Carl Schmitt on friends, enemies and the political (Andrew Norris) Carl Schmitt on friends, enemiesand the politicalAndrew NorrisIf the work that Carl Schmitt produced during the Weimar Republic is of interest today, it is in large part because of his insistence on the conceptual autonomy of the political. ike !annah Arendt, Schmitt categorically distinguishes the political from the economic, the technological, and the legal" and, like her, he also critici#es liberalism for muddying and obscuring these distinctions.$n%& As one might e'pect from an eminent (urist, he places particular emphasis on the last ) the distinction between the legal and the political. *he main lines of his argument are clear enough+ the concept of law is defined by the criteria ofwhat is and is not in accord with legal roles and norms" the concept of thepolitical, by the criteria of friend and enemy. *he identification of friend and enemy is an e'istential decision which cannot be anticipated by law. ,oreo-er, the political is not simply distinct from the legal but prior to it in that no system of norms can be de-eloped or applied without a momentof decision that e'ceeds the regulation of those norms. *hus the state as the political actor cannot be reduced to a legal system, nor can what legitimacy it has be deri-ed from law. .articularly in an emergency or state of e'ception, a so-ereign /either0or1 decision must be made, and this decision cannot be deri-ed or inferred from the norms that obtain in the normal situation. 2ecause of the inherent limitations of laws, rules, and norms, the political decision that identifies friend and enemy must be made independently.*he main complaint+ against this formulation is familiar enough+ Schmitt allegedly emphasi#es the limitations of law only to glorify the decision that e'ceeds the regulation of any law. Insofar as rights are defined and guaranteed by law, Schmitt3s e'istential concept of the political makes these rights -ulnerable to unregulated political decision. *his is found to be all the more distressing, since Schmitt stresses the decision3s role in the most e'treme case, i.e., war, in the political identification of the e'istential enemy. As he puts it+ /4nly the actual participants can correctly recogni#e, understand, and (udge the concrete situation and settle the e'treme case of conflict. 5ach participant is in a position to (udge whether the ad-ersary intends to negate his opponent3s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preser-e one3s own form of e'istence.1$n6& *he bellicose nihilism this suggests is often seen as a causal factor in Schmitt3s own acti-e participation in the Na#i mo-ement in the %789s. !is political theory, it is alleged, is opportunistic,with only one consistent commitment :to the irrational. *hus Richard Wolin claims that the central roles played in Schmitt3s political theory by the political decision and the threat of war are both moti-ated by a /-italism1 and a /politics of authenticity,1 with the aim of o-erturning the-apid bourgeois order.$n8& *he result is a glorification of -iolence.$n;& In the end, politics for Schmitt is a matter of conflict and war, and the true criterion of the political is the enemy. Who one3s political /friends1 are is determined only in the encounter with the enemy, and they are -alued only insofar as they allow for success in the resulting war. As ,artin needed to create the solidarity of the homogeneous self.1$n?&*his reading of *he Concept of the .olitical is unwarranted. While some might not be surprised that Schmitt put his intellectual powers in the ser-ice of the Na#i .arty when it came to power, although most of his colleagues and students were shocked, it does not follow that Schmitt3s concept of the political is itself necessarily totalitarian.$n@& Schmitt3s attempt to characteri#e politics in terms of friendship and enmity is both more complicated and more interesting than his critics suggest. In particular, his pro-ocati-e formulations of the friend0enemy distinction should not lead to the conclusion that he reduces politics to a function of war. Schmitt3s theoretical position reAuires a prior substanti-e commitment to relations of /friendship1 and social solidarity. !is accountof political authority, in particular, rests on an almost !egelian understanding of the indi-idual3s relation to the community and one3s own mortality. *he friend0enemy criterion defines a particular form of life, one in which group identity is -alued abo-e physical e'istence.$nB& *o properly understand Schmitt3s work it must be considered not as a re(ection of an established moral order but as a response to a culture of nihilism in which meaning ) rather than -alue ) is ebbing away.*here are a number of reasons to be wary of accepting the interpretation of Schmitt as, in Alan ,egill3s phrase, /a prophet of e'tremity.1 *o begin with, Schmitt is no 5rnst power o-er the physical life of men =that> thepolitical community transcends all other associations or societies.1$n69& Since the enemy is defined as a threat to those relations of /friendship1 internal to the state, it follows that the latter are not entirely a function of the e'ternal relation to the enemy.$n6%& If Schmitt is at all coherent, then Wolin must be wrong in claiming that Schmitt3s /e'istential definition of politics in terms of the primacy of the friendGenemy grouping necessitatesthe relinAuishing of all claims to the Hgood life3 and instead to rest contentwith Hmere life3 ) namely, e'istential selfGpreser-ation.1$n66& If an oftenintemperate writer is also capable of subtlety, one might see Schmitt3s dedication to *he Concept of the .olitical as a clue to this. It reads /In memory of my friend, August Schaet# of ,unich, who fell on August 6C, %7%B, in the assault on ,oncelul.1At this point, howe-er, this may seem to be making e'tremely hea-y weather out of a few turns of phrase. 2ut Schmitt e'plicitly states that+ /*he politicalE does not describe its own substance, but only the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose moti-es can be religious, national $in the ethnic or cultural sense&, economic, or of another kind and can effect at different times different coalitions and separations.1$n68& *he plainest reading of this is as follows+ groups define themsel-es in a -ariety of ways. *he conflicts that emerge between these -arious groups are not political until they reach a certain le-el of intensity ) until they pose a threat to the group3s e'istence. *he so-ereign decision is then made whether or not to go to war in order to resol-e the conflict, at which point the conflict becomes political. What is distincti-ely political, then, is entirely a matter of the conflict with the enemy" the relation with the friend is only a prete't+ for this conflict. If the final step of this interpretation were correctly taken, in-iew of Schmitt3s claim that the political has an e'istential priority o-er all other forms of association, Wolin would be Auite right to conclude thatSchmitt is committed to the -iew that /all the energies of modern life stand in the ser-ice of war.1$n6;& !ow then can Schmitt assure his readers that /War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor e-en the -ery content of politics1F$n6?&/In case of need,1 Schmitt writes, /the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way (ustifiable by the indi-idualism of liberal thought.1$n6@& What does (ustify, such a demandFIn the longer of the two passages (ust Auoted, Schmitt is wholly unconcerned with the substance or moti-es of the association that enters into the political conflict. Iet something connected to these moti-es, which are said to ha-e no specifically political substance, is strong enough to lead men and women to offer their li-es for the group. ,ore, it is strong enough that men and women ought to recogni#e as legitimate the /right1 of the state to /demand1 their li-es. Di-en the political indifference of the content of the group3s moti-es and beliefs, it can only be this recognition itself that makes the group political. When one, for whate-er reason, pri#e the integrity of one3s way of life o-er one3s own li-es, then he has become political. *he threat to human life does not make one political, but ser-es only as a reminder of one3s commitment, ofthe fact that one3s way of life is -alued abo-e one3s life. Compare, in this regard, the Auotation at the beginning of this paragraph with Schmitt3s pre-iously cited claim+ /If physical destruction of human life is not moti-ated by an e'istential threat to one3s own way of life, then it cannot be (ustified.1 *he decisi-e conflict is between political solidarity and apolitical, liberal indi-idualism+ /*he negation of the politicalE is inherent in e-ery consistent indi-idualism.1$n6B&Indi-idualism is an understanding of human freedom at home in a /modern economy,1 in which /a completely irrational consumption conforms to a totally3 rationali#ed production. A mar-elously rational mechanism ser-es one or another demand, always with the same earnestness and precision, be it for a silk purse or poison gas or anything whatsoe-er.1$n6C& In an indi-idualistic society, /.ublic life is e'pected togo-ern itself. It should be go-erned by public opinion, the opinion of pri-ate indi-iduals. .ublic opinion, in mm, should be go-erned by a pri-ately owned press. Nothing in this system is representati-e" e-erything is a pri-ate matter.1$n67& Schmitt defines /representation1 in 2urkean terms, as an indi-idual3s ability to embody the body politic, and not to act as a mere functionary for one3s constituents.$n89& Schmitt in turn identifies the body politic with the constitution ) a collecti-e decision about the nature of political unity and identity. Schmitt is criticalof legal positi-ism, in part because a legal system cannot itself generate a constitution, but must always act in the ser-ice of one. *he essence of politics, for Schmitt, is a homogenous form of identity that both allows for the transcendence of pri-ate, physical life and opens the possibility of a particular form of -iolent conflict.$n8%&Compare this interpretation with eo Strauss3s reading of Schmitt+ Strauss concludes that, in the absence of an independent moral affirmation of the political, /the affirmation of the political is the affirmation of fighting as such, wholly irrespecti-e of what is being fought for.1$n86& *his still places too much emphasis on actual combat. As Schmitt put it+ /*he political does not reside in the battle itselfE but in the mode of beha-ior which is determined by this possibility.1$n88& *hat mode of beha-ior is a solidarity that makes possible both selfGsacrifice and political authority. In a passage often Auoted by his detractors, Schmitt insists that /*he high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recogni#ed as the enemy.1$n8;& /Simultaneously,1 because such high points of politics are not identical with the recognition of the enemy. It is not that groups need to be constantly at war with one another to be political,$n8?& but that the people belonging to them see war and what it demands as a real possibility, i.e., that they are reminded of their commitments, of their willingness to gi-e their li-es when the so-ereign demands they do so. *he relation of friend is not defined by the emergence of the enemy, but it is brought into -iew in its true significance. *his should make it plain why Schmitt suggests that a loss of meaning and significance attends the eclipse of the political.$n8@& ife will lack meaning unless it contains commitments cherished abo-e mere physical e'istence.$n8B&,uch of the drama and the danger of Schmitt3s work is a function of this attempt to use politics to counter nihilism. *hough Schmitt3s polemical political theory sets itself against the presuppositions of what he finds to be today3s /indi-idualistically disintegrated society,1$n8C& he is hardly a latterGday *ocAue-ille or a communitarian a la ,ichael Sandel. Where *ocAue-ille contrasts indi-idualism with a public life of the sort that (ury duty might encourage, Schmitt contrasts it with solidarity in the face of the potential enemy.$n87& If *ocAue-ille seeks to broaden personal interests and to temper /the habits of the heart,1 Schmitt seeks to change the concept of who one are.$n;9& .olitics pa-es the way for this in such a way that. it makes sense to sacrifice one3s life, because of the awareness that there will be some other form of sur-i-al. Where Schmitt adds decisi-ely to the analysis of *ocAue-ille et. al. is in his emphasis on authority $and hence commitment& and mortality. Schmitt aligns himself with the Dreeks in his insistence that politics be a response to the fragilityand futility of human life. !e is hostile to indi-idualism., not simply because of his authoritarian tendencies, but also because the form indi-idualism has taken in contemporary society, manifest in the consumption of images, pleasures, and commodities, is simply incapable of addressing this issue.*his helps to understand the significance of Schmitt3s almost cryptic note on !egel in *he Concept of the .olitical. /!egel remains e-erywhere political in the decisi-e sense.1 !e /also offers the first polemically political definition of the bourgeois. *he bourgeois is an indi-idual who does not want to lea-e the apolitical riskless pri-ate sphere.1 Jinally+ /!egel hasE ad-anced a definition of the enemy which has in general been e-aded by modern philosophers. *he enemy is negated otherness.1$n;%& *he first two of these claims become clear in light of an e'plication of the third. !egel argues that war is a fundamental possibilityof political life, one that is actually beneficial. It is a fundamental possibility, because the state is, -isGaG-is other states, an indi-idual, /and indi-iduality essentially implies negation. !ence e-en if a number of states make themsel-es into a family, this group as an indi-idual must engender an opposite and create an enemy.1$n;6& It is a beneficial one because, by pro-iding the necessary conte't for martial courage, war allows the indi-idual to transcend the limited perspecti-e of his place in society+ /the important thing here is not personal mettle but aligning oneself with the uni-ersal.1$n;8& As !egel acknowledges, e-en /robbers and murderers bent on crime1 sometimes demonstrate a willingness to risk their li-es. Such bra-ery has a merely negati-e worth because /it is the negation of e'ternalities, and their alienation, the culmination of courage, is not intrinsically of a spiritual character.1$n;;& *hat is to say, courage e-en in a wicked cause has some worth in that it strips away or /alienates1 the inessential baggage of life $e.gE the obsession with property&. *his worth, howe-er, is only negati-e because it is found in remo-ing or negating the inessential, without affirming something of real spiritual worth. Kuite different is patriotically moti-ated selfGsacrifice+ /*he intrinsic =or positi-e> worth of courage as a disposition is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the so-ereignty of the state.1$n;?&*he affinities between this position and Schmitt3s are ob-ious.$n;@& 2ut where !egel3s commitment to the -iew that reason must be actual leads him to celebrate the actual -irtuous conduct of war, Schmitt ne-er praises war as such and remains silent on the -alue of courage. Jor !egel, the modern state is the highest form of ethical life, and the sacrifices it demands are part of that life. *hus war /is not to be regarded as an absolute e-il,1 as it itself contains an /ethical moment1+ courage.$n;B& Jor Schmitt, war is essentially a political matter" as such, it is as little ethical as it is e-il. /If there really are enemies in the e'istential sense meant here, then it is (ustified, but only politically, to repel them and, fight them physically. E or any combination of other antitheses, not can it be traced to these.1 Jurther, /it would be senseless to wage war for purely religious, purely moral, purely (uristic, or purely economic moti-es.1$n??& 4n what, then, will the solidarity of the group be basedF What do they ha-e in common if it is neither economic, aesthetic, religious, or moralF *he answer is a shared identity, the homogeneity of the group. !ence the only /sensible1 (ustification for waging war is the selfGdefense of the group.$n?@& *he homogeneity that defines the group may well ha-e its origins in a shared religion or a shared set of moral -alues. 2ut politically this content is irrele-ant. *his would seem to sAuash most public debate and deliberation. ,oral, economic and e-en religious matters are things aboutwhich one can argue. 2ut shared identity, if there is one, appears to be nothing more than a fact. Indeed, it is not e-en that because this identity is so formali#ed, so thoroughly drained of content, that is nothing more than a shared commitment. ike the so-ereign decision, it is neither a factnor a norm.$n?B&*his does not completely preclude political deliberation. 2ecause solidarity is based on a shared identity, there is little room for the multiplicity of perspecti-es reAuired if debate is to emerge at all. 2ut there is still the possibility to differ about the interpretation of political identity. In a discussion of %BthGcentury theories of natural law, Schmitt writes+ /.ublic order and security manifest themsel-es -ery differently in reality, depending on whether a militaristic bureaucracy, a selfGgo-erning body controlled by the spirit of commercialism, or a radical party organi#ation decides when there is order and security and when it is threatened.1$n?C& *his suggests that there is no distinction between the regime and the so-ereign. 2ut the basic point remains rele-ant+ different regimes will be threatened by different things and in different ways, and these threats will not be selfGe-ident. Consider the LS, which today still has a slim claim to being /a selfGgo-erning body controlled by the spirit of commercialism.1 *he men who led the country into war against IraA could argue with at least some plausibility that they were /defending1 the concrete way of life characteri#ed in this way. 2ut it was ob-iously open to others to deny this, and to claim that the /self go-erning1 and /commercial1 spirit in no way reAuired this war. Such a debate can be conducted on at least two le-els. 4n the first, it is largely a matter ) in this case ) of economics" on the second, it is a matter of whether3 something poses an /e'istential1 threat to a political entity that merely happens to be guided by a /commercial1 spirit. 4n this second le-el the debate would concern the interpretation of identity and, as such, be a purely political one.Schmitt himself demonstrates an easy confidence in his own ability to make the reAuired distinctions+ /*o demand seriously of human beings that they kill others and be prepared to die themsel-es so that trade and industry may flourish for the sur-i-ors or that the purchasing power of the grandchildren may grow is sinister and cra#y.1$n?7& Such a remark might well be made in a debate o-er /4peration Mesert Storm.1 !ere the claim might be that Americans are committed to and united in a democratic freedom that has only contingently been aligned with capitalism3s interests, and that ,iddleG5ast oil is not one of this polity3s -ital interests. .ut this way, the reply is easy enough to imagine. 4n the face of it, such a debate about the nature of shared identity and the focus of mutual commitment would not seem to be in conflict with Schmitt3s strictures. Nonetheless, he does not permit for political decisions to in-ol-e public debate and deliberation, e-en of the minimal sort his theory will allow. In his constitutional theory, the populace is accorded the right to e-aluate the performance of the state only in the form of acts of acclamation.*his limitation is a result of Schmitt3s decisionism. Schmitt understands the political decision as an alternati-e to the law ) one necessitated by the law3s own limitations. *he rationality that characteri#es the normal situation is, in his eyes, that of a norm or law go-erning that situation. In its absence, there is no indication, in Schmitt3s te'ts of the %769s, of any rational guidance whatsoe-er.$n@9& *his is why Schmitt has no faith in public debate. If the only rational guidance that can be found is that of a norm, and if that will not apply in the case of an e'ception, it is plain that open debate will ser-e no purpose but that of undermining authority. Schmitt is Auite frank about this+ /*he decision becomes instantly independent of argumentati-e substantiation and recei-es an autonomous -alue.1$n@%& In the end /*he e'ception in (urisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.1$n@6&*he rele-ant point here is that this characteri#ation of the irrationality or arationality of the political decision is not necessarily connected with Schmitt3s characteri#ation of the nature of political community. Schmitt3 s-ersion of identity politics is largely deri-ed from his reading of Rousseau. As he emphasi#es again and again, according to this model, democracy is not a matter of popular participation, re-ocable consent, or liberal0 parliamentary institutions" instead, it is a Auestion of the identity of the ruler and the ruled.$n@8& Such identity is not at all irreconcilable with a form of dictatorship that denies to the populace the right to debate political issues.$n@;& *his much is clear in Rousseau3s own infamous references to the possibility of forcing the citi#enry to be free when they misunderstand their own $general& will. 2ut it does not necessitate dictatorship. As *he Social Contract again makes clear, a Rousseauian polity that rests on the homogeneity of the commitments of its members is compatible with a -ariety of political structures and institutions.$n@?&If the proper interpretation of *he Concept of the .olitical has been established here, this hardly neutrali#es Schmitt because, like !eidegger, Schmitt did not always appreciate his own best insights. *he fact that he put his theoretical system in the ser-ice of the Na#is should draw attention to the disturbing, if conceptually necessary, lack of content he gi-es the political form of life. ,any detect antiGSemitism in Schmitt3s references to the political enemy as /alien and E. of a different type.$n@@& 4thers disagree $though Schmitt is blatantly and offensi-ely antiGSemitic in some of the writings he produced under the Na#is&. 2ut there iscertainly no reason why a political form of life could not re-ol-e around such bigotry. Indeed, Schmitt3s own attempt to sta-e off nihilism is clearly compatible with the nihilistic fren#y tearing apart regions like the former Iugosla-ia, where ethnic solidarity is rife.No doubt, this interpretation shifts the grounds of the debate on Schmitt in an important way. *oo many of Schmitt3s critics take him to task for warGmongering. If this were true, it would make him an easy target. It is far more uncomfortable to recogni#e his close relation to the currently fashionable identity politics. *he assertion of identity need not follow from nor lead to a -iolent conflict. Schmitt is Auite right when he insists that /=w>ar is neither the aim nor the purpose nor e-en the content of politics.1 2ut it would be nai-e or disingenuous to maintain that a politicsthat defines itself in terms of a shared identity did not raise this and other dangers. As Schmitt rather chillingly puts it /=M>emocracy reAuires Efirst homogeneity and second ) if need arises ) elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.1$n@B&If this suggests that the essentially Aristotelian0.latonic appeal to the primacy of the political whole o-er the political part is problematic, Schmitt3s work suggests similar limitations to the appeal to the whole in terms of the indi-idual3s own life. *hroughout his work, Schmitt is centrally concerned with commitment. *o commit oneself to a political authority that can then make decisions concerning one3s life and death is, in a sense, an absolute commitment. It does not allow for the whimsical changes of mind Schmitt associates with romanticism and aestheticism. 2ut, in itself, this hardly seems to (ustify the close connection Schmitt establishes between mortality, authority and meaning. If the point is to gi-e meaning to .life and not, like Aristotle, to ensure that death be kalos ) why bother with death at allF Surely some other /absolute1 form of commitment is possible, say, marriage without the possibility of di-orce, or the bearing of children whom one will /absolutely1 refuse to abandon or disown. Schmitt3s utter disregard of such banal alternati-es suggests that the commitment reAuired in-ol-es a life in its entirety. Schmitt here appears to be working on precisely the same principle that defines his concept of the political the part finds meaning only in assuming its rightful place within the whole.