MoD Life Cycle Management of Conventional Ammunitionrasrinitiative.org/pdfs/workshop-9/RASR-Workshop-9-PPT-NSPA.pdf · MoD Life Cycle Management of Conventional Ammunition ... In-service

www.nspa.nato.int

PREPARED FOR

PRESENTED BY

@nspa.nato.int

MoD Life Cycle Management of Conventional Ammunition

RASR Podgorica

October 2017

David TOWNDROW

NSPA Project Officer

David.Towndrow

An Understanding of:

• Concept of MoD LCM,

• Factors and challenges of MoD LCM,

• Understand the processes to manage the

stockpile given limited resources,

• How might donors assist.

David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 2October 2017

Facilitate Discussions

• MoD LifeCycle Management of Ammunition

• Storage

• Quantity

• Management of a national stockpile

• Disposal

• Transportation


Agenda

NATO AAP-48

The purpose of AAP-48 is to provide guidance on the implementation of System Life Cycle Management, which is

used to mitigate risk, reduce acquisition times and to identify, quantify and control Life Cycle Cost, from the earliest possible

opportunity. Principles and application in the NATO context. SLCM will assure that the processes used across projects are consistent, harmonized, and that there is effective sharing and coordination of resources, information and technologies.


Definitions

Recycling serviceDisposal of materiel

PRE-CONCEPT

DEVELOPMENT

PRODUCTIONUSE and SERVICING

MAJOR REPAIR

CONCEPT

Repair service

Defense Industrial

Armed Forces

General (policy);

Research-scientificConceptual design

Experimental-design work

Manufacture design

Design supervision while in operation

Military Equipment Lifecycle from a product (ammunition) perspective

October 2017 5David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme

Processes to manage the stockpile –ammunition management organisation can only be MoD

6David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services ProgrammeOctober 2017

MoD

Mature, well resourced MoD


Mature Policy and Guidance


In-service surveillance of ammunition is undertaken to ensure that ammunitioncontinues to meet the required quality standards throughout its entire life cycle. Surveillance is undertaken to ensure "that

the ammunition continues to meet the required quality standards throughout its life. Quality, from this perspective, includes the performance of ammunition during use and its safety and stability during storage. The chemical, electrical,

and mechanical properties of ammunition change and degrade with time, leading to a finite serviceable life for each munition. The accurate assessment of munition life is of paramount importance in terms of safety and cost

Defence Industry NATO Standard National Defence Policy

Critical factor is to monitor the ongoing safety of ammunition during its lifetime

Delivery of a partial capability


A Eur 8M project to deliver ammunition depot infrastructure, logistic equipment and training

Addressing only part of the problem?


Old, potentially unsafe and improperly stored Safe demilitarisation, recovery of

valuable materials, reduction of

stockpile, reduction of logistic burden

Strong political

leadership, focused

effort, secure

funding – but only

for demilitarisation

How far can an individual donor assist?


Political & senior

leadership

intervention

Complex equipment

(demil facility and

propellant

surveillance lab)

Low level skills

and direct

support

(MANPADS

destruction)

Stockpile Management (LCM of ammunition)


Stockpile management is a wide-ranging term when applied to ammunition.

Defined as those procedures and activities regarding ammunition safety

and security, including accounting, storage, transportation, and handling. It

includes:

• Definition of stockpile types;

• Determination of required stockpile levels;

• Location of stockpiles;

• Financial management of stockpiles;

• Accounting for ammunition;

• Safety, storage, and transport of ammunition;

• Security of stockpiles; and

• Disposal, demilitarization, and destruction of surplus ammunition.

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Stockpiles and ownership

Stockpile LocationMinistry

Division

Brigade

Regiment

Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO)

Forward Stock

Defence Positions

Basic Loads

October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme

Remote/Poor Storage Sites

14October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme

Good Storage Sites

15

12 Heavy NATO standard bunkers Chimtallah, Afghanistan

Dispersed ammunition storage UK, and CAD Kineton storage, UK MoD


Determination of Ammunition Stockpile

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EQUIPMENT DAER FORCE

EQPT LEVEL

DAYS FORCE DAER SUSTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT

IS PSO GW (L) GW (I) IS PSO GW (L) GW (I) Rifle 5.45mm Ball 5 20 60 120 600 30 9000 360K 1.08M 2.16M Rocket A/Tk RPG 7 0 1 4 20 100 30 0 3,000 12K 60K Mortar 60mm HE 0 1 10 20 40 30 0 1,200 12K 24K 152mm Gun HE 0 0 50 200 20 30 0 0 30K 120K

Operational Stocks (Police) - 30 DAER at Internal Security Operations rates;Operational Stocks (Military) - 10 DAER at General War (Light) Rates;

War Reserve - 25 DAER at General War (Intensive) Rates; andTraining Stocks - 10% of Defence Stockpile

IS Internal SecurityPSO Peace Support Operations

GW (L) General War (light)GW(I) General War (intensive)

Daily Ammunition Expenditure Rates (DAERs)DAERs is one method to calculate the quantity of ammunition required to support different types of operation. These base figures are a start point to determine the global stockpile requirement for a nation. Issues such as shelf life, procurement strategy, available finance, accepted risk, availability of storage, rates of training, operational disbursement and readiness all influence the final figures for National Stockpile.

Other nations have simply inherited a quantity of ammunition


Surplus Ammunition

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Surplus ammunition should be the total of: •ammunition that exceeds the stockpile level requirements of the national stockpile for in-service weapon systems;

•ammunition that is now obsolete or obsolescent;•ammunition for which weapon systems are no longer held;

•ammunition that has exceeded its serviceable life and has been declared for disposal by the national authority. This surplus ammunition should be:

•officially declared as surplus to national security or defence requirements;

•taken out of service;•recorded by type, lot, batch and/or serial number;

•stored separately; and•preferably destroyed or demilitarized.

Challenges to determination of National Stockpile•Some nations do not have accurate national accounts (Typically former WP members or nations coming out of conflict or nations where the previous policy had been to devolve ammunition resupply to local commanders)

•Estimates of stockpiles often fluctuate significantly and are very difficult to determine even with modern stock control systems.

•Perceived national secrecy.•Reluctance to offer-up surplus at a local or national level.


March 2008 Gerdec, Albania

26 people killed, hundreds injured, widespread damage when an uncontrolled

munition disposal facility caught fire

October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 18

It’s a major issue, it’s expensive to solve and it’s ongoing

19David Towndrow Project Support Branch4 October 2017

Explosions at two large Ukrainian military depots this year have caused losses of ammunition so high that they represent the biggest blow to Ukraine's combat capability since the start of the conflict with Russia-backed separatists in 2014, a senior security official said on September 28 in Kyiv. Source RFE 28 Oct 17. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-ammunition-depot-blasts-combat-capability/28762247.html

Balaklia, 23 Mar 17 explosions/fireKalynivka, 27 Sep 17 explosions/fire

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DECLARED CAUSE # OF EVENTS % ADJUSTED

%1 REMARKS

Auto-Ignition of Propellant 7 3.7 5.8 During Demil / EOD Clearance 17 9.0 14.0 Electrical Fault 5 2.6 4.1

Fire 48 25.4 39.7 A significant number of these may be propellant auto-ignition.

Handling / Negligence 24 10.6 19.8 High Temperature 3 1.6 2.5 Lightning 8 4.2 6.6 Not Known 68 36.0 Security 6 3.2 5.0 Others 3 1.6 2.5 TOTALS 189 100.0 100.0

1 Assuming all ‘Not Knowns’ are spread proportionally against the other possible causes.

Ammunition Storage Incidents

Declared Cause of Depot Fires/Explosions 1995 - 2009

Source: www.explosivecapabilities.com (Adrian Wilkinson 16 Feb 10)

October 2017

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Functional Management & Expertise

Defence Policy

MoD

Management/resources

J4

Storage Depots Transport Testing/training Monitoring Procurement Disposal

Ammunition Competencies

Basic Awareness

Functional responsibility

Expert knowledge

• Nation’s own knowledge, resources and experts

• Use of another nations expertise or international management

• Use of advisors (ammunition experts – Regional, OSCE, UN, NGO, NATO, commercial)

David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services ProgrammeOctober 2017

Functional areas of ammunition stockpile management

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Functional Area Requirements Ammunition Management § Inventory Management System and Procedures

§ Risk Management System and Procedures § Procurement System and Procedures § Hazard Classification System § Accident, Fault and Performance Failure

Investigation Capability and Procedures § Ammunition Surveillance and In-Service Proof

Capability and Procedures Ammunition Storage § Field and Temporary Storage Procedures and

Operations § Depot Storage Procedures and Operations § Safe Depot Storage Infrastructure § Unit Storage Procedures and Operations § Safe Unit Storage Infrastructure

Ammunition Processing § Ammunition Inspection Capability and Procedures

§ Ammunition Maintenance Capability and Procedures

§ Ammunition Repair Capability and Procedures § Ammunition Process Building Infrastructure

Ammunition Disposal § Identification of Ammunition for Disposal Methodology

§ Disposal Technology and Infrastructure § Disposal Capability and Procedures

Ammunition Security § Physical Security Infrastructure of Explosive Storage Areas

§ Security System Capability and Procedures § Vetting System for Staff

Ammunition Transport § Transport Procedures in accordance with International and National Legislation

§ Intrinsically Safe Vehicles


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Stockpile Surplus

Why Stockpile Destruction Programmes

• Baseline Stockpile Planning / Capability• Reduce resource burden; space and physical security• Reduce hazard; loss of stock, loss of life and infrastructure• Remove overage and dangerous stock• Remove obsolete stock; no weapons/no ammunition

Stockpile reduction is good management for defence and civil obligations: • Focus resources and supports a better capable defence• Reduces hazard, improves safety and security


Techniques

•Dumping

•Open Burning / Open Detonation

•Closed Burning/ Detonation Systems

•Disassembly Reduction & Separation

As UN Dangerous Goods Class 1 all ammunition is subject to safety

regulations throughout Whole Life from manufacture to disposal


Ammunition Destruction

Dumping

Dumping is not destruction; it is a disposal method that puts ammunition

beyond reach. Aging and degradation is not stopped. Unlike

radioactive material, explosives do not have a decay or have ‘safe life’.

(Deep) Sea DumpingLegacy activity now banned. Shallow

dumps and ocean movement now

causing problems.

Landfill/BurialShort term for immediate problem.

Require some safeguarding. Problems

with theft, leakage and functioning.



Burning/Detonation

Military munitions are optimised and designed to

be efficient. Causing them to function as close to

as intended is a most efficient destruction.

Open Burning / Open DetonationRequires approved sites and safety exclusion.

Low cost with open ranges. Capability for large

destructions. Consider Impact of residual scrap.

Closed Burning / DetonationCost of building a contained system. Reduced

safety exclusion, reduced throughput.

26October 2017


David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme

27October 2017


Burning/Detonation

Burning and incineration is often subject to Directives and permits to control civilian non-operational activities.

Military Field Operational Demolitions

Explosives Incineration Pollution Abatement System


Disassembly

Either complete or partial disassembly techniques to recover all

materials or to separate for destruction through burning/detonation.

• Mechanical: pull apart, saw, unscrew etc

• Cryogenic: freeze and shatter

• Melt out: heat to soften or liquifiy

• Wash: water jet, solvent etc

28October 2017



29October 2017


Disassembly/RecoveryMost demilitarisation programmes do not permit military reuse of components.

Explosives may be recycled for civilian use

(including Mine Action and some EOD) which requires a user market and

application of civil/international rules for security and certification.

Not suitable for civilian purposes without

reworking and not necessarily economic.

Explosives also present significant health hazards in handling and reprocessing.


October 2017 David Towndrow/ LB General and Cooperative Services Programme 30

Example of European demil facilitiesused/potentially used by NSPA

Norway

Nammo NAD

SwedenNammo

Vingo

Germany

Nammo BuckISL

EST

UK

Qinetiq

Bulgaria

ExpalDunarits

France

Alsetex

MBDA

SpainExpal (Faex)

Italy

Expal (UEE Italia)Esplodenti Sabino

Albania

ULP-Mjekës

KM-Poliçan

SerbiaTRZ Kragujevac

TurkeyKirikkali

Ukraine

Pavlograd

DonetskShotska

Poland

Bumar

Czech Republic

VOPSTV

Commercially sustainable, competitive and high quality industrial base

From military depot to demil facility


Points of Contact

Fred PEUGEOTChief, Project Support TeamGeneral and Cooperative Services Programme

Tel.: (+352) 3063 5994 E-mail: [email protected]

David TOWNDROWTechnical Officer – Project Support Branch

Tel.: (+352) 3063 7234E-mail: [email protected]

32David Towndrow Project Support Branch4 October 2017

Documents

MoD Life Cycle Management of Conventional Ammunitionrasrinitiative.org/pdfs/workshop-9/RASR-Workshop-9-PPT-NSPA.pdf · MoD Life Cycle Management of Conventional Ammunition ... In-service