MMA1WalkerC

Charlie WalkerThe Making of Modern Africa: HIST1491

Dr. Christopher Vaughn & Miss Nicki Kindersley

Were colonial chiefs “decentralised

despots”?

Mahmood Mamdani’s controversial belief that colonial chiefs in Africa were “decentralised

despots”1 is so pejorative that it is not surprising it has invited criticism. Despite this though, he is

still grappling with an important idea: where the loci of power and authority were in colonial

Africa. It is an intensely debated subject but it seems that essentially a synthesis of the two extreme

versions of chiefly power is the most accurate. Chiefs were not always decentralised despots,

sometimes they portrayed both traits concurrently, sometimes neither, and sometimes one or the

other. Examinations upon regional and local lines demonstrate that they held considerable

autonomy over their subjects, but that at the same time, exterior mechanisms of power were also at

work in many colonial places in Africa. The three arguments examined here are: Mamdini’s belief

that they were decentralised despots, a more synthesised argument that perhaps they were more

intermediaries between colonial governments and the people, and finally that perhaps colonial

government held real authority. In the end, chiefs seem more ‘negotiators-in-chief’ than

decentralised despots.

In Citizen and Subject, Mamdani illustrates that both ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ rule are benign terms;

both were actually variants of a despotism. While direct rule denied rights to subjects on racial

grounds, indirect rule incorporated them into a customary mode of rule, with state-appointed Native

Authorities defining custom.2 Eventually, the French and others followed the British model of

1 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (Princeton, 1996), p. 38.2Mamdani, Citizen and Subject p. x.

1



indirect rule, a state form known as decentralised despotism. Pre-colonial Africa was “a continent

where noble savages lived freely and without restraint”,3 and two forms of chief existed (traditional

and administrative.) According to Mamdani, it was “not until the colonial period that the

administrative chief emerged as the full-blown village-based despot, shorn of rule-based restraint”.4

They assumed a “model [that] was monarchical, patriarchical, and authoritarian.”5 Colonial rule

“presumed a king at the centre of every polity, a chief on every piece of administrative ground, and

a patriarch in every homestead or kraal.”6

What turned pre-colonial Africa where “traditional chiefs functioned in ‘an advisory and

consultative context’”7 into village-based patrimonial societies with a colonial chief at the apex was

a colonial reliance on the administrative form of chiefly appointment. This introduced a highly

bureaucratic command-and-control system in which chiefs acted with increasing autonomy. There

was a changing relationship of popular (clan) and administrative (state) organs from the pre-

colonial to colonial period and it is illustrated by the example of Botswana. In pre-colonial

Botswana an institution called the kgotla existed, “a place where the community met to discuss

openly issues of common interest with the chief”.8 Although women and subject nationalities

weren’t allowed to participate in debates, it represented a check on the authority of the chief. With

the advent of colonial rule however, a decentralised arm of the colonial state grew to prominence; it

was called the Native Authority, and comprised of a hierarchy of chiefs. These Native Authorities

manipulated administrations to utilise Native Courts to turn writ into law. In effect, this made

chiefs decentralised despots, and the “scope of [their] agency”9 is exemplified through the regime

of extra economic coercion that chiefs instilled over their subjects. In 1891 the Natal Native Code

3Ibid., p. 39.4Ibid., p. 43.5Ibid., p. 39.6Ibid.7Ibid., p. 45.8Ibid., p. 46.9Mamdani, Citizen and Subject p. 52.

2



in South Africa specified the ends to which powers of the chief may be used. They had the power

of summoning “the prompt supply of men for purposes of defence, or to suppress disorder or

rebellion, or as labourers for public works”.10 And it was not only in South Africa that chiefs

enjoyed powers of extra economic exertion. They were systemic throughout colonial Africa; in

1900 the Buganda Agreement specified “the upkeep of roads” as a task to be assumed by the chief,

along with the “collection of taxes”.11 Furthermore, in Nigeria, it was cited by Padmore that many

chiefs were decentralised despots as they regularly collected taxes and colonial officials “seldom

interfere[d]” as long as “chiefs collect[ed] the amount of taxes assigned to them”.12

Aside from the economic sanctions a chief could impose, the conflation of his private wealth and

that of the stools has also been seen as a sign of decentralised despotism. What this merging meant

was that whatever the chief did with his resources was, by definition, for the stools benefit and this

resulted in a lack of accountability (decentralisation), and despotic behaviour for those that decided

to indulge in it. Chiefs turned “position into wealth and wealth into power.”13 Some have cited that

by virtue of a chiefs office, he had to provide “food and drink for those who visited him, reward the

services of his subjects, and distribute presents at religious festivals”.14 On the face of it, a

redistribution of wealth, but this didn’t depend on a chief’s individual altruism, in reality it flowed

from the structural logic inherent in different village constitutions (the example used is Asante.)

Therefore, even in cases when chiefs proclaimed to be acting in the interests of the people, they

were often only following constitutional precedent. In 1912, District Commissioner Fuller

proclaimed that chiefs would use “their rents”15 to maintain roads in Asante. However, twenty

years later, his successors were still trying to convince chiefs and superiors that the “cocoa tribute

10Ibid.11Ibid.12Ibid., pp. 52-53.13Frederick Cooper Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 24.14Sara Berry, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996 (Oxford, 2001), p. 41.15Berry, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996 p. 42.

3



for land access ought to be treated as a form of public money.”16 In the case of finance then, chiefly

rule seemed to be wholly unaccountable and self-interested.

In certain regions, however, chiefs can be seen as intermediaries between state and people, rather

than fully fledged decentralised despots. Whilst this role had aspects of decentralisation, it was

more concerned with chiefs as mediators rather than agents of historical forces; perhaps

‘negotiators-in-chief’ is a more appropriate term. Kumese Chief Frimpon was literate in English

and managed to use this to his advantage as a negotiator. He “took full advantage of his position to

wield influence over both” Asantes and their colonial rulers. For example, in 1915 Chief Frimpon

won a case over Atipinhene Kweku Dua about land in Ahwia. Frimpon claimed the land had

always been his, whilst Kweku Dua believed Frimpon had sold the land to the then Asantehene,

who gave it to the Atipin stool from whom he claimed rights. The dispute was taken to the

provincial commissioner, but partly because of his ability to speak English and persuade, and

because he had decided to “clear the roads”,17 the decision was ruled in Frimpon’s favour. Frimpon

had gone above and beyond his responsibilities as a chief to persuade the provincial commissioner,

a trait that it seems was essential if chiefs were to maintain their power. This idea of ‘negotiator-in-

chief’ is something that Spear recognises as being more aligned with recent historiography. After

all, “colonialism was not a unilateral political phenomenon … colonial authorities sought to

incorporate pre-existing polities, with their own structures of authority and political processes into

colonial structures”.18 It was not unheard of for governments to use chiefs as proxies for disputes

with locals; Marshall Clough believed that chiefs had to “balance the demands of the D.C. and the

16Ibid.17Ibid., pp. 21-22.18Thomas Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’ in The Journal of African History (Vol. 44, No. 1, 2003), p. 4.

4



wishes of the people”.19 Ultimately, chiefs “trod a fine line between traditional obligations … and

colonial demands to collect tax”20 if they were to remain in favour.

Frederick Cooper in Africa since 1940 actually promotes “attempts to solidify the power of chiefs

who could represent people in large regional groupings”21 under colonial rule. This represents a

totally inverted interpretation to the pervasive one presented by Mamdani, one in which colonial

authorities retained real autonomy, and utilised chiefs more as puppet rulers because “it was

convenient to have people concentrated in large settlements under the effective control of powerful

chiefs”.22 British officials had the power to “appoint and depose chiefs”23 if they didn’t comply

with what they had been mandated to do: “raise revenue, [and] spend money on public facilities

such as roads, latrines and clinics”.24 Geschiere furthers this idea of colonial hegemony, stating, “to

all colonial rulers … it soon became a matter of policy to rule new subjects through indigenous

chiefs”.25 Sir Frederick Lugard’s policy of indirect rule places ultimate power with colonial

government, and nuances in the segmented Bakweri society demonstrate that the “goal … to rule

through chiefs”26 was harder than initially thought in practice, and chiefs played on ‘tradition’, yet,

ultimately, British support was where decision making lay. In Bakweri, the central figure was

Kuva, ‘king’ of Buea, who became chief of the Bakweri district. He had gained military ascendary

over rivalry villages after humiliating encroaching German forces in 1891. However, three years

later the Germans succeeded in their conquest and Kuva died, the Germans installed Endeley I

(Kuva’s son) as chief after his death. After Germany lost World War I in 1918, Bakweri was

19Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’, p. 10.20Ibid., p. 9.21Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present p. 59.22Sara Berry, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa (University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), p. 26.23Ibid., p. 35.24Ibid.25Peter Geschiere, ‘Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon: Inventing chieftaincy, French and British style’ in Africa: Journal of the International African Institute (Vol. 63, No.2, 1993), p. 151.26Ibid., p. 158.

5



annexed by Britain, who appointed Lifafa Endeley II (Endeley I’s son) as chief following an

interlude in rule after Endeley I’s retirement. However, Friedrick Motinda, the leader of rival

Wondongo quarter argued chieftaincy belonged to his family, as did the people of Soppo. Both

parties went to extremes with their claims; Motinda even hired a British lawyer. However,

eventually the British government supported Endeley Lifafa IIs position, despite his alleged

incompetency. It seems that “British support … guarantee[d] the future of the Endeley dynasty”.27

Therefore, ultimate sovereignty of power lay with colonial governments, not individual chiefs,

making it impossible for them to be despots.

Furthermore, in colonial Asante, disputes based on the British land policy there reveal that it was

difficult for chiefs to assess allegiances from subjects. As a result, wider, structural forces rendered

their formal authority obsolete, with colonial powers retaining the real force of government. In

colonial Asante there was a “simultaneous and contradictory process of codification and

proliferation of narratives about the past”28 which steeped all disputes over land in historical

precedent, ones in which colonial governments had the final say. In 1906 Edwesohene Yaw Awuah

claimed that land known as Ahiresu was his based on the fact his ancestor had killed the landlord

Kwatchi Depoah in Opohu Ware’s reign (1700 – 1750). However, his claim was challenged by

headman Wuameihi who claimed that Kwatchi Depoah was killed by one of his connections. The

court, overseen by colonial officials, ruled in favour of Wuameihi despite the local chief’s desire for

Edwesohene’s claim to be successful.29 Here, the colonial power seems to have acted arbitrarily,

superseding the local chiefs wishes. Moreover, it was made clear in Asante that whilst colonial

powers were keen to “establish a stable hierarchy”,30 they didn’t want to force Asante’s to live

under a chief whom they didn’t like. This allowed relocations, authorised by the British

27Geschiere, ‘Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon: Inventing chieftaincy, French and British style’ p. 160.28Berry, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996 p. 10.29Ibid., p. 8.30Ibid., p. 7.

6



government, which gave rise to disputes from chiefs over subjects running away and other chiefs

stealing subjects. The seriousness of this is exemplified by the litany of enquiries. Eventually

colonial admissions attempted to codify a set of hitherto lucid and malleable set of traditions, which

many subjects were exploiting using colonial rule. By trying to impose a Western set of rules onto

the Asante way of life, Meyer Fortes (1948) believed a culture of litigation emerged, which

demonstrated the incompatibility between the old social structure and modern development. A

chief was no longer primarily the servant of the community and their intermediary with the

ancestors: “he was much more the servant of the White Man.”31

There were various nodal points of power in colonial Africa. Chiefs were among colonial

authorities, hereditary monarchies, wealthy nobles and other citizens in exerting power and

influence. Mamdani fails to appreciate that chiefly rule in colonial Africa was regional, some

“chiefs … controlled the spoils of the colonial system”, whilst some “were powerless”.32 Chiefly

rule was characterised by a complex web of different interlocking levels of power strata. They were

by no means the only agents determining the course of African history in the colonial period; they

were negotiators-in-chief most of the time whilst locked into a symbiotic relationship with colonial

governments. After all, colonies needed the chief, as their “rule [was] deeply rooted”33 for many

Africans, but chiefs needed colonial powers, because without their assent they would simply be

dismissed.

WORDS: 1996

31Berry, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996 p. 39.32Thomas Spear, Mountain Farmers (University of California Press, 1997), p. 4.33Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’ p. 7.

7



Bibliography

Berry, Sara, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante,

1896-1996 (Oxford, 2001)

Berry, Sara, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan

Africa (London, 1993)

Cooper, Frederick, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge, 2002)

Geschiere, Peter, ‘Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon: Inventing chieftaincy, French and British

style’ in Africa: Journal of the International African Institute (Vol. 63, No. 2, 1993), pp. 151-

175.

Mamdani, Mahmood, Citizen and Subject (Princeton, 1996)

Spear, Thomas, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’ in The

Journal of African History (Vol. 44, No. 1, 2003), pp. 3-27.

Spear, Thomas, Mountain Farmers (Oxford, 1997).

Willis, Justin, ‘Hukm: the Creolization of Authority in Condominium Sudan’ in Journal of African

History 46 (Cambridge, 2005)

8

Documents

MMA1WalkerC