MODULE #4 MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, PLUMBING … · 2017-07-11 · LEED IEQ: 0.02” w.c. average, 0.004” w.c. minimum (LEED 2009) 2011 ASHRAE: ... Sealing light fixtures; Sealing

MODULE #4MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, PLUMBING I

MICHAEL WALSH | PRINCIPAL, R.G. VANDERWEIL ENGINEERS, LLP

274 Summer Street, Boston, MA 02210(T) 617-423-7423 (F) 617-423-7401

[email protected]

1

MODULE 4 | MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, PLUMBING CONSIDERATIONS I

Module 4 Agenda

1. Identify Biological Containment MEP Criteria

2. Pressurization and Airflow

3. Building Systems & Controls


MEP CRITERIA

2

SARS Virus

Ebola Virus

Word Health Organization (WHO): Avian influenza is a threat to agricultural production and human health.

Bird Flu

Need for Biocontainment Facilities


Protection of:

Researchers

Custodial Personnel

Public

Environment

Allows:

Diagnosis

Experimentation

Products (Vaccine)

Purpose of Biocontainment Facilities & Systems


3

• All criteria must be identified by a project specific risk assessment• Assessment must identify project specific codes and standards• Assessment must identify types of agents to be used in the facility• Agent list will help determine required Biosafety Level


Identify Design Criteria

US Department of Health & Human Services (CDC/NIH):Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 5th Edition

Primary Containment for Biohazards - Selection, Installation and Use of Biological Safety Cabinets (CDC-NIH)

US Department of Agriculture:ARS P&P Manual 242.1M - Biosafety Level 2, 3, 4 & 3AG

National Institutes of Health:Design Requirement Manual

NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules

Health Canada, Health Protection Branch – Lab Centre for Disease ControlLaboratory Biosafety Guidelines

National Academy PressBiosafety in the Laboratory - Prudent Practices for the Handling and Disposal of Infectious Materials

World Health OrganizationLaboratory Biosafety Manual


Identify Codes & Standards

4

National Select Agent Registry (CDC/APHIS):Federal Select Agent Program

http://www.selectagents.gov/SA_Gram.html

American Industrial Hygiene Association/ANSI:Standard Z9.5-2012 Laboratory Ventilation

Standard Z9.14 Testing and Performance Verification

Methodologies for BSL-3 and ABSL-3 Facilities - NEW


Identify Regulations & Guidelines

Design Criteria


US Department of Health & Human Services:CDC BSL-2 & 3 Inspection Checklists

National Institutes of Health:CDC/NIH BSL-2 & 3 Inspection Checklists

National Research Council:Guide for Use and Care of Laboratory Animals

Building/Mechanical Codes:Current Applicable Version

National Fire Protection Agency:Standard 45-2012 Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals

General Design Guides:ASHRAE Laboratory Design Guide

American Biological Safety Association:High Containment Laboratory Accreditation Program

5

Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1). Agents of no known or minimal potential hazard to facility personnel, animals or the environment. No potential economic loss to the agricultural industries.

Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2). Agents of moderate potential hazard to personnel, animals, and the environment, with minimal economic loss to the animal industries. Most research and diagnostics laboratories are at this level. (98% of all agents are BSL-2 Classified)

Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3). Agents which may be indigenous or exotic to the United States that can be contracted by the respiratory route, and may cause serious or lethal diseases to man, animals, or cause moderate economic loss to the animal industries. (Tuberculosis)

Biosafety Level 3 Agriculture (BSL-3Ag). Pathogens that present a risk of causing infections of animals and plants and causing a great economic harm. (Foot and Mouth Disease).

Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4). Used with highly lethal exotic agents which pose a high individual risk of life-threatening disease to man. Some of these viruses also infect food animals and have the potential to cause severe economic loss to animal industries. (Ebola)

Identify Biosafety Level Classification


Sample CDC BMBL SECTION VII Agent Summary StatementsAgent: Bacillus Anthracis

Numerous cases of laboratory-associated anthrax, occurring primarily at facilities conducting anthrax research, have been reported. No laboratory-associated cases of anthrax have been reported in the United States since the late 1950s when human anthrax vaccine was introduced.

Laboratory Hazards: The agent may be present in blood, skin lesion exudates, cerebrospinal fluid, pleural fluid, sputum, and rarely, in urine and feces. Direct and indirect contact of the intact and broken skin with cultures and contaminated laboratory surfaces, accidental parenteral inoculation, and rarely, exposure to infectious aerosols are the primary hazards to laboratory personnel.

Recommended Precautions: Biosafety Level 2 recommended for activities using clinical materials and diagnostic quantities of infectious cultures. Animal Biosafety Level 2 recommended for studies utilizing experimentally

infected laboratory rodents. Biosafety Level 3 practices recommended for work involving production quantities or concentrations of cultures, and for activities with a high potential for aerosol production.

Transfer of Agent: For a permit to import this agent, contact CDC. Laboratory registration with CDC is required before sending or receiving this select agent.

Agent Summary Statements


6

Containment Recommendations

Biosafety Level 2 facilities, practices and procedures are recommended for diagnostic, research and production activities utilizing contemporary, circulating human influenza strains (e.g., H1/H3/B) and low pathogenicity

avian influenza (LPAI) strains (e.g., H1-4, H6, H8-16), and equine and swine influenza viruses. Animal Biosafety Level 2 is appropriate for work with these viruses in animal models. All avian and swine influenza viruses require an APHIS permit. Based on economic ramifications and source of the virus, LPAI H5 and H7 and swine influenza viruses may have additional APHIS permit-driven containment requirements and personnel practices and/or restrictions.

Non-contemporary human influenza (H2N2) strains Non-contemporary, wild-type human influenza (H2N2) strains should be handled with increased caution. Important considerations in working with these strains are the number of years since an antigenically related virus last

circulated and the potential for presence of a susceptible population. Biosafety Level 3 and Animal Biosafety Level 3 practices, procedures and facilities are recommended with rigorous adherence to additional respiratory protection and clothing change protocols. Negative pressure, HEPA-filtered respirators or positive air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) are recommended for use. Cold-adapted, live attenuated H2N2 vaccine strains may continue to be worked with at BSL-2.

Agent Summary Statements – Changes Occur


BMBL 5TH Edition Requirement for BSL-3:

The laboratory building exhaust air should be dispersed away from

occupied areas and from building air intake locations OR the exhaust air must be HEPA filtered.

Example of Specific Direction from CDC for a specific Public Health Lab project:

“HEPA filtration is only needed with general exhaust when using viable Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEE) and/or rift Valley Fever Virus as a select agent”.

Agent Summary Statements – Ask for Clarification


7

Priority 1: Laboratory Work Practices & Protocols:Defined in the Laboratory Biosafety Manual (similar to Lab Chemical Safety Manual and Lab Fire Safety Manual)

Priority 2: Primary Containment (Biosafety Cabinets, Glove Boxes, BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 Containment Spaces)For BSL-3 and lower classification, the goal of primary containment is to minimize exposure to bio-hazardous material in the immediate lab environment.

Biological safety cabinets or glove boxes provide the primary containment barrier. HEPA filters in the BSC are intended to keep biohazards released during a procedure within the cabinet from escaping into the room or general exhaust system. Filters are decontaminated or contained in bags before they are taken out of the laboratory.

For BSL-3AG and BSL-4 Level Labs, facility and MEP systems are considered primary containment requiring decon of people and equipment leaving the space.

Priority 3: Secondary Containment (Facility & MEP Systems)Secondary containment is typically considered as the walls, floor and ceiling of the space in combination with the mechanical ventilation system.

How is Containment Provided?


Class II Type A2 Class II Type B2 BSC (Hard-Ducted)

Primary Containment Devices


Containment Caging

Understand primary containment performance during fan or power failures – Risk Assessment

NSF 49-2012:5.25.3 Type B exhaust alarmType B cabinets shall be exhausted by a remote fan. Once the cabinet is set or certified in its acceptable airflow range, audible and visual alarms shall be required to indicate a 20% loss of exhaust volume within 15 s. The internal cabinet fan(s) shall be interlocked to shut off at the same time the alarms are activated.

8

Dirty Change

Clean Corridor

Containment Boundary

Legend:Dirty

Shower

Clean Change

BSL-3 Anteroom 1

BSL-3 Anteroom 2 –Infrequent Use

Equipment Path

BSL-3 Lab

Where is Containment Barrier?


Select Agent Definition:The BSL-3 anteroom is considered to be within the containment envelope.

Consider Pressurized Corridor to Separate BSL-3 from Non-Containment Spaces

HVAC

Temperature

Humidity

Pressure

Directional Airflow/ Prevent Reversal

Exhaust

Filtration

Decontamination

Plumbing

Effluent Treatment

Water Supply

DI/RO Water

Fire Protection

Lab Gases

Breathing Air

Electrical

Lighting

Power

Emergency

Fuel

UPS

Security Systems

Telecommunications


Is Redundancy Required?

9


Is Redundancy Required?

SA Grams - BSL-3/ABSL-3 Verification

Mechanical failure of exhaust fan or fan component(s):

If redundant fans are present, the ability to transition to the alternate fan without reversal of air flow from potentially contaminated laboratory space into “clean” areas surrounding the laboratory must be verified.

If no redundancy is present in the laboratory HVAC system, the capacity to transition from sustained inward air flow into the laboratory to a “static” condition, i.e., no air flow out of the laboratory must be verified.

NOTE: RISK ASSESSMENT MAYCONSIDER STATIC CONDITION AS ACCEPTABLE AFTER MULTIPLE FAILURES WHEN REDUNDANCY HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE DESIGN

System Redundancy Review


10

MEP Biocontainment System Redundancy Options


Enhancements are Project Specific

• Visible barrier inspection

• Double HEPA filtration

• Redundant HEPA filtration

• Directional airflow

• Pressure control or monitor

• Backward airflow prevention

Additional HVAC Criteria to Identify


11

Plumbing Criteria


Electrical Criteria


12

For Containment Spaces Must Identify:

Required systems

Identify biocontainment barrier

Penetration seal details

Pressure relationships

MEP equipment redundancy

Control strategies

Maintenance of equipment outside containment

Failure Testing Per Risk Assessment –

Single Failure

Double Failure

Owner Project Requirements and Design Intent Document



PRESSURIZATION & AIRFLOW

13

“A ducted air ventilation system is required. This system must provide sustained directional airflow by drawing air into the laboratory from “clean” areas toward “potentially contaminated” areas. The laboratory shall be designed such that under failure conditions the airflow will not be reversed.”


Biocontainment Pressurization - Normal Operation

“Potentially Contaminated” Areas Can Be Neutral To Adjacent “Clean Areas” But NOT POSTITIVE.


Biocontainment Pressurization - Failure Mode

14


Biocontainment Pressurization Concept


Biocontainment Pressurization – Relative Pressure

No Consensus on Pressure Differential for Design:

Health Care Isolation Room Guidelines: 0.01” w.c. minimum

Typical Non-Containment Labs: 0.01” w.c. (Siemens Lab Design)

LEED IEQ: 0.02” w.c. average, 0.004” w.c. minimum (LEED 2009)

2011 ASHRAE: 0.03” w.c. minimum for Nuclear Secondary Confinement

2012 NIH DRM: 0.05” w.c. minimum each lab door

2012 USDA ARS 242.1M: 0.05” w.c. BSL-3 Labs

2012 IBC: 0.10” to 0.35” w.c. Stair Pressurization Systems

15


Biocontainment Pressurization Concept

BIOSEAL

Sealing light fixtures; Sealing all conduit penetrations; Sealing all penetrationsSealing outlet boxes; Sealing door bottoms, tops and frames

HOW TIGHT IS TOO TIGHT???

Mechanical System Details


16


Provide paths for transfer air if doors completely sealed (e.g. animal room vermin sealing).


Engineer Transfers to Suite In Order to Minimize Pressure in Space During Failure Mode and Initial Testing


Primary Containment Biosafety Cabinets Have Known Openings But Provide Containment


Sealing and Inspection of Barrier Penetrations Eliminates UncontrolledLeakage Paths for Contaminants and Decontamination Gas

Engineered Transfers Are Sealed Similar to BSC Opening for Decon Process

17


Pressurization Monitor and Alarm


Airflow Requirements

Standards and Guideline Recommendations Vary

Minimum Airflow Therefore Must Be Identified in Risk Assessment Based Criteria

18


SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS I


Mechanical Systems and Material Options

Only one system option for biocontainment HVAC main systems – All Air

19

Penetration Seal Options:All seals accessible for visual inspectionBio-seal caulk at all penetrations into BSL-3Welded concrete in-bed penetrations sealed air tight BSL-3Ag/4

Space Leak Testing Options:Visual smoke or soap bubble pressure testing of all penetrations for BSL-3 (must define required test pressure and what is an acceptable test results - i.e. no visible leaks)Pressure decay testing @ 2 inches water column pressure for BSL-3Ag/4

Duct Testing Options:Standard SMACNA duct leakage test for BSL-2 - SMACNA defines acceptable leakage and test pressure for duct classification (not acceptable in biocontainment lab). Must define project requirements in specifications (seal class, duct pressure class, acceptable leakage)Pressure decay or helium leak testing may be required for BSL-3Helium leakage test for BSL-3Ag/4 (i.e. test at 4 inches water column pressure). Coordinate with ductwork specification.

Ventilation Control Options:Directional Air FlowActive Room Pressure control



HEPA Filter Testing Options:Standard DOP Test (uses “average” efficiency)Filter Scan Testing - tests positive seal at filter/housing and test for large leaks recommended)

Monitor/Alarm Options:Monitor/alarm each space locally – CONSIDER AUDIBLE PER BMBLMonitor locally, alarm locally and centrallyMonitor locally, alarm locally, in all adjacent spaces and centrally

Redundancy Requirements:N+1 recommended for BSL-3N+1 required for BSL-3Ag/4

Zone Isolation Options:Individual room - allows each room to be decontaminatedSuite isolations - requires shut down of entire suite of spaces for decontamination

Source: Flanders Filters



20

Duct/Terminal Device Material Options:Standard galvanized steel construction may be applicable for lower containment (no gas decon - per ANSI Z9.5 only use standard construction for “light duty systems”)

Welded stainless steel recommended where gas decontamination, pressure decay or helium leak testing is required

Gas tight welded stainless steel ductwork required for BSL-3Ag/4 (helium leak testing may be a requirement)

Exhaust System Options:HEPA filtration at all primary containment devices is required

HEPA filtration of general room exhaust may be required may be required for BSL-3 (recommended for aerosolized work)

HEPA filtration of exhaust required for BSL-3Ag/4



Supply System Layout Options:Dedicated Supply Air System for each containment level

Combined BSL-2/3 with system backflow prevention

Supply Backflow Prevention Options:HEPA Filtration (static protection not mechanical system). Filtration option on supply impacts system pressure requirements for all areas served

Bubble tight damper with automatic closing actuators



21

HVAC Room Isolation Strategy:

Electronic Isolation + Control Valves- $$$$

Manual Isolation + Control Valves - $$$

Shut-off Valves - $$

HEPA Filtration Strategy:

Parallel HEPA Caisson - $$$$

Single HEPA Caisson - $$$

Room Side Replaceable HEPA - $$




System Layout Options

Top Floor with Interstitial

Lower Floor with Interstitial

22

REMOTE HEPA FILTERS


System Layout Options

Lower Floor with Adjacent Mechanical Space

Lower Floor with Remote HEPA

• Coordinate equipment alarms with matrix

• Some labs require reports to comply with CDC, USDA, AAALACand other regulatory bodies



23

Supply Diffuser



Lab BSC Exhaust Connection



24



• Clearly Identify All Applicable Codes, Standards & Criteria At Beginning of Design – Owners Project Specific Requirements

• MEP Systems & Controls Are Complex. Reduce Complexity Whenever Possible

• Definition of Secondary Containment Barrier is Critical For Design & Commissioning


Tradeline Takeaways

25


Questions?

MODULE #4 | MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, PLUMBING IMichael Walsh | Principal, R.G. Vanderweil Engineers, LLP

274 Summer Street, Boston, MA 02210(T) 617-423-7423 (F) 617-423-7401

[email protected]

Date:

Session:

Presenters:

Metrics

Tools

Resources

Innovative Ideas

Proofs

Date:

Session:

Presenters:

Metrics

Tools

Resources

Innovative Ideas

Proofs

Date:

Session:

Presenters:

Metrics

Tools

Resources

Innovative Ideas

Proofs

Documents

MODULE #4 MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, PLUMBING … · 2017-07-11 · LEED IEQ: 0.02” w.c. average, 0.004” w.c. minimum (LEED 2009) 2011 ASHRAE: ... Sealing light fixtures; Sealing