G.R. No. 152809 August 3, 2006 MERCEDES MORALIDAD, Petitioner,vs.SPS.DIOSDADO PERNES and ARLENE PERNES, Respondents.Facts:In her younger days, petitioner taught in Davao City, Quezon City andManila. While teaching in Manila, she had the good fortune of furthering herstudies at the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. While schooling, she wasoffered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, which she did forseven (7) years. Thereafter, she worked at the Mental Health Department ofsaid University for the next seventeen (17) years.During those years, shewould come home to the Philippines to spend her two-month summervacation in her hometown in Davao City. Being single, she would usually stayin Mandug, Davao City, in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes,a daughter of her younger sister, Rosario.Back in the U.S.A. sometime in1986, she received news from Arlene that Mandug at the outskirts of DavaoCity was infested by NPA rebels and many women and children were victimsof crossfire between government troops and the insurgents. Shocked andsaddened about this development, she immediately sent money to Araceli,Arlenes older sister, with instructions to look for a lot in Davao City whereArlene and her family could transfer and settle down. This was why shebought the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-123125.Petitioner acquiredthe lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandugto Davao City proper but later she wanted the property to be also availableto any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner madeknown this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986.Issue:I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSINGTHE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR BEING PREMATURE WHICH DECISION ISNOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES448 AND 546 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODE ON USUFRUCT INSTEAD OFARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE.Ruling:The Court rules for the petitioner.Usufruct, in essence, is nothing elsebut simplyallowing one to enjoy anothers property. 9 It is also defined asthe right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jusutendi and the jus fruendi, 10 with the owner retaining the jus disponendi orthe power to alienate the same. It is undisputed that petitioner, in adocument dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her intention to giverespondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of herproperty. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents being giventhe right "to build their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "aslong as they like." Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks "proceedsor income derived from the aforementioned properties" for the petitioners"nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesserpercentage to those who are better of (sic) in standing." The establishedfacts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the propertybut also granted them, among the petitioners other kins, the right to enjoythe fruits thereof. We have no quarrel, therefore, with the CAs ruling thatusufruct was constituted between petitioner and respondents. It is thuspointless to discuss why there was no lease contract between theparties.There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall beconsidered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the CivilCode enumeratessuch other modes of extinguishment:ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearlyappears;(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by thefulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating theusufruct;(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;(4)By renunciation of the usufructuary;(5) By the total loss of the thing inusufruct;(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting theusufruct;(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes thetitle creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3thereof states "[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to staytherein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same isnot inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis supplied). What may beinimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from thepreceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear "thatanybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned propertyshould maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and mustavoid bickering with one another." That the maintenance of a peaceful andharmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an indispensablecondition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from thesucceeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kinswho cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise thefreedom to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of the following:the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation ofharmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutorycondition which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there wereindeed facts and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may bedeemed terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutoryconditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely, thedocument adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986. Thus,the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and thePernes family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure,despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases toconsider the usufruct as having been terminated.By express provision of law,respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement forthe improvements they may have introduced on the property. We quoteArticles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code:Art. 579. The usufructuary may makeon the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses formere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form orsubstance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may,however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so withoutdamage to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)Art. 580. The usufructuary mayset off the improvements he may have made on the property against anydamage to the same.Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will haveto be ordered to vacate the premises without any right of reimbursement. Ifthe rule on reimbursement or indemnity were otherwise, then theusufructuary might, as an author pointed out, improve the owner out of hisproperty. 15 The respondents may, however, remove or destroy theimprovements they may have introduced thereon without damaging thepetitioners property.