the CMCC. As planning for operations begin, the responsibilities and workload for CMCC personnel increases. It may be necessary to augment CMCC with additional personnel (e.g., Marine reserves, other commands).

2006. Casualty Management My job was simply to report on casualties, enemy as well as our own; casualties due to hostile action and those due to nonhostile causes— the accidents that inevitably occur where there are large numbers of young men armed with lethal weapons or at the controls of complicated machinery. Artillery shells sometimes fell on friendly troops, tanks ran over people, helicopters crashed, marines shot other marines by mistake.

—Philip Caputo on serving as the casualty officer of 3d Marines, Republic of Vietnam, 1965 from A Rumor of War

The G-1 is responsible for casualty management. Specifically, he conducts casualty reporting and casualty mail coordination. He coordinates with the G-4 for the accounting and transportation of casualty personal effects. He plans, coordinates policies, and supervises the conduct of ceremonies and funerals while planning and coordinating policies for returning patient fitness for duty determinations. Most importantly, he participates in operational planning to determine personnel loss or casualty estimates. MAGTF planners can then use these estimates to arrange for replacements, transportation, medical support, mortuary affairs, and help commanders

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choose between different operational courses of action. Casualty estimates will become the basis for individual ready reserve recall planning at HQMC Code MPP-60.

a. Casualty Reporting Casualty reporting provides timely and accurate notification to the next of kin of killed or injured Marine, Sailor or attached Service members. Additionally, it provides timely information to the commander and his senior commanders to make them aware of the status of forces and events that may have significant operational impact or media interest. The G-1’s primary source of guidance on casualty reporting within the Corps is contained in Marine Corps Order (MCO) P3040.4E, Marine Corps Casualty Procedures Manual. The report is referred to as the Personnel Casualty Report (PCR), and is intended to provide both peacetime and combat casualty reporting throughout the Marine Corps’ chain of command. Also the Marine Corps may publish Marine Administrative messages for any additional casualty reporting procedures for specific real-world operations as they did for OIF (Iraq) and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) (to include reporting of contractor casualties). The Department of Defense has mandated that all the Services use its electronic casualty reporting system titled “Defense Casualty Information Processing System,” or DCIPS, when submitting a PCR. When submitting a PCR in a deployed environment, it is known as DCIPS-Forward. Finally, when the Corps must report casualties to a joint higher headquarters, it is accomplished using the JPERSTAT format similar to what is depicted in Appendix B. (DCIPS-Forward is not used when reporting JPERSTAT.) Prior to deployment it is recommended that the MEF G-1 publish a casualty reporting SOP to facilitate casualty reporting procedures for the MSCs. DCIPS-Forward is a software program that is designed to work in a situation where e-mail/internet access is not available. All casualty information can be entered and stored on a computer. When the user gains access to e-mail or internet, all the casualty records recorded prior can be sent. Upon receiving the casualty reports from the field, the higher headquarters casualty office can then use the Autoload process in DCIPS to

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review and load all the casualty report records into the main DCIPS’ database. The casualty reporting SOP should include DCIPS-Forward procedures. The record of emergency data and Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance for Marines are two documents that must be kept current if the G-1 is going to manage casualties efficiently. The G-1 personnel must be familiar with the casualty reporting process and follow established guidelines as outlined in MCO P3040.4E. Since life-threatening accidents and illness may occur at any time without notice, it is important for the G-1 to have a casualty SOP and staff members trained in its use. The G-1 should develop casualty guidelines that facilitate the transition from normal peacetime routine to operations and account for a mass casualty emergency. If the commander has not already provided one, the G-1 should recommend an assumption of command plan for key assignments. Casualty reporting is typically a collaborative effort between the operational forces and the supporting establishment, especially if the next of kin is located near a supporting establishment installation and the Marine is physically located with the Operating Forces overseas. The G-1 section must work with all hands to verify that information about a casualty is correct and does not reach the next of kin through unofficial means.

b. Personnel Loss Estimation Casualty management begins with the personnel loss estimate. It is often called the casualty estimate. When complete, it becomes the basis for the medical, personnel, and many of the logistical plans. There are three types of personnel losses, battle casualties, nonbattle casualties, and administrative losses. A battle casualty results from hostile action. Consequently, it is often called a hostile casualty. It includes victims of terrorist activity and those service members who in the performance of their duties become casualties as the result of fratricide—so called “friendly fire.” All other casualties are typed as nonhostile. A nonbattle or nonhostile casualty is any casualty resulting from circumstances not directly attributable to hostile action or terrorist activity. This includes injuries or death due to the weather, combat fatigue, and self-inflicted wounds. “Friendly fire” casualties that occur while an individual is in an

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unauthorized absence, deserter, dropped from rolls status, or is otherwise voluntarily absent from his place of duty are also considered nonhostile casualties except in unusual cases. Administrative losses are transfers, rotations, unauthorized absences, and any other loss which is not the result of a casualty.

Personnel loss estimation is a product of staff coordination and developed in concert with intelligence, operational, and logistical planning. The G-1 has staff cognizance for the task of personnel strength and casualty management. MCWP 3-40.1 says that the G-1 coordinates with the G-3 to produce the personnel loss estimate. In practice, a good personnel loss estimate necessarily involves a coordinated effort from all staff sections of the MAGTF, to include health services or medical planners from organic and attached health services organizations. In addition to the G-1, G-3, and health services planners, the G-2’s and G-4’s contribution is essential to accurately forecast casualties. Indeed, the casualty estimate is a continuing process of updating and revaluation that meshes easily with the planning process steps of mission analysis, COA development, wargaming, and comparison and decision. See Part III of this pamphlet for a detailed description of the role of the personnel loss or casualty estimate in the planning process. Personnel loss or casualty estimation is part art and part science. Planners use a variety of means to supplement their own intellect and judgment in developing the casualty estimate. Detailed studies—some classified—are available to calculate the ranges and effects of modern munitions. Historical data concerning casualty rates in operations similar to those being planned are extremely useful and often form the basis of casualty estimates. Recently, computer tools have been made available to augment the traditional pencil and paper method. HQMC (Code MPP-60) has developed casualty estimation (CASEST) software. It contains approved casualty rates in an easy to use windows based program. Copies are available for download from the MPP-60 website at www.usmc.mil. MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.3, MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual, contains an eight-step casualty estimation method beginning on page 63. Copies of this and other MSTP pamphlets are available at the MSTP website (www.mstp.quantico.usmc.mil). In the final analysis casualty estimation deals with that chief incalculable in war—the human will. Consequently, assumptions that are necessary to develop an estimate may prove tragically

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The final factor in forecasting personnel losses is the condition and morale of the force. Units comprised of Marines who are physically, mentally, and spiritually fit have fewer casualties than those who are not. Marines with good leaders, high morale, and strong bodies are more alert and take the extra precautions that save lives and reduce casualties. They can withstand long periods of strenuous combat activity, lack of regular sleep, and

wrong. Opponents thought to be weak and ineffective may render deadly resistance. Conversely, a dreaded, deadly enemy may capitulate or simply run away. Casualty planners must temper any casualty estimation model with their own judgment, experience, and appreciation of the situation. No tool or model will be universally accurate. c. Factors That Influence the Casualty Rate Planners who develop the personnel loss estimate must understand the factors that historically have influenced casualty rates. Some of these factors are the type of operations, the terrain, character of the enemy, weather and climate conditions, and morale of the troops. Casualties vary a great deal depending on the type of operations. An amphibious or airborne assault against a prepared and determined enemy are generally the most costly operations in terms of the numbers killed and wounded. Terrain affects the casualty rate in ways that are very similar to the type of operations. A capable defender who can make terrain work to his advantage will increase casualties in the attacking force. Operations on urban terrain generally cause a high casualty rate. The character of the enemy will naturally have a heavy bearing on friendly casualties. Resolute opponents will inflict greater casualties than poorly motivated and untrained forces. Weather and climate will influence nonbattle casualties as well as battle casualties. Their effect will be greatest on unacclimatized or poorly equipped personnel. If the weather produces poor visibility, the accuracy of enemy fire may be diminished and the friendly battle casualty rate improved accordingly, but the same factor may reduce our ability to control our small units. Planners must therefore increase the numbers they expect to turn up missing or captured under those conditions.

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The G-1 is responsible for personnel management (administration). Per the existing draft of MCO P5000.14D, Marine Corps Administrative Procedures, “Personnel administration includes those tasks that generally deal with a Marine’s administrative support requirements. Unit diary reporting into MCTFS includes elements that affect a Marine’s pay, compensation, promotion, life insurance, and items existing in personnel records….” Some specific tasks that G-1 supervises in this category are planning and coordinating personnel procurement, retention, and reenlistment; classification, reclassification, assignment, promotion, and

constant exposure to the enemy and elements. The condition of Marines is reflected to an even greater extent in the nonbattle casualty rate. That is because troops of low morale or poor condition are likely to become psychiatric casualties even if they avoid physical harm from the enemy. d. Mortuary Affairs The MEF G-1 coordinates and tracks mortuary affairs while the FSSG executes these functions. Mortuary affairs skills reside only in the Marine Corps Reserve of the 4th FSSG (designated as a graves registration unit) and, when activated, would be part of the FSSG supporting the MEF in theater. During OIF I and II, I MEF did not have a Reserve mortuary affairs unit assigned to it, therefore, a unit (artillery battery for OIF I, NBC platoon from FSSG for OIF II) was assigned by the MEF G-1 and trained to conduct mortuary affairs. The following procedures were in effect for OIF I and II:

• Marine mortuary affairs personnel were assigned to designated airheads in Iraq to identify and prepare remains for shipment (usually via medical evacuation).

• Mortuary affairs personnel were also assigned to the U.S. Army collection point in theater where the remains were shipped to the designated point of entry in CONUS (Dover Air force Base).

• G-1 tracks the remains via the web from death until burial.

2007. Personnel Management (Administration)

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reduction; supervising personnel management procedures relating to transfer, retirement, separation, and rotation; conducting staff inspections to ascertain the effectiveness of personnel administration; monitoring the deployability of all personnel; and maintaining personnel records.

Accurate and complete personnel records are prerequisites for effective personnel management. Although unit operational readiness is monitored by the G-3 section, monitoring the state of individual readiness is a command responsibility that the G-1 section monitors. A deployment readiness checklist or database should be established to allow the commander to know the deployment readiness status of his Marines along with any problem area that may require additional resources or focus to achieve optimal operational readiness. Of course, the unit’s mission will determine the deployment-readiness threshold. For example, a Marine division will be expected to be at a higher operational readiness state than a Marine Corps base, while within the division the air alert battalion will require constant maintenance to remain prepared for emergency deployment. a. Influence on Morale

Few things affect a Marine’s morale more than personal administrative problems (pay, awards, promotions, etc.). Ensuring each Marine receives adequate administrative support not only contributes to the individual Marine’s well-being, but also to the unit’s overall strength by contributing to esprit de corps. The G-1 faces additional challenges when processing and reporting reservists and other Service members. Combat zone entitlements such as tax exemption, hazardous duty pay, family separation allowance, etc., may not have been entered properly by the parent command. They must be verified and corrected if necessary by the joining command. Administrative processing can be efficiently accomplished en mass. This is especially true if joining large amounts of Marine reservists or other Service augmentees to the command at one time. There is no substitute for ensuring every Marine fully understands his operational entitlements and personnel records are thoroughly checked by a trained administrator.

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Thorough personnel management is as critical at the conclusion of a deployment as it is before and during one. The G-1 section must audit personnel records to ensure their accuracy. Entitlements must be ended at the correct time and any campaigns, battles, combat zones, or other significant events must be properly annotated. Inaccurate data can cause overpayment (and subsequent repayment problems) and awards difficulties (unauthorized or missing awards). b. Awards Awards are an area of particular concern for the MAGTF commander. Done properly, awards can achieve their primary purpose of animating the fighting spirit. Done poorly, they can either have no effect or actually breed frustration, discontent, and disillusionment. Awards require a keen eye for detail and administrative acumen. Eligibility for certain personal and unit awards need administrative records for validation. The Purple Heart needs medical record or witness affidavits. Such awards as the Combat Action Ribbon and campaign medals need unit diary verification of a Marine’s presence in the operation or battle to prove eligibility. It is often many months after the operation before a Marine is honored for his service and, only then, if his records can show proof of his eligibility.

2008. Morale and Personnel Services According to MCWP 3-40.1 the G-1 is responsible for a variety of plans, programs, services, and activities related to morale and personnel services. This includes assessing the state of morale in subordinate units and advising the commander accordingly; determining the requirements for leave, liberty, and rest and recreation facilities; planning, coordinating and supervising the unit award program; and planning, coordinating, and supervising the following:

• MWR services (includes recreation equipment, units funds, and USO).

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• Exchange facilities (includes barbers, food venders, and phone banks). • Postal services

Personnel services are often confused with personal services. Personnel services are activities that serve the general, reoccurring needs and interests of all hands. Marines use personnel services on a regular basis. Some notable examples are listed in the preceding paragraph. Marines will require personnel services when they deploy. Personal services are in a related, but distinct category. They are defined by MCO P1700, The Personal Services Manual as “programs that support commanders’ efforts in the prevention and resolution of problems that detract from mission readiness and enhance the quality of life for the military community, regardless of geographic location.” They include transition and relocation assistance, volunteer training and coordination, suicide awareness, retired activities, domestic violence prevention, exceptional family member programs, new parent support programs, information and referral, personal financial management, clinical counseling, libraries, family advocacy, and substance abuse programs. Many Marines may never avail themselves of personal services or use them only occasionally. Personal services will normally remain at the home base or station. Keeping track of the morale in the MAGTF is another important function of the G-1. He accomplishes this by means of personal visits, reading reports, analyzing data, and asking questions. He reports his findings and makes appropriate recommendations to the commander. Figure 2-2 lists some means by which the G-1 can assess morale. Appendices 5 (Military Postal Service) and 6 (Chaplain Activities) to Annex E (Personnel) relate to this G-1 function. Each has several associated tabs.

Indicators of Morale

• Personal appearance • Standards of military courtesy • Use of recreational facilities • Condition of mess and quarters • Response to orders and directives • Arrests, military or civilian • Sick call rate • Unauthorized absences

• Personal conduct • Personal hygiene • Interpersonal relations • Care of equipment • Motivation during training • Requests for transfers • Reenlistment rates • Use of drugs and alcohol

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• Request masts • Congressional interest requests

Figure 2-2.

2009. Operations Plans and Orders The G-1 prepares Annex E (Personnel) of the operations plan or order. Some commanders may ask the G-1 to help coordinate the collection, assembly, editing, formatting, and distribution of the basic operations order or plan. MCWP 5.1 and CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II (Planning Formats and Guidance) contain detailed guidance on the producing of plans and orders. Appendix D of this pamphlet contains the format for Annex E (Personnel).

2010. Other Duties and Responsibilities Although not assigned doctrinally, traditionally the G-1 has received the responsibilities, programs, issues, and initiatives that do not belong naturally to any other principal staff section. These may include voting, savings bonds, Navy and Marine Corps Relief Drive, Marine Corps Birthday Ball, Combined Federal Campaign, and so forth. One technique for managing these small but numerous responsibilities is to maintain separate packets (“mini-SOPs”) or turnover folders for each responsibility. G-1 personnel can retain and update these packets that can then be assigned to an officer appointed to accomplish each responsibility as an additional duty. The appointment of such officers is best left to the principal staff officers. The G-1 can rotate these duties among the various staff sections on a fair share basis. The packet should contain information and procedures to help conduct and complete the necessary actions.

2011. Civilian Personnel Management

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The purpose of civilian personnel management is identical to military personnel management; to plan, organize, direct, and effectively supervise civilian personnel so that individuals achieve their maximum efficiency. According to JP 1-0, when deployed the J-1 is responsible to the commander for the administration of civilian personnel, therefore, the G-1 must be prepared to manage staffing, position description reviews, job announcements, awards, and advancements. He also coordinates the civilian personnel Equal Employment Opportunity program and with the servicing Human Resource Office. Civilian personnel can be from the local population or U. S. citizens. The Marine Corps may employ locals as laborers, translators, guides, informants, or in other positions when necessary. In an operational situation, American citizens employed by the MAGTF in an operational setting will probably be contractors. Separate laws, regulations, and customs govern the use of local employees and contractors. The G-1 may have occasion to be responsible to the MAGTF for developing and supervising policies related to both categories of civilian employees. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield, may be of some assistance in regard to managing contractors.

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Part III Planning

Effective planning for personnel support to MAGTF operations increases the commander’s ability to successfully accomplish the mission. The MAGTF G-1 and his staff must be fully involved in all phases of planning and collaborate with other principal staff members in preparing the order. The G-1 personnel—along with the other staff members—must fully understand and participate in the MCPP. See MCWP 5-1 for more information. The commander may conduct planning through the use of an OPT. The OPT is a task-organized planning element that supports the commander and his staff in decisionmaking. The OPT is not a substitute for normal staff action and coordination. The G-1, along with other principal and special staff officers, provides representatives to the OPT in order to conduct detailed planning to coordinate warfighting functions. The representatives keep the principal staff officers informed of the planning effort. They also receive guidance to take back to the OPT.

3001. Mission Analysis During mission analysis the G-1 and the G-1 planners familiarize themselves with the possible area of operations; available forces; and political, military, and cultural characteristics of the area. See Figure 3-1. a. Inputs

Inputs for mission analysis are from the MAGTF commander, the higher commander, adjacent commanders, and other external sources. These inputs include (but are not limited to) the commander’s orientation, the higher headquarters’ operation order, and restraints and constraints.

b. Process Using the information in the commander’s orientation and higher headquarters’ orders, the G-1 planners first identify specified and implied tasks. Tasks that define mission success and may be applicable to the force as a whole are further identified as essential tasks.

MISSIONANALYSIS

COMMANDER’S ORIENTATION

HIGHER HEADQUARTER’SOPERATION ORDER

RESTRAINTS AND/ORCONSTRAINTS

G-1 TASKS(Specified/Implied/Essential)

INITIAL G-1PERSONNEL ESTIMATE

PERSONNELSHORTFALLS

RESTRAINTS AND/OR CONSTRAINTS

ASSUMPTIONS

APPROVED PERSON-NEL CCIRs

•MISSION STATEMENT•COMMANDER’’S INTENT•COMMANDER’’S PLANNING GUIDANCE

Figure 3-1. Mission analysis. The G-1 planners gather information to begin the personnel estimate. The personnel estimate is an analysis of how all human resources and personnel factors impact the individual Marine and unit effectiveness before, during,

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and after the mission. It includes established command relationships and a current overall functional personnel status of the organization, its subordinate units, and any attached or supporting elements. Personnel status includes assessments of the following tangible and intangible factors:

• Medical evacuation and hospitalization • Unit-strength maintenance • Replacements • Individual readiness • Cohesion • Discipline, law, and order

The personnel estimate predicts losses (of which casualty estimation is a part) and when, where, and if such losses cause the culmination of an operation. It contains the G-1’s conclusions and recommendations about the feasibility of supporting major operational and tactical missions. See Appendix C for the personnel estimate format. The personnel estimate will be continuously refined throughout the planning process. It provides a logical and orderly examination of all administration factors that affect mission accomplishment. It supports the commander’s decisionmaking throughout the planning process and subsequent execution of the operation. As mission analysis is conducted, planners determine whether specialized personnel or other expertise is required (e.g., civil affairs, specific intelligence or language skills, nuclear, biological, and chemical). If this expertise is not readily available, the commander—through the G-1 and in conjunction with the G-3—should request augmentation. The G-1 planners may identify administrative and personnel restraints and constraints during mission analysis. If any are identified, they are recorded and carried forward for use in subsequent planning. Only the commander decides what information is critical, but the G-1 planners may propose essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs) on personnel. EEFIs are continually reviewed and updated or deleted as required. Additionally, the G-1 planners can submit other friendly force

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information requirements necessary to answer questions based on assumptions and to develop plans. See Figure 3-2.

EEFIs

When will the combat replacement system be robust enough for the MAGTF to be able to conduct sustained operations ashore?

When will numbers of EPWs be too large for the MAGTF to effectively maintain the tempo of offensive operations?

Figure 3-2. Examples of essential elements of friendly information

related to personnel. Assumptions may be included in operation plans, but are not included in operation orders. Assumptions not validated become risks and may require branch plans. The G-1 planners may develop assumptions to allow the commander to make a decision concerning a COA. c. Outputs Mission analysis outputs are vital inputs to subsequent steps in the MCPP. In addition to the required outputs, the G-1 planner’s outputs may include—

• G-1 tasks (specified, implied, essential) • Initial G-1 personnel estimate (including casualty estimate) • Personnel shortfalls • Restraints and/or constraints • Approved personnel EEFIs • Assumptions

3002. Course of Action Development During COA development the G-1 and the G-1 planners—with the commander and the rest of the staff—develop COAs. Each COA is examined from a personnel perspective to ensure that it is suitable, feasible, acceptable,

distinguishable, and complete with respect to the current and anticipated situation, the mission, and the commander’s intent. See Figure 3-3.

COA DEVELOPMENT

G-1 TASKS

INITIAL G-1 PERSONNELESTIMATE

PERSONNEL SHORTFALLS

RESTRAINTS/CONSTRAITS

APPROVED PERSONNEL CCIRs

ASSUMPTIONS

UPDATED G-1PERSONNEL UPDATE

INITIAL CASUALTYESTIMATE

ROUGH CONCEPT OF PERSONNELSUPPORT FOR EACH COA

•MISSION STATEMENT•COMMANDER’’S INTENT•COMMANDER’’S PLANNING GUIDANCE

•COMMANDER’S DESIGNATED COA FOR WARGAMING•COMMANDER’S WARGAMING GUIDANCE•COMMANDER’’S EVALUATION CRITERIA

Figure 3-3. Course of action development.

a. Inputs The G-1 planner’s inputs may include the same topics listed in paragraph 3001c.

b. Process G-1 planners help develop broad COAs using mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available – time available (METT-T), manning rates, and casualty rate estimates. The goal of COA development is to answer two fundamental questions—“What do I want to do?” and “How do I want to do it?” To help provide the answers, the G-1 planners ask:

• Does the MAGTF have the required total personnel? 35

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• Are the personnel the proper mix and MOS? • Are adequate replacements available?

To these questions, planners must assess relative combat power and estimate casualties. Relative combat power assessment provides planners with an understanding of friendly and threat force strengths and weaknesses relative to each other. Casualty estimation forms the basis of replacement, medical and medical logistic planning. While force ratios are important in the relative combat power assessment, the numerical comparison of enemy and friendly forces is just one aspect that must be balanced with other factors such as weather, morale, level of training, and cultural orientation. The goal of relative combat power assessment is to identify threat weaknesses that can be exploited through asymmetric application of friendly strengths and identify friendly weaknesses that require protection from threat actions. The goal of casualty estimation is to allow the MAGTF to replace personnel losses, continue the mission, and to provide sufficient medical treatment. Both efforts require participation by all staff sections to be as accurate as possible. Using the commander’s planning guidance—as well as updated intelligence preparation of the battlespace products, the relative combat power assessment, and center of gravity analysis—planners begin developing “how” they intend to accomplish the mission. This becomes the COA. It is critical that COAs provide the commander with a variety of employment options. COAs should conform to the following criteria:

• Suitability. Does the COA accomplish the purpose and tasks? Does it comply with the commander’s planning guidance?

• Feasibility. Does the COA accomplish the mission within the available time, space, and resources?

• Acceptability. Does the COA achieve an advantage that justifies the cost in resources?

• Distinguishability. Does the COA differ significantly from other COAs?

• Completeness. Does the COA include all tasks to be accomplished? Does it describe a complete mission (main and supporting efforts, reserve, and associated risks)?

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If time permits, a COA should contain supporting concepts. These supporting concepts help the OPT to synchronize all the essential warfighting functions of the force within the battlespace. In addition to the supporting concepts of fires, intelligence, and logistics, the commander may direct the G-1 (or the G-1 decides) to develop a concept of personnel support. The concept of personnel support should focus on personnel capabilities and capacities versus requirements. The OPT may have to consider shifting of priorities, priority of work, support relationships, how units are organized, and whether to reassign personnel. See Figure 3-4 for an example of a personnel concept. The OPT produces the COA graphic and narrative to portray how the unit will accomplish the mission. The COA graphic and narrative identify who (notional task organization), what (tasks), when, where, how, and why (intent). The graphic portrays the scheme of maneuver of the main and supporting efforts and critical maneuver, control, and fire support coordinating measures. The narrative provides the purpose and tasks of the main and supporting efforts, the reserve, and the sequencing of the operation. The COA graphic and narrative, when approved by the commander, form the basis for the concept of operations and operations overlay in the basic plan or order. The G-1 planners may develop and use other planning support tools in addition to the COA graphic and narrative. These may include—

• Personnel Overlay. This overlay may include locations of commanders (for succession), locations of critical personnel (critical or short MOSs), straggler collection points, EPW collection points, and locations of special staff members (chaplains, etc.).

• Casualty Evacuation Plan. This provides information on the location and capabilities of the various level aid stations, rules for requesting transportation (type and destination), and routing based on the COA (if not completed by the G-4 or health services support personnel).

• Combat Replacement Plan. This provides information on the movement of personnel into the MAGTF area of operations (AO), location of the reception center, and procedures for requesting replacements. Planners must be careful not to confuse combat replacements with the MAGTF operational or tactical reserve. Combat replacements replenish unit human resource losses on an individual or unit basis. The reserve is a portion of his force that the commander

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does not commit until he seeks a swift resolution to the final outcome of the present battle.

Concept of Personnel Support

(a) Phase I

1 Purpose: Ensure sufficient number and appropriate types of personnel are present to support and conduct MEF operations. 2 Method: Continue personnel buildup began in the continental United States (CONUS). Coordinate with HQMC to locate, transfer, or maintain identified personnel. Assist attached units from other Services as appropriate. Joint Task Force (JTF) J-1 will establish a joint reception center in the joint operations area (JOA). MEF G-1 will provide liaison and assistance as directed. 3 End State: All designated units manned with appropriate personnel (total numbers, types, specialized MOSs) to support and conduct MEF operations.

(b) Phase II Stage A

1 Purpose: Provide general personnel support to all MEF and attached units in the MEF AO. 2 Method: Monitor casualties and replacement personnel into, through, and out of the MEF AO. Provide personnel support to attached 1st Armored Division units with U. S. Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) out of Blueland. Coordinate with U.S. Navy Forces (NAVFOR) for additional medical and chaplain support as required. 3 End State: All personnel requirements for the MEF and attached units are met.

(c) Phase II Stage B

1 Purpose: Continue to provide general personnel support to all MEF and attached units and establish a MEF forward personnel staging area in the vicinity of Tealton. 2 Method: Inbound personnel will continue to report to their destination units from the joint reception center until the MEF forward personnel staging area is established in Tealton. MEF G-1 will maintain liaison personnel at the joint reception center. 3 End State: All personnel requirements for the MEF and attached units are met; MEF forward personnel staging area is established.

(d) Phase II Stage C

1 Purpose: Establish a rest and recreation facility in vicinity of Greentown to support MEF units. 2 Method: Coordinate with MEF G-3 and G-4 to prioritize unit rotation and establish transportation to the rest and reaction facility. Identify host nation support assets and locations. 3 End State: Operational pause conducted at the Blueland border in order to replenish and reconstitute units prior to commencement of phase III as

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needed.

Figure 3-4. Example concept of personnel support.

Developed COAs, along with updated facts, assumptions, risk, etc., are briefed to the commander. Each COA is briefed separately and is sufficiently developed to be wargamed. The COA briefing may also include initial estimates of supportability from subordinate commands and staff estimates. The G-1 personnel estimate summarizes the significant personnel aspects of the situation which influence the COA, analyzes the impact of all personnel factors upon the COA, and evaluates and determines how the means available can best support the COA. Following the COA briefing, the commander may select or modify the COAs to be evaluated during COA wargaming. He may also provide additional COA and wargaming guidance and express his desires concerning evaluation criteria. Lastly, the commander provides the evaluation criteria he will use to select the COA that will become his concept of operations. The evaluation criteria help focus the wargaming effort and provide the framework for data collection. Evaluation criteria important to the G-1 planners may include—

• Limitation on casualties • Risk • Force protection

c. Outputs In addition to the required outputs, the G-1 planner’s outputs may include—

• Updated G-1 personnel estimate • Initial casualty estimate • Rough concept of personnel support for each COA

3003. Course of Action War Game

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During the COA war game the AC/S G-1 and the G-1 planners help identify strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and personnel shortfalls for each friendly COA. See Figure 3-5.

UPDATED G-1 PERSONNELESTIMATE

INITIAL CASUALTY ESTIMATE

ROUGH CONCEPT OF PERSONNELSUPPORT FOR EACH COA ASSUMPTIONS

COAWAR GAME

IDENTIFICATION OF ASSETSREQUIRED AND SHORTFALLS

REFINED G-1PERSONNEL ESTIMATE

• WARGAMED COA GRAPHICS AND NARRATIVES

• INFORMATION ON COMMANDER’S EVALUATION CRITERIA

• COMMANDER’S DESIGNATED COAs FOR WARGAMING

• COMMANDER’S WARGAMING GUIDANCE• COMMANDER’S EVALUATION CRITERIA

UPDATED FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Figure 3-5. Course of action war game. a. Inputs In addition to the required inputs, the G-1 planner’s inputs may include the same topics listed in paragraph 3002c. b. Process

During COA wargaming, the planners evaluate the effectiveness of friendly COAs against both the enemy’s COAs and the commander’s evaluation criteria. They make adjustments to identified problems and weaknesses of the friendly COAs and identify branches and sequels. The G-1 planners may have to suggest changes to force flow, task organization, and replacements based on wargaming results. Each friendly COA is wargamed independently against selected enemy COAs. COA wargaming helps the commander determine how best to apply his strength against the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities while protecting his critical vulnerabilities. Wargaming pits friendly COAs against enemy COAs; it does not compare friendly COAs against each other. (Friendly COAs are compared against each other in COA comparison and decision.)

41

Estimates provide the staff and subordinate commanders’ information on the COAs. This assists the commander during COA comparison and decision. The commander’s staff and subordinate commands continue to develop their staff estimates and estimates of supportability. The casualty estimate may become part of the refined G-1 personnel estimate. These estimates are used during the next step, COA comparison and decision. c. Outputs In addition to the required outputs, the G-1 planner’s outputs may include—

• Refined G-1 personnel estimate • Refined casualty estimate (if not included as part of the personnel

estimate) • Identification of assets required and shortfalls

3004. Course of Action Comparison and Decision During COA comparison and decision the commander selects the COA that he believes will best accomplish the mission. The G-1 and the G-1 planners—together with the rest of the staff—assist the commander by providing estimates and judgments in their areas of expertise. See Figure 3-6. a. Inputs

In addition to the required inputs, the G-1 planner’s inputs may include the same topics listed in paragraph 3003c.

42

REFINED G-1 PERSONNELESTIMATE

IDENTIFICATION OF ASSETSREQUIRED AND SHORTFALLS

ASSUMPTIONS

COACOMPARISONAND DECISION

G-1 PERSONNELESTIMATE

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

• WARGAMED COA GRAPHICS AND NARRATIVES

• INFORMATION ON COMMANDER’S EVALUATION CRITERIA

CONCEPT OF PERSONNELSUPPORT

Figure 3-6. Course of action comparison and decision. b. Process

The commander, subordinate commanders, and his staff examine each COA against the evaluation criteria. They discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each COA. Recorders take notes. The G-1 provides feedback in his areas of expertise (personnel requirements and assignments, tracking medical casualties, processing personnel at reception centers, EPW handling, etc.). The results of the COA evaluation allow the commander to conduct COA comparison. He may use a comparison and decision matrix to help him compare one COA against another with the highest aggregate signifying the favored COA. (See Table A-2).

Commander’s Evaluation Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3

Casualties 1 3 2

Critical MOS Skills 2 3 1

EPWs 3 2 1

Replacements 1 2 3

Table A-2. Example of comparison and decision matrix.

Once all COAs are evaluated and compared, the commander selects the COA which will best accomplish the mission. The selected COA narrative

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becomes the basis for the concept of operations, including the concept of personnel support, and is used to develop the G-1 personnel estimate. The casualty estimate is used in both the concept of personnel support and G-1 personnel estimate. c. Outputs

The G-1 planners’ outputs may include—

• G-1 personnel estimate • Concept of personnel support

3005. Orders Development During orders development the G-1 and the G-1 planners produce their portions of the order. The G-1 section is normally tasked to distribute the completed order. See Figure 3-7.

G-1 PERSONNEL ESTIMATE

CONCEPT OF PERSONNELSUPPORT THE ORDER OR PLAN

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

EXISTING SOPs, PLANS, AND ORDERSC/S OR XO ORDERS DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE

ANNEX E, PERSONNELORDERS

DEVELOPMENT

Figure 3-7. Orders development.

a. Inputs In addition to the required inputs, the G-1 planner’s inputs may include the same topics listed in paragraph 4004c.

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b. Process Normally, the chief of staff (C/S) coordinates with staff principals to assist the G-3 in developing an order. He dictates the format for the order, sets and enforces the time limits and development sequence, and determines which annexes are published by which staff section. Supporting portions of the order or plan, such as annexes and appendixes, are based on staff estimates, subordinate commander’s estimates of supportability, and other planning documents. The G-1 planners are responsible for producing Annex E (Personnel) (and any appendices), and contributing to other sections as directed. See Appendix D for the personnel annex format. After the basic order (or plan) and the major annexes are produced, the staff conducts an orders reconciliation and orders crosswalk.

• Orders Reconciliation. Orders reconciliation ensures that the basic order and all the annexes, appendixes, etc., are complete and in agreement. Specifically, the staff compares the commander’s intent, and the mission against the concept of operations and the supporting concepts.

• Orders Crosswalk. During the orders crosswalk, the staff compares the order with the orders of higher and adjacent commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure that the superior commander’s intent is met. It identifies discrepancies or gaps in planning.

The final action in orders development is the approval of the order or plan by the commander. c. Outputs In addition to the required outputs, the G-1 planner’s outputs may include—

• Annex E, Personnel. • Contributions to other sections of the order or plan and annexes.

3006. Transition

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During transition the G-1 and the G-1 section shift from planning to execution. The G-1 may provide a representative as a proponent for the order to answer questions, aid in using any planning support tools, and help determine necessary adjustments to the order. See Figure 3-8.

TRANSITION

SUBORDINATE COMMANDERSAND STAFFS THAT ARE

•READY TO EXECUTE THE ORDER•PREPARED TO PLAN SEQUELS

INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE FUTURE MISSIONS (SEQUELS)

ANNEX E, PERSONNEL

ANY OUTSTANDINGPERSONNEL ISSUES

THE ORDER OR PLAN

Figure 3-8. Transition.

a. Inputs The G-1 planner’s inputs may include—

• Annex E, Personnel • Any outstanding personnel issues

b. Process Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing the order have a full understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander’s intent, the concept of operations, and MCPP tools. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans or future and current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and his subordinate commands. c. Outputs

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The outputs of a successful transition are subordinate commanders and staffs that are ready to execute the order and possible branches and prepared to plan sequels. The G-1 and the G-1 planners will continue to assist to ensure personnel issues are addressed as necessary.

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Appendix A

Notional G-1 Organization This notional G-1 organization will vary depending on echelon, mission, and the commander’s requirements. Normally it will have a personnel, personnel operations/plans, and adjutant subsections. In addition, there may be other subsections as required. For actual tables of organization (T/Os) for each MEF, see www.mccdc.usmc.mil/tfs/index.htm. Description Grade MOS G-1 Division AC/S G-1 Col 9906 Deputy AC/S G-1 LtCol 0180 Provost Marshal 1 LtCol 5802 Reserve Liaison Officer LtCol 9910 G-1 Chief MGySgt 0193 Administrative Clerk LCpl 0151 Career Retention Specialist MSgt 8421 Personnel (Manpower) Branch Personnel Officer 2 Maj 0180 Personnel Chief MGySgt 0193 Administrative Clerk 3 Sgt 0151 Operations/Plans Branch Personnel Operations/Plans Officer Maj 0180 1 Not all MEF G-1 section T/Os include this billet. 2 There may be an assistant personnel officer (warrant officer).

48 3 There may be multiple administrative clerks as well as additional SNCOs.

49

Personnel Operations/Plans Chief GySgt 0193 Administrative Clerk 3 Cpl 0151 Adjutant Branch Adjutant Maj 0180 Assistant Adjutant/CMCC Officer Lt 0180 Adjutant Chief MGySgt 0193 Administrative Clerk 3 Sgt 0151 Clerk/Driver/Courier Cpl 9916 CMCC Chief GySgt 9916 CMCC Clerk/Driver 4 Sgt 0151 The following subsections are representative. They can be part of the above branches, organized as separate subsections, or combined as directed by the commander to support the unit’s mission. Casualty Section Casualty Chief GySgt 0193 Casualty Reporting Clerk 5 Sgt 0151 Reserve Support Section Reserve Liaison Officer Col 9906 Assistant Reserve Liaison Officer LtCol 9910 Administrative Chief GySgt 0193 Administrative Clerk 3 Cpl 0151

4 There may be multiple CMCC clerk/drivers. 5 There may be multiple casualty reporting clerks.

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Appendix B

Joint Personnel Status And Casualty Report

This appendix provides the format of the JPERSTAT. The format is from CJCSM 3150.13, Joint Reporting Structure – Personnel Manual. The JPERSTAT provides total troop strength data to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff for monitoring and evaluating the status of personnel under the operational control of a combatant commander. Each combatant and/or CJTF commander will usually modify this report to suit their needs. It also provides the information on casualties. The information is used to address issues about the combatant commander’s personnel strength and other personnel concerns. The combatant commander submits the JPERSTAT using the information provided by the component commanders. It normally covers a 24-hour period. The data shows changes to personnel strength and casualties only during the period of the report. Cumulative data is not reported. The JPERSTAT is divided into three parts:

• Part One. This part is a total personnel count that identifies personnel by location, unit, and Service. It identifies the number of Reserves, National Guard, and female personnel within the joint operational area. Both afloat and ashore personnel should be counted.

• Part Two. This part reports casualties since the last JPERSTAT report.

• Part Three. This part is a narrative used to amplify data, raise personnel issues, and explain changes or discrepancies.

Omit parts not applicable to an operation. The Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1), Personnel Readiness Division, will coordinate with the combatant commander and provide changes to the JPERSTAT format to accommodate any unique reporting requirements of a particular operation. The report is auto-populating, as well as web-based.

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B-1. Part One, Total Personnel Count

TOTA

L

TOTA

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USC

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USC

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52

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53

B-2. Part Two, Casualty Data

RM

C

AW

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CA

PTR

D

MIA

MIS

S

DU

ST

WU

N

DO

NH

C

AS

WIA

KIA

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Cat

egor

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A

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54

RM

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55

Notes:

AC active component HCAS hostile casualties KIA killed in action WIA wounded in action NHCAS nonhostile casualties * DO death due to other DUSTWUN duty status whereabouts unknown MISS missing MIA missing in action CAPTRD captured AWOL absent without leave RMC returned to military control * This acronym is from CJCSM 3150.13. It is different from the one listed in JP 1-02 and Appendix G.

B-3. Part Three, Narrative Topics appropriately addressed in this part include, but are not limited to—

• Explain all gains and losses. Include the gaining or losing unit(s). • Explain all casualty figures as required. • Describe any administrative error or discrepancy in personnel

accounting from the previous report. • Comment on personnel issues that adversely affect operational postures

because of a unit’s inability to carry out its mission (e.g., special skill shortages, grade imbalances, vacancies, and vacancies of key billets).

Appendix C

Personnel Estimate

Format This appendix provides a format and example of the personnel estimate. The format and example are based on MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, Appendix F. Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet requirements. The personnel estimate may be used by Marine Corps forces at all levels. Copy no. ____ Of ____ copies OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND PLACE OF ISSUE Date/time group Message reference number PERSONNEL ESTIMATE ( ) ( ) REFERENCES: As appropriate to the preparation of the estimate. (U) TIME ZONE: 1. ( ) Mission

a. ( ) Basic Mission. This subparagraph contains a restatement of the basic mission of the command as a whole as previously announced by the commander.

b. ( ) Previous Decisions. State any previous decisions by the commander, such as early deployment of specific personnel.

2. ( ) Situation and Considerations

a. ( ) Enemy

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57

(1) ( ) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Refer to the intelligence estimate.

(2) ( ) Major Capabilities. Enemy capabilities likely to affect friendly personnel matters.

b. ( ) Friendly. A brief description of the current personnel status, which includes planned or known changes before and during the period covered by the estimate. The following subparagraphs address typical personnel areas of concern. If possible, state specific numbers of personnel, units, or facilities.

(1) ( ) Major Unit Strength and Disposition. Include authorized, assigned, and attached strengths. Include the effects of deployability, losses (combat and noncom bat), critical MOSs and skill shortages, projections (gains and losses), and any local situations affecting strength (i.e., restrictions on the number of personnel allowed in an area by treaty). May be provided as text and/or a situation map or an overlay appended as an annex.

(2) ( ) Probable Developments. Review major deployments necessary in initial and subsequent phases of the operation.

(3) ( ) Morale. Determine the level of fighting spirit, significant factors affecting current morale, religious and welfare matters, and awards. Use indicators of morale.

(4) ( ) Personnel Services Support. Identify the required exchange, recreational, and special services support.

(5) ( ) Nonmilitary Personnel. Indicate civilian personnel (Department of Defense or Service civilian personnel, civilian contractors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and others) required for the mission.

c. ( ) Courses of Action. The proposed COAs are stated in full.

d. ( ) Characteristics of the Area. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting the personnel situation.

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e. ( ) Logistics Situation. State known logistics problems, if any, that may affect the personnel situation (e.g., lack of transportation assets).

f. ( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Situation. State the C4 situation, emphasizing known problems that may affect the personnel situation. List succession of command.

g. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the personnel situation made for this estimate.

h. ( ) Special Factors. List items not covered elsewhere that may influence the personnel situation, such as identifying civil and indigenous labor available or essential for support.

3. ( ) Analysis. Each COA under consideration is analyzed—in the light of all significant administrative and personnel factors—to determine problems that may arise, measures required to resolve those problems, and any existing limiting factors. Omit areas not applicable. State all considerations of the analysis that have equal effects on all proposed COAs.

a. ( ) Course of Action #1

(1) ( ) Current Personnel Status. Determine if there are sufficient personnel (total numbers, proper MOS mix and assignment) to support the COA.

(2) ( ) Casualty Rate Estimation. Determine combat and noncombat casualties using the appropriate model.

(3) ( ) Replacements. Identify replacements on hand, replacements to be received, and the quality of the replacements.

(4) ( ) Unique Personnel Requirements. Identify unique personnel requirements for the entire command (e.g., foreign language specialist, civil affairs personnel, special equipment operator).

(5) ( ) Marine Corps Community Services Support. Identify necessary exchange, recreational, and special services support.

(6) ( ) Civilian Personnel. Number, restrictions on use, and organization.

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(7) ( ) C4. Management, operation, and support of required command, control, communications, and computer support.

(8) ( ) Personnel Section Considerations. Identify G-1/S-1 section considerations unique to the COA (i.e., additional personnel to identify, process, and pay; EPWs; and displaced civilians).

(9) ( ) Miscellaneous. Other personnel factors, such as expected numbers and locations of EPWs and displaced civilians.

b.( ) Course of Action #2. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

c.( ) Course of Action #3. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

4. ( ) Evaluation. From a personnel standpoint and based on the analyses, summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

5. ( ) Conclusion

a. ( ) Preferred Course of Action. A statement as to which COA, if any, can best be supported from a personnel viewpoint.

b. ( ) Major Disadvantages of Other Courses of Action. A statement whether the other COAs can be supported from a personnel viewpoint citing the disadvantages that make them less desirable or unsupportable.

c. ( ) Personnel Problems and Limitations. A statement of significant problems to be resolved and any limitations to be considered in each COA.

d. ( ) Decision or Action. A statement of measures required to resolve personnel problems cited above that must be brought to the attention of the commander.

/s/ ________________________

ANNEXES: (As required)

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Appendix D

Personnel Annex Format

This appendix provides a format and example of the personnel annex for an operation order. The format and example are based on MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, Appendix G, and CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II (Planning Formats and Guidance), Appendix E. The personnel annex is Annex E and applies to Marine Corps forces at all levels. Copy no. ____ of ____ copies OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND PLACE OF ISSUE Date/time group Message reference number ANNEX E TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) ( ) PERSONNEL ( ) ( ) REFERENCES: a. Any relevant plans or orders.

b. Required maps and charts. c. Other relevant documents.

( ) TIME ZONE: 1. ( ) General

a. ( ) Mission. Provide a clear, concise statement of the personnel objectives in support of the basic plan.

b. ( ) Concept of Personnel Support. State the general concept of personnel support for the forces assigned to support the operation plan.

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The commander’s intent and factors of METT-T drive the initial concept of personnel support. State operations security and communications security planning guidance for personnel matters addressed in the annex. In particular, provide guidance to ensure personnel actions promote essential secrecy for the commander’s intentions, military capabilities, and current activities. Also, address manning levels, mobilization timetables, and indicators of morale.

c. ( ) Assumptions. List any assumption made of friendly, enemy, or third-party capabilities, limitations, or COAs that could influence the feasibility of the personnel support. Omit in orders. d. ( ) Planning Factors. Use approved Marine Corps personnel planning factors and formulas for reserve and active duty forces except when operational requirements, experience, or local conditions dictate changes. When deviating from approved methods, identify the factors used and reasons for such use.

2. ( ) Personnel Policies and Procedures

a. ( ) General Guidance. Summarize how the commander visualizes personnel actions throughout the operation. Describe how personnel actions will support the command’s operational mission.

b. ( ) Specific Guidance

(1) ( ) Personnel Augmentation. The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or divided into two or more paragraphs depending upon the complexity of the operation.

(2) ( ) Personnel Reception and Processing. Identify locations of joint, Marine Corps component, and MAGTF reception centers. Prepare process flowchart and provide instructions for reception center personnel.

(3) ( ) Personnel Accountability and Strength Reporting. Provide date, time, and receiving activity. Note handling of significant information (e.g., CCIR parameters).

(4) ( ) Rotation Policies. Provide command’s rotation policy. Coordinated with the G-3 and G-4 sections.

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(5) ( ) Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Policies. Include requirements for execution of dependent care and reception plans.

(6) ( ) U.S. Citizen Civilian Personnel. Note any requirements for U.S. citizen civilian personnel such as accountability, casualty affairs, pay, health and comfort, equipment, special identification, etc. Differentiate between government service, contractors, and approved media.

(7) ( ) Non-U.S. Citizen Labor. Note any requirements for non-U.S. citizen labor (e.g., medical screening, security concerns).

(a) ( ) Estimates of Availability and Requirements.

(b) ( ) Responsibility for Procurement and Administration.

(c) ( ) Host Nation Contracting and Support Agreements.

(8) ( ) Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons. See Appendix 1.

(9) ( ) Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained U.S. Personnel. See Appendix 2.

(10) ( ) MWR. Identify locations of recreation areas. Provide liaison with USO.

(11) ( ) Casualty Reporting. Establish casualty reporting policy in coordination with G-4 section (health services), public affairs, and chaplain.

(12) ( ) Decorations and Awards.

(13) ( ) Pay and Allowances.

(14) ( ) Travel Procedures. Include passport, visa, and theater clearance requirements.

(15) ( ) Medical Returnees to Duty. See Annex Q, Medical Services.

(16) ( ) Leave Policy. Publish command leave and liberty policy. Include information such as special leave accrual.

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(17) ( ) Combat Zone/Contingency Operation Benefits.

(18) ( ) Deployability Criteria. Include deployability criteria for this operation.

(19) ( ) Benefits and Entitlements.

(a) ( ) Special Leave.

(b) ( ) Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay.

(c) ( ) Federal Income Tax Combat Zone Exclusion.

(d) ( ) Free Postage.

(e) ( ) Sole Surviving Son.

(f) ( ) Absentee Voting/Voting Information.

(g) ( ) Red Cross Notification and Coordination for Additional Services.

(20) ( ) Performance Evaluations/Proficiency and Conduct Marks.

(21) ( ) Civilian Personnel Policy and Procedures.

3. ( ) Finance and Disbursing. See Appendix 3.

4. ( ) Legal. See Appendix 4.

5. ( ) Military Postal Services. See Appendix 5.

6. ( ) Chaplain Activities. See Appendix 6.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT Name Rank and Service Title

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APPENDIXES:

1 — Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons ( May be provided by the G-3.)

2 — Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained U.S. Personnel

3 — Finance and Disbursing (Provided by the comptroller.) 4 — Legal (Provided by the SJA.) 5 — Military Postal Services (Provided by the FSSG.) 6 — Chaplain Activities (Provided by the chaplain.)

OFFICIAL: s/ Name Rank and Service Title

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Appendix E

66

References and Notes On References

JP 1-0, Joint Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms JP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations MCWP 3-40.1, Marine Air Ground Task Force Command and Control. MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process MCRP 4-11.8C, Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP 5-12A), Operational Terms and Graphics. MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3-1, Command and Staff Action Operational Handbook (OH) 1-1 Operational Functions of the G-1/S-1 Marine Corps School (MCS) 1-1 Publication, Personnel, 1955 Field Manual (FM) 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield Field Manual (FM) 12-6, Personnel Doctrine Department of Defense Instruction 1300.18, Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures.

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The recently approved MCWP 3-40.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control, contains the only significant treatment of the G-1 in current Marine Corps doctrine. It is designed as a replacement for the staff

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03A, Joint Operations and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3150.13, Joint Reporting Structure – Personnel Manual. Marine Corps Order (MCO), P3040.4E, Marine Corps Casualty Procedures Manual MCO P5000.14D, Marine Corps Administrative Procedures (MCAP) [ Draft] MCO P1700.24B, Marine Corps Personal Services Manual Notes This list of references is not exhaustive. It only lists those references most useful in preparing this pamphlet. Draft MCO P5000.14D, Marine Corps Administrative Procedures, provides a much more complete lists of references that are most pertinent to the personnel section. NAVMC 2761, Catalog of Publications, contains a comprehensive list of all publications currently available within the Department of the Navy. There are some joint publications and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals (CJCSM) that impact G-1 tasks, but there is precious little written in Marine Corps publications for the G-1 directly. This pamphlet is in part an effort to address this deficiency. Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations, is the capstone joint publication on J-1. Its major focus is on integrating personnel into a joint task force headquarters. All G-1 staff members need to read it, but should not expect to find too much that will be immediately helpful. It will give the reader a good idea of what personnel officers on a joint staff consider important. The other joint publications that fall under JP 1-0 are written for the chaplain, legal, and financial specialists.

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organization and functioning portions of the venerable, but dated FMFM 3-1. (The planning portions of 3-1 had already been superceded with the publication of MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, in 2000.) MCWP 3-40.1’s listing of G-1/S-1 responsibilities served as the basis for part II of this pamphlet. All G-1 staff members need to read this publication in its entirety. Obsolete Marine Corps doctrinal and instructional publications provide excellent perspective into the role and functions of the G-1. Publications like the Staff Manual ( 1948 or 1956 version) or Marine Corps School (MCS) 1-1 publication, Personnel, of 1955 are insightful. Copies are available in the stacks of the General Alfred M. Gray Research Center in Quantico. Anyone interested in the development, functions, and purpose of the MAGTF G-1 should peruse these out-of-date publications. The Army publishes much doctrine and has not neglected their G-1s. FM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine, is voluminous but remarkably little is of any help to the MAGTF G-1. The Army simply has a very different organizational and operational philosophy. Marines can safely skip FM 12-6.

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Appendix F

G-1 Lessons Learned From Operation Iraqi Freedom I

Ongoing operations in the Middle East have yielded a crop of lessons learned for the G-1. This appendix contains a summary of some of the more significant lessons from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). It is neither complete nor representative. In the interest of brevity, only those lessons that bear directly on the MAGTF G-1 are included. Many lessons remain in the purview of HQMC and the Supporting Establishment. They will be addressed at that level based on input from the Operating Forces. Those lessons are not included. • Delegate award approval authority early in the planning process.

Award approval authority is typically granted at a lower level during wartime. The MAGTF G-1 should seek this authority for his commander as soon as possible to facilitate the prompt recognition of valor and meritorious service.

• Publish an Annex E to the operation order as soon as practicable. The

lack of an Annex E in some operations orders left subordinate personnel officers scrambling to gather the information and guidance necessary to develop their own personnel plans. Matters such as the replacement system, in-transit tracking, casualty procedures, and other personnel issues, although primarily web-based, still need to be identified before operations begin. • Provide unit liaison officers with sufficient communications assets in

theater hospitals. Marines in OIF did place liaison officers with the various theater hospitals. Unfortunately, they often lacked sufficient communications assets and work spaces to accomplish their mission. Many were forced to rely on borrowing the resources they needed from

71

• Do not reassign postal or disbursing Marines from the combat service support element to the command element on the eve of a deployment. One subordinate Marine amphibious brigade deployed for OIF without its brigade service support group (BSSG). Shortly, before leaving the states,

sister Service liaison officers. This situation compounded the casualty reporting and tracking challenge. Marine hospital liaison officers often had the correct information about Marine casualties but lacked the means to transmit it.

• “Reach back” personnel administration worked. 5,000 Marine

administers deployed to Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Only 2,000 deployed for OIF. This reduction in the administrative footprint was executed with no pause in unit diary reporting or other required administrative functions. Despite this initial success much work remains to be done in reach back procedures and connectivity. Many forward deployed administrators faced shortfalls in communications and computer equipment that inhibited their ability to reach back. The G-1 will have to work more closely with the G-6 to avoid similar problems in the future as reach back admin will doubtlessly become the norm.

• Bring sufficient mail handlers. Timely delivery of mail was a problem

for Marines in OIF. Part of the problem was the quick tempo of the operation and diversion of precious logistics assets to higher priorities. But a lack of Marines qualified for postal operations also factored into the problem of delivering large amounts of mail to a fast moving force. The average Marine in OIF received mail at the rate of 2.4 pounds per day. Personnel planners must have sufficient numbers of mail handlers ready to receive, sort, and distribute mail in such large amounts in a timely manner.

• Disbursing Marines are a force multiplier. Although they normally do

not deploy at a level below the Marine expeditionary unit, during OIF disbursing Marines were assigned in direct support of ground combat element down to the battalion. This was necessary because of the dispersed nature of operations in Iraq and the requirement to provide quick payment for goods and services purchased from the local population or provide small “solaria” payments as an expression of sympathy or remorse to the families of native civilian casualties. Disbursing Marines also provided critical expertise in handling huge amounts of captured Iraqi and U. S. currency.

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some of the required postal and disbursing Marines from the BSSG were attached directly to the MAGTF G-1. The G-1 had neither the experience nor resources necessary to accommodate this unanticipated force structure. The postal and disbursing Marines were unfamiliar with working as a part of the command element. Naturally, Marine ingenuity and resources prevailed, but the mission was not accomplished as efficiently as it might have if these subject matter experts had fought as they trained.

• Casualty reporting procedures need improvement. Marines in OIF

experienced significant difficulty in getting casualty information from the theater of operation to the next of kin through official channels. Often next of kin received casualty information through back channels or directly via embedded journalists on broadcast media. In some cases erroneous information reached next of kin through casualty assistance officers. This caused hardship for family members and embarrassment for the Marine Corps. While much of the solution to this problem remains outside of the Operational Forces, the MAGTF G-1 can take steps to report casualties in a timely manner. The record of emergency data information must be current, personnel administrators must rehearse casualty reporting procedures, all hands should understand how to report casualties and the status of casualties tracked within the command. This is especially important for attached Navy and other Service units which have no familiarity with Marine Corps casualty procedures and may not be prepared to provide timely casualty information.

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Appendix G Glossary

Section I Acronyms

Note: Acronyms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes, and other similar developments. The following publications are authoritative sources for official military acronyms:

1. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

2. MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. AC/S assistant chief of staff ADMINORD administrative order ADMINPLAN administrative plan AO area of operation AT/FP antiterrorist/force protection ByDir by direction C2 command and control C4 command, control, communications, and computers CACO casualty assistance calls officer CAOC combined air operations center/casualty assistance operations center CASFAMTM casualty/family assistance team CASREP casualty report CBAE commander’s battlespace area evaluation CCIR commander’s critical information requirements CIS communications and information systems

s CISO communications and information system

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officer; counterintelligence staff officer CJCSM Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual CMCC (*) classified material control center COA course of action COC combat operations center (referred to as the “BUG” in I MEF during OIF I) CONUS continental United States EEFI essential elements of friendly information EPW enemy prisoner of war FAP fleet assistance program FFIR friendly force information requirements FOS future operations section FRAGO fragmentary order FSA family separation allowance GCE ground combat element HQMC Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps IGO independent governmental organization INFOREQ information requested as to IO information operations, investigating officer IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace IR intelligence requirement ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance JFC joint force commander JP joint publication JPERSTAT(*) joint personnel status and casualty report JRC joint reception center JTF joint task force JUMPS joint uniform military pay system KIA killed in action MAA mission area analysis

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MACE Marine expeditionary force augmentation command element MACO marshalling area control officer MEF Marine expeditionary force MCCC Marine Corps Command Center MCCS Marine Corps Community Services (current term for MWR) MCMS Marine Corps mobilization station MCDP Marine Corps doctrinal publication MCG Marine Corps Gazette MAGTF Marine air-ground task force MCPDS Marine Corps Publications Distribution System MCPP Marine Corps Planning Process MCRP Marine Corps reference publication MCTFS Marine Corps Total Force System MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication MMS manpower management system MP military police/manpower plans @ M&RA, HQMC MOS military occupational specialty MSC major subordinate command/Military Sealift Command MSTP MAGTF Staff Training Program MWR morale, welfare, and recreation NGO nongovernmental organization OH operational handbook/on hand OPP offload preparation party OPT operational planning team PCR personnel casualty report POW prisoner of war R2P2 rapid response planning process SA situational awareness SOP standing operating procedure SWO senior watch officer SNCO staff noncommissioned officer TEEP (*) training exercise employment plan

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UMCC unit movement control center USO United Service Organizations (*) Denotes acronyms that do not appear in either source reference.

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Section II Definitions

Note: Definitions of military terms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes, and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official military definitions of military terms:

1. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

2. MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

A accountability—(JP 1-02) The obligation imposed by law or lawful order or regulation on an officer or other person for keeping accurate record of property, documents, or funds. The person having this obligation may or may not have actual possession of the property, documents, or funds. Accountability is concerned primarily with records, while responsibility is concerned primarily with custody, care, and safekeeping.

activation—(JP 1-02) Order to active duty (other than for training) in the Federal service. activation order—(MCRP 5-12C) An order issued by a MARFOR commander to activate a Marine air-ground task force for planning and/or operations. It contains the mission, troop list, date of activation for planning, date of activation for operations, designation of the MAGTF commander, command and control guidance, delegation of authority, command relationships, reporting instructions, administration instructions, special instructions, and deactivation instructions. administrative control—(JP 1-02) Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other

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matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON.

administrative map—(JP 1-02) A map that contains graphically recorded information pertaining to administrative matters, such as supply and evacuation installations, personnel installations, medical facilities, collecting points for stragglers and enemy prisoners of war, train bivouacs, service and maintenance areas, main supply roads, traffic circulation, boundaries, and other details necessary to show the administrative situation.

administrative order—(JP 1-02),(DOD, NATO) An order covering traffic, supplies, maintenance, evacuation, personnel, and other administrative details. adjutant—(MCRP 5-12C)An officer who performs the general duties of a special staff officer under the cognizance of the G-1/S-1 with respect to personnel administration and office management. appendix—(JP 1-02) A document appended to an annex of an operation order, operation plan, or other document to clarify or to give further details.

B backfill—(JP 1-02) Reserve Component units and individuals recalled to replace deploying active units and/or individuals in the continental United States and outside the continental United States.

billet—(JP 1-02) 1. Shelter for troops. 2. To quarter troops. 3. A personnel position or assignment that may be filled by one person.

C casualty—(JP 1-02) Any person who is lost to the organization by having been declared dead, duty status - whereabouts unknown, missing, ill, or injured. See also casualty category; casualty status; casualty type; duty status - whereabouts unknown; hostile casualty; nonhostile casualty.

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casualty category—(JP 1-02) A term used to specifically classify a casualty for reporting purposes based upon the casualty type and the casualty status. Casualty categories include killed in action, died of wounds received in action, and wounded in action. casualty collection—(MCRP 5-12C) The assembly of casualties at collection and treatment sites. It includes protection from further injury while awaiting evacuation to the next level of care. Planning for casualty collection points must include site selection and manning. casualty evacuation—(JP 1-02) The movement of casualties. It includes movement both to and between medical treatment facilities. Any vehicle may be used to evacuate casualties. Also called CASEVAC. (MCRP 5-12C) The movement of the sick, wounded, or injured. It begins at the point of injury or the onset of disease. It includes movement both to and between medical treatment facilities. All units have an evacuation capability. Any vehicle may be used to evacuate casualties. If a medical vehicle is not used it should be replaced with one at the first opportunity. Similarly, aeromedical evacuation should replace surface evacuation at the first opportunity.

casualty status—(JP 1-02) A term used to classify a casualty for reporting purposes. There are seven casualty statuses: (1) deceased; (2) duty status - whereabouts unknown; (3) missing; (4) very seriously ill or injured; (5) seriously ill or injured; (6) incapacitating illness or injury; and (7) not seriously injured. casualty treatment—(MCRP 5-12C) Casualty treatment includes triage and all levels of care from self-aid or buddy-aid through resuscitative care. casualty type—(JP 1-02) A term used to identify a casualty for reporting purposes as either a hostile casualty or a nonhostile casualty. centralized control—(MCRP 5-12C) In military operations, a mode of battlespace management in which one echelon of command exercises total authority and direction of all aspects of one or more warfighting functions. It is a method of control where detailed orders are issued and total unity of action is the overriding consideration. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction—(JP 1-02) A replacement document for all types of correspondence containing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) policy and guidance that does not involve the employment of forces. An instruction is of indefinite duration

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and is applicable to external agencies or both the Joint Staff and external agencies. It remains in effect until superseded, rescinded, or otherwise canceled. CJCS Instructions, unlike joint publications, will not contain joint doctrine and/or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Terminology used in these publications will be consistent with JP 1-02. Also called CJCSI. See also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual—(JP 1-02) A document containing detailed procedures for performing specific tasks that do not involve the employment of forces. A manual is of indefinite duration and is applicable to external agencies or both the Joint Staff and external agencies. It may supplement a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction or stand alone and remains in effect until superseded, rescinded, or otherwise canceled. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals, unlike joint publications, will not contain joint doctrine and/or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Terminology used in these publications will be consistent with JP 1-02. Also called CJCSM. See also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction.

civilian internee—(JP 1-02) 1. A civilian who is interned during armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or for protection or because he or she has committed an offense against the detaining power. 2. A term used to refer to persons interned and protected in accordance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention). Also called CI.

combat and operational stress—(JP 1-02) The expected and predictable emotional, intellectual, physical, and/or behavioral reactions of Service members who have been exposed to stressful events in war or military operations other than war. Combat stress reactions vary in quality and severity as a function of operational conditions, such as intensity, duration, rules of engagement, leadership, effective communication, unit morale, unit cohesion, and perceived importance of the mission. command and control—(JP 1-02.) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also in Marine Corps usage, the means

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coordination—(JP 1-02) The action necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships between separate organizations located in the same area. Coordination may include such matters as fire support, emergency

by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Also called C2. command information—(JP 1-02) Communication by a military organization with Service members, civilian employees, retirees, and family members of the organization that creates an awareness of the organization's goals, informs them of significant developments affecting them and the organization, increases their effectiveness as ambassadors of the organization, and keeps them informed about what is going on in the organization. Also called internal information.

command post—(JP 1-02) (DOD, NATO) A unit's or subunit's headquarters where the commander and the staff perform their activities. In combat, a unit's or subunit's headquarters is often divided into echelons; the echelon in which the unit or subunit commander is located or from which such commander operates is called a command post. Also called CP. commander's battlespace area evaluation—(MCRP 5-12C) A methodology that supports the entire planning and decisionmaking process by aiding the commander in the visualization, development, assessment, integration, translation, and final transmission of knowledge to the staff and planning team. Also called CBAE. commander's critical information requirements—(JP 1-02) A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decisionmaking process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. Also called CCIR.

commander's estimate of the situation—(JP 1-02) A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken in order to accomplish the mission. A commander's estimate that considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation. constraint(s)—(JP 1-02) Something which must be done that limits freedom of action.

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defense measures, area intelligence, and other situations in which coordination is considered necessary. course of action—(JP 1-02) 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission.

3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. Also called COA.

course of action development—(JP 1-02) The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander's estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting databases.

critical information—(JP 1-02) Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment

D deceased—(JP 1-02) A casualty status applicable to a person who is either known to have died, determined to have died on the basis of conclusive evidence, or declared to be dead on the basis of a presumptive finding of death. The recovery of remains is not a prerequisite to determining or declaring a person deceased. decision point—(MCRP 5-12C) An event, area, or point in the battlespace where and when the friendly commander will make a critical decision. died of wounds received in action—(JP 1-02) A casualty category applicable to a hostile casualty, other than the victim of a terrorist activity,

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who dies of wounds or other injuries received in action after having reached a medical treatment facility. Also called DWRIA.

disease and nonbattle injury casualty—(JP 1-02) A person who is not a battle casualty but who is lost to the organization by reason of disease or injury, including persons dying of disease or injury, by reason of being missing where the absence does not appear to be voluntary, or due to enemy action or being interned. Also called DNBI casualty.

disposition —(JP 1-02) (DOD, NATO) 1. Distribution of the elements of a command within an area; usually the exact location of each unit headquarters and the deployment of the forces subordinate to it. 2. A prescribed arrangement of the stations to be occupied by the several formations and single ships of a fleet, or major subdivisions of a fleet, for any purpose, such as cruising, approach, maintaining contact, or battle. 3. A prescribed arrangement of all the tactical units composing a flight or group of aircraft. See also deployment; dispersion. 4. (DOD only) The removal of a patient from a medical treatment facility by reason of return to duty, transfer to another treatment facility, death, or other termination of medical case.

doctrine— (JP 1-02) Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See also multinational doctrine; joint doctrine; multi-Service doctrine.

duty status - whereabouts unknown—(JP 1-02) A transitory casualty status, applicable only to military personnel, that is used when the responsible commander suspects the member may be a casualty whose absence is involuntary, but does not feel sufficient evidence currently exists to make a definite determination of missing or deceased. Also called DUSTWUN.

E essential elements of friendly information—(JP 1-02) Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about

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specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called EEFI.

evacuee—(JP 1-02) A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. executive staff—(MCRP 5-12C) Normally, the executive staff consists of the executive officer, S-1 (personnel), S-2 (intelligence), S-3 (operations and training), S-4 (logistics), and S-6 (communications and information systems). However, aviation and combat service support organizations may have additional executive staff officers to cover unique functions.

F filler personnel—(JP 1-02) Individuals of suitable grade and skill initially required to bring a unit or organization to its authorized strength. fingerprint—(MCRP 5-12C) The document which substantiates the inclusive personnel, square, and cube of a representative MAGTF, and serves as a comparison model for derivative studies. fly-in echelon—(JP 1-02.) Airlifted forces and equipment of the MAGTF and Navy support element plus aircraft and personnel arriving in the flight ferry of the aviation combat element. Also called FIE. force movement control center—(JP 1-02) A temporary organization activated by the Marine air-ground task force to control and coordinate all deployment support activities. Also called FMCC. friendly force information requirements—(MCRP 5-12C) Information the commander needs about friendly forces in order to develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the circumstances, information on unit location, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logistics status could become a friendly force information requirement. Also called FFIR.

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G

general staff—(JP 1-02) A group of officers in the headquarters of Army or Marine divisions, Marine brigades, and aircraft wings, or similar or larger units that assist their commanders in planning, coordinating, and supervising operations. A general staff may consist of four or more principal functional sections: personnel (G-1), military intelligence (G-2), operations and training (G-3), logistics (G-4), and (in Army organizations) civil affairs and military government (G-5). (A particular section may be added or eliminated by the commander, dependent upon the need that has been demonstrated.) The comparable Air Force staff is found in the wing and larger units, with sections designated personnel, operations, etc. G-2 Air and G-3 Air are Army officers assigned to G-2 or G-3 at division, corps, and Army headquarters level who assist in planning and coordinating joint operations of ground and air units. Naval staffs ordinarily are not organized on these lines, but when they are, they are designated N-1, N-2, etc. Similarly, a joint staff may be designated J-1, J-2, etc. In Army brigades and smaller units and in Marine Corps units smaller than a brigade or aircraft wing, staff sections are designated S-1, S-2, etc., with corresponding duties; referred to as a unit staff in the Army and as an executive staff in the Marine Corps.

H

hostile casualty—(JP 1-02) A person who is the victim of a terrorist activity or who becomes a casualty "in action." "In action" characterizes the casualty as having been the direct result of hostile action, sustained in combat or relating thereto, or sustained going to or returning from a combat mission provided that the occurrence was directly related to hostile action. Included are persons killed or wounded mistakenly or accidentally by friendly fire directed at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force. However, not to be considered as sustained in action and not to be interpreted as hostile casualties are injuries or death due to the elements, self-inflicted wounds, combat fatigue, and except in unusual cases, wounds or death inflicted by a friendly force while the individual is in an absent-without-leave, deserter, or dropped-from-rolls status or is voluntarily absent from a place of duty.

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I

implied tasks—(MCRP 5-12C) Tasks derived from a mission order that, while not specifically stated, must be completed to accomplish the overall mission. intelligence preparation of the battlespace—(JP 1-02) An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. (MCRP 12-5A.) In Marine Corps usage, the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called IPB. intelligence requirement—(JP 1-02) 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the battlespace or threat forces. (MCRP 5-12C) 3. In Marine Corps usage, questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to which a commander requires to make sound decisions. individual mobilization augmentee—(JP 1-02) An individual reservist attending drills who receives training and is preassigned to an Active Component organization, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Individual mobilization augmentees train on a part-time basis with these organizations to prepare for mobilization. Inactive duty training for individual mobilization augmentees is decided by component policy and can vary from 0 to 48 drills a year. Also called IMA.

isolated personnel—(JP 1-02) Military or civilian personnel separated from their unit or organization in an environment requiring them to survive, evade, or escape while awaiting rescue or recovery. See also combat search and rescue; search and rescue.

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J

joint doctrine—(JP 1-02) Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Military Departments in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is authoritative and, as such, joint doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. It will be promulgated by or for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands and Services.

joint duty assignment—(JP 1-02) An assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service, joint, or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified or specified command. Also called JDA.

joint force commander—(JP 1-02) A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. joint task force—(JP 1-02)A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. joint mortuary affairs office—(JP 1-02) Plans and executes all mortuary affairs programs within a theater. Provides guidance to facilitate the conduct of all mortuary programs and to maintain data (as required) pertaining to recovery, identification, and disposition of all US dead and missing in the assigned theater. Serves as the central clearing point for all mortuary affairs and monitors the deceased and missing personal effects program. Also called JMAO.

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System—(JP 1-02) A system that provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and combatant command-level commanders and their staffs. It is

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designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations.

joint operation planning process - (JP 1-02) A coordinated Joint Staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission.

joint personnel training and tracking activity—(JP 1-02) The continental US center established (upon request of the supported combatant commander) to facilitate the reception, accountability, processing, training, and onward movement of both military and civilian individual augmentees preparing for overseas movement to support a joint military operation. Also called JPTTA.

joint publication—(JP 1-02) A publication containing joint doctrine and/or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures that involves the employment of forces prepared under the cognizance of Joint Staff directorates and applicable to the Military Departments, combatant commands, and other authorized agencies. It is approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands and Services. Also called JP.

joint reception center—(JP 1-02) The center established in the operational area (per direction of the joint force commander), with responsibility for the reception, accountability, training, processing, of military and civilian individual augmentees upon their arrival in the operational area. Also the center where augmentees will normally be outprocessed through upon departure from the operational area. Also called JRC.

joint reception complex—(JP 1-02) The group of nodes (air and/or sea) designated by the supported combatant command, in coordination with the host nation and United States Transportation Command, that receives, processes, services, supports, and facilitates onward movement of personnel, equipment, materiel, and units deploying into, out of, or within a theater line of communications.

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joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration—(JP 1-02) A phase of joint force projection occurring in the operational area. This phase comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. Also called JRSOI.

K killed in action—(JP 1-02) A casualty category applicable to a hostile casualty, other than the victim of a terrorist activity, who is killed outright or who dies as a result of wounds or other injuries before reaching a medical treatment facility. Also called KIA.

M Marine Corps Planning Process—(MCRP 5-12C)A six-step methodology which helps organize the thought processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of command and supports the establishment and maintenance of tempo. The six steps consist of mission analysis, course of action development, course of action analysis, comparison/decision, orders development, and transition. mass casualty—(JP 1-02) Any large number of casualties produced in a relatively short period of time, usually as the result of a single incident such as a military aircraft accident, hurricane, flood, earthquake, or armed attack that exceeds local logistic support capabilities..

medical evacuees—(JP 1-02) Personnel who are wounded, injured, or ill and must be moved to or between medical facilities.

missing—(JP 1-02) A casualty status for which the United States Code provides statutory guidance concerning missing members of the Military Services. Excluded are personnel who are in an absent without leave, deserter, or dropped-from-rolls status. A person declared missing is categorized as follows. a. beleaguered—The casualty is a member of an organized element that has been surrounded by a hostile force to prevent

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escape of its members. b. besieged—The casualty is a member of an organized element that has been surrounded by a hostile force, compelling it to surrender. c. captured—The casualty has been seized as the result of action of an unfriendly military or paramilitary force in a foreign country. d. detained—The casualty is prevented from proceeding or is restrained in custody for alleged violation of international law or other reason claimed by the government or group under which the person is being held. e. interned—The casualty is definitely known to have been taken into custody of a nonbelligerent foreign power as the result of and for reasons arising out of any armed conflict in which the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged. f. missing—The casualty is not present at his or her duty location due to apparent involuntary reasons and whose location is unknown. g. missing in action—The casualty is a hostile casualty, other than the victim of a terrorist activity, who is not present at his or her duty location due to apparent involuntary reasons and whose location is unknown. Also called MIA.

mobilization—(JP 1-02) 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial mobilization. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories. a. selective mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. c. full mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, as well as all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an

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external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months. d. total mobilization—Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Also called MOB.

N nonhostile casualty—(JP 1-02) A person who becomes a casualty due to circumstances not directly attributable to hostile action or terrorist activity. Casualties due to the elements, self-inflicted wounds, and combat fatigue are nonhostile casualties. Also called NHCS.

O operation annexes—(JP 1-02) Those amplifying instructions that are of such a nature, or are so voluminous or technical, as to make their inclusion in the body of the plan or order undesirable.

operation order—(JP 1-02) A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD.

operation plan—(JP 1-02) Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operational Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN—An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order

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personnel recovery—(JP 1-02) The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from

(OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the combatant commander's strategic concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. Plans will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. b. CONPLAN—An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the combatant commander's strategic concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD—A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces.

order—(JP 1-02) (DOD, NATO) A communication, written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate. (DOD only) In a broad sense, the terms "order" and "command" are synonymous. However, an order implies discretion as to the details of execution whereas a command does not. operational planning team—(MCRP 5-12C) A group built around the future operations section which integrates the staff representatives and resources. The operational planning team may have representatives or augmentation from each of the standard staff sections, the six warfighting functions, staff liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also called OPT.

P parallel planning—(MCRP 5-12C) Planning by parallel chains of command refers to the planning procedures resulting from the close and continuous coordination necessary between corresponding naval and troop echelons. personnel—(JP 1-02) Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission.

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Ready Reserve—(JP 1-02) The Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive National Guard liable for active duty as prescribed by law (US Code, title 10 (JP 1-02), sections 10142, 12301, and 12302).

uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. That includes US, allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary, and others as designated by the National Command Authorities (term no longer used—substitute President and the Secretary of Defense). Personnel recovery (PR) is the umbrella term for operations that are focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harm's way. PR includes but is not limited to theater search and rescue; combat search and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; evasion and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. PR can occur through military action, action by nongovernmental organizations, other US Government-approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through any of these.

priority intelligence requirements—(JP 1-02) Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision making. Also called PIRs.

prisoner of war—(JP 1-02) A detained person as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant's privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts which do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, a prisoner of war may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories who has fallen into the power of the enemy: a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces. Also called POW or PW.

R

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rest and recuperation—(JP 1-02) The withdrawal of individuals from combat or duty in a combat area for short periods of rest and recuperation. Also called R&R. restraint(s)—(MCRP 5-12C) Something which is prohibited that limits freedom of action. retained personnel—(JP 1-02) Enemy personnel who come within any of the categories below are eligible to be certified as retained personnel. a. Medical personnel exclusively engaged in the: (1) Search for collection, transport, or treatment of the wounded or sick; (2) Prevention of disease; and/or (3) Staff administration of medical units and establishments exclusively. b. Chaplains attached to enemy armed forces. c. Staff of national Red Cross societies and other voluntary aid societies duly recognized and authorized by their governments. The staffs of such societies must be subject to military laws and regulations. Also called RP.

S

shortfall—(JP 1-02) The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a combatant commander for planning, that would adversely affect the command's ability to accomplish its mission.

staff estimates—(JP 1-02) Assessments of courses of action by the various staff elements of a command that serve as the foundation of the commander's estimate.

staff supervision—(JP 1-02) The process of advising other staff officers and individuals subordinate to the commander of the commander's plans and policies, interpreting those plans and policies, assisting such subordinates in carrying them out, determining the extent to which they are being followed, and advising the commander thereof.

straggler—(JP 1-02)(DOD, NATO) 1. Any personnel, vehicles, ships, or aircraft which, without apparent purpose or assigned mission, become separated from their unit, column, or formation. 2. A ship separated from its convoy by more than 5 nautical miles, through inability to keep up, and

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unable to rejoin before dark, or over 10 nautical miles from its convoy whether or not it can rejoin before dark.

T task organization—1. In the Navy, an organization which assigns to responsible commanders the means with which to accomplish their assigned tasks in any planned action. (JP 1-02) 2. An organization table pertaining to a specific naval directive. (MCRP 5-12C) 3. In the Marine Corps, a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. Task organization involves the distribution of available assets to subordinate control headquarters by attachment or by placing assets in direct support or under the operational control of the subordinate. tempo—(MCRP 5-12C) The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time. temporary hospitalization—(MCRP 5-12C) Hospitalization services which provide treatment facilities for holding the sick, wounded, and injured for a limited time. This usually does not exceed 96 hours. Within the Fleet Marine Force, only the medical battalion has the staff and equipment to provide temporary hospitalization. times—(JP 1-02) (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (Zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day. a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by

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the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning. b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. c. F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. d. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. e. H-hour (amphibious operations). For amphibious operations, the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone, and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations. f. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. g. L-hour (amphibious operations). In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the landing zone. h. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. I. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. j. R-day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation. k. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000). l. T-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup). m. W-day. Declared by the National Command Authorities, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).

time-phased force and deployment data—(JP 1-02) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD.

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U United States Prisoner of War Information Center—(JP 1-02) The national center of information in the United States for enemy and US prisoners of war.

V

validate—(JP 1-02) Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and US Transportation Command that all the information records in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error-free for automation purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs.

W

wounded in action—(JP 1-02) A casualty category applicable to a hostile casualty, other than the victim of a terrorist activity, who has incurred an injury due to an external agent or cause. The term encompasses all kinds of wounds and other injuries incurred in action, whether there is a piercing of the body, as in a penetration or perforated wound, or none, as in the contused wound. These include fractures, burns, blast concussions, all effects of biological and chemical warfare agents, and the effects of an exposure to ionizing radiation or any other destructive weapon or agent. The hostile casualty's status may be categorized as "very seriously ill or injured," "seriously ill or injured," "incapacitating illness or injury," or "not seriously injured." Also called WIA.

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