Modality in Lusoga

7/27/2019 Modality in Lusoga

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Negative Modal Polar Questions in English and Lusoga*Michelle Johnson CUNY

Semantics 3 Fall 2011 Rutgers

1 Negation and Modality in English1

There are two logically possible ways to combine negation and modality. Either,negation scopes over modality (1) and (2) or modality scopes over negation (2)

(1)Floyd cant eat turkey.It is not the case that Floyd can eat turkey.

[[ Floyd POSScan eat turkey]] = Floyd is not able eat turkey.*[[POSScan Floyd eat turkey]]

= *Floyd is able to not eat turkey.

(2)Floyd can not eat turkey.It is possible for Floyd to not eat turkey.*[[ Floyd POSScan eat turkey]] = *Floyd is not able eat turkey.[[POSScan Floyd eat turkey]]

= Floyd is able to not eat turkey.

Example (1) is termed Outer Negation based on the scope position of negationwith respect to the Subject, and (2) is termed Inner Negation for the same reason.With the right prosody, these can both have the meaning of (1), the outer negationreading. However, no matter the prosody assigned, (1) can never have the innernegation reading; it can never mean what (2) means. This scope ambiguity showsthe different scope positions of modality and negation, and how they can interactwith tangible effects. This alternation becomes more complicated in questions aswe see in (3) and (4).

*My heartfelt appreciation is extended to Joel Kigyeni for his nearly endless patience andenthusiasm and for sharing his language with me, Marcel den Dikken for his insights anddiscussion and Micah Jacobs, Liz Avanzato, Devon McSweeney, Yakov Kronrod and the LehmanCollege Linguistics Club for giving me many grammaticality judgments.

All errors contained herein are strictly my own.

Glossary of termsAPPL Applicative AUG -Augment COPCopula EMP -Emphatic FV-Final Vowel MOD- ModalNoun Classes1/2-human SG/PL; 5,7,11,12-thing SG; 8-thing PL; 9-thing SG&PL; 15-18 -locatives

1 The syntax I am assuming is that modals are verbs, merged into the derivation at V, and areraising verbs, specified for [+finite]. (Wurmbrand, 1999 and den Dikken, p.c.).


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(3)Cant Floyd eat turkey (either)?[[Q Floyd POSScan eat turkey]] = Is Floyd not able to eat turkey?*[[QP FOSScan Floyd eat turkey]]

= *Is Floyd able to not eat turkey?

(4)Can Floyd not eat turkey?[[Q Floyd POSScan eat turkey]] = Is Floyd not able to eat turkey?[[QPOSScan Floyd eat turkey]]

= Is Floyd able to not eat turkey?

Example (3) can only be said to ask if Floyd is not able to eat turkey. It can beeasier to distinguish the acceptable reading from the unacceptable one for example(3) by including the NPI, either. This forces the reading that Floyd is unable to eatturkey in addition to something else he is unable to eat, but there is no way tocoerce the reading that Floyd is capable of not eating turkey in addition to being

capable of not eating something else.

In these examples, there are 3 scope-taking elements negation, modality andthe Q operator. Notably, the pattern of scope interactions between negation andmodality in propositions has changed in the parallel questions. The case with cliticnt (1) and (3) is outer negation, but the separate can not in examples (2) and(4) is ambiguous between inner and outer negation. With the proper prosody,example (2) can be assigned two different readings as well, so this result is not assurprising as it first appears. Still, it is unresolved as to why (4) is a genuine case of

ambiguity whereas (2) requires some coercion.

Table 1 Proposition QuestionCan + not (i) POSScan (iii) QPOSScan(iv) QPOSScanCant (ii) POSScan (v) QPOSScan

A possible solution to this puzzle leads into the topic I will address in the bulkof this paper. The combination with a possibility modal in a question is what allows

multiple readings for (4) in English.

The Q operator functions to pick out the set of true propositions (Hamblin 1958,Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982). Alternatively, this could be thought of as pickingout the possible worlds that fulfill the question. In example (2), possibility scopesover negation then combines with the Q operator. The effect in (2) is that negationapplies to the embedded proposition first, then modality and Q apply, with the

result that all worlds which fulfill the question will contain p, restricting thecontexts that the question can be licensed in. Conversely, in example (1), negation


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takes scope above modality; modality applies before negation and the Q operator,and therefore negation does not need to hold in every world that fulfills thequestion and the licensing context is ambiguous.

The propositions picked out by (iii) are a subset of those picked out by (iv). As

an example, consider the proposition, p = Fred washes dishes (iii) = (a), (iv) = (b).

(a) Is Fred not able to wash dishes?

(b) Is Fred able to not wash dishes?

Example (a) picks out all the worlds in which Fred does not have an ability to dosomething. Example (b), however, picks out all the worlds in which Fred has anability to not do something. There is a downward entailment relationship betweenhaving an ability and not having an ability. For example, all the worlds in whichFred is unable to do x look the same as all the worlds in which Fred is able to not

do x and doesnt do it. So, all the affirmative answers to (a) as in (b) will be possibleaffirmative answers to (b). However, there are worlds in which Fred is able to notdo x, but chooses to do x anyhow. That is, (b) allows for the answer in (c) whereas

(a) does not allow any affirmative answer in which he ends up doing the dishes.

(c) Yah, hes not going to.

(d) Yah, but hes going to do them anyhow.

Therefore, if an affirmative answer confirms the question under discussion,then the worlds picked out by (a) are a subset of those picked out by (b). So, if aquestion allows (b), it will allow (a), which explains the alternation in Table 1, and

the differences discussed for examples (1)-(4).

This shows that there is a real scope interaction between negation and modality.The possibility modal, can has the effect of allowing other possible worlds to beconsidered. The quantification-scope position of this modal operator affects what isbeing quantified over, whether it is real entities or all possible entities (Heim andKratzer, 1998, 168). This scope difference has a truth conditional effect such thatthe truth conditions for modal propositions should never be more restricted thanfor the corresponding non-modal proposition. Extending this to questions, it maybe expected that the licensing conditions of a question follow the same pattern and the licensing conditions of a modal question should not be more restrictedthan the corresponding non-modal question. If this is the case, a theory thataccounts for positive and negative polar questions should be able to account forpositive and negative modal polar questions as well.


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2 Negative Polar Questions - BackgroundLadd (1981) and Buering and Gunlogson (2000) (henceforth B&G) analyzed the

environments for which non-modal polar questions are licensed. They make adistinction between inner and outer negation polar questions, INPQs and ONPQs

respectively and positive polar questions, PPQs. The B&G theory rests oncompelling contextual evidence, which they take to be the evidence immediatelyavailable for or against a proposition. This is defined in (5) and (6) ( B&Gs (21) and(22)).

(5)Contextual EvidenceEvidence that has just become mutually available to the participants in thecurrent discourse situation.

(6)Compelling:a. Evidence forp is compelling if, considered in isolation, would allow

the participants to assume p.b. Evidence againstp is compelling if it is compelling evidence for the

opposite of p, W-p.

B&G highlight that in isolation allows for the case in which if there was

evidence for the opposite of the proposition (W-p), any information that supportsthe proposition may be enough to re-open the case for questioning. They stress thispoint, because for B&G, the common ground does not determine the questionform. The question form is determined by the contextual evidence defined in (5).

Table 2 shows the conditions they develop for each polar question type.

Table 2

Contextual evidence ONPQ INPQ PPQFor p * * OkNeutral Ok * OkAgainst p Ok Ok *B&Gs theoryaccounts for both positive polar questions as well as negative.

They show that positive questions are also restricted in their licensing

environments, and are not always neutral (7) (their (18))

(7)Scenario: A enters Ss windowless computer room wearing a dripping wetraincoat.(contextual evidence for p = it is raining)

a. S:Whats the weather like out there? Is it raining?b.# S:Whats the weather like out there? Is it sunny?


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In (7), there is contextual evidence for p, so (7b), which is similar to (W-p), isnot allowed, the contextual information does not support it. This is an importantobservation in the licensing of polar questions. Namely, that positive polarquestions can be just as biased as negative and should be analyzed as such.

They make a slight variation from Ladd (1981), who claims that ONPQs areasked in the context where the speaker believes a proposition P and wantsconfirmation and INPQs are asked when the speaker has just inferred aproposition, P and wants confirmation.In the way Ladds theory is formulated,there is a distinction between the background knowledge and immediate wants ofthe speaker.

Ladds theory relies on what can be inferred from tag questions aboutnegative questions and the part of the proposition under question. While I do notintend to address tag questions in this paper, by looking at them in the context of

negative polar questions, Ladd brings out an important point that there are twoscope positions for negative questions. He shows that the particular choice forwhich scope positions is based both on background information as well as what thespeaker desires.

However, Ladd has not defined the case where a positive polar question isasked. In (7), the speaker has reason to believe p, and therefore would be asking forconfirmation of that belief, but chose a positive question to get this confirmation.Therefore it must be accommodated in the theory.

In this paper, I motivate the need to preserve the distinction between

background beliefs and new inferences and also the need to treat positive polarquestions as in B&G by looking at the licensing of Negative Modal Polar Questions(NMPQs) and Postive Modal Polar Questions (PMPQs) in both English and Lusoga.

Section 3 lays out the Lusoga data and shows why the B&G account is notsufficient to handle the data. In Section 4, I propose another theory that uses theB&G analysis as well as the Ladd analysis in combination to then account for theLusoga data. In Section 5, I show how my proposal can handle the English datamore efficiently. Section 6 concludes.

3 Lusoga dataLusoga is a Bantu language spoken in Eastern Uganda. Deontic ability is

expressed by an auxiliary verb that shows overt subject agreement, and can befinite or non-finite.Negation in this type of modal environment is expressed by apre-verbal affix which affixes to the modal auxiliary, not the lexical verb.Lusoga


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Yes/No questions are formed as in (8). In speech, there is a rising prosodic contour

at the end of the sentence which indicates that it is a question.

Lusoga does not allow for inner (narrow scope) negative polar questions, butthere is an interaction with

(8)T-a-sobol-a ku-lya embuuzi?NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat goatCan he not eat goat?

Eh, t-a-sobo-ka, edhi-mu-lwair-ekaYes, NEG-3SG-can-EMP2AUG-9-3SG-sick-APPLYes, Its not possible, it makes him sick.

3.1 Neutral Background LusogaB&G mention in their definition of contextual evidence that it can be taken

in isolation so whether the speaker has any background information or not. I willfirst focus on situations in which the speaker has no background information as in

(1)-(3).

A1: #T-a-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi?NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goatCant he eat goat?

A2: * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goatCan he not eat goat?

A3: A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FVgoat?Can he eat goat?

2Kais interpreted as an emphatic suffix. It is most likely a negative polarity item, but that has notbeen investigated yet for Lusoga.

Situation 1, Frances is a very distant relative, living in London, and has come toUganda for a wedding and has never met Alice. Alice notices that Frances isnot taking any goats meat.p=waiswa eats goat Alice asks:

B&G: Compelling contextual information against p(neutral background, new information againstp)


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A4: T-a-ly-a embuuzi?NEG-3SG-eat-FV goatDoesnt he eat goat?

A5: *T-a-ly-a embuuzi?NEG-3SG-eat-FV goatThis is ungrammatical with neg taking narrow scope.

A6: # A-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-eat-FV goatDoes he eat goat?

B: Mbe, t-a-sobo-ka, edhi-mu-lwair-ekaNo, NEG-3SG-can-EMPAUG-9-3SG-sick-appl

No, Its not possible, it makes him sick.

In this situation, which is a B&G for p type of context, there is contextual

information that, on its own, would be enough to infer that Frances eats goat. Onlythe negative question and the positive modal question are allowed. This may be anunexpected pattern if looking only at polar questions, since the NMPQ (A1) is notallowed even though the NPQ (A4) is, and the PMPQ (A3) is allowed even thoughthe PPQ (A6) is not. If looking only at their status as positive or negative, this is a

highly unexpected result.


A2: * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goat

Can he not eat goat?A3: #A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FVgoat?Can he eat goat?

A4: #T-a-ly-a embuuzi?NEG-3SG-eat-FV goatDoesnt he eat goat?

Situation 2, John is a foreigner, and has never met Alice. Alice is curious aboutJohns goat meat eating habits.

B&G: neutral context(neutral background, no new information)


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A6: A-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-eat-FV goatDoes he eat goat?

B: Mbe, t-a-sobo-ka, edhi-mu-lwair-ekaNo, NEG-3SG-can-EMPAUG-9-3SG-sick-applNo, Its not possible, it makes him sick.

Situation 2 provides the most neutral context, but none of the modalquestions are allowed, and the negative polar question (A4) is not licensed either.The B&G model would predict that the ONPQ (A4) to be licensed, but we see that,in Lusoga, it is not. Likewise, and explanation for why all the modal questions arenot allowed cannot be treated by the B&G analysis nor why there is a differencebetween the licensing of the PPQ (A6), but not the PMPQ (A3).


A2: * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goatCan he not eat goat?

A3: A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FVgoat?Can he eat goat?

A4: #T-a-ly-a embuuzi?NEG-3SG-eat-FV goatDoesnt he eat goat?


Situation 3, Frances is a very distant relative, living in London, and has come toUganda for a wedding and has never met Alice. Alice notices that Frances tooksome goats meat. p=waiswa eats goat Alice asks:B&G: Compelling contextual information for p(neutral background, new information forp)


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A6: ?A-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-eat-FV goatDoes he eat goat?

B: Eh, a-ly-aYah, 3SG-eat-FVYes, he eats (it).

Speakers report that (A6) can be allowed, but it is better with a modal verbor aspectual marker. In the B&G theory, the situation with compelling contextualinformation for p, the PPQ (A6) is the only type of question that should be allowed.The best question form here is the PMPQ (A3). Speakers try to coerce (A6) into amodal-like form by adding aspectual markers and other such inflections. I will notattempt to address the question as to whether or not aspectual markers can beconstrued as modal operators, only that they have a temporal impact on the

question.

This alternation is summarized in Table 3

Table 3

Contextualevidence ONPQ INPQ PPQ ONMPQ INMPQ PMPQFor p (3) # * ? # * OkNeutral (2) # * Ok # * #Against p (1) * * * Ok * OK

The B&G account as summarized in Table 2 is modified and repeated herefor comparison, as Table 2a, the differences are highlighted. The rightmost 3columns are present for comparison with the modal questions in Table 3. They arenot present in the B&G analysis; they are an extrapolation based on the B&G

framework.

Table 2a

Contextualevidence ONPQ INPQ PPQ ON(M)PQ IN(M)PQ P(M)PQFor p * * Ok * * OkNeutral Ok * Ok Ok * OkAgainst p Ok Ok * Ok Ok *


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Looking just at this table, it seems that with a neutral background, onlylooking at contextual information, the Lusoga ONPQs and ONMPQs both do notallow neutral contexts whereas the B&G model predicts that they should beallowed. This could be attributed to the absence of a narrow scope reading onnegative questions. However, both the PPQs and PMPQs only allow one readingeach, whereas the B&G model would predict two. It is therefore worth looking inmore depth at the Lusoga data.

3.2 Lusoga Biased Data

Building on the Ladd (1981) intuition that there is a difference betweenbackground knowledge and the speakers wants that impacts the licensed questionform, I take background knowledge to be the same, and the speakers wants to bethe B&G compelling contextual information. Table 4 lays out the possible

combinations of background information and contextual information.

Table 4

Some of these combinations do not allow a question to be asked. If asituation is held stable, asking a question is awkward; if the speaker thought thatsomeone ate goat and then saw him eating goat (i), it would be unlikely that shewould ask for confirmation. Likewise, if a speaker thought that someone ate goat

and then received no information otherwise, it is unlikely s/he would ask a questionas we do not go around confirming or challenging everything that we know. Thisleaves (at least) 5 environments for questions3 (marked with a Q).

3 Van Rooy and Safrov (2003) give another possible distinction for the neutral/neutralenvironment laid out in (ix). They postulate that neutral questions are asked such that the

Backgroundinformation Contextualinformation ResultI For p For p Stable

Ii Q For p Against p Contrast Against

iii For p None Stable

iv Q Against p For p Contrast For

v Against p Against p Stablevi Against p None Stable

vii Q None For p Contrast For

viii Q None Against Contrast Against

ix Q None None Neutral


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1 Situation 1 corresponds to (vii)2 Situation 2 corresponds to (viii)3 Situation 3 corresponds to (ix)4 Situation 4 corresponds to (ii)5 Situation 5 corresponds to (iv)

Thus far, (vii)-(ix) are the only situations that have been treated. The other

two environments (ii) and (iv) are laid out here in Situations 4 & 5, respectively.

A1: T-a-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi?NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goatCan he not eat goat?

A2: * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goat

A3: # A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FVgoat?Can he eat goat?

A4: T-a-ly-a embuuzi?NEG-3SG-eat-FV goatDoesnt he eat goat?


A6: # A-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-eat-FV goatDoes he eat goat?

B: Eh, t-a-sobo-ka, edhi-mu-lwair-eka

Yes, NEG-3SG-can-EMPAUG-9-3SG-sick-applYes, Its not possible, it makes him sick.

affirmative answer will be maximally informative or relevant to the speakers goal s for asking the

question.

Situation 4, Waiswa is at a wedding but is not taking any goats meat. Alice issurprised because Waiswa raises goats,p = Waiswa eats goat. Alice asks:B&G: Compelling contextual evidence against p

(background information forp, new evidence againstp)


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Here both types of outer negation questions are allowed, ONPQ andONMPQ. This is the expected result by the B&G theory, noting that the reasonINPQs and INMPQs are not allowed is that Lusoga does not use an inner negationscope position.

A1: #T-a-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi?NEG-3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FV goat

Cant she eat goat?A2: * A-sobol-a ti-ku-ly-a embuuzi?

3SG-can-FV NEG-15-eat-FV goatCan she not eat goat?A2: Y-a-li t-a-sobo-ka ku-lya embuuzi?

3SG-PST-COP NEG-3SG-can-EMP 15-eat goatDid she used to not be able to eat goat?

A3: A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi (saawa eno)?3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FVgoat (now)Can she eat goat (now)?

A4: #T-a-ly-a embuuzi?NEG-3SG-eat-FV goatDoesnt she eat goat?


A5: Y-a-ba-ire t-a-li-ire embuuzi?3SG-PST-COP-ASP NEG-3SG-eat-ASP goatDid she used to not eat goat?

A6: #A-ly-a embuuzi?3SG-eat-FV goatDoes she eat goat?

B: Eh, a-sobol-a saawa enoYes, 3SG-can-FVhour this

Yes, she can now.

Situation 5, Nakimuli had a toothache and was not allowed to eat goat.She took some today. Alice saw this and wants confirmation for thenew proposition p, Nakimuli eats goat.B&G: Compelling contextual evidence for p(Background against p, new evidence for p)


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4 HypothesisFor this hypothesis, I take background information that contradicts contextual

information as more different than neutral background information. Therefore,situations like (4) and (5) require a bigger change in the speakers beliefs to reach anew belief state whereas Situations (1) and (2) require less change, and Situation (3)requires no change.

4.1 Belief Scale

Now, considering the speakers beliefs on a bi-directional continuum, for ponone end and against pon the other, this change can be visually encoded. Figure 1visually represents this.

Figure 1

On this scale, if a speaker believes a proposition, it is represented on the for p

end, if s/he does not have any information for a proposition, it is represented atneutral, and if s/he believes the contrary of p, either (W-p), or p, it is representedon the rightmost end.

By this construction, the further apart the background information is from thecontextual evidence, the more change must be made to the speakers belief state. InLusoga, this change is encoded in the question. So, if the starting point(background) is neutral and the ending point (contextual evidence) is against p,there is only one step of change. If the starting point is that the speaker believes pto be true, so for p and the contextual evidence is against p, the ending point isagainst p, there are two steps of change.

4.2 Necessary assumptionsBefore applying this model, definitions must be established. First, negation,

modality, adverbial modifiers and tensed auxiliaries in Lusoga4

are all operators, asjustified in the remainder of this section. Every operator has the effect of changingthe belief state of the speaker. Therefore, since each level in Figure 1 corresponds

4 Whether or not tense has a modal function is an necessary distinction for this discussion. I do notmake a claim in this paper other than to say it can function as an operator in this environment inLusoga. For discussion about the future tense as a modal, see Condoravdi 2002.

for p neutral against p


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to a belief state, each operator can shift the proposition by one level as representedin Figure 1.

Modal operators act on possible worlds, allowing hypothetical worlds to beconsidered in the proposition. Since can is a possibility modal, the agent has theability to do x but is not required to. In this way, there is a correlation with irrealis(9)/(10).

(9) He can drink wine, but he doesnt(10) A-sobol-a ku-ly-a embuuzi ate t-a-dhi-kol-a

3SG-can-FV 15-eat-FVgoat but NEG-3SG-15-work-FVHe can eat goat, but he doesnt.

Possibility modals can therefore impact the speakers belief state by bringingin possibilities other than the real world. It is this ability to change the belief state

that allows modal operators to act as operators in this system.

Negation has the effect of making all propositions that were true, false, andit is the complement set of this world. Negation also has the effect of altering thespeakers belief state by changing the truth-value of a proposition, and is thereforean operator in this system with the effect of shifting the belief state by one level.

Adverbial modifiers and tensed auxiliaries in Lusoga can have the effect ofshifting the world-time interaction, anymore and now make an overt contributionto the world-time pair. If modal operators have the effect of allowing for otherworlds, I posit that adverbial modifiers and Lusoga tense auxiliaries have an effect

of allowing for other times. In this way, they are operators as they allow for analtered time of evaluation, and the speaker can alter his or her belief state to reflectthe updated truth value of the proposition, corresponding to the updated time ofevaluation.

4.3 Application

If each operator has the gross effect of shifting by one world, Table 6 shows

the distribution in Lusoga. The unexpected combination is shaded (a).


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Table 6

By this hypothesis, the ONMPQ (a) should be allowed to express thequestion in the situation with background information against the proposition and

contextual evidence for the proposition since that situation requires two changes oflevel based on the representation in Figure 1. The ONMPQ has both a modaloperator and negation and therefore should be allowed, but we see it is not (a).Here, a stipulation is necessary that questions with contextual evidence for theproposition must have a positive form to them to express the new for p bias (11).

(11) Positive Form RequirementSituations with compelling contextual evidence for a proposition onlylicense questions with a positive form.

Situation 5 corresponds to this belief environment; there is backgroundinformation against p and contextual information for p. There are two alternativeconstructions provided, (A2) and (A5). Both of these constructions involvenegation realized below a tensed modal auxiliary. The form of the entireproposition is positive with an embedded negation, and I therefore assume that(A2) and (A5) both qualify as questions with a positive form for Lusoga.

ContrastAgainst p2

Against p

1

Neutral

0

For p

1

Contrastfor p2

ONMPQ, mod 2

#2

#2

#2

# (a)2

INMPQMod,

NA NA NA NA NA

PMPQMod

#1 1

#1 1

+adv2

ONPQ

#

1 1

#

1

# (b)

1

#

1

INPQ

NA NA NA NA NA

PPQ()

#0

#0 0

? (b)0

#

0


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negation is allowed, though outer negation is awkward in this environment. This isnot paralleled in the modal environment as may be expected. This is the firstindication that the B&G theory may not be able to account for modal questions inEnglish.

C1: #Cant Betty eat turkey?

C2: #Can Betty not eat turkey?

C3: ?Can Betty eat turkey?

C4: #Doesnt Betty eat turkey?

C5: #Does Betty not eat turkey?

C6: Does Betty eat turkey?

D: No shes a vegetarian.

In Situation 7, the neutral context for B&G and the neutral background,neutral evidence context for this theory, only (C6), the PPQ, is completely acceptedby speakers. B&G would have predicted that either the ONPQ or the PPQ to beallowed, and the ONPQ is questionable to speakers. Likewise, this distribution isnot paralleled in the corresponding modal questions, it is most noteworthy that thePMPQ is not allowed in this situation either.

Situation 7, Charlie is still new to the table and also curious about Betty, whohas not been passed the turkey. There is not any information for or against pBetty eats turkey, Charlie asks:B&G: neutral(neutral background, no evidence)

Situation 8, Charlie is new to the table and is curious about Mika, who took lotsof turkey. There is not any background information for or against p Wandaeats turkey, and Charlie asks:B&G: compelling contextual evidence for p(neutral background, contextual evidence for p)


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C1: #Cant Mika eat turkey?

C2: #Can Mika not eat turkey?

C3: #Can Mika eat turkey?

C4: #Doesnt Mika eat turkey?

C5: #Does Mika not eat turkey?

C6: Does Mika eat turkey?

D: No - he became a vegetarian last month.

In this case, the only question that can be asked is the PPQ. This is theexpected result by the B&G theory, but it does not explain why the PMPQ is notallowed. Again, this is a surprising result if modals do not affect a propositions

truth values.

Overall, it seems that the B&G theory cannot fully account for the Englishdata with a neutral contextual background as in Situation 7, the neutral situationby B&G should allow the ONPQ but does not. Secondly, the modal contexts arestill unexplained especially because they contrast with the non-modal contexts intheir licensing environments.

5.2 Contradictory background

The following examples show backgrounds that contradict the contextualinformation.

C1: Cant Floyd eat turkey?

C2: Can Floyd not eat turkey?

C3: #Can Floyd eat turkey?

Situation 9, it is Thanksgiving and Floyd is avoiding the turkey, Charliethought that Floyd loved turkey. Charlie wants to check this new information;p =Floyd eats turkeyB&G: compelling contextual evidence against p

(background forp, new evidence against p),


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C4: Doesnt Floyd eat turkey?

C5: Does Floyd not eat turkey?(anymore)?

C6: #Does Floyd eat turkey?

D: No - he became a vegetarian last month.

The background in Situation 9 is for p, but the updated information isagainstp, creating a situation where the new belief state must be far from the oldone. The B&G theory predicts that both INPQ and ONPQ should be allowed.Speakers very much preferred this example with an adverbial modifier on theINPQ, and most rejected it without6.

C1: #Cant Frida eat turkey?

C2: #Can Frida not eat turkey?

C2:Cant Frida not eat turkey?

C3: Can Frida eat turkey?(now)?

C4: #Doesnt Frida eat turkey?

C5: #Does Frida not eat turkey?

C5:Doesnt Frida not eat turkey?

C6: Does Frida eat turkey?(now)?

D: Yah the doctor said it was ok.In Situation 10, with compelling contextual information for the proposition,

B&G would predict that the PPQ should by licensed. Speakers reported that theypreferred the PPQ as well as the PMPQ with an adverbial modifier, and offered the

6 Thanks to Marcel den Dikken for pointing this out.

Situation 10, Last year at Thanksgiving, Frida was not eating turkey per thedoctors orders. This year, Charlie saw her take some turkey and wants toconfirm the new information,p, Frida eats turkey.B&G: compelling contextual evidence against p

(background evidence against p, new evidence for p)


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double negative constructions in (C2) and (C5) as alternatives. As expected, all of

the mono-negative constructions were rejected.

5.3 English Summary

Table 7 provides a summary of the English data.Table 7

Situation 6Neutral/Against

Situation 7Neutral/Neutral

Situation 8Neutral/For

Situation 9For/Against

Situation 10Against/For

ONMPQ # # # #

INMPQ ? # # #

PMPQ ? # # ?(adverb)

ONPQ ? # #

INPQ # # # (adverb) #

PPQ # ?(adverb)

If the B&G analysis could be extended to modal polar questions, Situation 6and Situation 9 should have the same questions licensed. Likewise, Situation 8 and

Situation 10 should be the same. Even disregarding modal questions briefly, thenon-modal question environments of Situations 6 and 8 are not paralleled in 9 and10 as they should be. Therefore, the B&G theory cannot fully account for this data.

5.3 Applied to English

In Table 8, the situations are repeated, in with their descriptive labels andthe number of belief state levels each must change by. The data here is forEnglish, and the situations which do not apply are highlighted.


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Table 8

Clearly there are more problems with the English data than with the Lusogafor this hypothesis, but they should be reconcilable. First, there was a stipulationmade for the Lusoga data that is necessary to retain here, the Positive FormRequirement (11), this accounts for the boxes marked (i) to (iv).

Secondly, there are two English-specific stipulations first, outer negation isstrong and inner negation is weak in English. Since double negation in English islicensed in positive environments, both types of negation do not need to be equal,they only need to sum to a positive outcome. In Situation 10, with backgroundinformation against p and contextual information for p, speakers offered doublenegative constructions in (C2) and (C5) to express the question.

ContrastAgainst p2

Against p1

Neutral0

For p1

Contrastfor p2

ONMPQMod 2

#2 #2 #2 # (i)2

INMPQmod, 2

? (b)2

#2

#2

# (ii)

2

PMPQMod

#1 1

? (e)1

# (f)1

+adv

2

ONPQ

(a)1 1

#1

# (iii)1

#1

INPQ

+adv2

? (c)1

#1

# (iv)1

#

1

PPQ()

#0

(d)0 0

(g)0

+adv (h)1


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C2:Cant Frida not eat turkey?C5:Doesnt Frida not eat turkey?

Under this hypothesis, negative constructions are not allowed in positiveenvironments, so I must assume that (C2) and (C5) have a net positive effect.There is no obvious reason to expect that the two scope positions for negation havethe same strength or effect, only that they can combine to yield a positive reading.It is unlikely that they would have equal strength given that in the wide scopeposition (outer negation), negation applies to all of the possible worlds whereas inthe narrow scope position, only the world which (W-p) already holds. Therefore, inEnglish, outer negation is stronger than inner. This disparity does not exist inLusoga because Lusoga only has one type of negation.

Combination (a) is explained now because outer negation being strongenough to shift the belief state by more than one level. Combinations (b) and (c)

are examples of inner negation and therefore not strong enough to shift the beliefstate by a full level, yielding a degraded result rather than a bad one.

Finally, an account is needed for (d), (g) and (f). PPQs in English have ashifting reading that Lusoga does not allow. It is not necessary to say that it onlyshifts towards for p as it is encoded in (11) that positive evidence conditions willonly license a net positive question form. This stipulation requires PPQs in Englishto be as marked for positivity as they are for negativity, but to be unmarked inLusoga. Possibly because English makes more distinctions in polarity than Lusogadoes, Lusoga encodes less with positive/negative operators than English does.

Therefore, PPQs in English can shift from an against p belief state to a neutralbelief state, licensing (d) and (g) because it has no other operators and (h) becausethe adverbial nowupdates to for p. Combinations marked (e) and (f) would alsobe ruled out because they are too strong. However, (e) is simply degraded, not bad;this is an unexpected result, as if (f) is not accepted, (e) should not be either.

5 ConclusionsThe B&G theory as formulated for positive and negative polar questions is

unable to account for positive and negative modal polar questions in Lusoga and

English. Therefore, to capture the distribution of negative polar questions cross-linguistically, a much more articulated set of background considerations must beproposed. The distribution of polar questions results from the combination ofpropositional operators, and the effect they have individually on the belief state ofthe speaker. The more of a change in the belief state the speaker must make, themore operators must be present in the question. Languages differ in the strengthof each operator.


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References:Buering, Daniel and Christine Gunlogson. 2000. Arent positive and negative polar

questions the same? Ms. UCSC/UCLAden Dikken, Marcel. 2011. Personal Communication. 7 Dec 2011. New York: CUNY

Graduate CenterGroenendijk, Jeroen, Martin Stokholf. 1982. Semantic analysis ofwh-

complements. Linguistics and Philosophy, 5:2, 175-233.Groenendijk, Jeroen, Martin Stokhof and Frank Veltman. 1996. Coreference and

modality in the context of multi-speaker discourse. Ms. University ofAmsterdam.

Hamblin, C. L. 1958. Questions in Montague English. Foundations of Language, 10:1, 41-53.

Heim, Irene & Angelika Kratzer. 1998. Semantics in generative grammar. Malden,MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Iatriadou, Sabine & Hedde Zeijlstra. 2010. On the scopla interaction of negation anddeontic modals. Logic, Language and Meaning, 6042, 315-324.

Johnson, Michelle. 2011. Lusoga made simple. Kisubi, Uganda: MirianumPublishers.

Ladd, D. Robert. 1981. A first look at the semantics and pragmatics of negativequestions and tag questions. Proceedings of Chicago Linguistic Society, 17:164-171.

Palmer, F. R. 2001. Mood and modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Portner, Paul. 2009. Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

van Rooy, Robert, and Marie Safarova. 2003. On polar questions. In Proceedings ofSemantics and Linguistic Theory, volume 13. Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications.Wurmbrand, Susi. 1999. Modal verbs must be raising verbs. WCCFL 18 Proceedings

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Modality in Lusoga