RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY3000F Danville Boulevard #268Alamo, California 94507Plaintiff in Pro Per

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA

RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

Plaintiff,v.

ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS, an individual, VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS, an individual and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, inclusive.

Defendants.__________________________________

ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS, an individual, VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS, an individual

Cross-Complainants

v.

RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an entity, and RAVI REDDY, an individual and DOES 1 through 100

Cross-Defendants

______________________

CASE NO. C13-02412

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA AND MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Original Action Filed: November 15, 2013

Filed Concurrently With Declaration of Ravi Reddy

TO DEFENDANTS ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS AND VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS AND

THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on _________________ or on the date allocated by the

entitled Court, located at Superior Court – Martinez, 725 Court Street, Room 103,

Martinez, CA 94553, PLAINTIFF RSR DEVELOPMENT will move this Court pursuant

to California Code of Civil of Civil Procedure under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify

the subpoena duces tecum , and will and hereby do, move for a protective order against

the production of business records. Notice of this motion shall be given to the witness and

deposition officer at least five days prior to production. The motion will be based on this

notice of motion, on the declaration of Ravi Reddy and the memorandum of points and

authorities served and filed herewith, on the papers and records on file herein, and on such

oral and documentary evidence as may be presented on the hearing of the motion.

A. INTRODUCTION

1. On January 24 2014, Defendants served Plaintiffs and Coldwell Banker the deposition

subpoena for production of business records. Plaintiff seeks an order to quash the

deposition notice and a protective order pursuant to California Code of Civil of Civil

Procedure Section 1985.3 (g): “ Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a

subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces

tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1

to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum. No witness or deposition officer shall be

required to produce personal records after receipt of notice that the motion has been

brought by a consumer, except upon order of the court.” CCP §1985.3(g).

2. A motion to quash is the procedurally appropriate method of testing the validity of a subpoena

duces tecum, for an order made for discovery of documents without showing of good cause,

or challenging a request for documents which is not particularized [see People ex rel. Dept. of

Public Works v. Younger (1970) 5 Cal. App. 3d 575, 579, 86 Cal. Rptr. 237 (prior to adoption

of Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1); Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal. App.

2d 61, 67-68, 77 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; Flora Crane Serv., Inc. v. Superior Court (1965) 234 Cal.

App. 2d 767, 787, 45 Cal. Rptr. 79] .

3. Plaintiff shall move the Court for a protective order prohibiting the production of

consumer records. Plaintiff shall also move the Court for a protective order prohibiting

the taking of any third party witness deposition. This Motion is made on the grounds to

protect Plaintiffs’ privacy interest in his bank records and the privacy rights of third

parties financial records.

4. Defendants cannot demonstrate the requisite compelling state interest to permit the

invasion of those privacy rights the court should quash the subpoenas.

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B. FACTS

5. The Parties to this action are as follow: Plaintiff, RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY is

a business entity within the state of California. RAVI REDDY, is President and Owner

dba as RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. Defendant, ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS

is an individual attorney practicing at Van Blois & Associates in Oakland California.

Defendant, VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS is an individual, married to ROBERT LEWIS VAN

BLOIS. Mr. and Mrs. VAN BLOIS own the property that is the subject of this dispute as

joint tenants.

6. The parties entered into a purchase agreement on June 13th 2013 for the sale of

property generally referred to as the Happy Valley property.

7. This case involves a dispute over the purchase agreement between the parties for the

purchase said property to Plaintiff.

8. On October 4th 2013 Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant Robert Van Blois’ law

office demanding that he sign a Cancellation of Contract by October 09th 2013 or that he

(Van Blois) would commence litigation.

9. Plaintiff’s lawyer wrote the Defendants on October 8th 2013 and informed Defendants that

the funds were in escrow and Plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform.

10. Specifically, on October 8th 2013 attorney Anderson informed Defendant Van Blois that

“escrow number FSJP-6061300928 has been opened at Chicago Title Company and that

the full amount of the property's purchase price is being transferred into escrow at this

time”.

11. Defendants refused to perform and continuess to refuse to perform.

12. Plaintiff filed a Complaint on November 15th 2013 on the causes of specific performance,

breach of contract, and interference with prospective economic relations.

13. Defendants answered the Complaint and Cross Complained for quiet title to the property

on January 13th 2014.

14. Defendants unilaterally served Plaintiff with an ex parte Notice to Compel Deposition and for the

Production of Documents on December 23rd 2013. Defendants failed to meet and confer with

Plaintiff regarding the ex parte issuance of the Notice of Deposition.

15. On January 24th 2014 Defendants unilaterally served Plaintiff and third party Coldwell Bankers

with a Deposition Subpoena for the Production of Business Records. Defendants failed to meet

and confer with Plaintiff regarding the issuance of the Deposition Subpoena for the Production of

Business Records.

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16. Plaintiff has the necessary funds to purchase the property as of the date of this motion. Plaintiff

remains ready, willing, and able to perform. Any request therefore by Defendants for

financial records is rendered moot and protected under Article I, Section 1 of the

California Constitution.

C. AN ORDER TO QUASH OR MODIFY A SUBPOENA IS A PROPER MEANS BY

WHICH PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF PRIVACY MAY BE PROTECTED

17. Parties can preclude, limit or control and condition discovery if it is unduly burdensome,

expensive or intrusive, by obtaining a protective order. Concerning depositions and

document requests directed to parties, a court is allowed to "make any order that justice

requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from

unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense."

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(b), 2031.060(b).

18. When a subpoena requires a witness to attend a deposition or produce documents, that

witness or any party, or any consumer whose records are subject to the subpoena, may

move to quash the subpoena in its entirety or to modify its terms. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

1987.1, 1985.3. 

19. Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution recognizes an individual’s right to

privacy. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130. The right

contained in the California Constitution is limited to natural persons and does not extend

to corporations. Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp.(1983) 147 Ca.App.3d 770, 791.

20. Respecting the right to privacy in the California Constitution is also a valid ground upon

which to quash the deposition notice and the request for the production of business

documents.. This right covers matters such as personal finances (Valley Bank of Nevada v.

Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 652 (1975).

21. Business records is further broadly interpreted to include documents such as journals,

account books, reports, correspondence and the like as well as electronically stored

information about the business entity. Urban Pac. Equities Corp. v. Sup. Court. (1997) 59

Cal.App.4th 688, 692-93; cal. Code civ. Proc. § 2020.410(a).

22. Plaintiff’s financial files are within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy, set forth

under Article I, Section 1 of California’s Constitution, and this protection applies to such

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records. Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844; Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55

Cal.App.4th 1379

23. The standard applicable to general discovery, i.e. that items need only be reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is inapplicable to the discovery

of items protected by a right to privacy in which the threshold requirement is that such

items must be directly relevant. .

24. For matters coming within the right to privacy, a court must grant a protective order

unless disclosure is found to further a "compelling" state purpose and that the purpose

could not be achieved through less intrusive means. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 844

(1978).

25. When discovery is used to seek information from a non-party in a California lawsuit,

California courts utilize deposition subpoenas to bring the non-party within the purview of

the court. The subpoena is used to compel the non-party’s attendance, testimony, or

production of documents. Cal. Code civ. Proc. §§2020.010(a)(1), 2025.280(b); Terry v.

SLICO(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 352, 357

26. The right to subpoena third party witnesses is not absolute. The right to privacy may

pertain to one of the parties to the action or a third person non-party. Robert I. Weil et al.,

Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial § 8:296 (2013). Information involving a non-party

may be within the recognized zone of privacy protected from discovery in an action

between other parties. Coito v. Sup. Ct. (State of Calif.) (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 502.

27. The court may make whatever orders are appropriate to protect any party, witness or

consumer from “un-reasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations

of the right of privacy of the person.” Cal. Code civ. Proc. §§ 1985.3(g), 1985.6(f)(4).

28. In ruling on a motion for protective order, even in the case of an initial deposition, the trial

court must consider the "particular facts" of the case. ( Greyhound Corp. v. Superior

Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 382-383.) The court exercises wide discretion, and may

grant a motion if it concludes that a protective order is necessary to limit attempted

discovery which, while it may come within the rules established by other code sections,

offends the sense of justice and reason. Weisman v. Bower (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1231,

1238.

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29. Thus, the moving party merely has to make a showing "good cause" for a court to exercise

its discretion in granting a protective order. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. g 2025.210; S. Cal.

Edison Co. v. Super. Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 832, 843, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715 (1972),

30. The court may, as set forth in pertinent part, of California Code of Civil Procedure

§1987.1 “…make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing

compliance with it upon such terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including

protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate

to protect the parties, the witness, the consumer, or the employee from unreasonable or

oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the

consumer.

31. Likewise, the court may make whatever orders are appropriate to protect any party,

witness or consumer from “un-reasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable

violations of the right of privacy of the person.” Cal. Code civ. Proc. §§ 1985.3(g),

1985.6(f)(4). “The court exercises wide discretion, and may grant a motion if it concludes

that a protective order is necessary to limit attempted discovery which, while it may come

within the rules established by other code sections, offends the sense of justice and

reason.” Weisman v. Bower (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1231, 1238.

32. The breadth and scope of Defendant’s subpoenas are overly broad failing to include any

date boundaries and are an invasion of his privacy. The court may make “any other order

as may be appropriate to protect the parties … from unreasonable or oppressive demands

Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Assn., (2007) 151 Cal. App. 4th 575 59 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 924.

33. The disclosure of private information may be ordered only if a “compelling public

interest” would be served. Courts recognize “the historically important state interest of

facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings,” and carefully

balance this interest against an individual’s right to privacy to determine if disclosure is

appropriate. El Dorado Savings & Loan Assn v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d

342, 345-46 citing Moskowitz v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 313, 316. See also

Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355.

34. The party seeking discovery is required to show a “compelling need” for the information.

A “compelling need” is demonstrated where the information is directly relevant and

essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit. Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844,

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859. Defendant fails to meet this threshold test because Plaintiff is in a position to

perform.

35. While the filing of the lawsuit by petitioner may be something like issuing a fishing

license for discovery, as with a fishing license, the rules of discovery do not allow

unrestricted access to all species of information. Discovery of constitutionally protected

information is on a par with discovery of privileged information and is more narrowly

proscribed than traditional discovery." (Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp.

852-853.)

36. The party at whose instance the subpoena was issued must show good cause for the

production of the items and their materiality to the issues in the action [see Code Civ.

Proc. § 1985(b)]. The declarant in support of issuance of the subpoena cannot rely merely

on the legal conclusion, stated in general terms, that the desired documentary evidence is

relevant and material [ People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Younger (1970) 5 Cal.

App. 3d 575, 580, 86 Cal. Rptr. 237] .

37. In conducting the balancing test and determining whether good cause has been

established, the court looks at the following non-mandatory, non-exhaustive factors: the

requester's need for the information from this particular source, its relevance to the

litigation at hand, the burden of producing the sought-after material; and the harm which

disclosure would cause to the party seeking to protect the information. Burka v. United

States. Dep't of HHS, 87 F.3d 508, 517 (D;C. Cir. 1996); Phillips v. General Motors Corp.,

307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002) ("For good cause to exist, the party seeking

protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no

protective order is granted .").

38. Defendant’s subpoena is unduly burdensome because it seeks information

regarding topics that are unrelated or beyond the scope of the litigation as a violation of

Plaintiff’s privacy rights. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. (9th Cir. 2003) 353

F.3d 792, 813-14 The court may make whatever orders are appropriate to protect any

party, witness or consumer from “un-reasonable or oppressive demands, including

unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” Cal. Code civ. Proc. §§

1985.3(g), 1985.6(f)(4).

39. When discovery is sought from non-parties, the standard for obtaining a protective order

is reduced because” there appear to be quite strong considerations indicating that

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discovery would be more limited to protect third parties from harassment, inconvenience,

r disclosure of confidential documents.” Dart Indus Co. v Westwood Inc 649 F 2d. 64 649

(9th Cir 1980); “ non-parties are afforded "special protection against the time and expense

of complying with subpoenas"); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 455, 458 (D. Nev. 1986)

"The rule is thus well established that nonparties to litigation enjoy greater protection

from discovery than normal parties.” Exxon Shipping Co.v United States Dept. of Interior

4F 3d. 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994).

D. CONCLUSIONA motion to quash or limit Defendant’s request for Coldwell Bankers deposition and

document request is warranted in this case, the subpoena being a stark violation of

Plaintiff’s right to privacy to bank and consumer records. For the foregoing reasons,

Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court issue an order quashing the deposition subpoena

and moves the Court for a protective order prohibiting the production of documents

p ursuant to the deposition notice.

Respectfully Submitted,

___________________

RAVI REDDY dba RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

Plaintiff Pro Per

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