Modos de Explicação 1 Cap Palgrave

Contents

List of Figures ix

Preface xiii Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber

Acknowledgments xvii

Context

1 Introduction: Thoughts on Explanation 3 Michael Lissack and Abraham Grabe r

2 A Place in History 17 Alicia Juarrero

3 The Context of Our Query 25 Michael Lissack

Case Study

4 Case Study: Creationism 59 Zack Kopplin

Examining the Case

5 Scientific Realism on Historical Science and Creationism 75 Abraham Graber

6 A Pragmatic Constructivist Take on the Case 93 Michael Lissack

Dialogue

7 Robustness and Explanation 109 William Wimsatt

8 A Mode of “Epi-Thinking” Leads to the Exploration of Vagueness and Finality 115 S. N. Salthe

Copyrighted material – 9781137406453


viii ● Contents

9 Complexity, Ockham’s Razor, and Truth 121 Kevin T. Kelly and Konstantin Genin

10 Getting a Grip 133 Nancy J. Nersessian

11 Modes of Explanation: Complex Phenomena 143 Sandra Mitchell

12 Narrative as a Mode of Explanation: Evolution and Emergence 151 Rukmini Bhaya Nair

13 Economic Explanations 161 Paul Thagard

14 Narratives and Models in Complex Systems 171 Timothy F. H. Allen, Edmond Ramly, Samantha Paulsen, Gregori Kanatzidis, and Nathan Miller

15 Evaluating Explanations through Their Conceptual Structures 197 Steven Wallis

16 Investigating the Lay and Scientific Norms for Using “Explanation” 203 Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Andrew Higgins, and Joseph Spino

Conclusion 215 Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber

Afterword 1: The Scientific Attitude Toward Explanation 229 Lee McIntyre

Afterword 2: Explanation Revisited 233 Jan Faye

Afterword 3: Is The World Completely Intelligible? A Very Short Course 241 Peter Achinstein

Afterword 4: Explanation and Pluralism 249 Beckett Sterner

Reprise 257 Michael Lissack

References 263

Suggestions for Further Reading 285

Notes on Contributors 289

Index 295



MODES OF EXPLANATION Copyright © Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber, 2014.

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ISBN: 978–1–137–40645–3

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Modes of explanation : affordances for action and prediction / edited by Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber.

pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–1–137–40645–3 (har : alk. paper) 1. Explanation. I. Lissack, Michael.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Thoughts on Explanation

Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber

This is a book about explanation. Its origins lie in the all too frequent observation that our way of thinking often does not match the world. Such mismatches give rise to ambiguity and uncertainty. The ambi-

guity, in turn, acts as both a constraint on possible actions (including the action of reliable prediction) and the desire to “explain” what is going on. Explanation is the name for the process we use to answer the questions raised by observed ambiguities. Explanation is also the name for the product of such processes. This process/product divergence is merely a hint of the many con-f licting approaches to be found in the contemporary understanding of expla-nation. This book is the first in decades to attempt to bring these conf licting approaches together and to offer a compelling narrative to explore how those conf licts can converge.

Such convergence is important because explanation is important. Often we work with an idiosyncratic conception of explanation—a conception that may not match those of our neighbors. In this dissonance lies both potential gain and potential trauma. The lack of an explanation often leads to either creative inquiry or troubling confrontations between holders of differing beliefs. Such occurrences may be found even when some believe that an explanation has been forthcoming—an “explanation” that others find “explains nothing.”

Explanations are central to our way of navigating the world. Some explana-tions appear in the everyday life of the average person. Thus, the best explana-tion of the fact that there is dog food all over the kitchen f loor is that, while we were away at work, Fido got into the food. Other explanations are more rarified. For example, one might explain the blueness of the sky in terms of the comparatively long wavelength of blue light and the comparative predilec-tion of longer wavelengths to disperse when passing through the atmosphere. There are important similarities and differences between these two sketches of explanation.



4 ● Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber

Contemporary philosophy is characterized by a fascination with explana-tion. The philosophical literature on explanation is rapidly expanding; the philosophical literature that attempts to use explanations is vast. This fasci-nation with explanation appears to correspond with the contemporary trend toward naturalized philosophy. More and more, philosophers are coming to take their cues from the sciences. Thus, philosophers are increasingly expend-ing energy on studying the methods and results of the sciences. Explanation appears to be central to the practice of actual scientists; a brief glance at scientific practice suggests that scientists are in the business of offering explanations.

This focus on scientific practice, however, overlooks an important set of practitioners who also rely heavily on explanation. Explanation is important for managers, consultants, entrepreneurs, investors, and so on. The parallels between the work of these practitioners and the work of scientists are notable. Just as scientists construct explanations to make sense of observed phenom-ena, practitioners create explanations to make sense of the world around them. Furthermore, just as scientists use accepted explanations to make the world respond as they want it to, practitioners rely on explanation to navigate the complicated social, financial, and political world that they inhabit. In each case, explanations allow humans to manipulate the world successfully. Put another way, explanations offer affordances (Gibson, 1977). Some of these may be affordances for action; others are affordances for prediction.

There are, however, also important differences between the ways in which scientists and practitioners construct and use explanations. The scientist aims to use established explanations as a starting point for the production of fur-ther, true explanations. In practice, the scientist makes use of explanations as the basis on which to make predictions. Successful predictions, in turn, help to generate the theories that then become the basis for further expla-nations. The practitioner’s aims are more pragmatic. The practitioner relies on explanations insofar as they are useful; that is, truth is incidental to the practitioner’s aims. Explanations have value if they lead to affordances for action. Explanations have little value if they do not create an affordance but rather merely offer more description. For the scientific realist, an explanation is good if it is accurate. Pragmatic success is, at best, a secondary desideratum. Priorities are reversed for the practitioner: for the practitioner, an explanation is good if reliance on the explanation leads to pragmatic success. Truth is, at best, a secondary goal.

The distinction is perhaps best illustrated by considering two disciplines, each of which is interested in offering explanations: physics and economics. Physics offers reductive explanations in terms of the properties of the constitu-ents and sub-constituents of matter. For the past century, Western thinking has been guided by the physics paradigm: the world is organized around discrete objects that aggregate and have simple relationships. Everything is explainable through rules, laws, and algorithms. The observer is not a part of the observa-tion but is external to the closed systems under consideration.



Introduction ● 5

Economics carries the mark of the last century of Western thought and so is modeled on the physics paradigm. Physics has been strikingly successful; economics, less so. There are at least two fundamental differences between the object of study of physics and that of economics. While physics studies the interactions of mindless particles, economics studies the interactions of auton-omous and semiautonomous agents. Furthermore, while in the study of physics the physicist stands outside of the closed system being studied, the same cannot be said of the economist.

Despite the successes of the frame of thinking that characterized physics, it has a serious deficiency: How can it be that the actions and behaviors of ref lexive, anticipatory creatures are best described by rules for nonthinking, non-ref lexive, non-anticipatory objects? How can it be that context is deemed not to matter? And what about complexity or those relationships that cannot be described by the simple? The physics-based frame has no answer and instead discards these issues with the magic words ceteris paribus (“all other things being equal”). Ceteris paribus clauses need not be problematic for the physicist, for physics studies closed systems. However, we do not live in a closed system; thus, the need arises for some other frame of thought to enable our tools for understanding to be adequate for the world around us.

The philosophical literature suggests that explanation and understand-ing, while intertwined, are also different. Ricoeur’s (1973, 1974) hermeneu-tical method, for example, unfolds through the dialectic of understanding, explanation, and comprehension. Understanding seems to be better thought of as the acceptance of a structure into which the target understanding can be “comfortably placed.” Another way of saying this is that understanding involves locating the target into a context in which it seems to be coher-ent. While contexts are often quite large, the frames we use when seeking to explain need not be. If the mode of our explanation is to place the target into a pre-given structure, then both context and frame will be as large or small as the structure itself. If, by contrast, the mode of our explanation is to detail a mechanism for “how” something happens or the conditions that “allow” for action to occur, then the context will be large but the frame rather small. This contrast between frame and context ref lects the notion that each explanation we encounter contributes to the larger environment that in the aggregate makes up our cognitive understanding. This contrast also sheds some light on the role that recursive inquiry among description, explanation, and understanding can have in constituting and revising our cognitive envi-rons (cf. Runciman, 1983).

Forms of explanation are themselves context dependent. Social systems dif-fer from physical systems in that the use of theories changes the behavior of social systems. As participants in these systems act, they do so on the basis of ref lexive consideration of context, goals, and affordances drawing on their own mental models (which are themselves the product of prior contexts and current attention) in anticipation of possible outcomes. These recursive ref lex-ive considerations (or as Piaget (1929) would have called it, learning through




actions) have no parallel among the physical sciences. The additional consider-ations give rise to questions of objectivity, discovery, and the basis for scientific explanation.

The basis for social sciences and design (pragmatic assumptions) is differ-ent from the “hard” sciences. There is a need to deal with ideas and commu-nication in social systems. Thus, the philosophy of science needs expansion to include paths to the potential logics of the social sciences. Example questions might include asking “What is the basic unit (individual, group, set, dynamic, environment, etc.)?” Sciences of the sentient will require different languages and different frameworks of thinking than are commonly used in the hard sciences of non-sentient beings. Meta-level thinking is an opportunity that can create the need for new strategies of simplification so as to meet requisite variety.

Objectivity and a goal of reliable predictivity are the hallmarks of what we shall label Science 1. These are the hard sciences as traditionally taught and as used as references by philosophers of science. Physics is the exemplar of Science 1. In the Science 1 world, we label and categorize via deduction, probabilistic inference, and induction. Science 1 excludes context dependence; thus, when it is forced to deal with the possibility instead asserts ceteris paribus .

Discovery and attunement to context are the hallmarks of what we shall refer to as Science 2. In the Science 2 world, we instead seek to identify rela-tionships, affordances, and potential actions. We ask questions rather than seek to label or categorize. Science 2 explicitly makes room for the context dependencies that Science 1 has excluded. These can be characterized as emer-gence, volition, ref lexive anticipation, heterogeneity, and design, among oth-ers. The philosophical sources necessary to understand the hermeneutics of social experience can be found in the field known as systems sciences, with a focus on the underlying models, feedback loops, ref lection, and anticipa-tion that goes by the label of systems thinking. In the social science modeling embraced by systems science, apparent inconsistencies raised by the inclusion of the observer are replaced by a need to pay close attention to processes and to multiple adjacent possibles. Once participants are admitted as part of the process being modeled and their decision-making and design abilities are taken into account, then the multiple possibilities to which they give rise must also be taken into account and not seen as contradictory. The broad applicability of context dependence and observer questions throughout the anticipatory sci-ences demands the exploration of both logical foundations and narrative appli-cation. The possibility for implementation or “action” lies in the reconciliation of experience and models in the “anticipatory” science.

The inability of Science 1 models to capture the essence of Science 2 events adequately has been well documented. For example, consider social science domains where ref lexivity and ref lexive anticipation are characteristic traits of actors. Actors can become ref lexive by learning and by modifying their cogni-tive repertoire. More advanced forms of ref lexive anticipation at the actor’s level occur when actor A possesses an image of actor B’s image of A, actor B an image of actor A’s image of B, and so on (the explicit basis of interaction in



Introduction ● 7

Gordon Pask’s (1976) Conversation Theory). Learning and the acceptance of error as part of context add to the recursive ref lexive loop. For example, the dual function of DNA in a cell as a machine for maintaining and reproducing an organism and as a code for reproducing an organism makes it highly self-ref lexive. Likewise, the neural networks in the brain are also self-organized in a ref lexive manner. A challenge arises whenever a researcher becomes part of the domain of investigation itself. The act of observing systems poses a series of challenges in terms of interactions, consensus-building, and results.

Concurrent but Orthogonal—How the Domains of Science 1 and Science 2 Entwine

If we start from a puzzling action, the story we tell places that action in a tem-poral continuum, relating it to previous actions and events that led up to it; and it places the action also in relation to a future scenario or set of possible futures. The original action was puzzling in part because we didn’t have its temporal con-text . . . we illuminate the unfamiliar by relating it to the familiar . . . Causality, however, with which the early covering-law theorists tried to link the elements of a narrative, is totally out of place here. A perceived situation, an emotional reac-tion, taking on a goal and initiating a plan for reaching it, these do not cause the action but serve to motivate it . . . the causal account leaves out a conscious agent whose relation to the antecedent situation is at least a subjective and practical, if not a deliberative, one . . . Common-sense discourse about human behavior is thus seen as a kind of aspiring but deficient explanatory endeavor, trying hard but failing to do what real science is now presumably able—or soon will be able—to do, namely to explain, predict, and control human behavior . . . One thing that seems not to be considered is that the context of everyday interac-tion might have other motivations than the search for laws, causal explanations, prediction, and control that we associate with the ideas of natural and biological science. (Carr, 2008)

Human behavior—indeed, any behavior that occurs in the domain of Science 2—is contingent and context dependent. Change the context or the cogni-tive environs and the behavior is likely to change. The domain of Science 1 is quite different. In the hard sciences, contingency is an enemy of prediction and control. The contingent is thus to be eliminated if possible and controlled for ( ceteris paribus ) if not.

Given this role for contingency, the rough-and-ready distinction between Science 1 and Science 2 is epistemic; it may or may not have an ontological cor-relate. At some point, the epistemic tools of the physicist cease to be helpful. The world can no longer be treated as constituted by discrete closed systems, describable solely in terms of simple relationships. This rough-and-ready dis-tinction can be illustrated through the use of a continuum—a Mobius strip ( Figure I.1 ).

In our continuum (pictured as a one-sided loop), the world as we encounter it in the raw is undifferentiated, and it is we who do the differentiations who allow for cognition. Along the simple and ordered side of the surface lies the




world as we label and categorize it. Along the complex and attuned side of the surface lies the world as we act in it.

These two sides of the surface have strikingly different characteristics despite being part of a continuous surface. The simple and ordered side on the right (Science 1) corresponds roughly to our traditional way of thinking. It excludes context dependence. It is the world of reliable predictions, truth claims, and invariants. The complex and attuned side on the left (Science 2) corresponds to a more relationship way of thinking. It explicitly includes context dependence. This is the world of affordances, anticipations, and actions. It is devoid of truth claims in favor of abductive hypotheses.

The very notion of what counts as an explanation seems to differ between these two worlds. Adherents of both worldviews in general agree that a descrip-tion of a mechanism in response to a “how?” question constitutes an explana-tion. The disagreements arise over the kinds of answers offered in response to a “why?” question, those that tend to arise when an expectation is not met. While the Science 1 worldview inquires “why” as a means of revealing “truth” and will keep asking until this criterion is met (an optimization strategy), the Science 2 worldview inquires “why” as a foundation for further action (or non-action) and will stop asking when a satisfactory narrative has been offered (a satisficing strategy). The discussion that follows will attempt to outline the basis for these orthogonal divergences.

Traditionally, Science 1 is concerned with regularities. Thus, observations of individual events or occurrences are important only to the extent that the occurrence of such an individual event is the basis for the falsification of a claim about regularities. Within the Science 1 context, the answers to ques-tions of “why” concern the placement of regularities (observed or conjectured) within an overall schema of regularities. The relevant questions seem to be those of order and of fit. Both further descriptions of regularities within an ordered regime (functional explanation) and measurements of adherence to a “pure” (noncontingency messed-with) regularity are both offered and accepted as “explanatory.” The “how?” question implied by the “why?” questions is “How

Figure I.1 Science I and Science 2.



Introduction ● 9

does this fit within the established order?” where the answer is a mechanism for how fit happens.

Some of the unarticulated assumptions in the Science 1 worldview are the pre-givenness of an established order, the idea that there “should” be fidelity to that order, that the correct granularity for inquiry is at the level of regularities, and that regularities can be referred to adequately by labels and models. Given these assumptions, it is reasonable to eliminate contingency with a further claim of ceteris paribus , to treat “fit” as measurable, to rely on noun forms, and to posit “truth” as a justificatory variable. While each of these “reasonable” approximations can be discarded in the pursuit of “better explanation,” our human cognitive limits and our reliance on the “least action principle” enable us to simplify “why” explanations in the Science 1 world as category member-ship questions, and allows a pragmatic scientific realism to guide the articula-tions of the abbreviated worldview that results.

In the Science 2 world, the focus is on individual actions and occurrences, whereas the regularities of Science 1 are part of the context in which these indi-vidual events occur. In Science 2, the “why?” questions tend to demand answers in the form of narrative—here are the constraints/affordances that given this particular context allowed or prevented a particular action. Once again, the “least action principle” combined with human cognitive limits means that while a particular context includes an infinitude of variables, the observer/actor is limited in what is attended to and processed. The regularities that are the granular focus of Science 1 frequently are treated as “assumed” in the atten-tion/cognition processing of Science 2. The granular focus of Science 2 is on individual actions and events and the regularities are part of the context.

Some of the unarticulated assumptions in the Science 2 worldview are the contingency and context dependence of any observed or assumed order, the idea that “fidelity” to any particular order only has relevance as part of an observation/expectation/further action feedback loop, that the correct granu-larity for inquiry is at the level of individuality, and that regularities can be referred to only contingently by labels and models. Given these assumptions, it is never reasonable to eliminate contingency with a further claim of ceteris paribus (for in that claim one might eliminate the explanatory variables them-selves), to treat measurement of deviance from expectations as a further con-tingent variable in the feedback loop, to rely on verb forms, or to posit actions as a justificatory variable. While each of these “reasonable” approximations can be discarded in the pursuit of “better explanation,” our human cognitive limits and our reliance on the “least action principle” allow us to simplify “why” explanations in the Science 2 world as narratives about affordances and constraints, and allow a pragmatic constructivism to guide the articulations of the abbreviated worldview that results.

The differences between Science 1 and Science 2 echo as we seek to answer: “What do we mean by explanations and how are we comfortable with them?” The two perspectives ask different questions that might affect what we believe or do not believe about explanations. Are we looking at the right things? Are




we self-aware of our beliefs? Do we have the right words? Do we know the limitations of what we are talking about? The two perspectives also offer differ-ent typologies of kinds of explanations. In both perspectives, there are “how” explanations or mechanisms. In both, there are “why” explanations, although in Science 1 “why” is with reference to a pre-given structure, while in Science 2 “why” refers to a sense of purpose. Then there are contingent explanations, which only happened because some context enabled them to happen, so when you offer an explanation you say: “Here was the context.” There are but-for explanations—something else should have happened, but it did not, and this filled the gap. Finally, there are two more explanatory types that, as Sandy Mitchell (this volume) puts it, are not an explanation but nonetheless happen all the time: coercive explanations—“Because my mother said so” or some more powerful force—and “explain away” explanations, where you explain the con-tingencies as a result of whose occurrence the expected observation/action did not happen, or so we claim.

In Science 1 terms, explanations either describe a mechanism or suggest that things belong to a category. The mechanism tells us the how, and the better we can get in describing the mechanism, the better we think the explanation is. Category membership in a way asserts a “why”—“This happened because she was nice.” Science 1 explanations are seldom satisfactory to either the explainer or the recipient unless the explanation is causal. (There is more on causal expla-nations in later chapters.) By contrast, Science 2 explanations are seldom general enough to assert causality in any kind of a reliably predictive way. Science 2 has more room for the notion that “how” and “why” can collide with each other, and that when they do sometimes you do not know what is going on. Science 2 explanations of the “explain away” varieties do make causal claims, but they are claims about what might have/should have/would have/could have happened had some set of contingencies not been present. The resulting explanation is more of a descriptive narrative of those very contingencies along with the asser-tion of some more general (Hempel’s covering law? Woodward’s general rule regarding interventions?) structure or mechanism that, had ceteris paribus held, would have cohered to the explainer’s perspective of how the world works.

Figure I.2 Differences between Science 1 and Science 2.



Introduction ● 11

While Science 1 explanations allow for and are structured around predic-tions, Science 2 explanations suffer from the contingencies accompanying explicit rejection of ceteris paribus . As such, these explanations by definition allow for a series of possible errors that are seldom found or asserted in the Science 1 world. These errors include the possibility of the wrong model being used, the wrong contingencies happening or failing to happen, overlooked con-text, inadequate metaphor, inappropriate synecdoche, misdirected awareness or attention, intervening volition or coercion, and incommensurable worldviews.

Despite these differences, we must remember that Science 1 and Science 2 are on the same surface and part of the same continuum (that Mobius strip in Figure I.1 ). As such, our mission is trying to make sense of this giant muddle, define what we mean, suggest where it might work and where it might not, and then try to explore what it is that we are talking about.

Worldviews

Some of our contributors have suggested that the muddle of explanation and its “meaning” that we describe above can be clarified when approached from the perspective of scientific realism; still others suggested that the answer can be found in the perspective known as pragmatic constructivism. The philosophy of science literature often portrays these perspectives in opposition; much like the worlds of Science 1 and Science 2. It can be very tempting to attempt an overlay and then to suggest that Science 1 can be mapped to scientific realism and Science 2 to pragmatic constructivism. However, as the collection of chap-ters in this book will reveal, such a mapping is far too simple and overlooks the very nuances that make the question of explanation of interest.

Exploration requires perspective and the philosophy of science offers two perspectives that seem to be helpful. Scientific realism is often modeled as taking Newtonian physics to be the paradigm instance of science: other sci-ences are understood via assimilation to the Newtonian model; explanations are understood to be reductionist and law driven. While the scientific realism practiced by scientists and philosophers is much more nuanced, what it shares with the “common-sense” version is an underlying belief in the independent existence of reality and of the fundamental importance of truth. The takeaway of importance here is that scientific realism makes truth claims, judges those claims for coherence against a pre-given world, and affords as “real” entities whose existence cannot be observed and can only be inferred.

The pragmatic constructivism approach begins by asking what actions are being contemplated and how judgments regarding those actions can be arrived at. The key to these observations lies in the recognition of the ontological difference between natural entities and those that are the product of human construction—while the “natural” entities can be referred to as “pre-given” and thus “described” (functional explanation), human constructions are always changing and requisite explanations demand mechanisms and explication of relationships. This form of constructivism is less concerned with the idea that man “constructs” reality and more with the notion that “what matters” is the




representation of a supposed reality with which we opt to deal at a given time. Truth is thus irrelevant and “reality” is observer dependent.

Without taking a stance on the issue, this volume considers questions such as: Is the philosopher’s focus on scientific explanation myopic? Are important philosophical issues being overlooked by ignoring the use to which practitio-ners put explanations? Explanation as the focus of inquiry provides a fertile arena for the exploration of these questions. And, at least with respect to the domain of explanation, this book offers a compelling narrative on how the two worldviews can be reconciled.

The narrative takes the form of an enacted hermeneutic circle. Because we were holding a conference, those in attendance had the luxury of engaging in dialogue, questioning authors of text on both content and intent, inquiring as to the underlying context that gave rise to each of the intended and inferred meanings, and engaging in recursive ref lexive conversation. This is not to sug-gest that stable eigen values were reached regarding any of the myriad of topics so discussed, but rather highlights the processes and routines in which the participants engaged. In presenting this book, we aim similarly to engage both authors and readers in a hermeneutic cycle. Our concept is to do so in as prag-matic a way as possible given that you the reader cannot (without significant effort) directly engage with the authors themselves. Our pragmatic hermeneu-tics herein consists of presenting a multitude of authors speaking in their own voice and then giving the reader the opportunity to engage and ref lect. As edi-tors, we have restricted our voices to defined chapters, interjections before and after the chapters of others, and the conclusion.

To keep our task within the definition of the scientific enterprise as sug-gested by Nagel (1979)—the distinctive aim of the scientific enterprise as being theories that offer systematic and responsibly supported explanations—our hermeneutics is similar to that advocated by Gadamer:

“Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is that all understanding involves not only interpretation, but also application. Against an older tradition that divided up hermeneutics into subtilitas intelligendi (understanding), subtilitas expli-candi (interpretation), and subtilitas applicandi (application), a primary thesis of Truth and Method is that these are not three independent activities to be relegated to different sub-disciplines, but rather they are internally related. They are all moments of the single process of understanding.” (Bernstein, 1982) “The best definition for hermeneutics is: to let what is alienated by the character of the written word or by the character of being distantiated by cultural or histori-cal distances speak again . . . the movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to the part and back to the whole. Our task is to expand the unity of the understood meaning centrifugally . . . Let us think of this structure in a dynamic way; the effective unity of the anticipated meaning comes out as the comprehen-sion is enlarged and renovated by concentric circles. The perfect coherence of the global and final meaning is the criterion for the understanding. When coherence is wanting, we say that understanding is deficient. The harmony of all the details with the whole is the criterion of correct understanding. The failure to achieve this harmony means that understanding has failed.” (Gadamer)



Introduction ● 13

Approximately half of the authors in this volume hold one belief or the other with respect to scientific realism and some form of pragmatic constructivism. The interchange between these two worldviews formed the heart of the inter-esting dialogue during our event: Modes of Explanation. Both perspectives have a concern for explanation by means of category membership. Still other kinds of explanation raise concerns for one perspective and not the other. For example, functional explanations are not explanatory from the perspective of pragmatic constructivism, because a functional explanation fails to create any kind of first-order affordance for action (descriptions may provide background information, and thus create a second-order affordance, but fail to create an enablement or a constraint on action in and of themselves). By contrast, the two kinds of context-dependent explanations that play critical roles in prag-matic constructivism—explanations that point to aspects of the context that enabled such-and-such and explanations that point to aspects of the context such that, were these contexts absent, this-and-that would have come about—are similarly not considered to be explanatory from the perspective of the scien-tific realist, for each kind of “explanation” points to contingent features of the world as opposed to bottoming out in robust, exceptionless laws.

Rich (2011), in his farewell column in the New York Times , noted that the pressures of writing for a readership “can push you to have stronger opinions than you actually have, or contrived opinions about subjects you may not care deeply about, or to run roughshod over nuance to reach an unambiguous con-clusion.” We believe that unambiguous conclusions about the nature of expla-nations are a mistake and thus have undertaken to find a way to preserve the very ambiguity that gives nuance its due.

To accomplish this, a concept that we believe helps to reconcile the Science 1 and Science 2 perspectives is the notion of concurrent but orthogonal. Science 1 and Science 2 are indeed different, but they are not oppositional. They are also not “super-positional,” where one would claim a status of truth only in the light of a revealed contingency. Concurrent but orthogonal suggests a simulta-neity that is perpendicular, much like the planes in Figure I.3 .

Figure 1.3 Perpendicular planes.




Of course, these planes are not existing in their own space, but have a con-text—thus the shape we suggest looks more like the plane-crossed ellipsoid in Figure I.4 .

Initially we conjecture that the intersecting planes can be thought of as the two Sciences (1 and 2) and the two philosophies of science (scientific realism and pragmatic constructivism). This conception helped us shape the conference, the workshops, and this book. Yet the exercise of organizing, gathering, speaking, listening, transcribing, questioning, editing, and writ-ing has led to a revision in this conception. We now are suggesting that the two planes are those of ontology—represented by the Mobius strip of the two Sciences —and epistemology—represented by a model of question genera-tion that we will further discuss in chapter 5 and beyond. This question-generation model represents a guide to the pragmatic hermeneutic process (see Figures I.5 and I.6 ).

Figure I.5 Question-generation model.

Figure I.4 Plane-crossed ellipsoid.



Introduction ● 15

This question-generation model allows the simple mappings of scientific realism and Science 1 and pragmatic constructivism and Science 2 to be avoided. What it does instead is to demand that framing issues be reexamined and not merely assumed. It is designed to help avoid the errors described by Kahneman (2011): “We are ruined by our own biases. When making decisions, we see what we want, ignore probabilities, and minimize risks that uproot our hopes.” By making assumptions (and in so doing restricting ourselves to a set of labels and a model), we predetermine what might be learned, which will limit the options that appear to be open to us. As Kahneman says: “We often fail to allow for the possibility that evidence that should be critical to our judgment is missing. What we see is all there is.” Gould’s (2011) take is: “We therefore fail to note important items in plain sight, while we misread other facts by forc-ing them into preset mental channels, even when we retain a buried memory of actual events.” Further, Piattelli-Palmarini (1994) notes: “we take up only those actions and solutions that have an immediate effect on the situation, and always as they have been framed for us.”

Concurrent but orthogonal is a very different way of thought. It calls for mapping the f low of ideas on the ellipsoid shown in Figure I.3 . Given that frame, the world can look very different. The following quotes help to frame the idea. Dewey speaks of new thoughts and new perceptions, as does Gadamer. Gould tells us that the framing takes place in stories, and Rorty reminds us of our goal: coping with the reality in which we find ourselves.

No matter how ardently the artist might desire it, he cannot divest himself, in his new perception, of meanings funded from his past intercourse with his surroundings, nor can he free himself from the inf luence they exert upon the substance and manner of his present being. If he could and did there would be nothing left in the way of an object for him to see. (Dewey, 1934)

Figure I.6 Question-generation model.




The truth of experience always implies an orientation toward new experiences. That is why a person who is called experienced has become so not only through experiences but is also open to new experiences. The consummation of his expe-rience, the perfection that we call “being experienced” does not consist in the fact that someone already knows everything better than anyone else. Rather the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had, and the knowl-edge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experi-ences and to learn from them. (Gadamer, Truth and Method ) [S]ince we cannot observe everything in the blooming and buzzing confusion of the world’s surrounding richness, the organizing power of canonical stories leads us to ignore important facts readily within our potential sight, and to twist or misread the information that we do manage to record. Canonical stories predict-ably “drive” facts into definite and distorted pathways that validate the outlines and necessary components of these archetypal tales. (Gould, 2011) Knowledge is not a matter of getting reality right . . . but rather a matter of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality. (Rorty, 1991)



abduction, 78, 223accidentalism, 97–8, 102Achinstein, 34, 206, 241–2, 244, 246, 248,

263, 285, 293affordance, 4–6, 8–9, 13, 35–6, 40, 53, 55,

81, 85, 95–6, 101–4, 138, 141, 220, 225, 227, 249, 258, 269, 274

Allen, 38, 171–2, 174, 176, 178, 180, 182–4, 186, 188, 192, 194, 198, 263, 271, 275, 279, 283, 292

alliances, 45ambiguities, 3, 13, 44, 53, 89, 117, 151,

204, 209, 257analog, 36, 49, 163, 184–6, 260, 270, 286,

291analogy, 27, 47, 49, 82, 125, 137, 164, 168–

9, 185–8, 219, 223, 260–1, 292Aristotle, 20–1, 144, 157, 186, 242, 263,

278Ashby, xiv, 199, 263Austin, 34, 97–8, 103, 263

Bakhtin, 38, 263Barker, 37, 263Barondes, 32, 264Bauerlein, 49, 264Beatty, 148, 264Bechtel, 23, 28, 45, 135, 264Beck, 222, 264behavior, 5, 7, 18, 31, 34, 37, 39–41, 43, 45,

48, 78, 87, 102, 110, 112, 136–9, 143–7, 154, 162, 175, 177, 188, 198–9, 220, 229–31, 233, 238, 242–3, 268, 271, 274, 277–80, 282, 287, 289, 291, 293

Behe, 75, 264

belief, 3, 10–11, 13, 17, 20, 22, 25, 29, 32, 44–5, 51, 59–60, 66, 68, 70, 77, 79–80, 84, 90, 93–5, 97–8, 102–4, 122, 126–7, 130, 134–5, 154, 156–8, 163–5, 167, 197, 204, 218, 230, 234, 236, 238, 260, 264, 266, 270, 273, 277, 281, 283, 291

Bernstein, 12, 218, 264Bertalanffy, 202, 281Bhaskar, 224, 264biology, 7, 27, 30–1, 34, 44, 48, 61, 63–4,

69, 77, 91, 99, 115–16, 118–19, 133–5, 138–41, 143–4, 147–50, 152–4, 156, 163, 169–70, 172–8, 181, 187, 193–7, 199, 202, 215, 219, 236–7, 255, 263–6, 269–71, 273–6, 278–83, 286–7, 290–1, 293–4

Blunden, 225, 264Boden, 25, 264Bohm, 182, 217, 264Braverman, 205, 265Broad, 6, 116, 144, 205, 224, 255, 265, 292Bruner, 45–6, 265Buber, 217Bunge, 47, 265Bunzl, 30, 265

Cabrera, 197, 199, 265Carnap, 26–7, 265Caro, 39, 267Carr, 7, 219, 265Cartwright, 134, 148, 245, 265–6category, 6, 8–10, 13, 19, 21, 26–8, 35–6,

40–2, 78, 80, 143–4, 151, 163, 200–1, 203–4, 216, 220, 231, 235, 238, 276, 287

Index



296 ● Index

cause, 7, 10, 22, 25–6, 28, 30–7, 39–40, 42–3, 46–54, 63–5, 78, 84, 87, 91, 95, 97, 99, 105, 110, 115–19, 122, 127–30, 138, 143–8, 152–3, 165, 173, 193–4, 199–202, 204, 206, 219–21, 225, 230–1, 234, 238, 242, 246, 253, 256–7, 265, 268–70, 272, 274–5, 277–9, 282–3, 286, 289, 291

Ceteris Paribus, 5, 7, 10–11, 22, 48, 52–3, 148, 291

Checkland, 197Chomsky, 155, 266Churchland, 28, 46, 204, 266codes, 40, 45, 104, 173cognition, 5–7, 9, 18, 29, 31, 35, 45, 47, 49,

54–5, 83–4, 94–5, 99, 102, 104–5, 119, 152–3, 155, 157–8, 162–4, 167–70, 197, 199, 220, 231, 233–7, 239, 264–7, 270–1, 273, 275–6, 279–81, 285–9, 291–3

Cohen, 266, 270, 275Coherence, xv, 11–12, 23, 96–7, 164, 170,

199, 202, 238, 258, 273, 280–1, 283, 287, 289

Colosi, 197, 265complexity, 5, 8, 23, 31, 33–7, 39, 47,

50–2, 64, 88, 99, 102, 104, 112, 119, 121–3, 125, 127, 129, 131, 135, 137, 139, 141, 143–5, 147–52, 155–6, 161, 163, 168–71, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183–5, 187, 192–3, 195–6, 198–200, 203–4, 208, 215–16, 225–6, 229–31, 238, 245, 249–50, 253–7, 263–5, 267, 269, 271–3, 275–6, 278, 280–3, 286–92

complicated, 4, 38, 54, 85, 111, 121, 130, 146, 158, 165, 169, 176–7, 183–5, 198–9, 225, 253, 257

concept, 12–13, 26–7, 29, 31, 41–2, 46–52, 54, 57, 69, 81–2, 91, 95–6, 98, 100–1, 119, 123, 129, 133, 136, 147–9, 151–2, 163, 166, 174, 185, 197–202, 213, 216–17, 219, 221, 225, 229, 249–56, 264–5, 268–72, 274–8, 280–2, 285–7, 290–2, 294

Connell, 182, 266constraint, 3, 9, 13, 37–8, 48, 53, 55,

112–13, 117–19, 137, 205, 233, 274constructivism, 9, 11, 13–15, 31, 39–40,

44–9, 52–3, 73, 76, 79, 83, 86–7, 90, 93–9, 101–5, 110, 117–18, 137–9, 152,

156, 178, 198, 221–2, 224–6, 230, 234–5, 237–8, 249–51, 257–8, 260–1, 263, 266, 268, 273, 275–7, 279–82, 285, 288

context, 1, 5–14, 19–23, 25–7, 29–31, 33–41, 43–5, 47–53, 55, 57, 60, 66, 80–1, 83, 88–90, 93–4, 96, 102–3, 113, 127, 133–5, 141, 143, 146, 150–1, 153, 158, 164, 182, 192, 195, 217, 219, 224–5, 233–6, 242, 246–8, 250–3, 258, 260–1, 265, 267, 274, 276, 286–8

contingency, 7, 9–11, 13, 35, 37, 48, 51, 53, 55, 143, 147–50, 216–17, 224–5, 235, 250, 264

Craik, 38, 46, 266Craver, 28, 31, 55, 135, 203–4, 254, 266,

274, 285creationism, 45, 59–70, 73, 75–7, 79–80,

82, 84–8, 90–5, 97–8, 101–4, 156, 162, 176, 200, 202, 217, 230, 236–7, 250, 263–4, 271–2, 274–5, 277, 290

Cummins, 205, 266Cupchik, 39, 49, 94, 97, 266cybernetics, 45, 261, 263, 270, 281, 283,

289

Dallmyr, 107, 266Danto, 35, 266, 272Darden, 28, 135, 266, 274Darwin, 60, 67, 75–6, 79–80, 86–8, 91,

153, 158, 199, 237, 264, 267–8, 271, 276, 280, 283, 285, 290

Dennett, 152–3, 157, 267description, 4–5, 7–8, 20, 22, 28, 30, 32,

35–6, 43, 48–9, 81–3, 88, 96, 99–101, 103–4, 128, 163, 201, 208, 231, 234, 237–8, 244, 253–4, 257, 277

design, 6, 44, 47, 60, 62, 65–7, 69–70, 76–7, 85–6, 99, 112, 198, 220, 230, 236, 268–70, 274, 279, 283, 285

Devitt, 78, 101, 267Dewey, 15, 50, 267Dilthey, 30, 234, 252Droysen, 30, 234Dubin, 201, 267Duhem, 25, 267

Eco, 21, 153, 267ecological, 31, 36, 76–7, 99, 110, 175, 178,

193, 199, 263, 269, 283, 292



Index ● 297

economics, 4–5, 59, 154–5, 157, 161–5, 167–70, 198, 215, 222, 229–31, 268, 273–4

Edmonds, 49, 267Einstein, 104, 154, 267, 275, 280Elgin, 135, 267Ellerman, 115, 268Elster, 166, 268emerge, 6, 18–19, 21, 23, 35–6, 38, 47–8,

50–1, 59, 94, 97, 99, 118–19, 122, 126, 143–7, 151, 163, 174, 176, 180, 201, 223, 230–1, 238, 245, 250, 252, 255, 261, 268–70, 272–5, 278, 281–2, 286, 289–92

Emmeche, 48, 268environment, 5–6, 29, 32, 36–7, 44–7, 55,

85, 94–6, 99, 101–2, 112, 145, 152, 177, 199, 202, 216, 220, 224–5, 238, 263, 279, 292

episteme, 7, 14, 21–2, 26, 30–1, 34, 36, 39, 41–4, 49, 55, 77, 84–6, 91, 94, 101, 122, 124, 135, 141, 143, 174, 177, 203–4, 220, 223–6, 233, 236, 238, 251, 254, 256, 267–8, 270, 276–7, 279–81, 288, 291, 293–4

Epstein, 105, 268Erbele, 218, 268evidence, 15, 29, 46, 50–1, 54, 57, 59, 65,

69–70, 76–80, 85–7, 93, 95, 100, 103, 121, 134, 145, 153, 158–9, 162, 165–7, 198, 205, 215, 219, 221, 229–31, 236, 265, 269

evolution, 44, 46, 59–70, 73, 75–7, 79, 86–91, 93–5, 97–9, 101–4, 110, 116, 119, 148, 151–3, 155–6, 158, 162, 167, 176, 178, 181–2, 187–8, 193, 199, 230, 236–7, 256, 263–4, 266, 269–71, 273–4, 278–80, 282, 285, 288, 290–1

experience, 6, 16, 28, 38, 44–6, 49–50, 63, 95, 101–2, 104–5, 126, 153, 155, 169, 171–3, 176–8, 181, 183, 192–5, 216–18, 220, 225, 229, 253, 267, 292

fact, 3, 15–17, 19–21, 25, 28–31, 33, 41–2, 44, 46, 48, 50–1, 54, 59, 64, 66–9, 83, 87–8, 91, 94, 96–8, 102–4, 107, 109–10, 113, 119, 135, 138, 151–3, 157, 164, 170–3, 176, 182, 193, 203, 205, 212–13, 219–20, 223, 236–8, 241, 246–7, 249, 255–6, 260, 269–70, 275

falsifiability, 8, 61, 97, 100, 102, 104, 162, 273

Faye, 33–4, 100, 233–4, 236–8, 257, 260, 268, 293

Ferraris, 39, 267foundation, 8, 17, 19–20, 45, 66, 70, 82,

86, 96, 130, 153, 157, 275, 286, 290, 292–3

Fraassen van, 33, 50, 93, 107, 237, 281Franklin, 77, 268Fundierung, 95–7, 103–4, 227Funtowicz, 171, 268

Gabriel, 54, 269Gadamer, 12, 15–16, 217–18, 220, 252, 269Gee, 77, 269Gibson, 4, 101, 269Giere, 107, 237, 286Gilovich, 28, 269Glasersfeld, 45, 97, 281–2Glennan, 34, 36, 48, 269Glymour, 122, 128, 130, 269, 272, 280,

286Goldstein, 144, 269Goodman, 221, 269Gould, 15–16, 152, 269Graber, 3–4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 75–6, 78,

80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 215–16, 218, 220, 222, 224, 226, 234–7, 249–52, 289

Graham, 51, 270Griffiths, 205, 280Guba, 48, 273

Habermas, 222, 270, 288Hacking, 163, 270Ham, 70, 76–7, 79–80, 85, 92, 274, 277Hanson, 33, 50, 270Harmon, 203, 265, 282, 293Hawking, 31, 270Haynie, 116, 270Heidegger, 219, 252Hempel, 10, 22, 26, 28, 32–3, 54–5, 115,

134, 203–4, 243, 254, 270Henderson, 79, 270, 286hermeneutics, 5–6, 12, 14, 25, 216–19,

221, 225–6, 252, 264, 268, 277, 279, 281, 286

Hesse, 39, 263, 270heuristics, 43, 47, 226, 286, 290Higgins, 203, 265, 279, 293



298 ● Index

Hiltzik, 69, 271Hoekstra, 174, 178, 263Hong, 95, 103, 105, 271Horgan, 79, 270Humphreys, 203, 271, 286Husserl, 216

inference, 6, 20–2, 31, 49–50, 57, 68, 78–80, 91, 99, 117, 122, 127, 130, 153, 164–9, 179, 182, 200–1, 219, 252, 264, 276, 279, 286, 291

Juarrero, 17–18, 20, 22, 27, 271, 289–90

Kagan, 30, 271, 286Kahneman, 15, 113, 271, 286Kaidesoja, 42, 45, 52, 271Kaiser, 223, 266, 269, 271, 275, 280–1Kanatzidis, 171, 292Kant, 22, 235, 271Karsenti, 144, 271Keefe, 117, 199, 271, 276Keil, 204, 272, 286Kellert, 31, 272Kelly, 34, 94, 121–2, 124, 126, 128, 130,

272, 291Kennedy, 51, 64, 287Kesseboehmer, 38, 283Keynes, 162–3Kim, 144, 241, 272Kitcher, 28, 50, 122, 272, 278Kleidon, 117, 272Klochko, 198, 272Kopplin, 59–60, 62, 64–70, 75–7, 79, 100,

104, 236, 290Korzybski, 172, 272Koslowski, 77, 273Krummaker, 199, 279Kuhn, 36, 83, 131, 177, 182–3, 237, 273

Labov, 155, 273Lakatos, 162, 273, 293Lane, 197, 271, 273, 278law, 4, 7, 10–11, 13, 18, 21–2, 27, 29–34,

36, 39, 43, 45–6, 48–9, 54, 60–4, 66–7, 71, 89, 93, 100, 103, 107, 109, 112, 115–19, 121, 124, 127, 134–5, 143, 146–50, 154, 158, 174–5, 177, 179–81, 187, 193–4, 199, 216, 219–20, 233, 235, 237, 242–8, 250, 255, 260, 263–6,

270–1, 274–5, 279, 281, 283, 285–7, 290–1, 293

Leibniz, 121level, 6, 9, 23, 29, 39, 52, 54, 61, 65, 67, 69,

109–12, 119, 129, 136, 139, 141, 144–7, 149, 153, 161–3, 167–72, 175, 177–80, 182–3, 187–8, 192, 194–5, 199–201, 203, 217, 221, 231, 235, 238, 247, 252, 255, 268, 275

Levins, 37, 273Lincoln, 48, 273Lipton, 79, 245, 273Lissack, xv, 3–4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 25–6,

28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 93–4, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 215–16, 218, 220, 222, 224, 226, 234–5, 237, 249–52, 257–8, 260, 273, 287, 289

Litt, 204, 281Little, 4, 29, 33, 52, 62–3, 65, 68, 77–80,

118, 124, 138–40, 145, 151, 166, 192, 204, 224

Lobdell, 197, 265Lombrozo, 204, 273Lorand, 29, 273Lucas, 173, 280Lundberg, 47, 274Luskin, 93, 274

Machamer, 28, 135, 274Macklem, 99, 274Mahabharata, 158Maillat, 95, 274Marx, 223, 274Matsuno, 117, 274Matthews, 105, 274McGhee, 75, 274McGrenere, 101, 274mechanism, 5, 8–11, 21, 23, 26, 28, 30–1,

33–4, 36–7, 43, 48, 51–3, 63, 73, 75, 83, 98–9, 101, 111, 135–6, 138–9, 141, 143–7, 161–4, 167–71, 177, 215–16, 234, 236–8, 242–3, 245, 257, 261, 264–6, 269, 274–5, 279–80, 286–7

Meehl, 201, 274Mele, 166, 274memories, 15, 94, 154, 159, 206–12, 265,

278, 286metaphor, 11, 21, 36, 39, 102, 107, 156,

168, 185–8, 197, 225, 250, 266, 270, 277, 285, 287



Index ● 299

method, 4–5, 12, 16, 21, 30–1, 35–7, 47–9, 55, 57, 60–1, 66, 68, 78–80, 84–8, 92, 99–100, 102–5, 121–5, 127–9, 131, 153, 161, 169–70, 172, 177, 180, 196, 198–9, 203, 205, 212, 215, 217, 221, 229–31, 235–7, 248, 250–2, 263, 268–70, 273, 275, 277–9, 282, 291, 293

Meyer, 75, 274Mill, 144, 166, 274Miller, 28, 32, 171, 275, 292mind, 5, 18, 22, 26, 29, 41, 49, 54, 68–70,

73, 79, 83, 85, 90, 94, 107, 119, 130, 143–4, 163–4, 170, 173, 192, 197–9, 201, 235, 241, 251, 253, 257, 264–6, 268–70, 272, 274–7, 279–83, 285–9, 292

Minsky, 168, 275Mitchell, 10, 52, 143–4, 146, 148, 150,

199, 222, 238, 255–6, 275–6, 286, 291Mlodinow, 31, 270mobius strip, 7, 11, 14, 225, 258, 261model, 5–6, 9, 11, 14–15, 22–3, 27–8,

31–3, 35–9, 41, 49, 51–3, 64–5, 84–5, 95, 99–101, 103–4, 107, 115–17, 122, 133–41, 149–50, 164, 169, 171–88, 192–7, 200, 203–4, 208, 210, 216, 218, 222–3, 231, 234–5, 243–4, 249, 251, 254–6, 258, 260–1, 264–7, 269, 272–3, 275–8, 280–3, 286–8, 290–2, 294

Moreno, 48, 275Morgan, 134, 144, 266, 275Morris, 98–9, 275Morrison, 134, 275Mossio, 48, 275

Nagai, 52, 269Nagel, 12, 34, 102, 161, 241–4, 275Nair, 151–2, 154, 156, 158, 255, 275, 291narrative, 3, 6–10, 12, 17–18, 32, 38, 40,

45, 53, 69, 97–8, 151–9, 171, 173–7, 179, 181–8, 192–5, 199, 219, 234, 249–50, 255, 261, 265–6, 273, 275, 283

Nathan, 171, 292Needham, 192, 275Nersessian, 133–4, 136, 138, 140, 204,

222–3, 253, 275–6, 282, 291Neubert, 101, 275Newton, 11, 21, 83, 111, 148, 177, 243,

246–8, 263, 275

Nietzsche, 28, 275Nor, 15, 20, 22, 38, 42, 81, 96, 99, 102,

148, 175, 177, 222, 234–5, 237, 243, 245–7

Nussbaum, 166–7Nye, 76, 274

observe, 3–4, 6–7, 9–10, 12, 16, 27, 37, 41, 55, 76–8, 80, 82, 85, 88, 90, 92, 100–3, 127, 153, 156–7, 172–81, 187–8, 193–5, 202, 216, 237, 258, 260–1, 279

ontology, 7, 11, 14, 17, 19, 21–2, 30, 33, 39–41, 44–5, 48–9, 52, 80, 82–5, 97, 100, 121, 224–6, 235–8, 250–1, 266–7, 271, 280

order, 8–9, 13, 18–19, 25, 28–9, 31, 35, 40, 43, 45, 47, 61–2, 68, 78, 81, 84, 101, 103–4, 110–11, 119, 122, 126–7, 129, 131, 133–5, 139–40, 146, 148–50, 159, 161, 167, 170, 172, 182, 200, 205, 210, 219, 230, 236, 241, 243–5, 249, 255–6, 261, 264, 268, 282

orthogonal, 7–8, 13, 15, 39, 47, 50, 52, 151, 224–6, 249–51, 258, 261

Orzack, 41, 276Oulasvirta, 40–1, 44, 47, 276Overton, 205, 276

Palmarini, 15, 268, 276paradigm, 4–5, 11, 17, 81, 83, 102, 136,

153, 177–8, 182–3, 206, 222–3, 237, 269, 273, 275–6

Pask, 7, 276Passmore, 27, 280Pattee, 174, 177, 276pattern, 17–18, 27–8, 30–2, 37, 40, 42,

45–6, 50–1, 82, 94–5, 103–5, 127–8, 137–8, 144, 157, 165, 179, 201, 248, 256, 271, 278

Paulsen, 171, 292Pearl, 128, 276Perino, 198, 282phenomena, 4, 17, 19–21, 23, 30–2,

35–6, 39, 42–4, 46, 49–50, 52, 54, 73, 75, 79, 89, 96–7, 99, 103–4, 110, 115, 133–6, 138–41, 143, 145, 147, 149–51, 153–5, 170, 223, 230–1, 235, 238, 243–4, 246–7, 256, 268–9, 274, 285



300 ● Index

physics, 4–7, 11, 30–2, 40, 48, 84–6, 89–90, 109, 121, 127, 133–4, 147, 149–51, 154, 156, 170, 174, 192, 222–3, 231–2, 237–8, 241–5, 248, 250, 263, 265, 268, 279, 288

physiology, 30, 119, 168, 274Piaget, 5, 45, 276Piattelli, 15, 268, 276Pinillos, 206, 277Plato, 20, 130, 176Poerksen, 95, 281Poulton, 158, 277Powell, 206, 277Praetorius, 104, 277pragmatics, 4, 6, 9, 11–15, 26, 29, 33, 41,

44–5, 48–51, 55, 66, 73, 81, 85, 93, 95–7, 99, 101–5, 134, 149–50, 152, 203, 216–19, 221, 224–6, 235, 237–8, 249–51, 255–6, 258, 263–4, 268, 271, 274–6, 288, 291, 293

prediction, 3–4, 6–8, 10–11, 16, 21–2, 26, 30, 32–6, 38, 43, 46–7, 49, 55, 76, 78, 99–100, 103–4, 121–2, 127, 130, 133–4, 140, 149, 153–4, 157, 162, 170, 183, 193–4, 200–1, 219–20, 223, 256, 261, 266–8, 280, 283

principle, 9, 18–19, 21, 29, 31, 34, 43, 59, 76, 83, 95, 100, 110–11, 117–19, 121–2, 144, 236, 276

process, 3, 6, 12, 14, 27, 33–4, 36, 44–5, 50, 55, 73, 76, 78, 80, 94–5, 97, 99, 103–5, 107, 111, 115, 117–19, 135, 137, 139, 141, 144, 152–3, 155, 157–8, 169, 176–8, 183, 186–8, 195–8, 204, 208–10, 217, 234, 237, 249, 251–3, 256, 258–60, 271, 279, 288, 292, 294

Prometheus, 18, 279properties, 4, 19, 23, 30, 39, 41, 43, 47,

51, 100–1, 110, 136–7, 143–7, 163, 219–20, 225, 238, 242, 246, 255–6, 279, 289

Psillos, 54, 277psychology, 44, 46, 83–4, 94, 104, 134,

143, 152, 154–5, 162, 164–7, 198, 203–5, 208, 212, 237, 253–5, 264, 266, 268–9, 272, 274, 276–8, 281–2, 286–7, 290–3

Putnam, 237, 276–7

Quine, 20, 28, 277

Raiffa, 161–2Rakover, 31, 35, 271, 273Ravetz, 171, 268Rawls, 221, 277realism, 4, 9, 11, 13–15, 27–9, 32, 37, 39–45,

47–9, 51–4, 73, 75, 77, 79–91, 93, 95–8, 100–1, 104–5, 171–2, 175, 215, 220–6, 230–1, 235, 237–8, 249–1, 258, 261, 264–7, 269–1, 274, 276–80, 285, 287

recursion, 5, 7, 12, 31, 151, 154–5, 217Regt de, 26, 141, 267, 288regularities, 8–9, 22, 31–2, 36, 39, 43,

51–2, 110, 112, 216–17, 224, 282representation, 12, 14, 26, 28, 35, 37, 39,

41–3, 45–6, 97, 99–102, 107, 116, 118, 135, 137–9, 153, 163–4, 167, 185, 200–1, 204–6, 218–20, 222, 234–5, 237, 260–1, 277, 281, 283, 286, 290–3

Rescher, 30, 277, 288Reutlinger, 31, 277Rich, 13, 49, 195, 260, 277Ricoeur, 5, 277Robertson, 93, 98, 277Rorty, 15–16, 21, 28, 49, 104, 220, 277, 281Rosen, 39, 95, 99–100, 172, 174, 177,

184–5, 260, 266, 277–8Rosenberg, 40, 278Rota, 96–7, 278Runciman, 5, 278Russell, 50, 286Russo, 31, 269, 278, 286

Salmon, 22, 26, 30, 33, 43, 47, 51, 201, 203–4, 243, 272, 278

Salthe, 115–19, 222, 263, 274, 278, 290Samarapungavan, 46, 265Satish, 198, 278Sayer, 32, 42, 53, 278Schalk, 201, 266Schank, 32, 46, 52, 54, 278–9Scheines, 128, 279–80, 283Schiele, 199, 279Schruijer, 201, 266Schueler, 38, 40, 279Schutz, 218, 279Scriven, 30, 32, 206, 279Searle, 38, 43, 53, 153, 157, 279sentience, 6, 45, 48, 188Shakespeare, 166Shermer, 29, 31, 279



Index ● 301

Shirvani, 198, 281Shklar, 218, 279Simon, 204, 275, 279–80simple, 6, 9, 34–5, 37, 39, 65, 76, 83, 90,

102, 110, 121–3, 125–31, 139, 177, 198, 219, 229, 231, 245, 251, 272

situated, 7, 15, 19, 25, 27, 35–6, 38, 47, 49–50, 52, 80, 94, 101–2, 104, 117–19, 128, 140, 156, 161, 163, 169, 172–3, 185–6, 195, 216, 229, 233, 235, 245, 260, 270, 280

Smedt, 77, 267Sober, 51, 148, 279–80Soros, 163, 170, 280Souter, 39, 279Sperber, 95, 270, 280Sterelny, 99, 280Stinchcombe, 200, 280stories, 7, 15–19, 23, 28, 31, 38, 45, 54, 67,

70, 82, 84, 93, 113, 121, 123, 128, 136, 145, 147, 151–8, 168, 177, 182–3, 187, 193, 208, 219–20, 223, 225, 230, 255, 277, 285

Stotz, 205, 280structure, 5, 10, 12, 25–7, 31, 33, 36–9,

41–2, 45–6, 49, 53–4, 68, 77, 81, 86, 91, 99, 104, 110, 119, 135–6, 138, 143–4, 146–50, 153–8, 174–8, 180, 184, 186, 188, 197–202, 216, 219, 222, 233–4, 251–5, 257, 260, 266–7, 269, 272–3, 275–6, 278–9, 286, 290, 292

Suchman, 27, 280Suedfeld, 199, 280synecdoche, 11, 95, 102–4, 258system, 4–7, 12, 27, 31, 34, 36–7, 43, 45–8,

54, 59–60, 70, 89, 94, 97, 99–100, 103–4, 110–12, 116, 119, 122–4, 126–7, 133, 135–41, 144–8, 150, 156, 163, 166, 168–71, 173, 175–7, 179–81, 183, 185–7, 192–3, 195, 197–202, 215, 238, 242–3, 251, 255–6, 263–6, 269, 271–2, 275, 277–83, 285, 287–92

Szathmary, 119, 279–80

Tainter, 173, 263, 280Tamminen, 40–1, 44, 47, 276Tetlock, 199, 280Thagard, 161–2, 164, 166, 168, 170, 202,

204–5, 219, 280–1, 291–2Theiner, 45, 281

theorem, 27, 125–7, 129, 218theory, 4–5, 7, 12, 21, 23, 29–32, 35–6,

38–9, 42–3, 45–6, 49, 51, 57, 59, 66–7, 69–70, 75–93, 95–103, 107, 109–10, 121–2, 124–6, 129–31, 134–5, 139, 152–9, 161–2, 164, 166–7, 178, 182–3, 198–205, 208, 210, 215–16, 218–19, 222–3, 229–32, 234, 237–8, 241–2, 244–52, 254–6, 263–83, 285–93

think, 3–6, 8, 10, 12, 20, 28, 35, 49–50, 60–2, 64–70, 75–8, 80–3, 85, 87, 93, 97, 115–17, 119, 122, 124–5, 135, 137–8, 140, 143–4, 149, 152–3, 156–7, 162–9, 171, 173, 182, 192, 195, 197, 202, 219, 221–3, 227, 229–30, 232, 234–5, 237–8, 241, 247, 252, 256–7, 260, 265–6, 268, 271, 274–5, 279, 282, 285–9, 292

truth, 4, 8–9, 11–13, 16, 21–2, 33–4, 38, 41–3, 47, 55, 60, 68, 71, 75–6, 78–85, 88, 90, 95–9, 101–2, 104–5, 107, 121–5, 127–31, 148–9, 151, 193, 216–17, 220–1, 223, 235–6, 238, 246, 250, 255, 258, 260, 265, 267, 269–72, 277, 279, 281, 287, 291

Tucker, 51, 219, 281Twining, 57, 281

Umpleby, 197, 281uncertainty, 3, 36, 70, 152, 158, 183, 192,

223, 266, 270, 272, 280–1, 286, 291

Vaihinger, 95, 258, 281Varela, 95, 281Verges, 220, 281Viale, 42, 47–8, 51, 281Vosniadou, 204, 282Vygotsky, 198, 224–5, 272, 282

Wallis, 197–202, 282, 292Walton, 78, 264Warfield, 198, 282Waskan, 203–6, 208, 210, 212, 253–6,

265, 282, 292Waters, 148, 193–4, 282Weber, 29–30, 216, 267–8, 273, 282–3Weick, 199, 282Weinberg, 244, 248, 283, 288Wheeler, 119, 282–3White, 38, 194, 283



302 ● Index

Wiener, 46, 283Wilkes, 25, 283will, 5–8, 11, 14–15, 19–21, 25, 27, 35,

37, 39, 43–4, 46, 48, 50, 54–5, 60–1, 63, 71, 80, 82–3, 85, 87, 89, 91, 94–6, 99, 101–5, 107, 110–13, 116–19, 122–3, 129, 135–6, 138–40, 144, 146, 149–50, 155–7, 161, 164–5, 173, 176, 178–80, 182, 186, 193–5, 197–200, 204, 213, 216–21, 223–4, 227, 230–1, 235, 238, 243–7, 249–50, 252–5, 258, 260, 275

Williams, 216–17, 272–3, 283Williamson, 90, 269, 283, 286Wilson, 95, 128, 269, 272, 280, 286

Wimsatt, 37, 43–4, 55, 109–10, 112, 283, 290

Windelband, 30, 234Wixon, 173, 283Woodward, 10, 52–3, 148, 283Wright, 30, 282

Yang, 121, 202, 273, 282Ylikoski, 38, 43, 52, 268, 276Yolles, 202, 283York, 13, 248, 263–83, 285–8, 290

Zellmer, 38, 174, 176–9, 181, 183, 185, 187–8, 192

Zizek, 152, 283



Documents

Modos de Explicação 1 Cap Palgrave