Military Intervention in Post-Hegemonic

International System

PhD DISSERTATION

This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence

University, Islamabad in partial fulfilment for the

degree of PhD in International Relations

By

NAZISH MAHMOOD

NDU/IR/PhD/S-13/022

Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

Department of International Relations Faculty of

Contemporary Studies National Defence University

Islamabad, Pakistan

2019

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my late mother Musthsenha Bibi who had

been ultimate source of inspiration to me in life, and my father Mahmood

Ahmed Khan without whose love and prayers I would never have been able

to complete it after suffering the trauma of the loss of my mom during the

pursuit of this degree…..

Acknowledgments

All praise and gratitude for the Almighty alone, who gave me the strength and determination to

complete the task.

I acknowledge my indebtedness and deep sense of gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Prof. Dr.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema who spared time from his busy and very hectic academic schedule. His

scholarly guidance and encouraging attitude enabled me not only to remove the shortcomings in

the work but also the strength to complete it.

My special thanks to Dr. Nazia Fiaz who gave me assistance and guidance on personal level and

her insights into the work at the developing stage was great inspiration to continue this research

to the best of my commitment and dedication.

I am extremely grateful to all my colleagues and teachers, my Head of Department for their

support and guidance.

I also gratefully acknowledge the cooperation extended to me by the staff of the IR department

as well as the staff of the NDU Library.

Last but not least, my family members especially my father Mahmood Ahmed Khan, my

maternal uncle Dr. Najam-ul-Hassan and my friends especially Javeria Hassan for all the

moral and material support to me for the completion of my study. Without their faith and

support, the task could not have been completed up to the best of my ability.

Abstract

Uncontested US supremacy established with the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 is fast

drawing to a close. Impending power transition in the global hierarchy has triggered post-

hegemonic phase in the international system. This transition of power in the global order has

marginalized US military interventionist policy. The “rise of China” along with alternate power

centers has considerably constrained US clout to obtain “desired outcomes.” These systemic

changes apart from inducing drift away from US led and controlled patterns of interaction and

exercise of influence, have altered shape of the existing international system and brought

additional actors with increasing sway on political outcomes. Besides, the drift towards post-

hegemony send strong signals to local / regional hierarchies where “challengers” try to take

advantage of the vulnerability prevailing in the global hierarchy. Such regions with significant

changes in regional structure and hierarchy give rise to great power intervention dynamics

made possible through conflict, instability and erosion of traditional structures of power. One

such region is MENA (Middle East and North Africa) after the unprecedented Arab Spring

upheavals, where a clear de-link from previous US hegemonic practices could be observed.

These regional hierarchies with diffused power structures are significant in establishing the link

between global and regional hierarchies in post-hegemony, explored in the study through

extension of Power Transition Theory research program. The arrival of post-hegemony also

alters military intervention behavior of the declining hegemon that has to rely on “securitization

of threat” through “political discourse” as enunciated through case studies of Libya and Syria

by employing Securitization Theory and Discourse Analysis Approach. The study seeks to

substantiate not only the dawn of post-hegemonic phase in the international system but validate

“threat securitization military intervention model” developed within the study to explore the link

between MENA and global power hierarchy in transition, and significance of discursive

construction of “threat” for foreign direct military intervention The rise of peer challengers, US

“back-seat role” in Libya and its incoherent and inconsistent foreign policy approach towards

Syria has exposed US limitation to influence and direct events on the international stage,

increasingly frustrating acquisition and implementation of US policy goals in key regions like

MENA. The study affirms that power transition in the global order has introduced post-

hegemonic system that has marginalized US unilateral interventionist policy on the use of force.

Table of Contents

List of Tables viii

List of Figures ix

List of Maps x

INTRODUCTION 1-29

0.1 Aim of the Study 12

0.2 Thesis Statement 12

0.3 Hypothesis 13

0.4 Key Research Questions 13

0.5 Theory & Method 13

0.6 Significance of the Study 25

0.7 Scope & Limitation of the Study 26

0.8 Organization of the Study 27

Chapter 1: Literature Review: War & Intervention – a journey through

History and Theory 30-68

1.1. War / intervention through History 30

1.1.1. Just War Tradition 37 1.1.2. Humanitarian Intervention 51

1.1.3. From Interstate to Intrastate Wars 54

1.1.4. Discursive Dimension in War Literature 56

1.2. Theoretical Perspective on War / Conflict 57

1.2.1. Systemic Level War Theories 58 1.2.2. Dyadic or Interactional Level War Theories 60

1.2.3. State and Societal Level War Theories 61

1.2.4. Individual-Level Decision Making 63

1.2.5. Organizational-Level Decision Making 65

1.2.6. Civil Wars 66

Conclusion 68

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework: Threat Construction for International

Military Intervention in Post-Hegemonic System 69-113

2.1. Power Transition Theory 72

2.1.1. Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics 76 2.1.2. Post-Hegemony and Power Transition 79

2.2. Threat Securitization for Military Intervention 81

i

2.2.1. Stage I: Post-Hegemonic International System 82

2.2.1.1. Global Hierarchy in Post-Hegemony 84 2.2.1.2. Regional Hierarchies in Post-Hegemony 91

2.2.2. Stage II: Threat Securitization 94

2.2.2.1. Securitization Theory 94 2.2.2.2. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables in Military Intervention 99

2.2.2.3. Threat Securitization in Post-Hegemonic International System 104

2.2.3. Stage III: Political Discourse and Military Intervention 106

2.2.3.1. Discourse and Political Action 106 2.2.3.2. War Legitimation Discourse 108

Conclusion 112

Chapter 3: Towards Post Hegemony 114-67

3.1. Power Structure of the Post-Cold War International System 115

3.1.1. European Union 129

3.1.2. Japan 132

3.1.3. India 136

3.1.4. Brazil 141

3.2. Power in Transition – Analyzing US-China Relations within the Context 145

3.3. Post-Hegemony begins 153

3.3.1. Global Financial Crisis 2008 154

3.3.2. Russian Reassertion in its ―Near Abroad‖ 156

3.3.3. The Arab Spring 161

Conclusion 165

Chapter 4: Middle East & North Africa (MENA) in Transition 168-218

4.1. Pivotal Regional Players in MENA 170

4.1.1.Iran 170

4.1.1.1. Iran in post-Arab Spring MENA 170

4.1.1.2. Iran-US Relations 179

ii

4.1.2. Saudi Arabia 181

4.1.2.1. Saudi Arabia in post-Arab Spring MENA 181

4.1.2.2. Saudi Arabia-US Relations 189

4.1.3. Turkey 191

4.1.3.1. Turkey in post-Arab Spring MENA 191

4.1.3.2. Turkey-US Relations 200

4.1.4. Egypt 202

4.1.4.1. Egypt in post-Arab Spring MENA 202

4.1.4.2. Egypt-US Relations 205

4.1.5. Israel 206

4.1.4.1. Israel in post-Arab Spring MENA 207

4.1.4.2. Israel-US Relations 208

4.2. Russia Re-enters the Region 209

4.3. US-The Declining Hegemon in MENA 212

Conclusion: Regional Hierarchy in Transition 216

Chapter 5: Libya – US“Leading from Behind” 219-53

5.1. Pre-Qaddafi‟s Libya 220

5.2. Libya under Qaddafi 222

5.2.1. US-Libya Relations 222

5.2.2. Anti-Government Unrest 2011 224

5.3. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables in Libyan Military Intervention 229

5.3.1. Geography 230

5.3.2. Intra-State Conflict 231

5.3.2.1. Government Structure and Policies 232

5.3.2.2. Internal and External Opposition Groups 232

5.3.3. Regional and Extra-Regional Players 235

5.3.3.1. North African Libyan Neighbours 237

5.3.3.2. Key Regional Players in Libyan Crisis 242

iii

5.3.3.3. Keya Extra-Regional Players in Libyan Crisis 246

5.3.4. Legitimacy 252

Conclusion 245

Chapter 6: Threat Securitization for International Military Intervention in

Libya 254-92

6.1. Threat Securitization for Libyan Military Intervention 255

6.1.1. Target State‘s Ruling Regime as a Threat to International Peace & Security 258

6.1.2. ―US‖ versus ―Them‖ Binary Employed 262

6.1.3. Co-opting International / regional Institutions 265

6.2. War Legitimation Discourse 267

6.2.1. Legitimation by reference to authority 268

6.2.2. Legitimation by reference to values 270

6.2.3. Legitimation by reference through rationalization 277

6.2.4. Legitimation by reference to temporality 280

6.2.5. Legitimation by reference to group demarcation – Us versus Them Category 283

6.3. Leading from Behind 288

6.3.1. Post-Qaddafi Libya 290

Conclusion 291

Chapter 7: Syria – The US quandary 293-340

7.1. Pre-Bashar al-Assad Syria 294

7.2. Syria under Bashar al-Assad 296

7.2.1. Anti-Bashar al-Assad Unrest 2011 299

7.3. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables 303

7.3.1. Geography 304

7.3.2. Intra-State Conflict 305

7.3.2.1. Government Structure and Policies 306

iv

7.3.2.2. Internal and External Opposition Groups 307

7.3.3. Regional and Extra-Regional Players 312

7.3.3.1. Key Regional Players 312

Conclusion 340

Chapter 8: Syria and Threat Securitization for Military Intervention 341 -87

8.1. Key Extra-Regional Players 342

8.2. Legitimacy 354

8.3. Threat Securitization for Syrian Conflict 358

8.3.1. Target State‘s Ruling Regime as a Threat to International Peace & Security 362

8.3.2. ―US‖ versus ―Them‖ Binary Employed 365

8.3.3. Co-opting International / regional Institutions 367

8.4. War Legitimation Discourse 371

8.4.1. Legitimation by reference to authority 372

8.4.2. Legitimation by reference to values 374

8.4.3. Legitimation by reference through rationalization 380

8.4.4. Legitimation by reference to temporality 381

8.4.5. Legitimation by reference to group demarcation – Us versus Them Category 383

Conclusion 385

CONCLUSION 388-409

Bibliography 410- 453

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table Title PAGE

5.1. Obama on Libya 250-51

5.2. Clinton‘s Remarks on American Leadership 252

6.1. Positively moralized processes representing ‗Our‘ violent actions 273

6.2. Negatively moralized processes representing ‗Their‘ violent actions 274

6.3. Our side‘s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions 275

6.4. Their side‘s negatively moralized titles, attributes, ambitions 276

6.5. Modality – degrees of commitment and certainty 280

6.6. Levels of modality 281

6.7. Temporal Maximization in Obama Statements 282

6.8. We – the International Community 284-85

6.9. They against Us-the International Community 285

8.1. Positively moralized processes representing ‗Our‘ violent actions 376

8.2. Negatively moralized processes representing ‗Our‘ violent actions 377-78

8.3 Our side‘s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions 378-79

8.4 Their side‘s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions 379-80

8.5 Temporal Maximization for Syria 383

vi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Title Page

0.1 Theoretical Basis of Dissertation 15

0.2 Arguments developed within the study 16

0.3 Van Dijk - The Ideological Square 21

2.1. Hierarchical distribution of power in the international order 74

2.2. Effects of Dissatisfaction and Satisfaction in the International System 75

2.3. Regional Hierarchies in the International System 78

2.4. The Global Hierarchy: A Chinese Perspective 83

2.5. Global Hierarchy in the Cold War Period 87

2.6. The Global Hierarchy in the Post-Cold War Period 88

2.7. Alternative A: The Global Hierarchy under a U.S.-led Superbloc 88

2.8. Alternative B: The Global Hierarchy under China 89

2.9. Global Hierarchy in Post-Hegemony 90

2.10. Issue scale, derived from Buzan et al. 96

2.11. Factors contributing to successful securitization 97

2.12. Internal Hierarchy of the Target State located in a key Region 100

2.13. Military Intervention Threat Securitization in Post-Hegemonic System 103

6.1 Libyan Military Intervention Threat Securitization 257

8.1 Syrian Military Intervention Threat Securitization 361

vii

List of Maps

Map Title Page

4.1. Political Map of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 169

5.1 Libya consisting of Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica 221

7.1 Map of Syria 295

viii

INTRODUCTION

The sudden demise of Soviet Union heralded us in a post-Cold War era with US as its

undisputed leader. The removal of rival competing blocks ignited false hopes of an era of global

peace, prosperity and economic interdependence. This optimism also reflected acknowledgement

of wider scope of international institutions. On the contrary, the structural reality soon

manifested itself in military interventions also where American willingness to do what it thinks

right – international law notwithstanding - became the new norm. Due to this development two

very basic and twin pillars of the existing international system i.e. state sovereignty and non-

intervention had been put to severe test. How external impositions put the developing states in a

fragile position vis-â-vis civil society and expose them to foreign conflict/peacekeeping,

intervention, economic dislocation and external policy imposition has been a matter of keen

interest to scholars across the world.

Foreign direct military interventions which are frequently employed in the twenty-first century

international politics to meet the peculiar challenges of security had also been subjected to

intense debate. The criticism is based on the logic of intervention being employed to achieve the

strategic objectives of the intervening state. Up till the end of Second World War, we saw

conflict mostly between states or/and alliances involving militaries. During the era of Cold War a

temporary but fitful bi-polarity kept the world securely ensconced within different camps and

alliances. Often totalitarian regimes were kept in power and popular sentiments of their people

suppressed by artificial support provided to them by their protagonists. With the advent of a

unipolar world and the effective removal of most big powers from the international stage, the

coast became clear for USA to emerge as unchallenged international player. Simultaneously, the

desire to intervene by USA became more and more tempting and its absence on occasions

equally a source of criticism against it. Where this intervention had been desirable to put an end

to human suffering e.g. in Kosovo, misuse of its pretext to advance agenda of various big powers

had simultaneously raised prickly questions.

1

The most recent debate in International Relations about the impending American decline, end of

the ―unipolar moment,‖ ―rise of the rest‖ especially China and its likely repercussions on

American power and prestige has given rise to alternative perspective raising specter of a post-

hegemonic international system. Studying military intervention within such a system would

prompt new thinking about this old and intriguing concept.

Post-Hegemonic International System

Application of the term ―post-hegemonic international system‖ within the contemporary

international environment is vital for understanding the core argument developed within the

study. Though the term and its attributes have been discussed in detail in Chapter 2 yet it is

imperative to define the scope of the term at the start. It is meant to avoid confusion with regards

to its usage and implementation within the study.

Explanation of a ―post-hegemonic international system‖ naturally begins with definition of a

hegemonic one, whether such a system existed, if yes and how it has been elaborated within the

academic and scholarly IR community. Like so many other key concepts, the term ―hegemony‖

is also hotly contested within International Relations as regards its scope and limitations.

Different schools of thought stress different dimensions which have further added to the

confusion regarding its scope and assumptions.

The term ―hegemon‖ is originally derived from the Greek hegemonia, meaning ―leadership‖.

Instead of the coercive and illegitimate forms of power usually attributed in the contemporary

thinking, the original notion of the concept regard ―legitimacy‖ as one of its central attributes. As

a contemporary scholar of the concept Richard Ned Lebow also notes how Greeks deliberately

distinguished hegemonia from arkhe i.e. legitimate leadership from coercive control.

Thucydides‘ History of the Peloponnesian War clearly hints at two core messages with regards

to hegemony: first, its essential for sustainable international leadership; and secondly,

―hegemony requires prudent exercise of power‖. 1 It basically is an honorific status conferred by

others in recognition of the benefits an actor has provided for the community as a whole and

Richard Ned Lebow and Robert Kelly, ―Thucydides and hegemony: Athens and the United States,‖ Review of the International Studies 27, no. 4 (2001): 603.

2

there is an implied right to lead as well. Lebow also identifies power of persuasion as

fundamental for hegemonia. He adds that this hierarchical relationship is least likely to generate

resistance from the community when initiated by an actor whose right to lead is widely accepted.

But when the same hegemon displays behavior at odds with the accepted morality of the age, not

only its standing and influence are compromised but hegemony undermined too.2

No discussion on hegemony could be complete without referring to Antonio Gramsci‘s

articulation of the concept though he never wrote directly about the International Relations. It

has, however, still attracted interest of contemporary scholars who believe Gramsci‘s ideas could

be profitably adapted as a tool for analyzing power in international arena. For him ―hegemony

presupposes that account be taken of interests….. of the groups over which [it] is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed….such a compromise cannot touch

the essential; for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic.‖3 Thus a clear

coercive element is embraced in Gramsci‘s concept of hegemony, though the notion of consent is

there too.

The key shared perspective thus uniting Lebow and Gramsci is the idea that effective power

rests on shared mutual responsibility and obligations on all actors and for the dominant actor it

involves taking into account of interests and concerns of the subordinates too as this kind of

relationship both reflects and embodies system‘s legitimacy, thus conversely the hegemon, and is

the essence of the hegemony.

Charles Kinderberger, however, has been more explicit in his articulation of the term in The

World in Depression where he outlined causes of 1939 economic depression and stated that

global economic and financial stability and prosperity could most effectively be maintained

when a single state (a hegemonic power) is not only able but willing to underwrite structures and

processes of international economic system by acting as ―lender of the last resort‖.4 There is an

evident eco of Gramsci in Kindelberger‘s view and hegemon‘s role is not solely imposed via

coercion and compulsion but with voluntary and willing support and cooperation of the other

Richard Ned Lebow, ―The power of persuasion,‖ in Power in World Politics, ed. Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (London, NY: Routledge, 2007), 120-140.

Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2005), 161.

Charles Kindelberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939 (London: Allen Lane, 1973).

3

members within the system it leads, thus giving them a direct stake in supporting and

maintaining this kind of hegemony.

For later scholars, Kindelberger‘s work has become important not only for the elaboration of

hegemony in the economic realm but how peace, security and order are best maintained in a

world which incorporates existence of hegemonic states of the kind he describes. However, the

concept of hegemony has become hardened in contemporary academic writing in comparison

with its origin in ancient Greek thought. John Mearsheimer defines hegemon as ―a state that is so

powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. In essence, a hegemon is the only

great power in the system.‖5 For him no genuine hegemon ever existed mainly due to ―the

stopping power of the water‖.6 Kendall Stiles refers it as ―the predominance of one state over its

peers‖7 and Robert Vitalis equates hegemony to ―the hierarchical order among rival great

powers.‖8

The general lack of consensus on the meaning of hegemony is further underpinned by John

Ikenberry distinction between ―liberal‖ and ―imperial‖ variants of hegemony. His liberal

conception corresponds to the hegemonic thinking evident in writings of Thucydides based on

recognition by the hegemon of the indispensability of allies for advancing its own interests as

well as for maintaining its leading status in the world though he doesn‘t make such a comparison

explicit. While the imperial variant corresponds to the understanding implicit at the core of

Mearshiemer‘s work.9 In one of their works Ikenberry and Kupchan equate hegemony with

―preponderance of military and economic capabilities.‖10

For Jack Levy and William Thompson the term ―hegemony‖ is akin to both concentration of

material capabilities in one state and the political dominance that this material strength may John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 40.

Ibid.

K. Stiles, ―Introduction: Theories of Non-Hegemonic Cooperation,‖ in Cooperating Without America: Theories and Case Studies of Non-Hegemonic Regimes, eds. S. Brem and K. Stiles (London: Routledge, 2009): 2-3.

Robert Vitalis, ―Theory Wars of Choice: Hidden Casualties in the ‗Debate‘ between Hegemony and Empire,‖ in

Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush, eds. C. P. David and D. Grondin (Adlershot: Ashgate, 2006), 26.

John Ikenberry, ―Liberalism and empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age,‖ Review of International Studies 30, no. 4 (2004): 609-30. ; and John Ikenberry, ―Power and liberal order: America‘s postwar world order in transition,‖ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005): 133-52.

10G. Jhon Ikenberry and C. Kupchan, ―The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power,‖ in World Leadership and

Hegemony ed. D. P. Rapkin (Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner,1990), 49.

4

enable.11

Whereas Keohane in the Hegemonic Stability Theory explicitly equates hegemony

with ―preponderance of material resources.‖12

However, in another work hegemony is defined as

something manifested through rules and its successful creation not only subjected to sufficiency

of power but willingness to exercise it too. Thus a hegemonic power is the one ―powerful enough

to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so.‖13

Corresponding to the debate on post-hegemony is an element of legitimacy. As Martha

Finnemore stated in 2009 article ―the structure of world politics….is social as much as it is material‖ and hence she reminds us the key importance of legitimacy as a factor of power further

adding ―actors, even unipoles, cannot create legitimacy unilaterally. Legitimacy can only be

given by others.‖14

The material preponderance of even a hegemon has to be self-limited in

order to employ fully the social dimensions of power.

This leads us to neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony. Neo-Gramscian perspectives in 1980s

are generally attributed to the rejection of established approaches within IR who have help

maintained prevailing social relations of power with all their injustices, within an existing order.

Robert Cox developed a Critical Theory of Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change

based on the dialectical conception of history centered on the constant process of historical

change and investigates the potential for alternative development.15

This perspective tries to

understand development of hegemony historically.

According to Cox, hegemonic structures are product of social processes, which include social,

cultural and ideological dimensions too. Here hegemony implies prevailing structures of power

and domination, secured by a combination of coercion and consensus. …. The later finds Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, ―Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power balancing in Europe, 1945-1999,‖

Security Studies 14, Issue 1 (2005): 1-33.

R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 32.

R. O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 234. ; P. K.

O‘Brien, ―The Pax Britannica and American Hegemony: Precedent, Antecedent or Just Another History,‖ in Two hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001, eds. P.K. O‘Brien and A. Clesse (Aldershot:

Ashgate, 2002), 3-4.

Martha Finnemore, ―Legitimacy, hypocrisy, and the social structure of unipolarity,‖ World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 58-61.

Robert W. Cox, ―Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,‖ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-155. ; Robert W. Cox, ―Gramsci, Hegemony and International

Relations: An Essay in Method,‖ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 (1983): 162-175. ; Robert

W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

5

expression in the general acceptance of certain ideas by a large number of actors and is also

undergirded by material resources and institutions. For him Pax Americana is over as

international hegemony is no longer linked so strongly to the role of a leading nation state but is

the expression of the hegemony of the social forces.16

The definitions quoted so far reflect the

tension regarding whether the question of hegemony is to be approached from perspective

resting on material preponderance or the one constituted by normative cohesion – a question also

addressed by Dent and Lee in their works.17

The confusion surrounding usage of the term ―hegemony‖ also stems from the misinterpretation

regarding wide array of terms simultaneously used to invoke unprecedented US-dominated

system in the contemporary history – a dominance that is overlapped with terms such as

―primacy‖, ―empire‖, ―imperium‖ and ―unipolarity‖ etc. Ikenberry removes this confusion when

he distinguishes application of terms like ―unipolarity‖ that ―refers narrowly to the underlying

material distribution of capabilities and not to the political patterns or relationships depicted by

terms such as empire, imperium, and hegemony.‖18

The post-Cold War relationship between the US and the ‗rest of the world‘ which is fundamental

to all aspects of the contemporary international order has largely remained dysfunctional since

1990s. The explicit absence of resistance to US primacy in the decade after the demise of the

Soviet Union does not negate the lack of presence of a constructive relationship capable of

addressing existing extremely urgent problems. However, those who were skeptical of any

imminent shift in the global distribution of power saw US playing ―inevitable…. central role in providing world order,‖ and had been stressing ―world politics will center around how other

powers relate to this global hegemon.‖19

But what these writers had been stressing is the

primacy enjoyed by the US with respect to a number of indicators of material power

conventionally defined as size of population, its territory, resource endowment, military might,

Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, ―Neo–Gramscian perspectives,‖ in Theories of International Relations, ed. Siegfried Schieder and Manuela Spindler, Trans. Alex Skinner (London & NY: Routledge, 2014), 214-230.

C. M. Dent, ―Regional Leadership in East Asia: Towards New Analytical Approaches,‖ in China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, ed.C. M. Dent (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 280. ; L. Lee, US Hegemony and International Legitimacy: Norms, Power and Followership in the Wars in Iraq (London: Routledge, 2010), 2.

G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, ―Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behaviour, and Systemic Consequences,‖ World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 3.

F. Fukuyama, ―Challenges to World Order after September 11,‖ in Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order, ed. I. W. Zartman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 242.

6

economic capacity and its organizational-institutional ―competence‖.20

They also stress how it

has faced neither any geostrategic rival nor any countervailing grouping of states. For them the

international order, therefore, is probably ―stuck with American hegemony.‖21

The list of scholars endorsing US hegemony as the most striking feature of the post-Cold War

world is probably as long as those contesting its scope and attributes. Among those who

acknowledge and advocate US hegemony include Mark Brawely asserting: ―If there was ever a

time in modern history that a hegemonic power existed, it is now.‖22

For Kori Schake this

hegemony will persist for another forty to fifty years.23

Carla Norrlof also backs the view that

we are ―truly in an era of US hegemony‖ that is ―stable and sustainable‖ and set to persist for the

―foreseeable future.‖24

For Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth: ―No system of sovereign

states has ever contained one state with comparable material preponderance.‖25

Robert Jervis

also vociferously asserts the United States ―is a hegemon in today‘s unipolar world order.‖26

The other camp consists of scholars claiming ―the time for US hegemony may have passed,‖27

as the conditions specifying it have already receded. Citing the same material power as threshold,

they hold the view that the rise of peer challengers, power centers along with relative decline of

the US in material power is gradually diminishing its global role. Such views endorsing a host of

premonitions of the possible erosion of US primacy and hence hegemony can be traced in

writings of Michael Cox, M. J. Williams, Kishore Mahbubani, Fareed Zakaria and Terrence

Paupp.28

When it was being stipulated by some scholars that the Obama Administration may not Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesely 1979), 131.

Kori N. Schake, Managing American Hegemony: Essays on Power in a Time of Dominance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2009), 1-4.

M. R. Brawley, ―Hegemonic Leadership: Is the Concept Still Useful?‖ Connecticut Journal of International Law 19, (2003/04): 345.

Schake, Managing American Hegemony, 135.

Carla Norrlof, America‟s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2,x.

S. Brooks and W. Wholforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1.

Robert Jervis, ―The Remaking of a Unipolar World,‖ The Washington Quarterly 29, no 3 (2006): 7.

M. H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained And Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 322.

M. Cox, ―Is the United States in Decline-Again? An Essay,‖ International Affairs 83, no.4 (2007): 643-53. ; M. J. Williams, ―The Empire Writes Back (to Michael Cox),‖ International Affairs, 83, no.5 (2007): 945-50. ; Kishore Mahbubani , The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008). ; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (London: Allen Lane, 2008). ; and Terrence E. Paupp, The Future of Global Relations: Crumbling Walls, Rising Regions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), xvi-xvii.

7

be dwelling on the options requiring ―renunciation of the hegemonic role and the responsibilities

that go with it,‖29

there was an acknowledgement of the contrary view in the official 2010

National Security Strategy. It gave due acceptance and awareness of ―a dynamic international

environment, in which different nations are exerting greater influence‖ and ―emerging powers in

every region of the world are increasingly asserting themselves.‖30

Such a view though not very optimistic in reflecting the US hegemonic role is yet not the least

reason of global financial crisis 2008 and US ability to sustain economic damage to its model of

capitalism. The event has been citied at length within the study as one of the empirical evidences

of the drift towards post-hegemony. It may also be not because of inward-looking US domestic

priorities and fewer dispositions to bear the responsibilities of international leadership as getting

increasingly evident in Trump‘s Administration also. More troubling is the US cultural and

ideological appeal and gradual erosion of elements of its traditional soft power which according

to Hunt, Parmar and Cox may not evoke quite as positive a response as they did in the second

half of the twentieth century.31

Others still find the problem even more deep-seated and find US

as the victim of its own successes. They hold the view that US has helped shape a world which is

not amenable to hegemonic direction.32

The same thought is expressed by John Agnew who

clearly states: ―American hegemony has set in motion a world that can no longer be dominated

by any single state or its cultural fruits.‖ 33

Thus it is apt to quote a statement from Ian Clark

from Hegemony in International Society that, ―whatever the precise condition of today‘s

international order, we can at least agree that it is now post-hegemonic.‖34

Though the discussion on aspects of ―hegemony‖ and its scope is inconclusive but the

contemporary era has given further credence to the debate whether America still is the hegemon.

This debate has been explored at length in Chapter 3 where both from the academic angle and

I. W. Zartman, ―The Quest for Order in World Politics,‖ in Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order, ed. I. W. Zartman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 20.

United States National Security Council (USNSC) US National Security Strategy 2010 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2010. Hunt, The American Ascendancy, 322. ; I. Parmar and M. Cox, eds. Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Abindon: Routledge, 2010).

K. Bajpai and V. Sahni, ―Hegemony and Strategic Choice,‖ in War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century, ed. C. Chari (London: Routledge, 2008). ; C. Chari ed. War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2008).

John Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), vii.

Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society, (London: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.

8

through citation of empirical evidence, it has been established that the era of unparalleled and

unprecedented US dominance has come to end. US still is the dominant state in any of the

military, political and cultural sectors but the economic and financial realm is fast in flux and

thus its ability to frame agendas in varied international settings and exact preferable outcomes

has considerably been reduced. What we are witnessing is a glaring discrepancy between its

overwhelming military and economic strength and increased inability to get others do what it

wants them to do. This has also challenged US legitimacy as the uncontested leader of the

prevailing international system.

The study thus approaches the question of hegemony away from its conventional connotations and

approaches the problem as rooted in social legitimacy. Thus as Barry Buzan reminds us the question

isn‘t whether US commands overwhelming control over a set percentage of global resources i.e. the

material power alone but whether such unprecedented dominance grants it ability to recruit

―followers‖ also.35

Corresponding to this aspect is Ian Hurd‘s view on hegemony that requires the

strong to subscribe ―to a minimum standard of compliance with the legitimized rule or institution.‖

Resultantly inducing the strong ―to alter their behavior by the effects of the legitimated rules.‖36

Such an approach according to Clark enhances the institutional dimension of hegemony rather than

simply enhancing the power of the hegemon.37

The notion of legitimacy is even more problematic in

neo-Gramscian accounts on the basis of considerable range of interpretation within the school of

thought.38

However, the hegemonic legitimacy most commonly is regarded as a construct of the

powerful where the ruled are seduced to believe it

35

Barry Buzan, ―A Leader without Followers? The United States in World Politics after Bush,‖ International Politics 45, no.5 (2008): 554-70. Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 78-9.

Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 20.

W. L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci‟s Political and Cultural Theory

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). ; P. Burnham, ―Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and the International

Order,‖ Capital and Class 15, no.3 (1991): 73-92. ; A. W. Cafruny, ―A Gramscian Concept of Declining Hegemony:

Stages of U. S. Power and the Evolution of International Economic Relations,‖ in World Leadership and Hegemony,

ed. D. P. Rapkin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990). ; R. W. Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1996). ; B. Fontana, Hegemony and Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and

Machiavelli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). ; B. Fontana, ―State and Society: The Concept of

Hegemony in Gramsci,‖ in Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics, eds. M.

Haugaard and H. H. Lenter (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006). ; S. Gill, (ed). Gramsci, Historical Materialism

and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). ; D. P. Rapkin, (ed.) World Leadership

and Hegemony (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,1990). ; A. S. Sassoon, (ed.) Approaches to Gramsci (London: Writers

and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society, 1982).

9

―compatible with their interests.‖ 39

Thus in these neo-Gramscian perspectives, unlike the

Hegemonic Stability Theory emphasis is less on the provision of benefits and more on the moral

quality of leadership. Thus not only the consensual element but the shared societal norms

―constitute hegemonic power by defining the range of legitimate behaviour that will cause other

actors to recognize a state‘s identity as a leader.‖40

Without clearly delineating the US primacy grounded in material resources and hegemony

grounded in legitimacy, any intended study on the subject would mean nothing beyond US

enjoyment of degrees of material primacy. The normative account has to be incorporated while

dwelling on the concept to arrive at a conclusion reflecting contemporary realities. Clark traces

three types of stories commonly told about US hegemony since 1945.41

According to the first, it

stretches back unbroken to 1945. This tale is reflected in statements such as: ―For the US power

elite, being on the top of the world has been a habit for 60 years. Hegemony has been a way of

life.‖42

The second is the tale of structural discontinuity where US ceased to be the hegemon in

1970s till the end of the Cold War brought opportunity for its renewal.43

Finally the same logic

is applied where Bush Administration exploited US power potential much more assertively than

previous governments in the post-2001 scenario.44

Clark clearly distinguishes it as a shift away

from hegemony as a structural outcome to one as an agential design.45

However, there is a dichotomy attached to such an interpretation of US hegemony. If hegemony

is no more than the wider leverage in the exercise of unilateral power, then both 1971 and 2001

represented the height of US hegemony rather than a sign of its dissipation. In both episodes US

was able to unilaterally revise the prevalent political and security order by not only overturning Cox, Approaches to World Order, 136.

Lee, US Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 16.

Ian Clark, ―Bringing Hegemony Back In: The United States and International Order,‖ International Affairs 85, no.

(2009): 23-36. Philip S. Golub, ―The Sun Sets Early on the American Century,‖ Le Monde Diplomatique, October 2007 at https://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/25893.html accessed December 27, 2017. A. J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 2002). ; M. Cox, ―Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the New United States Hegemony,‖ New Political Economy 6, no.3 (2001): 311-40. ; A. Parchami, Hegemonic Peace and

Empire: The Pax Romana, Britannica, and Americana (London: Routledge, 2009), 184-5.

44C. P. David and D. Grondin (eds.), Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush

(Adlershot: Ashgate, 2006). ; J. L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2002). ; Bruce W. Jentleson, ―America‘s Global Role After Bush,‖ Survival 49, no.3 (2007): 179-

; Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005). ; D. E. Nuechterlein, Defiant Superpower: The New American Hegemony (Washington, DC: Potomac Books,2005). Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 24.

10

the Bretton Woods system46

but multilateral security arrangements it had itself been previously

advocating in 1971 and 2001 respectively. While at the other end of the spectrum same events

had extensively been quoted as the signs of US global decline. As Clark aptly asserts: ―To have

the capacity to exercise such revisionism was testimony to the continuing material powers of the

United States; it was the response to those exercises that left the future prospects of American

hegemony in doubt.‖47

Those who accept ―consensual legitimacy‖ as one of the core ingredients

of hegemony, ―there has been no recent American hegemony, its material-power primacy

notwithstanding.‖48

The study also instead of focusing on the attributes of the hegemon or the resources at its

commands viz-a-viz others, emphasizes the perception and responses of the ones it claims to

lead. It had been the ―crisis of legitimacy of US hegemony‖ that precipitated debates about the

continuing collapse of US leadership role in the world.49

Issue of legitimacy is central as it shifts

perspective on hegemony away from something structurally determined by distribution of power

alone and rather incorporates social component also. As Agnew elaborates, this approach

conceives hegemony as a new form of power resting on ―the enrolment of others in the exercise

of your power by convincing, cajoling, and coercing them that they should want what you

want.‖50

The study explores how this crisis of legitimacy in the contemporary ear has given rise

to altered and constrained dynamics for the dominant state sitting at the apex of the international

system.

This era the study identifies as ―post-hegemony‖ is defined as an era beyond the preponderant

presence of US led patterns of interactions and exercise of influence. In spite of being the single

largest aggregation of power, US relative decline in power and absolute decline in influence has

heralded us in a post-hegemonic international system. Here, not only the ―rise of the rest‖

including China‘s Rise constrains the politico-economic space available to the US but the

traditional friends and allies are also adopting increasingly sectoral approach – cooperating B. J. Cohen, Organizing the World‟s Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations (New

York: Basic Books, 1977). ; F. Hirsh and M. W. Doyle, ―Politicization in the World Economy: Necessary

Conditions for an International Economic Order,‖ in Alternatives to Monetary Disorder, (eds.) F. Hirsh, M. W. Doyle and E. L. Morse (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).

Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 25.

Ibid.

Walden Bello, ―The Global Crisis of Legitimacy of Liberal Democracy,‖ Focus on Global South, October 2005, at https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/211/44824.html.

Agnew, Hegemony, 1-2.

11

where interests are aligned and offering overt resistance where interests diverge. The legitimacy

of the leading nation rests on acquired consensus and US in this post-hegemonic era increasingly

finds it unable to develop this consensus not only among its traditional rivals but staunch allies

and friends also. The study after assuming the post-hegemonic drift as a contemporary reality,

explores the military intervention behavior exercised by a global power in decline. This era may

give rise to another hegemony of US or any other power or it may drift into a non-hegemonic

phase, only time will tell.

0.1 Aim of the Study

It is to specify detailed mechanisms whereby decision makers within the US administration

become persuaded for considering foreign direct military intervention in fragile, conflict ridden,

unstable strategic regions; and how far they are constrained by the drift in the global hierarchy

towards post-Hegemony. In short, it is to prompt new thinking about the old problem of military

intervention in the contemporary era. This change in the nature of distribution of power at global

level has gradually altered conditions for both the intervening and the target state/s.

0.2 Thesis Statement

Increasing usage of logic of intervention in face of internal conflict and human suffering in a

unipolar world became a reality, yet in absence of universally accepted principles its selective

application raised prickly questions. The dawn of the post-hegemonic international system has

led to further marginalization of the United State‘s ability to exercise military intervention

abroad. In the contemporary global hierarchy in flux, application of time-tested and assertive

hegemonic practices like militarized unilateralism and pre-emption might not be a convenient

and preferable policy option. The study aims to explain how such transition periods create

constrained and altered conditions for international military intervention by the declining

hegemon especially in unstable strategic regions like Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

12

It simultaneously explains how the discriminatory application of the same principle in a post-

hegemonic international system would require the construction of an imminent threat to world

peace and security to provide the intervening state/s with the pretext for direct international

military intervention. Successful construction of an ―existential threat‖ by the declining hegemon

proves that international system is still very much the product of hegemon‘s preferences and

influence while the contrary developments send signals to peer competitors that long-awaited

systemic changes are on the horizon. These preliminary efforts to re-write the global hierarchy

thus prompt both friends and foes to recalibrate their foreign policy orientation keeping in view

their own strategic interests.

0.3 Hypothesis

Power transition within the global order and the dawn of the post-hegemonic international

system has led to the marginalization of US military interventionist policy.

0.4 Key Research Questions

What is the post-hegemonic international system and how has it marginalized United

State‘s ability to exercise military intervention abroad?

Within the post-hegemonic international system – at which systemic and unit levels does

a discourse and consensus need to emerge for military intervention?

How has power transition affected the US hegemonic interventionist policy in conflict-

ridden, unstable strategic regions like MENA in the post-Arab Spring scenario?

How recent conflicts in Libya and Syria prove marginalized role of the US military

interventions?

0.5 Theory & Method

Whenever a research project is undertaken, the choices available to the candidate are either to go

for quantitative, qualitative research or triangulation. After the formulation of hypothesis and

13

research questions, the researcher has to decide and after careful deliberation come to a

conclusion as to which type of research would most accurately inform the research problem at

hand. As the crux of the research undertaken within the study involves construction of ―threat

securitization military intervention model‖ within a post-hegemonic international system; the

assertions made within the model can most accurately be validated through a qualitative method

involving discourse analysis technique. Alternative choice was the Quantitative Content Analysis (QCA). It originates in positivist

assumptions about objectivity and provides a way of obtaining data to measure the frequency and

extent and not the meaning of the messages. It involves verification as the research goal;

progression from data collection, analysis and interpretation is serial; primary researcher

involvement is reduced to setting up the protocol and then analyzing and interpreting the data.

But the research problem at hand demanded a slightly different approach. It required a recursive

and reflexive movement between concept development – sampling – data collection – data

analysis – and, interpretation. The study undertaken involves data analysis in textual form. Thus

the study is strongly oriented to qualitative data analysis, which involves description, attention to

nuances and openness to emerging insights. Besides adoption of QCA could have given surface analysis rather than an accurate picture,

which required more in-depth analysis through qualitative method. For example reliance on

QCA would have noted few words like ‗threat‘, ‗attack‘, ‗kill‘, ‗bomb‘, ‗destroy‘ etc and

determine the number of times they are utilized or invoked for presenting Qaddafi or Assad

regime as ―threat‖. Such an approach would have failed to present the accurate or complete

picture because it could not have reflected the other synonyms employed or how they have been

framed within a particular context. Hence the qualitative approach fitted within the framework

determined for the study.

Theory Triangulation

Qualitative Researchers usually opt for triangulation to assure validity of the research through

the use of variety of methods to collect data on the same topic. This technique not only cross-

validates data but is simultaneously useful in capturing different dimensions of the same

phenomenon. There are four types of triangulation: (a) data triangulation, (b) method

14

triangulation, (c) investigator triangulation, and (d) theory triangulation. The study has employed

theory triangulation for the analysis and interpretation of data gathered for research.

It relies on three dominant schools of thought represented below (Figure 0.1) on a continuous

spectrum to establish grounds for theoretical research. A. F. K. Organski‘s ―Power Transition

Theory‖ with roots in ―Realist‖ school of thought and Barry Buzan‘s ―Securitization Theory‖

with links to ―Social Constructivism‖ along with insights from T. A. Van Dijik‘s and Van

Leewen ―Discourse Analysis‖ technique has helped formulate a ―Military Intervention Threat

Securitization Model‖, subsequently tested in case studies of Syria and Libya.

Realism

Social Constructivism

Critical Theory

Power Transition Theory

Securitization Theory

(insights from) Discourse Analysis

Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model51

Figure 0.1. Theoretical Basis of Dissertation

Hence, Triangulation has been employed to achieve two basic purposes with regards to the

research undertaken. First, it has been done to reduce the risk that study‘s conclusions might

reflect bias because of limitations of a specific theory, thus allowing broader understanding of

the issues under investigation. Secondly, this has also been done with the aim to produce

coherence in the study‘s arguments that dwells on post-hegemonic phase in the global hierarchy

to power transition and threat securitization for military intervention in the regional hierarchy

(Figure 0.2).

This study repeatedly employs terms such as ―threat securitization‖ or ―military intervention threat securitization‖ throughout the study. This basically is a model developed in Chapter 2 after incorporation of three aforementioned schools of thought. This model explains the underlying assumptions about the change in US military interventionist policy in the post-hegemonic system and how these assumptions will be used to validate study‘s hypothesis through case studies of Syria and Libya.

15

Post-Hegemonic Drift within the Global Hierarchy (US waning hegemony)

Power Transition in the Regional Hierarchy (MENA in transition)

Threat Securitization for Military Intervention (Libya & Syria)

Figure 0.2. Arguments developed within the study

The detailed link between them for the formulation of a military intervention model has been

explored in Chapter 2. It first establishes characteristics of the bourgeoning Power Transition

program and its extension Multiple Hierarchy Model. It then identifies the theoretical gap in the

research program by linking the two models and applying it for study of contemporary era and

developments. ―Threat Securitization Military Intervention Model‖ thus formulated help us

analyze change in military intervention behavior of a declining global hegemon i.e. US in an era

reflecting drift towards ―post-hegemony.‖

Comparative Case Study Research Design

The study is qualitative employing comparative case-study research design. A case study

involves in depth study of a particular situation rather than a sweeping survey regarding the

phenomenon under investigation. It narrows down a very broad field of research into easily

researchable topic. It might not fully explore the question under investigation within the study

but it will give some indications and allow further elaboration of the research undertaken. A

case-study can also be designed as a comparative investigation that shows relationships between

two or more than two subjects as enunciated by Michele C. Flores in her elaboration of

comparative methods.52

The study incorporates insights from Flores comparative methods to

enrich the findings of the project under investigation.

For determining the extent of post-hegemonic drift within the global hierarchy and detection of

change in US military interventionist policy, the study relies on ―structured, focused

Michelle C. Flores, ―Comparative Methods,‖ in 21st

Century Political Science: A reference Handbook, ed. John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning (California: SAGE Publications, 2011): 283-92.

16

comparison‖ of Libyan and Syrian cases. This method has been advocated in Alexander George

and Andrew Bennett‘s Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences and allows

for collection of data that can be systematically compared as well as accumulated.53

Catherine L.

Jhonson in her elaboration of case study methodology also recommends this as one of the

qualitative methods adopted by social science researchers to rigorously examine an event, for

developing original theoretical insight and for allowing in-depth appreciation of complex

phenomenon being observed.54

―Structured, focused comparison‖ required same information to be collected for Libya and

Syria, and same questions to be addressed in each case to draw valid causal inferences. Research

establishes how both these cases represent the most appropriate case-studies for elaborating

military intervention model in a post-hegemonic international system. The study specifically

chooses Arab upheavals 2011 and explores how the unfinished transition in MENA in the wake

of the Arab Spring gave rise to competitive environment regionally. This competition for the

reconfiguration of the regional hierarchy has manifested itself in regional conflicts in Libya,

Syria and Yemen etc. It simultaneously reflects US marginalized role to affect political outcomes

within the region in the backdrop of power transition within the global hierarchy. This inability

to affect desired outcomes can directly be linked to US role as a declining hegemon and

establishes a change in US military intervention behavior; the choice of Libya and Syria were

most appropriate to explore the phenomenon.

Libya was chosen because a foreign direct international military intervention took place after the

unrest against the Qaddafi regime in the wake of Arab uprisings; and US back-seat and ―leading

from behind‖ role was vocally criticized as a sign of abdication of its role as the world‘s leading

superpower and as an early indication of its decline. Similarly, Syrian case-study was the logical

choice to further explore the sings of arrival of post-hegemony, especially within MENA. Obama

Administration explicitly stated that chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime would

constitute a ―red line‖ that would prompt punitive military reaction from the US. In spite of

publicly committing to such a path, the Obama Administration failed to implement it, thus giving

Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

Catherine L. Jhonson, ―Case Studies,‖ in 21st

Century Political Science: A reference Handbook, ed. John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning (California: SAGE Publications, 2011): 293-99.

17

further credence to the argument that decades of unprecedented American dominance within the

region were over. It simultaneously gave substance to the argument that US would no longer be

be able to act as sole dominant arbiter within the region.

Thus these case-studies helped us reveal and illuminate a previously ignored issue of studying

post-hegemonic drift in the international system through foreign direct military intervention in a

conflict-ridden, unstable regional hierarchy.

Variables

The study is based on two variables. ―US military interventionist policy‖ is the dependent

variable and ―post-hegemonic power transition‖ is the independent variable because the

proposition of the thesis shows that dependent variable is affected by the independent variable. It

is the power transition in the contemporary era and drift towards the post-hegemonic phase that

has affected US military intervention behavior.

Data Collection, Analysis and Interpretation

The study first establishes that long-awaited systemic changes in the shape of waning US

hegemony are on the horizon. It relies on already published academic material: journals, articles

as well as latest figures available through primary and secondary sources to determine the extent

of hegemonic control lost by US vis-a-viz other peer challengers in the contemporary

international system. The data explicitly relies on published, available, accessible and retrievable

data to gauge the prevalent perception among scholarly and analytical community; and make

inferences based on the dominant thought.

The next stage establishes power transition in the regional hierarchy and explains with reference

to the foreign policy pursuits of major regional actors that fragile regional balance of power in

the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since the first Gulf War of 1990s is fast in flux. It

establishes that changes in the global hierarchy though not directly linked with the upheavals

occurring in the region; nevertheless affect regional hierarchy significantly and trigger events

18

there. US inability to affect the outcome of events like Arab Spring emboldens regional actors

for assertive foreign policy behavior and draw extra-regional actors into the region. The regional

and extra-regional challengers to US policies speculating changes in global power hierarchy

resort to traditional hard balancing strategies to protect their self-interests.

The argument for validation relies on both primary and secondary data. Primary data refers to the

explicit foreign policy declarations of these actors, available in the shape of official documents.

While the secondary data refers to the way foreign policy developments have been identified and

published in the news stories, articles and journals and how they have been used to build specific

narrative about involvement and role of different actors within the region. To help address

author‘s bias a wide range of news stories have been consulted from both Arab and non-Arab

sources. Local, regional and international stories all are simultaneously quoted to verify the

foreign policy claims, aims and objectives of the actors involved. The aim of relying on news

stories, in particular, is to determine how alignments and realignments in the region were

presented in the region for the local and international audience. Based on this foreign policy

orientation of key actors and their role in Libyan and Syrian conflict were gauged.

Discourse Analysis Technique

Once the conditions specifying post-hegemony in the international hierarchy and MENA in

transition are established, case-studies of Libyan military intervention and Syrian emerging

scenario are studied at length to ascertain change in foreign direct military intervention behavior

involving the declining hegemon. The study probes into the political discourse of both the

interveners and the target states to determine how ―securitization theory‖ along with ―discourse

analysis‖ technique is employed to construct ―threat‖ for ―international military intervention‖.

The case studies are also used to elaborate the link between unit and systemic level variables,

and establish how and why foreign military intervention model in case of Libya could not be

replicated for Syria so far.

The case-studies examine the intertextual encounters based on identity, morality, security, threat

and legitimacy language that helped US construct ―existential threat‖ posed by Qaddafi regime

to ―international peace and security‖; and how the replication of strategies failed in case of Assad

19

regime because of successful counter-narrative by Syrian regime allies. The insights form Van

Dijik‘s and Van Leewan ―Discourse Analysis‖ approach helped analyze ―war legitimation

discourse‖ employed in both cases. The approach looks into presidential ―speech acts‖ that

constructed the kind of ―threat‖ Libyan and Syrian regimes posed; examines discursive practices

by the US president, other dominant US elite actors like Secretary of State etc. and US allies;

analyzes the employment of moral, social, security, ideological, religious, and political language

and explores intertextual patterns in both official political language and media discourse. Then it

compares the reproduction or resistance to official rhetoric and discursive structures in media for

―war legitimation‖ and ―military intervention‖ in Libya and Syria. It thus employs political

speeches and statements of elite actors of both the target state and the intervening parties to

analyze post-hegemonic regional hierarchy, military intervention threat securitization, and

construction of war legitimation discourse. Both case studies help us validate study‘s hypothesis.

Why Political Speech/Discourse was opted?

Jonathan Charteris-Balck defines ―political speech‖ as ―a coherent stream of spoken language

that is usually prepared for delivery by a speaker to an audience for a purpose on a political

occasion.‖55

Broadly speaking they are either classified as policy-making or consensus-building

speech, though a clear-cut division does not exist as the typology suggest. Whenever political

leaders deliver speeches or address public they have the audience in mind and their choice of

language is influence by their assumptions about the audience current state of knowledge about

the event under focus. They also have understanding of the media through which speech will be

transmitted to attain maximum effect.

As speech is a socially produced text, so it is analyzed by journalists, de-constructed by

academics and judged by the general public too. The study for analysis of political statements

and speeches rely on insights for critical discourse analysts like Van Leewan and Van Dijik

because these analysts believe language is crucial in determining social power relationships.

Their point of view is based on the assumption that power is not equally distributed in society

Jonathan Charteris-Black, Analysing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse and Metaphor (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), xiii.

20

and language is central to how this power is enforced. Thus with regard to the political utterances

critical discourse analyst interest is in analyzing how these social and political relations of

power, dominance and inequality are enforced and determining the role of discourse in their

reproduction and permeation through society. Besides it is also significant whose voice is being

heard, who has more access to public mind as well as the privileged access to media.

Emphasize our De-emphasize their

positive positive characteristics

characteristics

De-emphasize our Emphasize their

negative negative

characteristics characteristics

Figure 0.3 Van Dijk – The Ideological Square56

With regard to the research undertaken it was analyzed that a discourse of threat securitization

for military intervention will set the stage for how mass media, leaders and citizens would define

the unrest in Libya and Syria in the wake of Arab Spring. For example, when a group in power is

referred as ―regime‖ it deemphasizes the positive characteristic of legitimacy that is implied

when the same group is referred as ―government‖. Conversely, if it is referred as an ―elected

government‖ this reinforces positive characteristic of being democratic. We have seen how

repeatedly these regimes are referred as ―fascist regime‖ as it further emphasizes its negative

characteristics. Similarly, the ones opposing these regimes as either referred with positive

characteristics ―revolutionaries‖ or relatively neutral nouns like ―rebels‖ are employed to negate

the negative connotation attached with the word ―terrorist‖ though there is an implicit hint that

such elements exist. Van Dijk through his ―Ideological Square‖ elaborates the same point (Figure

0.3).

T. Van Dijk, Ideology (London: Sage, 1998) , 267

21

When actions of a specific regime become matter of discourse, it ―expands‖ beyond specific

referent to be used as a more general orientation. Over time, with repeated usage and nuances

blend, we have a different perspective on the particular situation. That‘s exactly why discourse is

used for constructing threat securitization and its analysis help us understand the kind of

language employed to achieve one‘s objective. Hence, the political utterances (speeches,

statements) became the logical choice for analyzing threat securitization for Libya and Syria.

How Data Validity Assessed and Contradictions Resolved?

As the study involves threat securitization for international military intervention in Libya and

Syrian ongoing crisis, so the data basically relies on threat securitization through elite discourse.

The study focused on official discourse, presidential speeches, wider foreign policy debate for

military intervention in Libya and Syria, print and electronic media and public opinion polls and

surveys. In order to specify how the validity of the data for both case-studies was assessed and

contradictions resolved, the detailed process for Libya would be elaborated. It was

simultaneously repeated for Syrian case-study too.

First of all the temporal period was identified. In case of Libya, the temporal period focused on

the time since the unrest against the Qaddafi regime began in mid-February 2011 to his grisly

demise in Sirte on October 20, 2011.

Secondly, the elite actors within the US administration were identified. They were the President,

the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence and any other related key government officials

who made significant statement about the Qaddafi regime or the unrest in Libya e.g. US

representative to the UNSC etc.

Thirdly, it was carefully outlined that speeches and statements should be from the chosen time

frame identified within the study so that it could be accurately gauged when the events were in

flux and no one was certain about the outcome of the situation, how the threat Qaddafi regime

posed was carefully constructed; how it materialized into UNSC resolution requiring

implementation of ―all necessary measures‖ so that threat could be accepted as imminent by both

the domestic and international audience. Similarly, the logic of reinforcing the same threat

22

throughout the conflict that could justify the continued operation by NATO that ultimately

brought the regime change was also explored.

Fourthly, these statements covered press statements, press conferences, TV interviews, official

meetings with foreign dignitaries, keynote addresses to briefings on NATO operation in Libya

etc.

Fifthly, most of these statements were accessed from the US official websites like

https://www.whitehouse.gov/ and https://www.state.gov/ which are not only electronically

accessible but retrievable too. The question of checking the validity of US official statements did

not arise as they were directly accessed from US official websites. For analyzing the narrative

from the other side, Libyan officials‘ statements during the same period were consulted. As it

involved translation of the original Arabic text into English, so as to reduce the biases wherever

Libyan official English subtitles of the original text were available it was given preference. In

other cases the translation of the same source was checked from different sources. For example,

it was checked how the same speech appeared in any of the Arab, African or Western

newspaper/media. In case of contradiction rather than relying on Western, African or Arab

sources, biases (if any) were simultaneously were quoted within the text.

Lastly, print media stories also played a vital role in threat construction. Whenever, threat

construction from ―Our‖ side representing US and allies was involved, research heavily relied on

Western international and pro-US Arab allies sources. For Libyan side, mostly African sources

or pro-Qaddafi African government sources like Algerian newspapers were consulted. So

basically effort was made not only to have access to the most truthful and accurate data but to

ensure the validity of the data the existence of bias in reporting or presentation of a political

statement was duly acknowledged and accordingly dealt with.

The methodology employed in case studies (Syria and Libya) can be summed up

Ontological Position: Subjective / Anti-foundational: The world out-there is the one of our

making.

Epistemological Position: Interpretive: knowing through interpretation

Theoretical Perspectives: Juxtaposition of Realist tradition and critical social constructivism.

23

Method of Analysis: Discourse Analysis (Van Dijik and Van Leewan)

Number of selves for discourse analysis: Two

―US‖ represented through United States and those on ―Our‖ side ―Them‖ represented by Libyan and Syrian regime and those with ―Them‖

Analytical focus: official discourse: presidential speech-acts and discourse on Libya and Syria;

wider foreign policy debate on military intervention in Libya and Syria; media (print and

electronic news articles) and public opinion polls.

Object of analysis: official texts, intertextual links, supportive texts, academic analysis, media

texts (local, regional and international) and public opinion polls and surveys (secondary).

Focus of study: US foreign policy and war legitimation discourse; Arab Spring upheavals in

Syria and Libya; identity, morality, fear, threat and legitimacy language and threat securitization

in the official and media discourses.

Number of events: Arab Uprising 2011; Libyan Unrest 2011; Syrian Civil War 2011 -2017

Temporal perspective of study: historical developments and construction of war legitimation

discourse in US foreign policy in official and media discourse during Libyan uprising 2011 and

Syrian civil war 2011 to date.

Focus of temporal period: for case studies of Syria and Libya- Arab Uprising 2011; Libyan

Unrest – 2011 till death of Mummar Qaddafi; Syrian Civil War 2011 to mid 2017 (the civil war

continues unabated till the point of submission of this study but the focus of the period was when

first chemical attacks by Assad regime were reported and Obama Administration speculated

direct military intervention.

Intervention: study of multiple discursive encounters in the presidential and official narrative on

Libyan and Syrian regime for threat securitization for international military intervention, their

reproduction / resistance in local, regional and international media and its overall impact on war

legitimation threat securitization.

24

Validity: Although there is no universally accepted terminology and criteria to evaluate

qualitative research but certain strategies are usually recommended that had been followed in the

study too to ensure validity of the study. First, Theory triangulation whereby different

perspectives help produce a more comprehensive set of findings has been followed; Second,

establishing a comparison case/seeking out similarities and differences across accounts to ensure

different perspectives are represented. Hence, ―structured, focused comparison‖57

of Syrian and

Libyan cases has been done; and Third, acknowledging biases in sampling and ongoing critical

reflection of methods to ensure sufficient depth and relevance of data collection and analysis. In

sampling a wide variety of Arab and non-Arab, local, regional and international sources were

consulted and quoted to minimize perspective bias of both author and those quoted;

0.6 Significance of the Study

The findings of the study will contribute to the already burgeoning Power Transition Research

program. It has contributed to the extension of the Power Transition Theory and its Multiple

Hierarchy Model by formulating a model for Military Intervention in Post-Hegemonic

International System. It deals with a period when the US hegemony is in decline and other

potential actors are staging a comeback on the international theatre, before a new global

hierarchy is established. Power transition with its clear focus on the dominant state and potential

challenger misses the changing dynamics in wider international system when the system is in

flux. In the contemporary environment, this research program with scholarly analysis chiefly

through lens of China‘s Rise-US Decline has produced dearth of literature for impact of such

transitions on troubled regions like Middle East where a clear delink from previous US

hegemonic practices could be observed.

Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model introduced in the study will remove the

shortcoming in the Power Transition Research Program that hitherto has been restricted on the

analysis of outbreak of major power wars or wars within regional hierarchies with little or no

focus on exploring the link between the two. The study has contributed to the program by

George and Bennett, Case Studies.

25

looking at the effects of post-hegemony on foreign direct military intervention in troubled

regions like MENA.

Secondly, the exploration of the concept of intervention through political discourse technique has

helped us reveal social construction of ―intervention‖ discourse and how securitization of

projected ―threat‖ gain acceptance among members of the international community, eventually

labeling it ―existential‖ thus facilitating intervening state/s and providing them with desired logic

that establishes ground for intervention. Most of the existing literature on ―war‖, ―intervention‖

and the ―use of force‖ in the present day globalized world focuses on dimensions other than

―threat‖ as socially constructed phenomenon. The discursive dimension of threat construction

has still scope to be explored within military intervention cases.

Contemporary works in literature focus on purposes of the intervening state/s and identify them

in regime change, some geopolitical objective, gaining access to the economic resources of the

target state or recently most international interventions have been justified on humanitarian basis.

The underlying pattern of ―threat construction‖ and its ―securitization‖ through discourse has

widely been neglected in current literature which has been explored in the study through political

discourse analysis. The examples from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya have proved beyond doubt

that war is a discursive reality and the intervener/s resort to ―threat securitization‖ through

political discourse. Besides since 9/11 discursive dimension with regard to the military

intervention has been under focus for the Iraq War 2003. The scope for exploration of the same

discursive practices with respect to ongoing Libya and Syria conflicts is very much there as these

conflicts and their discursive threat securitization hitherto have captured little attention within the

IR academic circle.

0.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

It is imperative to define the scope of the study and its limitations so as to avoid

confusion especially with regard to the contentious term ―post-hegemony‖. The study identifies

2008 as the year when the drift towards post hegemony started within the international system

and dwells on three global events of immense significance i.e. The Global Financial Crisis 2008;

Russian Resurgence in its Near-Abroad; and The Arab Spring 2011. It then picks up the Arab

26

Spring for detailed analysis because the Arab upheavals in MENA not only establish the link

between global and regional systems in transition but also explain impact of arrival of post-

hegemony in a key geo-political region. While elaborating that structural changes occurring

during the period are too important to be ignored, the study focuses only on the military

intervention behavior exercised by a global power now in decline.

The study simultaneously acknowledges the limitation of the research project as the post-

hegemonic phase has been explored with regard to the military intervention and that too in

MENA region only. Unless other regions like East Asia with its North Korean crisis or Russian

near-abroad with Georgian and Ukrainian crisis are explored plus other dimensions like impact

of this phase on US financial aid, economic realm etc., full impact of the post-hegemonic drift

would remain concealed.

0.8 Organization of the Study

The dissertation has been organized into eight chapters.

Chapter 1 discusses the concept of war and intervention and its evolution through history and

theory. Divided into two parts it covers the general literature on the use of force, war, military

intervention and how the use of force has changed over time, mapping out the just war tradition,

aspects related to ethical foreign policy, changes in the twenty-first century with a drift in trend

from inter-state to intra-state wars and discursive dimension in IR literature on war. A review of

different theoretical perspectives on the question of war and conflict has helped identify the

existing theoretical gap and scope for further exploration, laying basis for ―military intervention

threat securitization model‖ developed in the next chapter.

Chapter 2 constructs a theoretical framework for military intervention in post-Hegemonic

International System. It starts with the proposition that power transition in the contemporary

global hierarchy has triggered ―post-hegemony‖ in the international system which coincides with

the waning influence of the established but declining hegemon (US) and increased assertiveness

on part of other rising and resurgent powers. It simultaneously explores how global hierarchy in

transition affects key regional hierarchies ridden with conflict and chaos, and establishes the link

27

between the two by extending the Power Transition Research Program. It concludes that the drift

towards the post-hegemonic international system not only raises prickly questions about

declining hegemon‘s international standing but alters its military intervention behavior in

regional hierarchies by increasing its reliance on securitization of threat through political

discourse.

Chapter 3 validates theoretical assertions made in Chapter 2 regarding impending power

transition in the global hierarchy and how it has already triggered post-hegemonic phase in the

international system. The ―Rise of China‖ along with alternate power centers has considerably

constrained US clout to obtain ―desired outcomes‖ and few significant political developments in

the first decade of the twenty-first century are already tilting the debate in favour of drift towards

post-hegemony.

Chapter 4 deals with power transitions in regional hierarchy in post-hegemonic phase. The

focus of contemporary debate on power transition through ―China Rise-US Decline‖ lens seldom

explores impact of such global transitions on troubled regions like Middle East and North Africa

(MENA) where a clear de-link from previous US hegemonic practices could be observed. Here

significant changes in regional structure and hierarchy have given rise to new dynamics, made

possible through conflict, instability and erosion of traditional structures of power hierarchy.

These regional hierarchies with diffused power structures are significant in exploring the link

between global and regional hierarchies in post-hegemony, being more vulnerable as a play

ground where potential challengers to the declining hegemon could be seen with their assertive

foreign policy behavior and traditional soft and hard balancing strategies. These regional

hierarchies are open for great power intervention because disturbances in these regional

hierarchies with interests at stake for great powers draw them it in local settings and make

regional hierarchies as play ground for proxy wars and at time for direct and overt military

intervention.

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss international military intervention in Libya from the perspective of

post-hegemony. US ―leading from behind‖ exposed not only limitations of a global power in

decline in influence in the wake of failed Middle Eastern adventures of Afghanistan and Iraq, but

a changed international environment that heralded arrival of potent peer competitors in

international politics. Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model developed in chapter 2 is

28

tested with reference to construction of threat for military intervention in Libya. It asserts how

gradual loss of influence made co-opting of international and regional institutions along with

construction of target state as ―existential threat‖ to international peace and security contingent

for semblance of legitimacy for undertaking third international military intervention within a

span of a decade since 9/11. US backseat role and reliance on securitized military discourse gave

earlier indications of global drift towards post-hegemony in international system.

Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the Syrian conflict in progress since last seven years shedding

further light on the global hierarchy in transition and how far the world has moved away from

US controlled patterns of interactions since the fateful events of Global Recession 2008; Russian

resurgence and belligerence in its ―near abroad‖; and the Arab Spring triggered post-hegemony

in the international system. Middle East and North Africa (MENA) seemed drifting away from

predominant US control established since the unprecedented victory of the First Gulf War.

Syrian civil war has become arena of the proxy war where the battle for a new global hierarchy is

simultaneously being played along with restructuring of the erstwhile US endorsed and allied

regional hierarchy. Decades-long and time tested old allies are gradually replaced and those with

links still intact with their American counterparts have displayed increased assertiveness with

regards to regional disputes. The writing on the wall tells MENA by the resolution of the Syrian

conflict will have empowered sworn US enemies in a region that traditionally and hitherto had

been shaped in accordance with US desires and goals. A post-hegemonic MENA along with

post-hegemonic international system is on the march.

Conclusion sums up the task undertaken in the study. It points out the limitation of the research

program as well as the way forward for future scholarly work to be undertaken within the field.

29

Chapter1: Literature Review

War &Intervention through History and Theory

It won‘t be an overstatement to claim, that questions of war and peace, have most consistently

preoccupied human mind since times immemorial. The centrality of the subject to human

existence and its direct impact on human life, has led political scientists to give immense

importance to exploration of key concepts related to the use of force in global society. Tons of

available material on the subject focuses on pertinent aspects but fresh perspectives keep

intriguing scholarly minds and beg constant attention. It would be impossible to present a review

of the available literature; however, considering the scope of the subject undertaken in this study,

few broad areas directly related to dissertation will be discussed.

Review of literature would fall in two categories with the aim to cover the allotted area. First part

will cover the general literature on the use of force, war, military intervention and how the use of

force has changed over time, mapping out the just war tradition, aspects related to ethical foreign

policy, changes in the twenty-first century with a drift in the trend from inter-state to intra-state

wars and discursive dimension in IR literature on war; Second part will chiefly focus on review

of the different theoretical perspectives on the question of war and conflict, and will determine

whether a theoretical gap could be identified for further exploration.

The study takes into account other determining variables apart from post-hegemonic drift that

brought a change in US policy on the use of force. The literature review chiefly reflects on the

changes in the war / intervention tradition throughout history and how the evolving tradition

along with peculiar circumstances has constrained US military interventionist policy in the

contemporary era.

1.1. War / intervention through History

30

Any study of foreign military intervention has to begin with the use of force which has been the

most prominent, consistent and regular feature of international politics, being employed against

one another by members of the international society without discrimination, as far back as

history can trace. This is because how ―force is used among members of a society, by whom, and

to what purpose reveal a great deal about the nature of authority in the group and the ends that its

members value.‖1 The shared notions that govern the use of force in international society grant

large-scale force as the prerogative of states only; use of violence by non-state actors is not only

branded as illegitimate but its perpetrators are hunted down by states too, often collectively, in

the name of the ―international community‖. Hence intervention and ultimately war becomes the

most consequential ways of enforcing standards of conduct agreed upon by the states.

Unlike war, interveners have choice whether to use force; that‘s why they ―debate long and hard,

and those and among themselves, about whether to intervene, who should intervene, and what

social values exactly are being secured by uses of force.‖2 Patterns of military intervention might

have changed over time but it is likely to remain salient phenomenon on the international scene.

The undeniable fact is interventions are

―one of those phenomenon endemic in the quasi-anarchic nature of the international system, irrespective of its particular structure and the particular types of domestic political systems of its major actors….there is no international system known in the past or imaginable in the future which is either reassuringly

preventive or comfortably non-conducive to military interventions.‖3

Part of the problem inherent to the study of any type of intervention is the difficulty in defining

the concept. What has particularly intrigued scholarly minds is how to differentiate ―classical

wars‖ from ―foreign military interventions‖; whether one can be interchanged with another; what

qualifies as an ―intervention‖ and why it is being pursed in such an enthusiastic manner as

compared to the term ―war‖ in contemporary international discourse. Stanley Hoffmann defines

1 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 1.

Ibid., 2.

Bruce Jentleson and Ariel E. Levite, ―The Analysis of Foreign Military Intervention,‖ in Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict, ed. Ariel E. Levite et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 14.

31

intervention in its most abstract form as ―practically the same thing as international politics, from

the beginning of time to the present.‖4

However, Bruce W. Jentleson and Ariel E. Levite based their distinction on the basis of three

factors. First, the principle domain of conflict is ―interstate‖ in case of ―classical wars‖ with the

aim to transform the international order and ―intrastate‖ in case of ―foreign military intervention‖

to affect domestic affairs of the state, not the external activities. Recognizing both have

consequences and reverberations beyond their principle domains form ―outside in and inside

out‖, respectively, they go on to explain that the point is not to define their limits so much as to

differentiate their epicenters. Second, ―direct physical control over territory, destruction of

military capabilities, often also destruction of the adversary‘s economic infrastructure‖ is the

central objective being pursued in ―classical war‖, while focus is less to control the territory than

to shape in intervention that Oran Young calls ―the political authority structure‖ of the target

state, to be done in part coercively, nevertheless indirectly through a local ally who is to be

assisted in gaining or maintaining power.

Third difference is with respect to the strategy. Classical wars are fought with strategies that are

primarily military and secondarily political. Armed forces of the attacking state confront the

military forces of the target state on the battlefield. Other strategies like special operations,

psychological warfare, counter-terrorism and other conventional political strategies are largely

supplementary and supportive ones. The relative balance is reversed in foreign military

intervention i.e.it becomes a political-militarily strategy. The goals being pursued are much less

readily translatable into operational military objectives as the intervener has to build political

support for his local ally and not just defeat the adversary on the battlefield. Besides

unconventional strategies particularly counterinsurgency guerrilla warfare and anti-terrorism

gain ascendance over conventional military capabilities.5

What needs to be understood that military interventions are neither the only nor the most

frequent strategy of intervention but in fact represent ―only a small segment of the intervention

Stanley Hoffmann, ―The Problem of Intervention,‖ in Intervention in World Politics, ed., Hedley Bull (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1984), 7.

Jentleson and Levite, ―Analysis of Foreign Military Intervention,‖ 5-6.

32

field.‖6 Other possible interventionary strategies being what Richard Little calls the ―verbal

intervention‖ of demarches and other declaratory diplomacy; carrot and stick strategy where both

economic benefits, aid and sanctions are employed; intelligence activities and covert actions; and

military strategies short of full-fledged direct intervention like aid, training, advisers, even

sporadic incursions are employed to coercively influence the internal political order of another

state.7

Martha Finnemore states that intervention policies lie at the boundary of war and peace. Even

when military forces are deployed against another state, yet states take pains not to label explicit

hostile activity as war. While intervention is considered as different and usually something less

than war but just what those differences are, can be at times difficult to discern from facts on the

ground. Though a formal declaration of war is a trivial distinction, but one that needs to be taken

seriously Finnemore asserts. She defines this reluctance to declare war as a change from the past

patterns. At one place she asserts that one distinction is that interventions are smaller in scale and

have more limited objectives than war, but at the same time recognizes that when objectives are

to replace whole governments, the definition loses its clarity except limited objectives do not

include territorial conquest and absorption. Thus objective alone seems to be a weak source of

distinction between two; just as if scale is the criteria i.e. one has wars with strong states and

intervenes in weaker ones, then why even anyone would bother with the term ―intervention‖.8

Most of the existing literature on interventions dates back to the 1960s, agree with James

Rosenau that the central objective of a military intervention is to change ―political authority

structure‖ of the target state; hence they distinguish it from more pedestrian foreign policy and

emphasize the need for military personnel to cross borders, presumably for the same reason. The

debate during 1960s basically centered on the question whether intervention required an armed

force.9 The term, therefore, has evolved over a period of time and has been redefined in ways

Richard Little, Interventions: External Involvement in Civil Wars (London: Martin Robertson, 1975), 11.

Ibid., 8-11.

Finnemore, Purpose of Intervention, 8-9.

James N. Rosenau, ―The Concept of Intervention,‖ Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 2 (1968): 165-76; James N. Rosenau, ―Intervention as a Scientific Concept,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 2 (1969): 149-71; James N. Rosenau, ―Foreign Intervention as Adaptive Behavior,‖ in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, ed. John Norton Moore (Baltimore, Md: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 129-51.; Oran Younge,

―Systemic Bases of Intervention,‖ in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, ed. John Norton Moore, (Baltimore, Md: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 111-126; Jentleson and Levite, ―Analysis of Foreign Military Intervention,‖ 1-22. ; Max Beloff, ―Reflections in Intervention,‖ Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 2

33

that legitimate or require certain kinds of behavior and deligitimate or bar others depending on what

is required to be accomplished. For example, the term ―humanitarian intervention‖ has evolved over

time from military action to rescue one‘s own citizens in other states to the protection of citizens of

other states by military means and now as response to ―complex humanitarian emergencies.‖10

How

the pattern of intervention is increasingly being understood in the normative context, definition of

who is a ―human‖ and why multilateralism is being preferred to unilateralism has been explored by

Finnemore in The Purpose of Intervention.11

Hence, for a state to describe the activity as an

―intervention‖, they not only are suppose to understand that they are engaging in something labeled

so but also had to use the term when writing to and talking with one another at the time. Secondly,

military action has to be involved.12

Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts on the other hand were concerned with the implication of the

term ―intervention‖ in international law and therefore, produced a legal definition: ―the forcible

or dictatorial interference of a state in the affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain

conduct or consequences on that other state.‖13

For some it might represent a narrow definition

but nevertheless significant because it differentiates those military operations aimed at

influencing the internal affairs of the states from those whose purpose is to influence the

outcome of an international dispute between two or more state parties.14

It is important to understand domestic dimension of international disputes and how the internal

affairs of one state may be the root cause of international disagreement or indeed constitute a

threat or be perceived as such to international peace and security. Even when military serve both

―internal‖ and ―international‖ security purposes, Steven Haines asserts that still legal distinction

between two may still have relevance to the particular circumstances of each case and may also

influence the way soldiers conduct themselves. For non-legal observers Haines keep it simple as

it includes ―the use of military forces to intervene in international disputes.‖15

While Steve Chan

(1968): 198-207; Manfred Halpern, The Morality and Politics of Intervention (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1963), 20.

Finnemore, Purpose of Intervention, 10.

Ibid., 52-84.

Ibid., 11-12.

Sir R. Jennings and Sir A. Watts, Oppenheim‟s International Law Volume One: Peace (Introduction and Part I),

9th

ed., (London: Longman, 1996), 430. Steve Haines, ―Military Intervention and International Law,‘ in Issues in International Relations, ed. Trevor C.

Salmon (New York: Routledge, 2000), 104.

Ibid., 104.

34

regards intervention as ―any involvement by a government in a conflict situation that does not

concern it in a direct or major way.‖16

Although the terminology ―war‖ has been more frequently employed as compared to

―intervention‖ in recorded history but forced military intervention go all the way back to the

Peloponnesian Wars, when Athens and Sparta intervened in civil wars and other internal political

conflicts of the city-states as expressly stated by Thucydides: ―It became a natural thing for

anyone who wanted a change of government to call in help from outside‖.17

Hans Morgenthau

also elaborates why from ―the time of ancient Greeks to this day, some states have found it

advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf of their own interests.‖18

Besides the interveners had been superpowers and regional powers, democracies and non-

democracies; just as the target countries have been both distant ones and neighboring allies; and

the local allies have been both incumbent regimes and insurgent movements.

The contemporary literature on military operations since World War II has identified three

different categories of intervention for influencing international disputes: partial intervention,

impartial intervention and enforcement actions. There is nothing new about ―partial

intervention‖; any state which has provided assistance to another to resolve an international

dispute throughout history is labeled as one. The category also includes the military combat

operations within any sort of military alliance framework. ―Impartial intervention‖ is the one

when military forces are deployed between states with the aim to act as honest brokers to aid

dispute resolution. Not entirely a post-Second World War phenomenon though, has provided a

baseline for future since operations under the ―peace-keeping‖ banner of UN Enforcement Force

to Egypt in 1956. However, a sharp increase in the number of operations in late 1980s and early

1990s; the number of states providing forces to them; and the variety being mounted has

generated complexity in terms of the legal basis for what these operations are trying to achieve

and how to distinguish ―impartial intervention‖ from ―enforcement action‖, which brings us to

the third category of intervention defined as one which involves application of UN-endorsed

Steve Chan, International Relations in Perspective: The Pursuit of Security, Welfare, and Justice (New York:

Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), 81.

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. R. Warner (Penguin: Hammondsworth, U.K., 1954), 208.

Hans J. Morgenthau, ―To Intervene or Not to Intervene,‖ Foreign Affairs, 45, no.3 (April 1965): 425.

35

military sanctions (diplomatic, economic, and military) in accordance with Chapter VII of the

UN Charter.19

Beside these three categories there are military operations which intend to have an impact on the

internal affairs of the ―host‖ state. A further sub-categorization is done to distinguish between

military operations done with the consent of the host state and those that do not. They fall into

four categories. First: at request of or with agreement of the host state. It can become illegal,

even if the deployment is done with the consent of the host state, when forces deployed overstep

their mandate. Another problem notwithstanding prior consent is subsequent legal confusion

over interpretation and even fabrication of the already given consent; Second: at request of

previous colonial possessions e.g. U.K. interventions in Muscat and Malaysia and French in

Chad and Zaire; Third: non-consensual military intervention e.g. Soviet Union in Hungary and

U.S. in Grenada. This position stems from the legal definition employed for ―intervention‖ which

implies lack of consent by a government or at best its unwilling acquiesce in face of a military

force deployed in its territory. This precise legal definition reflects the International Law

Commission‘s draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, by Article 3 of which ―every

State has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of any other

State.‖ Besides Article 2(7) of the UN Charter itself establishes the same position with respect to

the domestic affairs of the states, as one of its fundamental principle.; Fourth: humanitarian e.g.

Liberia and Somalia. A detailed analysis of this last category will be done subsequently in the

discussion on the Just War Tradition section.20

Interventions differ in their scale, composition, duration, intensity, authority and above all

objectives. Keeping these differences in view Richard Hass classified military interventions on

the basis of their purposes as: deterrence, prevention, compellence, punishment, peacekeeping,

war-fighting, peace-making, nation-building, interdiction, humanitarian assistance and rescue.21

Hass covered these types of interventions in his work on the use of American military force in

the post-Cold War world, exploring when it is appropriate for the US to use military force as an

appropriate policy tool. Haines, ―Military Intervention,‖ 104-111.

Ibid., 111-127.

Richard Hass, Intervention: The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World, revised. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 49-65.

36

Apart from defining the term ―intervention‖ and its sub-categorization, scholarly work on

interventions has focused on questions like why interventions have taken place, how they have

been conducted and what policy lessons had been learned. However, in the age of

internationalism, when the actions, be they domestic or international in their orientation, are

under the global scrutiny and whether they were right or wrong being unceasingly determined or

labeled so, one cannot afford to gloss over general normative or legal consideration of a military

action whether a ―war‖ or an ―intervention‖. Hence how war and intervention grapple with

questions of sovereignty, norms, ethics, motives, intentions, perceptions, legitimacy, justice, law

(to quote few among others) and influence international order or shape new rules has been

debated throughout history.

1.1.1. Just War Tradition

It would not be an overstatement to assert that ―no‖ discussion on war may be complete without

mapping the evolution of the Just War Tradition along with the controversies that shaped it and

without investigating the normative dilemmas it pose to the contemporary wars and

interventions. By addressing aforementioned questions of sovereignty, law, ethics, justice,

norms, legitimacy, and intentions etc., the tradition shapes our contemporary understanding of

changing pattern of foreign military interventions.

Just War Tradition is more than a two thousand year old conversation about legitimacy of war22

that over time has crystallized around several core principles and sub-traditions, which however

provide more than a framework for judgment as it also constrains and enable certain types of

activity. By using the word ―just‖ the tradition is not implying that it is just to wage war or it is

good in itself but instead recognizing it as a social fact which can‘t be overlooked, hence the

criteria is to be used as a tool for evaluating and critiquing the actions of those involved both

political leaders and soldiers.23

Acknowledging war with its evil consequences, principally the death of non-combatants;

tradition draws attention to the fact that there are some wrongs worse than the wrong of war T. Nardin, ―Ethical Tradition in International Affairs,‖ in Traditions of International Ethics, eds.T. Nardin and

D.R. Mapel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6-21. ; J.N. Rengger, ―On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century,‖ International Affairs 78, no. 2, (April 2002): 362.

J.T. Johnson, ―The Just War Idea and the Ethics of Intervention,‖ in The Leader‟s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity

and Responsibility, ed. J. C. Ficarrotta (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001), 110.

37

itself. The Just War is a ―theory‖ in the loosest sense, in fact comprising many fragmented sub-

traditions, indeed sub-sub-traditions, none of which permanently prevail over one another. It at

best can be defined as a conversation between different theories: secular and divine, legal and

moral, consequentialist and deontological.24

Alex Bellamy comprehensively sums up that these fragmented sub-traditions are united by three

common factors: first, they are unanimous in their concern about how the recourse to war ought

to be limited and its conduct made as humane as possible; second, these sub-traditions have their

origin in the Western tradition of theological, legal and philosophical reasoning; third, despite

having differences over the interpretation and the relative weight they attach to them, they do

subscribe to a common set of rules governing jus ad bellum (the decision to wage war) and jus in

bello (its conduct).25

The evolution of the tradition over centuries along these lines has lead us to

an era where war has been outlawed as a policy tool and interventions in the internal affairs of

other states require fierce debate between and among themselves and has to meet minimum

criteria of justice and legitimacy.

Although the Just War Tradition is commonly traced to ancient Greece and Rome but there is

sufficient proof to assert that earlier civilizations like Aztecs, Chinese,26

Ancient Hindus,

Egyptians and Hebrew civilizations also attempted to limit war.27

Attempts to limit recourse to

war and its conduct in antiquity was witnessed in ancient Greece between 700 and 450 BC,

derived mainly from Hellenic customs and written treaties. The aftermath of the Peloponnesian

war brought new forms of philosophy to the fore, prompting new ways of thinking about war.

Plato directly addressed the question of war in The Laws; accepting war as the eternal feature of

human society, he asserted that it should only be waged for the sake of peace.28

Compared to Plato‘s deontological conception of justice, a relational concept was given by According to him, justice depended on human relations. He not only came

forward

Alex J. Bellamy, introduction to Just Wars From Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 3-4.

Ibid.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. S.Griffth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 76-78.

P. Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), 9-10.

Plato, The Laws, trans. T. Saunders (London: Penguin, 2005).

F. D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle‟s Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 84.

38

Aristotle.

29

with legitimate causes of war but even used the term ―just war‖.30

Thus Ancient Greece saw

restraints placed on both recourse to war and its conduct after having witnessed devastating

consequences of war for Athens and the Hellenic society but these restraints were valid for only

in internal Greek wars.

Rome valued military glory so much that their leaders launched new offensive almost every year

but this does not mean, there were no rules about the decision to wage war. Ancient Rome

believed in satisfying gods to gain victory and therefore, followed ius fetiale (fetial law) to please

the gods when deciding to launch defence.31

Under fetial law, emissaries were sent to the enemy

states with proposed demands. After a thirty-three days period, when either those demands were

rejected or no reply was forthcoming, war would be waged that too once religious leaders (the

fetiale) had endorsed the proposed action. This practice too disappeared around 171 BC.32

Neither the concern to create a pretext to wage a war nor the fetial law could restrain Roman

expansionism or could compel them to fight defensive wars only.

According to Cicero, wars could only be fought to protect the safety or honour of the state33

and

the only excuse would be to gain ―peace unharmed‖.34

He, however, justified expansionist wars

―to enlarge the boundaries of peace, order and justice‖. No contradiction existed between

fighting for either the glory of Rome or to preserve peace for him.35

Despite the fact that

Cicero‘s prescriptions were overlooked on number of occasions, Roman practice did bequeath

that certain laws were binding on all. Hence one of the most significant contribution of the

Roman law and ethics to the later Just War Tradition was providing a useful guide to the

question of jus ad bellum especially just cause and right authority.

Unlike ancient Greece and Rome, the early Christians confronted a problem in the New

Testament which contained no definitive answer to the question pertaining to the participation of

a Christian in a war. Constantine conversion to Christianity, which became empire‘s religion,

was an important turning point in Christians‘ attitude towards war. ―This changed situation was

Aristotle, The Politics, trans. E. Baker, ed. R. F. Stalley (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1998), 199.

W. R. Halliday, Lectures on the History of Roman Religion: From Numa to Augustus (London: Hodder & Stroughton, 1922), 114.

W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 167.

Cicero, De Re Publica III, trans. C. Keyes (New York: G. P.Putnam‘s Sons 1928), 211-3.

Cicero ,De Officiis, trans. W. Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 38.

R. N. Wilkin, Eternal Lawyer: A Legal Biography of Cicero (New York: Macmillan, 1947) 65.

39

reflected in the writings of the Church leaders from the fourth century onwards- particularly

those of Ambrose of Milan and Augustine of Hippo.‖ 36

For Ambrose, the Jesus injunction to ―turn the other cheek‖ pertained more properly to the

―inward disposition of the heart than to outward actions.‖37

He was the first one to deal with the

question if it was right for a Christian to use force to protect the empire, the faith and the law and

such other questions which were irrelevant when the state was pagan and persecuted Christians.

However, it was his contemporary, Augustine of Hippo, who is credited with forwarding the first

Christian doctrine of the Just War. A refinement of the earlier work rather than a break with the

past, Augustine‘s work started with the debate whether an individual could permissibly kill in

self-defence, which he did not endorse on grounds that it was not the act of killing in self-

defence that was itself sinful but the inward disposition that drove the act (love for earthly

things-life, honour, property-over spiritual). Though the question why it was impermissible to

use force to save oneself drew criticism from pacifists, most eloquently expressed by Robert

Holmes.38

Two principle insights on the ethics of war could be drawn from Augustine: first, war must be

waged with right intentions; second, if killing was only justified on behalf of the state, in the

service of the common good then it can only be just if authorized by the appropriate public

authority.39

Criticism notwithstanding, Augustine was the one who combined Christian theology

with Roman law and philosophy and provided basic ideas that would inform judgments about

legitimacy of war for centuries to come.

The European political order was chaotic and complicated at the start of the Middle Ages, as

feudalism flourished and both Church and empire laid claim to political authority. In theology,

canon law and Christian practice, three strains of thought – pacifism, holy war and Just War -

developed into coherent bodies of thought. At least three significant ideas were added to the Just

Bellamy, Just Wars,24.

Louis J. Swift, ―St Ambrose on Violence and War,‖ Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 101 (1970), 541.

Robert Homles, On War and Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 121-2.

Richard Shelly Hartigan, ―Saint Augustine on War and Killing: The Problem of the Innocent,‖ Journal of the History of Ideas 27, no.2 (April-June 1966), 203.

40

War Tradition during this period. First, a consensus emerged through Canon lawyers40

and

Aquinas on the question of who had the legitimate authority to wage war. Through ―Peace of

God‖41

and ―Truce of God‖42

movements two lasting contributions were made to the Just War

Tradition. First, clerics were not to be targeted; second, certain groups of people were to be free

from ravages of war. Gratian of Bologna‘s Decretum, remains the most influential source of

guidance in the tradition, addressing questions of whether war and killing were ever justified; the

nature of the just war; question of right authority; and conduct in war.43

Second key contribution of the Middle Ages was Thomas Aquinas doctrine of double effect and

providing a blend of both philosophical and theological underpinnings to the just war tradition.

He formulated doctrine of double-effect on two fundamental elements: First, any act has two

consequences: one intended, other not. Even in self-preservation, an individual has to

demonstrate that his intent was not to kill the assailant. Likewise the government has to

demonstrate that it acted out of intent to promote the common good and have a just cause.

Second element of doctrine related to objective consequences of an act and asked whether it has

met criteria of proportionality. If injustices of an act outweigh the injustices of war waged, only

then it could be waged.44

Third key contribution of the period was chivalric code‘s development of customary jus in bello

rules. Although it would be an overstatement to state importance of chilvary‘s rules on the

conduct of war, especially as far as non-knights are concerned, but it did establish soldiers as a

discrete professional class governed by its own code of ethics.45

Canon Law was a system of law governing the Church and individuals who fell under its jurisdiction. Among

other things, canon law claimed jurisdiction over wills, offences against God, oaths and war.

Established by Abbey of Cluny, ‗Peace of God‘ movement was a response to the increasing violent nature of feudalism towards the defenseless and the Church especially. It forbade all acts of warfare and vengeance against clerics, pilgrims, merchants, Jews, women, and peasants and the despoliation of ecclesiastical and agricultural property.

Created by Abbot Odilo of Cluny, the Church forbade the conduct of war from Saturday noon until Monday morning, during Lent and Advent and on other holy and saint‘s days under the banner on ‗Truce of God‘.

F.H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 57.

T. Aquinas, Political Writings, trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 264.

Bellamy, Just Wars, 40-4 and 48.

41

With the launch of Crusades in the Middle Ages, Holy War doctrine gained importance. It was a

part of the Just War Tradition rather than antithetical to it46

as it drew upon the Just War idea

that war was justifiable if directly commanded by God.47

Through Holy War doctrine, Pope

gained highest authority to wage war and the idea of constraints on conduct were rejected. With

gradual fracture of Christianity, the crusading impulse was directed at other Christians rather

than Muslims. By seventeenth century, this idea was exclusively used by Catholics and

Protestants against each other and the same doctrine was used to furnish justification for the

carnage of the Thirty Years‘ War.48

From sixteenth century onwards, the Just War Tradition witnessed a more secular trend as its

foundations shifted from canon law and scholasticism towards natural law grounded in human

reason and positive law based on voluntary agreements of sovereigns.49

Though it was not until

nineteenth century, this fully ―secularized‖ form could be realized; till then secular ideas and

theological doctrines co-existed within the tradition. Three of the aforementioned sub-traditions:

canon law, scholasticism and the chivalry code became less central during the period.

Another simultaneous development during the period was Machiavelli‘s realism which gave a

very different concept of virtue from the one held by scholastic and canon lawyers. His Prince

was to appear to conform to traditional Christian virtues of ―compassion, faith, integrity,

humanity and religion‖ for the sake of domestic legitimacy but insisted that it was sometimes

necessary to act ―against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion‖.50

His

theory of justice51

was also at odds with the prevalent ideas of the day. For him, state required

justice ―to restrain and correct the subjects‖ and arms ―to protect them from foreign attacks.‖52

LeRoy Walters, ―The Just War and the Crusade: Antitheses or Analogies?‖ The Monist, 57, no.4, Philosophy of

War (October 1973): 584-94.

C. Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade, trans. M. W. Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977),7.

N. Housely, ―The Crusading Movement: 1274-1700,‖ in The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades, ed. J.

Riley-Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 270.

Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace, 49-110. ; A.J. Coates, The Ethics of War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 76-122.

N. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. C. Detmold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 18.

What Machiavelli meant by ‗justice‘ was outlined in part in the Discourses, which he wrote between 1515 and

1520. See N. Machiavelli, ―The Discourses,‖ in Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, ed. and trans. A. Gilbert (Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 1965).

A.J. Parel, ―Machiavelli‘s Notion of Justice: Text and Analysis,‖ Political Theory 18, no.4 (November 1990): 531.

42

No moral or legal constraints were placed on Prince‘s decision to wage war, his only guide being

necessity, making room for moral evil means if they accomplished good consequences.53

For legalists, Machiavelli schema was problematic; agreeing that states were valuable but

departed their position from realism by arguing they comprised an international society

constituted by laws and norms governing their mutual relations. While their difference with

scholasticism centered on their rejection of theology as a foundation of earthly law. Balthazar

Ayala and Alberico Gentili were among the best known advocates of the sixteenth century

legalism. 54

The fourth tradition which emerged in the sixteenth century England and challenged king‘s right

to wage war for its anti-humanist consequences because famous as Reformism. Erasmus More

and John Colet were few among celebrated reformists who questioned the foundations of classic

Just War thinking, realism and legalism. Colet expressly challenged that predominant

justifications of war deviated from scriptural teachings as there was little in scripture to support

the view that ―evil was a good, just and Christian means of overcoming evil.‖55

Reformists

poked fun at marital values attached to war, even though war may be justifiable in certain

circumstances. Erasmus argued that an unjust peace was morally preferable to a just war, thus

almost endorsing pacifism. He lifted the proportionality bar much higher than either the

scholastics or legalists had placed it.56

These ideas gained much approval during the period

alarming authorities that they were actively suppressed throughout Europe after 1520s.

The period between 1570 and 1660 was one of almost incessant holy war in Europe,57

brought

to an end by two treaties collectively known as the ―Peace of Westphalia‖. Hobbes reaction to

civil strife of the seventeenth century was his rejection of scholasticism and giving preference to

C.L. Hancock, ―Cicero Versus Machiavelli: Does the End Justify the Means?‖ Contemporary Philosophy 16, no. 6 (1994):14.

A. P. D‘Entreves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (London: Hutchinson University Library,

1951),68. ; G.H.J. Van Der Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law: His Life, Work

and Times, 2nd

revised edition (Leyden: A.W.Sijthoff ,1968),116-17. R. M. Adams, The Better Part of Valor: More, Erasmus, Colet and Vives on Humanism, War and Peace 1496-

1535 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), 22.

D. Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince, trans. L.K.Born (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 252.

J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe: 1450-1620 (London: Leicester University Press in Association with Fontana Paperbacks, 1985), 28.

43

reason and history instead.58

He believed civil wars were result of the breakdown of sovereign

power; to increase their chance of survival in an anarchic international society; the states should

maximize their power. He advocated an absolutist conception of sovereignty which had

important consequences for Just War tradition.

Grotian response to holy wars also altered elements within the Just War Tradition as theological

arguments were explicitly marginalized in favour of natural and volitional law based arguments. He

challenged sovereign right to wage war for any reason as states, according to him were bound by

international law. He divided international law into natural and human law, the first governing what

was just, and the latter determining what was legal.59

Natural law was binding on all people only

acts that were clearly repugnant and ―unambiguously destructive of society‖ were forbidden by it.60

Human law was more comprehensive element of international law which referred to the agreements

of states manifested in treaties and customs.61

The complex relationship between two was shaped by

Hugo Grotius ―notion of permissions‖. Grotius argued that ―human law cannot command what

natural law forbids or forbid what natural law commands.‖62

Legalism bifurcated into two sub-traditions after Grotius. The first, Natural Law, manifested

itself in the works of such celebrated authors like Samuel Von Pufendorf and Christian Wolff

while the other Positive Law was evident in works of Emerde Vattel and Cornelius Van

Bynkershoek. For Pufendorf natural law could be studied without appeal to theological argument

but religion also was not irrelevant to international law.Besides natural law, for him, was

grounded in right reason and hence, carried a significant moral component. On the law of war, he

argued nature permitted war waged for the end of peace.63

By elaborating just causes of war as a

wrong received, the satisfaction of rights, reparation for wrongs and to guarantee future peace, he

echoed his predecessors.

S. Cahn , ed., Classics of Modern Political Theory: Machiavelli to Mill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),

79.

H. Grotius, De Jure Beli ac Pacis Libri Tres, trans. F.W. Kelsey (Washington,DC: Carneige Council, 1925), 44-5.

W. Ballis, The Legal Position of War: Changes in its Practice and Theory from Plato to Vattel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1937), 110.

H. J. M. Boukema, ―Grotius‘ Concept of Law,‖ Archive fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archive for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 69, no.1(1983): 68-73.

Steven Forde, ―Hogo Grotius on Ethics and War,‖ American Political Science Review 92, no. 3 ( September 1998): 644.

S. Pufendorf, ―On the Law of War,‖ in The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf, ed. and trans. C.L. Carr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 257.

44

Even Wolff, though articulated a cohesive account of the laws of war but failed to fill the gaps in

Grotius work. Wolff‘s natural law gave both individuals and states a right of self-preservation

and perfection but this right entailed a duty to assist others. Both Pufendorf and Wolff failed to

make substantive contribution to the Just War tradition as they were unable to articulate a

doctrine of natural law that went beyond scholasticism.

The second strand of thought within post-Grotian legalism which proved more successful than

naturalism in terms of both intellectual development of Just War tradition and restraining the

actual conduct of war was positive law. Its most significant contributor was Vattel, who along

with Grotius dominated the thinking about the laws of war until the twentieth century. For

Vattel, nations were free, independent and equal in nature; hence separate nations were equal

sovereigns, thereby rejecting idea of a universal community predicated upon either Christianity

or rationality. The laws of the war were grounded in relationship between sovereigns and the

rights and duties they owe to each other.64

It was the idea of an international society bounded by

voluntary rules that was propagated by him.

While at the same time reformist school under Immanuel Kant also made significant contribution to

the Just War Tradition whose relevance though had also been hotly contested. This was because Kant

dismissed ―the idea that there could be a just war‖65

as ―nothing but confusion and harm resulted

from regarding wars as just‖.66

Natural law had no appeal to his discussion of war, only sources of

law were customary practices, treaties and opinions of ―recognized authorities‖.67

He was more

optimistic than legal positivists of nineteenth century about potential of law in reshaping relations of

states governed by rule of law. His Perpetual Peace also presents the same argument: that

international society can have lasting peace if states voluntarily bind themselves to rules. His

enlightened states if first abide by six preliminary articles that he enunciated in his work Perpetual

Peace, would be able to create conditions for three definitive articles which

E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of

Nations and of Sovereigns, trans. , C. G. Fenwick (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution,1916), 3.

Fernando R. Teson, ―The Kantian Theory of International Law,‖ Columbia Law Review 92, no. 1(January 1992): 90.

W. B. Gallie , Philosophers of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978), 19-20.

C. Covell, Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International law and International Relations

(New York: St Martin‘s Press, 1998), 94.

45

would abolish war altogether.68

This last point led his opponents to insist that he had nothing to

do with Just War tradition.

Brain Orend proposed that it was possible to construct a Kantian Just War theory comprising jus

ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum. Orend argued Kant jus ad bellum holds that a just

cause is created when the rights of a state are violated. His jus in bello was much less well

developed; though principles of non-combatants immunity and proportionality could be inferred.

Also sixth preliminary article69

of Perpetual Peace forbid use of strategies inconsistent with the

long term ideal, thus putting restrictions on jus in bello, as suggested by the requirement to abide

by treaties. Orend, however, added an innovative component in his Just War doctrine - jus post

bellum: To create perpetual peace, the victor must allow the right of self-determination to the

vanquished, to select their own form of government and not have it imposed on them.70

The technological changes by the end of the eighteenth century not only increased military

firepower dramatically but advancement in communications and logistics enabled states to field

much larger and rapid military and that too for much longer periods.71

War-wagging turned into

a duty for every citizen. By the times Napoleonic wars came, they pitted nations rather than

mercenaries against each other. Sovereigns enjoyed unlimited legitimacy to wage war, tempered

only by military necessity as Realism dominated this time period, though the position later

challenged by legalists from mid-nineteenth century onwards.

Friedrich Hegel‘s concept of state as enunciated in a series of works, illustrated how realism got

translated from broad philosophical worldview into state‘s ideology combining both nationalism and

militarism during the nineteenth century. Hegel identified defending the state and its interests as the

most important human endeavour. Following this, it can be inferred that the doctrine of raison

d‟e tatwas the guiding idea for political leaders in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Where

prudence, morality and power conflicted, the doctrine of raison d‟e tat suggested a clear hierarchy.

The doctrine also shifted normative discussion about the war during I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, trans. M. Campbell Smith (London: Simon Sonnenschein &

Co., 1903), 109-142.

‗No state at war with another shall countenance modes of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible in a subsequent state of peace‘. (Kant 1903)

B. Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000) 51-2 and 58-9.

J. Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents 1450-2000 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 164-70.

46

the same period. Though domestic political and moral concerns, prudence and utility acted as

central constraints on war-fighting, the key determinant of the actual conduct of war was

strategic. Raison d‟e thadt important impact on the Just War tradition too as it allowed political

and military leaders to invoke ―necessity‖ to justify overriding tradition‘s rules.72

Carl von Clausewitz was another most influential thinker of the times, who expressly talked

about prioritization of strategic over moral considerations. He was skeptical about either legal or

moral constraints on the conduct of war which can only be limited by its end.73

War, though can

be waged whenever it is in the interests of the state but Calusewitz insisted that political leaders

must stipulate clear political objectives when ordering armies. Thus for nineteenth century

strategists, it was not universal morality or law that limited war but domestic political

considerations. In Just War tradition‘s context, Jus ad bellum concerns were clearly subverted

with only proportionality left intact as a prudential check on reckless war while in jus in bello,

realists argued war is limited by its political goals.

A manifestation of mounting humanitarian concern was witnessed in Europe, which finally led to

establishment of Red Cross in a conference in Geneva in 1863. Two important contributions in

jus in bello were made by 1984 Geneva Convention: first, it granted recognition to International

Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) which then became a key player in development of the laws of

war74

and secondly non-combatant community was extended to medical personnel and wounded

soldiers.75

As state‘s legal right to wage war against each other was recognized, from 1860s

onward states started focusing almost solely on jus in bello. This period also started a ―golden

era‖ till the outbreak of WWI for international treaty-law governing war conduct.76

The First World War as an indisputable ―total war‖, pitted entire societies against each other,

was responsible for over six million deaths; after war challenges were more to reduce likelihood

of war significantly through compulsory arbitration, collective security and legal prohibition than

to create stronger jus in bello rules. Hence a shift in Just War Tradition from jus in bello back

Bellamy, Just Wars, 91.

M. Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 34-5.

Y. Sandoz, ―The Red Cross and Peace: Realities and Limits,‖ Journal of Peace Research 24, no. 3 (1987): 287.

C. Moorhead, Dunant‟s Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 1998), 47.

See James Brown Scott, ―The Codification of International Law,‖ American Journal of International Law 18, no.2 (1924): 260-80.

47

towards jus in bellum was seen. League of Nations created in the immediate aftermath of WWI

was predicated on the assumption first: that there were blatantly unjust wars of aggression, which

necessitated establishment of system of collective security for their prevention; second: there are

genuine disputes over rights which could be prevented by establishing a system of compulsory

arbitration. The League thus failed to make a revolutionary shift in the way states thought about

war.77

By the time of WWII, the Just War Tradition had crystallized around realism and positive law.

But there were significant differences from nineteenth and early twentieth century realism and its

post-Second World War successor as it became imbued with Just War thinking. A number of

factors contributed to this e.g. the introduction of nuclear weapons exponentially increased

inherent danger attached to war while the unbridled pursuit of national interests was exposed by

excesses committed by Nazi Germany. The questions which continued to resurge were how to

make moral and prudential sense of strategic dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons and how to

place more effective constraints on human behavior. Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr

were two proponents of this new type of realism. Both acknowledged that moral and legal

considerations should be factored into decision-making. But there are dangers of over-reliance

on morality and law, hence for them they play secondary role to power and prudence. ―However,

the principled realism of Morgenthau and Niebuhr still influence political leaders inasmuch as

leaders must constantly balance that which is ‗right‘ with that which is ‗necessary‘ or ‗effective‘

in case where the two collide‖.78

In spite of failure of positive law to prevent Germany and Japan from launching aggressive wars

in WWII, efforts to restrict both state‘s right to wage war and its conduct continued. The United

Nations Charter went ahead than League of Nations for prohibiting threat or use of force as

enunciated in Article 2(4). All international force, except when used in self-defence, was

outlawed as expressed in Article 51 or when authorized by UN Security Council for the purpose

of maintaining international peace and security as stated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus

aggressive wars were outlawed and sovereigns had to justify their actions to their peers whenever

Lynn H. Miller, ―The Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War,‖ World Politics 16, no. 2 (January

1964): 261.

Bellamy, Just Wars, 103-107 and 114.

48

they decided to use force thus delimiting the kinds of justifications acceptable to international

community.

Today‘s Just War Tradition rules are divided into jus ad bellum and jus in bello with increasing

emphasis on jus post bellum also. Jus ad bellum can further be divided into three types of

criteria: substantive, prudential and procedural. A substantive criterion is further subdivided into

four: the right intention i.e war can only be waged for common good or not for self-

aggrandizement; it can only be waged for a just cause; proportionality of ends have to kept in

focus i.e. whether the overall harm likely to be caused by war is less than the one that is being

righted; and final substantive test is of last resort. Prudential criteria impose checks on otherwise

justifiable wars. There has to be reasonable chance of success i.e a state may be able to prevail

but it has to carefully assess that the cost of prevailing may be much higher than it wishes to pay

or accept to satisfy a particular just cause. While procedural constraints involve satisfying

requirements of right authority and proper declaration.

Jus in bello regulates conduct of war and involves three basic criteria. First it takes into account

principle of discrimination emphasizing that non-combatants must never be deliberately

attacked. Second is the principle of proportionality regarding military targets which can only be

attacked if their military value outweighs the foreseeable destruction that will result. Third and

the last criteria bind combatants not to use prohibited weapons or to conduct themselves in ways

that violate established laws of war.

While jus post bellum focus is on how the victors should conduct themselves after the war.

Though realism, positive law and natural law can all be identified in this Just War tradition but

all differ from each other on three counts; on the basis of different interpretations they offer to

the criteria; different weight they attach to the criteria and different modes of reasoning. Despite

the differences which accompany contemporary Just War Tradition, there are at least two

absolute rules which have firmly taken their roots: actors remain obliged to provide good reasons

for waging war and non–combatants must never be deliberately targeted by combatants.

Contemporary debate on Just War has to deal with a range of issues, such as terrorism, pre-

emption, aerial bombardment and humanitarian intervention. All these issues represent the

change in trend in twenty-first century warfare that prompts us to think how time tested and

49

centuries old Just War rules will figure in with new realities. Terrorism is never justifiable.

Viewing terrorism within the Just War tradition paradigm provides us to interrogate the morality

of different types of violence. If the jus ad bellum criterion is not satisfied by an actor, it means

every act of violence it unleashes is immoral. Besides the very criteria of proportionality and

non-combatant immunity is violated in acts of terrorism.

Even when self-defence is recognized as a just cause of war, pre-emptive wars, except in face of

imminent threat, are expressly rejected as acts of aggression. Article 51 of the UN Charter

declares that ―nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or

collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs‖. The interpretation of Article 51 has lead to

two schools: one who believes in narrow interpretation and refers only to large scale invasion is

termed as restrictionists. They expressly rule out pre-emption as states have self-defence right

only after an armed attack has taken place, a view supported by ICJ in the Nicaragua vs. United

States case also.79

Counter-restrictionists include all ―armed attacks‖ regardless of the scale as

an armed attack.80

They, therefore, do not think that Article 51 diminishes state‘s inherent right

to pre-emptive self-defence. Hence it would not be an overstatement to argue that contemporary

international law permits limited right of pre-emption to state (based on imminence, necessity,

proportionality) that extends beyond Article 51 of the UN Charter but nevertheless limited by

customary international law and state practice since 1945.81

Not going into the further details

and merits, demerits of both schools, pre-emptive strategy became a part of the US military

doctrine and was employed in US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan once again raised ethical dilemmas associated with

aerial bombing as waging war on terrorists makes it difficult to distinguish terrorists/combatants

from non-combatants. They conceal themselves among civilian population thus manipulating

moral and legal restraints observed by their enemies. Though the moral absolutes of the Just War

tradition explicitly commit not to deliberately kill, maim or otherwise harm non-combatants but

pins the responsibility for deaths in such cases on terrorists and insurgents who put the 79

Hans Kelsen, ―Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter,‖ American Journal of International Law 42, no. 3 (October 1948): 792.

80 Josef L. Kunz, ―Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,‖ American Journal of International Law 41, no 4 (October 1947): 878.

I. Detter, The Law of War, 2nd

edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 86.

50

combatants in harm‘s way. The use of cluster bombs and terminology like ―collateral damage‖

has brought refocus on jus in bello in contemporary warfare.

1.1.2. Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian intervention provides the most plausible reason to intervene in the internal affairs

of the country and has recently been employed in a number of cases to override the universally

acknowledged norm of non-intervention. Even within the post-hegemonic system this logic of

intervention is most frequently employed and when threat securitization is made, the security

discourse is couched in humanitarian terms. This section traces how the humanitarian

intervention connotation has evolved over time.

The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention involves heated arguments from proponents of the

advocates of sovereignty, self-determination and ban on the use of force on one side and those

who are the champions of universal human rights on the other side. Keeping in view whether one

prioritizes natural or positive law, or offer a permissive or restrictive view of humanitarian

intervention four broad positions have been delineated. Legal positivist restrictionist school

argues for preserving ban on the use of force not authorized by UN Security Council. Without

this general ban, they state that ―there would be more war in international society but not

necessarily more genuine humanitarian interventions‖.82

Legal positivist counter-restrictionists position insists that a customary right (not duty) of

intervention exists in ―supreme humanitarian emergencies‖.83

Cases of genocide, mass killings

and ethnic cleansing are cited as grave humanitarian crises warranting intervention as per general

agreement in international society.84

The problem with approach is the extent to which it

exaggerates the consensus about the use of force to protect human rights. The third

communitarian position asserts that nations are free to determine their own system of 82

S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 231.

N.J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13.

See A. C. Arend and R. J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm

(London: Routledge, 1993). ; F. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd

ed. (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1997).

51

governance, right to develop and protect their idea about how its members ought to live. This

position is echoed by both Michael Walzer and John Stuart Mill.85

While the final approach liberal cosmopolitanism insists on certain inalienable individual rights

grounded in natural law and focus less on inter-state consensus. It departs it ways from counter-

restrictionism in insisting that external actors have not only the right but the duty also in

intervening in supreme humanitarian emergencies.86

Sovereignty entails a responsibility on

sovereigns to protect the welfare of their citizens, failing which it loses its sovereign right.87

Some draw from Kant‘s concept of rational individual with certain pre-political rights 88

to come

to this conclusion while others refer to contemporary globalized world and implications of events

at one place on every other part, creating moral obligation.89

Millions killed in Afghanistan, Biafra, Balkans, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, East

Timor, Latin America, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire and elsewhere, convinced that principles

of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of the states cannot constitute a screen

behind which such mass murder or ethnic cleansing might be carried out. Hence, use of force

against such sovereigns was justified ―as an exercise of cosmopolitan justice or global

solidarity‖.90

Evidently the idea of ―sovereignty as responsibility‖91

floated by Francis Deng and

his collaborators, gained attention and even led to a statement by UN Secretary-General Kofi

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Philosophical Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 87.; John Stuart Mill, ―A Few Words on Non-Intervention,‖ in Essays on Politics and Culture, ed., G. Himmelfarb (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), 368-84.; Gerald Doppelt, ―Walzer‘s Theory of Morality in International Relations,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs 8, no. 1 (Autum1978): 3-26. ; Bhikhu Parekh,

―Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,‖ International Political Science Review 18, no. 1 The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention. Les dilemmes de l'intervention humanitaire (January1997): 60.

J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press, 1999), 119.

F. Teson, ―The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,‖ in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and

Political Dilemmas, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 93. Simon Caney, ―Human Rights and the Rights of States: Terry Nardin on Non-Intervention,‖ International Political

Science Review 18, no.1(January 1997): 34.

Tony Blair , (Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, USA, 22 April 1999), to the Economic Club of Chicago, http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/blair.htm.

R.B. Miller, Interpretations of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism and the Just War Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 57.

Francis S. Kimaro Deng, T. Lyons, D. Rothchild and I.W. Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict

Management in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996).

52

Annan in 2001: ―the sovereignty of states must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations

of human rights‖.92

The high-profile International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)

constituted by Canadian government in 2001 further bolstered efforts to address issues of crimes

against humanity.93

Global society since the end of the Cold War has been most divisive on the

morality, legality and politics of humanitarian intervention, as it is suspected that mostly

humanitarian claims are invoked to conceal underlying geopolitical goals. This divisiveness is

clearly reflected in the recent literature produced on the subject.94

A more recent trend in intervention behavior points towards the multinational operations. For

states living in a world of legal anarchy, where the use of military power not only energizes the

government machinery but raises the emotional temperature of political debate too; Alliances

among pluralist democracies have all the problems of translational cooperation that one can

imagine. Such operations introduce unique burdens including the responsibility for developing

and maintaining coalitions, compromise on the use of force, how to establish clear and agreed

upon mission objectives, how to determine operations command and control, assessing financial

viability and focusing on reconstruction after hostilities have ceased. It hasn‘t been easy to

secure the cooperation as a country‘s willingness to share the burden and responsibility depends

upon its perception of threat as well as opportunities such an act might offer.95

As the frequency of interventions is increasing in the post-cold war world so is the concern on

how to proceed for reconstruction and stabilization in post-conflict states. Authors state that only

a comprehensive strategy in four component domains – political, social, security and economic –

and the interaction between them can help governments intervening and confronting numerous Kofi Annan, ―Nobel Lecture‖ (December 10, 2001), http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/2001/annan-

lecture.html. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:

ICISS, 2001), 17.

Of the vast literature see A. Schnabel and R. Thakur, ed., Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (New York: United Nations Press, 2000). ; J. Moore, ed., Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). ; J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane, ed. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). ; A. Jokic, ed., Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues (Toronto, Canada: Broadview Press, 2003). ; T. J. Farer, ed., Toward a Humanitarian Foreign Policy: A Primer for Policy (New York: New York University Press, 1980).

Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter K. Froster, Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), 2, 199 and 207.

53

and profound challenges. Besides focus of the intervenors, is also on addressing the dilemmas

such as short- and long-term goals and whether to work through or around state‘s central

government.96

1.1.3. From Interstate to Intrastate Wars

The shift from interstate to intrastate during recent periods has broadened our study of war to

include colonial wars, civil wars, ethnic and tribal wars and other forms of warfare. Similarly,

theoretically the factors explaining civil wars such as key variables of levels of economic and

social welfare, are given much less attention when elaborating causes of interstate wars that

focus on the distribution of the military power in the international system.

Human warfare evolved over centuries (discussed above) and the experience of the last two

world wars and the destruction associated with them reduced the incentives of great powers to

fight them. Resultantly the world has experienced no great power war in the last fifty plus years,

prompting some to term it as ―long peace‖.97

This is the longest period of peace between great

powers in the last five centuries which is usually attributed to the development of nuclear

weapons and their deterrent effects by few scholars.98

However, there are others who find this

observation misleading and refer to proliferation of small wars and other forms of conflict

especially civil wars and other forms of intrastate conflicts since WWII as counter-argument.99

The resultant shift of ―symmetric‖ interstate wars where two sides of roughly equal strength and

with almost similar weapons fought each other to civil wars with changing nature has raised

96

Ashraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World,

(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008). ; Charles T. Call, ed., Building States to Build Peace (Colo: Lynne Rienner,2008). ; Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press and Association of the U.S. Army, 2005). ; Keith Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2003). ; Michael Barnett, ―Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War,‖ International Security 30, no.4 (Spring 2006): 87-112. ; Nora Bensahel, ―Organizing for Nation Building,‖ Survival 49,(2007): 43-75; Paul K. Davis, Dilemmas of Intervention: Social Science for Stabilization and Reconstruction (RAND Corporation,2011). ; Richard D. Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005). ; Roland Paris, At War‟s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). ; Seth D. Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development (New York: Praeger, 2008). ; A thorough exploration of the stabilization and reconstruction literature is beyond the scope of the study undertaken. However, few works had been quoted for reference.

John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

54

questions on conventional ―Westphalian‖ model of warfare and its relevance in contemporary

era.

In civil wars, nowadays, the army of state instead of facing a single rebel army faces a coalition

of rebels representing different groups with different interests.100

Some of them represent

religious or ethnic groups thus these wars are referred to as ―identity wars‖ and ―ethnic wars‖ but

underlying factors are driven by political power, economic resources, security goals, or these

labels may be used to mask private interests.101

In the present day globalized world, criminal

networks also play significant role and often these wars are sustained by illicit black markets.102

Thus armies have increasingly ―outsourced‖ many of their traditional functions, giving this

whole phenomenon a more privatized face.103

The change in the nature of civil warfare has also led to change in strategy and tactics as well as

norms of warfare which is increasingly ―asymmetric‖ now. Rebels groups resort to strategies of

guerilla warfare, terrorism and insurgency and may not hesitate to employ tactics of direct

targeting of civilians, ethnic cleansing and massacre, thus leading to increased ―barbarization of

warfare‖.104

This is a deliberate strategy to coerce people to shift loyalty and to demonstrate that

state is unable to protect citizens. This trend has been evident in present-day conflicts too and the

post-hegemonic military interventions exhibit this pattern also. Here, these groups are recruited

by rival parties to obtain their strategic objectives without overtly engaging their respective

countries in the on-going conflict. This is the image of ―new wars‖ which are often contrasted

with Westphalian ―old wars‖105

and has sparked the recent debate whether or not the elements of

the new wars can be found in past historical periods.106

Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

V.P. Gagnon , Jr. , The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

John Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). ; Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black

Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

Deborah D. Avant, The Market of Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

George Kassimeris, ed. The Barbarization of Warfare (New York: New York University Press, 2006).

Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). ; Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). ; Herfried Munkler, The New Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). ; Isabelle Duyvesteyn, and Jan Angstrom, ed. Rethinking the Nature of War (London: Frank Cass, 2005). ; Sinisa

55

1.1.4. Discursive Dimension in War Literature

A new dimension witnessed in the 21st century has been the way discourse on war is being

framed and how discursive dimension has gained importance. It has become especially

predominant in the wake of 9/11. After ―war on terror‖ narrative was constructed by US to carpet

bomb Afghanistan‘s Taliban regime scholars started paying attention to the role of political

speeches, statements issued by key actors and the role of electronic, print and social media in

framing and constructing war narrative to legitimize war/intervention.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has given further boost to discursive analysis and theatrical

presentation of people, events and outcomes which is now a major component of any

intervention undertaken. Without taking into account this aspect, the reasonableness or otherwise

of military employment of force and its unprecedented scope and severity could not be assessed.

Resultantly what we witness now since Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya is frequently divided war

narrative that involves a dichotomous representation of the international scene and a global clash

between two antagonistic forces that invariably carry with them a moral identity.107

Scholars has explored different dimensions of discourse analysis technique and analyzed how it

is used to either construct narrative for war or used for manipulation by laying emphasis on the

usual forms and formats of ideological discourse, such as emphasizing ―Our‖ good things and

―Their‖ bad things. Thus manipulation through discourse involves not only power but abuse of

power i.e. domination as it implies illegitimate influence by means of discourse and controlled

by dominant political, bureaucratic, media, academia and corporate elite. Manipulators make

others do or believe things that are in their best interest and against the best interests of those

being manipulated. This has given rise to discourse and legitimation literature now widely

Malesevic, ―The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts,‖ International Political Sociology 2, no. 2 (June 2008): 97-112.

107 See S. Aoun, ―The Theatre of War,‖ Metro Magazine, 2004. ; M. Baseman, ―Selling war as an obligation:

Appeals to obligation at work in George W. Bush‘s Iraq speeches‖ (Master of Science thesis, Florida State University, College of Communications, 2006). ; C. A. Smith, ―President Bush‘s enthymeme of evil: The amalgamation of 9/11, Iraq and moral values,‖ American Behavioral Scientist 49, no. 1 (September 2005):32-47. ; Dana L. Cloud, ―Beyond Evil: Understanding Power Materially and Rhetorically,‖ Rhetoric &Public Affairs 6, no.3 (Fall 2003): 531-538. ; Richard Jackson, ―Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,‖ International Politics 48, no.2/3 (2011): 390-4111.; Trevor McCrisken, ―Ten Years on: Obama‘s war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice,‖ International Affairs 87, no.4 (2011): 781-801. ; Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, ―Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11 –Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration‘s Rhetoric,‖ Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (September 2005): 525-537.

56

employed in studies on war legitimation discourse.108

The link between war and legitimation has

important implications for this dissertation and it will be explored in detail in the next chapter.

1.2: Theoretical Perspectives on War / Conflict

Considering the frequency of war in human society since times immemorial, it is not possible

that this central topic would not have been analyzed extensively theoretically too. To analyze

war/intervention various theoretical frameworks start with the ―levels of analysis‖ approach.

Taking inspiration from Kenneth Waltz‘s Man, the State, and War (1959), this framework

identifies three ―images‖ of war corresponding to the individual, the nation-state and the

international system respectively. These images were then referred as ―levels‖ of analysis,

following classification by J. David Singer.109

The levels of analysis is not a theory of war but

certain theories then came forward based on these levels to explain the causes of war.

The individual level pertains to the political leaders of the state and their decisions but also

include characteristics shared by all humans such as ―human nature‖ and dwells on human

predisposition towards aggression. Though variations in personalities, social mobilization,

ideologies etc are recognized but it presumes on the whole that particular individual or

individuals have important casual effect on the foreign policy decision-making.110

The next level i.e the nation-state or the national level includes factors associated with both the

government and the society. The former is said to contain variables like political system‘s

institutional structure and its policy-making process while the later is based on variables like

interest groups, public opinion, as well as its economic system and political culture and ideology.

Lilie Chouilaraki, ―The Soft Power of War: Legitimacy and Community in Iraq War Discourses‘,‖ special issue of

Journal of Language and Politics 4, no. 1 (2005). ; L. M. Martin Rojo and Tenu A. Van Dijk, ―There Was a Problem,

and It Was Solved: Legitimating the Expulsion of Illegal Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse,‖ Discourse &

Society 17, no. 3(2006): 359-383. ; Tenu A. Van Dijk, ―Discourse and manipulation,‖ Discourse & Society 8, no. 4

(1997):523-566. ; Federica Ferrari, ―Metaphor at work in the analysis of political discourse: investigating a ‗preventive

war‘ persuasion strategy,‖ Discourse & Society 18, no. 5(2007): 603-625.

J. David Singer, ―The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations,‖ World Politics 14, no. 1 (October 1961): 77-92.

John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic 1989).

57

This level of analysis has given rise to war theories who state that come cultures are more prone

to war or that democracies behave differently that authoritarian regimes.111

The third and the final systemic level refers to the anarchic structure of the international system

and it further encompasses factors such as number of great powers in the system and other

factors related to the distribution of power besides military and economic power, and the pattern

of alliances etc. Most realist theories are system-level theories such as those of hegemonic order

and power transitions. Similarly, some scholars resort to the ―dyadic‖ or ―interactional‖ level to

reflect bilateral interaction between pair of states while others just prefer system-level to include

everything in state‘s external environment.

1.2.1. Systemic Level War Theories

However, based on the classification above, we will briefly dwell on the theories of war. Most of

the theories of war traditionally are dominated by realist school of thought and pertain to the

systemic level. The realist school that dates back to Thucydides‘ account of the Peloponnesian

War is not a single theory but rather a constellation of theories with shared assumptions.

Morgenthau‘s Politics Among Nations lead to resurgence of this school in 1948.

The security dilemma compels states to respond with measures that obviously are deemed

threatening to others, generating an action-reaction cycle and a conflict spiral that may

eventually escalate into war.112

According to Jervis both conflict spiral and security dilemma are

at the core of the spiral model of war and peace that elaborates how war can occur even if states

prefer peace and behave rationally since conflict spirals are structurally induced by the system.

This model is often contrasted with deterrence model that suggests war occurs when deterrence

fails where one side‘s threat lacks credibility or lacks the military capability to threaten a

sufficiently costly response to an aggression.113

Both these theorists in fact argue that it‘s the

policy prescriptions that make the war more likely.

Michael Doyle, ―Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,‖ Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 Parts I & II, no. 3 &

4(Summer & Autumn 1983): 205-35 and 323-53.

John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). ; Robert

Jervis, ―Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,‖ World Politics 30, no.2 (1978): 186-213. ; Charles L. Glaser, ―The Security Dilemma Revisited,‖ World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171-201.

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), chap. 3.

58

In realist school, the classical realists trace multiple sources of state behavior leading to various

causes of war. In addition to the absence of central authority in the international system, the role

of human nature especially aggressive instincts like selfishness, greed, pride and passion are

emphasized as a source of aggressive behavior and war by classical realists. While Waltzian

variation of realist school criticize this emphasis on human nature114

and instead point to the

pursuit of security rather than the power as an end in itself by placing particular emphasis on the

international anarchy and the distribution of power in the international system. He stressed the

central importance of ―polarity‖ in the international system and elaborated how states of different

polarity create different threats and opportunities for states leading to different foreign policy

behaviours, especially for great powers.115

His theory proved to be the most influential theory in

the last half century of the international system.

Waltz‘s theory lead to further variation of realist school of thought and the debate started that

states instead of balancing against the leading state in the international system as stressed by

Waltz, balance against the threats. This generated Stephen Walt‘s ―balance of threat‖ theory116

and gave birth to defensive realists‘ school with their emphasis on a more ―fine-grained structure

of power‖117

that dwells on the impact of decline of military power over distance (the ―loss of

strength gradient‖)118

R and importance of technology affecting the ―offensive-defensive

balance‖.119

Among realists, the defensive realists are most confident about restraining of aggression through

balance of power mechanisms.120

While the other variation ―offensive realism‖ trace the

existence of predatory states and leaders, inherent uncertainty about the intention of others, and

without invoking the domestic variables refer to anarchy-induced tendencies towards worst-case

analysis which compel even status-quo oriented states to adopt offensive strategies.121

Even Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

Stephen M. Waltz, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999).

Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper, 1962): 262.

Jervis, ―Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.‖; Van Evera, Causes of War.

Jack Synder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). ; Glaser, ―The Security Dilemma Revisited.‖; Andrew Kydd, ―Sheep in Sheep‘s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight One Another,‖ Security Studies 7, no.1 (1997): 1-49. ; Van Evera, Causes of War.

Fareed Zakaria, ―Realism and Domestic Politics,‖ International Security 17, no. 1 (1992): 177-198. ; Eric J. Labs, ―Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,‖ Security Studies 6, no. 4 (1997): 1-69. ; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). ; Colin

59

currently benign intentions can provide no guide against future belligerent turn in future122

thus

offering a strictly structural theory of war and peace.

While neoclassical realists recognize the material capabilities as the single most important

determinant of state strategies along with recognizing the importance of anarchy and give casual

primacy to system structure. They however, emphasize that system-level pressures affect foreign

policy through intervening domestic pressures which include political perceptions of leaders

about material distribution of power; state‘s ability to build army through extracting resources;

autonomy of state from society and influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups in

the process.123

Each of these realist theories, however, emphasize varying degree of centrality of balance of

power concept in their theories of conflict and war by dwelling on concepts like ―external and

internal balancing‖124

to prevent hegemonies from forming; ―power parity and power

preponderance‖ hypothesis to ascertain whether power preponderance or its disparity is more

likely to lead to peace125

; and ―offshore balancing‖ to explain that states that have achieved

regional hegemony prevent rise of peer competitors by playing role of ―offshore balancer‖.126

Then there are hegemonic theories like power transition theory and long cycle theory which will

be discussed in detailed in the next chapter because of their relevance in the theoretical

framework. A brief analysis of realist theories has shown that they include multiple levels in

their analysis of causes of war.

1.2.2. Dyadic or Interactional Level War Theories

Then there are dyadic-level theories like the ―steps-to-war‖ model, the bargaining theory of war,

theories of economic peace and interdependence which though not exclusively dyadic in

Elman, ―Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America‘s rise to Regional Hegemony,‖

American Political Science Review 98, no.4 (November 2004): 563-76. Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

Gideon Rose, ―Neoclassical Realism and Theories of foreign Policy,‖ World Politics 51, no.1 (October 1998):

144-172. ; Randall L. Schweller, Unaswered Threats: Political constraints on the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Presss, 2006). ; Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ed. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Waltz, The Theory of International Politics.

Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke,ed. Parity and War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996). ; D. Scott

Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, The Behavioral Origins of War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004). ;

Mearshiemer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

60

character, however, place primary emphasis on casual variables relating to the interaction

between pair of states. The ―steps-to-war‖ model of Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez is

about particular behavioural patterns that likely increase the probability of war with primary

emphasis on issues of contention between states than to power relations between them.127

While

later works identified greater tendency to fight for some issues like territorial disputes more than

other issues.128

The ―Bargaining Model of War‖ posits that actors make decisions of war based not only on their

preferences and constraints under which they act but on the anticipation of how others are going

to react, thus rendering human behavior as both rational and strategic. So if the adversaries have

similar expectations about the outcomes of war and minimal differences about the relative power

of each other, they should be able to reach some agreement based on those shared expectations

about how war will end.129

While liberal theorists have long held that trade and other forms of

economic exchange can promote peace between states giving rise to economic theories of

Interdependence and conflict130

while others hold that trade continues between warring parties

thus overwriting importance of this factor for introducing peace.131

1.2.3. State and Societal Level War Theories

Besides there are state and societal level theories especially the liberal and Marxist-Leninist ones

locating the causes of war by focusing on the international political and economic structures of

states and societies. They cover wide range of arguments based on state structures, conditions

and processes believed to increase the likelihood of war. Marxist-Leninist theories central

argument rests on the contention that war and imperialism is driven by the interests of the Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, In Search of Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

Paul K. Huth, ―Territory: Why are Territorial Disputes between States a Central cause of International Conflict?‖ in What Do We Know About War, ed. John A. Vasquez (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000: 85-110). ;

Paul R. Hensel, ―Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict,‖ in What Do We Know About War?, ed. John A. Vasquez (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000: 57-84).

Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd

ed. (New York, Free Press, 1988).

For different liberal perspectives see Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). ; Bruce Russett and John R.Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).; Edward D. Manfield and Brain M. Pollins, ed. Economic Interdependence and International Conflict (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003).; and Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri and nils Petter Gleditsch, ed. Globalization and Armed Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, ―Commercial Liberalism under Fire: Evidence from 1915 and 1936,‖ Security Studies 6, no.2 (1996/97): 4-50. ; Katherine Barbieri and Jack S. Levy, ―Sleeping With the Enemy: Trade Between Adversaries During Wartime,‖ Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999): 463-479.

61

capitalist class who benefits from war and thus, is responsible for it. This class then uses state

apparatus to formulate policies to advance its own parochial interests while shifting the costs of

those policies to other societal groups.

The chief exponent Karl Marx did not develop a systematic international theory but primarily

focused on the domestic politics. Lenin added the international component by building on the

ideas of J. A. Hobson, Rudolph Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg;132

given Lenin‘s central role

the theory is referred as ―Marxist-Leninist‖ theory of imperialism though a number of variations

exist.133

These are the theories of the military-industrial complex that emphasize how generating

military build-ups and a ―war system‖ produces profits for business that goes far beyond

reasonable security precautions.134

Apart from the emphasis on domestic sources of imperialism and war, there are other theories

that focus on the system-level sources of international patterns, behavior and conflict, especially

the structure of the world political economy as depicted through ―core-periphery‖ thesis. The

wealthy ―core‖ dominates the ―periphery‖ located outside the core and dependent on it. Such

arguments are advanced in sociology by the proponents of the ―world system theory‖.135

Various coalitional theories are also attributed to this state and societal level which emphasize

that grand strategies pursued by state are actually the product of the bargaining between

opposing coalitions of the economically self-interested domestic groups. Mostly widely

discussed among them are Jack Synder‘s ―theory of logrolled coalitions,‖136

Kevin Narizny‘s

137 and Steven Lobell‘s

138 economic models of domestic grand strategy and Benjamin Fordham

V. I. Lenin, Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, ([1916] 1939). ; J. A. Hobson, Imperialism (Ann Arbor,

MI: University of Michigan Press, [1902] 1965). ; Rudolph Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of

Capitalist Development, trans. Morris Watnick and Sam Gordon, ed. (Tom Bottomore, London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul [1910]1981). ; Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, [1913]1981).

V. Kubalkova and A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). ; Bernard Semmel, ed. Marxism and the Science of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

Seymour Melman, Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). ; Steven Rosen, Testing the Theory of Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1973).

Immanuel Wallerstein, ―Three Instances of Hegemony and the History of the World Economy,‖ International Journal of Comparative Sociology 24 (1984): 100-108.

Synder, Myths of Empire.

Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

Steven E. Lobell, ―The Political Economy of War Mobilization: From Britain‘s Limited Liability to a Continental Commitment,‖ International Politics 43, no.3 (2006): 283-304.

62

elaboration of the competition of the opposing coalitions for power and influence within the

liberal state.139

Other theories of war discussed at societal-level are the ―diversionary theory of war,‖ that

advocates finding a common enemy against whom state can make a common cause by creating

―rally‖ round the ―flag‖ effect, increasing popular support for political leaders and are often

explained in terms of ―in-group/out-group‖ or ―conflict-cohesion‖ hypothesis when conflict with

an out-group increases the cohesion and political centralization of the in-group:140

the

―democratic peace‖ thesis advocating unique features of democratic states and their foreign

policy behaviors that make them less prone to war against other democratic states;141

and the

―clash of civilization‖ thesis which is the most prominent culture-based explanation for war,

emphasizing the fault lines between civilizations as the source of most prolonged and most

violent conflicts in history.142

This assertion is contrasted by others who however advocate that

sates are not more prone to militarized conflict across civilization lines than within

civilizations.143

1.2.4. Individual-Level Decision-Making

Having surveyed variety of national-level causes of war, there are theorists who have focused on

the role of decision-making at both the individual and organizational level. Within the individual

decision-making level fall theories such as: rational decision-making; psychological models of 139

Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security

Policy 1949-51 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998). George Simmel, ―The Persistence of Social Groups,‖ American Journal of Sociology 3, no. 5 (1898): 662-98. ; 3, no. 6: 829-

36. ; Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959).

R. J. Rummel, ―Democracies Are less Warlike Than Other Regimes,‖ European Journal of International Relations 1, no.4 (1995): 457-479. ; Kenneth Benoit, ―Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General),‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (1996): 309-41. ; Zeev Maoz, ―The Debate Over the Democratic Peace:

Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?‖ International Security 32 (1997):162-198. ; Bruce M. Russett and

Harvey Starr, ―From the Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and Conflict in the International

System,‖ in Handbook of War Studies II , ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 93-128.

Samuel P. Huntington, ―The Clash of Civilizations?‖ Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-29. ; Samuel P.

Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

Giacomo Chiozza, ―Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict

Involvement, 1946-97,‖ Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 6 (November 2002): 711-734. ; Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox, ―Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà vu? Some Evidence,‖ Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 5 (September 2000): 583-608.

63

international conflict; prospect theory; poliheuristic theory; and crisis decision-making process to

be discussed subsequently.

Traditional approaches generally assume that political leaders select policies believed to advance

state‘s interests without giving due importance to the internal processes driving foreign policy.

The dissatisfaction with this approach along with increasing interest in the more explicit

conceptual framework for analyzing foreign policy led in 1960s to the development of the

decision-making approach to the foreign policy.144

This approach rests on the premise that

understanding of the processes through which political leaders perceive the external world; and

make and implement their decisions is very important for understanding the foreign policy

actions of the state. It is necessary to open the ―black-box‖ of decision-making to understand the

foreign policy behavior as the choices determined by key individuals, groups and organizational

actors have impact on state foreign policies.145

Rational models of decision-making thus emphasize that it does not matter what goals are

pursued by actors but what is significant is their engagement in an ends-means calculation and

selection of those strategies or options that it anticipates will maximize its values or goals. Thus

immoral or repulsive goals in themselves do not make the behavior immoral.146

Then at this

level certain psychological models of international conflict are also analyzed focusing on the

content of individuals‘ belief systems about world politics, their personalities, emotions and the

psychological processes through which they acquire information and implement decisions.147

The most important factor in this analysis is the role of perceptions and misperceptions of the

capabilities and intentions of both adversaries and third parties.148

144

Richard C. Synder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, ed. Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War, (West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell Publication, 2010), 128-129.

Ibid., 130-133.

Ole R. Holsti, ―The ‗Operational Code‘ Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles‘ Philosophical and Instrumental Belief,‖ Canadian Journal of Political Science 3, no.1 (March 1970): 123-57. ; Alexander L. George, ―The ‗Operational Code‘: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and

Decisionmaking,‖ International Studies Quarterly 13, no.2 (June 1969): 190-222. ; Jervis, Perception and

Misperception. ; Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

148Jack S. Levy, ―Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problem,‖ World

Politics 39, no.1 (October 1983): 82-93.

64

Similarly ―Prospect theory‖ that asserts that people avoid losses and optimize for sure gains

when choosing among several alternatives because the pain of losing is greater than satisfaction

of an equivalent gain, has a number of implications for war and peace in international

relations.149

Apart from prospect theory, ―Poliheuristic theory‖ developed by Alex Mintz and

Nehemia Geva is an interesting addition to the set of alternative models of decision-making with

implications for the study of decisions involving war and peace.150

Cuban missile crisis of 1962 prompted scholars to devote energies to study of crisis decision-

making as the nature of the regime, the institutional structure of the state and nature of the

decision unit may impact process of judgment and decision-making in a crisis situation than in a

more routine decision context. Hence, most of the literature on the subject focuses on the

characteristics of decision-making during crisis and how they differ from non-crisis contexts.151

1.2.5. Organizational-Level Decision-Making

Organizational level decision-making, however, focuses on theories of bureaucratic politics and

organizational processes and look at the key variables that might contribute to the processes

leading to war. These theories shed light on the impact of bureaucratic politics on state strategies

and on the distortion of information.152

Graham Allison‘s Essence of Decision was the For discussion of these see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ―Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision

Under Risk,‖ Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March 1979): 263-91. ; Barbara Farnham, Taking Risks / Avoiding Losses (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994). ; Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998). ; James W.

Davis Jr., Threats and Promises (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000). ; Jack S. Levy, ―The Implications of Framing and Loss Aversion for International Conflict,‖ in Handbook Of War Studies II, ed. Manus

Midlarsky (Cambridge: MIT Press,2000): 39-83. ; and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

Alex Mintz, ―The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution

37 (1993): 595-618. ; Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva, ―The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking,‖ in

Decision-making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate, ed. Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva (Boulder, CO: Lynne

Rienner Publishers, 1997). ; Alex Mintz, ―How Do Leaders Make Decisions? : A Poliheuristic Perspective,‖ The Journal of

Conflict Resolution 48, no.1, The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making (Feb. 2004): 3-13.

Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 156; For more see H. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic

Books, 1967). ; Ole R. Holsti and Alexander L. George, ―The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-

Makers,‖ in Political Science Annual, ed. C. P. Cotter (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975). : 255-319; Ole R. Holsti,

―Crisis Decision-Making,‖ in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. I, ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al. (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1989): 8-84. ; and Michael Brecher, Crisis in World Politics: Theory and Reality (New York:

Pergamon, 1993).

Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, ed. Readings in American Foreign Policy (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1973). ; Morton Halperin , Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1974). ; John

Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974): chp. 3 &4

65

groundbreaking work that gave first systematic challenge to the assumption that where national

interest was at stake, governmental politics was put aside in favor of national interest

calculations.153

His ―governmental politics model‖ reject the assumption that state act as a single unit with well-

defined foreign policy goals, but is the outcome of the inner circle of decision-makers where

President or the Prime Minister is the single most powerful actor and his power is limited by

other actors in top positions in primary governmental organizations involved in foreign policy

making. Here each actor tends to maximize his/her interest as he/she defines them, based

primarily on organizational interests. The influence of each actor depends on his/her formal

position within government; access to president (prime minister); political skill; expertise or

reputation; control over information, resources and policy implementation; and his ability to

mobilize external support. The foreign policy then becomes the outcome of internal process of

bargaining, conflict and consensus building among these actors.154

While the ―organizational behavior model‖ instead of emphasizing on the overtly political

dimension of organizational behavior, focuses on key foreign policy agencies and standard

operating procedures. Thus bureaucratic politics take place between as well as within

organizations.155

Organizational interests and routines thus contribute to war by virtue of their

impact on the flow of information within decision-making units.

1.2.6. Civil Wars

Considering the increase in the relative frequency of civil wars since the 1945 according to the

Correlates of War Project that recorded 23 interstate and 108 civil wars in the period from 1945 to

1997, most of the recent theorizing about civil war has focused on casual factors and respective roles

of greed, motivation, grievance and opportunity.156

It is not useful to apply level-

Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (New York: Longman, 1971). ; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow,

Essence of Decision, 2nd

ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 162-166.

For details see Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision.

Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, introduction to The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, ed. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). ; Cynthia J. Aronson and I. William Zartman, ed. Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008). ; David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil War, Adelphi Paper No. 320 , (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1998). ; Paul Collier and Anke

Hoeffler, ―Greed and Grievance in Civil War,‖ Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004): 563-595. ; Paul Collier, Anke

66

of-analysis framework to civil wars as they do not emphasize a privileged variable or a variable

at a particular level although socioeconomic inequality, weak states or rebel group financing

have been analyzed but the core argument usually revolve around motive versus opportunity

debates and less explicitly on the onset verses duration considerations.

Similarly, many of the internal wars are not really exclusively waged as internal wars and

involve rebels engaged in some type of operations outside of their home state, with support from

interstate rivals who exploit dissidence as a proxy for interstate conflict. Not surprisingly, civil

wars occur in regionally linked conflicts and are interdependent. ―The more permissive the

regional opportunity structure, the more incentive rebels have to risk taking on regimes that they

hope to change or overthrow.‖157

There are others who adopt systemic perspective with respect to civil wars and link weak states

to fundamental changes in the international system.158

They discuss how changing international

norms have discouraged expanding territorial boundaries by force and thus the previous

mechanism of eliminating weak states is no longer in operation. This forces weak states to act

like stronger states to provide security and welfare to their citizens but lacking in capacity to do

so. Thus when local grievances emerge in weak states, they are less likely to be successfully

managed, giving weight to Ann Hironak‘s point that what take place at the local level is

contingent on systemic and dyadic levels of interaction. Thus the same international system and

international norms along with aid from superpowers help sustain these weak states and prohibit

other states from becoming stronger through warfare in the old-fashioned way.

Stathis Kalyavs and Laia Balcells take Hironak‘s argument further by arguing that civil wars are

actually manifested in three types: Asymmetric civil wars where state is stronger than the rebels

and it generally go by several names such as guerrilla warfare, insurgency and irregular warfare;

second is conventional civil war where both sides relatively equal with relatively high levels of

military technology. And the third is unconventional combat where both the opposing sides are

Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom, ―On the Duration of Civil War,‖ Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 253- ; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ―Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,‖ American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 75-90.

Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 195.

Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). ; Michael C. Desh, ―War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States,‖ International Organization 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 237-268.

67

comparable but both have access to low military technology and wage civil wars referred ―new

wars‖ by Kaldor.159

It is further argued by Kalyavs and Balcells that the post-Cold war era has

given rise to symmetrical unconventional civil wars as compared to insurgencies that dominated

Cold War period. They further argue that it is only in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

where still Cold War-style insurgencies still predominate.

In this section attempt had been made to briefly cover the theoretical perspectives pertaining to

the causes of war and explain through ―level-of-analysis‖ framework how different theories

tackle the issues of war and conflict.

Conclusion

War is such a permanent, consistent and constant phenomenon of human history that it is

impossible to explore the full dimensions and thus the changes associated with it over a period of

centuries. After going through the literature, the theoretical extension of the Power Transition

theory, whose research program has been most dynamic for the last more than half century, was

chosen for subsequent work. The gradual changes occurring in the systemic hierarchy especially

after the 9/11 has led to a peculiar situation described as post-hegemony in dissertation and this

systemic change has far reaching impact on regional hierarchies undergoing transition.

The course of study reveals that the ―Power Transition Theory‖ and its extension ―Multiple

Hierarchy Model‖ could be linked together through a ―Threat Securitization Model‖ which will

help us understand military interventions taking place in the twenty-first century by a global

power in decline. This model besides exploring the unit-systemic link, will help us analyze the

discursive turn through war legitimation and its incorporation in war narratives at a point of time

when US legitimacy to lead the system is at its lowest. Hence, Chapter 2 will discuss this model

and its attributes in detail.

Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, ―International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,‖ Unpublished Paper, Yale University, 2009 quoted in Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 196-197. ; Kaldor, New and Old Wars.

68

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

Threat Construction for International Military Intervention

in Post-Hegemonic System

As the initial enthusiastic proclamations about the durability of the ―unipolar moment‖ are being

replaced with rampant speculations about the impending US decline, power transition theories

are staging a comeback among scholarly international relations community. Increasingly

optimistic projections of ―China‘s Rise / Threat‖ scenario have given fresh impetus to the debate

whether a new configuration of powers is on the horizon. Hence, the reduction of power parity

gap between the two giants point towards an intense conflict of interest which may lead us

towards yet another inevitable great power confrontation as frequently witnessed in previous

power transitions.

Historically systemic changes in world politics are accompanied by a recurrent pattern or cycle

of major wars. Literature that accounts for power transition and its linkage to war abounds in

international relations and include among others Arnold Tonybee (1950)1, Charles Doran‘s

Power Cycle Theory (1971, 1991)2, George Modelski‘s Long Cycle Theory (1987)

3, Immanuel

Wallerstein‘s World System Theory (1987)4, Robert Gilpin‘s Hegemonic Leadership Theory

(1981)5, Robert Keohane‘s Hegemonic Stability Theory (1980)

6, Torjorn Knutsen‘s Rise and

Fall of World Orders (1999)7 and Quincy Wright‘s Study of War (1965)

8. However, A. F. K.

Arnold Tonybee, War and Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950).

Charles .F. Doran, The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1971). ; Charles. F. Doran, Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century‟s End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1987).

Immanuel Wallerstein, ―The United States and the World ‗Crisis‘,‖ in America‟s Changing Role in the World

System, ed. Terry Boswell and Albert Bergesen (New York: Praeger, 1987), 1-29. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

R. O. Keohane, ―The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-

1977,‖ Cisa Working Paper Series No. 12, (Los Angeles: UCLA Center for International Relations, 1980). ; Most theories of the hegemonic stability theory are the theories of the stability of the international political economy and say little about war and peace.

Torjorn L. Knutsen, The Rise and Fall of World Orders (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

69

Organski‘s Power Transition Theory (1958)9 is the one that explicitly links power transition to

major wars (between great powers) and calls attention to the danger that a period of power

transition may increase the probability of war.

Being one of the most enduring and successful structural theory of international war, Power

Transition Theory (PTT) has been frequently utilized over the last five decades to answer

questions such as what happens when an established (and declining) dominant state and rising

power confront each other over the leadership of the international system.10

Since its initial

formulation by Organski in World Politics in 1958, PTT has proved to be ―a lively and

expanding research program that has moved forward in several substantive directions‖

generating ―novel predictions, many of which are empirically corroborated‖11

, subsequently

resulting in extending the bounds of power transition theory. Besides originally addressing the

questions of war and peace as dealt with in foundational works of Oragnski (1958), Organski and

Kugler (1980), Kugler and Lemke (1996) and Tammen et al (2000),12

the research program has

been extended to incorporate additional questions such as the positive relationship between

power parity and international war and conflict,13

the impact of alliances on dyadic relations,14

A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).

A term ―Thucydides Trap‖ has also been coined by Graham T. Allison, an American political scientist to explain the same phenomenon, and is named after the 5

th Century Athenian historian Thucydides. For more details see

―What is Thucydides‘ Trap in International Relations?‖ The Hindu, June 16, 2017; Shannon Tiezzi, ―Graham Allison on the ‗Thucydides Trap‘,‖ The Diplomat, July 29, 2017.

Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, ―Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition

Research Program,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (December 1999): 700. ; Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy cited in R. L. Tammen, ― The Organski Legacy: A fifty-year Research Program,‖ International

Interactions 34, no. 4 (2008): 315.

Organski, World Politics. ; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). ; Kugler and Lemke, Parity and War. ; Ronald Tammen et al. Power Transitions (New York: Chatham House, 2000).

Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, ―Power Transitions as a Cause of War,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (1988): 87-102. ; Charles S. Gochman, ―Capability-Driven Disputes,‖ in Prisoners of War, ed. Charles S. Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 141-159. ; Bruce Bueno de

Mesquita ―The Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony,‖ World Politics 43(1990): 28-52. ; Woosang Kim and James Morrow, ―When do Power Shifts Lead to War?‖ American Journal of Political Science 36 (1992): 896-922. ; Stuart A. Bremer, ―Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1819-

1965,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (1992): 309-341. ; Daniel S. Geller, ―Power Differentials and War in

Rival Dyads,‖ International Studies Quarterly 37(1993): 173-193. ; John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993). ; Zeev Maoz, ―The Onset and Initiation of Militarized Interstate

Disputes in the Modern Era,‖ International Interactions 19 (1993): 117-141. ; Indra de Soysa, John R. Oneal and

Yong-Hee Park, ―Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities,‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1997): 509-528. ; Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace (New

York, NY: W. W. Norton and CO. 2001).

Woosang Kim, ―Alliance Transitions and Great Power War,‖ American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 833-850.

70

the stability of the nuclear deterrence,15

the relationship between power transition and

international war,16

the relationship between arms races and conflict,17

between dissatisfaction

with status quo and international war,18

the democratic peace19

and more recently it has been

extended from international system to regional subsystems throughout the developing world.20

The theory has extended well beyond the originators to generate a wealth of additional

hypotheses about risk propensity, the timing speed, and trajectory of overtakings, and about

integration as an opposite of war.21

The burgeoning of power transition research program has led

to its development, specification and application to increasingly diverse political and economic

phenomenon. Notwithstanding the strength and applicability of its ever expanding research

program, the original theory introduced in 1958 and its subsequent modification in 1989, along

with its extension into Multiple Hierarchical Model (MHM)22

1993 by Douglas Lemke will

provide the basis for arguments in this dissertation.

The chapter will be divided in two parts. Part I will reiterate Power Transition Theory as

propounded by Organski (1958), Organski and Kuglar (1989) and Lemke (1993) and discuss

what the theory has to offer for contemporary issues. Part II will provide a framework for ―threat

securitization for military intervention in Post-Hegemonic system‖ by building on the insights Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare, ―The Long-Term Stability of Deterrence,‖ International Interactions 15, no. 3-

4 (1990): 255-278. 16

Charles F. Doran, ―Systemic Disequilibrium Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle,‖ Journal of Conflict

Resolution 74 (1989): 371-401. ; Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, ―Power Transitions and Critical Points as Predictors of Great Power War: Toward a Synthesis,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (1991): 107-116. ; Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama , ―A Two-Level Explanation of World War,‖ in Parity and War, ed. Jack Kugler and Dogulas Lamke (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,1996), 107-116. ; Gilpin, War and Change. ; Robert Gilpin, ―The Theory of Hegemonic War,‖ Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988): 591-613.

Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, ―Power Transitions and Military Buildups,‖ in Parity and War, ed. J. Kugler and D. Lemke (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 187-207.

Woosang Kim, ―Alliance Transitions and Great Power War.‖ ; Woosang Kim, ―Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo,‖ World Politics 45,(1992): 153-172. ; Woosang Kim, ―Power Parity,

Alliance, Dissatisfaction, and Wars in East Asia, 1860-1993,‖ Journal Of Conflict Resolution 46 (1996): 654-671. ; Michelle Benson, ―The Ties that Bind,‖ PhD Dissertation, (Claremont Graduate University, 1999).

Douglas Lemke and William Reed, ―Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations,‖ International Interactions 22, no.2 (1996): 143-164.

Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Kim and Morrow, ―When do Power Shifts Lead to War?‖ ; Mark Abdollahian , In Search of Structure, (PhD Thesis, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California, 1996). ; Carole Alsharabati, Dynamics of War Initiation, (PhD Thesis, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California,1997). ; Brian Efird , From Conflict to Integration, (PhD Thesis, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California, 2001). ; Kelly Kadera, The Power-Conflict Story (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

Just as Organski‘s Power Transition Theory deals with power transition at the systemic level. MHM by Douglas Lemke replicates Organski‘s power transition in regional scenario and asserts that without interference from the top, it works in exactly the same way as the global hierarchy. For details see Lemke, Regions of War and Peace.

71

provided by Power Transition Theory. It proceeds in three stages. Stage I establish post-

hegemonic international system and explain how global and regional hierarchies work in such an

international system. Stage II elaborates threat securitization for military intervention in a post-

hegemonic international system while Stage III deals with the role political discourse play in

legitimizing international military intervention. The aim is to come up with a ―threat

securitization model for international military intervention in post-hegemonic system‖ that can

help us analyze international military intervention in Libya and Syrian emerging scenario.

2.1. Power Transition Theory

Any discussion on Post-Hegemony naturally begins with Power Transition Theory which is

about the causes of major interstate wars in international politics, with emphasis on shifts in

relative power among the dominant states as a primary catalyst for conflict. Whereas balance of

power theory posits that states balance against any state threatening hegemony, and stability best

achieved when power distribution is approximately symmetrical; hegemonic theories such as

power transition argue in favour of strong concentrations of power in the hands of a single state

in the international system and finds stability in the imbalances of power - the greater the

imbalance, the greater the stability.

Viewing balance of power theory as too static, too narrowly focused on military power and

inattentive to the sources of changes in relative power; power transition theory was advanced by

Organski in 1958 to capture the dynamic and cyclical nature of international relations. Rise and

fall of states is associated with differential rates of growth, based largely on different rates of

industrialization in this dynamic theory. Using the metaphor of a pyramid, it describes hierarchy

of states within the international system. At the top of the pyramid sits a dominant state who is

the most powerful nation in the world, the nation that controls the established international order of its own making and receives the greatest share of benefits that flows from the existing

international order. Its relationship with lesser members in this international order varies

according to power of the lesser members involved. A large power discrepancy between them

not only ensures security of the leader but the stability of the order as whole too.23

Organski, World Politics, 326-327.

72

Organski then places great powers just below the apex of the pyramid, which are to be

distinguished from dominant state on the basis of the lesser influence they enjoy with other

members of the international order as compared with the dominant state as well as the

differential benefits they receive as members of the same order. Support of few of these great

powers, however, is vital for the smooth functioning of the international order created by the

dominant state. Hence, they accordingly drive greater benefits too by aligning themselves with

the established leader.24

They are then followed by middle and small powers respectively; most

of those have found a place in the existing international order that assures them certain benefits

but otherwise lack power to bring changes to the established international order, if they desire

so.25

Power parity and dissatisfaction with the status quo are described as key conditions for war in

power transition theory. The most war prone situation is when a rising but dissatisfied state with

the status quo begins to approach the strength of the leading dominant state. The challenger, as

usually referred, seeks to upset the existing international order, because it has grown in power

after the rules of the existing international order have been imposed and main benefits have

already been allocated to the dominant state and its allies.26

The dominant state and its allies are

not usually willing to grant more than a small share of the advantages they receive to the rising

state. Challengers, on the other hand, seek to establish a new place for themselves in

international society, ―a place which they feel their growing power entitles them.‖27

They are

unwilling to accept a subordinate position when they have a reason to believe that they can rival

or surpass the dominant nation in power and dominance would endow them with much greater

benefits and privileges.

Power parity which is considered a necessary condition for major war is defined as a phase

when the potential challenger develops more than 80 percent of the resources of the dominant

power and ends when it exceeds by 20 percent the resources of the dominant nation.28

Figure 2.1

illustrates conditions for both peaceful international order as well as periods of instability. The

Ibid., 327-328.

Ibid., 329-330.

Organski and Kuglar, The War Ledger, 174.

Organski, World Politics, 328.

Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, ―The Power Transition Research Program,‖ in Handbook of War Studies II, ed. Manus I. Midlarasky (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 130-1. Italics original

73

former prevailing ―when the dominant nation has a large power advantage over any other single

nation and most combination of countries dissatisfied with the status quo in the second tier‖.29

Hence preponderance of power is equated with periods of stability and peace in power transition

theory and specifically where there is preponderance coupled with broad acceptance of status

quo or satisfaction with the state of international system, while instability is likely only during

periods of ―relative parity among potential competitors.‖ Thus ―as a dissatisfied great nation

approaches parity by growing in power more rapidly than the dominant nation, instability

increases and so does the probability of conflict‖.30

Dominant Nation

Great Powers

Satisfied Middle Powers

Dissatisfied Small Powers

Colonies

Figure 2.1. Hierarchical distribution of power in the international order (Organski 1958)

Organski and Kugler further elaborate that this fear on account of closure of power gap is

engendered among leaders in dominant nation because they suspect that the challenger will ―(1)

surpass the dominant country, (2) become increasingly unwilling to accept a subordinate position

in the international order, (3) challenge the leadership and rules of the international order‖.31

In

its original work by Organski factors causing war are listed as depending on the power potential

of the challenger when it begins to climb to power; the speed with which the challenger rises in

power; the flexibility of the dominant nation in adjusting to the changes required by the

appearance of a new major nation; the last not least being the amount of friendship between the Organski and Kuglar, The War Ledger, 174.

Ibid., 175.

Ibid.

74

dominant nation and the challenger.32

While the effects of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in the

international system are graphically captured by Okon Eminue and Henry Ufomba in their recent

work, which has been reproduced here to elaborate the point (Figure 2.2)33

Satisfied Maintenance of the status quo

Great Power

Dissatisfied

Challenges the status quo

Loss

Great Power wars

Wins Changes the status quo

Figure 2.2. Effects of Dissatisfaction and Satisfaction in the International System (Eminue

and Ufomba, 2011)

The important question of timing of war during a power transition is still without consensus.

Organski‘s (1958) argues that war is initiated by the rising challenger before the point of

transition while Organski and Kugler (1980) empirical analysis offers arguments in favour of

war more likely to occur after the point of transition; the finding then again is questioned by

Kugler and Lemke (2000) in their work. While a more recent research on power transition by

Tammen et.al (2000) suggests that the challenger initiates a war after the point of transition.

However, war initiation can be attributed to both dominant state and the challenger, albeit

different reasons. The dominant nation or the hegemon in a power transition might initiate a

preemptive war to prevent a rising challenger from surpassing it and hence assuming position of

Organski, World Politics, 333-337.

Okon E. Eminue and Henry U. Ufomba, ―Modeling Terrorist Target Selection: Organski‘s Power Transition

Theory,‖ Defence and Security Analysis 27, no. 4 (2011): 377.

75

dominance. While a challenger through military consolidation and industrial modernization

might act to prevent the hegemon from blocking its rise to ascendancy.34

2.1.1. Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics

An important contribution in the Power Transition research program came from Douglas Lemke,

who originally in his PhD dissertation Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics35

took up issue to

determine ―whether a well established theory of great power interactions could be modified to

help understand interactions among minor powers‖ and hence by extension give careful

consideration to ―international sub-systems within which sates interact‖.36

What makes such an

extension significant is the persistence and continuance of most of the conflict in international

system among less powerful states in regional interactions. This Multiple Hierarchical Model

(MHM) then appeared in his celebrated work Regions of War and Peace. It is important to dilate

characteristics of MHM whose subsequent extension and modification will help us understand

structural dynamics in Post-Hegemonic System.

Based on the assumption that regional hierarchies are functiontionally identical to the overall

global hierarchy dominated by great powers and as propounded by PTT; Multiple Hierarchy

Model comes with the exception that in regional hierarchies a regional dominant state establishes

and maintains status quo. Satisfaction / dissatisfaction with the status quo and power parity

create the same incentive for potential conflict in a regional hierarchy as it exists in a global

hierarchy. Other states in the regional hierarchy are either satisfied with this regional status quo

and hence are advantaged or they are dissatisfied like the ones in global hierarchy and hence

disadvantaged. Hence negative evaluations of the status quo and power parity are associated with

war in regional hierarchies too. The only significant difference between a regional hierarchy and

global hierarchy is that they are subordinate to overall global hierarchy and should the great

powers chose to interfere with relations among regional hierarchy members, they can and they

do whenever they choose. Thus unlike great powers at the peak of the overall global hierarchy,

34

Zhiqun Zhu, US-China in the 21st

Century: Power transition and peace (Routledge: London and New York,

2006), 16. Douglas Lemke, Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1993).

Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, 1.

76

the regional hierarchies are subject to international intervention and the outcome of any

confrontation at the regional hierarchy could be significantly altered with their interference.37

Secondly, ―Power Transition anticipates that wars will diffuse downward from the global to the

regional hierarchies but will not diffuse upward from regional to global‖.38

As wars in the global

hierarchy are fought for the control of the international system between the dominant state and a

dissatisfied challenger, it is up to them if they want to expand the scope of the war or want to

keep them confined within their area of origin, because they are the only ones to have the power

projection ability outside of their region too. On the other hand, minor power conflicts in a

regional hierarchy are waged over regional concerns, where minor powers also lack power to

make credible threats against great powers; their goal is to establish prominence within the

regional hierarchy, thus these disputes remained confined to the regions between minor powers.

Diagrammatically (Figure 2.3.) MHM is visualized as a three-dimensional cone within which

smaller cones are nested, each representing a hierarchy. The largest representing global hierarchy

while the smaller cones representing regional hierarchies. Geographic distance is the third

dimension represented in the cone which highlights that how dominant states of regional

hierarchies like Brazil in South American regional hierarchy and India in a South Asian regional

hierarchy, are placed at the same height in the three-dimensional triangle but they do not interact

within the same regional hierarchy.

Lemke‘s classification of ―regions‖ is based on proximity and patterns of interaction.

Proximity39

is important because it increases the potential for disputes by not only increasing

interaction between them but also forcing countries to be more sensitive about the space they

inhibit and the threats to it. Thus regional/ local hierarchies are defined as existing where ―the

members of each local hierarchy consider each other when developing their foreign policies and

planning for various military contingencies‖.40

While powerful states concern themselves with

larger areas, less powerful states are constrained to limit themselves to their ―politically relevant

neighborhood‖ because of resource constraints to affect matters far from their borders. Hence

Tammen et al. Power Transitions, 63-65.

Tammen et al. Power Transitions, 8.

The strongest evidence that proximity increases the probability of a Militarized Interstate Dispute has been presented by Bremer in ―Dangerous Dayds‖.

Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, 68.

77

more attention is paid to that part of the globe where ―the members of such international sub-

systems as able to interact military with each other‖.41

Patterns of interaction are also very important. Regional status quo are primarily territorial but

may also be characterized by ethnic, military, economic or ideological disagreements between

regional dominant powers and regional challengers. Potential great power interference within the

regional hierarchy depends upon the character of the regional status quo, more likely to be of

great power interest and interference when the regional status quo is more salient externally.

Global Hierarchy

Regional Hierarchies

South Asian

regional

South American hierarchy

regional

hierarchy Brazil India

Pakistan

Argentina

Chile Bangladesh

Figure 2.3. Regional Hierarchies in the International System (Lemke, 1993)

Regional hierarchies will parallel the overall global hierarchy more, if there is less interference

from the above.42

Despite powerful evidence that great powers rarely involve themselves overtly Ibid.

78

in minor power interstate disputes, Afghanistan, Korea, Vietnam offer dramatic examples to the

contrary.43

Therefore great power interference in a regional dispute / status quo should be

expected when the stakes involved are consequential to the great powers. Strong empirical

evidence suggest that parity and dissatisfaction make war ten times more likely in a minor power

regional settings, thus providing convincing validation to the multiple hierarchy model‘s

expectation.44

Thus MHM is an important extension of the power transition theory which can be

utilized to analyze minor power international interactions.

2.1.2. Post-Hegemony and Power Transition

Organski‘s Power Transition Theory and Lemke‘s Multiple Hierarchal Model both offer

valuable insights about power transitions at systemic/global and sub-systemic/regional levels.

Post-Hegemony characterizes conditions which can be conveniently explained by logical

extension and modification of the aforementioned research program. However, PTT with its

exclusive focus on the global hierarchy and MHM with its main emphasis on regional hierarchy

level leave limited scope for the joint investigation of the interplay of global and regional

hierarchies when power is diffusing in the global hierarchy and power transition towards post-

hegemony is taking place.

Post-hegemony rests on the contention that we are witnessing a power transition in the

international system. This power transition is increasingly evident in the light of wealth of

literature being generated on the recent debates between the reigning dominant but declining

hegemon i.e. U.S. and the rising challenger i.e. China.45

Power diffusion at the global level is

very significant as it alters conditions and potential for conflict in a local hierarchy too. Instead

of focusing on the differential rates of growth of capabilities, the speed of overtaking and the

timing of a major power war that might cause a reconfiguration of the international system as

explicitly propounded by PTT during periods of such power transitions; post-hegemonic phase

focus in this dissertation is: how transition periods create constrained and altered conditions for

international military intervention for the declining hegemon. Existing status quo, as established

Tamment et al. Power Transitions, 68-69.

For details see Douglas Lemke, ―Toward a General Understanding of Parity and War,‖ Conflict Management and Peace Science 14 (1995): 143-62.

Tammen et al. Power Transitions, 73.

In the subsequent chapter an entire section is dedicated to discussion on US-China power trajectory.

79

by the dominant state, is in flux and replication of time tested assertive hegemonic practices for

international military intervention (e.g. pre-emption, unilateral militarism etc.) might not be a

convenient and preferable option for the declining hegemon.

While Organski‘s PTT and MHM by Lemke offer insightful explanations for potential for

conflict in their global and local hierarchies, with the aim to establish, control or reassert

dominance in their respective hierarchies; nevertheless, both address issues which are mutually

exclusive. Dominant state in a global hierarchy has a concern to maintain status quo which can

perpetuate its leadership in the international system and prevent rise of any potential challenger

rising that aims to re-write the rules of the system to its own advantage; while regional dominant

state is focused and concerned with maintenance of regional hierarchy which prevents rise of

local challengers to established regional status quo. However, when one tries to find out how a

power transition in a global hierarchy alters conditions for a conflict ridden regional hierarchy

and provide incentives to dominant states within the regional hierarchy to either reassert status

quo or for regional challengers to rewrite regional hierarchy, both these research programs fail to

establish a casual connection between the two.

Besides wherever issue of diffusion of great power wars in regional hierarchies is concerned, it is

assumed as a logical extension of the issues at stake for the great powers as witnessed during

World War II where the original conflict between the United Kingdom and Germany expanded

to Russia and then virtually encompassed every regional hierarchy with the exception of South

America.46

Multiple Hierarchy Model (MHM) precludes diffusion of minor power interstate

militarized disputes into wars encompassing great powers. Wherever great powers intervened in

regional disputes - a rather rare phenomenon, they did it mainly to protect their own interests at

stake as witnessed in World War I when the conflict between Austria-Hungry and Serbia

expanded to engulf the world.47

Notwithstanding the limitations of these research programs when analyzing power transition in

post-hegemony; Structural changes taking place during post-hegemonic phase are too important

to be ignored or left for analysis for a period where a new hierarchy of power has been

established. On the contrary by lying thread bare dynamics surrounding changing circumstances, Tammen et al. Power Transitions, 77.

Ibid., 78.

80

it becomes far easier to understand how systemic change from hegemony to post-hegemony is

taking place and what such changes has in store for important events, like military interventions

by the declining hegemon occurring in the international arena.

Even contemporary scholarly focus on power transitions chiefly through the prism of ―China‘s

Rise–US Decline‖ scenario has produced dearth of literature for the impact of such transitions on

troubled regions like Middle East where a clear delink from previous US hegemonic practices

could be observed. One basic reason for this has been the restriction of power transition model to

the analysis of outbreak of war between major powers or to wars within regional hierarchies with

little focus on exploring the links between two. Arguably then, scholarly research has largely

failed to examine how power transition in a post-hegemonic setup plays out; for instance, in

terms of scope and substance of the military intervention exercised by a global power now in

decline.

By expanding the research program to include military intervention by great powers in a regional

hierarchy when power at the global hierarchy is already undergoing transition, helps us explore if

there exists a causal connection between two. Besides it will help us understand in a period of

ambiguous power preponderance at the global hierarchy, how regional powers undergoing power

transitions are more prone to conflict with increasing scope for great power interference and

intervention. Hence conditions signifying post-hegemonic military intervention will be detailed

in the subsequent section, besides addressing question of what characterizes post-hegemony and

why it increases reliance on ―threat securitization through political discourse.‖

2.2. Threat Securitization for Military Intervention

Construction of ―threat securitization through political discourse‖ for military intervention

follows a distinct path in post-hegemonic system which will be traced through three stages, each

though independent but provide necessary foundation for the subsequent stage. This section will

be utilizing insights of the power transition research program to formulate a military intervention

threat securitization model to be tested for case studies of Libya and Syria. These case studies

will highlight the arrival of a post-hegemonic system that has dented US unprecedented

81

preponderance and standing in the international system while simultaneously heralding long-

anticipated systemic changes.

STAGE I establishes conditions characterizing post-hegemonic international system.

STAGE II elaborates how threat securitization for international military intervention takes place

in post-hegemonic system. This stage also deals with the interplay of systemic and unit-level

variables that may or may not constrain both the intervener and the intervened.

STAGE III deals with the role that political discourse plays in legitimizing military intervention.

It explores at which systemic and unit levels does a discourse and consensus need to emerge in

order for military intervention to take place. Besides it determines within unit and systemic

levels – is one discursive proponent more important than the other in generating normative

structure? Aim is to look at the nature, content and normative effects of the discourse espoused

by a global power on the decline. Specifically the discourse around securitization to legitimize

military intervention and to ascertain in what ways does the discourse change as a result of

decline.

A detailed analysis of three stages through case studies of Libya and Syria will demonstrate

whether a pattern of threat construction can be traced that might emerge through unit-systemic

interplay of securitized political discourse hence either confirming or disapproving this research

project hypothesis, i.e.

Hypothesis:

Power transition within the global order and the dawn of the post-hegemonic international

system has led to the marginalization of US military interventionist policy.

2.2.1. STAGE I: Post-Hegemonic International System

US uncontested supremacy established with the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 has been

replaced with another threat to US dominance in the world theatre; this time in the shape of a

formidable China. Organski in one of his most prophetic predictions back in 1958 stated that ―the

question is not whether China will become the most powerful nation on earth, but rather how

long will it take her to achieve this status ….. The United States will retain world leadership for

82

at least the remainder of the twentieth century, perhaps even for a longer time, but the position

will eventually pass to China‖.48

The same thought was again echoed in words of a former US

ambassador to China Winston Lord when he expressed his concerns in these words ―The

question is not whether China will be a major player in global as well as regional security affairs

but rather when and how. China‘s rapid economic development, its growing military capabilities

and its historical international role will make it a major power in the coming century‖.49

United States

Europe

Japan Russia

China

Figure 2.4. The Global Hierarchy: A Chinese Perspective (Xue Mouhang, 1995)

The Asian landmass with China at the heart of it has already brought Asian theatre in the

forefront of US foreign policy focus while its previous Eurocentric orientation has taken a

backseat. Notwithstanding China‘s economic, demographic and political potential to establish

parity and then overtake US first in the size of its economy and then in other domains of power;

scholars like Xue Mouhang50

still finds US at the heart of a global hierarchy composed of a

square pyramid, visually represented in Figure 2.4. Organski, World Politics, 446.

Winston Lord, ―U.S. Policy Toward China: Security and Military Considerations‖ Statement before the

Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 11 October 1995, U.S. Department of State Dispatch 6(43): 775

Xue Mouhang, ―The New World Order: Four Powers and One Superpower?‖ Beijing Review 38 (1995): 19-20.

83

2.2.1.1. Global hierarchy in Post-Hegemony

The question of China attaining parity with US and then may be overtaking it would be a matter

of detailed discussion in the next chapter. Here the focus of analysis is on post-hegemonic phase

when the waning of American hegemony has altered the shape of the existing international

system and brought additional actors with increasing sway on political outcomes. It is important

to dwell on what is ―hegemony‖ before announcing a verdict about the arrival of ―post-

hegemony‖ in the international system. The term ―hegemony‖ has generated intense debate

between liberals and realists for a long period of time. For scholars like Michael Doyle, it stands

for ―controlling leadership of the international system as a whole.‖51

Michael Mastanduno,

however, characterizes establishment of hegemony when one political unit has the ―power to

shape the rules of the international politics according to its own interests.‖52

Others like Stuart

Kaufman, Richard Little, and William Wohlforth equate hegemony with hierarchy which is the

political-military ―domination‖ of a single unit ―over most of the international system.‖53

Such

influence ultimately rests on material power, and John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan assert is

―effectively exercised when hegemon is able to establish a set of norms that others willingly

embrace.‖54

For liberals like Robert Keohane, hegemony is a mix of power and norms, resting

on the twin premises: that ―order in world politics is typically created by a single hegemonic

power‖ and ―the maintenance of order requires stability.‖55

For liberals and realists, hegemony is a question of power; for realists, in particular, material

capabilities constitute power, which then in turn confer influence. Exclusive emphasis on

material component as power, ignore how that power simultaneously depend on the nature of

state‘s capabilities, how they are developed and used. In the contemporary era of enhanced

nationalism, people are less willing to be coerced by foreign powers, increasing great powers

reliance to translate power into influence through resort to a combination of carrots and sticks

policy. Use of raw power in a politically unsophisticated way and at odds with the prevailing Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 40.

Michael Mastanduno, ―Hegemonic Order, September 11, and the Consequences of the Bush Revolution,‖

International Relations of the Asia Pacific 5 (2005): 177-96.

Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William C. Wohlforth, The Balance of Power in World History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 7.

G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ―Socialization and Hegemonic Powers,‖ International Organization 44, no. 3 (1990): 283-315.

Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 31.

84

norms erodes not enhances the influence of the state sitting at the apex of the system already

witnessed in case of epic failures of US in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus power‘s material and

social basis has to be taken into account. It is not feasible to disaggregate influence from power.

Too much emphasis on the material factor alone has been unable to explain why the

preponderant US military and economic power fails at time to get desired outcomes. While

taking into account influence that rests on persuasion (shared values and acceptable practices)

convinces others that it is in their interests to do what you want them to do. Influence of this kind

is not a function of material capabilities though it benefits from them. Such influence ―depends

on sophisticated leaders and diplomats, shared discourses with target states, advocacy of policies

that build on precedent, and a willingness to let others help shape and implement initiatives.‖56

Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow in their recent work Good-Bye Hegemony, talk about a

―posthegemonic world‖ by describing three functions that personify a hegemon and how they

require ―contingent forms of influence rather than the blunt exercise of power.‖57

Hegemon‘s

first responsibility is normative. It is the capacity to shape the policy agenda of global institutions

and ad-hoc coalitions based on knowledge and manipulation of appropriate discourses.58

Here

constructivists emphasize persuasion over coercion, achieved primarily through agenda setting

and by appeal to shared norms. Second constituent of hegemony is the economic management.

Here they refer to the declining performance of the US as manager of the global system either

willingly or increasing lack of capability. Third and final element is the enforcement of global

initiatives referred to as sponsorship resting ultimately on capabilities. It entails agreed-upon

goals and procedures to confer legitimacy on any initiative; dialogue; negotiation; and the use of

regional or global institutions as venues. By emphasizing how these functions are becoming

diffused among states and non-state actors rather than concentrated in hands of hegemon, they

announce the arrival of a posthegemonic world.59

Hence the study defines post-hegemony as a phase which signifies a new era beyond the

preponderant presence of US led patterns of interactions and exercise of influence. US still is the 56

Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony: Power and Influence in the Global System (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 6.

Ibid.,8.

See Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ―Power in International Politics,‖ International Organization 59, no. 1(2005): 39-75, especially 56-57. ; Ian Manners, ―Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?‖ Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235-58, especially 239.

Reich and Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony, 6-8.

85

single most powerful nation in any of military, political and cultural domains of power but

because the economic realm is fast in flux so it undercuts US ability to exercise unmitigated

influence that it had enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth century as the sole superpower or

at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Thus drawing on theories of Antonio Gramsci and

Roger Simon that describe hegemony as a relation ―not of domination by means of force, but of

consent by means of political and ideological leadership,‖60

we will discuss the loss of

―legitimacy‖ as an important component in announcing arrival of post-hegemonic world. Reich

and Lebow aptly characterize this phase as the glaring discrepancy between ―America‘s self-

image and goals on the one hand, and the others perception of them…. the extraordinary military and economic power of the United States and its increasing inability to get others to do what it

wants.‖61

(Italics in original text)

The economic attenuation between US and China is already restructuring the global hierarchy.

Whether it has the potential of peaceful transformation that was witnessed a century ago between

Britain and US and almost two decades ago when the mantle of power peacefully slipped from

USSR to US without a great power confrontation, is still far from clear. Power transition theory

predicts power parity and dissatisfaction with the status quo as two important variables that have

the potential to convert a great power transition into a great power conflict. But before such

variables could assert themselves in China-US case, a phase of uncertainty prevails which could

turn things around either way. This phase of drift away from the US hegemony to the

establishment of a new global hierarchy of power in the international system is termed as post-

hegemony. Post-hegemony may eventually give way to a new hegemony with or without a great

power confrontation or it may just slip into a non-hegemonic international system with a

different configuration of power, as also witnessed in history.62

Debates on America‘s waning influence has already led to speculations about the future of the

international power structure and who might qualify in the prestigious category and on what

basis. Power transition research program has also made significant contribution on the emerging

structure of the international system. Tammen et.al in their book Power Transitions: Strategies Roger Simon, Gramsci‟s Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982), 21.

Reich and Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony, 3.

For further discussion on nonhegemony see Amitav Acharaya, ―Nonhegemonic International Relations: A Preliminary Conceptualization‖ (Working Paper No 10, presented at the International Studies Association

Convention, San Francisco, 2008).

86

for 21st Century published a chapter under the title ‗The World to Come‘ and after outlining

what power configuration of the international system had been in World Wars, Cold War and

Post-Cold War period, speculates about the global hierarchy of the future as well.

United States

Europe

Japan USSR

China

Figure 2.5. Global Hierarchy in the Cold War Period (Tammen et al., 2000)

The global hierarchy in Cold War period (Figure 2.5. ) suddenly changed with the collapse of the

Soviet Union and gave way to a US-led international system (Figure 2.6.) with preponderance of

power in military, economic, political and cultural sectors. Post-Cold War period also saw

exclusion of Japan as one of the main contenders for supremacy in the international theater as its

economic strength was significantly constrained as opposed to previous speculations about it.

Power transition theory predicts that ―the future structure of the global hierarchy will be

determined by the continued economic expansion of the great powers. As endogenous growth

fosters convergence in the growth of per-capita economic output, the size of a nation‘s

population will ultimately set limit on the size of its economy‖.63

Based on the endogenous

model it can be predicted that the distribution of world economic resources will shift over time,

with Asia as the largest holder of world‘s wealth as per-capita GDP converges.64

Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 189.

Ibid., 190.

87

United States

Europe Russia

China

Figure 2.6. The Global Hierarchy in the Post-Cold War Period (Tammen et al., 2000)

Power transition theory predicts a number of possible structural arrangements in the twenty-first

century. There are two ideal types representing opposite ends of the spectrum of possible

hierarchies with many types in between. On one end of the spectrum is U.S.-led superbloc

(Figure 2.7.) wherein US can greatly increase its power by expanding NATO via incorporation

of Russia, China and India into a superbloc.

U.S. Superbloc

Europe

India Russia

China

Figure 2.7. Alternative A: The Global Hierarchy under a U.S.-led Superbloc (Tammen et

al., 2000)

88

While the other end of the spectrum is represented by Greater China (Figure 2.8.). Here a

dissatisfied China overtakes the US as its coalition proves stronger than the satisfied states led by

US.

China

Europe

India U.S. /

NAFTA

Islamic Bloc and/or

Resurgent Russia

Figure 2.8. Alternative B: The Global Hierarchy under China (Tammen et al., 2000)

While the first scenario predicts an ultrastable system with US as its leader for decades to come,

the second raises prospects for global war. What alternative B implies that in war or peace Asia

will be occupying centre of the international system with an Asian state as a dominant power

replacing U.S.65

Which future alternative will finally prevail, many thinks it still is in US hands.

However, this study deals with a period between the two i.e. when the US hegemony is in

decline and other potential actors are staging a comeback on the international theatre, before a

clear new hierarchy is established. Power transition theory with its usual focus on the dominant

state and potential challenger misses the dynamics unfolding in the international system when

the system is still in flux. This phase as already labelled ―post-hegemony‖ is represented through Ibid., 189-193.

89

a pentagonal pyramid (Figure 2.9.). Post-hegemony deal with the contemporary international

environment and how it is unfolding at the systemic level.

United States

Brazil

Europe India

China

Russia Japan

Figure 2.9. Global Hierarchy in Post-Hegemony

US still occupies the top and leads the system through its capability to secure preferable

outcomes, being constrained with the emergence of other key actors with significant resources

and power e.g. Europe, Japan, India, Russia, Brazil. While China occupies the base of the

contemporary global hierarchy with its overwhelming economic strength through which it

increasingly makes its presence registered as the key contender that routinely pushes its agenda

to be at the top of the pyramid by replacing US.

While the power is in transition in the global hierarchy and this flux provides different incentives

to major players in different contexts. These players do assert themselves and provide not only a

strong opposition to US-led systemic structure but at the same time try to construct alternative

structure thus undercutting US influence and hence its ability to frame agendas to a certain extent

in varied international settings.

90

Power parity and dissatisfaction with the status quo again being the two most dominant variables

driving foreign policy behavior of emerging actors in the post-hegemonic phase too. However,

power parity (power diffusion) is not only about the leading challenger approaching parity in

power with the dominant state, in any of the leading sectors (political, economic, military) but it

is also about how other political contenders (e.g. India, Russia, Brazil) which have recently

emerged, try to carve a place for themselves in the emerging structure of the international

system.

When leading actors are dissatisfied with the status quo, as they have emerged to power after the

rules of the international system have been written by the hegemon and established and

maintained with the active involvement of its allies (EU, Japan) who also disproportionately

profit from hegemon. The emerging new actors in a bid to carve a larger space for them try to

align themselves with other actors with whom they might not have anything in common except

the will to find a larger share for themselves in the evolving international system. It is also a well

established fact without joint efforts no single actor, not even the strongest among them, is in a

position to rewrite the rules of the international system in its favour.

2.2.1.2. Regional Hierarchies in Post-Hegemony

The drift towards post-hegemony in the global system sends very strong signals to regional /

local hierarchies which try to take advantage of the vulnerability prevailing in the global

hierarchy. The challengers in a regional hierarchy might get emboldened and attempt to rewrite

the rules for the regional hierarchy, under the impression that they might not encounter the same

kind of opposition as they expected earlier.

Regional hierarchies in post-hegemony function very much like the mechanism outlined in

Lemke‘s Multiple Hierarchy Model (MHM). However, one significant difference is the

increased likelihood of interference of other powers/ great powers in regional hierarchies. While

MHM asserts that great powers do not intervene when the interstate disputes are territorial or

their national interests not at stake. Regions with established hierarchies in flux are of special

concern to great powers.

It is the interplay of regional and global hierarchies which attains significant importance in post-

hegemonic phase. To establish this linkage and understanding how its unfolding affects the

91

dynamics of international system in flux, will help us understand how undertaking international

intervention takes a distinct route in post-hegemony.

The inter-linkage between global and regional hierarchies in post-hegemony depends on the

identification and categorization of regional hierarchies and how they evolve to create room for

an increased likelihood of great power interference and intervention.

Lemke‘s definition of regions is built upon notions of proximity and the ability to interact

militarily with each other. Each state has power to exert military influence over some portion of

the globe‘s surface which degrades because of the loss-of-strength gradient.66

The steeper the

later, the smaller the ability of state to interact or influence other states militarily. Applying the

concept of the loss-of-strength gradient, Lemke calculated a state‘s ―relevant neighbourhood‖

where it can ―reach‖ them militarily and thus exert influence within their territory. Such states

were then designated as ―relevant dyads‖ as their joint reachability makes wars possible between

them. Lemke then adjusted ―miles per day‖ formula of Bueno de Mesquita67

to his estimates of

―transit ranges‖ to form set of local hierarchies, suitable to his theoretical framework.68

Regional hierarchy classification given by Lemke in 1990‘s still holds true for the regions that

have been relatively stable over a period of time and / or the dissatisfied challengers have failed

to bridge the 80% power parity gap, as identified an important threshold for initiating power

transition in a relevant dyad, with the leading state, as witnessed e.g. in case of South Asian and

South American local hierarchies. In South Asia India over a period of time strengthened its

position in spite of increasing tensions with the regional challenger Pakistan. Similarly in South

America Brazil has kept its leading role intact.

However there are certain regions where significant changes in regional structure and hierarchy

have given rise to new dynamics, made possible through conflict, instability and erosion of

traditional structures of power hierarchy. Such regions with uncertainty, conflict and instability

prevalent among them and struggle among potential leaders have opened room for intervention /

interference by great powers. For details see Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defence (New York: Harpers and Brothers Publishers, 1962).

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita The War Trap (New Haven,CT: Yale University Press, 1981) 103-108.

Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, 67-111. Lemke formula incorporates types of terrain to be traversed and the transportation technologies used to traverse terrain type. Thus ―miles per day‖ formula might be different for a terrain because of the transportation technology employed.

92

These regional hierarchies with diffused power structures are significant in establishing the link

between global and regional hierarchies in post-hegemony, being more vulnerable as a play

ground where potential challengers to the declining hegemon could be seen with their assertive

foreign policy behaviors and traditional soft and hard balancing strategies. Middle East and

Northern Africa are regions where we will see the post-hegemonic interplay of global and

regional hierarchies. These two regions will be later explored through case studies of Syria and

Libya.

In post-hegemony the global hierarchy undergoing power transition is comparatively stable. The

declining hegemon and potential challenger are engaged in maintaining and altering the

established status-quo to their own advantage respectively but none is in a position nor

displaying disposition to upset the status quo through traditional overt power transitional great

power confrontation.

The declining hegemon would not initiate a conflict because it still enjoys preponderance in all

the major sectors of powers and it has reasons to believe that potential challenger could be co-

opted in the established status-quo. While the potential challenger though dissatisfied with the

status quo and aiming for an enhanced presence in the international system commensurate with

its growing strength would not be in a position to overtly challenge the established status quo.

This inability comes both from the prevalent power gap where 80% threshold in all the leading

sectors has not been attained and the realization that existing power hierarchy though not fully

compatible with its growing strength, has been responsible for its rise as a major power and

hence continues to feed it. Secondly, overt hard balancing against the declining hegemon could

be counter-productive, as it could unnecessarily provoke it for retaliatory postures. Co-opting

other states dissatisfied with the status quo could also be far from possible.

In the absence of both internal and external balancing mechanisms, system changing great power

conflict is still a far-fetched reality. Regional hierarchies without dominant leaders and conflict-

ridden dynamics, are however, open for great power intervention. Because disturbances in

regional / local hierarchies with interests at stake for great powers, draw them in local settings

and make regional hierarchies as play ground for proxy wars and at times for direct and overt

military intervention.

93

These regional hierarchies are also vulnerable because inter-state and intra-state conflicts have

left such regions without dominant leaders. Power abhors vacuum which then make conditions

ripe for uncertainty and conflict with overt intervention from the top, to be replaced with a new

regional hierarchy, however unstable that might be.

2.2.2. STAGE II: Threat Securitization

Once the conditions specifying post-hegemony are in place, it is easier to ascertain that military

intervention in a regional scenario by the declining hegemon would trigger certain dissatisfied

potential challengers too. Disturbance in a local hierarchy, where interests of great power are at

stake, are of special concern to the state sitting at the apex of the system. The reconfiguration of

regional hierarchy, not suitable to the dominant state of the global hierarchy, is an outcome that

ought to be avoided at every cost. Such an outcome is especially unacceptable to declining

hegemon as it leads others to question its legitimacy as leader of the international system.

Reconfiguration of an important region has to be in line with expectations of the globally

dominant power. This reaffirms that international system is still very much the product of the

hegemon‘s preferences and influence. The contrary development sends strong signals to potential

challengers that long awaited systemic changes are in progress.

With a decline in hegemon‘s standing, the reliance on international and regional bodies

increases. Hence, a change in military intervention behaviour is also detected. Instead of opting

for assertive unilateralism, the leading state prefers multilateral course where the target state is

presented as a threat to international peace and security. Securitization theory presents the most

logical choice to analyze military intervention in post-hegemonic system. It will be elaborated in

the first part of the section. Next section will identify the systemic and unit-level variables that

may or may not constrain both the intervener and the intervened while military intervention is

being undertaken. How threat securitization in post-hegemony is achieved will be elaborated in

last section of stage II.

2.2.2.1. Securitization Theory

Securitization Theory developed by the Copenhagen School in 1990s originally consisted of

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jap de Wilde. Their groundbreaking work Security: A New

Framework for Analysis (1998) aimed at widening and broadening security beyond the

94

traditional political-military sectors to include economic, societal and environmental sectors too.

Secondly it had widespread influence in the early development of Critical Security Studies as it

provided a ―constructivist operational method‖ – an analytical framework for distinguishing how

and when issues become security issues.69

However, in retaining the role for the state in

international security it earned criticism for still being wedded to (neo)realism but it maintained a

link with traditional security studies with the aim to ―analyze international security without

losing sight of its original purpose‖.70

―Security‖ according to them, ―is still about survival‖. It is when an issue is presented as posing

an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state,

incorporating government, territory, and society).71

The security-survival logic is maintained

and extended to include other four categories beyond military sector. The dynamics of each of

these sectors are determined by ―securitizing actors‖ and ―referent objects‖. While former are

―actors who securitize issues by declaring something, a referent object, existentially threatened‖;

while later are ―things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim

to survival‖.72

While ―securitizing actors‖ can be expected to be ―political leaders, bureaucracies, governments,

lobbyists, pressure groups‖73

but ―referent objects‖ and the kind of existential threats they face

vary across security sectors and levels of analysis eg., state in military security, national

sovereignty or an ideology in political security, collective identities in societal security etc. 74

Securitization is thus a two-stage process for which the Copenhagen School provides a spectrum

along which issues can be plotted as non-politicized, politicized and securitized (Figure 2.10).

This framing of a security issue and its movement from politicized to the securitized end of the

spectrum takes place through an act of securitization. In this discursive process an already

politicized issue is articulated as an existential threat to a referent object (for example, state,

groups, national sovereignty, ideology, economy, species, habitat) by a securitizing actor (for

example, government, political elite, military, civil society). Thus ―an issue is dramatized and Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis (Boulder and London:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), vii.

Ibid., viii.

Ibid., 21.

Ibid., 36.

Ibid., 40.

Ibid., 21-23.

95

presented as an issue of supreme priority: thus by labeling it as security an agent claims a need

for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means‖75

.

NON-POLITICIZED

Issue has no state involvement and is not subject to public debate or decision

POLITICIZED

Issue is part of public policy, needing government decision and resource allocation

SECURATIZED Issue is an existential threat, requires emergency measures and actions outside the scope of normal politics

Figure 2.10. Issue scale, derived from Buzan et al. (1998: 23)

Thus securitization ―is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and

frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be

seen as a more extreme version of politicization‖.76

While desecuritization is the reverse process

and involves the ―shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining

processes of the political sphere‖.77

Through the two-stage process it is explained how and when an issue is to be perceived and

acted upon as an existential threat to security in securitization. The first stage deals with

portrayal of certain issues, persons or entities as existential threats to referent objects. Here

usually state initiates a move of securitization but non-state actors can also be the initiators like

popular movements or trade unions but the process tends to be dominated by powerful actors

with privileged positions in state thus revealing the power and influence of the securitizing

actor.78

The use of language of security does not mean that an issue is automatically transformed into a

security question as second stage depends upon acceptance by the relevant audience (public

opinion, military officials and other elites) that a referent object is existentially threatened; only Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 23.

Ibid., 4.

Allen Collins, ―Securitization, Frankenstein‘s Monster and Malaysian Education,‖ Pacific Review 18, no. 4(December 2005): 567-88.

96

then can extraordinary measures could be imposed. Central to this stage is ―speech act‖- ―the

utterance itself is the act‖79

thus signifying the discursive representation of a certain issue as an

existential threat to security. It is the starting point of securitization process where through

speech alone a certain issue is designated as an existential threat to security irrespective of the

―reality‖ of the threat or its existence in material terms. It is the use of ―discourse‖ which

articulates an issue as threat as ―existential threat‖ to the relevant audience and thus presenting a

case for immediate mobilization of state power and movement beyond traditional rules; hence it

always a ―political choice‖80

Timing

Social and Audience

discursive context

of speech act acceptance

SUCCESSFUL

Repetition / process of External reality:

security speech acts

SECURITIZATION

nature / features of

following grammar of ‘threat’

security

Relationship

between speaker

and audience

Positioning of securitizing actor

Figure 2.11. Factors contributing to successful securitization (Jonna Nyman, 2013)

79

Ole Waever, ―Securitization and Desecuritization,‖ in On Security, ed. Ronnie D.L. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 55.

Buzan et al. Security, 29.

97

Waever describes ―something is a security problem when the elites declares it to be so‖81

thus

signifying that actors with privileged position of power (governments and political elites) had an

added legitimacy of their position and hence they are more successful in securitizing an issue.

Thus this school regards security as a socially constructed concept and hence is primarily

constructivist in its approach.82

What constitutes an ―existential threat‖ is very much a subjective

matter depending upon shared understanding of a danger to security. In other words a collective

has to accept it as such; only then would standard political procedures would be discarded as

inadequate and adoption of emergency measures considered feasible.

An act of securitization has a tendency to lead to excesses and abuse of power also. Besides

moves of securitization can fail also if the audience rejects the speech act articulated by the

securitizing actor. In such a case it remains a securitizing move but not a successful

securitization.83

In sum successful securitization (Figure 2.11) involves three key facilitation

conditions: the speech act itself following the ―grammar of security‖ emphasizing priority,

urgency and survival; the securitizing actor being in a ―position of authority‖ to maximize

audience acceptance; and the features of ―alleged threat/s‖.84

Another point to be emphasized is the tension within securitization theory on ambiguous

understanding of ―the speech act‖, which has led it to evolve into two distinct directions with a

sociological and a post-structural branch. This tension is because of the desire to have both ―a

social sphere (with ―actors‖, ―fields‖, ―authority‖, ―intersubjectivity‖, ―audience‖ and

―facilitating conditions‖) and a (post-structural / post-modern) linguistic theory of Derrida and

performativity‖.85

However this tension could be partially resolved by a greater emphasis on

discursive context.

Waever, ―Securitization and Desecuritization,‖ 54.

Thierry Balzacq , ―Constructivism and Securitization Studies,‖ in The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, ed. M.D. Cavelty, V. Mauer and T. Balzacq (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 56-72.

Buzan et al. Security, 25.

Ibid., 33.

85H. Stritzel, ―Towards a Theory of Securatization: Copenhagen and Beyond,‖ European journal of International

Relations 13, no. 3 (2007): 377.

98

This securitization theory by Buzan et. al will be used to explain discursive construction of

existential threat in post-hegemonic system for international military intervention in a local /

regional hierarchy.

2.2.2.2. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables in Military Intervention

Exploring the link between systemic and unit-level variables is significant. As already discussed

the uncertainty, instability and conflict in regional hierarchy has rendered local states vulnerable

and this vulnerability is exploited by both the regional and extra-regional actors and assist them

in pushing forward their agendas. Besides it‘s the power transition in the global hierarchy that

provides additional impetus to events unfolding in regional hierarchies.

Geographical setting, intra-state conflict, legitimacy of the global dominant state and hence the

system its constructed, domestic-political settings of the intervening state and regional, extra-

regional scenario all are important variables and their interplay makes great power military

intervention in a local hierarchy all the more probable.

2.2.2.2.1. Geography

Declining hegemon intervenes in areas of strategic importance. Even Lemke‘s Multiple

Hierarchy Model postulates that great powers never intervene in minor powers territorial

disputes. Overt military interventions in such geographical settings take place when interests of

great powers are at stake or adverse outcomes are consequential to them. As power transition

theory caters to the cyclical nature of international politics so it can be logically stated that these

minor states or local hierarchies gain importance at one time and become irrelevant at others.

Contemporary international environment and events shaping the politics at the global level thus

play significant role in assigning importance to a region / local hierarchy.

While the global dominant state will elevate or reduce the region in importance depending on

contemporary international environment; the target state in a local hierarchy is permanently

caught in a geographical dilemma like all territorial bound states. One can neither chose one‘s

neighbors nor shift boundaries when friends turn into foes. When a military intervention is

undertaken in a local hierarchy, role of its neighbors and regional dominant state play a decisive

role. Any target state surrounded by hostile neighbors will fear intervention more; while target

99

states with friendly allies in the region could frustrate any intervening state. Exploration of

military intervention patterns in Libya and intended action against Syria will shed light on the

issue in the subsequent chapters.

2.2.2.2.2. Intra-State Conflict

Besides the external conditions facilitating intervention by a great power, certain internal factors

also make the overt intervention more probable. These include domestic politico-military

situation and economic conditions.

Satisfied, stable, thriving and functioning polities whatever their form of government, rarely

attracts foreign intervention. Whenever internal political setup is in transition or there is active

opposition to the state‘s established status-quo, plus internal dissatisfied challengers who could

be co-opted by interveners, intervention by regional / extra-regional players becomes a reality.

It can thus be stated that power transition two key variables satisfaction with the state‘s status-

quo and potential dissatisfied challengers make state vulnerable for external overt intervention

which can be visually represented as Figure 2.12. Hence it‘s possible to analyze domestic

conflictual situation in the target state through power transition lens.

Target State‘s Established Status-Quo

Stable, Satisfied, Thriving

& Functioning State

Dissatisfied Challengers & Status-quo

in Transition

No Overt External Military Intervention

External Military Intervention and / or

Regional and Extra-regional Players

Figure 2.12. Internal Hierarchy of the Target State located in a key Region

100

2.2.2.2.3. Legitimacy

When internal disturbances in a state upset hierarchical balance in a key regional hierarchy and

overt intervention by both regional and extra-regional players becomes apparent; then the

legitimacy of the globally dominant state becomes at stake. Mark Suchman defines legitimacy as

―a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or

appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs and definitions.‖86

It also

refers to ―the normative belief by an actor that a rule or an institution ought to be obeyed. It is a

subjective quality between actor and institution, and defined by the actor‘s perception of the

institution. The actor‘s perception may come from the substance of the rule or from the

procedure or source by which it was constituted.‖87

Here legitimacy refers to the ability of the

globally dominant state to run the affairs of the world and others perception of its capability to

manage them accordingly. When perceived to be legitimate, then rule assumes authoritative

quality. ―The character of power accordingly changes when it is exercised within a framework of

legitimate relations and institutions. The concepts of power and legitimacy might be said to come

together in the exercise of ―authority‖.88

There are certain regions where frequent inter-state and intra-state conflicts are witnessed that

never attract great power intervention. Usually in such regions the apex of the regional hierarchy

is not in dispute and a different outcome won‘t affect hegemon‘s influence within the local

hierarchy. Such inter-state militarized disputes thus seldom attract attention (Somalia, Rwanda)

or if they do hegemon‘s interest is restoring peaceful status-quo. Besides, such inter-state

militarized disputes with minimum possibility to engulf regional hierarchy also seldom raise

alarming questions on dominant state‘s claim to global leadership. The legitimacy is questioned

when the outcome of an intra-state conflict could alter regional status-quo, vital to the interests of

the global dominant state. Hence, such conditions warrant overt military intervention, thus

enlarging the circle of a local conflict to include extra-regional players.

Contemporary US foreign policy overtly states that it will not allow opposition in any region by

any state. Such a public declaration puts additional pressure because an outcome contrary to the 86

Mark Suchman, quoted in Ian Hurd, ―Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,‖ International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 387. Hurd, ―Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,‖ 381.

Reich and Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony, 36.

101

declared policy could mean acceptance of an overt loss of influence in a key region. Legitimacy

is such an important variable that international organizations are co-opted to assume a semblance

of international support even by the state sitting at the apex of the international system. To

intervene or not to intervene then becomes a policy matter directly linked to hegemon‘s ability to

shape international system to its own preferable outcomes. This is a stage where securitization

theory becomes implicit.

Military intervention in a state located in a key regional hierarchy is thus framed for the domestic

audience as the test of dominant state‘s systemic legitimacy. An untoward situation externally

imposed through ―irresponsible‖ actions of target state rather than a matter of choice which could

be side-stepped. This framing then cites threats emanating from local hierarchy as ―existential‖

directly linked to the security of the dominant state and conversely the system it created.

Domestically an audience has to be satisfied which includes organizational- bureaucratic

interests besides general public. Besides domestic politics and international politics are closely

related, hence, politics that takes place within states affects politics that occur outside states.

Securitization of threat then gains special place in a democratic society where public registers its

dis/content through electronic, print and social media, mass gatherings and dissenting opinion

gets heard on every major forum within the country.

Framing of disturbance in a local hierarchy thus assumes ―existential threat‖ character, expressed

through political speeches of elite actors. This will be discussed in detail in next section.

2.2.2.2.4. Regional and Extra-regional Players

An inter-state conflict may or may not attract the regional involvement and may be limited to a

conflict within the relevant dyad. However, a conflict with intervention from the global hierarchy

always triggers other regional and extra-regional actors and hence potential challengers in a local

hierarchy get active to carve a place for themselves when the local hierarchy is still in flux and

obtain a favourable outcome for themselves.

Thus local disturbances offer incentives to both regionally based states and extra-regional

players. While regional states are concerned with new configuration of power to emerge once

102

the conflict ends. Extra-regional players want to enhance their position as important global

player with ability to alter local status-quo.

Military intervention in a post-hegemonic system has been diagrammatically represented below

in Figure 2.13.

Regional hierarchy in Intervener Intervener

transition

(declining

Post-Hegemonic Phase

hegemon)

Domestic

politics

Target State

Threat Legitimacy

State hierarchy International

in transition Securitization Crisis

Institutions

Extra-Regional involvement

Post-Hegemonic Phase

Intervener

Figure 2.13. Military Intervention Threat Securitization in Post-Hegemonic System

Military intervention can become protracted when extra-regional players are also dissatisfied

potential challengers in global hierarchy. This reinforces legitimacy factor for declining hegemon

and draws them more heavily in a local hierarchy.

Any adverse outcome in a key local hierarchy may not altogether alter contemporary global

hierarchy but it definitely constrains the dominant state‘s legitimacy to lead the system and may

embolden potential global challengers to assert themselves more visibly leading to overt hard

balancing strategies.

103

The events following military intervention and its subsequent effect on local and global

hierarchy also explain inter-linkage between the two. Both regional and global hierarchies in

transition make international military intervention by declining hegemon an event of unusual

political importance and impact.

The swift conclusion of such undertaking by the globally dominant state signify that potential

global dissatisfied states haven‘t bridged the power parity gap with the declining hegemon and

hence their ability to undercut its international political influence would be undermined.

International system and its structure thus run on rules and norms erected by the declining

hegemon with the ability to reassert its hegemony if it could arrest factors draining its strength.

However a protracted involvement in a local hierarchy may lead to system transformation as

witnessed in case of Soviet Union when it got bogged down in Afghanistan mess and it

eventually led to the very disintegration of the mighty Soviet Union. Thus protracted wars in

local hierarchies have potential to lead to peaceful systemic reconfiguration also.

Further exploration of this hypothesis might reveal interesting dynamics of system transforming

minor-major power wars but it is beyond the scope of the study undertaken in this dissertation.

2.2.2.3. Threat Securitization in Post-Hegemonic International System

Power Transition Theory posits that great powers rarely interfere in a local hierarchy involving

minor powers until and unless their vital national interests are at stake. It has already been

specified that when power in key local hierarchy is in transition, uncertain and unstable

environment prevailing in the region invites other regional and extra-regional players to indulge

in local matters and try to shape regional environment suitable to their national interests.

Dominant state sitting at the apex of the global hierarchy has special interest in shaping overall

regional environment; otherwise an adverse status quo in a key regional hierarchy can have

consequential impact on its legitimacy and hence embolden potential challengers to bid for

increased assertion in pursuit of their goals, not compatible with interests of the declining

hegemon. Hence legitimacy is an important variable and declining global hegemon‘s ability to

lead the international system and shape its structure rules and norms, rest in proving itself as

―legitimate‖ leader of the free world. It is again reiterated that seldom a set-back in a local

hierarchy threatens the international system configuration of power as witnessed in Afghan-

104

Soviet case but it can seriously dent dominant‘s power claim as leader of the established global

status quo.

Key regions with unstable and uncertain local hierarchies and conflictual regional environment

draw increasing external intervention from both regional and extra-regional players. Legitimacy

of the global dominant power is at stake when overt military intervention from extra-regional

players involves powers designated as members not satisfied with the established global status

quo club also. These dissatisfied global players though not in a position to openly challenge the

declining hegemon on one-on-one basis, resort to power display through supporting regimes not

acceptable to the declining hegemon. Thus great powers get deeply drawn in a local hierarchy

and overt military intervention becomes a more probable future.

This is where the Copenhagen School and its Securitization theory provides framework to

determine how a specific matter is securitized by the intervening state to provide it with a pretext

to justify not only military intervention in the target state but to reassert its claim as the leader of

the free world . Besides discourse analysis technique provide us an insight that reveals intricate

role of language which is used to construct ―existential threat‖ that resonates more positively

with domestic and to some extent with international audience as well, hence legitimizing use of

force.

In post-hegemonic international system, resort to unilateral use of military force is not the most

preferable intervention behavior sought by the Intervening state even if it still retains

predominance in key sectors of power. Intervention logic is built around ―existential threat‖

which gains acceptance within unit and systemic levels. Discourse of the securitizing actor play

critical role, which consistently generate narrative pertaining to the securitization of threat. By

politicizing local events in the target state and selling them to domestic public, Intervening state

creates space for discourse to be generated at systemic level.

Threat securitization in post-hegemonic system involves securitizing actor (the intervener, which

security). It is subjective discursive construction that has more to do with positioning of the

securitizing actor within the systemic level and its ability to manage a successful securitizing

move within the relevant audience. The path followed for threat securitization is already

explained in Figure 2.13. Intervening state takes advantage of its global dominant position and

105

intervenes in a local hierarchy to re-arrange key hierarchy in line with its own declared national

interests and preferred local hierarchical configuration. Military intervention in the target state

thus begs for discursive construction of threat as more regional and extra-regional players get

involved.

The domestic audience is relevant for successful securitization and thus both media and interest

groups are employed to construct narrative which support stated official position and hence

establish ―legitimate‖ authority to adopt extraordinary / emergency measures to pursue their

political agenda by-passing traditional normal politics. The intervening actor employs

―existential threat‖ discourse internationally too, through will it legitimizes use of force.

International organizations are co-opted to attain semblance of legitimacy; if UN is not

forthcoming then regional organizations are co-opted to convince the domestic and international

audience of the legitimacy of intended intervention. The relevant audience in domestic political

spheres and in international organizations is convinced through a discursive process that target

state poses an ―existential threat‖ to international and peace. By defining the ‗existential nature

of threat‘ the intervener legitimizes the use of force.

2.2.3. STAGE III: Political Discourse and Military Intervention

After specifying conditions characterizing post-hegemony and elaborating how the interplay of

global and regional hierarchies in transition, make conditions conducive for great power

involvement in a local hierarchy; it will be now outlined how securitization of threat through

political discourse is employed for military intervention. This stage discusses the role that

political discourse plays in legitimizing military intervention. It also explores systemic and unit

levels where a discourse and consensus need to emerge for military intervention to take place.

Besides it will also determine within unit and system levels – is one discursive proponent more

important than other in generating normative structure.

2.2.3.1. Discourse and Political Action

Federica Ferrari says that ―the rationale of political discourse is intrinsically rooted in the consent

of its audience, all the more so within a political system that defines and frames itself as

106

democratic‖.89

Ever since 9/11, the world saw US as ―protagonist as well as principal agent and

operator on the international scene‖ which conversely was ―responsible for the hardening of

American political rhetoric as one of the distinctive features of a ―securitization‖ programme‖.90

The rhetorical aspect is one of the essential components of ―securitization theory‖ of Buzan et al.

and the process of ―securitization‖ is associated with ‗speech acts‘ which is the utterance itself

that is the act.91

Defined in this way ―securitization is essentially an intersubjective process. The

senses of threat, vulnerability and in(security) are socially constructed rather than objectively

presented or present‖.92

As a consequence no ―really‖ endangered object is to defended or

secured rather securitization implies understanding the ―processes of constructing a shared

understanding of what it is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat‖.93

When a securitizing move is made, political elites are conscious of the fact that they are stating

―a political fact that has consequences because this securitization will cause the actor to operate

in a different mode than he or she would have otherwise‖.94

As the entire process is

intersubjective, it will lead different communities to react differently to ―threat‖. For one what

might seem as legitimate securitization may appear paranoid to others outside it or they may

perceive that it has been undersecuritized by a political community.95

As a consequence it is

possible to maneuver interaction ―if one knows who can ‗do‘ security on what issue and under

what conditions‖.96

Political discourse employed for building consensus for international military intervention

reveals that both systemic and unit levels are involved and an ―existential threat‖ cannot be

constructed without employing threatening discourse catering to both levels. Based on conditions

identified for military intervention in Figure 2.14, the systemic and unit levels are explored

through three assumptions which will be tested through political discourse in case studies of

Libya and Syria in subsequent chapters.

Ferrari, ―Metaphor at work,‖ 606.

Ibid.

Buzan et al., Security, 26.

Ibid., 57.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 30.

Ibid.

Ibid., 31.

107

Assumption 1: Target state is constructed as ―existential threat‖ to international peace and

security. Dissenting discourse within the target state is given wide acceptance

while target state‘s official discourse is marginalized (or dismissed as

propaganda) and discredited internationally.

Assumption 2: Regional and Extra-Regional Players favoring or opposing military intervention

are presented through ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary.

Assumption 3: In post-hegemony the intervener (i.e. the declining hegemon) co-opts

international institutions and relies on ―legitimation discourse‖ for authorization of

force against the target state.

The War Legitimation discourse strategy would be employed to analyze the aforementioned

three assumptions for ‗securitization of threat‘ for military intervention in case studies of Libya

and Syria

2.2.2.3. War Legitimation Discourse

―Legitimacy‖ has already been identified as one of the most important variables as it deals with

―reinvention and legitimization of American superpower identity in the post-Cold War era‖.97

Power in transition in global hierarchy has created a ―crisis of legitimacy‖ for the declining

hegemon. This ―crisis of legitimacy‖ has both internal and external dimensions. In order to

reestablish American superpower identity in times of political crisis, the political discourses of

ruling elites consciously resort to legitimation discourse which is a process through which

legitimacy is acquired and maintained. Van Dijk expresses similar opinion when he states,

―Legitimation may not be necessary in normal course of events and when no

challenges to institutional power or authority are imminent. They become

imperative, however, in moment of crisis, when the legitimacy of the state, an

institution…… is at stake. Legitimation, then becomes part of the strategies of A. Lazar and M.M.Lazar, ―The Discourse of the New World Order: ‗Out-Casting‘ the Double Face of Threat,‖

Discourse & Society 15, issue 2-3 (2004): 225.

108

crisis management, in which in-groups and their institutions need self-legitimation

and out-groups must be delegitimated.‖98

War/intervention legitimation discourse involves developing ―rapport with both domestic and

international audience‖, ―hostility towards the enemy‖, ―postive self-perception and

representation‖ and ―negative other-perception and representation‖. Domestically, ―political

action is equated with societal purpose, and, as a result, short-term and substantive matters of

policy are given broad teleological meaning‖. It in turns provides ruling regime with ―supporting

social conditions for effective policy‖.99

Besides, presence of domestic component means that

enunciated foreign policy has both a national and an international audience, thus creating the

necessary link between the two.

At the system level, through international institutions attempt is made to construct ―existential

threat‖ involving international community. Building consensus at systemic level is very

important as it not only establishes ―legitimacy‖ of the intervener authorizing use of force against

the target state but it conversely establishes ―legitimacy‖ of the system also whose rules and

norms have been shaped by the declining hegemon. Thus perpetuation of the system, its stability

and security is constructed as the principal duty of the most powerful nation on earth, along with

its duty to take timely action against threatening culprits.

To deal with this structured representation of reality, legitimation then functions not only to

identify relevant norms, but also to make apparent a world compatible with action. Martin-Rojo

and Van Dijk thus define legitimation as the act of ―attributing acceptability to social actors,

actions and social relations within the normative order‖, in context of ―controversial actions,

accusations, doubts, critiques or conflict over group relations, domination and leadership‖.100

In a crisis or in the face of an external threat, then this legitimation is accompanied by persuasive

(or manipulative) discourse where extreme actions become not only acceptable but morally

justified and politically defensible too, citing ―present circumstances‖. Hence the legitimation

discourse employing military intervention provides ―good reasons, grounds or acceptable T. A. Van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 256-8.

B. Thomas Trout, ―Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and the Cold War,‖ International Studies Quarterly

19, no. 3 (Sep. 1975): 254.

L. Martin Rojo and T. A. Van Dijk, ―‗There was a Problem, and it was Solved!‘ Legitimating the Expulsion of ‗Illegal‘ Immigrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse,‖ Discourse & Society 8, no.4 (1997): 560-61.

109

motivations for past or present action‖.101

Besides it employs polarizing lexical resources to

constitute ―Us‖ verses ―Them‖, ―Self‖ and ―Other‖ binary. Through representation of past and

pre-empting future, the aforementioned binary then legitimizes use of force; military intervention

is then presented as logically consistent path to be pursued in ―present unusual and extraordinary

circumstances.‖

Securitization of threat and legitimation discourse for war assumes importance because

war/intervention is a social practice that involves justifying to domestic audience, especially in a

democratic society questions such as ―Why?‖ – ―Why should we do this‖ and ―Why should we

do this in this way?‖102

The responsibility/task for presenting case, justifying this dangerous, deadly activity is often

carried out by political leaders. Here President is the most important discursive proponent of a

narrative, whose official and policy addresses provides guidelines to the ruling elite to replicate

same themes and rhetoric in their own narratives depicting present and pre-empting future.

Electronic, print and social media too is co-opted for propagating official narrative while

dissenting opinion within the domestic audience is marginalized as half-backed, uninformed

opinion, not only misleading public but simultaneously forcing them to a chart a dangerous, dark

and unknown future. That‘s why legitimation and threat securitization discourse relies on

political elites. As elaborated by Van Dijk too who acknowledged that they have privileged

access to mass media and the power to reach and influence enormous public audiences.103

Threat securitization and military intervention legitimation discourse hence would be analyzed

through Us/Them binary involving the semantic macro strategies of positive self-presentation

and negative Other-representation as outlined by Van Dijk.104

Us/Them binary is useful as ―Us‖

represents not only Us but ‗friendly‘ nation states too in global and regional hierarchies while

―Them‖ is the broad category that describes not only the ―unfriendly‖ nation states but

―uncivilized and opposing groups‖ too.

Van Dijk, Ideology, 255.

T. Van Leeuwen, ―Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,‖ Discourse and Communication 1, no. 1 (2007): 93.

T. A Van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism (Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 1993). ; Van Dijk, Ideology.

Ibid.

110

―Us/Them polarization is hortatory in that it covertly implies that violent action in

the world is necessary. In fact, by representing an enemy that is completely evil

and ready to strike, the discourse practically necessitates only one course of

action: wipe Them off the face of the planet. In this way Us/Them polarizations is

a key legitimation strategy- an argumentative technique that rhetors employ to

justify violence.‖105

Thus threat securitization and subsequently military intervention legitimation discourse hence

would rely on Us/Them; Self/Other binary

Legitimation by reference to authority (the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of

persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested)106

Legitimation by reference to values (how the moralized lexis is used to differentiate

―our‖ actions [violence] and values from ―their‖ actions [violence] and values; by

reference to discourses of value or value systems, which are not made explicit and

debatable but are only hinted at, by appraisals that ―trigger a moral concept‖107

)

Legitimation through rationalization (by reference to the goals, the uses and the effects of

institutionalized social action)108

Legitimation by reference to temporality (through temporal representation of past and

future, how to legitimize military intervention in present)109

Legitimation by reference to group demarcation (through discourse the rhetors demarcate

Us/Them category-to highlight who are ―with Us‖ and to marginalize and discredit who

are ―with them‖. In this category people who stand in the way of violence are also

deligitimated,; they are frequently described in terms of their connections to or intentions

to connect to other enemies. This is the most sinister form of legitimation, as the mere 105

John Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse: Representing ‗Us‘ and ‗Them‘ in four US presidential addresses,‖ Discourse & Society 22, no. 3 (2011): 289 , doi: 10.1177/0957926510395442.

Van Leeuwen, Legitimation in Discourse and Communication.

Ibid., 97.

Ibid., 91.

P. Cap, Legitimation in Political Discourse: A Cross-disciplinary Perspective on the Modern US War Rhetoric

(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006). ; P. Cap, ―Toward the Proximation Model of the Analysis of Legitimization in Political Discourse,‖ Journal of Pragmatics 40(2008):17-41. ; P. Cap, ―Axiological Aspects of Proximization,‖ Journal of Pragmatics 42(2010):392-407. ; P. Dunmire, ―Preempting the Future: Rhetoric and Ideology of the Future in Political Discourse,‖ Discourse & Society 16, no. 4 (2005): 481-513.

111

implication of a mutual relation between certain agents is used as grounds for violence

against non-aggressors).110

These ―legitimation‖ discourse strategies would be employed for exploring ―threat

securitization‖ in case of Libya and Syria in subsequent chapters.

CONCLUSION

With global hierarchy in transition, emergence of a peer competitor and ―rise of the rest‖, the

most powerful state in the system is no more a hegemon whose material capabilities can directly

be translated into desired outcomes. This is so because others are catching up in different

dimensions of power (economic, cultural, financial, and technological) even though the military

sector still has US preponderance.

The power in transition in the global hierarchy creates incentives for other major powers too,

especially the ones who are dissatisfied with the status quo. These dissatisfied powers resort to

hard-balancing strategies and their assertive foreign policy behaviour is evident in conflictual

regions. With global hierarchy in transition, the regions undergoing transition cannot remain

intact and become a battleground for proxy war for great powers. Such conflict-ridden strategic

regions provide opportunities to dissatisfied global challengers to enhance their standing within

the changing global hierarchy.

These diffused conditions enhance ―legitimacy crisis‖ and the declining hegemon gets trapped

within the very institutions it had erected previously to run the globe in accordance with its

preferred rules and norms. Military intervention in regional hierarchies in such circumstances

relies on ‗threat securitization‘ and ‗legitimation‘ discourse and failure to successful

securitization may further erode hegemon‘s dwindling standing and influence in an already

ambiguous international hierarchy.

Domestic structures and processes play an important role in the formulation of foreign policy in

liberal democracies.111

Hence, the role the political systems and public opinion play has to be

given due consideration before leading an intervention that violates sovereignty of another state.

Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse,‖ 290 and 304.

112

This chapter basically traces change in US military intervention strategy in the post-hegemonic

system. After elaborating how contemporary era has heralded post-hegemonic phase within the

international system it comes up with a military intervention threat securitization model. Rest of

the study will validate the theoretical assertions made within the chapter. Based on the

assumptions made regarding dawn of the post-hegemonic system Chapter 3 will quote academic

and empirical evidence. The drift towards post-hegemony has marginalized US military

interventionist policy. Chapter 4 will, then, explain dynamics of a regional hierarchy in

transition. It is important to see how important regional players are asserting themselves with

less US ability to affect preferable outcomes and increased realization on part of these players

that US no longer is the sole dominant arbiter within the region. Next Chapters on Libya and

Syria then tests the military intervention model for ongoing conflicts and validate the study‘s

hypothesis.

See Thomas Risse-Kappen, ―Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,‖

World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479-512.

113

Chapter 3: Towards Post-Hegemony

The sudden demise of Soviet Union in 1991 along with the disappearance of a biopolar

international order led to enthusiastic proclamations of ―Unipolar moment‖ 1 by advocates of US

primacists. The unprecedented military preparedness and economic prowess with explicit

absence of a peer competitor led credence to the argument that the ―American Century‖2 is not

only well entrenched but capable to last further into the twenty-first century. Thus preserving

―US hegemonic role in a unipolar world‖ became the over-riding grand strategic objective of

every post-Cold War administration from G.H.W. Bush to Barack Obama.3 While Pax

Americana was being hailed by a number of security studies scholars, foreign policy analysts and

policymakers, another heated debate started at about the same time with primary focus on

whether unipolarity can last and/or the maintenance of ―hegemony‖ a wise grand strategy for the

US?

With balance-of-power realists predicting unipolarity to backfire as had repeated bids for

hegemony in past by counterbalancing efforts of other great powers, advocates of ―American

exceptionalism‖ continued to view failure of this hitherto ironclad rule as an exception to

―American primacy‖4. Despite the most forceful and comprehensive defense of uipolar stability,

and durability of American hegemony from Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth in Charles Krauthammer, ―The Unipolar Moment,‖ Foreign Affairs: America and the World 70, no. 1 (1990/91): 23-

The term ‗American Century‘ was for the first time used by Henry Luce, owner and editor of Time magazine, in 1941. Henry Luce, ‗The American Century,‖ Life, 17 February 1941, 61-65.

Christopher Layne, ―The Unipolar Exit: Beyond the Pax Americana,‖ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24, no. 2 (2011): 149, DOI:10.1080/09557571.2011.558491.

For discussion on ‗American primacy‘ and ‗unipolarity‘ in the first decade of the post-Cold War era, see Krauthammer, ―The Unipolar Moment,‖ 23-33. ; Christopher Layne, ―The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise,‖ International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5-51. ; Kenneth N. Waltz, ―The Emerging Structure of International Politics,‖ International Security (Fall 1994): 5-41. ; Zalmay Khalilzad, ―Losing the Moment? The United States and the World after the Cold War,‖ Washington Quarterly 18, no.2 (Spring 1995): 87-

; Michael Mastanduno, ―Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy,‖ International Security 21, no.4 (Spring 1997): 49-88. ; Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American

Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). ; Charles William Maynes, ―The Perils

of (and for) an Imperial America,‖ Foreign Policy 111 (Summer 1998): 36-49. ; Robert Kagan, ―The Benevolent

Empire,‖ Foreign Policy 111 (Summer 1998): 24-35. ; Coral Bell, ―American Ascendency and the Promise of

Concert,‖ The National Interest 57 (Fall 1999): 55-63. ; Samuel P. Huntington, ―The Lonely Superpower,‖ Foreign

Affairs 78, no.2 (March/April 1999): 35-49. ; William C. Wohlforth, ―The Stability of a Unipolar World,‖ International Security 24, no.1 (Summer 1999): 4-41.

114

their 2008 book World Out of Balance, scholars in the opposite camp kept predicting impending

end of Pax Americana. It won‘t be wrong to claim that for every analyst announcing the demise

of America‘s power potential and global leadership, we find an equally compelling American or

Western analysis securing another decade of American preponderance.

Amid all these conflicting views, the argument about US drift towards post-hegemony will

proceed in three main directions, to be covered in three different sections. The first section will

discuss the current academic debate between US ―primacists‖ and ―declinists‖ school, shedding

light on the uncertain times we are surviving and how this ambiguity provides substance to

debate on post-hegemony. This section also discusses key players of the post-hegemonic system

mentioned in pentagonal pyramid (Figure: 2.9, Chapter: 2) and the role they are playing in the

impending power transition.

The next section deals with US-China relations in post-hegemonic phase when the global power

is in transition and the shape of a new international order is far from clear. How far power has

become diffused within this dyad and how far China-US power trajectory could significantly

alter any new power configuration, would also be discussed.

The last section will list the events thought to be instrumental in setting post-hegemony in

motion. It includes three significant events of the contemporary history i.e. global financial

crisis, 2008; Russian belligerence and reassertion in its own backyard; and the Arab Spring.

Viewing these events from post-hegemonic lens would shed further light on global power-in-

transition in the twenty-first century and hence with it the prevailing international order.

3.1: Power Structure of the Post-Cold War International System

Henry Kissinger wrote in 1994 that ―almost as if, according to some natural law, in every century

there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus

to shape the entire international system accordance with its own values‖.5 Twentieth century

bore witness to the application of the statement by blessing US the pre-eminent status, whether

the twenty-first century will also, is a question still being contested in the academic circles. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994), 17.

115

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War has been two most significant events in

the last quarter of the twentieth century that not only brought an end to more than five decades of

intense rivalry between two competing ideological blocks (US/Soviet Union;

Capitalism/Communism) but also led to vast speculations about the future power structure. Some

authors tried to make sense of the post-Cold War period, especially after September 11 as ―post-

post-Cold War‖6, referring the tragic and terrible event as the clear dividing line that made world

different from what it had been hitherto then.7 However, the world had changed in far more

complicated ways then to be made sense of it by just adding another ―post‖ to already existing

―post-Cold War‖ label.

One of the foremost ideas to be floated immediately after the end of the Cold War was that of a

―new world order‖ by G.H.W. Bush on September 11, 1990. The concept manifested that not

only would ―power‖ play a secondary role along with ―state‖ as primary actor but would be

replaced by international organizations and entities as the lead actors. The basic objective behind

this proclamation being that realism and power politics have been replaced with a cooperative

liberal perception of international relations in this new order. Since then the idea has been hailed

through different labels from ―idealpolitik‖8 to ―neo-liberalism‖

9 to ―neo-Wilsonian idealism‖

10

and ―neo-idealist moment‖.11

When scholars like Francis Fukuyama were hailing ―The End of History‖12

back in late 1980s

and celebrating ultimate triumph of market economy and Western liberal democracy as the final

form of human government expecting all states to gravitate towards it for pure self-interest, there

were others like Paul Kennedy who saw a vision of a multipolar world owing to the ―imperial

overstretch‖ of the reigning hegemon and rise of other influential actors like European Union and

6Thomas.L.Friedman, ―The post-post-Cold war,‖ New York Times

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/opinion/10friedman.html Accessed 29 May,2012 R. Cossa , ―Toward a post post-Cold War world,‖ PacNet 41. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0141.pdf. Accessed 29 May,2012; Richard N. Hass, ―Defining US foreign Policy in a post-post-Cold War world,‖ Defence Institute of Security Assistance Management J1-2 (2002): 30-37. Stanely Kober, ―Idealpolitik,‖ Foreign Policy 79 (1990): 3-24.

Joseph Nye, ―Neorealism and neoliberalism,‖ World Politics 2 (1988): 235-251. ; J.M. Grieco, Cooperation among nations: Europe, America, non-tariff barrier to trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

Charles W. Kegley, ―The neo-idealist moment in international realities,‖ International Studies Quarterly 2 (1993): 131-146.

Francis Fukuyama, ―The end of History,‖ National Interest, 1989.

116

Japan13

. How strong this perception was, can be gauged from statements of Paul Tsonga, the late

US Senator from Massachusetts who said, ―The Cold War is over: Japan won‖ at 1992

Democratic Convention.14

Still others like John Mearsheimer in an article in 1990 argued that

international order in post-cold war period would be a reversion from bipolarity to multipolarity.

But his vision was of a far more pessimistic world, a world that cast doubts on optimistic

projections of a peaceful, prosperous future, a world that he arrived at by drawing parallel

between future of great powers and early twentieth century experience of Europe.15

Apart from the two grand ideas being floated immediately in the post-Cold War period, a third

perspective gained importance and they were proponents of the ‗unipolarity‘ school. It stressed

US hegemony16

and expressed admiration for Pax Americana17

. One of the most initial and

clear manifestation of this vision appeared in March 1992 in the leaked draft of Pentagon‘s

Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) for the fiscal years 1994-99, for referring to preserving

unipolarity as its goal which was subsequently altered owing to its very controversial nature and

strong resistance against it. It explicitly stated:

―We must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to

discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the

established political or economic order and that we must maintain the

mechanisms for deterring political competitors for even aspiring to a larger

regional or global role.‖18

The main protagonist of grand idea of unipolarity was Charles Krauthammer, who in a 1990

article ―The Unipolar moment‖ proclaimed an unprecedented era of US dominance that was

expected to last for approximately a decade before giving way to multipolarity.19

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 438-439.

M. Dowd, ―The 1992 Campaign: campaign memo; voters want candidates to take a reality check,‖ New York Times, 1992.

J. Mearsheimer, ―Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold war,‖ International Security 4(1990):5-

Christopher Layne and S. Benjamin, ―American hegemony: without an enemy,‖ Foreign Policy 92 (1993): 5-23.

J. Muravchik, ―At last, Pax Americana,‖ New York Times, 1991.

P. E. Tyler, ―Pentagon imagines new enemies to fight in Post-Cold war era,‖ New York Times, 1992.

Krauthammer, ―The Unipolar Moment.‖

117

Did US have any idea ―what to do with it primacy‖20

was a question put forward by Robert Art,

most agree that in the era after the end of the Cold War, US did not play part of the sole

remaining superpower.21

It found itself in a position that required understanding of the new

prevailing situation.22

Hence, 1990s made the unipolar vision moot23

as neither G.H.W. Bush

nor the first Clinton administration could devise a new foreign policy vision and strategy for

implementing ―the idea of unipolarity‖. Thus, argued L.Gaiser and I. Kovac: ―Consequently, the

power structure of the international system changes from bipolar (in the Cold War) to multipolar

(in the post-Cold War).‖ Further adding, if the Gulf war is accepted as a sign of unipolarity, even

then US did not follow up, missing the historic opportunity to be reduced to a historical moment.

―It was so brief that it lasted a few months in the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity, and

did not have a relevant impact on the changing of the power structure of the international

system….the unipolar moment of the US came to fruition 10 years later.‖24

Though the second Clinton Administration was a bit more assertive and Madeline Albright, the

then United States Secretary of State, for the first time stated publicly ―the indispensible nation‖

title for the US in 199825

but it was the G.W. Bush Administration in 2001 to be credited for a

clear vision and strategy to implement the unipolar moment. Even before the catastrophic event

of September 11, his administration emphasized the military preparedness, great power politics

and concrete national interests to implement their grand vision.26

Bush Junior was determined to

preserve US supremacy27

and Condoleezza Rice article in Foreign Affairs in 2000 made explicit

such an intension.28

Robert Art, ―Defensible defense: America‘s grand strategy after the Cold War,‖ International Security 4 (1991): 5-5.

Condoleezza Rice, ―Promoting National Interest,‖ Foreign Affairs 1 (2000): 45.

Kissinger, Diplomacy, 809.

John Ikenberry, ―America‘s Imperial Ambition,‖ Foreign Affairs 5 (2002) : 50

Laris Gaiser and Igor Kovac, ―From Bipolarity to Bipolarity: International Relations Repeating Again,‖ Journal of Global Policy and Governance 1 (2012): 53, doi:10.1007/s40320-012-0004-1.

Madeline Albright, Transcript: Albright interview on NBC-TV, 1998, accessed August 29, 2012, http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/19/98021907_tpo.html. C. Dueck, “Ideas and alternatives in American grand strategy, 2000-2004,” Rev International Studies 4 (2004):

A. L. Friedberg , “Same old songs, what the declinists (and triumphalists) miss,” The American Interest (2009):30.

Rice, “Promoting National Interest.”

118

Opening of new bases in former Soviet Republics (Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Uzbekistan)29

; withdrawal from ABM (Anti-ballistic Missile)

Treaty; veto on BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) protocol verification; refusing to sign

the Kyoto-Protocol; refusal to ratify the Rome Statue of International Criminal Court were all

early manifestations of the new grand vision which Ikenberry saw nothing less than ―neo-

imperialistic‖.30

This was unabashed vision of American global supremacy and militant

unilateralism. It involved deep distrust of international institutions and multilateralism generally;

emphasis on military ―pre-emptive strikes‖ to defeat terrorism and curb ―rouge states‖; keeping

―weapons of mass destruction‖ out of wrong hands and a putative campaign for creation of new

democratic regimes.31

What intensified the unipolar drive of the Bush Administration after

September 11 was not a significant change in the international structure rather it were the

political decisions that made the world unipolar in 2001, like the political decisions that had

made it multipolar in 1990s.32

The unparalleled political-military-economic preponderance generated equally unprecedented

confidence in Bush Administration, which not only came forward with its own ―Bush doctrine‖33

conceptualized in 2002 in National Security Strategy of the US but also in the 1-4-2-1 strategy of

Pentagon. This strategy visualized a force able to defend US homeland, operate in and from four

forward regions, defeat two regional adversaries swiftly and simultaneously along with the ability to

achieve regime change in one of those regions.34

Such was a pervasive impact of this preponderant

power that not only Kennedy has to retract his statement of the decline of the US owing to ―imperial

overstretch‖ predicted in late 1980s35

but even Krauthammer was compelled to reframe the earlier

―unipolar moment‖ into a ―unipolar era‖.36

Even a noted American journalist W. Pfaff writing in the

The International Herald Tribune stated ―Washington is considering whether it should deliberately

use American political, economic and military M. Paolini, “la NATO dell’esto,” Limes 6 (2004): 123-138.

Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition.”

Yale H. Ferguson, “Illusions of superpower,” Asian Journal of Political Science 11, no.2 (2003): 23, doi:10.1080/02185370308434225.

Gaiser and Kocac, “From Bipolarity to Bipolarity,” 55.

Charles Krauthammer, Democratic realism: an American foreign policy for a unipolar world (Washington: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2004).

M.T. Owens, “A balanced force structure to achieve a liberal world order,” Orbis 2 (2006): 315.

Paul Kennedy, “The Eagles landed,” Financial Times, 2002, accessed August 29, 2013, http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/JohnJudge/linkscopy/EagleLand.html. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar moment revisited,” National Interest 70 (2002): 17.

119

activities to consolidate and expand American global might, making the twenty-first century

even more the American century than was the second half of the twentieth,‖ and reminded us

that ―sun sets on every empire‖.37

The triumphant mood of the Bush administration manifested itself in assertive unilateralism,

especially visible in rapid overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and that too with

substantial international approval, and of Saddam Husain in Iraq. In the later case there was

widespread international opposition and few key NATO allies publicly registered their

disapproval too. These episodes led to apprehensions about the very nature of American power

and words like ―superpower‖, ―hyperpower‖, ―empire‖ and ―hegemon‖ increasingly came to be

associated with US sometimes as acknowledgement of its unprecedented power and at others as

warnings from others; as a sign of growing resentment towards unbridled and overwhelming

power exercised by the lone superpower. It was not until 2008, US had to learn hard way that

military power was not ―the almighty‖ that could solve all challenges.38

The new imperialism which turned into simple militarism and US steadily lost ideological

legitimacy abroad. Michael Mann reflected, ―whereas in the recent past American power was

hegemonic….now it is imposed at the barrel of a gun.‖39

He further stated that though American empire might not yet be over-stretched but ―its stretch is incoherent‖. ―This giant‘s military

might sits uneasily with economic and geopolitical resources that originate in multilateral

arrangement….Its militarism also greatly outstrip its political capacity to rule any conquered

country and contradicts the ideology of freedom and democracy.‖40

This unilateral adventurism generated widespread resentment and dented US ―soft power‖

significantly. At about the same time, we saw that some scholars and analysts were coming round to

another perception. Krauthammer asserted that US was ―past the apogee‖ of its unprecedented

power.41

In spite of having the strongest power and the largest military, US power to get others do

what it wants them to do was constrained and it led Joseph Nye to state that Karen Brutents, “In search of pax Americana,” Russian Politics and Law 37, no. 3 (May-June 1999), 90.

Robert Jervis, “The Compulsive Empire,” Foreign Policy 137 (2003): 82-87.

Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: verso, 2005), 252.

Ibid., 266.

Charles Krauthammer, “Past the apogee: America under pressure,” Keynote address at the Foreign Policy

Research Institute Annual Dinner, accessed October 13, 2013, http://www.fpri-org/enotes/20061213.krauthammer.pastapooge.html.

120

unipolarity is a misleading term as it exaggerates the degree to which US can obtain the results it

requires in different dimensions of world politics.42

Besides Nye also mentioned how some aspects of international system were unipolar while

others multipolar. He made a distinction between ―relative‖ and ―absolute‖ decline; while

―absolute decline‖ is the sense of decay and ―relative decline‖ is one in which the power

resources of other states grow or are used effectively. He refuted that US could decline because

of ―imperial overstretch‖ but because of ―domestic underreach‖. His ―three-dimensional

chessboard‖ concept captures the diffused nature of power, which according to him posed a

greater danger than power transition. In this concept the top chessboard is occupied by military

which is largely unipolar with US likely to retain the position for quite some time. Economic

power occupies the middle chessboard and its been multipolar for more than a decade where

others are gaining in importance besides US, Europe, Japan and China. The bottom chessboard is

the realm of international relations, here power is largely diffused because of non-state actors

and he further asserts that it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity or hegemony

as far as bottom dimension of chessboard is concerned. 43

Friedberg addresses the same problem by differentiating ―power as control over resources‖ with

―power as control over outcomes‖ and further elaborates just because the US has the largest

economy and the most powerful military might does not mean it can get everyone to do

everything it wants all of the time.44

Samuel Huntington has debated concept of unipolarity back

in 1999 when he came forward with one of his own ―uni-multipolarity‖ concept. He said, ―There

is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is unipolar. A unipolar

system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers…. Contemporary international politics……. is a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one

superpower and several major powers.‖45

While there were others who believed that US had been declining since 1970s and US response

to September 11 attacks only accelerated decline. Immanuel Wallerstein remarked, ―The Joseph Nye, The paradox of the American Power: why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 38-39.

Joseph Nye, “The Future of American power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010): 2-12.

Friedberg, “Same old songs.”

Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” 35-36.

121

economic, political, and military factors that contributed to US hegemony are the same factors

that will inexorably produce the coming US decline‖.46

How far damage has been done through

its self-interested unilateral assertiveness can be gauged from the statement that ―the United

States finds itself –a lone superpower that lacks true power, a world leader nobody follows and

few respect, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control‖.47

Wallerstein was not the only one expressing concern about US unilateral exercise of its huge

military might, Kishore Mahbubani also saw blind pursuit of its narrow self-interests which were

costing US a lot. ―The ‗root causes‘ of the problem of American power vis-à-vis the rest of the

world is that this huge edifice of American power is structurally designed to serve only one

purpose: to further American interests‖.48

A realization that was deeply entrenched among academic circles was that US power will readily

exhaust itself and some even saw visions of new world orders. Richard Hass contributed to this

debate by advocating his concept of non-polarity. According to him it is ―a world dominated not

by one or two or even several states but by rather a dozens of actors possessing and exercising

various kinds of power …. a non-polar international system is characterized by numerous centers

with meaningful power.49

Hass asserts that though US is and will remain the largest single aggregation of power but ―the

reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United State‘s position in

the world – and with the relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and

independence‖.50

For him multipolarity might be a generation or two away but power and

influence are even less linked in era of nonpolarity and it will be increasingly difficult for

Washington to lead an occasion, where collective responses to regional and global challenges are

required. For him history, US policy and globalization have brought the inevitable end of the

unipolarity.51

Power and influence are interlinked and this theme is repeatedly invoked by those

who point out declining ability of the US to get desired outcomes and as a sign of its vanishing

Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of America Power: The US in a Chaotic World (New York, London: The New Press, 2003), 13.

Ibid., 17.

Kishore Mahbubani, Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust between America and the World (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 152.

Richard N. Hass, “The age of nonpolarity, what will follow US dominance?,” Foreign Affairs 2008.

Ibid.

Ibid.

122

hegemony. Power shifting sideways from states to markets and non-state actors is an argument

also given by Susan Strange.52

Hass ―age of nonpoloarity‖ thesis wasn‘t the only novel addition to the debate of alternative

world order, Nail Ferguson has already aired his idea of ―apolarity‖ and warned those who were

eagerly looking towards retreat of American hegemony that rather than a multipolar world of

competing great powers, a world that was awaiting them is a world with no hegemon –―apolar‖

world- ―a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would

benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.‖53

Just like Ferguson apolar world, Charles Kupchan contemplates ―no one‘s world‖- ―the twenty-

first century will not be America‘s, China‘s , Asia‘s or anybody else‘s; it will belong to no one.

The emergent international system will be populated by numerous power centers as well as

multiple versions of modernity…...A global order, if it emerges, will be an amalgam of diverse

political cultures and competing conceptions of domestic and international order.‖54

In such a

world the western model will offer only one of many competing conceptions of domestic and

international order.

Amitav Acharya looks beyond the language of hegemony and polarity and gives a vision of a

world order realized through the metaphor of a multiplex cinema- a multiplex being ―a complex

that houses several movie theaters‖. ―In a multiplex world, the making and management of order

is more diversified and decentralized, with the involvement of established and emerging powers,

states, global and regional bodies, and transnational non-state actors‖.55

In such a world the

liberal hegemony story presented by its American proponents is equivalent to one movie at one

time in one theater. Although American show may dominate the box office for a while but

audience may lose interest when faced with more choices.56

A multiplex world is different from

multipolar world that it stresses not the number of powers but the interdependence among them

Susan Strange, The retreat of the state: the diffusion of power in the world economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199), 189.

Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of American Empire (London: Penguin Books, 2005), xxviii.

Charles A. Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, The Rising Rest, and The Coming Global Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3.

Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity press, 2014), 7-8.

Ibid.

123

and it is more decentred than a multipolar world with more scope for local and regional

approaches.57

Another notable figure who contributed to this declinist perspective was Fareed Zakaria with his

―rise of the rest‖ thesis and vision of a ―post-American world‖- a world where except the

politico-military level, power is moving away from American dominance in every other

dimension (industrial, financial, educational, social, cultural). A post-American world is likely to

be different from anything that has preceded it – a world defined and directed from many places

and by many people.58

Rise of alternative centers of power chiefly will bring end to US primacy

is debated by Charles Kupchan who thinks it would actually be because of the ―tiring burdens of

global hegemony‖. Further adding ―what makes America‘s unipolar moment fleeting is the

combination of the rise of other powers and US waning and unilateralist internationalism.‖ 59

He

visualizes a digital era replacing today‘s industrial era and multipolarity replacing unipolarity.60

Amidst all these divergent speculations, there were still others who saw a return of bipolarity

with China replacing Soviet Union of the last bipolar order. As early as 2007, Carlo Pelando

made a very compelling case for a new inevitable bipolar strife between US and China. In his

book Grand Alliance he argued that this new fight would be played for triumph of either

autocratic or democratic capitalism and suggested a grand alliance of US, Europe and Russia to

be forged for democratic capitalism to prevail.61

One thing that had been consistent through all

these speculations had been theme of the US decline. Even the National Intelligence Council

made a prediction about the future trajectory of power, speculating that in 2025 ―the US will

remain the pre-eminent power but the American dominance will be much diminished‖.62

Thomas Wright also believed that unipolarity waned in 2008 and he designates the period from

1990-2008 as a ―post-Cold War Concert of Power‖ that ―rested on US unipolarity and hegemony

as well as the collective willingness (of other major powers) to work within it to varying

Ibid., 9.

Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 4-5.

Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Alfred A. KNOPF, 2003), 29.

Ibid., 334.

Carlo Pelando, Grand Alliance: The global integration of democracies (Milano: Franco Angeli,2007).

Nye, “The Future of American Power,” 2.

124

degrees‖.63

But this concert began to fall apart even before Obama took office as it was ―the

result of fleeting conditions and a fundamental misunderstanding between the Western and non-

Western powers. …Thus when the unipolar moment waned, so too did the Unipolar Concert.‖64

David Shlapak remarked that the unipolar moment has been ―profoundly ahistorical and was

always fated to end.‖65

While ―declinists‖ were forcefully arguing their case, there were others ready to brush aside

these arguments and stress on US ability to reinvigorate its waning hegemony and primacy.

Confident about the resilience of American system and society and they believe that

prognostications of American decline are nothing new. Back in 1980s this debate had raged

between scholars in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) especially when Robert

Keohane talked about a period ―after hegemony‖;66

Robert Gilpin referred to ―intensified

mercantile competition‖ because of decline of US hegemony67

and David Calleo raised the

question for policy makers how to grapple with US power in decline.68

Others however

dissented at that time too. Notable among them were Susan Strange and Stephen Gill. Strange

wrote about the myth of the hegemonic decline, insisting that many contributors to literature

have chosen indicators which are either irrelevant or imprecise69

; while Gill broke away from

theory of US decline by presenting his neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony, which

according to him was not simply a physical capability such as military might and economic

weight but as ―intellectual and moral leadership‖70

.

Thomas Wright, “The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar concert,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2014): 9-10, doi:10.1080/0163660x.2014.1002150.

Ibid., 21.

David A. Shlapak, “Towards a more modest American strategy,” Survival 57, no. 2 (2015): 60 doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1026068.

R. Keohane, After hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987),

David Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: basic Books, 1987).

Susan Strange, “The persistent myth of lost hegemony,” International Organization 41, no. 4 (1987): 554.

Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990),

125

Some of these authors prefer to use anemic words like global ―leadership‖71

while others go for

the inoffensive terms like ―primacy‖72

. Still there are others who unabashedly use the term

―hegemony‖73

. Brooks and Wohlforth had been the most ardent champions of US unipolarity

and its durability. They claimed ―If today‘s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity,

then nothing ever will….. There has never been a system of sovereign states that contained one

state with this degree of dominance.‖74

While Mandelbaum went a step further and claimed,

―The United States is no longer a mere superpower; it has ascended to the status of a

‗hyperpower‘‖,75

though he nonetheless cautioned that US might not be able to sustain the

burdens of global leadership.

―Empire‖ was another term being used to encompass the extent and the vastness of US power.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri asserted that that what we are dealing with, is in fact an

―Empire‖, that is ―a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or really that rules

over the entire ‗civilized world‘‖ and in which ―United States does indeed occupy a privileged

position‖.76

While the role of restructuring unipolar world by arrogating to itself ―the global role

of setting standards, determining threats, using force and meting out justice‖ was US

―neoimperial vision‖ in eyes of Ikenberry.77

This overwhelming power was being acknowledged from every nook and corner. The Economist

described an American world where ―the United States bestrides the globe like a colossus. It

dominates business, commerce and communications; its economy is the world‘s most successful,

its military second to none.‖78

While two American triumphalists put it, ―Today‘s international

system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony‖.79

Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets (New York: 2002), 88.

Ferguson, Colossus, 8.

Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: 2003), 88. ; Kupchan, End of the American era, 266.

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 21 and 23.

Michael Mandelbaum, “The inadequacy of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (September / October 2002), 61.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 2000).

Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” 44.

“America’s world,” The Economist, October 23, 1999, 15.

Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Present Danger,” The National Interest, Spring 2000.

126

Another addition to the debate is Nye latest book with the tilte Is the American Century Over?

For him the American Century began when US economy represented nearly half of the share of

the world economy in the post-war period and dated it from 1945-70. Though the abnormal share

returned to the normal - of roughly a quarter of the world economy to its pre-war portion but it

led widely to perceptions of American decline. Nye remarks: ―the American Century roughly

coincides with the twentieth century, reaching its peak in the mid century, and it will end in the

next decade or so when analysts expect China to pass the United States as the world‘s largest

economy.‖80

As far as ―purchasing power parity‖ unit is concerned China has already passed US

in gross domestic product while if the economy is measured through exchange rate of currencies

then it may take a decade for China to beat US.81

Nye asserts that China overtaking US in economic size will not automatically mark end of the

American Century. He defines power as ―the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one

wants and there are three ways to do that: by coercion (sticks); by payments (carrots); and by

attraction or persuasion‖.82

Relying only on economic size to define American Century would be

misleading. Instead it should also take into account the resources which are used to affect global

balance of power.83

However, downgrading role of economy would also be tantamount to

distorting the entire picture and it would not be an exaggeration to say that it was the economy as

the single largest indicator that brought the mighty Soviet Union to its knees, more than any

other factor.

The list of scholars celebrating US unipolar durability and sustainability is just as long as those

speculating its exit and announcing end of Pax Americana. The debate hitherto has been

inconclusive and it is expected to go on till a clear new hierarchy of power is apparent. One

argument which has been established beyond doubt is the gradual shift of power from one centre

of power to an unknown and uncharted territory. It seems too early to speculate what it will be.

Will it be an age of ―nonpolarity‖, ―apolarity‖, a ―multiplex world‖ or will it be ―no one‘s world‖

or simply the familiar ―multipolar‖ or ―bipolar‖ international order, is too early to

Joseph Nye, Jr., Is The American Century Over? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 3.

Ibid., 3

Ibid.

Ibid., 4.

127

speculate. What, however, is written on the wall that China is emerging fast and it is set to make

its presence felt and go for its rightful place which its growing power has entitled to it.

Henry Kissinger saw scope for ―so dominant an America‖ shrinking in 2010 because of three

successive wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and because of economic conditions which

will inevitably bring about pressure on military budgets, constraining the scope for intervention

and imposing the need for establishing priorities.84

Similarly those who for long have been hailing explicit absence of counterbalancing and

revisionist behavior of other major powers can see the return of both through Russia and China.

Russia‘s coercive diplomacy and military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia had

been useful in checking and preventing further expansion of EU and NATO in Russian ―near

abroad‖. Besides it has also launched countless provocations against Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania,

Sweden, Finland and Denmark by intruding into their air and maritime space. Such provocations

cannot be brushed aside without labeling them as hard-balancing by a resurgent Russia.

While China‘s revisionism through its belligerent activities can be seen in both East and South

China Sea, in its military build-up, especially with asymmetric weapons to blunt US power

projection capabilities.85

This was a clear departure from the hitherto prevalent practices. The

US power has been so dominant in all these years that other states either bandwagoned with it or

forged closer and deeper relations either through establishing alliances or partnerships.

Sometimes they tried to bind US to international institutions to gain maximum in an era of

overwhelming and unparallel power. At other occasions they tried to build roadblocks either by

delegitimizing it in the court of public opinion or by using international law to increase costs of

unilateral action for US. But there never had been formal efforts to counter-balancing which has

so far been a normal response to a state seeking hegemony in the international system. How far

can these moves are designated as a shift towards post-hegemony will be discussed in next

sections.

China and Russia are not the only states vying for their place in the emerging configuration of

powers. States like India and Brazil has also been hailed as new members of this powerful circle

Henry A. Kissinger, ―Power Shifts,‖ Survival 52, no.6 (2010): 209, doi:10.1080/00396338.2010.540792.

Thomas Wright, ―The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Concert,‖ 7-8.

128

and they are actively seeking to establish themselves as great powers with their own ―area of

influence‖ and interests. Besides these new emerging power centers, European Union and Japan

have increasing realization of changing international environment. Though still firmly allied with

the US, they are nervously watching as US is gradually losing its hegemony and with it the

power to shape ―desired outcomes‖.

3.1.1. EUROPEAN UNION

Any traditional speculation that EU is a contender to end US hegemony starts with quoting its

impressive economic indicators and ends with problems confronting its integration. It usually

begins with how before ―Brexit‖86

and acting as entity, its economy was the largest in the world

and until 2010 Greece fiscal crisis, the euro was the strongest candidate to replace dollar as the

world‘s primary reserve currency. On the downside, EU faces significant limitations on the

degree of its unity. The biggest challenge confronting Europe at the moment is: Will it have

enough political and social-cultural coherence to act as a single entity on a wide range of

international issues or will it remain a grouping of countries whose individual cultures,

nationalisms and foreign policies dominate their European identity even though when it has

substantial influence in WTO and able to balance power on equal terms?87

These questions though not less important but their reply usually rests on quoting facts and

figures to either support or refute the argument. Conclusion based on these arguments may

rightfully state that while Europe is in flux but its power is never going to surpass US. Besides

they are likely to remain allied to each other or even a neutral EU would reinforce US rather than

acting as its peer competitor. The possibility of an EU emerging as traditional balancer to US is

very low, though political frictions might exist. But it would not be the EU that can bring an end

to the US primacy or the ―American Century‖ as usually referred.88

However, post-hegemony is

not about who can and who will replace US hegemony; it is about whether US position among

its traditional allies and supporters be sustained; and/or how far traditional allies interests have

become divergent from each other.

June 23, 2016 British citizens voted to exit the European Union in a referendum.

Joseph Nye, ―Is The American Century Over?,‖ 25.

Ibid., 24-28.

129

Europeans which have been accustomed to believing since Greek and Roman times that their

continent possessed an inherent geo-strategic value that automatically placed them at the centre

of the world politics, are in for a rude shock as twenty-first century introduced new major players

on the international chessboard. As Alan Mendoza aptly remarked: ―The proud continent that

once bestrode world affairs, will be reduced to interval gazing and even greater irrelevance on a

global stage, increasingly dominated by new superpowers and great powers which often will not

share its values or strategic priorities.‖89

The rising powers of the world, most notably China and India are not Europe-based or focused

on Europe, with the partial exception of Russia. Europe is no longer the world‘s strategic pivot

and to remain relevant in a changing world, it cannot solely rely on its strategic importance but

instead have to count on its contribution to global power projection and to Western security

strategy.90

Even the Americans which throughout the Cold War have shouldered more than their

fair share of the Western military expenditures on the grounds that US security was inherently

tied to European security in relation to Soviet Union have slowly begun to question the value of

this transatlantic relationship.

The more recent insensitive remarks from a Republican candidate Donald J. Trump, on the eve

of acceptance of his nomination for President, rattled US NATO allies. In a clear departure from

pre-established principles, he explicitly raised new questions about his commitment to

automatically defending NATO allies as per Article 5 of the charter, especially the small Baltic

States, if they were attacked by Russia, saying he would decide whether to come to their aid only

after reviewing if those nations have ―fulfilled their obligations to us.‖91

Europe too is undergoing its own transition since the time of Bush junior and being riddled with

its own intra-European debate between Euro-Atlanticists who advocates EU to strengthen itself

as a meaningful partner to US and Euro-Gaullists who see EU as a counterweight to US. ―In the

former view, the EU has a distinct interest in reinforcing the dominant Western pole, while

making it multilaterally oriented and managed; in the later, Europe has a distinct interest in Alan Mendoza, ―European defence in the long run: Can Europe play a leading role in a multipolar world?,‖

European view 9 (2010):233 DOI: 10.1007/s12290-010-0137-z. Ibid., 235.

David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, ―Donald Trump Sets Conditions for Defending NATO Allies Against Attack,” New York Times, July 20, 2016.

130

favoring the transition from unipolarity-that is, American hegemony- to multipolarity.‖

According to the later view EU would evolve itself as a ―new, autonomous pole in the

international system, sometimes supportive of America, sometimes not.‖92

The first Atlantic crisis of 2003 though apparently set off by specific differences over Iraq but

actually revealed that international conditions that made traditional Atlanticism possible had

collapsed. The assumption in Washington that Europe in any case would follow was challenged

by France and Germany. Besides, being no longer the nexus of world politics and after the loss

of pre-eminence in US foreign policy concerns which rests on fact that in post-1989 and post-11

September world the significant threats to US come from beyond the Europe. This is also evident

in US reaction to recent crisis of Georgia and Ukraine. Owing to its over-extended commitments

in other theatres, US response to these crises is a marked contrast with Russian commitment to

draw a clear ―sphere of influence‖ in the region.

Nothing reveals Russian designs to assert itself, more than its ambitious projection of its role in

Eastern Europe. While ―expansion fatigue‖ is evident within EU and NATO and whatever took

post-Cold War expansion of EU to 27 in 2007 and of NATO to 28 states in 2009, have stopped at

the borders of the Eastern Europe. US minimal interest in the region is marked contrast with

Russian war in Georgia in 2008. Even NATO Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and

Georgia discussed in 2008 now seem dead in water. For EU its ―soft‖ southern frontier after

Greece near-default seems a more urgent issue than eastern expansion.93

East Europeans are still frightened by Russian ambitions, especially after annexation of Crimea

and Ukraine crisis; prefer the traditional NATO to continue indefinitely while the rest of the

Europeans resist any American connection that leaves them into hostile relationship with

Russians. What is increasingly becoming evident is the competing as well as common interests

of EU and US towards Russia and the Islamic world. Same is the case with China which is vital

to both US and EU but their policies might not be compatible and both are ―competing to fill the

role of China‘s principal Western partner. In short, even a strong EU would not necessarily

Marta Dassu and Roberto Menotti, ―Europe and America in the Age of Bush,‖ Survival 47, no. 1 (2005): 107 DOI: 10:1080/00396330500061786.

Andrew Wilson, “Eastern Europe’s balancing Act,” Current History 109, no. 729 (Oct 2010): 295.

131

always share the same perspectives and interests as a strong United States. Thus it seems far

from certain that a close transatlantic alliance must endure.‖94

In short, in a transition towards post-hegemony, instead of analyzing indicators which place

Europe at par with US and how EU overtaking US can bring an end to US hegemony or replace

it with one of its own; emphasis should be on how far EU has developed complementing or

divergent priorities with US and whether their approach towards key international developments

reflect a departure from Cold-War and post-Cold War era.

A recent analysis show that though EU still sits comfortably in US camp but changing

environment in global and regional hierarchies is forcing both to reassess their interests and

reposition their responses to particular issues. Such ambiguity will lead to not so familiar paths.

At times staunch US allies would not be able to offer the kind of support to US, rendered in the

past as evident from UK parliament rejection of intervention in Syria in August 2013; at other

times, Europe won‘t be US priority as recent Eastern European crisis is reflecting but one thing

is certain old, traditional blocks are being fractured and how far transatlantic alliance can endure

this, only time will tell.

3.1.2. JAPAN

How linear projections based on rapidly rising economic rates can be misleading at times is

exemplified through US-Japan comparisons. Almost three decades ago, US feared of being

overtaken by Japan when its per capita income surpassed that of US. Now with highly

sophisticated industry, third largest economy and the most modern military in Asia, it still enjoys

a status far above others but nowhere in comparison to either US or China. Japan‘s economy was

38% larger than China in 1995 and now China‘s is 295% larger than Japan. Its economy is the

same size today as it was in 1993 while China‘s economy has grown twenty fold over the same

period.

No doubt Japan has considerably been reduced in stature in the post-Cold war emerging scenario

contrary to previous predictions, but it would be equally wrong to agree with the judgment of

Michael J. Green who believes that the end of the Cold War appears to have turned Japan- that David P. Calleo, “Europe and America in a New Century,” Survival 55, no 5 (2013): 219, DOI: 10:1080/00396338.2013841822.

132

almost two decades ago was hailed as the most obvious newcomer in the emerging post-Soviet

power structure - into an economic afterthought and a geopolitical footnote compared to its

bigger neighbours in Asia.95

China‘s neighbours in the Asia-pacific are apprehensive about an illiberal China gaining

ascendance and are searching for ways to constrain it. These changing dynamics have compelled

Japan to reinvigorate its ties with the fellow Asian countries. India in the equation occupies a

peculiar place and the changed circumstances have allowed both to diversify the bilateral

relationship from previously purely economic-based partnership that focused on aid, trade and

investment. The restructuring in the East-Asian security environment in the post-Cold war era

has forced Japan to purse a policy of ―cooperative approach to regional security‖.96

India and

Japan ―Joint Security Declaration‖ signed in October 2008 in good part is attestation that both

are worried about China‘s growing power.97

In these changing circumstances even Sino-Japanese relations would have lasting impact on the

emerging post-hegemonic international order. While interweaving their economies even more

closely both sides at the same time remain poisoned by history and a small insensitive gesture

reignite the bitter old memories, for example, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe‘s December 26, 2013

visit to Yosukuni Shrine caused much resentment in the neighbouring circles. Political leadership

on both sides has failed to address the problem so far, which conversely has been worsened by

rifts that remain deeper, wider and harder to resolve.

These irreconcilable differences over history interpretation have been the main hurdle in closer

Sino-Japanese relationship and remain one of the main reasons for still bad bilateral relationship.

Barry Buzan interprets this as ―an enormous gift to the United States, for which ‗China threat‘

advocates in the Washington are profoundly grateful.‖ The fact that Japan feels threatened by

China, not only underpins US-Japan alliance but also the legitimacy of the whole US military

Michael J. Green, ―Japan‘s Confused Revolution,‖ The Washington Quarterly 33, no.1 (January 2010): 3-19. ; Fred Hiatt, ―Does Japan Still Matter?‖ The Washington Post, December 11, 2009.

Reinhard Drifte, Japan‟s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: From Economic Super Power to What Power? (London: Macmillan, 1996), 50.

97For details see David Browster, ―The India-Japan Security Relationship: An Enduring Security Partnership,‖ Asian

Security 6, no.2 (2010): 95-120.

133

and political position in the Northeast Asia. Buzan then concludes: ―It leaves the US as the

ringleader between China and Japan……with no interest in seeing their relationship improve.‖98

The easiest route to superpower status is to be free of regional entanglements. The bad

relationship with Japan is the outstanding contradiction that China is rising ―peacefully‖ within

the region, also casts doubt on the rhetoric of ―peaceful rise/ development‖ so earnestly

propagated through Chinese official discourse. With the post-hegemonic shift in progress Japan

occupies a pivotal position not just in the regional but also in the global calculus, especially for

US. If China could improve its relations with Japan, it could weaken US position in East-Asia

and in the long run globally.

An effort to balance power relations with Japan and India would keep Beijing confined to Asian

sphere besides putting a question mark on her legitimacy to lead the region. Legitimacy of their

leadership role is the hallmark of their superpower status and ―by allowing its relationships with

Japan to fester, China strengthens the US position in East-Asia, undermines its prospects for

peaceful rise in its region, compromises its role in international society, and weakens its bid for

global power status.‖99

Besides consensual regional order where power is mediated by

international institutions is more in keeping with the style of contemporary great powers.

While China is struggling to deepen its political standing in the region, US enjoy an edge. Japan

is a long-standing US ally, tied to it through a network of security arrangements in the wake of

its defeat from allies in World War II. But the end of the Cold War combined with intense

economic rivalry between the two, was predicted to lead to a weakening of the security-based

alliance100

but they revamped their ties through 2005 security alliance in a manner that the two

are even more closely allied on a range of issues.101

Rather than shake off the restraints left from

the legacy of WWII and emerging as a power in its own right, Japan has actively sought to forge

closer security ties with Washington. Barry Buzan, ―China in International Society: Is ‗Peaceful Rise‘ Possible?,‖ The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 26-27, DOI: 10.1093/ cjip/pop014.

Ibid., 28.

Richard Betts, ―Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,‖ International Security 18, no.3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77. ; Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, ―The Coming Conflict with America,‖ Foreign Affairs 76, no.2 (March/April1997):18-32.

Yoichi Funabashi, ―Keeping up with Asia: America and the New Balance of Power,‖ Foreign Affairs 87, no.5 (September/October 2008), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-09-01/keeping-asia.

134

The period between 2001-09 has also been referred as the high point in the bilateral relation.

Japan has been designated as the ―Britain of the Far East‖ implying the ―special relationship‖ it

enjoyed was at par with the one existing between the United Kingdom and the United States.102

David Scott notes, ―US presence, power and pre-eminence in the Western Pacific is further

buttressed by its external balancing carried out with a range of other Asia-Pacific states who are

concerned about China‘s rise, and who encircle China.‖103

The US-Japan-Australia Trilateral

Strategic Dialogue (TSD) carried out since 2007 and US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral

mechanism initiated since 2010 are respectively south and north anchors in the Pacific for the US

to forestall and deter China.104

China is a major trade partner for all the states in the region, including Japan, and Tokyo wants

to enmesh China in a web of ties that will ensure Japanese security but it nonetheless, wants to

avoid a China-dominated regional system and is greatly concerned about Beijing‘s propensity to

use its increased naval power in the region.105

The assertive Chinese stance over the territorial

control of the potentially oil-rich areas of the South China Sea has prompted Japan to explicitly

factor China into their justifications for a more proactive Japanese military posture.106

A former deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg emphasized that the United States needs to

help Japan become ―a more normal Japan‖.107

A militarily-revitalized Japan is eminently

desirable not only to reduce the influence of China but also to control the erratic and irrational

North Korea. Besides the dangers posed by Pyongyang nuclear program, the overshadowed but

102

Kosuke Takahashi, ―Japan to Become ‗Britain of the Far East,‖ Asia Times, February 25, 2005. ; Mike Mochizuki and Michael O‘Hanlon, ―A Liberal Vision for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,‖ Survival 40, no.2 (Summer 1998): 127-34. David Scott, ―US Strategy in the Pacific-Geopolitical Positioning for the Twenty-first Century,‖ Geopolitics 17, no. 3 (2012): 623, Doi: 10.1080/14650045.2011.631200.

Y. Wang, ―Basic Features and Problems in Central Asia-Pacific Situation,‖ Foreign Affairs Journal 86 (Winter

2007), (Chinese‘s People Institute of Foreign Affairs), available at http://cpifa.org/en/q/listQurterlyArticle.do?articleId=1147. Yoichi Funabashi, ―New Geopolitics Ranges over Various Parts of Asia,‖ Asahi Shimbun, January 15, 2002. ; Michael Green, ―Managing Chinese Power: The View from Japan,‖ in Engaging China, ed., Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), 170-72.

John Hemmings, ―China‘s Rise= Remilitarizing Japan?‖ Diplomat, January 21, 2011.

Quoted in Bruce W. Jentleson, ―Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21st

Century National Security

Strategy,‖ The Washington Quarterly 37, no.1 (Spring 2014): 125.

135

long-standing territorial issue with Russia has also fostered US-Japan security alliance in the

post-2001 period.108

As per Japan becoming a peer competitor to US, either militarily or economically is very low.

With a population roughly to the size of California and with ethnocentric attitude and policies, it

is unlikely to gain the status that US enjoys today. Though Japan can develop its nuclear capacity

rapidly if its alliance with US enters into difficulties but even then it would be far from a peer

competitor. A troubled past makes alliance with China unlikely and current East-China Sea

disputes also predict Japan seeking an American support to preserving its independence from

China rather than bandwagoning with it against the former.109

Japan‘s place in Asia relative to

its larger neighbours would depend on whether it wants to remain tied to the West as a reliable

member of a Western axis of stability or is it prepared to seek greater integration within the

region in flux that favours a revisionist China more than the distinct declining hegemon.

3.1.3. INDIA

India with a population of around 1.2 billion people, economic progress, significant military

power resources, established democracy and vibrant popular culture with transnational appeal

and influence is being hailed as yet another major power along with other ―emerging‖ nations.

This significant power potential has emboldened many Indians to predict a tripolar world by mid

century with China, US and India as leading poles. But with a third of its population-i.e. less than

a billion people in acute poverty, hundreds of millions of illiterate citizens and with a per capita

income that is half of China and a fifteenth of US, India still has a long way to go.110

India has scored some gains; the most striking among them is a drop in the poverty rate but the

dismal quality-of–life statistics make predictions of India‘s rise as a global power sound hollow.111

The impressive recovery from the great recession of 2008-2010 has confirmed India‘s

108

Shigekri Hakamada, ―Nature of Russian State and Japan‘s Strategy Towards Russia‖ (The 30th

Policy Recommendations of the Japan Forum on International Relations, February 2008). ; Robert Scalapino, ―In Search of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding the Korean Peninsula-Challenges and Opportunities,‖ American Foreign Policy Interests 28, no.2 (October 2006): 367-78. ―Nye, Is American Century Over?,‖ 28-32.

Ibid., 38-41.

These figures are quoted at length in Rajan Menon, ―Asia‘s Looming Power Shift,‖ The Nationao be decisivl Interest 127 (September/ October 2013): 26-27.

136

economic resilience but it still has daunting problems in its path towards great power status. One

aspect of India-on-the-march narrative quotes Indian efforts to seek military modernization and

become a global military power. In spite of entertaining such global ambitions, its reach remains

pretty much regional- and will remain so for years to come.

Besides active Naxalite Maoist insurgency in one-third of the country, increasingly restless

Indian Held Kashmir and Sikh separatist movements are exacerbating already potent differences

of caste, class, language, religion and political ideology, and once celebrated heterogeneity is

increasingly coming under strain. It would not be wrong to claim that its ethnic and linguistic

diversity, once designed to manage country‘s fundamental heterogeneity, now feeds areas

marginalized by uneven economic growth.112

All the daunting problems aside, India is still on a

firm path towards attaining a great power status and the post-hegemonic shift offers peculiar

opportunities to realize her dream.

India is uniquely poised between the U.S. and China in their bid to shape the current post-

hegemonic shift in the international order. Delhi‘s long-standing democratic credentials make her

a natural ally of the secular and liberal values championed by the West while her desire to crave

a special place for herself, commensurate with her contemporary standing, makes her share

resentment with China toward the international system and places her in a bid to rewrite the rules

favouring the ―emerging‖ South wherever possible.

Reversing her long-standing non-aligned tradition India, on the one hand, is actively seeking

strengthened bilateral relations with US which had waxed and waned throughout history but

since the advent of the twenty-first century the bilateral relations has edged toward closer

strategic cooperation. On the other hand, ―the epochal shifts associated with the transition added

an additional rationale for better Chinese relations with India: strengthening China‘s position in

the face of US ‗unipolar‘ pressure and interference.‖113

The support for a multilateral system

drives the two otherwise incompatible giants together. As analyst John Graver wrote, ―Neither

Amy Kazim, ―States of Desire,‖ Financial Times, April 20,2010.

John Graver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 216-7.

137

China nor India liked the fact of unipolarity. Both resented it and felt it was unjust both in terms

of its origins and its consequences.‖114

Though India‘s approach towards US is chiefly guided by her concerns with an increasingly

assertive China right in her backyard but it is not hostage to it. Besides both countries

acknowledge the military threats posed from non-proliferation and terrorism along with sharing a

joint interest in dealing with the conflicts and rivalries in Asia, the threats to oil and gas supplies

from the Gulf, and more generally to Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). 1999-2000 saw a

major shift in the Clinton administration‘s vision of India. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe

Talbott claimed in 1999 that while ―America and India should be natural partners, but all-too-

often, history, circumstance and incompatibilities of perspective seemed to have kept us from

being so. This is a reality. But it is not necessarily a permanent one or an immutable one.‖115

The change in thinking vis-à-vis India continued in the Bush administration and Delhi voted in

favour of US-backed interim government in Iraq in 2004 after its initial opposition to the

invasion. Besides the strategic partnership meant increased arms purchases from the US along

with joint India-US military exercises.116

Even the contentious issues like CTBT would not

hamper the deepening US-India engagement. The most publicized outcome of these burgeoning

bilateral relations was the nuclear deal first signed in 2005 and eventually passed by the both

governments in 2008. The deal ended three decades of US moratorium on nuclear trade

agreements with India.117

At the heart of the deal lied symbolism that squarely placed India in

the camp of legitimate nuclear powers even though not being a party to the ―non-proliferation

treaty‖. Parshad notes, ―it was rather, as a political matter: an India anointed as a legitimate

nuclear power.‖118

K. P. Vijayalakshmi commenting on the significant shift in Indo-US relations

notes:

Ibid., 353.

Quoted in K. P. Vijayalakshmi, ―American Worldview and Its Implications for India,‖ South Asian Survey 15, no.2 (2008): 206.

James Parisot, ―American Power, East Asian Regionalism and Emerging Powers: in or against empire?,‖ Third World Quarterly 34, no.7 (2013): 1198, Doi: 10.1080/01436597.2013.824655. (biblo 1159-1174)

J. Bajoria and E. Pan, ―The US India Nuclear Deal,‖ Council on Foreign Relations, 2010, accessed on March 12, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663. V. Prashad, ―Quid pro quo? The question of India‘s subordination to the ‗American narrative,‘‖ Monthly Review 63, no.5 (2011): 84.

138

―India was now being perceived as an important player on the world stage, on the

assumption that it would play a more active role accompanied by commensurate

expansion of responsibility for reinforcing security and stability in the Middle

East, the Indian Ocean region, Central Asia and even for the international system

as a whole. Perception of India as a rising global power with a rapidly growing

economy signified the comprehensive shift in the image of India.‖119

From the power transition perspective, India assumes significant importance within the emerging

global scenario. India is too big a player to be confined within either the US or the Chinese

camps, should a bipolar international order replaces the current unipolar world. India though

definitely interested in balancing China but ―not alienating China and making it an enemy due to

an over-zealous US ―containment‖ strategy.120

It for sure is an unlikely challenger to US even

after half of the twenty-first century is through, but Sino-Indian collaboration though highly

unlikely has such potential.

Simon Serfaty, on the other hand, paints a scenario where both India and China are more

interested in their relations with the United States and Europe than with each other. This is

because neither ―holds a ‗card‘ that it can play with the other, or even with others, against the

West.‖121

Thus it would be appropriate to assert that there is no ―Chindia‖ in sight even though

India and China had been seen collaborating over trade negotiations and UN-sponsored climate

change negotiations.122

However, Delhi‘s long term security anxiety is clearly China which has forced India to seek

greater economic cooperation with the Southeast Asian nations. Even Indian analyst Anindya

Batabyal acknowledges that the growing Chinese economic and military influence in Asia

clearly appears to be decisive strategy in moulding India‘s ―Look East‖ strategy.123

The power

gap between India and China is still heavily tilted in favour of China. Rajan Menon remarks ―if

China‘s successes routinely make headlines, it is India‘s failures that get attention. While the

Vijayalakshmi, ―American Worldview,‖ 210.

Michael Kraig, ―India as a Nuclear-Capable Rising Power in a Multipolar and Non-Polar World,‖ Strategic Analysis 33, no.3 (May 2009): 367.

Simon Serfaty, ―Moving into a Post-Western World,‖ The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011): 16.

Ibid.

Anindya Batabyal, ―Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India‘s Look East Strategy,‖ China Report 42, no.2 (2006): 79-197.

139

acceleration of India‘s economic growth … (has) received coverage, enumerations of India‘s

failings, especially relative to China, are more common, and there are many of them.‖124

Michael Kraig aptly sums up Indian delicate balancing game in both the economic and security

spheres on extra-regional and even global basis through constant efforts to find ―the middle

ground between ideologies and values (Arab, Persian, Israeli, United States, Western, Asian etc.)

and between developed and developing countries, as well as between a complex fabric of

economic import/export preferences across a non-monolithic developing South.‖ Finally

concluding, ―India is not a 100 per cent „friend‟ or „ally‟ of anyone‖125

(italics in original text).

India still lacks the political, economic and ideological freedom to alienate any one bloc or

coalition of actors in the global system despite having substantial defense and economic growth

in recent years, prompting Kraig to declare India has ―a de facto global stance of „no

enemies‘‖126

(italics in original text).

The question is whether India‘s region will remain confined to South Asia or as its capabilities

increase over time, the region will also expand to include a large part of the Asia-Pacific. Where

India has failed to present a feasible regional vision and invest in it, China has built strong

political and economic links with all of India‘s neighbours in South Asia. The net result has been

to tie down India within a regional framework, something that is detrimental to India‘s interests

and ambitions. India is looking for ―extended neighbourhood‖ that includes Central and

Southeast Asia after its lack of progress in SAARC.

As New Delhi searches for a place in the post-hegemonic system that places it squarely at par

with US and China, rather than in one or another camp between any two powers against the

other. India‘ relations with both US and China will remain complicated by its economic interests;

and competition for non-renewable resources and key metals intensified owing to the ever-

increasing population. New Delhi will keep its relations with both ―sectoral‖ in nature, making if

there are alliances, resource by resource and issue by issue, rather than an overall alliance against

the other. India is unlikely to swap American global hegemony with Chinese continental

hegemony. At the same time none of them would be in a position to automatically count her in Menon, ―Asia‘s Looming Power Shift,‖ 26.

Kraig, ―India as a Nuclear-Capable Rising Power,‖ 367.

Ibid., 368.

140

their club. India is desperate for a great power status and its future actions will prove whether its

fit to be one.

3.1.4. BRAZIL

Rising powers are coming into focus as world enters a period of increasing challenges to waning

US hegemony. Brazil with its significant economic and cultural potential is another power that

recently got attention for its ambitions to carve a large global leadership posture for itself along

with other continent-sized nations and democracies.

Being a home to the world‘s fifth largest landmass that makes its territory thrice the size of India,

the seventh largest economy, 90 percent literate citizens, the world class banking and financial

sector, the third largest stock exchange in the world and one of the top producers of the stuff

from animals, vegetables, minerals to water, energy and airplanes; it has been successful to

recast itself as a global brand and a global power.

2007 massive oil reserves discovery has made it a significant player in the energy sector too.

Besides being without a regional competitor to hold her ambitions back, Brasilia enjoys peculiar

soft power too. Its popular culture of carnival and football has transnational appeal. Chosen to

host the 2014 World Soccer Cup tournament and the 2016 Summer Olympics was perceived to

be an acknowledgement of the nation‘s long anticipated and generally celebrated emergence onto

the world stage.

With all these impressive indicators, it possesses few equally disturbing challenges too. That

includes its inadequate infrastructure, glaring underinvestment in capital and innovation,

overburdened legal system which is notoriously inefficient and costly, high crime rate, rampant

corruption and near absence of the state from the lives of millions of Brazilian citizens with

almost 26 percent of its population still living in slums.

Compounding this alarming situation is that its ―gross domestic product was on track to shrink

by more than 3 percent in 2015, and looks set to repeat this dismal performance again in 2016,

even as inflation running above 10% and the deterioration of government finances hamper an

effective policy response to the recession.‖127

This is a marked contrast with the very recent Mathew M. Taylor, ―Brazil in the Crucible of Crisis,‖ Current History 115, no. 778 (Feb 2016): 68.

141

years when its economy was on a roll, never falling into recession even in the depths of the 2008

global financial crisis.

Brazil of course is way behind in mounting any viable challenge to US primacy. But as has been

asserted previously it is not about replacing or overtaking US in any of the key indicators that set

the process of post-hegemonic transition in motion. Post-hegemony is about waning influence of

the hegemon in a particular region where it had enjoyed massive presence and along with it the

rise of the alternate power centers that are willing to assert themselves , not only when their core

interests are at stake but to increase their own area of influence.

Amidst this background, Brazil‘s ascent coincides with the relative decline of US influence in

Latin America. In doing so it has undertaken an ambitious and far-flung foreign policy agenda,

independent of Washington, heading at times to misunderstandings and dashed hopes. This quest

involves carving a permanent place in the United Nations Security Council, expanded voting

rights for itself and others at influential world bodies like World Bank and International

Monetary Fund, and organizing other major and minor powers into strong coalitions to champion

a South-South agenda in near and far abroad.

Along these lines Brazil has promoted a pan-ideological South American integration. The

primary rationale behind creation of Mercosur (the Common Market of the South) in 1991 had

been Brazilian aspirations to build a self-identified regional sphere of influence. It is

simultaneously working with regional groupings like Organization of American States (OAS)

and Inter-American Development Bank too. Additionally, it has moved to establish the Union of

South American Nations (UNASUR) to play an increasingly important political role.

The establishment of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, consisting of

every Western Hemispheric nation except the US and Canada, reveals Brazil‘s regional

ambitions. A nascent pan regional military body has also been proposed in parallel with the

Inter-American Defense Board. The concrete impact of most of these parallel regional

institutions has been minimal so far but they are expected to play more valuable role as these

institutions mature with the passage of time.

In post-hegemonic transition, the role of other emerging actors is very important. Unable to

mount a single decisive challenge to US waning hegemony, these emerging actors are searching

142

for convergence of interests that could give additional weight to their demands on international

forum. With the same aim, Brasilia began forging a loose coalition and dialogue with India and

South Africa which lead to the formation of India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum

in June 2003, to benefit from the global power shifts.

They then formed a Group of Three (G-3) during the fifty-eighth United Nations General

Assembly session and contributed crucially to the failure of World Trade Organization‘s Cancun

Conference by pressing for fundamental changes in the agricultural subsidies regimes of the

developed world.128

While they pressed ahead for the establishment of the global market

conditions that would allow developing countries to benefit from their comparative advantages in

agriculture, industry and services in the Doha Round of WTO and with a view to eliminate high

non-tariff barriers to trade imposed by the developed countries.

IBSA states had been able to improve their position in the international trade hierarchy even

though the WTO negotiations had hardly progressed in terms of content. Limited diplomatic

coalitions like IBSA and G-3 are thus, helpful in constraining the power of US and other

established great powers by extending the room for maneuvering for themselves. Post-hegemony

particularly view these developments as impending shifts in power hierarchy.

Beyond the hemisphere, Brazil has been an aggressive supporter of the BRICS and used its

summits to strategically position itself as a leader of the emerging global community. July 2014

initiative of BRICS to establish a New Development Ban with $50 billion initially subscribed

capital, set to launch in 2016 is a key milestone of the cooperation among emerging economies

and developing countries – a testimony of coming age of these countries in the world of

development finance.129

Brazil has proved itself adept in developing cordial bilateral relations with Washington whenever

convenient but never letting its overall strategic vision of building global or regional influence

slipping out of focus. It has very strong ―aspirations to be a significant actor in its own right,

Daniel Flemes, ―India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) in the New Global Order: Interests, Strategies, and Values of the emerging Coalition,‖ International Studies 46, no. 4 (October 2009): 402, Doi: 10.1177/002088171004600402.

Eric Farnsworth, ―Dancing with Brazil,‖ The National Interest 138 (Aug 2015): 34.

143

rather than following outlines of a script written in Washington.‖130

It has overtly taken

positions contrary to US to implement its agenda, whenever circumstances arose.

When requested for the use of Brazilian airbases and other military institutions for US military

aircrafts involved in the Colombian conflict by Secretary of State, Madeline Albright in 2002,

Brazil not only rejected the request but denied overflying rights too.131

It strenuously objected to

the bilateral treaty on the use of seven Columbian military bases by the US armed forces in

September 2009.132

Brasilia also complicated efforts to address 2009 political crisis in Honduras

by supporting deposed leader Manuel Zelaya and publicly took a strong position in favour of the

constitutionally mandated electoral process even when Obama‘s team backed off its initial

position on the Honduran crisis and acquiesced in Zelaya‘s ouster.133

But the single most controversial initiate of Brazil to assert its global role had been its efforts to

provide an alternative to UN sanctions against Iran along with Turkey. The initiative involved

persuading Iran to send its uranium abroad for enrichment, was initially proposed by Obama

administration itself. But after Chinese and Russian approval for additional sanctions and US

sponsored resolution in the UNSC, the entire initiative was dubbed as a ―ploy‖ by the US to

delay UN actions. This single episode created most strained bilateral relations with US, and

Brazil for the very first time voted against the American interests at the UN Security Council.134

Besides China‘s entrance into the Latin America also proved to be a game changer for Brazil and

the region. It has reduced US leverage in the region, given Beijing willingness to finance projects

and engage with leaders. Talk of economic and political ―decoupling‖ from the US is becoming

prevalent in the region. Predicting that Latin America or for that matter Brazil will become a

region with much reduced US leverage is neither impossible nor improbable. Post-hegemonic

transition has started unfolding in key regions as well.

Ibid., 30.

Daniel Flemes, ―Brazil‘s Cooperative Leadership in Southern Latin America‘s Security Policies‖ (Doctoral

Dissertation, University of Hamburg, 2006), 243, accessed March 15, 2012, http://www.dissertation.de/englisch/index.php3?active_document=bunch.php3&sprache=2&buch=4580. Flemes, ―IBSA in the New Global Order,‖ 408.

Julia E. Sweig, ―Getting Latin America Right,‖ The National Interest 123 (Jan/Feb 2013): 26-27.

Julia E. Sweig, ―A New Global Player: Brazil‘s Far-Flung agenda,‖ Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2010): 176-179.

144

3.2 Power in Transition – Analyzing US-China Relations within the

Context

The post-1945 international order which rested on US overwhelming power to shape and direct

global events, is drawing to a close as country‘s relative power declines along with its ability to

manage global economy and security. A looming great-power rival – China – is already on a

trajectory towards closing the gap that might bring this unprecedented era of American

dominance to an end. Besides along with the US, the transition in progress will also bring the

end of almost 500 years of Western dominance over world events. As Christopher Layne notes:

―The impending end of the Old Order – both Pax Americana and the period of Western

ascendency – heralds a fraught transition to a new and uncertain constellation of power in

international politics.‖135

The final shape of the new configuration of great powers might be ambiguous at the moment but

there can hardly be a scholar or policy analyst that denies the power transition in progress.

Interestingly every academic debate centering American decline involves comparison with

China, by even those who otherwise believe US to be undisputable leader for long times to come.

Among them Kevin Cooney bluntly rejects the notion that the US is in decline relative to China,

seeing no prospect of a hegemonic shift during this century.136

Zhu Feng also considers China‘s

power disparity with the US to be ―insurmountable‖.137

Those who accept the proposition that China is leaping forward, mostly have a bleak future to

predict. Among them neo-realist perspective predicts that China is predestined to exercise its

power to alter the status quo. Mearsheimer asserts: ―China cannot rise peacefully, and if it

continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China

are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.‖138

Liberals, on the other hand, with a contradictory vision believe that China‘s enmeshment into the

Christopher Layne, ―The Global Power Shift from West to the East,‖ The National Interest 119 (May/June2012):

Nigel Cox, ―Managing the Rise of China (Review Article),‖ Asian Affairs 40, no.2 (2009): 271, DOI:

1080/03068370902871615. Ibid.

John J. Mearsheimer, ―Better to be Godzilla than Bambi,‖ Foreign Policy 146 (January/Feburary2005): 47.

145

world system will help her to appreciate the values of cooperation as well as the obsoleteness of

war.

The strategies forwarded to deal with China vary, depending upon whether those advocating

their stance view China as a revisionist or a status quo power. Warren I. Cohen remarks

―historically, a strong China has brutalized the weak – and there is no reason to expect it to act

differently in the future, to behave any better than other great powers in the past.‖139

The rising China is inevitably changing the American-centered East-Asian security order.

Besides steadily growing across economic, political and military domains, its diplomatic resolve

to engage the region is evident through involvements in groupings like the ASEAN Regional

Forum, ASEAN plus 3 and the Six-Party talks over North Korean denuclearization and crisis

prevention. Its forward engagement is already turning the region away from the uncontested

American hegemony to a bipolar order organized around Chinese and American rivalry.

Countries in the region will find themselves facing strategic choices as to which regional

coalition to join. A glimpse into the future can be seen through this recent article headline

published in Foreign Policy magazine which read as, ―Time to Choose between U.S. and China,

American Officer Tells Australia.‖140

The possibility, that China might gradually replace US as regional hegemon in East Asia with its

own distinct East-Asian political order organized around Beijing and its own bilateral ties;

through the incremental reorientation of economies in the region towards the booming Chinese

market and strengthening already existing social and cultural ties, is not implausible. In such a

scenario the region might willingly accept gradual replacement of American with Chinese

hegemony.141

Whenever US bilateral (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and countries to the South East Asia),

trilateral and multilateral mechanisms to contain China in the Asia-Pacific are mentioned, the

possibilities of other Asia-Pacific actors beyond South Korea, India, Japan and Australia to

―bandwagon with an emerging Sino-centric hegemonic order rather than balance against it with Cox, ―Managing the Rise of China,‖ 269.

Paul Mcleary, ―Time to Choose between US and China, American Officer Tells Australia,‖ Foreign Policy, September 1, 2016..

G. J. Ikenberry, ―American Hegemony and East Asian Order,‖ Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no.

(2004): 361-363, DOI: 10.1080/1035771042000260129.

146

the declining hegemon-the US‖ is ignored. They also overlook ―Chinese economic and soft-

power diplomacy further afield amongst the micro-states in the Pacific basin (which) could

outflank US military advantages in the second island chain.‖142

ASEAN states at the same time

reserve the judgment whether China will ultimately remain benign and also prefer the USA to

remain strong power in the region. Besides there is an unspeakable fear that an increasingly

assertive China might probe US willingness to engage China in its sphere of influence and

testing of waters might occur over Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Michael Lumbers has aptly summed up the dilemma confronting the states in the region. He

remarks: ―Anxiety over Beijing‘s recent saber rattling in the East and South China Seas and over

its long term intentions has stirred widespread endorsement of a reassertion of American

influence in the region‖143

but at the same time there is an understanding among these states

that, ―their future prosperity is inextricably linked to continued trade with an economically

vigorous China, as well as an unspoken fear that a sustained American presence in the region

cannot be guaranteed, rendering a choice to make an enemy out of the mainland foolhardy.‖144

However, the questions involving ―China‘s Rise‖ suffer from a basic flaw. China‘s rise is usually

assessed from a regionally confined lens which generally places her in the regional context of

―East-Asia‖ or the ―Asia-Pacific‖ thus confining it to an unduly geographically restrictive

framework. Such a confined lens offers a biased analysis of a country that border areas such as

Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Siberia along with its important regions located on

the coast. No matter how rival powers might want to confine this giant but its undeniable fact

that this is one country whose future actions will have important repercussions through-out the

Asia-Pacific, South Asia and even the entire world.145

Besides this bipolar lens focused on East-

Asia/ Asia-Pacific region also distorts the complete picture, which seems no more than as a

struggle between a solitary regional power striving for hegemony; and a geographically distinct Scott, ―US Strategy in the Pacific-Geopolitical Positioning,‖ 624.

Michael Lumbers, ―Whither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China‘s Rise,‖ Comparative Strategies 34, no.4 (2015): 313, Doi:10.1080/01495933.2015.1069510.

Ibid., 313-314.

C. Dale Watson, ―Beyond China: The Geopolitics of Eastern Eurasia,‖ Comparative Strategy 21, no.3 (2002): 204, DOI:10.1080/01495930290042976.

147

hegemon, attempting to balance would-be-hegemon and safeguarding security of its East Asian

allies.146

The larger picture presents China to be much potent international player with interests far beyond

Asia-Pacific. As a party to over 300 international treaties and a member of more than 130

intergovernmental organizations or regimes, China has taken in international cooperation from

nuclear non-proliferation to mitigating global climate change.147

China‘s role has gradually changed from a passive adherent to existing global order, to an

increasingly participatory and sometimes aggressive stakeholder. To promote its national

interests ―China has inadvertently and inevitably challenged the existing norms and rules that

govern inter-state relations, inducing some countries to modify their original compliance to these

norms and rules so as to please Beijing.‖148

Being a strong advocate of state sovereignty and

non-intervention but recently China has modified its traditional adherence to these norms and

eventually succeeded in creating new norms of international intervention centering on

involvement of a relevant regional organization. This was particularly witnessed in case of

Darfur where authorization of the African Union was an important condition to be satisfied

before intervention.149

UN Security Council authorization has always been insisted mandatory

by China.

Even the ―Chinese model of the development‖ gained apologists after it came unscathed through

the 2008 global financial crisis. Beijing offers a distinct model of development that privileges the

building of economic and social infrastructure and satisfaction of basic human needs. It founded

the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to support regional infrastructure projects

besides the New Development Bank to finance emerging economies; they both serve as

alternatives to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Assistance offer is made

through these without imposing harsh ―good governance‖ conditions as demanded by the West,

OECD, World Bank or the IMF.

Ibid.

Ren Xiao, ―The Rise of a Liberal China,‖ Journal of Global Policy and Governance 2, no. 1 (July 2013): 90, DOI:10.1007/s40320-013-0030-7.

Gerald Chan, ―China Face the World: Making Rules for a New Order?‖ Journal of Global Policy and Governance 2, no. 1 (July 2013): 106, DOI:10.1007/s40320-013-0022-7.

Ibid., 107.

148

Whether or not a ―Beijing Consensus‖ exists but those who believe it does see it as a threat to US

hegemony.150

China‘s success demonstrated that ―it is not true there is only one model of

development in the world. In fact, there are alternative development patterns‖151

and one can

gain if one has understanding of one‘s own national situation meanwhile referring to other

countries experience for learning something. China in fact has effectively offered an alternative

to the Western way of doing things, at least in the development sector. As Gerald Chan elaborates:

―In international development, China does not go about deliberately making rules for others to

follow. China does things its own way, according to its own circumstances. It does things by

exemplifying rather than by laying conditions in politically intrusive ways, even when it extends

aid investments to the Third World.‖152

China is proactively pursuing regional multilateral organizations or mechanism. Amid the

financial crisis, China together with Japan and South Korea initiated ASEAN plus 3 and since

formed a web of cooperative mechanisms in a range of functional areas and at various levels.

Besides the China, Japan and South Korea has since then organized them into a trilateral

cooperation which has been institutionalized through annual summit meetings on rotational

basis. At the same time the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is being

pursued as alternative regional trade structure to the US sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership

(TPP) trade agreement.153

Meanwhile the ―Shanghai Five‖ have grown into Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).154

Organization‘s stated security goal is combating ―three evils‖ of terrorism, separatism and

extremism but it aims at limiting US influence in the Central Asia and beyond. Similarly the

―New Security‖ framework proposed at the 2014 meeting of the Conference on Interactions and

Confidence-Building measures in Asia (CICA) is widely understood to be a critique of US

regional security institutions and how they might be replaced.155

The formation of G20 summit

against the backdrop of 2008 financial meltdown is particularly significant. ―As a founding

Stefan Halper, Beijing Consensus (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

Xiao, ―The Rise of a Liberal China,‖ 86.

Chan, ―China Faces the World,‖ 117.

Richard Fontaine and Mira Rapp-Hooper, ―The China Syndrome,‖ The National Interest 143 (May/June 2016):

Xiao, ―The Rise of a Liberal China,‖ 91.

Fontaine and Rapp-Hooper, ―The China Syndrome,‖ 15.

149

member, a shaping force, and a core participant, China sees this as an institutional recognition of

its major power status as well as of its crucial role.‖156

As China rises to a global power status, its military modernization driven by its large overseas

interests and existence of Taiwan issue is simply a matter of time. US-China military spending

ratio show how China is gradually catching up with US. In 1994 US spent 19 times as much as

China which was reduced to 9 times in 2004. A recent analysis of defence figures show that gap

has been reduced to 3 times as of 2014157

while the Economist is projecting that China‘s defence

spending will be equal to that of US by 2025.158

In spite of all the hype about military

modernization, a Chinese military analyst Ren Xiao himself admits, ―the process of

informatization in the PLA [People‘s Liberation Army] remains at an initial stage, and

modernization level still lags substantially behind that of the world‘s military power.‖159

But

there are others who admit no doubt US military forces are ―bigger and better‖ than China‘s but

―what matters…is not what forces China and America possess, but what they can do with them

where and when it counts.‖160

China‘s new assertiveness in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) has raised alarms about her

―peaceful rise‖ regardless of the quality of its military modernization. Besides hypothesized

potential confrontation of the two superpowers and other stakeholders could take place in

China‘s near coast, the South China Sea, China‘s lane of sea transportation to the Middle East

and China naval patrol in the sea off the east African coast, as their interest collide.161

As Daniel

Blumenthal, a former US defense official noted: ―As (China) grows more powerful, it desires to

change international rules written when its weak.‖162

Xiao, ―The Rise of a Liberal China,‖ 92.

Tweeted by @intlspectatator

Layne, ―The Global Power Shift,‖ 22.

As quoted in Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, ―Informatization and the Chinese People‘s Liberation Army Navy,‖ in The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles, ed. Phillip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 263. ; Three structural barriers to China‘s path to peer status with US in military modernization has also been elaborated Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth,

―The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: China‘s Rise and the Fate of America‘s Global

Position,‖ International Security 40, no.3 (Winter 2015/16): 39-44. Hugh White as quoted in Yuen Foong Khong, ―Primacy or World Order? The United States and China‘s Rise-A

Review Essay,‖ International Security 38, no.3 (Winter 2013/14): 156. Chan, ―China Face the World,‖ 114.

D. Blumenthal, ―The US stands up to China‘s bullying,‖ Wall Street Journal Online, 2010, accessed July 28, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703700904575391862120429050.html.

150

This new assertiveness has also been interpreted as China‘s arrival as a great power onto the

international theater. This has sparked a fierce debate between those who believe in

accommodating China‘s territorial ambitions without taking firm position of its affect on

regional power balance.163

There are differences between advocates of US grand strategy of

―restraint‖ or ―offensive balancing‖ versus those who aim for ―deep engagement‖ in the

region.164

The United States pursued a strategy of reorientation towards Asia – Asia pivot, with

the aim to dissuade China from making a bid for hegemony and thereby preserving the existing

balance of power in the region.165

The containment and engagement strategies are simultaneously being pursued by the US to

integrate China into the existing liberal international order and hence bind it to the extent where

its bid for hegemony might not dislodge US from its pre-eminent position too. The launch of the

US –China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009 indicated US willingness to deepen

diplomatic engagement strategy166

but internal and external balancing strategies are side by side

pursued. Internal balancing focus on a military buildup to enhance US capability to operate in the

Asia-Pacific while the external balancing involves a shift away from the hub-and-spokes167

model of asymmetrical bilateral alliances in vogue in the region since the Korean war, with a

federated network model in which US would lead a web of more powerful allies and partners

with links to one another168

David Shambaugh, however, asserts containment strategy is not viable even if it were decided

that this was a wise course of action, noting ―precisely because of China‘s existing integration in

163

See Robert S. Ross, ―China‘s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects and the US Response,‖ International Security 34, no.2 (Fall 2009): 78. ; and Charles L. Glaser, ―A US-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice Between Military Competition and Accommodation,‖ International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015), 83. The sample literature on debate see Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.:

Cornell University Press, 2014). ; Christopher Layne, ―From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America‘s Future Grand

Strategy,‖ International Security 22, no.1 (Summer 1997): 86-124. ; Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C.

Wohlforth, ―Don‘t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,‖

International Security 37, no.3 (Winter 2012/13): 7-51. ; and Campbell Craig et al., ―Correspondence: debating American Engagement- The Future of US Grand Strategy,‖ International Security 38, no.2 (Fall 2013):181-199.

On the existing power balance see Michael Beckley, ―China‘s Century? Why America‘s Edge will Endure,‖

International Security 36, no.3 (Winter 2011/12): 41-78. ; Khong, ―Primacy or World Order,‖ 155-157.

Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 22.

On hub-and-spokes model see Kent E. Calder, ―Securing Security through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective,‖ Pacific Review 17, no.1 (March 2004): 135-157.

For details on three strategies see Nina Silove, ―The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power balance in Asia,‖ International Security 40, no.4 (Spring 2016): 45-88.

151

the global system. The genie cannot be put back into the bottle‖.169

Any effort to weaken

Chinese economy would ignite fierce protest from politically powerful US domestic

constituencies with vested interests in sustaining economic links to the mainland.

There are others who maintain that contrary to the belief propagated by critics of the rise of

China, it is acting like a ―status-quo‖ power, cautious, responsible, focused on its internal

problems and willfully avoiding conflict.170

To counter ―China threat theory‖171

, ―Peaceful Rise

(heping jueqi)‖172

, ―Peaceful Development (heping fazhan)‖173

and Harmonious World (hexie

shijie)‖174

concepts has been promoted by the Chinese official discourse. The ―Peaceful Rise‖

concept was first floated officially by Zheng Bijian in 2003 and it was then introduced to the

domestic audience by China‘s President Hu Jintao during a regular meeting of the Political

Bureau in Feb 2004.175

But the concept recognizes and accepts the apprehension that a rising

China could pose for the rest of the world. Hence some prefer the term ―Peaceful Development‖

to ―Peaceful Rise‖ as the former would be ―bloodless‖, less aggressive and much less

controversial.

Regardless of the official jargon being employed by Chinese officials, Beijing is well entrenched

on a path towards the great-power status with the potential to act as competitor to the mighty US.

However there are equally large barriers to its bid for hegemony: these include its relative

poverty in per capita terms that hinders Beijing‘s ability to successfully conduct a consistently

aggressive foreign policy; inefficiency in certain sectors of economy; military backwardness and

David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford Cambridge University Press, 2013), 315.

Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China‟s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press, 2005). ; Alastair Iain Johnston, ―Is China a Status Quo Power?‖ International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5-56.

D. Roy, ―Hegemon on the horizon? China‘s threat to East Asian Security,‖ International Security 19, no.1 (1994): 149-168.

Bijian Zheng, ―China‘s ‗Peaceful Rise‘ to Great-Power Status,‖ Foreign Affairs 84, no.5 (September/October2005): 18-24.

S Kang and L Gung, Zhongguo heping fazhan guoji zhanlue yanji [Studies on International Strategies for China‘s

Peaceful Development] (Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe [Chinese Central Party School Press], Beijing, 2007).

X Yu, ―Hexie shijie‘ yu zhongguo de heping fazhan daolu,‖ [‗Harmonious world‘ and the road to China‘s peaceful development], in Shijie Dashi yu hexie shijie (World Trends and Harmonious World), ed. D Xu (Zhishi chubanshe, Beijing, 2007) 31-43. ; J Xu, ―Jiashi hexie shijie de lilun sikao.‖ [Theoretical Thinking Behind the

Development of Harmonious World] in Shijie Dashi yu hexie shijie (World Trends and Harmonious World), ed. D Xu (Zhishi chubanshe, Beijing, 2007): 44-54.

Raviprasad Narayanan, ―The Chinese Discourse on the ‗Rise of China‘,‖ Strategic Analysis 31, no.4 (2007): 646, DOI: 10.1080/09700160701559326.

152

its resultant inability to project power regionally; and potential internal political instability that

could even threaten Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain power.176

These daunting problems, however, cannot stall China to a regional size portfolio. With even 7%

annual growth, the Chinese economy is all set to account for more than half of the global output

by 2050- something never achieved by US even in its post-World War II heydays too.177

The

power transition in the global hierarchy is already being witnessed and scholars like Christopher

Layne are warning US policy elites to come to terms with the undeniable reality. He asserts:

―American elites must come to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined

supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for an indeterminate period of

time.‖178

Beijing is clearly accepting some rules, rejecting others and seeking to re-write still

others. As a result there is no single answer to what kind of superpower China aspires to be but it

is destined to be one indisputably.

3.3: Post-Hegemony begins…

History in the long run will remember 2008 as a year that heralded post-hegemony in the

International Relations. Globally the arrival of post-hegemony corresponded with three

significant international developments that shook the very foundations of hitherto undisputed US

leadership and its ability to shape political, economic and financial future of the globe with

respect to these episodes especially. They included 2008 global financial crisis; Russian

belligerence and reassertion in its ―near-abroad‖; and the Arab Spring.

The power in transition in the global hierarchy curtailed US ability to affect desired outcomes in

either of the aforementioned cases and emboldened many to bid assertively to regain their

previous place in the international hierarchy or try to carve a place for them to affect future

configuration of power at the systemic level. Thomas Wright discussed the significance of these

Watson, ―Beyond China,‖ 205.

Salvatore Babones, ―The Once and Future Hegemon,‖ The National Interest 138 (July/August2015): 57.

Layne, ―The Global Power Shift,‖ 31.

153

episodes under the title of ―demise of the unipolar concert‖179

but in this analysis their

significance is attested to the arrival of ―post-hegemony‖.

3.3.1. Global Financial Crisis 2008

One of the most significant events of the first quarter of the twenty-first century which even

reignited decades-old debate about the distribution of power in the international system, was the

fall 2008 global financial crisis. Worst in 70 years, it was dubbed as a major geopolitical setback

for the US and Europe. In its first year, the global crash of 2008 was actually worse than the

1929 crash with respect to all the major economic metrics- industrial production, world trade and

equity markets.180

Debate centered on whether the core of US primacy – its financial and economic resilience –

may be unraveling and whether it may ultimately change the face of the global power being

speculated for a long time. The fact that the collapse of Lehman Brothers which triggered a full

scale global financial crisis occurred only six weeks after the Russian invasion of Georgia, gave

another boost to ones already speculating end of Pax Americana.

Conventional wisdom blamed the collapse of the housing prices and the subprime mortgage

market in the US for the crisis. But ―the crisis‘ underlying cause was the combination of very

low interest rates and unprecedented levels of liquidity.‖181

Christopher Layne aptly summed up

the causes in his recent analysis as ―too much consumption and not enough savings; persistent

trade and current-account deficits; deindustrialization; sluggish economic growth; and chronic

federal-budget deficits fueling an ominously rising national debt.‖182

The US GDP fell in the

third quarter of 2008 and was forecast to drop precipitously by nearly four percent in the fourth

quarter. 183

Wright, ―The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Concert,‖ 17-22.

Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O‘ Rourke, ―A Tale of Two Depressions: What Does the New Data Tell Us,‖

VoxEu, March 8, 2010, accessed May 30, 2016, http://www.voxeu.org/article/tale-two-depressions-what-do-new-data-tell-us-februrary-2010-update#jun09. Roger C. Altman, ―The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West,‖ Foreign Affairs 88, no.1 (Jan/Feb 2009): 3-4.

Layne, ―Global Power Shift‖, 27.

Altman, ―Great Crash,‖ 6.

154

Reacting to the enormity of the events, Pan Wei of the Center for Chinese and Global Affairs

remarked: ―My belief is that, in 20 years, we will look the Americans straight in the eyes - as

equals. But maybe it will come sooner than that.‘184

Gaiser and Kovac rated the bankruptcy of

the Lehman brothers (September 15, 2008) as an event of unprecedented significance placing it

higher than September 11, 2001 because of the huge and unavoidable ―structural consequences‖

not even witnessed in the former case.185

Friedberg went far in declaring that Wall Street‘s

inability to police itself, showed devastating consequences for the rest of the world and could

also diminish America‘s soft power by discrediting its model of liberal capitalism.186

Criticism

kept pouring from all corners and the editorial of the Italian Journal Limes referred to the

financial meltdown as ―……the tombstone of the grandiose project to center the world on only

one pole‖187

While much of the world blamed US financial excesses for the global recession that brought its

model of free-market capitalism out of favour; others were equally concerned that US will now

be inward focused and more likely to be constrained by its own domestic concerns i.e.

unemployment and fiscal pressures. Many feared nationalization of financial sectors will be done

in a search for stability by the US and Europe. World seem to be heading towards a period which

again called for expansion of role of the state as compared to the private sector, against the

fiercely preached tenets of modern capitalism propagated by the US itself. The crisis exposed the

weaknesses within the European Union too. Economic divergence was on the rise - the three

largest EU economies - Germany, France and UK- failed to form consensus on a response to the

crisis and refused pleas for emergency assistance from the most vulnerable Eastern Europe.

Roger Altman, a former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, expecting prolonged severity of the

global recession wrote: ―The world‘s three largest economies, the United States, the EU and

Japan – will not be able to generate a normal cyclical recovery. The pervasive financial damage

will prevent it. As a result, nations dependent on those markets for growth, such as those in D. Rothkopf, ―9/11 Was Big. This Is Bigger,‖ Washington Post, October 5, 2008.

Gaiser and Kovac, ―From Bipolarity to Bipolarity,‖ 58.

Friedberg, ―Same Old Songs,‖ 35.

Quoted in Jason W. Davidson and Roberto Menotti, ―American Primacy by Default: Down but Not Out,‖ The International Spectator 44, no.1 (2009): 13, DOI:1080/03932720802692855.

155

Eastern Europe, will also face long recovery.‖ 188

Even the international financial system was

devastated with the IMF estimating loss for the global financial institutions to eventually reach

$1.5 trillion189

Without a doubt the crisis shook the world‘s trust in US business and policy elites but whether

alternate leaders were stepping up to the plate, was another most heated aspect of the debate

generated on the issue. It was acknowledged that nations with insulated financial systems, such

as China, Russia and India had suffered the least economic damage. Especially China‘s unique

political-economic model came through unscathed in 2008. No country was speculated to benefit

economically from the financial crisis but China with its ability to make key investments in other

nations‘ natural resources and to assist them at a time when West cannot, was expected to be in a

relatively stronger position. It could take bold political initiatives and expand its diplomatic

presence in the developing world in order to further its model of capitalism.

With the passage of time a consensus has gathered momentum that the weaknesses will

eventually be repaired but that would not be able to arrest the trends that are shifting the world‘s

center of gravity away from the United States. 2008 economic meltdown is a painful reminder of

the limitations of the US power and as Roger Altman asserted, it has ―inflicted profound damage

on its financial system, its economy, and its standing in the world.‖190

September 15, 2008

might eventually and most likely will go down in the history as the date that triggered post-

hegemony. We might be only a few decades away from the final verdict.

3.3.2. Russian Reassertion in its “Near Abroad”

―With the Cold War‘s demise, the menacing Russia that long loomed over Europe

seemed to vanish. The Russia of 1992 was just a fragment of its historic self in

military punch and economic weight. Not even Russia‘s still-formidable nuclear

arsenal deflected perceptions of decline. It was inevitable, then, that Western

policy makers would feel that this shrunken Russia was more to be ignored than

feared. They were wrong.‖191

Roger C. Altman, ―Globalization in Retreat: Further Geopolitical Consequences of the Financial Crisis,‖ Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4, (July/August 2009): 3.

Altman, ―Great Crash,‖ 7.

Altman, ―Great Crash,‖ 14.

Leslie H. Gelb, ―Détente Plus,‖ The National Interest 138 (July/August 2015): 9.

156

Russia will be one of the important players in post-hegemonic international system, though

without the economic prowess and depth of China but still with significant conventional military

might that can act as counterweight to US allies in the Eurasian theater. Post-hegemonic

transitions provide incentives to states like Russia which are aggressively seeking a place for

themselves in the global hierarchy and trying to reassert themselves as one of the key global

players. Dissatisfaction with the established status quo places Russia comfortably in the camp

with China, India and Brazil who are looking for a reconfigured international system that

understands their unique and enhanced global standing, even if not out rightly rejecting or over

writing the status quo.

US overwhelming interest in the Asia-Pacific theatre and its rebalancing strategy along with its

comparatively diminished presence in the Middle East and Europe, emboldened Russia to get

itself registered once again as a power with its own ―sphere of influence‖ and ―privileged

interests‖192

. The diffusion of economic power around the world suggest that the idea of ―sphere

of influence‖ no matter how unfashionable in Washington, has to be incorporated to lessen the

risk of conflict in both Chinese and Russian cases especially.

The second Bush administration‘s inability to reconcile the expansion of Euro-Atlantic

institutions (EU and NATO) into the former Soviet space- especially when viewed as a direct

threat by the Kremlin- with the previously stated objective of maintaining a partnership with

Russia, caused deep resentment in the Kremlin and pushed to adopt direct confrontational

attitude to safeguard what it considered its vital national interest.

Post-hegemony is still characterized by US military preponderance as one of the central facts of

international politics but US willingness and resolve to use this power is being watched

nervously by its allies in three crucial regions i.e. Europe, the Middle East and East Asia.

Russian role in the Eurasian and Middle East has particularly led to speculations of its re-

emergence as a vital player on the global theatre and its actions are being viewed as acts of overt

hard-balancing against American predominance in Europe.

192

This was the term used by President Dmitri Medvedev in the aftermath of Russia‘s war with Georgia. See President of Russia, ―Interview Given by Dmitri Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One Rossiya, NTV,‖ August 31, 2008, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml.

157

When Saakashvili came to power in Georgia in early 2004, with strong European aspirations and

intention to seek NATO membership following the footsteps of Central and Eastern European

countries, Europe already was developing ―enlargement fatigue‖ but what was more ominous

was ―the Russia of 2005 was not the Russia of 1995. No longer dependent on Western loans,

Russia was now buoyed by an oil windfalls, was in the midst of a self-aggrandizing effort to

restore its great power status.‖193

Vladimir Putin was determined to roll back ―color revolutions‖

that brought pro-western leaders power in Tbilisi and Kiev, but had also put Georgia and Ukraine

on a trajectory toward NATO membership. Viewing former as a direct result of Moscow‘s

weakness in the 1990s, Kremlin readiness to flex its muscles began in Georgia.194

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 represented first such forcible action since the end of

WWII on the European continent and its intervention in Ukraine directly led to movement of

NATO troops into the Baltic States on a rotational basis. Besides it did result in another

contentious debate regarding relevance of Article 5 to defend Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

should they ever come under attack by Kremlin. This is coupled with overt nuclear threats from

Russia and talk of a new Cold War.195

What heightens Western alarm is Putin‘s seeming

unpredictability and his apparently unlimited internal power to get his way through.

Putin alone isn‘t their biggest concern. Ukrainian crisis has also exposed ambivalence of US

NATO allies and the division within them as per reaction to Moscow is involved. With Balts and

Poles leading the hawks and calling for tough American response to Russian provocations;

Germany is in the opposite camp, clearly opposed to supplying weapons to Ukraine and thus

further antagonizing Russia. A recent Pew survey clearly captures the spirit of this rift. When

asked to respond to a question whether they supported using military force to a NATO ally,

neighboring Russia, that ―got into a serious military conflict with Moscow‖, less than the

majority in Poland and as low as 38% in Germany supported the proposition as against to 58%

Americans in favour of using military force.196

Economic sanctions against Russia have not done enough to make Putin back down, though they

have seriously harmed its economy to the extent to squeeze some dubious cease-fire agreement Svante E. Cornell, ―War in Georgia, Jitters All Around,‖ Current History 107, no. 711 (October 2008): 309.

Ibid., 309.

Gideon Rachman, ―Preserving American Power,‖ The National Interest 141 (Jan/Feb 2010): 18.

Ibid., 21.

158

on Ukraine. US European allies prefer to press ahead with a weak diplomatic hand and are

reluctant to expand sanctions for fear of prompting Russian military response and further

complicating their dependence on Russian oil and gas. Nothing has highlighted this diplomatic

impotence more than Obama distancing himself from this and letting Germans take the charge.

West‘s limp hand is painfully evident with its narrow options that includes no more aid to

beleaguered friends, even in the face of escalating Russian provocations; more diplomacy

without leverage; calls for NATO military buildup with no prospect of realization and more

tough sanctions that hurt but not humble Russia. While on the Russian side its military

superiority over NATO on its western border because of conventional forces backed by potent

tactical nuclear weapons and its stated willingness to use them to avoid defeat or sustain

advantages- is further inducing reluctance in US European NATO allies.

While in the Middle East US reluctance to put ―boots on the ground‖ in case of Syria especially

has signaled a power vacuum and the extent to which US has lost control of the region following

upheavals of Arab Spring and troops withdrawal from Iraq. Russia moved quickly to fill in and

the clarity of Russian support for Bashar-al-Assad marks a sharp contrast with US policy

confusion in Syria.197

Russian provocative actions in Ukraine and its support to Syrian dictator

may be viewed as signs of revisionism in Washington but for Kremlin it is the US that is the real

revisionist power in the world politics with its overt agenda of regime change in countries like

Ukraine and Syria – the ones not otherwise ready to tow the American line.

Besides Russian and Chinese resentment dates back to Libyan conflict where they believed they

have been fooled by the Obama administration; when instead of alleviating threats to civilians as

was agreed in the UNSC resolution 1973 the Western-led intervention entered the Libyan

conflict as cobelligerents on sides of the opposition, resulting in the capture and ultimately

violent death of the Libyan despot. There is a very genuine fear in both China and Russia that

unless they push back against US power, they too might ultimately fall victim to US-backed

regime change.198

Ibid., 18-19.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, ―Drifting to 2016,‖ The National Interest 142 (Mar/Apr2016): 32-33.

159

West has reluctantly realized that the correlation of forces in the Greater Middle East is moving

against them. Many of their time-tested friends are demoralized and most of their enemies are

emboldened. Any meaningful movement towards Iranian nuclear crisis would also require

Russians on the same page with the West. As Moscow‘s potential to affect Tehran‘s calculation

is greater than the combined efforts of Europe and the US.

Vice President Joe Biden February 2009 announcement to press ―reset‖ button in bilateral

relationship and adopt an approach that engage Russia on shared threats and where interests

converged and push back where Kremlin actions contradict US interests,199

has so far not been

able to achieve the desired outcomes. One of the major obstacles in bilateral relations is

conflicting approach to major international security issues ranging from future of the Euro-

Atlantic security structure to missile defense. Besides Russian insistence on its ―sphere of

privileged interests‖ conflicts with equally adamant US stance that countries in the region should

be free to make their own foreign policy choices.

US itself is realizing its overextension in the world and strategies like ―offshore balancing‖ and

―retrenchment‖ are making a comeback in the policy circles, especially for the regions not considered

as vial a US interest as Asia-Pacific in the twenty-first century. With Washington currently debating

the extent of its focus here, EU itself preoccupied with its own problems, limited Chinese reach in

Eurasia given Bejing‘s peripheral geographical location and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey‘s

competition for influence in the larger Middle East rather than in Eurasia are all helping Russia to

offset competitive influences and even initiate regional integration under its leadership. Launch of

Customs Union in 2010 is a step forward in the same direction.200

Besides along with China, Russia want to break out of a new ―dual containment‖ policy and is

looking forward to reshape a global political and economic system they view created to benefit US

and the West particularly.201

Other emerging regional players seem to share these sentiments. No

matter how short-lived and unlikely this Sino-Russian alliance may be based on their

Samuel Charap, ―The Transformation of US-Russia Relations,‖ Current History 109, no. 729 (October 2010):

Andrei P. Tsygankov, ―Moscow‘s Soft Power Strategy,‖ Current History 112, no.756 (October 2013): 262.

Graham Allison and Dimitri K.Simes, ―Beware Collusion of China, Russia,‖ The National Interest 126 (July/August 2013): 7.

160

particular strategic interests but even such a temporary tactical arrangement could have huge and

lasting impact on global politics.

―Regardless of how Americans view their country, Russians see it as a great power.‖202

Kremlin

is reasserting and reemerging politically far more forcefully than its economic weight might

entitle. As stated earlier political choices do make a difference and even reflect a country‘s

intention to play a more assertive role on the international political sphere. Putin‘s doctrine that

Russia would assume its domination and control over the states of the former Soviet Union203

and claim to defend Russian citizens abroad through military means if necessary (the exact

pretext used by Russia when it attacked Georgia), leaves no doubt that Russia refuses to be

written off. Post-hegemony definitely is in pipeline and Russia is determined to be a vital player

in announcing its arrival.

3.3.3. The Arab Spring

When 2010 drew to its end, no one could believe that a revolutionary fervor was about to seize a

region where firmly placed authoritarian regimes would be shaken and dictators toppled by

fearless and determined street protesters. This landmass had been frozen in time with populations

that had not only been tamed but grappling with already daunting economic problems and

political stagnation. These momentous events in history witnessed the revolutions in Tunisia and

Egypt, subsequently followed by the descent of Libya, Syria and Yemen into varying degrees of

civil war. What made these events even more historic was the fact that the biggest challenge to

the ossified Arab political order came not from without but from the within.

The self-immolation of a street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi triggered country-wide protests that

brought an end to Zine-al-Abedine Ben Ali, Tunisia‘s President and his long-standing regime.

Ben Ali had been ruling country since 1987 and less than a month of unrelenting public protest

made him flee the country by Jan 14, 2011. This was the first time ever in the Arab history that a

sitting head of a state was deposed not by a military coup but through massive popular uprising.

The Arab world was still grappling with the reality of the unprecedented abdication of power by

a long-reigning autocrat, when within two weeks another revolution shook Arab streets – this Graham Allison and Dimitri K.Simes, ―Stumbling to War,‖ The National Interest 137 (May/june2015): 11.

Cornell, ―War in Georgia,‖ 309.

161

time in Egypt. Again hundreds of thousands of democracy activists organized a grassroot

movement with the aid of social-networking platforms like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and

were able to bring the whole of Egypt to a standstill with mass protests in Cairo, Alexandria,

Suez, and Ismailia along with other major towns and cities throughout the country. After

Tunisia‘s ―Jasmine Revolution‖, Egypt‘s ―January 25 movement‖ toppled another despot- Hosni

Mubarak on February11, 2011 amid jubilations and wild celebrations in Tahrir Square.

Both the men in Tunisia and Egypt had been in power for the last 23 and 30 years respectively

and no one in their wildest imagination could dream about the possibility of a slogan like al-

shaab yurid isqat-al-nizam – ―The people want the fall of the regime‖.204

The urge to remove

corrupt despots, was so strong that it resonated across the Arab world and emboldened by the fall

of these regimes popular demonstrations erupted throughout Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen

while ruling elites in other Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco kept

keenly and nervously watching the ―unthinkable‖ developments in the region.

These unprecedented developments within the Arab world took the United States as much by

surprise as the local Arab regimes. The very regimes, with which America has entwined its

interests with, were shaken from the seats of power including some of its most ardent followers.

The Arab countries in the West Asia and the North Africa for long had remained core

geostrategic interest of the US. The region endowed with natural resources like petroleum and

natural gas and increasing energy demands across the world, compelled US to sustain close

relations with the ruling clans, overlooking their undemocratic characters, thus often discrediting

America in the eyes of populace in many parts of the Arab world. Besides US baggage of its

misadventure in Iraq in 2003 and unrelenting support to Israel, was already plaguing Arab public

perceptions about Washington.

Instead of following a coherent regional strategy, US seemed to be trapped in a reactive mode

responding to the events that no one was in a position to predict. The Obama administration

opted for a selective country-to-country strategy when it came to Arab revolutions. This seems to

validate the perception that some of the previous friends and allies were dispensable while others

Eugene Rogan, ―The Arab Wave‖ The National Interest 113 (May/June 2011): 48-56.

162

were not. Besides US support for the protestors in the Arab Awakening came almost when it

became quite apparent that Tunisia‘s Ben Ali and Egypt‘s Mubarak had to go.

While American strategists had been aware about the vulnerability of the region and threats to its

stability as well as the rising discontent among the majority of the Arab populations, but the

sheer pace and scale of the popular uprisings made the situation far more complicated. ―In short,

it would appear that America was perhaps unprepared for uprisings to take place this soon‖.205

America was accused of resorting to acute selectivity. With Bahrain as home to the US Fifth

Fleet and the vital role it plays in sustaining US strategic leverage in the Gulf, the alliance in the

face of massive street protests was read as backing to a regime that was disliked by the majority

of its Shiite population. Besides Saudi military intervention to back an unpopular regime did not

meet any rebuke from Washington, they only asked for ―restraint‖ from King Hamad involved in

brutal suppression of his protestors, besides designated him as ―a friend and ally‖ in the same

tone.206

Situation in Yemen was also as bleak, where the country went out of control of

President Ali Abdullah Saleh amid mass protests, fighting, defections and factionalism, and stage

was set for a protracted civil war beyond the control of any major player.

The US response to developments in Libya and Syria were in a marked contrast to its response

elsewhere. A full scale NATO bombing campaign was initiated against 44 year old Muammar

Gadhafi‘s regime while Syrian President Bashar-ul-Assad‘s fate remained uncertain as his

security forces started violent crackdown on protestors across the country. US seemed caught in

a dilemma: ―The leadership changes in the region have puzzled US who its friend and partners

are going to be, and till what point they should support an embattled ruler or throw in their lot

with the protestors. As the autocrats topple one by one, the US has been taking contrary

positions-sometimes giving moral arguments for airstrikes on Libya, while on the other hand

giving Bahrain‘s King a pass.‖207

The Arab Revolutions though not initially about ―Anti-Americanism‖ had the full potential to

degenerate into one if US seemed to continue to support corrupt, unaccountable regimes Anjan Roy and Amit Kumar, ―US grapples with political developments in the Arab world,‖ World Focus 379 (July 2011): 404.

Girish C. Mallik, ―American Perceptions on the Anti-Government Demonstrations in Bahrain,‖ World Focus 379 (July 2011): 416.

Shreya Upadhyaya, ―Arab Spring: Implications for Iran, Israel and the US,‖ World Focus 379 (July 20110): 457.

163

selectively. Would such a strategy serve long term security interests in the region were being

questioned too? Lack of a unified and coherent policy response in the face of rapid developments

involving sweeping away of old regimes in the region prompted few to question to American

resolve to remain dominant player in the region. It was noted: ―The United States is frantically

struggling to formulate a consistent response to developments in the Middle East and the Arab

world, otherwise called the Arab Spring, as that region seems to be moving imperceptibly away

from American influence.‖208

Many speculated that even military superiority would not be able

to arrest waning US influence in the region and would affect its capability to achieve its

objectives in such a vital region. Washington‘s leverage to prevent crackdown in Syria and its

inability to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear ambition along with failure to restart the Arab-

Israeli peace process was being cited as few examples.

The turmoil in the Arab world had in fact raised far more significant questions. Thomas Wright

asserted: ―The Arab Awakening was the breaking point and was to create huge uncertainty about

several basic questions: who would rule the Middle East, what would the make-up of the

governments be, and would the United States serve as the linchpin for the region‘s security

through its bilateral alliances.‖209

Obama‘s policy speech on the region which came almost six months after the Arab Spring

reflected the same ambivalence. While admitting ―the status quo is unsustainable‖ and ―societies

held together by fear and repression may offer the illusion of stability for a time, but they are

built upon fault lines that will eventually tear asunder‖, he also conceded that ―there will be

times when our short-term interests don‘t align perfectly with our long-term vision for the

region‖.210

Rhetoric about support to American democratic values and American ―real‖ interests in the Arab

countries were bound to clash and hence it was certain charting such a difficult path would place

limits that would adversely affect its legitimacy in the region. With erosion in legitimacy,

American influence in the region was bound to suffer a setback too. The years following the Roy and Kumar, ―US grapples with political developments in the Arab world,‖ 405.

Wright, ―The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Concert,‖ 21.

Excerpt of the Obama Speech on the US Policy towards the Middle East, published in World Focus, July 2011, 408-410.

164

Arab Spring revealed that the ―unlikely‖ events yielded undesirable results when the flux in the

region‘s status quo empowered Tehran much to the dislike of Israel and US.

After playing role of dominant arbiter of region‘s affairs for decades, US reluctantly realized it

had little ability directly to influence events on the streets of the Arab world. Post-hegemonic

Middle East and North Africa has arrived on the world stage and now decades old familiar

patterns of international politics were rupturing, making room for new regional status quo. The

declining hegemon would now, may have to adjust to the new regional reality where time tested

friends would not be occupying a key region‘s top slot.

Conclusion

One of the leading challenges that a declining power has to confront when a power transition is

taking place at the global level is the ‗crisis of its legitimacy‘. With the emergence of new

powerful actors and competing interests, the actions of a declining hegemon come under

increased scrutiny. Approval of the domestic public assumes importance especially when it

involves spending taxpayers‘ money and no adventurous foreign expedition could be undertaken

without having public‘s back. ―Any system of world order, to be sustainable, must be accepted as

just – not only by leaders, but also by citizens‖.211

US assertive and militant unilateralism in the

first decade of the twenty-first century made its legitimacy disputed and made it questionable

even to those Western allies which have so far been ardent followers of US led order. ―If the

approval of those whom its policies affect is the test of a government‘s legitimacy, then the

United States, in its capacity as the world‘s government, looked distinctly illegitimate‖.212

But

the rising speculations of US impending decline made all these assertions even more vocal. This

―legitimacy crisis‖ will constantly figure in post-hegemonic phase, when public fatigue with

protracted Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts linger into Libyan, Ukrainian and Syrian cases.

How strong had been the perceptions of American decline in public can be gauged by the Pew

Poll surveys of 2002 and 2013. In 2002 survey about US place in the world about 55% of

Henry Kissinger, World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History (London: Allen Lane, 2014), 8.

Ferguson, Colossus, 144.

165

Americans felt it was more important and powerful than it had been a decade before while 17%

felt contrary. By 2013 those figures had been almost been exactly reversed.213

Nye notes that

even though America is not in absolute decline but American century may still end simply

because of the rise of others. No single country is set to replace US but alliances among them

might bring an end to US pre-eminence and its ability to maintain an international order.214

The questions of ―American century‖, ―primacy‖, ―hegemony‖ and ―decline‖ are all inter-

related. Those who still find US at the top of the global hierarchy refuse to accept its waning

influence and its reduced ability to affect desired outcomes while those signaling its demise are

as extreme in their assertions with less room for US ability to steer through this phase. Viewing

US from exclusive primacy/declinist perspective can be misleading as it distorts the bigger

underneath emerging picture about changing international structure. Power is getting diffused in

more than one sector. The fact that world‘s 500 largest companies generated $31 trillion revenue

in 2014, more than the combined GDP of the US and China215

, tell us that power is getting

diversified in a lot different ways than we can possibly speculate. In such an environment

comparison of US power potential to individual emerging actors will distort facts as much as any

ambitious speculation on their combined ability to project themselves as counterweight to US

hegemony and primacy.

Question is not whether China, Russia, India and Brazil can construct an alternative collation

with ability to overwrite rules centering US, EU and Japan priorities. Such a proposition hinges

on the assumption that changing international environment has kept previous loyalties intact or is

unable to interfere much with already established political fault lines. One of the timeless facts

associated with international politics is that it had always been in flux. This flux introduces

unpredictability element into the equation. Fierce enemies might become staunch allies or the

vice versa. If history is any guide than case of Japan and Germany would testify to afore-stated

hypothesis. This argument only suggests that counting Japan and EU in the American camp can

be as misleading as placing China, Russia, India or Brazil in the opposite camp. The only thing

which distinguishes former from the later is that they have underwritten rules of the established

international order and hence their satisfaction with the status quo rests higher than the later. America‟s Role in the world (Washington: Pew Research Centre, 2013), 4 and 10.

Nye, ―Is American Century Over?,‖ 23.

Tweeted by @intlspectator on August 22, 2016 at 1:30 am.

166

While the later still are struggling for their rightful place where their newly earned positions have

placed them and they might be willing to cooperate with each other on this single indicator even

if nothing else provides enough incentive to be in the opposite camp.

Post–hegemony characterizes this ambiguous situation. If, on the one hand, time tested friends

are getting beleaguered due to US inability to comprehensively address their concerns in their

respective regions and these erstwhile allies are assessing their neighborhood and maneuvering

their options; On the other hand, US ability to affect desired outcomes is increasingly coming

under strain and deepening the ―legitimacy crisis‖ it is already facing. It is not the material

factors alone which could be bringing an end to US hegemony, but the political decisions taken

by US, its allies and even competitors have already heralded post-hegemony in international

relations.

Not only is the unipolar era visibly drawing to a close but a drift towards post-hegemony is

simultaneously underway.

167

Chapter 4: Middle East & North Africa (MENA) in

Transition

The dramatic events of 2011 heralded unprecedented changes in MENA (Map 4.1) that not only

shook the very foundations of long-established undemocratic governments but were bound to

affect fragile regional hierarchical structure in place since the end of the Cold War. However,

what made apparent extreme vulnerability of the entire region was the inability of the US to

direct events on the Arab streets. This vulnerability created space for ―dissatisfied‖ US global

challengers, who for almost two decades had been written off from the region after the collapse

of the Soviet Union, to register their presence once again within the region. While at the global

level ‗China‘s rise‘ had given impetus to literature speculating ―post-American world‖.1 The

pace and scope of changes in MENA were also giving credence to the argument that America no

longer would be able to serve as the sole dominant arbiter within MENA.

The hegemonic decline of the US while creating incentives for the major powers created equally

powerful opportunities for the major regional players within a key regional hierarchy undergoing

transition. Free from the hegemonic constraints of the global dominant power, they felt free to

pursue their self-identified regional agendas with more vigor and hence the unfinished transition

in MENA in the wake of the Arab Spring gave rise to competitive environment regionally. This

competition for the configuration of a new regional hierarchy has manifested itself in ongoing

regional conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen where all the major regional players Saudi Arabia,

Iran and Turkey could be seen vying for influence. But before undertaking a detailed study of the

dynamics of conflict in Libya and Syria, it is important to understand the changes occurring in

the regional hierarchy.

This chapter will delineate the changes taking place in MENA post-Arab Spring period and how

it had drawn major players into pitched battles for influence within the region. The first section

will identify key pivotal players in MENA; explain how their foreign policy behavior had

undergone changes in the post-Arab Spring period and what are their stakes in the new emerging Already discussed in detail in the Chapter 3.

168

scenario. Relationship of each player with the US would be discussed in detail to determine the

extent of US influence in a regional hierarchical structure in flux. The second section will focus

on Russian re-entry in the region. It has emerged as the dominant major power besides US,

playing pivotal role in re-drawing regional hierarchical configuration. It will also explore

whether Russian overt balancing is a logical result of US drift towards post-hegemony in global

hierarchy. The third section will discuss the US role in overall transition in MENA. How far has

US been able to arrest undesirable changes and how far her traditional standing in MENA has

been compromised. The last section will deal with the overall power transition in MENA and

how the conflicting and competing interests of traditional allies and foes have engaged them in a

regional transforming conflict and ruptured traditional alliances triggering new power hierarchy

within the region.

Map 4.1. Political Map of Middle East and North Africa (MENA)2

Analysis of MENA in transition would then place Libyan military intervention and situation

emerging in Syria within the context to be explored at length in the subsequent chapters. It will

simultaneously delineate why political discourse employed for military intervention and threat

construction had to take the path specified in ‗Threat Securitization for Military Intervention‘

model.

The map is taken from the website http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/north-africa-map.htm accessed November 21, 2016.

169

4.1. Pivotal Regional Players in MENA

Any analysis of ―MENA in transition‖ has to start with exploration of pivotal regional players

and their foreign policy pursuits within the region. US have enjoyed overwhelming influence

throughout the region even during the heydays of intense ideological bipolar superpower rivalry

of the Cold War. The sudden demise of Soviet Union and display of unmatched military

superiority in the First Gulf War again put US at the helms of affairs in MENA in the post-Cold

War period but without a rival with commensurate abilities this time.

However, the equally unprecedented developments during the Arab Spring in 2011 seemed to

have torn the fragile regional hierarchical balance apart and now not only the regional players are

engaged in enforcing a new power hierarchy in accordance with their self-identified national

interests but extra-regional players are also actively pursuing a greater role for themselves within

the region that will ultimately enhance their global standing and prestige. Hence, this section will

explore each pivotal player standing in post-Arab Spring MENA and their respective relations

with the US.

4.1.1. Iran

Iran, a country of nearly 80 million people and sitting over one of the largest oil reserves in the

world, occupies strategic position in the heart of the Persian Gulf and has traditionally played

pivotal role in the Middle Eastern politics. But the recent unprecedented developments following

the Arab Spring has assigned unusual importance to Iran as a regional player and placed it in an

envious position to effectively bid for enhanced position within the newly emerging regional

power hierarchy.

4.1.1.1. Iran in post-Arab Spring MENA

As in the wake of Arab Spring long-established Arab regimes teetered and got toppled one after

another, the specter of democracy haunted the local ruling elite. Amid speculations of its effect

on Iran, whose regional influence already peaked in the first decade of the twenty-first century as

US got embroiled in insurgency and two protracted wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, concerns

mounted among surviving regimes that the seemingly empowered new Arab publics might alter

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the usual course of bilateral relations with Iran and the new democratically elected governments

may forge a closer working relationship with the Islamic Republic.

Iran especially seemed eager to capitalize Egypt‘s Hosni Mubarak‘s exit from the political scene

and his policy of seeking anti-Iranian coalition in the Arab world. Traditionally the bilateral

relations had been strained for decades spanning various Egyptian regimes. Sunni-dominated

Egypt has usually sided with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

The new Cairo‘s desire to maintain normal ties with the prominent Persian Gulf players, rather

than being embroiled in anti-Iranian axis, suited Iranian renewed approach towards the region.

In a meeting with Iranian Interest Section in Cairo on April 4, 2011, the new Egyptian Foreign

Minister Nabil Al Araby ―affirmed that Egypt is opening a new page with all countries including

Iran…..provided they are based on mutual respect for the state sovereignty and the non-

interference whatsoever in the internal affairs.‖3 A further positive response arrived on April 17,

2011 when Egyptian foreign ministry spokeswoman Menha Bakhour asserted, ―We are prepared

to take a different view of Iran. The former regime used to see Iran as an enemy, but we don‘t.‖4

However the initial glee over fall of long reigning despots like Mubarak and Ben Ali proved

short-lived. NATO led airstrikes against Muammar Gaddafi evoked specter of strong Western

military presence within the region with potential to play spoilsport to Tehran‘s plan to

consolidate its standing in the emerging post-Arab Spring scenario. Besides Iran‘s strong support

for Bashar Al-Assad of Syria during the uprising against him was interpreted as an attempt to

quash the revolt and it further complicated relations with countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and

Jordan who had already been weary of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. The region currently is fraught

with challenges for increased Iranian influence.

Egypt: To start with Egypt, that enjoys strategic alliance with the US and other Arab states

staunchly opposed to increased Iranian influence within the region. The earlier enthusiasm in

Iran with the election of first Islamist President Mohammed Morsi corresponded with news

published in Iran‘s news agency FARS that claimed Morsi was ―interested in closer ties with 3 Ahmed Morsy, ―An Eager Iran and Hesitant Egypt: Relations Before & After the Arab Spring,‖ Muftah,

September 13, 2012. Will Fulton, ―After the Arab Spring: Iran‘s Foreign Relation‘s in the Middle East,‖ Iran Tracker, September 28, 2011.

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Iran‖ and ―sought revisions to the Camp David Accords with Israel‖. Egyptian government not

only denied news but the report received another blow when Morsi made public pledge to ―honor

all international treaties.‖5

Morsi‘s outreach to Iran despite persistent differences demonstrated a robust and pragmatic

foreign policy and a bid to reestablish Egypt‘s former position as a regional player.6 With the

military return to power in Egypt, Iran lost the opportunity to have Sunni Egypt as its partner.

Egypt-Iran current relations remain plagued by Iran‘s support for Palestinian militias particularly

Hamas which the government of Abd al Fattah Sisi views a potential Islamist threat, its influence

in Iraq and Iran‘s nuclear program.

Saudi Arabia: Iranian relations with Saudi Arabia have traditionally evolved around maintaining

binary balance of power in the region and seeking to maximize their positions with respect to

regional and outside players. The two countries despite having a common Islamic history are

divided by sectarian, ethnic and linguistic differences. Iran has always been apprehensive of

Saudi bid for seeking hegemony for its brand of Sunni Islam and denial to Iran and Shiite

Muslims in general any influence in the region. Resultantly Iran‘s aid to Shiite-dominated

governments and Shiites in Sunni-dominated countries has further stoked tensions between the

two countries and got them embroiled in a virtually existential war by proxy against each other

and in an attempt to thwart drive for regional hegemony by either.

During the Cold War both Iran and Saudi Arabia facilitated US Twin Pillar policy in the region

in spite of their latent rivalry and shared anti-Communist positions. However, Iran‘s Islamic

revolution accentuated core strategic tensions by bringing ideological and religious differences

between the two into sharp contrast. However, in the wake of Iraqi aggression against

neighbouring Kuwait in 1990s, Iran was viewed in less hostile terms during the period. But the

US invasion of Iraq in 2003 upended the prevailing security balance in the Gulf. Post-Saddam

Iraq has increased Iranian influence compared to its traditional archrival Saudi Arabia, where its

influence has been more direct and substantial. Even President Obama in an interview published

in Atlantic in April 2016 reportedly told Saudi leadership that they ―need to share the Middle Morsy, ―An Eager Iran.‖

For details see Dina Esfandiary, ―Iran and Egypt: a complicated tango?‖ European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 18, 2012.

172

East with their Iranian foes‖ and that both ―need to find an effective way to share the

neighbourhood and institute some sort of cold peace.‖7

Saudis have consistently accused Iran of inciting trouble among its restive Shiite-populated

Eastern Province and hold Tehran responsible for the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.

Besides Iran‘s nuclear program, its ballistic and cruise missiles forces, its unconventional naval

forces capabilities and its support of non-state actors especially Hezbollah pose a credible threat

in the minds of Saudi security officials.

The Saudi-Iranian relations touched a new low in January 2016, when reaction to execution of

Shia cleric, Nimr Baqar al Nimir in Saudi Arabia triggered violent attacks and vandalism against

Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad, Iran. Subsequently Riyadh severed

diplomatic relations with Tehran followed by Bahrain. Then Qatar, UAE and Kuwait also

recalled their ambassadors from Iran subsequent to the attack on Saudi diplomatic facilities.8

Saudi Arabian officials repeatedly cite past Iran-inspired actions within the kingdom including

violent demonstrations in Mecca during Hajj of 1980s and 1990s that lead to break in bilateral

relations from 1987 to 1991, as a reason for distrusting Iran.

Yemen: More recently, the bilateral relations between two nations are also tensed because of

Saudi Arabia‘s military campaign against Iranian backed Shiite Al Houthi rebel group in

northern Yemen. Iran is reportedly backing the Zaydi Shiite revivalist movement known as the

―Houthis‖ to seize the capital and assisting them with weapon shipments.9 Though Yemen has

never been perceived as core Iranian interest in the region but the conflict within the country and

its vulnerability has offered an opportunity to Iran to acquire additional leverage against its main

Arab adversary. A ten-country Arab coalition assembled by Riyadh with logistical help from US

has been helping pro-Hadi forces to recapture key territory since 2015.10

This conflict has again

brought fears of proxy conflict between the archrivals back into focus.

In spite of the fact that Iranian support for the Houthis appears far less systematic than its support

to Assad in Syria or the government in Iraq, its interference in Yemen has intensified hostility Jeffrey Goldberg, ―The Obama Doctrine,‖ Atlantic, April 2016.

―Qatar recalls ambassador to Iran in wake of Saudi execution crisis,‖ Middle East Eye, January 7, 2016.

Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention (CRS Report, R43960, October 2, 2015), 3.

Ali al-Mujahed and Hugh Naylor, ―Yemen Rebels Defy Saudi-led Attacks,‖ Washington Post, March 28, 2015.

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between Riyadh and Tehran. No firm estimates of Iranian aid to the Houthis exit either, but if it

is supplying them with weapons that could reach into Saudi Arabia. Riyadh thus safely assumes

that they are being considered as potential ally or proxy force with which Iran can project force

on the southwestern coast of the Arabian Peninsula.

Bahrain: Other than Saudi Arabia, Bahrain consistently blames Iran for fomenting unrest among

its Shiite community and trying to overturn the country‘s power structure as it reportedly

attempted in 1981 and 1996. Bahrain‘s ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family is still in the throes of

unrest following hard-line policy taken against dissidents after October 2010 parliamentary

elections. Once again Iran was blamed for plotting to otherthrow the government. Since then

Tehran‘s role has come under strident criticism from the tiny Gulf Kingdom.11

The Arab

Awakening provided impetus to Shiite-dominated opposition that had already been demanding

political and constitutional reforms. For the first time however, US State Department country

report on international terrorism for 2015 asserted direct Iranian involvement in providing

support to Shiites militias in Bahrain.12

Hence, Iran‘s bid to increase its influence in the tiny

kingdom though fraught with challenges remains a reality.

United Arab Emirates: UAE13

, which has a longstanding territorial dispute with Iran over the

Persian Gulf Islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb, also acts in concert with

Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries to blunt Iranian influence within the region. It has not

only refused urgings by US to ease its own sanctions against Iranian banks or to increase

diplomatic engagement with the Islamic Republic14

but has vocally detested Iranian drive for

greater regional influence. UAE ambassador to USA wrote in an op-ed for the Wall Street

Journal on April 3, 2016 that ―Iran we have long known – hostile, expansionist, violent – is alive

and well, and as dangerous as ever.‖15

Currently UEA-Iran diplomatic relations are downgraded

because of Saudi-Iranian dispute over execution of Nimr al Nimr16

and they are expected to be

driven by GCC perceived threat by Iranian expansionist designs in future too.

11

―Bahrain accuses Iran of training rebels,‖ Al Jazeera , January 3, 2014. For details see http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257520.htm For detailed information on UAE-Iran relations see Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues

for US Policy (CRS Report, RS 21852, May 23, 2011), 1-16.

Kenneth Katzman, Iran‟s Foreign and Defence Policies (CRS Report, R44017, October 21, 2016), 22.

Yousef Al Otaiba, ―One Year After the Iran Nuclear Field,‖ Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2016.

Caline Malek, ―UAE recalls ambassador to Iran,‖ The National (UAE), January 2, 2016.

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Qatar: Among the GCC countries, Qatar occupies a middle ground between the anti-Iranian

animosity of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain and frequent engagement exhibited by Oman with

Iran. It has traditionally pursued foreign policy strategy of playing off Iran-Saudi‘s conflicting

agendas to advance its own geopolitical interests.17

One the one hand, Doha maintains high-

level contacts with the Islamic regime; on the other hand it pursues policies opposed to Tehran

by aiding factions in Syria opposed to Iranian-backed Assad and by becoming part of the Saudi-

led military intervention in Yemen.18

Besides unlike its counterparts, Doha has never felt threatened by Iranian-inspired Shiite

revolution in Qatar because its small Shiite population has never succumbed to Iranian influence.

Instead of perceiving Tehran as a threat to regional security, it considers it as a part of solution to

regional security dilemmas and it was the only UNSC member to vote against Resolution 1696

that called halt to Iranian uranium enrichment program. However, the extent to which it can

continue to balance conflict between Saudi-Iran interests remain to be seen, though neither

approves of its independent foreign policy pursuits.19

Kuwait: Similarly Kuwait20

is walking on a tight rope in its relations with Iran. While fully

backing US efforts to contain Iranian nuclear ambitions, it simultaneously views Iran as helpful

in stabilizing Iraq. Kuwait consistent engagement with Shiite Iraqi leaders has also been met

with criticism. Yet by only recalling its ambassador in January 2016, but not severing diplomatic

relations with Iran it has kept the door opened for bilateral relations in future. Any improvement

in relations with Saudi archrival will have major implications for Kuwait‘s relationship with

Riyadh as it will reflect Tehran‘s ability to project strategic influence with states on the

kingdom‘s borders – a development bound to be fiercely resisted by the former.21

Qatari-Iran relations improved significantly between 1995-2013 during reign of Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa

al Thani. Its overreach to Iran, support for Muslim Brotherhood and ownership of Al-Jazeera has all infuriated Riyadh who accuse Doha of pursuing its own interests at the expanse of GCC unity and solidarity and collective security.

For detailed information on Qatar-Iran relations see Kenneth Katzman, Qatar: Governance, Security and US Policy, (CRS Report, R44533, June 9, 2017).

Giorgio Cafiero, ―Qatar‘s precarious position between Saudi Arabia and Iran,‖ Al-Monitor, February 4, 2016.

For detailed information on Iran-Kuwait relations, see Kenneth Katzman, Kuwait: Governance, Security and US Policy (CRS Report, RS21513, May 15, 2017).

Giorgio Cafiero and Cinzia Miotto, ―Kuwait-Iranian Relations: The Energy Angle,‖ Atlantic Council, September 29, 2016.

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Oman: Among the GCC states Oman, however, maintains the most consistent and extensive

engagement with the Islamic Republic. It believes in engaging Tehran rather than isolating it and

threatening it with military action. In 2013 Sultan Qaboos visited Iran which was reciprocated

with Hassan Rouhani‘s visit in 2014 – the only GCC state he has visited as President. Both

countries have accelerated their joint development of Omani port of Duqm since the lifting of

sanctions on Iran, which is envisioned as trade and transportation outlet for Iran. Oman has also

kept its neutrality intact by neither supporting any faction of Syrian war nor joining Saudi

coalition in its war against Yemen and subsequently undertaking the role of mediator in both

conflicts. It was again the only GCC country that didn‘t downgrade diplomatic relations with

Iran over Nimr execution dispute of 2016 between Iran and Saudi Arabia.22

Iraq: Apart from making inroads into GCC, Iraq23

has been the most prominent state where Iran

clearly emerged as a beneficiary with the ousting of long-established antagonist Saddam Husain

in 2003. His replacement with government led by Shiite Islamists, who have long-standing ties to

Iran, has improved prospects of Iranian influence not only within the country but earned support

for Tehran‘s regional goals also. However, Islamic State (IS) organization threat brought the

offensive close to Iranian border in June 2014 and forced Iran to replace longtime ally Maliki by

Haydar Al Abbadi who pledged to be more inclusive of Sunni leaders,24

a move approved by US

also. Besides Iran-backed Shiite militias formed since US withdrawal have been militarily

assisting Assad as well as remaining engaged in Iraq. Iran is likely to remain engaged in Iraq in

future also and that will have significant impact on emerging regional hierarchy.

Syria: Nothing reflects Iranian resolve to be a major player affecting outcome in post-Arab

Spring MENA than its foreign policy behavior being pursued in case of Syria25

. Syrian President

Bashar Al-Assad is a key ally whose regime survival is number one Iranian priority at the

moment. Iranian interest in Syria can be traced back to Assad‘s Alawite community which

practices a version of Islam akin to Shiism. Besides being Iran‘s closest Arab ally, the regime For detailed information on Oman-Iran relations, see Kenneth Katzman, Oman: reform, Security and US Policy

(CRS Report, RS21534, April 26, 2016). ; Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman: A Unique Foreign Policy Produces a Key Player in Middle Eastern and Global Diplomacy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995).

For more information, see Kenneth Katzman and Carla E. Humud, Iraq: Politics and Governance (CRS Report, RS21968, March 09, 2016).

Babak Dehghanpisheh, ―Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to confront Islamic State,‖ Reuters, September 2, 2014.

For more information on the conflict in Syria, see Christopher M. Blanchard et al., Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response (CRS Report, RL33487, September 17, 2014).

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survival is also linked to the arming and protection of another most cherished Middle Eastern

ally i.e. Lebanon‘s Hezbollah. Both Iran and Syria have reportedly used Hezbollah as leverage

against Israel and sought territorial and regional aims through them. The prospect of Assad being

replaced with an Islamic State or any other Sunni extremist is also too distasteful to Iranian

interests – an outcome that needs to be averted through overt and covert military and diplomatic

backing to Syria. The extent of this relationship and its impact on the overall emerging power

structure will be explored at length in the subsequent chapters.

Israel –Palestine: Simultaneously linked with Iran‘s support for Hamas and Hezbollah is the

issue of Palestine and question of Israel‘s existence, which the Islamic Republic considers to be

an illegitimate creation of the West. The clerical regime policy towards Israel is a complete

contrast with the one pursued by the earlier Shah of Iran that maintained extensive economic ties

with the former. Iran‘s open hostility to Israel is manifested through labeling of Israel as a

―cancerous tumor‖ by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamene‘i.26

Tehran‘s unabashed support for

Hamas and Hezbollah is already a source of grave concern for the Israeli leadership and prospect

of a nuclear-armed Iran is nothing less than an ―existential threat‖ to the State of Israel.27

While Iran also considers that Israel poses a serious strategic threat to its security and stability. It

has repeatedly accused international community of employing ―double standards‖ and treating

Israel‘s presumed nuclear arsenal differently than that of Iran‘s quest for nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes. Israel‘s repeated assertions to retain the option of unilateral strike on its

nuclear facilities have also prompted Tehran to cite Israel as a nuclear threat to Iran. Israel and

Iran are expected to be involved in fierce competition against each other within the region as

long as the Iranian nuclear program remains contentious and Iran‘s support for militant anti-

Israel groups continues as indicated by annual US State Department reports for the past two

decades.28

Lebanon: Apart from the nuclear issue Tehran‘s links with Lebanon‘s Hezbollah is another sore

issue in Israel-Iran relations. They are employed as a proxy to pressure Tel Aviv and Washington

Greg Tepper, ―Israel a ‗cancerous tumor‘ and Middle East‘s biggest problem, Iranian supreme leader says,‖ Times

of Israel, August 19, 2012.

Raphael Ahren, ―Would a nuclear Iran truly pose an existential threat to Israel?‖ Times of Israel, February 21, 2015.

Katzman, Iran‟s Foreign and Defense Policies, 35-38.

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and represent its ―axis of resistance‖ against the West. Though Iran is one of the many countries

vying for influence in Lebanon but it enjoys particularly close relations with its Shiite population

and their militia organization Hezbollah which receives funding, training and support from

Tehran. Besides, Iranian support for Hezbollah serves as a counterpoint to Saudi Arabian support

to Sunni groups. Riyadh growing frustration with increasing Iranian influence is evident through

its reversing of decades-long support to Lebanese government and its suspension of four billion

dollar security package. It has recently received a further set-back when Lebanon defied fellow

Arab States and rejected labeling of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.29

While others argue that Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 has left a power vacuum that is

filled by Iran through its proxy Hezbollah. Hezbollah‘s war with Israel in 2006 and its siege of

Beirut in 2008 reflect that it‘s gaining domestic strength and has the potential to act as a spoiler

of Western interests in the region. As regional influence of Iran grows, so does Hezbollah‘s

strategic depth and hence the prospect of instability in this part of the region along with

increasing animosity towards Israel.30

Turkey: Lastly, Turkey-Iran relations are the key to emerging regional hierarchical structure and

have implications for whether Iran would have an easy walk over in the Persian Gulf or will it

face competition for increased influence from its neighbour. The bilateral economic and political

ties between Turkey and Iran are quite extensive and both share concerns about their respective

restive Kurdish populations which enjoy safe haven in northern Iraq. But Turkey‘s membership

of NATO and its close relations with US limit prospect of cooperation. Turkey had been

advocate of Assad‘s ouster from Syria but post- military coup in July and mutual concerns over

Syrian Kurdish forces have resulted in narrowing of differences between the two. From outright

exit, Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdgoan has accepted Assad in power through a period of

political transition in August 2016.31

Competing regional ambitions, however, will keep them

away from comprehensively aligning their foreign policy ambitions.

David Daoud, ―Iran‘s Power Play in Lebanon,‖ National Interest, March 19, 2016

Shai Oseran and Stephane Cohen, ―Don‘t be Fooled. Hezbollah IS Bigger and Badder Than Ever,‖ The Tower Magazine 12, March 2014.

Ali Hashem, ―What‘s behind the Turkey-Iran Tango?‖ Al-Monitor, August 22, 2016.

178

While Iran‘s position within the region may be enhancing but its bilateral relations with US will

also determine how far its growing political influence within the region will be countered by the

US and her allies.

4.1.1.2. Iran-US Relations

US enjoyed cordial relations with Iran during the Cold War when Muhammad Reza Pahlavi‘s

government acted as a bulwark against Soviet influence expansion in the Persian Gulf and as a

counter-weight to pro-USSR Arab regimes and movements within the region. The toppling of

this key US ally on February 11, 1979 opened a period of ongoing rift and confrontation in US-

Iranian relations. The Carter Administration‘s initial bid to engage the Islamic regime ended

when the takeover of US embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 by pro-Khomeini students

resulted in taking hostage of 60 US diplomats for 444 days. US severed diplomatic relations with

Iran on April 7, 1980, prior to a failed US military attempt to rescue the hostages.32

From then onwards relations further deteriorated during Regan‘s Administration that designated

Iran as ―a state sponsor of terrorism‖ in January 1984 primarily because of Iranian support for

Lebanese Hezbollah. This also signified US tilt towards Iraq in the Iran-Iraq 1980-88 war and

Iran suffered because of US diplomatic efforts to block conventional arms sales to Iran.33

During

the same period US forces in the Gulf shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Gulf on July 3,

1988 killing all 290 on board. It then claimed that the plane was mistakenly hit and was an

―accident‖ but the Iranians saw the attack to be ―purposeful‖.34

When the inaugural speech of George H. W. Bush stated ―goodwill begets goodwill‖ with

respect to Iran; the comments were interpreted as offering to improve bilateral relations pending

Tehran‘s help in obtaining release of US hostages in Lebanon. However no thaw in relations

followed even after release of all hostages by December 1991.35

Announcement of ―dual

containment‖ strategy of keeping both Iran and Iraq weak instead of tilting to either by Clinton

Administration further aggravated tensions.

For a complete Chronology of US-Iran relations see https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-us-timeline.html. Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein‟s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York: John

Wiley and Sons, 1991), 168.

Max Fisher, ―The forgotten story of Iran Air Flight 655,‖ Washington Post, October 16, 2013

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, ―Why doesn‘t Iran trust the US?‖ Al-Monitor, June 22, 2015.

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The trend continued during George W. Bush Administration too. Despite limited cooperation on

post-Taliban Afghanistan,36

Iran was included in the ―axis of evil‖ in January 2002 State of the

Union message along with Iraq and North Korea. Iranian President Khatemi rebuffed Bush‘s

rhetoric as ―intervening, warmongering, [and] insulting.‖37

Later that year, Iranian nuclear

program became major US policy concern when it was confirmed that Iran was building a

uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak.

When Obama entered the White House, he asserted that there was potential for rebuilding US-

Iran relationship and Tehran can be persuaded through diplomacy to limit its nuclear program

after decades of mutual animosity. In spite of expressed skepticism from within the

administration US pursued a strategy of engaging Iran. However, at the end of 2009, Iran‘s

crackdown on election-related unrest once again soured bilateral relations38

and its refusal to

accept limitations on its nuclear program prompted Obama Administration to shift to ―two track

strategy‖ i.e. stronger economic sanctions coupled with negotiations on nuclear program that

offered the prospect of sanctions relief.39

The first direct contact since the 1979 revolution between the two countries‘ Presidents took

place on September 27, 2013 when Obama telephoned Hassan Rouhani.40

However concern

over Iran‘s nuclear program has never faded in the bilateral relations. There is increasing

speculation within the administration that a nuclear armed Iran would likely be more assertive

regionally and internationally and might conclude that US might be reluctant to use military

option against it. Besides this might induce an intense arms race within the already volatile

region and the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremist groups or

countries cannot be ignored either in the US official policy circles.41

Successive US Administrations have identified Iran as key national security challenge, citing its

missile and nuclear program and its attempts to counter US objectives in the region including its

persistent hostility to Israel. February 2016 annual threat assessment testimony by Director of

Robin Wright, ―U.S. In ‗Useful‘ Talks With Iran,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2003.

Alex Wagner, ―Bush labels North Korea, Iran, Iraq an ‗Axis of Evil‘,‖ Arms Control Association, March 1, 2002.

Nazila Fathi, ―Protesters Defy Iranian Efforts to Cloak Unrest,‖ New York Times, June 17, 2009. ; Nazila Fathi and Michael Slackman, ―Iran Stepping Up Efforts to Quell Election Protest,‖ New York Times, June 24, 2009.

For details see Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions (CRS Report, RS 2087, June 07, 2017).

Jeff Mason and Louis Charbonneau, ―Obama, Rouhani hold historic phone call,‖ Reuters, September 28, 2013.

Katzman, Iran: Politics, Gulf Security,19.

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National Intelligence James Clapper again cited Iran as ―enduring threat to US national interests

because of its support to regional terrorist and militant groups and the Assad regime, as well as

its development of advanced military capabilities.‖42

Iran‘s military-to-military relationships with Russia, China, Ukraine, Belarus and North Korea;

its asymmetric warfare capacity and power projection capability through allies and proxies leave

no doubt that it will continue to be a key security challenge to US objectives within the region.

4.1.2. Saudi Arabia

As a birthplace of Prophet Muhammad PBUH and as a home to two of the holiest sites of Islam

(cites of Mecca and Medina), Saudi Arabia has always enjoyed a unique and distinct position

particularly within the broader Middle East and the entire Muslim world at large.

4.1.2.1. Saudi Arabia in post-Arab Spring MENA

The Arab upheavals of 2011 caught Saudi Arabia amidst an uncertain predicament as it was not

only preparing for a potentially complicated monarchical succession but was already engaged in

fending off an ideological and strategic challenge from a resurgent Iran in its immediate

neighbourhood. The Arab Awakening could also be said to constitute the third most potential

challenge to its stability and security, as the first two Nasserism of 1950s and Iranian Revolution

of 1979, failed to dent fairly Saudi regime‘s domestic and regional standing within the Middle

East.

As the most ardent defender of the existing fragile regional balance-of-power, Riyadh

aggressively campaigned for preserving status-quo reflected through its offer of sanctuary to the

ousted Ben Ali of Tunisia and by speaking in favour of ―stability‖ in Egypt, Bahrain and other

countries when their restive publics were calling for tearing down of corrupt prevailing domestic

orders. The unprecedented events of 2011 created a series of diplomatic setbacks for the ruling

Saudi regime particularly. Not only there was political change in Egypt and Tunisia, protests in

Bahrain, collapse of pro –Saudi Saad al Hariri government in Lebanon, instability in Yemen and

Katzman, Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, 18.

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conflict in Libya but the prospect of Iran emerging as the most unaffected and the prominent

beneficiary of the Arab upheaval was the most distasteful to the Saudis.

History of Saudi-Iran mutual hostility for each other and how they are engaged in Bahrain,

Yemen, and Syria etc. has already been under discussion but apart from Saudi apprehension

about Iranian subversive activities within the region was the fear of the potential ramifications of

Shiite freedom movements on its own Shiite minority population. The regime‘s top priority had

been to safeguard domestic and regime stability and the Arab upheavals posed a significant

threat to both. It immediately adopted ―tried and tested strategy of buying social peace through

co-optation of the population.‖43

Large-scale benefits were announced catering to the lower and

middle income groups by King Abdullah on February 20, 2011-who just landed after a three

month medical absence.44

Estimates of the total costs for the social welfare programs introduced

since outbreak of the Arab Spring differs; Al-Arabia put the number at $93 billion by mid-April

201345

while Kamrava claimed them to be $130 billion.46

Iran: The impact of the Arab Awakening for Saudi regional foreign policy behavior was,

however, substantial. The Saudi-Iran bilateral relations worsened continuously since 2003 but

the Arab Uprisings accelerated the downward trend. The developments seriously threatened

Saudi Arabia and its allies, and the apprehension about the final outcome on the stability of

region‘s monarchies kept the ruling elites nervous. As Riyadh has lately been interpreting events

in the region first and foremost through the lens of its conflict with Tehran; it has displayed

sensitivity to both real and perceived Iranian ―incursions‖ within the region and suspected that

Iran might exploit instability prevailing in the region for enhanced influence – apprehension that

might not be altogether unfounded.

Tehran‘s nuclear ambitions and a Shiite-dominated Iran-friendly government in Baghdad have

jointly triggered aggressive foreign policy posture of Riyadh since 2005 but the concerns about

the nuclear program had caught Saudi ruling family in a dilemma. They neither wanted a nuclear

armed Iran within this region nor could get over the apprehension that US might be too

Bernard Haykel, ―Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution,‖ Gulf Analysis Paper, CSIS, February 2013, 3.

―Saudi King Boosts Spending, Returns to Country, ― Voice of America, February 22, 2011.

―Saudi King Tells Ministries to Facilitate Huge Housing Program,‖ Al-Arabiya, April 16, 2013.

Mehran Kamrava, ―The Arab Spring and The Saudi-led Counterrevolution,‖ Orbis 56, no.1 (2012): 98.

182

conciliatory and accept Iranian regional supremacy in return for concessions on its nuclear

program. The uprisings of 2011 amplified these fears. In an attempt to block real or perceived

gains in Iranian influence in the region, Saudis initially started with three fundamental

objectives: firstly, bolstering allies and limiting Muslim Brotherhood influence in the states

undergoing transformation in post-Arab Spring environment; secondly, intervened militarily in

Bahrain to protect their interests and send message to Iran that Gulf remains primarily Saudi

sphere of influence; and thirdly, backing insurgents in Syria since 2012 who are fighting for the

exit of key Iranian ally Bashar al-Assad.47

All these actions undertaken to protect vital Saudi

interests have simultaneously accelerated tensions with Tehran and further widened arenas for

proxy war between the two, now engulfing Yemen also.

Egypt: Regionally, the biggest blow to Riyadh came when the Arab uprising swept away its most

staunch ally, Egyptian President Mubarak; but as the revolutions unfolded within the region,

Saudi Arabia emerged to be the primary defender of the status quo. Bewildered by the pace of

the events and deeply inimical to political change itself; it was seen scrambling to extend

political and financial support to embattled allied rulers from Morocco and Egypt to Bahrain and

Jordan. Riyadh welcomed the Tunisian president after the successful revolution toppled the first

long-established Arab regime in MENA and he fled his country.48

Prior to Mubarak‘s departure,

the uprising against him was bitterly criticized by Riyadh who termed the revolt as ―blatant

interference‖ by outsiders.49

In addition, it tried its best to convince Obama Administration to

continue its political support for Mubarak.

However, after failing to save Egyptian President, it ensured new Egypt‘s political order and

strategic orientation might not contradict its interests. In mid-May 2011, Egypt‘s economy was

provided with ―soft loans, deposits and grants‖ amounting $4billion.50

The huge financial aid

might have been intended to reduce Muslim Brotherhood‘s growing appeal among the masses,

against which Riyadh had deep-rooted ideological rivalry. Prospect of either rapprochement

between Egypt and Iran or increased hostility towards Israel, once Muslim Brotherhood controls Guido Steinberg, ―Leading the Counter-Revolution: Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring‖ (SWP Berlin, June 2014),

―Ben Ali gets refuge in Saudi Arabia,‖ Al Jazeera, January 16, 2011.

Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL33533, March 10, 2011), 2.

Nayla Razzouk, ―Egypt to Receive $4 Billion Economic Aid from Saudi Arabia, SPA Reports,‖ Bloomberg, May 21, 2001.

183

Egypt‘s foreign policy, was also contrary to Saudi strategic interests.51

The former would have

strengthened Iran‘s relative power in MENA while the later would have put considerable

pressure on Riyadh because of its close strategic alliance with the US.

However, following the Brotherhood‘s electoral victories in parliamentary and presidential

elections in 2011/12, Saudis made an effort to enter into a working relationship with the new

government. However, when Morsi‘s government was toppled following popular unrests in early

July 2013, the Saudi regime emerged Egyptian military‘s strongest foreign supporter.52

As Saudi money bankrolled the coup by General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt, its aggressive

diplomacy and support for the Salafist movements reflected a determined bid to safeguard its

interests in the region. The return of military rule has subsequently proved unfounded the initial

fears prevalent within Saudi elite that the toppling of a close personal ally might call into

question the strategic orientation of the most populous Sunni Arab state. Unlike Iran, the military

coup was welcomed by Riyadh as it considerably narrowed Qatar‘s regional influence which

gained momentum after it emerged supporter of protest movements since 2011.

Bahrain: One might disagree with the extent of Vijay Prashad statement that ―The Arab Spring

was defeated neither in the byways of Tahrir Square nor in the souk of Aleppo. It was defeated

roundly in the palaces of Riyadh. From there came the petro-dollars to scuttle the ambitions of

the people.‖53

But Saudi Arabian militarily intervention in Bahrain was equally unprecedented

and if there was a moment to be identified as death knell to Arab Spring and region‘s quest for

broad and representative government across MENA it was the day Saudi tanks moved into

Bahrain to help put down the mass uprising against the ruling regime.

The aggression was clearly intended to send a loud and clear message not only to restive

domestic Shiite minority who were protesting in the eastern city of Qatif where violent clashes

were reported between Saudi security officials and the protestors as the Saudi Press Agency brief

dated October 4, 2011 acknowledged, as well to the ―foreign country‖ believed to be behind

them. In words of John Bradley: ―The brazen move was a clear signal from Riyadh to every state

For more information see Saud Mousaed Al-Tamamy, ―Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring: Opportunities and Challenges of Security,‖ Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf and the Red Sea 2, no. 2 (2012): 143-156.

―King Abdullah Congratulates New Egyptian Leader,‖ Arab News, July 4, 2013.

Vijay Prashad, ―Why Saudi Arabia Still Needs An Arab Spring,‖ Alternet, February 8, 2016.

184

in the Middle East that it would stop at nothing, ranging from soft diplomacy to full-on military

engagement, in its determination to lead a region-wide counterrevolution.‖54

The unrest and

resultant instability, however, provided a proxy arena for competition between Iran and Saudi

Arabia that possesses a key strategic value for both and continues till date. 55

Jordan and Morroco: Besides intervening in Bahrain, Riyadh also lobbied within GCC in favour

of extending membership to Jordan and Morocco. This move clearly reflected the Gulf States

shifting their strategic and political alliance in face of changed political environment due to

December 2011 Tunisian uprisings and adapting to changes in their basic security framework.

While Morocco never expressed its desire to join the club, but Jordan‘s request of 1980s and

1996 has been twice rejected before. The offer, however, was quickly downgraded to a ―strategic

partnership‖ and this might be because both states are economically much weaker than their Gulf

partners and might had quickly become economic burden for them. Analysts speculate that US

policy towards Mubarak was the turning point. Shadi Hamid asserts: ―The Saudis worried that if

the U.S. was able to turn its back on one of its closest allies in the region when former President

Hosni Mubarak left, will they do it again if unrest erupts somewhere else in the region? Who will

they throw under the bus next?‖56

The move might thus be interpreted to diversify defense allies

and reduce dependence on the West.57

The Gulf States: Even before the proposal of a Gulf Union became public, Saudi support for

financially weaker partners in the GCC was apparent at the first sign of protests in North Africa

in 2011. Aid totaling $20 billion was promised to Bahrain and Oman, to make it easier for

governments to keep the protests in check, prompting the specter of a GCC ―Marshall-type Plan‖

for the region.58

Oman which frequently has maintained much better relations with Tehran has

also played an obstructive role in GCC since 1980s. January 2011 protests in the Omani capital

of Muscat provided Riyadh an opportunity to exploit Oman‘s dependency on aid from its allies

to deepen integration. Consequently King Abdullah proposed in December 2011 that GCC states

John R. Bradely, ―Saudi Arabia‘s Invisible Hand in the Arab Spring: How the Kingdom is Wielding Influence Across the Middle East, ― Foreign Affairs, October 13, 2011.

For details see Simon Mabon, ―The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry,‖ Middle East Policy Council Journal 21, no.2 (Summer 2012).

Sara Hamdan, ―Gulf Council Reaches Out to Morroco and Jordan,‖ New York Times, May 25, 2011.

For more details see Dr. Saud Al Tamamy, ―GCC Membership Expansion: Possibilities and Obstacles,‖ Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, March 15, 2015.

Mohammad Al Asoomi, ―Oman and Bahrain have lot to gain from GCC plan,‖ Gulf News, June 19, 2013.

185

join together more closely in a political and economic union. While it was being hailed as a

visionary move by the pro-Saudi press, it was no less than an embarrassing blunder by the King,

who failed to consult ambitious proposal with his ministers too.59

Only Bahrain responded positively to the proposal because it perceived the same kind of threat

from Iran as Riyadh. On the other hand, resistance to the proposal was spearheaded by Oman

who saw it nothing more than another Saudi attempt to entrench their strength within GCC. UAE

and Qatar probably shared similar reservations but they held back public expression of criticism.

Finally Oman rejected the proposal in December 2013 triggering strong words on the Saudi

side.60

Thus Saudi efforts to form a unified front against Iran within the region that might

entrench their supremacy met a failure. Mutual suspicions between political elites of GCC

mitigated against closer ties.

Libya: Saudis reaction to the uprisings in Libya was, however, totally different to the popular

unrest witnessed in Egypt and Bahrain. Here, contrary to the prevalent view it didn‘t side with

the counter-revolutionary forces but on the other hand supported the popular fervor against

Gaddafi. When Arab League requested UNSC for no-fly zone to be imposed on Libya in the

light of massive attacks against protestors by pro-Gaddafi forces on March 21, 2011, Riyadh

reportedly played pivotal role in bringing about this landmark decision. Eleven out of twenty-two

Arab League member states were present the day UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted and

among the nine Arab League states that voted in favour of the resolution six were GCC countries

along with Saudi Arabia.61

However, Saudi jets did not participate in enforcing the no-fly zone

like Qatar and UAE.

In short the civil unrest in Libya presented an opportunity rather than a challenge to Saudi‘s

interest in the region. It is also reported that the Saudi regime also supported the rebels through

the much needed arm supplies. Besides settling the score with a long-standing adversary, the

move was also connected to developments in Bahrain. In words of Rene Rieger: ―….throwing See ―The Federal Gulf Countries?‖ an-Nahar (Beirut), December 21, 2011.

―Oman goes blunt ‗against‘ a Gulf Union,‖ Al Arabiya English, December 7, 2013. ; Madawi Al-Rasheed, ―Omani rejection of GCC union adds insult to injury for Saudi Arabia,‖ Al-Monitor, December 9, 2013.

Pepe Escobar, ―Exposed : The US-Saudi Libya Deal,‖ Asia Times Online, April 2, 2011.

186

Gaddafi under the proverbial bus was a price the Al-Saud would have been more than willing to

pay to contribute to the stability of Bahrain.‖62

While investigative journalist Pepe Escobar wrote in Asia Times Online in April 2011 that the

Arab League resolution arrived as a deal between Washington and Raiyadh. ―You invade

Bahrain. We take out Muammar Gaddafi in Libya …. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, gave the go-ahead for Saudi Arabia to invade Bahrain and crush the pro-democracy movement in their

neighbor in exchange for a ―yes‖ vote by the Arab League or a no-fly zone over Libya- the main

rationale that led to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.‖63

Syria: Labeling Saudi policy during the Arab Spring as counterrevolutionary won‘t do justice to

the ostensibly contradictory policy pursued by Riyadh. The primary interest of the Saudi

government throughout the period till now has been the regime security and regional stability as

well as containment and ideally rollback of Iranian regional influence. True that Riyadh has been

making significant efforts to guard political status quo in Arab monarchies unaffected by the

Arab upheaval but it simultaneously supported revolutionary factions in Libya and Syria.

Damascus since the Arab uprisings has become the most intensely contested proxy battleground

between Iran and Saudi Arabia and both are engaged in a consistent struggle to safeguard their

interests in the civil war still going on to dislodge Bashar al-Assad from Syria. The outcome of

the Syrian civil war will play a pivotal role in the emerging hierarchical structure. How intensely

Riyadh and Tehran are vying to affect the outcome will be discussed at length in the subsequent

chapters.

Iraq: Apart from Syria, Iraq also occupies significant position in the emerging equation. Saudi

Arabia that historically has enjoyed tensed relations with Baghdad, except for a brief period of

cooperation during Iran-Iraq war of 1980s, is now busy to preserve its strategic interests in the

country that include: limiting Iranian influence in the region; preventing repression of Sunnis by

newly empowered Shiites; and preventing instability and conflict in Iraq to threaten Saudi

internal security. 64

Saudi Arabia reopened its diplomatic office in Iraq in December 2015 after a

25 years absence marking a milestone in relative normalization of bilateral relations. Change of Rieger, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring, 13.

Escobar, The US-Saudi Libya Deal.

For the Saudi cabinet‘s statement of its key principles for Iraq, see ―King Abdullah Chairs Cabinet‘s Session,‖

Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh), November 20, 2006.

187

Iraqi leadership from Nori al-Maliki to Prime Minister Hayder al Abadi in 2014 was the reason

because the former was perceived as unduly influenced by Iran in Riyadh. Iraq-based IS

supporters still threaten Saudi leaders but Saudi Arabia has not participated in air strikes in Iraq

as a part of counter-IS coalition. Similarly empowerment of lran-linked Shiite militia groups in

Iraq will continue to be perceived with suspicion in Riyadh. So Iraq will remain a major concern

for Saudi foreign policy elite in coming years too.

Yemen: Apart from Iraq and Syria, another country now caught between Saudi-Iran proxy war is

Yemen. Traditionally Riyadh has exercised strong role in Yemen and sought to mitigate potential

threats through liaison relationships and security interventions. But the course of developments

since 2014 has challenged transitional set-up backed by Riyadh and GCC countries as an alliance

of northern Yemen insurgents under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh asserted itself.65

Situation worsened when Houthis and pro-Saleh forces continued military operations in

contravention of the agreed power sharing arrangement signed in September 2014.66

Houthis

unwillingness to withdraw from capital and unilateral moves renewed conflict and led to

President Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi‘s resignation and de facto house arrest in January 2015.

In the period since, Saudis claim Houthis have attacked their borders and targeted Saudi

nationals. Even Scud missile attacks reportedly have been intercepted on several occasions.67

Even the United Nations efforts to facilitate intra-Yemeni negotiations in Kuwait in April 2016

failed in August, resulting in once again intensification of war. A catastrophic humanitarian

crisis has engulfed this extremely poor state but the conflict is far from near any resolution.

Israel – Palestine: The flux in MENA has not only realigned Saudi relations with the Arab states

and other regional players but Saudi-Israel relations had also exhibited some deviation from

traditional policy postures that up till now has reflected extreme enmity between the two states.

Israeli-Palestinian conflict is viewed as a central policy problem in the Middle East by the Saudi

regime and they had been stressing to US that it should support a solution to the conflict that

addresses various Palestinian and Arab concerns. Riyadh, unlike several other GCC states, hasn‘t

For background on Yemen, its transition process and the conflict there see Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL34170, February 11, 2015).

―Yemen rivals sign peace agreement,‖ Al Jazeera, September 22, 2014.

―Houthis fire scud missiles at Saudi Arabia : Reports,‖ Middle East Eye, August 26, 2015.

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established open trade or liaison channels for communication with Tel Aviv so far; nevertheless

kept supporting US policy initiatives for Israel-Palestine peace agreements since 1990s.

But recently overt contacts have occurred between Saudi Arabia and Israel that have been

criticized by Hamas.68

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu also asserted in January 2016 that

―Saudi Arabia recognizes that Israel is an ally rather than an enemy because of the two principle

threats that threaten them, Iran and Daesh [ISIS]‖.69

In spite of this rhetoric official Saudi

statements are routinely critical of Israeli policies and IS has been described as Israeli tool by the

Grand Mufti Abd al Aziz al Sheikh.70

Thus the shared antipathy to Iranian regional pursuits,

parallel cooperation with the US and shared terrorism hasn‘t so far contributed to tangibly close

bilateral relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv in recent years.

Apart from increasing apprehension with enhanced Iran‘s role in the region and how flux in

MENA are changing traditional alliances, Saudi Arabian relations with US are also undergoing

significant changes and these may have lasting impact on the newly emerging power hierarchy

within the region.

4.1.1.2. Saudi-US Relations

Early formal Saudi-US diplomatic relations can be traced to the Second World War though US

recognized King Abd Al Aziz as the ruler of Hejaz and Nejd in 1931. However the discovery of

substantial oil reserves in 1938 in eastern Saudi Arabia and their management and production

during the inter-war period resulted not only in gradual replacement of UK but also in the

deepening of bilateral relations71

that progressed gradually in spite of recurring difference of

opinion on regional issues especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. Successive American

administrations of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon kept viewing the

monarchy as the bulwark against the spread of Communism within the Persian Gulf region and

beyond. The latent tensions in the bilateral relation came forward in the October 1973 Arab-

Israel war that became instrumental in changing the prevailing political and economic dynamics Dov Lieber, ―Hamas asks Saudis to prevent ‗normalization‘ visits to Israel,‖ Times of Israel, July 31, 2016.

―Netanyahu urges to adopt policy of moderate Arab states on Israel,‖ i24 News, January 22, 2016.

―Islamic alliance will defeat Daesh: Grand Mufti,‖ Saudi Gazette, December 28, 2015.

For details see Aaron David Miller, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian oil and American foreign policy, 1939-1949, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). ; and Simon Davis, ―Keeping the Americans in line?

Britain, the United States and Saudi Arabia, 1939-45: Inter-Allied Rivalry in the Middle East Revisited,‖ Diplomacy

& Statecraft 8, no.1 (1997): 96-136.

189

of the relationship. Both re-anchored the relationship, however, and during Carter and Regan

administrations Saudis actively coordinated with US policy and supported anti-Communist

causes throughout the world.72

The shared anti-Communist interests that helped define Saudi-US relations since the late 1940s

got eliminated with the end of the Cold War. But US interests in the uninterrupted flow of Saudi

oil and maintenance of political status quo in the Persian Gulf region remained strong. These

shared interests however were unable to bridge the persistent differences on the Arab-Israel

conflict and other regional issues. In the post-Cold War period traditional defense cooperation

survived but the gulf widened in other areas. The direct involvement of 15 Saudi nationals in

9/11 terrorist attacks - the worst of its kind on the American soil, however kindled strong

criticism in the US of Saudi involvement in terrorism. Others however criticized the Saudi policy

decisions that had been responsible for a certain type of religious extremism and international

terrorism over the decades either directly or indirectly. The same ideology had proved to be an

asset for the US during 1980s and was also embraced by US in its struggle against Soviets in

Afghanistan.73

The bilateral relations have been subjected to severe pressure but Saudi government denied any

knowledge of or involvement in 9 /11 and instead sought to project since 2003 its domestic threat

from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Members of this group have carried out

attacks within the kingdom but the 9/11 Commission Report released on July 23, 2004 described

Saudi Arabia as having been ―a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism‖.74

Appreciating Saudi government counter-terrorism as ―significant‖ but urging at the same time to

do more particularly with regard to terrorist threats beyond Saudi borders and asked Riyadh to

―exercise oversight of fundraising activities in the Kingdom and Saudi charitable activities

For details see Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America‟s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 168-190.

For details see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of CIA, Afghanistan, and Ben Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).

Quoted in Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL33533, November 16, 2009), 7.

190

abroad.‖75

Throughout the period terrorist financing concerns have proven to be a persistent

point of contention between the two countries.76

Saudi Arabian government has described Al Qaeda it affiliates, the Islamic State and other

Salafist-jihadist groups and their supporters as direct threat to its own national security. Shared

security challenges have long defined US-Saudi relations but time and again they have been put

to severe test based on diverging regional foreign policy priorities. Saudis are already not happy

with US-Iranian nuclear deal.77

It remains to been seen how long this relationship could endure

considering a change in US Administration and replacement of Barack Obama with Donald

Trump.

4.1.3. Turkey

A state, which during the Cold War was not more than a peripheral member of the Atlantic

community, is now at the centre of the world that spans the Middle East, North Africa, the

Balkans, Caucasus and beyond. Analyzing changes in the post-Arab Spring MENA without

taking into account the strategic calculations of Turkey and its foreign policy behavior, would

present not more than a distorted picture of the region.

4.1.3.1. Turkey in post-Arab Spring MENA

As the dramatic developments in Turkey‘s neighbourhood were jostling long-established Arab

and North African authoritarian regimes and along with it disrupting the established regional

order; Turkey though much like the West got off guard, but nevertheless, viewed them as

presenting Ankara with both long-term opportunities and threats. This regional opportunity was

equated with the ―global turmoil‖78

unfolding at the systemic level, corresponding with the

hegemonic decline of the United States and created incentives as well as room for maneuvering For details visit http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2008/122411.htm . For more information see Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues (CRS Report RL32499, September 14, 2007).

Gene Gerzhoy, ―How to manage Saudi anger at the Iran deal,‖ Washington Post, May 22, 2015. ; Carlo E. Lee and Gordon Lubold, ―U.S. Seeks to Allay Concerns of Allies on Iran Nuclear Deal,‖ Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2015.

Zibgniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993).

191

for the other regional powers. Turkey‘s regional activism and the Arab Spring are subsequently

to be analyzed in this broader geopolitical context.

Traditionally perceived as an actor that jumped on the US bandwagon during the Cold War, and

adopting a low-profile posture in the Middle East, Turkey saw in the US hegemonic decline an

unprecedented opportunity to bid for greater influence within the region as well as felt the

greater freedom and autonomy to realize its objectives.79

However, at the same time its declared

policy of ―zero problems with neighbours‖ was to be put to severe pressure and it had to be

revised and adjusted to adapt to the new realities. Turkey‘s desire for a role as an influential

regional power though within grasp, was also fraught with unique challenges.

When the rest of the world was experiencing democratization, MENA had to cope with

decolonization after the WWII. Even after the Cold War, the region seemed to be frozen in

history as the pro-western monarchic rulers maintained the status quo and addressed Western

concerns. The ―war on terror‖ further strengthened these authoritarian regimes and their relations

with the US in the first decade of the twenty-first century. However the Arab Spring offered

unique opportunity to Arab publics, who were no longer willing to have their destiny hijacked by

these corrupt regimes. Turkey with its democratic credentials, thriving economy and

modernization program presented a desirable model to be emulated and a more receptive

audience for a larger Turkish role in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab Spring was

speculated. Thus it would be not overstatement to claim ―that the myth of Turkey as a ‗bridge‘

between East and West has finally outlived its usefulness. Instead of deferring to American or

European interests in the Middle East, Turkey has begun to promote its own agenda. Where it

coincides with western ones, fine. Where it does not, too bad.‖80

While critics claim that the sheer pace of developments in MENA largely invalidated Turkey‘s

drive to become an influential regional power as the resultant changes severed Ankara‘s ties with

the very neighbours with whom it had earlier sought to develop unlimited cooperation. But its

ambivalent and at times contradictory stance during the Arab Spring came under intense scrutiny

and posed to be the most serious challenge to Turkey‘s aspiration as a regional leader to date. For details on how Turkish policy changed in the Middle East in the 1990s see Sabri Sayari, ―Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s,‖ Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no.3 (Spring 1997): 44-55.

Piotr Zalewski, ―The Self-Appointed Superpower: Turkey Goes It Alone,‖ World Policy Journal 27, no. 4 (Winter 2010/2011): 102.

192

With no particular commercial or geopolitical interests at stake with regime continuity or change

in either Tunisia or Egypt, it was quick to side with the popular demand and asked Egypt‘s

Mubarak to heed the demonstrator‘s call and leave office.81

But with significant number of

workers, companies and investment at stake in Libya, the decision to out rightly oppose Gaddafi

became quite difficult.82

Syrian Bashar al Assad‘s opposition proved to be even more

problematic. Though its policy in Libya and Syria finally converged with that of US and NATO

allies but not without significant loss of public face. Post-Arab Spring MENA had additional

challenges to offer to Turkish regional activism.

Egypt: The Arab Spring in Egypt first brought jubilation among the Turkish policy circles when

the Islamists emerged as the ultimate winners in post-Mubarak period. However, ever since

Abdel Fattah al-Sisi took over power by overthrowing former President Mohammed Moris- a

close Turkish ally in 2013, Turkey-Egypt bilateral relations are going from bad to worse.

Erdogan criticized the military Egyptian regime in a speech to the UN General Assembly by

labeling its rise as a coup d‘état.83

The Egyptian diplomatic corps highly angered by Erdogan‘s

remark accused him of funding terrorists and deviated for the first time from usual diplomatic

wordings.

Tensions renewed when the Egyptian Parliament on July 26, 2016 approved a resolution to

recognize the 1915 Armenian genocide at the hands of Ottoman Turks, making a new turn in the

bitter row that has already severed diplomatic ties between the two.84

Besides throwing light on

the detrimental influence of regime hard-liners on Egypt‘s regional policies, the remarks

threatened to damage relations with Ankara beyond repair after failed coup attempt in Turkey

which prematurely was reported successful in the Egyptian media.85

―Turkish PM Erdogan urges Mubarak to heed Egyptian outcry,‖ Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), February 01, 2011.

By March 2010, Turkey had $15 billion worth of outstanding contracts with Libya, $1.5 billion worth of equipment in the country and some 30,000 expatriates working there. Figures quoted from Philip Robins, ―The

Foreign Policy of Turkey,‖ in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan

Ehteshami, 2nd

ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 336. Aswat Masriya, ―Egypt Condemns Turkish President Erdogan‘s Speech at the UN,‖ Egyptian Streets, September 25, 2014.

Safa Joudeh, ―Why Egypt and Turkey won‘t reconcile anytime soon,‖ Al-Monitor, August 2, 2016.

―Egyptian media prematurely declares overthrow of Erdogan,‖ Mada Masr, July 16, 2016.

193

Egypt appears to have escalated crisis with Turkey with no clear strategy or end in sight. It

remains to be seen how Erdogan and Sisi reconcile their strong mutual dislike for each other in

order to address the more serious local and regional agendas. The bilateral ties are unlikely to be

restored even if Israel plays the mediator role and Saudi Arabia continues to bring the both in its

fold to contain Iran. Turkey is viewed as a rival in Levant affairs including the Palestinian theatre

where Ankara supports the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Hamas. Besides backing fellow Sunni

and the Islamist movements like MB is a moral obligation for the AKP elites and Egypt-Turkey

bilateral relations are not likely to heal anytime soon.86

Iraq: The Gulf War87

of 1990-91 was a critical catalyst for Ankara‘s re-entry into the Middle

East. In spite of dissentions within the government, the then-President Turgut Ozal threw

Turkey‘s full support behind the US campaign with a view to further strengthening ―strategic

partnership‖ with the US and increasing prospect of Turkey‘s entry into EU. However, his hopes

proved illusory and his dreams didn‘t materialize. Instead Turkey had to pay high price in the

shape of loss of billions of dollars in pipeline fees and trade. Since the end of the first Gulf War

and the extension of the American no-fly zone over the northern Iraq, Ankara‘s greatest concern

in the neighbouring country had been the emergence of an independent Kurdish state across its

southern border that serves as a model for its own separatist Turkish Kurds.88

Over the period of time Turkey‘s worst fears were confirmed. Not only Iraq became a breeding

ground for International terrorism but the apprehension about excessive Iranian influence over a

Shiite-dominated Iraq was also well founded. But what is jeopardizing Turkey‘s internal security

is the strengthened Kurdish nationalism and upsurge in violence in PKK over the past few years.

Ankara at the moment is caught between a territorially intact, democratic and stable Iraq without

being dismembered or dominated by any ethnic or sectarian group and also motivated to preserve

the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) viability in the face of both IS threat and weak

central government in Iraq even if this eventually lead to KRG independence.

Soner Cagaptay and James F. Jeffrey , ―Turkey‘s Regional Charm Offensive: Motives and Prospects,‖ the Washington Institute, June 27, 2016.

For information on how the First Gulf War affected Trukey and what were its impacts on domestic issues see Haldun Canci and Sevket Serkan Sen, ― The Gulf War and Turkey: Regional Changes and their Domestic Effects

(1991-2003),‖ International Journal on World Peace 28, no. 1 (March 2011): 41-65. ; and Meltem Muftyler-Bac,

―Turkey and the United States : The Impact of the War in Iraq,‖ International Journal 61, no. 1 Turkey: Myths and

Realities (Winter 2005/ 2006): 61-81. F. Stephen Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (Jul-Aug, 2007): 104-05.

194

Battle in Mosul will further complicate Turkish bilateral relations with Iraq. Mosul, with a Sunni

majority population, represents Turkish ―sphere of influence‖ which might fall under the control

of Iraqi Shiite troops, an outcome Erdogan is determined to avoid as his recent interview to

Saudi-based Television channel Rotana validated: ―After Mosul will be rescued from [IS], only

Sunni Arabs, Turkmen and Sunni Kurds should remain there.‖89

Erdogan also warned against

―any forceful change in the demographic composition of the region.‖90

Turkey‘s regional

activism has already sounded a death knell for the cherished ―zero problems with neighbours‖

approach.

Saudi Arabia: Historically Turkey-Saudi relations have been established on the common ground

of safeguarding peace and stability in the region. The bilateral relations have been primarily

viewed through the economic lens and their mutual regional and global policy views aimed at

creating synergy and supporting each other. Similarly, King Abdullah‘s visit to Turkey in August

2006, the first of its kind in 40 years highlighted strengthening of bilateral relations as well as

convergence on issues like Arab-Israel peace process. Though their views on foreign policy do

not always coincide but up till now they have kept the bilateral relations away from regional

squabbles but the Arab Awakening that literally tore the previous regional balance was about to

bring changes in this bilateral equation too.91

Aware of the intense rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Turkey had been successful in

maintaining good relations with both countries but the crisis in Syria meshed their interests.

Turkish-Qatari axis in Syria competes with Saudi Arabia in Syria, even though both agree that

Assad must go and the failure of the Syrian opposition to effectively succeed has been blamed on

this competition for influence within the anti-Assad circle. However, in spite of being in the

opposite camps Turkey has not criticized government in Riyadh while disparaging other Rikar Hussein, ―Turkey-Iraq Tensions May Complicate Battle Against IS in Mosul,‖ Voice of America, October 5, 2016.

Mark Lowen, ―Battle for Mosul: A row between Turkey and Iraq could derail the offensive,‖ BBC News, October 13, 2006.

For more information on Turkey-Saudi relations during the Arab Spring see Muhittin Ataman, ―Turkish-Saudi

Arabian Relations During the Arab Uprisings: Towards a Strategic Partnership?,‖ Insight Turkey 14, no. 4, (2012): 121-136.

195

countries though the attempts had been made to portray the divergence as the cold war for Sunni

hegemony.92

A new controversial dimension was added to the unblemished Ankara-Riyadh relations when

Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia in early 2015 and met the new King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al-

Saud and reached a new agreement with regard to Syria, where Salman promised to support

Turkey in declaring a no-fly zone. Besides Syria, their agreement of views on Iran, Egypt,

Yemen and Palestine illustrates that Turkey might be dragged into the much more dangerous

game of regional influence involving Iran. But the Turkish-Iran relations have never deviated

from stability in the past and they have never been engaged in a border conflict since 1963 and

somehow getting along in spite of having divergence of outlook on regional issues. This new

polarization may negatively affect relations between Tehran and Ankara.93

While Salman‘s concern might be in forming a Sunni block against Iran but Sisi-Erdogan mutual

hatred for each other will make it cumbersome for Riyadh to bring both Egypt and Turkey in its

fold against Iran.94

Turkey it appears, says Michael Stephens, ―have concluded that the best

position for them is to balance the Gulf States and Tehran, not fully committing to either side,

yet seeking economic benefit from both.‖95

How long Turkey can delicately balance this

strategy when another factor Israel and Russia is addition to the equation, only time can tell.

Iran: Turkey‘s greater activism in the Middle East had also been reflected through its effort to

strengthen ties with Iran and Syria. Relations were strained with both Damascus and Tehran over

their support for PKK in 1980s and 1990s96

but relations improved significantly after the shared

commitment to contain Kurdish nationalism was expressed and a security cooperation agreement

branding PKK a terrorist organization was signed when Prime Minister Erdogan visited Iran in

July 2004.97

Being the second largest supplier of Natural Gas to Turkey after Russia, energy also

Abdulmajeed al-Buluwi, ―The Saudi-Turkey cold war for Sunni hegemony,‖ Al-Monitor, April 1, 2014.

Fehim Tastekin, ―Are Turkey, Saudi Arabia working together against Iran?,‖ Al-Monitor, March 5, 2015.

―Turkey-Saudi relations turn ‗a new page‘, says top Turkish advisor,‖ Middle East Eye, March 5, 2015.

Ariel Ben Solomon, ―Analysis: Turkey trying to balance relations between Iran, Saudis,‖ Jerusalem Post, April 20, 2016.

For details see John Calabrese, ―Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship,‖ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25, no.1 (May, 1998): 75-94.

Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ 107.

196

had been a major driver behind the warming of Iranian-Turkish relations and energy-related

deals signed in 2007 have also brought the two countries together.98

More recently its approach towards Turkey has oscillated between two competing visions. On

the one hand, Ankara seeks to establish relatively normal political and economic ties with Tehran

not only for regional stability but for maintaining Turkish access to Iranian oil and gas; on the

other hand, it has been competing with Tehran for geopolitical influence.99

When the US and its

allies championed tougher measures against Iranian nuclear ambitions, Turkey tried to play the

role of a mediator. The Turkish-Brazilian scheme to swap Iranian nuclear fuel, though

unsuccessful, but at the same time displayed Turkey‘s independent approach and pragmatic

leadership to produce confidence in mediation efforts.100

The mediation efforts does not reflect that Ankara endorse Iranian nuclear drive. In fact, Turkey

kept viewing Tehran‘s nuclear ambitions with apprehension as they had the potential to

destabilize the Persian Gulf region and may even had forced Ankara to take countermeasures for

its own security if NATO‘s guarantees seemed less credible and EU rejected Turkey‘s

membership. Any serious drive by Iran to obtain the nuclear capability might undercut its

rapprochement with Turkey. Besides bilateral tensions also exist on questions of Iraq and Syria

where Iranian ties with the sitting governments in Baghdad and Damascus give it additional

leverage and its ties with Kurdish groups also provides a number of potential points of friction

with Ankara.101

Thus an emboldened Iranian presence in the region will always be a cause of

concern for the leadership in Turkey.

The overall bilateral Ankara-Tehran relations will remain evolving around much controversial

issues like Turkey‘s ongoing war with Kurds; its support for Sunni rebels in Syria; alliance with

Saudi Arabia on certain regional issues; and crisis with Russia particularly when later enjoys

close relations with Iran. Hence, up and down in bilateral relations along with cooperation will

continue to be the norm.

Ibid., 108.

For more on Turkey –Iran relations see Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby, ―Power Play: Turkey‘s Bid to Trump Iran,‖ World Affairs 173, no. 5 (January / February 2011): 6-15.

Alon Ben Meir, ―Turkey and Iran‘s Nuclear Challenge: Mediating With The Mullahs,‖ The World Today 66, no.

(November 2010): 27-28. Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, Turkey: Background and US Relations (CRS Report, R41368, August 26, 2016), 36.

197

Syria: Strained in 1980s and early 1990s, the Syria-Turkey bilateral relations reached a crisis

point when turkey threatened to invade Syria if Damascas did not cease its support for PKK. But

Syria‘s responded positively, not only closed PKK training camps but expelled its leader Ocalan

too; the shift opened the way for gradual improvement in bilateral relations finally culminating in

Bashar al-Assad‘s visit to Ankara in Janurary 2005 – the first such trip to Turkey by a Syrian

president since its independence in 1946. This rapprochement was also underscored by Syria‘s

growing concern about its own Kurdish population that an economically robust Kurdish

government in northern Iraq could stimulate102

Turkey‘s attempt to develop closer ties with Damascus created strains with US under the Bush

administration which sought to isolate Syria. Tensions intensified in 2005 when US failed to

convince Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to cancel his visit to Damascus. Later, when US

tried to initiate dialogue with Syria, the Turkish ties proved fruitful into bringing closer

alignment between Syria and US.103

Ankara boasting about its ―inclusionary foreign policy‖ and

claiming that ―we engaged with them‖ when ―other countries isolated the Syrians,‖ did not prove

misplaced.104

In the wake of the Arab Spring when civil war ensued in Syria; Turkey sided with US, Saudi

Arabia and the Gulf members to oust Assad from Syria; it entered into a regional proxy war

whose outcome will have far-reaching impact on the future regional hierarchy. This conflict has

created dangerous regional polarization among contending players. Currently, Turkey not only

offers safe heavens and support to Syrian dissidents and high-ranking Syrian Army defectors but

to show its military might conduct military exercises next to its borders with Syria but the fact

remains save direct military intervention, which seems unlikely Turkey has little leverage left to

shape course of events in Syria. 105

Israel – Palestine: Turkey had maintained a close relationship with Israel since 1996 especially

in defense and intelligence areas when it gave Tel Aviv ―a way of breaking out of its regional

isolation and a means of putting pressure on Syria‖ and ―for obtaining weapons and advanced

techqnology at a time when it faced increasing restrictions on weapons procurement from the Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ 109.

Ibid.

Zalewski, ―The Self-Appointed Superpower,‖ 99.

For details see chapter on Syria.

198

United States and Europe.‖106

In spite of the fact that Turkey was first Muslim country to

recognize independence of the state of Israel and establish diplomatic relations with it but its

policy towards Israel underwent a shift when it began to adopt a more active pro-Palestinian

policy. Following Israel‘s bloody bombing campaign in Gaza in 2008, Turkish Prime Minister

publicly accused Israeli President Shimon Peres of ―knowing very well how to kill people‖ and

labeled the Israeli military operation as ―crime against humanity‖ and an act of ―state terror‖ and

again calling Israel ―the main threat to regional peace‖ just three months later.107

Ankara then hosted a high ranking Hamas delegation led by Khaled Mashal after their win in the

elections in the Palestinian territories in January 2006. As the visit was arranged without

consulting either Washington or Tel Aviv, it irritated both governments.108

Erdogan refused to

classify Hamas as a terrorist organization but made western observers uncomfortable with his

statement that ―the world now perceives the Star of David alongside the swastika‖; while eroding

Western sympathy simultaneously boosted his image among the Arab public.109

According to a

poll conducted in November 2009, among those surveyed in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan,

Egypt and the Palestinian Territories, 75 % hold a ―very positive‖ and ―positive‖ view of

Turkey.110

After nearly six years of downgraded diplomatic ties, which worsened after 2010 Mavi Marmara

incident,111

both Turkey and Israel have announced to restore full diplomatic relations in June

2016. The rapprochement which many attribute to proposed natural gas pipeline shows Turkish

desire to reduce its dependence on Russian imports; while on the Israeli side there is a search for

energy partners to develop its Leviathan natural gas field.112

The rapprochement includes Israeli

Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ 110.

Zalewski, ―The Self-Appointed Superpower,‖ 100.

Larrabee, ―Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,‖ 110.

Zalewski, ―The Self-Appointed Superpower,‖ 100.

Ibid., 101.

The incident took place in international waters under disputed circumstances and resulted in the deaths of nine Turks and an American of Turkish descent. See Gonul Tol, ―The ‗Turkish Model‘ in the Middle East,‖ Current History 111, no.749 (December 2012): 352.

Fulya Ozerkan, ―Turkey, Israel to examine building gas pipeline,‖ Times of Israel, October13, 2016. ; Selin Girit, ―Gas pipeline hopes heal rapture in Israel-Turkey ties, BBC News, October 19, 2016.

199

compensation to victim families of flotilla incident but whether it curtail Hamas ties with Turkey

is far from clear.113

Similarly a return to previous civil-military and intelligence cooperation also seems to be

unlikely.114

Previously in apparent retribution to flotilla incident Turkey blew cover of Iranians

acting as Israeli intelligence sources back in 2011115

and even led to congressional rejection of

Turkish request to purchase drone aircraft to counter PKK.116

However, Turkey-Israel trade

continued to grow in spite of political differences.

Turkish bid to become highly influential regional power can become sustainable if it is able to

reconcile its liberal ethics of foreign policy with its realpolitik concerns in the region.

4.1.3.2. Turkey-US Relations

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk‘s revolutionary changes put country on a long march towards the West

in 1920s. ―Rejection of Turkey‘s Islamic, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern roots became state

policy.... The pursuit of modernity redefined the country‘s relationship with itself. A faithful ally

to the US and a NATO member, the Cold War sealed Turkey‘s transformation into a Western

nation and ensured almost unquestioning support from Washington.‖117

The statement published

in Foreign Policy has recently been severely tested after the failed coup attempt against the

Turkish President Erdogan in July 2016, with roots in moderate Islamism.

The bilateral relation can be traced back to the Second World War where Turkey remained

neutral until February 1945 and when the US battleship U. S. S. Missouri arrived in Istanbul

harbor in 1946, it signaled the formation of a long-term partnership with Turkey. Since then

Turkey has occupied a very special place in US foreign policy and throughout Cold War had

acted as the southeast bastion of NATO and as a buffer state against the Soviet Union. The

Rory Jones, et.al., Turkey, Israel Trumpet Benefits of Deal to Normalize Relations, Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2016.

Yossi Melman, ―A long way off,‖ Jerusalem Post, August 8, 2016.

David Ignatius, ―Turkey blows Israel‘s cover for Iranian spy ring,‖ Washington Post, October 16, 2013.

―Report : US canceled delivery of Predators to Turkey,‖ Today‟s Zaman, October 21, 2013, citing report in Taraf

―A Rising Star,‖ Foreign Policy 151 (Nov-Dec, 2005): 3.

200

bilateral relation endured compilations of the Cold War era, centered most of the time on issues

related to Cyprus.118

For the first Gulf War, Turkey sided with US and allowed US-led coalition to use its bases to

strike Iraqi territory but after the end of the Cold War, the rationale of providing large amounts

of grant aid to arm the Turkish military was questioned from few quarters.119

But following 9/11

it once gained new importance as possible staging ground for US-led military action in the

region. But the second Gulf War created tensions in the bilateral relations when in a surprise

move Turkish Parliament rejected US request to station ground troops at Turkey‘s border with

Iraq to open second front in 2003.120

Few analysts pointed that the rejection from Turkey was

because US ―asked for more in 2003 than it did in 1991‖; others referred to the benefits it

received for cooperation in 1991 as ―significantly fewer than expected‖.121

The damaged relations somewhat recovered when Turkey allowed US overflights into Iraq after

the coalition occupied the country and began stability, counterinsurgency and reconstruction

operations but the resumption of PKK attacks into Turkey form safe heavens in northern Iraq,

raised concerns about a core internal security issue. Since 2007 it had received direct US

cooperation in countering PKK. Anti-American sentiment within Turkey was also strengthened

owing to US involvement in the Middle East.122

The Obama Administration from the outset

sought to illuminate ties clouded during the Bush era. Signaling a change in policy both

President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton visited Turkey on their first overseas trips and

Obama hailed the ―model partnership‖ with Turkey in efforts to overcome ―challenges of our

time‖ while addressing Turkish Parliament.123

After crisis over Israel‘s interception of the Turkish ship intending to break Gaza blockade in

May and then its vote against increased UN sanctions against Iran in June 2010, Turkey was

Jim Zanotti, Turkey-US Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges (CRS Report, R41761, April 8, 2011), 38-39.

Ibid., 40.

Harry de Quetteville, ―US troops pack up and go as Turkey refuses any help,‖ Telegraph, March 24, 2003.

Zanotti, ―Turkey-US Defense Cooperation,‖ 40.

For details see Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, ―Friends No More? The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,‖

Middle East Journal 64, no.1 (Winter 2010): 51-66. ; Aylin Guney, ―Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,‖ Middle Eastern Studies 44, no.3 (May 2008): 471-87. Remarks by President to the Turkish Parliament, April 6, 2009, accessible at http://www.whitehouse.gov.

201

severely criticized in the US and was asked to demonstrate its commitment to NATO, Europe

and US.

In spite of the persistent differences, Turkey-US continue to enjoy extensive trade, aid and

defence relations with US that endured for decades but post-coup bilateral relations have become

complicated with requests from Turkey to extradite Gulen whom Erdogan blames for coup

attempt.124

US still enjoy access to Incirlik air base and other bases in Turkey but Ankara

maintains the right to cancel US access to Incirlik with three days notice.125

Without debating

the importance of US-Turkey elations, domestic issues and trends in Turkey raise questions

about future of the bilateral relations as their values and interests evolve and at times diverge but

they are too important to be permanently hijacked by a single incident or personality.

4.1.4. Egypt

A country whose geopolitical position distinguishes the importance it enjoys in MENA, as its

land bridges two continents and serve as a link between two principal waterways - the

Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Positioned astride the eastern and the western wings of

the Arab-Islamic world, and with a rich modern history of the long independence struggle

against the foreigners it naturally seeks a leadership role for itself within the region. The dream

was realized when Gamal Abdul Nasser harnessed these sentiments not only to challenge

Western dominance and to consolidate his regime but made Egypt a regional power too. His

successors were unable to keep Egypt on the path that peaked in Nasser‘s era. Among them,

Hosni Mubarak who already prioritized economic survival over nationalist ambitions in Egypt‘s

foreign policy faced an unprecedented challenge at the beginning of 2011 – an unrest that finally

brought end to his three decades long rule.

4.1.4.1. Egypt in post-Arab Spring MENA

Egypt was already undergoing uneasy transition when following rigged elections of 2010, the

National Democratic Party (NDP) not only gained massive victory, a transition that was likely to Jessica Durando, ―Turkey demands extradition of cleric Fethullah Gulen from U.S.,‖ USA Today, July 19, 2016.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Erin Cunningham, ―Pentagon‘s top general seeks to cool anti-American sentiment in

Turkey,‖ Washington Post, August 1, 2016.

202

bring his son Gamal to power, but resulted in further weakening of the opposition. However,

within a span of just 18 days the long-established authoritarian Mubarak regime ended due to

popular pressure, bringing massive changes to Egyptian politics and put the country on an

uncertain, bumpy road to more open political system, from which it has neither fully recovered

nor gotten used to it yet.

The Arab Spring and its impact in Egypt was significantly different from the other pivotal

players analyzed. While others were either indirectly affected or drawn deeper into the region to

shape the outcomes of unprecedented developments taking place on the Arab street, Egypt was

the one pivotal player that itself had to go through the transition. Thus instead of acting as one

powerful player bidding for greater influence and position within the regional hierarchy in flux,

it had first to cope with massive internal challenges of her own that emerged with the abrupt

departure of Mubarak, and secondly had to safeguard its interests, lest internal challenges are

exploited by competing regional powers.

The euphoria that was attached with the revolution has finally faded as the country ―whiplashed

form one political extreme to another‖, from the oppressive Muslim Brotherhood government to

the military regime that now rules, writes Ashley Fantz of CNN. An analysis of the revolution

after five years would place country on a shaky ground financially. Not only people are angry

and unemployment rampant but ISIS-linked insurgency is growing along with more frequent

terror attacks. She further adds, ―Nothing seems sure in Egypt today, except that there‘s bound to

be more fitful change ahead‖.126

Public political activism declined since military ouster of Morsi

in July 2013 but internal security situation remain volatile. The Egyptian economy hasn‘t

recovered fully in the aftermath of Arab Spring and government‘s effort to improve economic

growth to stave off public unrest has produced mixed results only.

The domestic instability and challenges has affected Egypt‘s ability to shape rapidly evolving

situation in MENA. Being one the ten non-permanent members of the UN Security Council

(term ending in 2017) its role has been pivotal in brokering a unity government in Libya but in

regions like Syria and Iraq its role has been minimal in countering Islamic State (IS) as it has a

homegrown terrorist threat such as Sinai Province of the Islamic State (SP) to counter.

Ashley Fantz, Egypt‘s Long , bloody road from Arab Spring hope to chaos,‖ CNN, April 27, 2016.

203

The unprecedented success of Egyptian revolution and then equally epic failure of the Muslim

Brotherhood as a governing alternative have but strengthened the forces of status quo throughout

the region. Cairo is not in a position to aggressively pursue an independent course due to its

growing financial dependence on the Gulf States but even then it showed reluctance to provide

ground troops for Saudi-led collation against Yemen, adding the request to be considered ―if

necessary‖.127

Saudis since July 2013 are actively trying to make Egypt a part of Sunni-lead

alliance to counter resurgent Iranian threat in the region. Even though their goals and priorities

diverge, Egypt still supports the Saudis bid to curtail Iranian influence in the region.128

Besides Gulf Arab monarchies, Morsi‘s forceful exit has also brought marked improvement in

Egypt-Israel relations as Tel Aviv had serious reservations about the long-term prospects of

having an Islamist-governed Egypt. The two nations though at peace since the historic 1979

peace treaty but the bilateral relations are not without challenges. The diplomatic relations were

re-established after a span of four years in 2015, the first time after 2012 when Morsi recalled

Egyptian ambassador as protest over Israel‘s Gaza operation, followed by similar action by

Israel.129

They view Hamas as a common enemy that assists anti-government militias in Sinai

Peninsula. Egypt since July 2013 is trying to create a ―buffer zone‖ to curb underground weapon

smuggling to Hamas and the decision was criticized as ―serving global and regional politics

against Palestinian people and will only increase suffering in the Gaza Strip‖ by Yahya Moussa,

the head of the Palestinian Legislative Council‘s Oversight Committee.130

Till the time Egypt‘s domestic security and stability is fraught with challenges, its prospects to be

an effective regional player will remain limited. It will keep interfering in Libya to affect a

favourable outcome in the conflict and to help seculars succeed so that domestic threat from

extremists could be curtailed. But in MENA its overall capacity will be extremely constrained

besides the trajectory of its relations with US will also determine whether it will get the kind of

limelight it had enjoyed till Anwar Sadat and Mubarak era. David D. Kirkpatrick, ―Egypt Says It May Send Troops To Yemen To Fight Houthis,‖ New York Times, March 26, 2015.

―Saudi Arabia Consolidates Its Alliance Against Iran,‖ Al Akhbar, March 7, 2015.

Isabel Kershner and Tim Arango ―Israel and Turkey Agree to Restore Diplomatic Ties,‖ New York Times, December 17, 2015.

Adnan Abu Amer, ―Egypt‘s buffer zone expansion hurts Hamas‘ arm supplies,‖ Al-Monitor, January 9, 2015.

204

4.1.4.2. Egypt-US Relations

Egypt traditionally had occupied distinctive place in US foreign policy calculations owing to its

geography, demography and diplomatic posture. It is the country where US has invested heavily

i.e. $76 billion since 1948 because it not only controls 8% of global maritime shipping through

Suez Canal critical for US and the global trade but apart from that it is the most populous Arab

state that is at peace with Israel and has traditionally provided logistical support for American

forces operating in and around the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.131

Besides it enjoys

significant ―soft power‖ in the Islamic world, its Cairo Al-Azhar university is the oldest and

leading source of Islamic scholarship. Up till Mubarak period it enjoyed distinctive position in

US Middle East policy orientation and calculations but the period following Arab Spring has

somewhat reduced the strategic importance of Egypt to US national security interests. The first

major blow to bilateral relations in recent history came after September 2001 when not only one

Egyptian was among 9/11 attackers but Egyptian cleric Ayman al-Zawahiri remains head of al

Qaeda worldwide and several Egyptians form core of the world leading terrorist organization.

The Arab Spring of 2011 briefly elevated the country towards the top of US foreign policy

agenda when it was assumed that a transition to democracy would provide prosperous

opportunity to people but the hopes proved misplaced. The coup d‘état that replaced Morsi with

Sisi has brought neither stability, prosperity nor the democracy in Egypt. The return of the

military rule in Egypt has left US policymakers in a quandary. On the one hand to maintain

stable partnership with Egypt is still considered vital for regional security and stability; on the

other hand, the authoritarian government and its quashing of public dissent through brutal tactics

is again making conditions conducive to the growth of violent extremism within this most

weighty Arab state.

After July 2013 military coup, the Obama Administration launched a lengthy review of US

foreign assistance policy toward Egypt and to register its disapproval of military‘s reassertion of

power,132

US announced to withhold the delivery of certain large-scale military systems pending

credible progress towards democracy. A major shift in policy occurred in March 2015 after a Statement Prepared by Steve A. Cook, before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on December 16, 2015 available online at http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypt-two-years-after-morsi/p37380. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Barack Obama on Egypt, July 03, 2013.

205

phone call between President Obama and President Sisi when due to terrorist attacks against

Egypt certain lawmakers pleaded Administration to end its weapon suspension.133

But a significant turn in the bilateral relations has occurred and one analyst asserted: ―In

Washington, Egypt‘s cash-flow financing had lost support from both parties and is not likely to

be reinstated no matter who moves into the White House in 2017.‖134

Thus current US-Egyptian

relations remain on an uncertain path. Besides US criticism of its recent policies to impose order

in a fragmented, unstable society has led Cairo to diversify its partnerships and alliances. Instead

of traditional reliance on US, it has turned to the like-minded Arab governments in the Gulf

region as well as Russia and China as an alternative. A lengthy quote of Michael Wahid Hanna

would sum up the entire situation:

―For decades, the partnership between Egypt and the United States was a linchpin of the American role in the Middle East. Today, it is a mere vestige of a bygone

era… no longer any compelling reasons for Washington to sustain especially close ties with Cairo. What was once a powerfully symbolic alliance with clear

advantages for both sides has become a nakedly transactional relationship….The time has come for both sides to recognize that reality and for the United States to

fundamentally alter its approach to Egypt.‖135

4.1.5. Israel

Israel exists in the heart of the Muslim Arab Peninsula with roots in the British government

issuance of Balfour Declaration in 1917 that aimed at ―establishment in Palestine of a national

home for the Jewish people‖136

and finally came into being in 1948 through a UN resolution 181

that divided Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.137

This ‗illegitimate‘ partition was never

accepted by both Palestinians and the Arabs who since then have engaged in military conflict

with Israel a number of times most notably in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. After the peace

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Readout of the President‘s Call with President al-Sisi of Egypt, March,31 2015.

―The Politics of Restoring Egypt‘s Military Aid,‖ Washington Post, April 2, 2015.

Michael Wahid Hanna, ―Getting Over Egypt: Time to Rethink Relations,‖ Foreign Affairs, (November/December 2015).

For complete text of the Balfour Declaration visit http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/balfour.html. For a contradictory view see Jeremy R. Hammond, ―The Myth of the U.N. Creation of Israel,‖ Foreign Policy Journal, October 26, 2010.

206

treaty with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994, Israel has made another multi-front war

against it less likely but major security challenges exist with Iran and states allied with it.

Unpredictable developments in the Arab states following Arab Awakening and the ongoing

Israeli-Palestinian conflict have further complicated its regional position.

4.1.5.1. Israel in post-Arab Spring MENA

Israel has faced significant challenges to its security in MENA since the day of its establishment

but the developments in 2011 added further anxiety in the Israeli policy circles when an Egyptian

scaled the exterior of Israeli embassy in Cairo and replaced the Star of David with a Palestinian

flag in August 2011. To many in Jewish land it only demonstrated that democratic change across

the region masked a regional irredentism implacable in its hostility towards Israel.138

It found

itself trapped in diplomatic, strategic and political upheaval across several fronts with few

diplomatic means to influence the outcome of events. At the same time there was an increasing

realization that US power across the Middle East was finite and hence Washington would be

unable to use its leverage to help shape a regional environment more benign to Israeli

interests.139

The removal of Morsi‘s government and its replacement with a military dictator brought relief in

Tel Aviv as Israel prefers the devils they have always known but the terminal decline of Arab

autocratic rule was apparent. Besides Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu never saw these uprisings

more than an ―Islamic, anti-western, anti-liberal, undemocratic wave‖ a view he expressed

before the Knesset in November 2011.140

Hence the developments in the Arab world like

uprisings in Syria, Bahrain and continued violence in Iraq was framed by reference to Islam as

monolithic danger and it became a catchall epithet to explain regional threats to their security as

an Israeli official is reported to have remarked: ―When some people in the West see what‘s

happening in Egypt, they see Europe 1989. We see it as Tehran 1979.‖141

Ari Shavit, ―Arab Spring Showed Its Real Face in Attack on Israeli Embassy in Egypt,‖ Haaretz, September 11, 2011.

Efraim Inbar, ―Israeli Defense: The Arab Uprisings Impact,‖ Middle East Quarterly 19, no.1 (2012): 41-42.

Brice Lynfield, ―With West Focused on Iran, Netanyahu Moves to Expand Israeli Settlements,‖ Christian Science Monitor, April 17, 2012.

Daniel Bayman, ―Israel‘s Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring,‖ Washington Quarterly 34, no.3, (2011): 123.

207

Even with conventional military superiority relative to its neighbours, it remains unclear how far

shifts in regional order and developing asymmetric threats affect its security. Israel has serious

reservations about Iran‘s nuclear program and any enhancement in Iranian regional influence is

inimical to Israeli security interests. Similarly US pursuit of diplomacy with the clerical regime

also exacerbates Israel‘s anxiety over the extent to which it can rely on its distant superpower

ally to actively thwart the potential threat it faces. Such a concern is attributable in part to

reduced US influence within the region.142

Besides Israel faces significant terrorist threats from ungoverned spaces which spread across its

borders and include security vacuums that exist in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt‘s Sinai Peninsula, Iraq

and Libya, giving momentum to terrorists groups like IS besides traditional threats from

Palestinian militant groups. Hence MENA in flux is a significant Israeli interest and it will keep

monitoring developing situation in post-Arab Spring environment. Though not in a position to

considerably affect outcomes of regional conflicts but the emerging new power hierarchy will

directly relate to its security.

4.1.5.2. Israel-US Relations

Israel is the staunchest US ally in the region and its security has significant relevance for US

Middle Eastern interests. They have enjoyed decades-long strong bilateral ties in defence,

diplomatic and economic sphere. The vital security cooperation exists in the realm of military

aid, arm sales, joint exercises, and information sharing including periodic cooperation in

developing military technology. Successive US Presidents and members of the Congress have

expressed firm commitment to Israeli security since 1948 and the question of Israel‘s security

have not only influenced US policy considerations regarding Middle East but has been the pivot

of its overall policy towards the region.

Besides perceptions of shared democratic values, religious affinities and security interests, the

US support to Israel has helped shape a regional security order through support to Arab countries

and Israel that has discouraged outbreak of an Arab-Israel interstate conflict for more than 40

years. Beyond temporary geopolitical considerations, Israel has substantial and multifaceted Jim Zanotti, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL33476, June 1, 2015), 10.

208

worth as US ally and the strong bilateral bond based on shared ideas and values holds.143

Given

the unprecedented changes in the Middle East, US commitment to Israeli security will sustain

and the inability of US to affect the configuration of a new regional order will not affect either

the mutual bilateral cooperation or US commitment to ensure Israel‘s ―qualitative military edge‖

in the region to enable Israel to defend itself against all perceived threats.144

4.2. Russia Re-enters the Region

The upheavals of Arab Spring not only brought dramatic changes in the region‘s power hierarchy

but helped bring about a revival in the Russian fortunes in the region too. Since the Soviet

Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the 1991 Gulf War, Moscow‘s influence in the

region was drastically reduced. The 2003 US-led Iraq war and resultant removal of Saddam‘s

regime resulted in loss of a key Arab ally for Russia. Up till the unprecedented developments of

2011 only Syria and Algeria were left as last big Russian defence clients in the Arab world, with

Syria already facing increasing isolation within the region.145

Besides major changes in the US

foreign policy pursuits during the same period and the focus of its attention away from Middle

East to Asia Pacific created additional incentives for extra-regional players to re-enter the region

and enhance their position in the overall global hierarchy.

―European and American leadership since the end of the Cold War has been operating on the

false belief that geopolitics had come to an end; they doubled down on that delusion as

geopolitics came roaring back in the Obama years,‖ writes Walter Russell Mead in the American

Interest.146

Russian entry on the side of Bashar-al-Assad has not only changed dynamics of the

conflict and thwarted Washington‘s diplomatic efforts but has simultaneously made Russia a

lead player in area‘s geopolitics. Besides its rapprochement with Turkey and developing ties with

Iran has also elevated its role as a major actor in the region where since the days of Soviet Union

such activism from Moscow had been missing.

For the debate see Michael Eisenstadt, ―Resetting the U.S.-Israel Alliance,‖ War on the Rocks, February 5, 2015. ; and Richard Klass, ―Is Israel Becoming a Strategic Liability,‖ War on the Rocks, January 28, 2015.

For more information on US-Israel relations see Zanotti, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, RL33476.

Frank Gardner, ―Russia in the Middle East: Return of the bear,‖ BBC News, November 14, 2013.

Walter Russell Mead, ―Russia Re-Emerges as a Great Power in the Middle East,‖ American Interest, September 12, 2016.

209

Moscow‘s desire to gain a foothold in the region has been interpreted differently. For some the

region‘s turmoil present an important opportunity to Russian President Vladmir Putin who not

only wants ―to revive Russia‘s long-faded image as a world power, restore its status as

America‘s main geopolitical foil, and gain bargaining chips with which to promote his more

immediate concerns in Russia‘s near-abroad.‖147

But for others its initiatives in the Middle East

especially in Syria clearly stretches far beyond its regional goal and ―has much to do with setting

the boundaries of what the Kremlin considers a struggle to shape the world order‖.148

The power

transition in the global hierarchy and the ―rise of the rest‖ especially ―rise of China‖ thesis has

contributed to this school of thought. Russian reassertion in the Middle East and in its ―near-

abroad‖ through traditional hard balancing strategies also gives credence to this argument.

The burgeoning relationship between Russia, Iran and Syria was quoted in the Time as a ―new

‗axis of evil‘‖ when Iran in an unprecedented move allowed Russia to fly its bombers from one

of its bases to attack rebels in Syria the first time since 1979 revolution. Besides it was also the

first time Russia used a third nation (other than Syria and Russia itself) to attack Syrian rebels. It

quoted a retired Army lieutenant general, David Barno, about Moscow‘s flexing military muscle

―this time from Iran‖ as Russia once again desired to be seen as a military power ―and one that

will not shy about poking the United States and its friends in the eye at every opportunity.‖149

Syria is the focus of Russian resurgence in the Middle East and it has largely altered dynamics of

the conflict in Assad‘s favour since the entry of Russia on his side. Critics of the overall US

Middle East strategy and the developing dynamics of the Syrian conflict view this as a clear sign

of waning US influence in the region. Especially Obama-Putin deal on Syria was bitterly

criticized and Walter Mead went to the extent of terming it as ―closest to..Donald Trump‘s plan

for the Middle East‖ and Putin‘s ―temporary alliance with the United States on Russia‘s

terms‖.150

The extent of Russian involvement in the region and its impact in the Syrian conflict

will be explored at length in subsequent chapters.

Besides Syria, another area where Russia is registering its presence within the region is the

Israeli-Palestinian issue where US has failed to break the intractable impasse for decades but a Shlomo Ben Ami, ―Russia‘s Ephemeral Middle East Alliances,‖ Project Syndicate, October 5, 2016.

Maxim A. Suchkov, ―Russia‘s plan for the Middle East,‖ The National Interest, January 15, 2016.

Mark Thompson, ―Russia and Iran Fly Across a Key Threshold in the Middle East,‖ Time, August 16, 2016.

Mead, ―Russia Re-Emerges as a Great Power in the Middle East.‖

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Russian special envoy was found shuttling through the region in September 2016, trying to

arrange a meeting between the Israeli Prime Minister Nethanyhu and Palestinian President

Mahmoud Abbas. While Russia surely lacks the leverage, economic or otherwise to produce a

deal but for few analysts Russia‘s newfound Middle East peace push is ―everything but finding

peace in the region‖ and, more about ―Moscow‘s ambition and competition with Washington,

exemplified by its intervention in Syria.‖151

Putin‘s intent on taking the lead in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is a show of Russian

significance within the region when it is already having tensions with Washington over Syria and

Ukraine. As a former Israeli ambassador to Russia, Zvi Magen asserts: ―The idea is not to reach

any specific results, but it‘s good for Russia. They don‘t need results. The need the process

itself.‖152

Even Israeli officials like Avi Ditcher who is chairman of Israel‘s foreign policy and

defense committee, are apprehensive about the divergence of interests in the Russian and Israeli

approach towards the region. While Russia considers Iran as the stabilizing force and the US-

Iranian nuclear deal as largely positive, Israeli views are completely opposite on this and same

goes for Syria‘s Assad and Lebanese Hezbollah.153

The Turkey-Russian rapprochement will also positively enhance Russian leverage in the region.

Turkey currently is walking on a tight path with US and the sign of Donald Trump President-

elect in the White House will further complicate this feverish transition in the Turkey-US

relations as Ankara is seen pursing a too independent path in its international policy. The

worsening of relations both with EU and US pushed Turkey to reactivate its ties with Russia.

Since August 2016, Erdogan and Putin conducted two state visits and both seemed to have

reached an agreement over the most significant regional issue i.e. the Syrian conflict, although it

is too early to talk about an alliance. In short Turkish independence in its foreign policy pursuits

though problematic for all regional players including Russia, is generating hope for better

Russia-Turkey relations in the future.154

Peter Baker and Isabel Kershner, ―Russia, Already Reinserting Itself in Middle East, Enters Israeli-Palestinian

Fray,‖ New York Times, September 9, 2016. Ibid.

―Israeli official: Russia has long-term ambitions in the Middle East,‖ Reuters, November 16, 2016.

Vladimir Avatkov, ―How Russia views Turkey‘s role in Syria,‖ Al-Monitor, November 18, 2016.

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Besides Turkey, Russian-Egyptian ties are also ―picking up‖ across all areas of cooperation since

Sisi ousted the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammad Morsi155

and in the wake of

cooling of decades-old US-Egyptian ties. A brief analysis of Russian initiates in the Middle East

leaves no doubt that Kremlin has successfully re-entered the region and with the decline of the

US hegemonic influence and the change of strategic shift of US policy away from the region the

scope for greater Russian influence is not very unlikely. Thus it would not be wrong to claim that

Russian resurgence in the Middle East regional hierarchy is the direct result of waning US global

influence and its hegemonic decline. The move towards post-hegemony is strengthening

assertive behaviours of US global challengers.

4.3. US- The Declining Hegemon in MENA

The crisis of hegemony is astonishing reality of our times and the period is fraught with both

risks and opportunities at the systemic and sub-systemic level. Hegemonic periods are equated

with stability and they dominate political relations leaving little room for regional actors to

maneuver outside boundaries determined by the hegemon itself. The post-Cold War period that

was initially triumphant with slogans of US unprecedented hegemony has seen the gradual

emergence of hegemonic crisis. The diminishing power of the US in world politics while giving

rise to rampant speculations about its causes has also emboldened regional actors to increasingly

bid for enhanced position within the regional hierarchy vital to their strategic interests. The

impact of this gradual US hegemonic decline has not been felt stronger in any region more than

MENA. According to Bulent Aras and Sevgi Akarcesme, ―[the] region had been stuck with a

static order predicated on three interrelated pillars: ensuring Israel‘s security, serving the oil

industry‘s interest and maintaining the status quo.‖ 156

The fall of the Mubarak regime, who acted in close concert with its hegemonic pattern raised

pertinent question about the US ability to influence developments occurring within the region.

For a general outsider, the Arab ―spring‖ seen to be coinciding with the ―global turmoil‖ and

hegemonic crisis. The signs of weakening hegemonic control soon pitted regional actors against For details see Vitaly Naumkin, ―Russia and Egypt‘s ‗new partnership‘,‖ Al-Monitor, February 11, 2015.

Bulent Aras and Sevgi Akarcesme, ―Turkey and the Arab Spring,‖ International Journal 67, no. 1, Charting the new Turkish foreign policy (Winter 2011-12): 43.

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each other who not only asserted after experiencing emancipation from the limiting influences of

the hegemonic order but the uncertainty about the new direction of the regional order forced the

regional powers to adopt a more proactive, assertive and at times aggressive foreign policy

postures. These regional players are utilizing sense of freedom of action and increasing room for

maneuver to affect an outcome that aligns with their strategic interest within the region.

The decline of the hegemon creates power vacuum, generating opportunity for medium-sized

countries, to grab this historic opportunity to leap forward and consolidate their position within

the new power hierarchy. MENA in the post-Arab Spring period has been a classic example of

this. Not only traditional US allies are increasingly and aggressively pursuing independent

foreign policy paths at times in direct conflict with the US interests but have also started

diversifying their relations with potential challengers to US global order. Though other major

powers also have interests at stake in the evolving regional hierarchy but Russia‘s assertion is

most overt, and directly contravening and threatening to US interests. It would be incorrect to

make an over-ambitions statement that American days within the region are numbered but it

would not be incorrect to assert that MENA precisely is the region where opposition to US

hegemonic practices is most prevalent and other major powers especially Russia is a factor

without whose consent, the most pressing Syrian crisis cannot be resolved.

The Age of US hegemony in MENA in the post-Cold War period was the result of the global

triumph of neoliberal capitalism over socialism and the resultant global economic crisis that led

to economic liberalization and structural adjustment opened MENA economies to the West and

made them more dependent on Western trade and loans. ―The consequent favoring of crony

capitalists and foreign investors ushered in a ‗post-populist‘ form of authoritarianism in which

the republics abandoned their former popular bases…[and] states increasingly omni-balanced

with the United States to contain domestic threats.‖ The trend that started in 1980s was

accelerated in 1990s with the establishment of US military hegemony over the region after the

First Gulf War.157

A Pax Americana in the region which appeared to have been established with the spectacular

swift victory of the US after the First Gulf War could not materialize into significant resolution

Raymond Hinnebusch, ―The Middle East Regional System,‖ in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2nd

ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushirvan Ehteshami (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,2014), 53.

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of pressing Arab problems especially the Arab-Israel conflict. On the contrary it generated new

threats, the most threatening in the form of al-Qaeda which starkly exposed US to terrorism from

the Middle East. A more robust attempt to impose its hegemony was then seen through US

invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) when abandoning its traditional ―offshore

balancing‖ strategy US entered the region as direct occupying force. US was warned by Arab

League chief Amr Mousa that the Iraq war would ―open the gates of hell‖158

- a warning not

heeded by the US officials.

An unintended consequence of the second Gulf war was the formation of a ―resistance front‖

which sought to delegitimize the Washington alignments of pro-Western Sunni states like Egypt

and Saudi Arabia and was championed by Shiite Iran, Shiite-controlled Iraq and Hezbollah as

well as Sunni-majority Syria and Hamas movement of Palestine. The war that was supposed to

strengthen those who accepted US hegemony in the region inadvertently empowered the axis

that opposed it and US hegemony faltered over the region.159

Americans have traditionally seen the Middle East through the regional balance of power lens.

For them a more moderate pro-American camp containing Saudi Arabia and Egypt that out to be

bolstered against a militant, pro-Iranian camp that needs to be contained. But such a flawed

assessment underestimates and misunderstands the role of Turkey that do not fit within either

camps and whose guiding principle is to blur the line between two. There was a prophetic

warning that ―the United States might soon awake to a Middle East that it will find even harder

to understand or influence.‖160

The massive challenges confronted by US in post-Arab Spring

MENA and its inability to decisively address them validate the statement.

Even before the Arab Spring, Robert Malley and Peter Harling writing in the Foreign Affairs

stated: ―For decades, the West has been playing catch-up with a region it pictures as stagnant.

Yet the Middle East evolves faster and less predictably than Western policymakers imagine.‖

They further added that US and European governments ―eventually grasp their missteps, yet by

Anne Penketh, ―Attack on Iraq will open gates of hell, Arabs warn,‖ Arab News, September 06, 2016.

Hinnebusch, ―The Middle East Regional System, 59-67.

Robert Malley and Peter Harling, ―Beyond Moderates and Militants: How Obama Can Chart a new Course in the Middle East,‖ Foreign Affairs 89, no.5 (Sep/Oct 2010): 20.

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the time their belated realizations typically occur, their ensuing policy adjustments end up being

hopelessly out of date and ineffective.‖161

The Arab uprisings which initially were seen as a reaction to post-populist mass exclusion inside

regional states were also reflection of the global power transition in progress. US was seen

caught off guard and was unable to affect outcomes on the Arab streets as decades-old allies

crumbled one after another within the region. The toppling of Mubarak regime came as a rude

shock to staunch US allies in the region especially Saudi Arabia which became disillusioned with

exclusive reliance on US support and for the first time in decades became more assertive in its

foreign policy pursuits with or without US approval as seen in case of its intervention in Yemen.

An analysis of the US relations with the pivotal MENA players highlights how the traditional

friends and foes are re-evaluating their foreign policies and behaviours with the US and the trend

overall has reflected more independence and friction with the US in the attainment of regional

goals and foreign policy pursuits. American bilateral relations with its erstwhile staunch allies

like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt are all-time low and its ability to get their cooperation on

vital Middle Eastern issues is being constrained.

With the departure of Obama administration and the arrival of Donald Trump President-elect in

the White House, the bilateral relations with each of these allies are speculated to become more

uncertain and the prospect of further waning US influence seems a more imminent reality.162

Trump‘s previous remarks haven‘t been too assuring for the allies like Saudi Arabia about whom

he remarked he ―wasn‘t a big fan‖ of the country and US has paid too much to ―back them up‖.

He at the same time predicted that the oil-rich Kingdom ―is going to be in big trouble pretty soon

and they‘re going to need help…the primary reason we‘re with Saudi Arabia is because we need

the oil. Now we don‘t need the oil so much.‖163

But at the same time Trump‘s negative

assessment of the Iran‘s nuclear deal which Trump criticized as ―horrible and laughable‖ and

―one of the most incompetent contracts‖ may make them see eye-to-eye on few issues of vital

regional concern.164

Ibid., 18 .

―Arab states congratulate Trump as anxiety stalks region,‖ Middle East Eye, November 9, 2016.

Sultan al-Qassemi, ―What a Trump Presidency Means for the Gulf,‖ Middle East Institute, February 25, 2016.

Ibid.

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However, there is a consistent decrease in US influence in the region and the trend seems

irreversible with the entry of Russia and its desire to carve a ―sphere of influence‖ in the region

as well as the increasingly independent and assertive behavior of regional allies to bid for

enhanced position for themselves within the regional order in flux.

Conclusion: Regional Hierarchy in Transition

As explained in Chapter 2 the drift towards post-hegemony send signals to potential global

challengers who want to exploit vulnerable local / regional hierarchies. Not only major powers

get emboldened, but regional challengers also attempt to re-write configuration and rules of the

regional hierarchy. The declining hegemon‘s reduced ability to arrest the scope of these changes

encourages potential challengers to make a bold bid to achieve their objectives within the region.

Great powers seldom interfere in local territorial disputes within a region lest their core interests

are threatened or outcomes of the conflict are consequential to them. They then intervene with

the objective of restoring status-quo amenable to their national interests.

MENA is one such region where significant changes in regional structure and hierarchy in the

wake of Arab Spring of 2011 has given rise to new dynamics, made possible through conflict,

instability and erosion of traditional structures of power hierarchy. This breakdown of the

traditional hierarchical power structure have not only pitched major players within the region

against one another to carve a greater role for themselves in the post-conflict period but have

opened avenue for interference / intervention by extra-regional players including great powers.

These regional hierarchies with diffused power structures are significant in establishing the link

between local/regional and global hierarchies in post-hegemony. Unlike Power Transition

Theory that explores the potential for systemic transforming great power war between the

reigning dominant state and the potential dissatisfied challenger that has obtained almost 80%

power parity with the leading state165

; this model explores the conditions for great power

competition against each other and intervention in local/regional hierarchy when the power

parity gap hasn‘t been abridged but the drift towards post-hegemonic phase is apparent. Such

For details refer to Chapter 2 where Power Transition Theory has been discussed in detail.

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regions simmering in conflict; and uncertainty and instability prevalent among them, then

becomes more vulnerable as play ground where potential challengers to declining hegemon

could be seen with their assertive foreign policy behavior and traditional hard and soft balancing

strategies.

In post-hegemony the global hierarchy undergoing power transition is relatively stable. The bid

to maintain and alter the established global status quo between the declining hegemon and

potential challengers is simultaneously in progress but none displays willingness to upset the

status quo through overt traditional great power confrontation. As can be seen, US-China along

with other emerging players are engaged in a power struggle but, US with overwhelming

military superiority, the odds are in its favour so the systemic transforming great power war is

still a far-fetched reality. However regional hierarchies without dominant leaders and conflict-

ridden mechanisms such as MENA in post-Arab Spring phase, are open for great power

intervention and disturbances. It has already drawn in both US and Russia heavily in the local

settings. It has effectively been turned into a play ground for proxy wars where both regional and

extra-regional players are vying for influence.

The Arab Awakening gave new impetus to the power struggle within regional players competing

to shape post-Arab Spring regional order and to affect the internal struggle for power in states

undergoing transition as a result of uprisings. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - the three pivotal

regional players with resources enough to shape the emerging regional order were speculated to

play decisive role in the new power hierarchy. While former key actors like Egypt and Syria

became the main prizes in the contest. Other states experiencing transitions like Tunisia, Libya,

Yemen and Bahrain also became vital in securing leadership of the ensuing order. States like Iraq

and Lebanon where unconsolidated regimes ruled fragmented societies became objects of power

struggle as the prevailing instability made them vulnerable for external penetration.

The detailed foreign policy analysis of these pivotal states and their evolving relations within the

states in the region demonstrates that the bid for enhanced regional role has pitted these players

against each other. While the lesser players are also flexing muscles as the declining US

influence in the region has emancipated them from the limiting influence of hegemonic order and

enabled them to pursue a more pro-active and aggressive foreign policy to secure their strategic

interests within the region. The ongoing conflict in Syria, Libya and Yemen are all prime

217

examples of how each player is eagerly implementing its strategy even at the cost of long-time

friends and allies both within and outside the region. A detailed analysis of Libya and Syria in

subsequent chapters brings out dynamics of these regional conflicts as well as delineates impact

of regional power hierarchy in transition.

US, what once used to be the sole arbiter in the region‘s disputes, has lost its hegemonic position.

Even traditional US allies especially Saudi Arabia is now not exclusively banking on US. MENA

is in transition but only time will tell what the new configuration of power would be and whether

US is able to re-establish its hegemony or it will have to share MENA with other regional and

extra-regional players.

MENA in transition validates the theoretical arguments made in Chapter 2 regarding the impact

of power transition in a regional hierarchy. The regional hierarchies are directly affected by the

power configuration at the systemic or global level. When the system is undergoing a power

transition, as witnessed in today‘s world when the American hegemonic influence is in decline,

certain vulnerable regional hierarchies also get more intervention and penetration from other

regional and extra-regional players. MENA in the post-Arab Spring period went through this

extreme vulnerability which is being exploited by all players vying for influence within the

region.

This chapter has not only outlined how old and traditional alliances are fracturing due to new

developments within the region and even regional players are re-evaluating their approach

towards each other. Similar re-structuring of relationship is occurring with the US - the declining

hegemon and other major players interested in playing key role in the new power hierarchy

within the region. The impact of this reassessment is most easily discernible in the ongoing

conflicts within MENA. The next case studies will establish the link between global and regional

hierarchies and explain how changes at the apex of the global hierarchy trigger and affect events

in a key regional hierarchy.

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Chapter 5: Libya – US “Leading From Behind”

Drift towards post-hegemony not only triggers power transition in the global hierarchy, certain

unstable regional hierarchies also get affected by ambiguity prevailing at the systemic level.

Previous chapter explained MENA as region where uncertainty, instability and conflict rendered

local states vulnerable and this vulnerability is being exploited by both regional and extra-

regional players to re-write the regional hierarchical structure in accordance with their self-

identified national interests.

The Arab uprisings of 2011, which had previously been cited as one of the events that could be

explicitly linked to declining American influence in the world, tore apart already fragile regional

hierarchical structure and seemed certain to alter region‘s dynamics and alliances. With

breathtaking speed and massive youth mobilization, the Arab awakening not only swept away

old regimes of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak but it also forced US to recalibrate

its relationships and policies in the region. The unsettling developments came with further rude

shock as US reluctantly realized, though long being the region‘s dominant arbiter; it had little

ability to directly influence the outcome of the events on the streets of the Arab world.

Libya presented a particularly interesting case to be further explored as Mummar al-Qaddafi,

previously a pariah, had recently been embraced by the Western governments after he renounced

his coveted nuclear weapons program in 2003.1 However, the indigenous mass protests against

more than four decades old dictatorial regime offered a unique opportunity to US, to get itself

registered once again as the dominant superpower with interests at stake within the ensuing new

regional hierarchical structure. The reconfiguration of regional hierarchy contrary to the global

dominant state‘s interest was an outcome that ought to be avoided at all cost. With existing

legitimacy of the declining hegemon already in question, a contrary development would cast

further doubt on US ability to affect desired outcomes. As stated in previous chapter, a

reconfiguration of an important region has to be in line with expectations of the dominant power. Joel Roberts, ―Libya Renounces WMD Program,‖ CBS News, December 21, 2003, accessed September 30, 2016, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/libya-renounces-wmd-program/.

219

This reaffirms that international system is still very much the product of hegemon‘s preferences

and influence, and the undesirable developments send strong signals to potential challengers that

long awaited systemic changes are in progress and embolden them to more assertively project

their own interests.

US refused to allow such an outcome that would embolden other autocratic regional dictators

that with repression and violence they might not only suppress their domestic population but at

the same time can internationally get away with it. Hence comes an international military

intervention in Libya apparently to support the indigenous uprising but it underlie an elaborate

plan for the region‘s emerging hierarchical structure. These underlying dynamics with impacts

on regional emerging structure would be further explored in the chapter.

It will be divided into five sections. First section will give a brief introduction to Libyan pre-

Qaddafi history. Next section will shed light on Muammar al Qaddafi‘s era, with exclusive focus

on US-Libya relations and chronological developments of 2011 unrest, to place US intervention

in Libya within the context. The third section will discuss interplay of systemic and unit-level

variables for international military intervention in Libya identified in ―Military Intervention

Threat Securitization‖ model in Figure 2.14 (Chapter 2).

5.1. Pre-Qaddafi‟s Libya2

The North Western territory that now makes up Libya is a union of three historically distinct

regions – northwest Tripolitania, northeastern Cyrenaica or Barqa, and the remote southwestern

desert region of Fezzan (Map 5.1). The region came first under the Ottoman Empire in the mid-

16th

century with near constant resistance from tribal confederations. Beginning in 1711 a semi-

independent state under Ahmed Qaramanli - a Turkish official emerged in the Ottoman

provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, with Fezzan remaining contested.

However, with the decline of Qaramanli naval power, Ottoman authorities reoccupied Tripoli in

1835, but their political penetration remained incomplete and resistance to Ottoman reforms and

For details see Christopher M. Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Libya: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL 33142, Washington DC, 2011), 34-36, available at http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/157348.pdf.

220

central authority persisted till it was invaded by Italy in 1911 under the pretext of liberating it

from the Ottoman control. It subsequently became an important battleground in the WWII and

finally emerged from the fighting as a ward of the Allied powers and the United Nations. The

three disparate regions were then united in a single, independent state through UN General

Assembly Resolution 289 in November 1949.

Map 5.1. Libya consisting of Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica3

Libya finally emerged as one of the Africa‘s first independent state on December 24, 1951 under

a federal system of government with central authority vested in King Idris Al Sanussi.

Throughout first decade infighting continued over taxation, development and constitutional

powers; and subsequently federal government was replaced with unitary monarchy which further

centralized royal authority in 1963. However, significant national and regional developments

contributed to gradual marginalization of the monarchy; When King Idris left Libya for Turkey

in mid-1969 on medical grounds, conditions were already ripe for a military coup in September

by a devoted Nasserite army captain named Muammar al Qaddafi.

3Source-http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-_p3IpH_m9s8/UT_l0K3E7fI/AAAAAAAAOX4/d0jOm-

U8ND0/s1600/Libya_Map_25.gif accessed September 29, 2016.

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5.2. Libya under Qaddafi

The military coup initially did not elicit any negative response from US, which appeared to

support an anti-Soviet and reformist agenda. However, Qaddafi actively sought not only to

secure full and immediate withdrawal of British and US forces from the military bases in Libya

which occurred on March 28 and June 11, 1970 respectively; but went for renegotiation of oil

production contracts with foreign companies including US and the British, eventually

nationalizing some. Besides Qaddafi also reversed its initial cold relations with Soviet Union and

adopted more vocal anti-Western and anti-Israel attitude in early 1970s that rapidly soured US-

Libyan relations for decades to come.4

Besides Qaddafi‘s Green Book and his ―Third Universal Theory‖ which blended all pan-Arabic,

Islamic and socialist values into one acquired great significance in the early 1970s. He and his

regime carried out drastic reorganization of Libyan political and economic life, in line with

Qaddafi‘s declared principles which aimed at direct governance rather than through elected

representatives and the more equitable redistribution of land and wealth thus reshaping Libya‘s

socio-political landscape. Beginning in 1977 his government restricted private ownership and

commerce and subsequently nationalized or confiscated and redistributed housing, businesses

and real estate in 1978 and 1981.

At the international level he championed his ―Third International Theory‖ for the developing

third world countries, which he presented as an alternative to both communism and capitalism of

Soviet Union and USA respectively. Qaddafi‘s ideological fervor and his confrontation with the

US were ultimately responsible for his drift in Soviet sphere of influence and further away from

both the US and the West.

5.2.1. US-Libya Relations

US-Libya relations from the very beginning struggled when Qaddafi championed cause of anti-

colonial, separatists, Islamic movements and other groups labelled as terrorists in US eyes, in

line with his cherished ideological percepts. These pursuits were categorically rejected by the US

and her allies in the West as unacceptable sponsorship of illegitimate terrorism and subversive 4 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Libya Revolt of 2011", accessed October 02,

2016,https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011.

222

violence. U.S. designated Libya as a state that sponsored terrorism in 1979 and imposed

economic sanctions, which then were expanded several times as the bilateral confrontation

intensified in the 1980s.

While Libya had long been accused of assassinations and killings of Libyan dissidents but what

especially widened the gulf between the two countries were Libyan bombings of Pan Am Flight

103 and UTA Flight 772 in the late 1980s. Besides Libya‘s role in Africa was equally subjected

to severe criticism, when Libyan-trained individuals led brutal movements throughout the

continent that included Foday Sankoh‘s Revolutionary United Front, Sierra Leone and Charles

Taylor‘s Liberian National Patriotic Front.5

Another pointed source of tension between Libya and US was the Arab-Israel conflict where

Qaddafi had remained distinctly opposed to any negotiation or reconciliation throughout the

Cold War period and even in 1990s. Except for a temporary pause during the first Palestinian

Intifada in 1987, Qaddafi continued to voice his opposition to the Oslo peace process.6 These

differences were already plaguing bilateral relations when US imposed diplomatic and economic

sanctions along with reports of some limited covert US efforts at regime change that created

more suspicion and rifts.7

2003 was marked as the beginning of new era in Libya‘s history as it took a number of steps

toward economic and diplomatic engagement with the international community. In August 2003,

Libya accepted responsibility for ―the actions of its officials‖ and agreed to a settlement

agreement for families of Pan Am 103 Flight victims following the termination of UN and US

sanctions.8 In order to register its change of attitude towards US, Libya offered counterterrorism

and intelligence cooperation after the 9/11 attacks on US soil. Qaddafi‘s policy reversals on See Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones (Broadway Books: New York, 2004), 23-25. ; Paul Richards, ―War as Smoke and Mirrors: Sierra Leone 1991-2, 1994-5, 1995-6,‖ Anthropological Quarterly 78, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 377-402. ; ―Foday Sankoh,‖ Economist 351, April 24, 1999. ; ―Qaddafi Says Farewell, Arabia, and Sets his Sights on Africa,‖ Economist 351, April 24, 1999. ; Scott Anderson, ―The Makeover,‖ New York Times Magazine, January 19, 2003. ; and Douglas Farah, ―Gaddafi ‗Meddling‘ in Africa,‖ Washington Post, August 16, 2003.

Ihsana A. Hijazi, ―Gaddafi and Arafat Mend Fences‖, New York Times, March 10, 1987.

Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Regan‟s Undeclared War with Qaddafi (Naval institute Press, 2003). ;

Bernard Gwertzman, ―Shultz Advocates U.S. Covert Programs to Depose Qaddafi,‖ New York Times, April 28, 1986. ; Clifford Krauss, ―Failed Anti-Qaddafi Effort Leaves U.S. Picking Up the Pieces,‖ New York Times, March 21, 1991.

Letter from the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah to the President of the Security Council, reprinted in United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office Release- ―UK Calls for Lifting of UN Sanctions on Libya,‖ August

15, 2003.

223

WMD and long range missile development programs in 2003 and 2004 opened room for further

steps in improving the bilateral relationship. Libya returned to the international stage with its

election as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in October 2007- the seat

which it then held in 2008 and 2009 also.

The Bush Administration hailed Libyan renunciation of terrorism and her reintegration as model

for potential rapprochement for other states that were ready to break away from their previous

record of sponsoring terrorism. The Obama Administration was engaged with modest foreign

assistance requests of Libya9 when Arab uprisings of 2011 erupted abruptly and political

changes in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt stirred long-simmering Libyan reform debates to

boiling point within the country.

5.2.2. Anti-Government Unrest 2011

Libya is a complex society and Muammar al-Qaddafi during his four decade long reign proved to

be a controversial, complex and often contradictory political survivor; though personally he

identified himself to be mercurial, charismatic, shrewd and reclusive. Even in the face of

numerous internal and external challenges, he managed to exercise nearly complete, even if at

times, indirect control over the country‘s intricate political dynamics. Libya has since then been a

country whose domestic and foreign policies nominally had been based on Qaddafi‘s personal

ideology and political change remained elusive even when shifting national political

environment and international reengagement begged for drastic reforms in country‘s changing

socio-political dynamics.

When the Arab uprisings were shaking neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, Qaddafi was the first

leader to publicly and vociferously react to demise of Ben Ali‘s regime. The Libyan government,

however, fearing domestic unrest, tried to pacify the public simmering discontent by initiating

reforms and announcing mega housing benefits and price controls.10

Even dozens of members of

the opposition including the former Al-Qaeda affiliated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)11

and Muslim Brotherhood were released to placate public and as a part of government‘s political

reconciliation program. However, the Libyan government was seen broadly inattentive to the

Blanchard and Zanotti, ―Libya: Background and U.S. Relations,‖ 13-15.

―Libya sets up $24 billion fund for housing,‖ Reuters, January 27, 2011.

David Witter, ―Fact Sheet: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,‖ Institute for the Study of War, April 08, 2011.

224

repeated calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for drafting of a constitution amid

opposition from hardliners.

Major anti-government protests broke out in mid-February, triggered by a chain of events in

Benghazi and other eastern cities that quickly spiraled out of Qaddafi‘s control. With zero

international media presence in Libya, other sources (communicating anonymously online or

opposition groups working in exile; reports from human rights organizations) cited killing of at

least a dozen people on February 17 when crowds were fired with live ammunition.12

Peaceful demonstrations soon escalated into full scale civil war. Demand for Qaddafi‘s ouster

unified ragtag groups of revolutionaries. As the unrest intensified, Reuters on February 18

quoted President Barak Obama as saying ―I am deeply concerned by reports of violence in

Bahrain, Libya and Yemen. The United States condemns the use of violence against peaceful

protesters in those countries and wherever else it may occur.‖13

The sudden escalation of violence against unarmed protesters and other civilians drew strong

condemnation from human rights organizations and foreign leaders. As broader unrest emerged

in other regions, government gradually lost control of major cities among news of defections by

a number of military officers, and senior Libyan diplomats. Among them were also the Libyan

Ambassadors to the China, India, Poland, Indonesia and Libyan representatives to the Arab

League and most of the United Nations missions.14

The regime seemed to be losing its

coherence as support for Qaddafi wavered among segments of military.

The ragtag opposition took form of coherent, organized armed rebellion as demonstrators

acquired weapons from defected military units and government arms depots. Qaddafi‘s hold on

power weakened as pro-Qaddafi troops were expelled from most of eastern Libya including

Benghazi and some cities in the Western region by February 23. The regime continued its efforts

to hold the capital amid more violence and increased international pressure for Qaddafi to step

down. The UN Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1970 and decided ―to refer the

―Deadly ‗day of rage‘ in Libya,‖ AlJazeera, February 18, 2011.

Ross Colvin, ―U.S. alarmed by Bahrain violence, appeals to gov‘t,‖ Reuters, February 18, 2011.

See ―More disciplined Libyan opposition force emerges,‖ CBS News, April 1, 2011. ; ―Five Top Generals Defect from Qaddafi‘s Army,‖ Fox News, May 30, 2011. ; John Hopper and Ian Black, ―Libyan defectors: Pilots told to bomb protesters flee to Malta,‖ Guardian, February 21, 2011.

225

situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the

International Criminal Court‖.15

While he claimed that he was still loved by Libyans, prominent figures among rebels established

a Benghazi based Transitional National Council (TNC) on February 27, to coordinate military

and political activities of rebellion and seek foreign support including freezing and transfer of

Qaddafi‘s assets outside Libya.16

The conflict appeared to have entered a stalemate after rebels

succeeded in taking control of eastern Libya and a number of cities in the West. Pro-Qaddafi

forces seemed once again gaining momentum, launching successful assaults to retake strategic

areas around Tripoli and on the coast of the Gulf of Sidra. By March 10 advantages in weaponry,

training and organization earned Qaddafi loyalists Al-Zawiyah and the oil-export centre of Ras

Lanuf. When Qaddafi forces were gaining the upper hand, the international community was

debating possible diplomatic and military response to the rapidly developing conflict.

The divisions of the international community over possible military intervention- most likely by

imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, persisted. Over expectations of the imposition of a no-fly

zone, the chilling warning came from the veteran ruler that much blood would be shed in

―another Vietnam‖ if Western powers intervened : ― We are ready to hand out weapons to a

million, or 2 million or 3 million, and another Vietnam will begin. It doesn‘t matter to us. We no

longer care about anything.‖17

In spite of stern warnings of ―bloodshed‖ from Qaddafi, the rebels received extensive support

through unrelenting television coverage from the Arab world. The Arab League (AL) and

members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) not only condemned violence against civilians

but urged for UN-enforced no-fly zone. France and the United Kingdom were unanimous for

such an operation but other countries like Turkey and Germany expressed their reservations,

emphasizing the need for broad international consensus and warning against possible unforeseen

consequences of international military intervention. Even African Union (AU) rejected military

―TEXT-Excerpts from UN sanctions resolution on Libya‖ Reuters (Africa), February 27, 2011.

For details see Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC) https://www.temehu.com/ntc.htm accessed October 04, 2016. ―Gaddafi threatens bloodbath in Libya‘‖ ABC News, March 03, 2011.

226

intervention option asserting the crisis to be resolved through negotiations. But it also failed in its

mediation efforts to either sway Qaddafi or to even obtain rebels approval.18

The prospect of rebel‘s military setbacks, mass atrocities and unprecedented Arab advocacy for

intervention pressured Western governments to act. US President Barack Obama eventually

sided with the British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy at

the UN Security Council that voted 10-0 (with five abstentions from China, Russia, Germany,

India and Brazil) to authorize military action against Libya on March 17.19

5.2.2.1. The NATO Military Campaign

The UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing ―all necessary measures‖ – except

occupation by ground forces – to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya, and imposing a

no-fly zone,20

came at a point with Qaddafi regime was on the verge of defeating rebels in

Benghazi. Imposition of no-fly zone started with French air attacks on regime‘s armoured

column on the road to Benghazi on March 1921

; while US-led operations began shortly

afterwards.22

Qaddafi termed collation attacks as act of aggression against Libya and vowed to

continue fighting.23

Handover to NATO came among debates where several countries objected that coalition‘s

aggressive targeting of ground forces loyal to Qaddafi had exceeded mandate set by the UN

Security Council to protect civilians. Even the NATO cover was unable to boost rebels‘ position

and as fighting progressed hopes of their decisive success against Qaddafi‘s professional troops

receded. As the stalemate persisted, UK announced on April 19 to send a team of military

advisers to aid rebels on military strategy, organization and logistics; followed by France and

Italy to do the same. These countries however specified that their officers would not participate

in fighting. The decision came amid news that poorly organized and underequipped rebels cannot

―The Arab Awakening,‖ The Strategic Survey 2011: The Annual Review of World Affairs, (September 6, 2011): 68-69.

―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya, Authorizing ‗All Necessary Measures‘ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,‖ Security Council, SC/10200, March 17, 2011, accessed

October 04, 2016, http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. ―Libya UN Resolution 1973: Text Analyzed,‖ BBC News, March 18, 2011.

Liz Sly, Sudarsan Raghavan and Joby Warrick, ―France fires first shots against Libya after Gaddafi‘s forces enter Benghazi,‖ Washington Post, March 19, 2011.

―Obama: US launches military action against Libya,‖ Fox News, March 19, 2011.

Ibid., “Encyclopaedia Britannica Online‖

227

win a decisive victory without foreign help. It was strongly condemned by Libya as it would

only prolong the conflict.24

NATO attacks continued and even sites associated with Qaddafi family and inner circle were

targeted, resulting in deaths of his son Sayf al-Arab and three of his grandchildren on April 30.

Libyan officials protested that NATO was actively pursuing a strategy of trying to kill

Qaddafi.25

While rebels claimed full control over the western city of Misratah, an arrest warrant

was sought by ICC against Qaddafi, his son Sayf al-Islam and their intelligence chief Abdullah

Senussi for ordering attacks on civilians during the uprising. Some observers expressed concerns

that the move would not facilitate Qaddafi to relinquish power voluntarily who continued to hold

Tripoli in spite of international isolation, NATO attacks and rebel advances in the eastern and

western regions.26

Libya kept blaming foreign elements for aiding unrest but it was not until June 29 when France

became the first NATO country to publicly admit that it shipped light arms and ammunition to

rebels in June to help break the stalemate in Libya. The rebels were under sustained attacks from

loyalist forces until roughly the same time and it also seemed to coincide with the weapons

drop.27

Even though the stalemate persisted, TNC was formally recognized by the US on July 15

as the legitimate governing authority in Libya paving way for TNC access to $30 billion in

frozen assets being held in the US.

The capital Tripoli and other western cities remained under control of government forces till

August 2011. But the tide turned against pro-Qaddafi forces when balance of power shifted and

rebel forces advanced to the outskirts of Tripoli, taking control of strategic areas including city of

Zawiyah. Finally coordinated offensive of NATO airstrikes against military targets, rebels in

Tripoli and from across Western Libya sent Qaddafi and his supporters into retreat and exile.

Qaddafi whereabouts remained unknown but he urged his supporters to put up resistance in an

audio statement broadcast on Libyan radio on August 25. $1.7 million reward was announced for David Stringer and Frances D‘Emilio, ―U.K. will send military advisers to Benghazi to help Libya rebels,‖ The Star, April 19, 2011.

Harriet Sherwood, ―Gaddafi compound hit in Nato attack,‖ Guardian, April 25, 2011.

Ibid., “Encyclopædia Britannica Online.‖

David Jolly and Kareem Fahim, ―France Says It Gave Arms to the Rebels in Libya,‖ New York Times, June 29, 2011.

228

anyone killing or capturing Qaddafi by TNC.28

On the international front, rebels gained a major

victory when the UN General Assembly voted to recognize TNC as representatives of Libyan

people on September 16 and some of the Qaddafi era sanctions were also lifted.29

While NATO struck targets in Sirte, Qaddafi‘s hometown, as rebels prepared major ground

assault on the last remaining centres of support for Qaddafi and in an attempt to wear down

supporters of the fugitive leader holed up inside.30

However sporadic and often intensified

fighting continued in and around Sirte and other military districts throughout September and

early October 2011. The revolt was brought to an abrupt close by grisly demise of Qaddafi at the

hands of rebel fighters in Sirte on October 20, 2011 bringing a violent end to a ―dark‖ chapter in

Libyan history, leaving an uncertain path ahead.

5.3. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables in Libyan

Military Intervention

As already detailed in Chapter 2 it is the power transition in the global hierarchy principally

which renders vulnerable local hierarchies open to intervention by regional and extra-regional

players in a bid to affect the outcomes of the conflict amenable to their regional agendas. Great

power intervention takes place to arrest the increasing speculation about the impending power

shift in the global hierarchy and to re-establish itself as the predominant state to affect outcome

of the new local hierarchy.

A brief history of Qaddafi‘s era till his gruesome death, already discussed, at the hands of rebel

fighters during the revolt will help us unfold interplay of both unit and systemic level variables at

work for military intervention in Libya. Analyzing Libyan intervention in the post-Qaddafi era

has solved few of the puzzles but the complete picture is still far from clear, considering its only

five and a half years old phenomenon. Analysis of ―threat securitization political discourse‖ for

military intervention in Libya also requires elaboration of these key variables in Libyan context.

See Kristen Chick, ―Libyan rebels announce $1.7 million bounty for Qaddafi,‖ The Christian Science Monitor, August 24, 2011. ; ―Rebels Continue Hunt for Qaddafi As UN Unfreezes Funds,‖ Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, August 26, 2011 .

―UN gives Libya‘s seat to NTC,‖ CBC News, September 16, 2011.

―NATO Airstrikes Hit Qaddafi‘s Hometown,‖ Fox News, September 26, 2011.

229

5.3.1. Geography

Geography is an important variable in military intervention model. A great power seldom

intervenes in any area strategically unimportant to her interests or in minor power bilateral

territorial disputes. Great power military intervention takes place in such countries when

outcomes of an intra-state or inter-state dispute might threaten national interests of those powers

or contrary developments might prove consequential to them. International politics designates

flux as the only constant. Hence, assigning a permanent place to a local state or hierarchy is not

possible. Some regions may assume unusual importance at time and might become irrelevant at

another.

International military intervention in Libya took place at a moment when U.S. prestige and

influence suffered a deficit owing to Global Financial Crisis 2008 and Russian belligerence in its

―near-abroad‖ unnerved US Western allies as they nervously watched US indecision and lack of

will to decisively assert in the ongoing transition. This international scenario was followed by

abrupt changes in MENA and resulted in terminating recent US apathy to the region as the pace

and scope of the changes unfolding also took US by surprise. Contemporary global and regional

environment assigned immediate spotlight to a region neglected for the past few decades.

While a super power might elevate or reduce the importance it assigns to a small state, a country

in its local environment is a permanently hostage to its immediate neighbours either friends or

foes. Hence, the role of neighbours and regional dominant state assumes great importance when

an international military intervention takes place in the target state. Geographically it won‘t be

correct to assert that it occupies a key strategic position for great powers especially for US but

abrupt and unprecedented changes in the overall regional scenario during the period assigned

unusual focus to events in Libya. Though Libya - the fourth largest country in the continent - had

for long occupied a prominent position within the African context. 95% of its territory consists of

the Sahara desert that extends into Tunisia and Algeria in the west, has Egypt in the east and

across the southern frontiers into Niger, Chad and Sudan.

The neighbouring countries had for long feared that instability in Libya would destabilize them

and bid for increasing influence by regional and extra-regional players would further spill the

entire region into chaos, a speculation that is corroborated by facts in the post-Qaddafi era.

230

However, Libyan military intervention took place at a time when local hierarchy had already

been torn apart by Arab uprisings in neighbouring states. Tunisia on the West and Egypt on the

East of Tripoli had de-seated their decades old authoritarian regimes that so far had been staunch

American allies, providing stability and continuity to US policies in the region. These startling

developments led to destabilization in the region.

Libya gained an unusual importance because of its dual affiliation also. Its Arab roots had always

rendered Libya as an important player in the Middle Eastern politics. Whereas the long-

established Western friendly allies couldn‘t stand the popular uprising, anti-West Libya seemed

to be on a determined path to contain the rebellion. A victorious and more defiant Qaddafi that

survived such a major onslaught on his regime was the least desirable US option. The impact of

such an outcome for the MENA region would have been far-reaching as Qaddafi‘s Libya had the

full potential to be one of the contenders for shaping regional hierarchy contrary to US interests.

Hence, the unexpected and unforeseen overthrow of familiar regional hierarchal structure was

determined to not only plunge the region into chaos but it also created a power vacuum that

pitched local, regional and extra-regional players against each other for affecting an outcome in

line with their self-identified interests. Military intervention in such an environment was, thus,

not a farfetched outcome.

5.3.2. Intra-State Conflict

Aside from external factors, internal domestic political-military situation and socio-economic

conditions also pave way for overt military intervention. A particular form of government rarely

makes a country more vulnerable to intervention, until it has satisfied, stable, thriving and

functioning polities. But when internal set-up already in transition or triggered by unforeseen

incident, it might leave a country more vulnerable. Especially when state‘s established status quo

is being contested and internal dissatisfied challengers are co-opted by interveners, overt military

intervention by regional and extra-regional players becomes a reality. Extension of power

transition research program to domestic situation is possible. Here again degree of satisfaction

with state‘s established status quo and potential dissatisfied challengers make the environment

more conducive to overt external military intervention (Chapter 2).

231

In Libyan case during Qaddafi‘s era its contradictory political dynamics emboldened competing

interest groups within the country to seek to influence domestic security and foreign policy

within the confines of its authoritarian political system. While Qaddafi‘s ideology permeated the

political discourse on security and foreign policy issues, economic front remained flexible for

reform and new frameworks to meet society‘s changing needs. Libya particularly sought to

project resistance to foreign domination and preserving sovereignty in rhetorical references.

5.3.2.1. Government Structure and Policies

In a country where tribal relations precede any other affiliation, Qaddafi preserved the balance

with regard to distribution of leadership role in government ministries and in political-military

relations. His strategy of frequent re-balancing of roles and responsibilities of his lieutenants

made it difficult for outsiders to understand Libyan politics. Overlapping portfolios were

assigned to several key political figures where they frequently switched roles. This was

significant in a country where personalities and relationships often played more important roles

than official titles. His own tribe, the Qadhafa, held key government positions while larger rival

tribes like the Warfalla resented Qaddafi regime for tribal discrimination. These grievances had

been responsible for limited coup attempts in 1984, 1993 and 1996, based in part on tribal and

familial rivalries. Following failed coup attempts Qaddafi started extensive purging of military

periodically, eliminating potential rivals and replacing them with loyal followers in their place.31

However, political parties and all opposition groups were banned in Libya under law number 71

of 1972. Most frequently cited laws in Libya were the 1971 and 1972 ―Protection of the

Revolution‖ laws. They criminalized activities based on political principles inconsistent with

revolutionary ideology. Though arbitrary arrest and detention was prohibited by law but, in

practice, security services detained individuals without formal charges and held them indefinitely

without court conviction. 32

The inability to acknowledge greater popular participation would

later turned out as one of the main driving force for revolutionaries in 2011 uprising.

Libya‘s unique political system though nominally decentralized with participatory levels of

government under Qaddafi was largely regarded by external observers as authoritarian and

31

―Politics Under Gaddafi,‖ Global Security Organization, accessed October 8, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/libya/opposition.htm. Ibid.

232

undemocratic. A major cabinet reshuffle along with Secretary (prime minister-equivalent) took

place in March 2006 which brought former Health Minister Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmudi to

power. The move was interpreted as reassertion of control by conservative and hard-line

elements of Libyan political establishment.33

Understanding of the basic government structure under Qaddafi is very important to assess the

kind of dissatisfaction prevailing within the country and how it challenged the established status

quo when opportunity arrived in February 2011. The unique political system practiced in Libya

failed to give popular participation to the citizens. The regime was stagnating economically too

and voices of opposition were subtly rising across the country, particularly from the poorer,

eastern areas. There had been simmering discontent with slow pace of constitutional reforms

which registered itself in the anti-government unrest when people overwhelmingly came out in

public against Qaddafi‘s regime.

5.3.2.2. Internal and External Opposition Groups

The festering grievance and discontent was also because of the way opposition leaders and

groups had been harshly dealt with over the last four decades. Establishment of ―people‘s courts‖

and ―revolutionary committee‖ was done to enforce ideological and political discipline and to

punish violators and dissidents. Throughout Qaddafi‘s era opposition to regime both within

Libya and outside can be broadly categorized as either Islamist, royalist or democratic in

orientation but neither posed a credible threat to Qaddafi‘s regime because their activities had

been largely limited by disorganization, rivalry and ideological differences. When 2011 anti-

government unrest took place neither of the exiled groups or leaders were in a place to present an

alternative to the Qaddafi regime.

Opposition groups in exile included the Islamist Rally, the National Libya Salvation Front

(NLSF), the National Alliance, the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Libyan

National Movement (LNM) and the Republican Rally for Democracy and Justice. Among them

NFSL and LNM were the two most important external opposition groups. The latter was

composed of dissidents of former POWs in Chad while NFSL had importance because of its

BBC Monitoring Middle East, ―Libyan leader says cabinet must be dismantled,‖ March 2, 2008. ; and ―Libyan Leader Addresses Libyan People‘s Congress: Dissolves Cabinet,‖ OSC Report GMP 200803005864001, March 3,

2008.

233

financial strength and it was the one that organized 1984 raid on Qaddafi‘s residence at Tripoli

Bab-al-Azizya barracks. The abortive coup attempt led to a short-lived reign of terror in which

thousands were imprisoned, interrogated and an unknown number executed. Otherwise internal

opposition was not that apparent other than Islamic opposition groups that emerged largely in the

eastern region in 1990s.34

Internally the main threat to Qaddafi always came from army itself and he often adopted policy of

shifting senior officers from one post to another to prevent officer corps from closing ranks. In spite

of that numerous coup attempts were uncovered in his four decades rule. Distrust of the professional

military also led him to entrust his personal security to a handpick detachment of his own region.

Dissent from government policies was deemed contrary to the spirit of revolution and severe punitive

measures were then adopted to counter them. One of the reasons why internal opposition remained

disorganized and ineffective was because of the comprehensive internal security system that involved

police, secret service and local revolutionary committees.35

5.3.2.2.1. The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood

From the late 1980s anti-Islamic fundamentalist policy agenda dominated domestic politics as

Qaddafi realized fundamentalism might prove to be a rallying point for opponents of his regime.

He had conflicts with traditional religious hierarchy but apart from them the Muslim

Brotherhood was prominent whose membership went into exile or underground during Qaddafi‘s

tenure especially when its activists were jailed in 1973. To stem the tide of this religious,

fundamentalist opposition, country‘s forty-eight Islamic institutes were also closed in late 1986.

They reemerged and kept clandestine operations for next two decades. Sayf al Islam Qaddafi

publicly characterized the group as non-violent and non-seditious in an attempt to reach out to

Muslim Brotherhood in 2007.

5.3.2.2.2. The Libyan Fighting Group (LIFG)

Another fundamentalist group, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was co-opted by

Qaddafi regime and over 100 members were released in the secret reconciliation program in

2009 to encourage them to renounce violence but concerns about group‘s domestic and

―Qaddafi Era Opposition,‖ Global Security Organization.

Ibid.

234

international activities persisted. US froze the LIFG‘s US assets in September 2001 and formally

designated it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2004.36

Members of the group had also been

linked to Al-Qaeda, though LIFG refuted the claim in July 2009 statement. But it was being

speculated that eastern Libya could serve as a stronghold for LIFG members and hence pose a

threat to Libyan security.37

However, with respect to unrest in 2011 it would not be wrong to claim neither internal nor

external opposition, both religious and secular, was in a position to pose a credible threat to

regime. The opposition based in UK and Egypt was also neither active nor cohesive. The tension

between eastern and western parts of the country was apparent though, probably partly because

of strong fundamentalist presence in the east of the country. Nevertheless, opposition kept

expressing desire to rid country of autocratic regime. In July 2005 opposition groups held a

conference in London and issued a ―national accord‖ that called for removal of Qaddafi from

power and voiced support for the establishment of a transitional government.38

A follow-up

meeting was then held in 2008.39

When opportunity arrived in February 2011 these internal and external groups, that for decades

had resented and resisted the established status quo, were ready to avail it and immediately a

Transitional National Council (TNC) was set up to chalk out a unified plan for ouster of Qaddafi.

Simmering discontent had been brought to the boiling point and both regional and extra-regional

players sensing a historic opportunity got involved in the domestic situation to affect the desired

outcome. However, absence of indigenous ground based opposition was bound to embroil post-

Qaddafi Libya into mad struggle for power and influence, witnessed till date of this writing.

5.3.3. Regional and Extra-Regional Players

Another variable that plays a significant role in the international military intervention and that

explicitly links the unit and systemic levels is the role of regional and extra-regional players. As

explained in Chapter 2, the conflict within the relevant dyad may or may not even involve ―Libya: Background and U.S. Relations,‖ CRS Report, 21.

Ibid. 21,22.

May Youssef, ―Anti-Gaddafists Rally in London,‖ Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo) 749, June 30 - July 6, 2005. ;

―Opposition Plans to Oust Al Qadhafi,‖ Al Jazeera (Doha), June 25, 2005. ; ―Libya‘s Fractured Opposition,‖ Middle East Mirror, July 29, 2005. ―Libyan Opposition Groups Meet in London to Reiterate Commitment to save Libya,‖ OSC Report

GMP20080329825012, March 29, 2008.

235

regional intervention. But when a great power intervenes in the target state, it always triggers

other local, regional and extra-regional players with interests at stake over the outcome of the

conflict. Every player wants a favourable end-result amenable to her security environment and

coinciding with self-identified national interests.

While local and regional states are concerned with the new configuration of power to emerge

within the country once the conflict ends and its impact on regional hierarchical structure; so few

of those states may or may not play a very active role when the power is still in transition and

may resort to more active role once the signs of extinction of existing set up becomes apparent.

Such local and regional states want to limit any damage if by chance the target state emerges

resilient and ruling regime survives the onslaught or if the great power intervention gets

terminated half-way. But once the impending transition is more than a reality, they actively

lobby and their interference becomes even more intrusive.

However, great powers role become apparent from the very start of the conflict. Especially those

extra-regional players who want to enhance their standing in the global hierarchy by shaping

local/regional status quo, they want to register themselves as important global players with

ability to re-write regional hierarchy. The stakes of the declining global hegemon are different

from other great powers; once the hegemon enters the conflict, its legitimacy as a global leader is

at stake. A protracted conflict or the contrary result may affect her global standing more than any

other player and send a very strong message to dissatisfied potential challengers that long-

awaited systemic changes are in progress. Though it may not dent her international standing

immediately; a swift conclusion of the undertaking, however, signify that the power parity gap

with the declining hegemon is still potent and their ability to undercut hegemon‘s international

political influence still negligible.

In the light of this analysis role of regional and extra-regional players in the Libyan intervention

will be ascertained; this involves all the major actors in both the African and Middle Eastern

context also. With the civil war in Libya still in progress, all the major players both internal and

external are deeply involved to affect the outcome. A final result will not only heavily alter

local/regional hierarchical structure, by empowering few players but will also determine where

US stands in MENA after advocating intervention in a second Muslim country within a decade.

236

5.3.3.1. North African Libyan Neighbours

The overthrow of Qaddafi though an event of major significance for the Sahel and North African

regions, was largely ignored and little scholarly or policy attention was paid to Libya‘s

relationship with respect to sub-Saharan Africa during and after the conflict. Their recent history

has been checkered and in modern times Libyan-African relations had been closely identified

with the person of Muammar Qaddafi who tried to buy influence in the continent after being

rebuffed by Arab leaders while also promoting grandiose visions of himself as the leader of the

continent. According to a popular perception his support for insurgents and some legitimate

liberation movements (such as the South African ANC) earned him approval of the largesse sub-

Saharan Africans in general and the AU in particular. Many black Libyans fighting on behalf of

the Qaddafi during the unrest were also stigmatized as ―African mercenaries‖. Fact is geography

cannot be overcome and Libyan stakes in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be overlooked and vice

versa.

5.3.3.1.1. SUDAN

The Sudanese role in the Libyan crisis of 2011 was pivotal and their support to Libyan

opposition was immediate and generous through effective collaboration with the TNC and the

international community. Sudan had visible interest in the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime as

their bilateral relations had been far from cordial owing to Qaddafi‘s negative interference in its

internal affairs, his logistic support to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Darfur

rebel movements. Qaddafi‘s support to Sudan‘s political opposition including the Sudan People

Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) later led to the secession of southern Sudan in July of

2011, forming the state of South Sudan. Throughout this period Khartoum had been trying to

neutralize impact of Qaddafi‘s interference in its internal affairs by trying to increase activities of

the internal Libyan opposition to make her engrossed in her own internal troubles.40

Events of

February 2011 provided Sudan with rare opportunity to achieve its objectives in Libya by

toppling Qaddafi and subsequently protecting its national security from further Libyan

intervention and help her achieve internal stability too.

Asim Elhag, ―The Sudanese Role in Libya 2011,‖ World Peace Foundation: Reinventing Peace, December 17, 2012.

237

They provided Libyan opposition with logistical assistance, training and supply of arms,

ammunition and combat equipment, and security and intelligence cooperation. Their role in

facilitating TNC communication with the Government of Niger was especially significant as

Niger leadership had been supporting the ex-Libyan regime.41

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)

also played decisive role in the city of Kufra by expelling Qaddafi elements from the city. This

overwhelming supporting role to topple Qaddafi regime was later revealed by the Sudanese

President, Omar Al Bashir, himself on October 26, 2011.42

Khartoum‘s interference in the post-

Qaddafi period hasn‘t subdued either. They are now being accused of supporting Islamists in the

country which resulted in the subsequent expulsion of Sudan‘s defence attaché by Libya in

September 2014.43

5.3.3.1.2. NIGER

Libya-Niger relations had also gone through ups and down. In 1980s and 1990s the Tuareg

insurgency in Niger and Mali was supported by Qaddafi‘s Libya but bilateral relations improved

significantly after 2000. Niger migrant workers along with Tuaregs fought on sides of the pro-

Qaddafi forces against the revolutionaries.44

It was one of the last African countries to recognize

the transitional set up in Libya.45

The extent of close relations could be ascertained by the fact

that prominent members of Qaddafi family including his son Saddi Qaddafi took refuge in Niger

until it was extradited to Libya in March 2014.46

Niger was concerned about the unrest in Libya as its own vital interests were at stake. It serves as

a transit route for Libya and Mali for AQIM, other jihadists as well as the Tuareg groups. This

cross-border terrorist activity and movement along with proliferation of arms undermines already

fragile stability. Recently Boko Haram, increasingly active in southern Niger, also used the

Ibid.

James Copnall, ―Sudan‘s Bashir says his country supported Libya rebels,‖ African Review, October 27, 2011.

―Libya accuses Sudan of arming terrorists,‖ Times of Israel, September 8, 2014.

Peter Gwin ―Former Qaddafi Mercenaries Describe Fighting in Libyan War,‖ Pulitzer Center, August 31, 2011.

Peter Clottey ―Libya To Question Gadhafi‘s Son, Says Niger Official,‖ Voice of America, October 01, 2011.

― Gadhafi‘s Son al-Saadi extradited to Libya,‖ USA Today , March 6, 2014.

238

transit route to get to and from Libya. Furthermore, the conflict in Mali and its spillover effect is

threatening its strategically important uranium mines by AQIM and its splinter groups.47

5.3.3.1.3. ALGERIA

Qaddafi sustained amicable relations with Algeria most of the times that enjoys a powerful

influence throughout the Maghreb and the Sahara; they stood neutral during 2011 unrest. Even

several of Qaddafi‘s family members also sought refuge there when events took serious turn in

Libya which led to antagonism on part of the new Libyan government.48

Both have shared same

stances on regional issues likes the wish to wrest the Western Sahara, controlled by the

Polisario49

, form Morocco and hostility towards Israel since 1980s. The African Press Agency

even claimed during the uprising that the Algerian government supported Qaddafi‘s attempt to

recruit mercenaries, especially from the Polisario to repress the insurrection.50

This issue also

sparked tension between TNC and Algeria.

Algerian bilateral relations with Libya had been heavily influenced by her own vital security

interests, affected in turn by current chaos in Libya. Fezzan is used as a safe haven by Al-Qaeda

in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other jihadists operating in Algeria. Certain areas of the region

close to borders with Niger and Algeria serve as logistic zones by terrorists and for launching

combat operations in neighbouring countries.51

Algeria at the moment is employing both diplomacy and military to safeguard its interests from

the fallout of Libyan chaos by facilitating negotiations between Libyan warring factions and

through UNSMIL mediation process along with Tunisia, Egypt, France, Italy and the US. Their

security service enjoys a reputation for penetration in all armed and political formations both

― Libya-The Interests of the Neighbouring States in Libya‘s Civil War,‖ Le Courrier du Maghreb et de I‟Orient

The Maghreb and Orient Courier 26 (July & August 2016) , accessed on October 3, 2016. http://lecourrierdumaghrebetlorient.info/focus/libya-the-interests-of-the-neighbouring-states-in-libyas-civil-war/. Ibid.

The Polisario is a politico-military organization based in Algerian town of Tindouf, currently fighting Morocco to take control of the former Western Sahara, currently under Morocco‘s sovereignty and win independence for that region.

Anna Mahjar-Barducci, ―The Role of Algeria in Libya,‖ Gatestone Institute, September 16, 2011.

―Libya-The Interests of the Neighbouring States,‖ Le Courrier du Maghreb et de I‟Orient.

239

inside and across the border making them a formidable presence to be employed for stabilizing

the region.52

5.3.3.1.5. CHAD

Chad leaned towards Qaddafi during Libyan crisis of 2011. They enjoyed friendly relations once

the conflict over Libyan sponsorship of particular leaders of Chadian civil wars, the territorial

dispute over Aouzou strip and the Libyan annexation of Chad was over in 1994. Chad President

Idriss Deby, brought to power in 1990 by Qaddafi himself through financial and military support,

was apprehensive of TNC ability to expel Africans and their rigid Islamist tendencies. Hence

Libyan tendency to destabilize its neighbour was a major concern.

During the revolution many Chadian mercenaries fought for Qaddafi. Libyan revolutionaries

accused Chad for playing key role in preventing fall of Qaddafi in February 2011. Chad

reluctantly recognized TNC only under international pressure in August 2011 but kept

expressing concern that political turmoil in Libya would have its impact on Chad.

5.3.3.1.5. TUNISIA

The smallest state in North Africa, Tunisia had vital interests in Libya. Surviving under the

shadow of its wealthy neighbour, it had always been concerned about impending instability in

Libya after Qaddafi. The 2011 uprisings started with Tunisia; before the unprecedented

developments the two countries had been at ―a historical high point‖, making Libya Tunisia‘s

biggest trade partner in the region. It also benefitted from oil imports at a preferential price that

accounted for almost 25 % of its recorded oil imports from its neighbour.53

In the wake of Libyan crisis, the links of domestic terrorist outfit the Ansar al-Sharia (AST) with

across the border western branch of Ansar al-Sharia (ASL) and the Islamic State presence were

unnerving Tunisian security apparatus. Tunisia recognized the transitional TNC as the sole

legitimate representative of the Libyan people on August 20, 2011 in a significant policy shift,

which has remained neutral in the months-long civil conflict.54

So far Tunisia has kept itself

Libya-The Interests of the Neighbouring States,‖ The Maghreb and Orient Courier.

Youssef Cherif, ―Libya and Tunisia, For Worse or for Better,‖ Institut Arabe des Chefs d‟Eterprises , 2014.

―Tunis recognizes Libyan rebels as country‘s rep,‖ Yahoo News, August 21, 2011.

240

away from Libyan internal quarrels and its ability to influence events in its eastern neighbour

remains limited.

5.3.3.1.6. EGYPT

Libya and Egypt have enjoyed strong historic ties and they have vital security and economic

interests tied to each other which had been seriously affected by the instability prevailing in

Libya following 2011 Arab awakening. While on the one hand, return of hundreds of thousands

of migrant workers and discontinuity in their remittances back home had put additional pressure

on all segments of Egyptian economy.55

On the other hand, the chaos following Libyan uprising

has affected domestic security interests of Egypt, especially with regard to its fight against its

own domestic counter-terrorism campaign.

Eastern Libya is used for weapons supply and staging attacks on Egypt by domestic jihadists

groups like Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), who claimed to have pledged allegiance to ISIL too.

Cario responded by significantly reinforcing troops on its western border.

During the time of Libyan revolution, Egypt itself was going through settling period after the

overthrow of Mubarak regime. However, once Qaddafi departed from the scene and al-Sisi

replaced Morsi as Egyptian President, Cairo has actively supported General Khalifa Hafter‘s

fight against Islamists including more moderate Libyan Muslim Brotherhood.56

A radical

Islamist state on its border would be a nightmare for Egypt. As a result, the assistance to Haftar

has been comprehensive and has included training and delivery of all kinds of ammunition,

weapons and military equipment including fight jets and attack helicopters.57

Depending upon

the number and intensity of terrorist attacks on Egyptian soil, an intrusive intervention into Libya

by Cairo is always a possibility and Egypt will most likely remained engaged in the conflict till it

shapes the outcome favourable to its strategic interests.

55

Hannah Gurman, ―Migrant Workers in Libya,‖ Asia Pacific Migration Network, International Labour Organization, accessed October 12, 2016, http://apmagnet.ilo.org/news/migrant-workers-in-libya. ―Egypt supports Haftar and his efforts to secure Libya‘s oil wealth,‖ Middle East Monitor, September 16, 2016.

―Libyan MP says Egyptian planes strike Benghazi as Haftar mounts attack,‖ Middle East Eye, October 15, 2014.

241

5.3.3.2. Key Regional Players in Libyan Crisis

Apart from local/neighbouring countries having their stakes directly involved in the ongoing

crisis in Libya; certain regional players also try to affect the outcome of the conflict so as to

improve their standing in the emerging local hierarchy. These players are also significant in

shaping war narrative emerging out of the conflict. In Libyan intervention context, role of UAE,

Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would be analyzed.

5.3.3.2.1. UNITED ARAB EMIRETS (UAE)

The fall of Qaddafi regime quickly dissipated the centralized power, leaving Libya into chaos

and allowing a wide range of armed groups to assert control over large swathes of the territory in

the oil-rich nation. Since then, it became a battleground for local, regional and extra-regional

powers with competing interests and conflicting visions. The UAE was the Gulf exception in the

sense that it enjoyed cordial relations with Qaddafi‘s Libya, ties that dated back to early 1970s

and reciprocated by the ruling Emirates family. Other than strong family and business ties, both

shared their strong aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood.58

The change in UAE public posture towards Libyan regime came in March 2011 when it declared

that it will contribute 12 jetfighters to help impose UN Resolution 1973.59

This was not a

principled change of heart on part of UAE but an attempt to offset the rumors that UAE along

with Algeria was transporting mercenaries from African locations to Libya to help Qaddafi put

down the revolt, the charge Emiratis always denied; and to counter Qatari moves that had already

been advocating military action against the regime along with France.60

However, in the post-Qaddafi Libya, the Emirati-Qatari rivalry have asserted itself in fierce

geopolitical struggle with UAE along with Egypt backing Tobruk-based government while Qatar

along with Turkey and Sudan supporting the Islamist-led government in Tripoli. This proxy war

is proving highly influential in shaping Libya‘s post-Qaddafi political order and also throws light

on how GCC ruling families react to grassroots democratic Islamist movements like the Muslim

Ahmed Meiloud, ―Foreign Actors and the Libyan Civil War,‖ Middle East Eye, September 5, 2014.

―UAE sending 12 planes on Libyan mission,‖ Khaleej Times, March 26, 2011.

Meiloud, ―Foreign Actors and the Libyan Civil War.‖

242

Brotherhood. Whereas, Abu Dhabi‘s concern reflect about movement‘s potential to challenge the

status quo in the UAE‘s poor emirates where it has maintained a support base for years.61

As long as the rise of Qatari-based Islamist groups in Libya and other MENA nations are viewed

as unsettling developments to their long-term political and economic order by Abu Dhabi,

prospects for a diplomatic settlement aimed at securing long-term resolution of the dispute

between rivals groups in Libya are very low. By further militarizing the conflict, the proxy war

will further diminish the prospects for stability in Libya and will keep actors within and without

the region engaged in the imbroglio.

5.3.3.2.2. QATAR

The small gulf state signaled its outsized geopolitical ambition after a period of initial caution in

January 2011 as the evolving contours of the political upheavals cascading across MENA

asserted themselves. Their decision to embrace the direction of change was unique in the sense

that most of the other regional states viewed popular pressures unleashed by the Arab Spring as

inherently threatening. Qatari role in Qaddafi‘s Libya got prominent since the beginning. With

little at stake in Qaddafi‘s Libya, officials in Doha realized that their interests would be better

served by his departure.

It played key role in galvanizing GCC and Arab support for UN Security Council resolution that

mandated NATO to defend civilians in Libya and subsequently recognizing NTC. During the

uprising, it actively supported the rebels with weapons and ammunition on a large scale. Not

only its air force took part in NATO-led attacks but it later admitted assisting rebels through

hundreds of ground troops as well.62

However, what got Qatar into trouble with neighbouring Gulf states was its backing of the

Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2011, Doha has emerged as one of the key backers of political Islam

by supporting the movement in MENA and other Islamist outfits from Tunisia to Syria.63

Qatar

relationship with the Islamist groups, including Hamas and Jabhat al-Nusra etc., though publicly 61

Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner, ―The UAE and Qatar Wage a Proxy War in Libya,‖ Huffington Post, December 14, 2015. Ian Black, ―Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels,‖ Guardian, October 26, 2011.

Ishaan Tharoor and Adam Taylor, ―Here are the key players fighting the war for Libya, all over again,‖

Washington Post, August 27, 2014.

243

questioned by the US, had privately become the go-to US partner for indirect communications

with these very groups. Beyond the Middle East Doha had facilitated talks between the US and

Taliban in Afghanistan though ended without success. Qatar viewed their contribution as the

natural outgrowth of their belief in nonjudgmental dialogue.64

In the post-Qaddafi period, Qatar had failed to leverage its control into tangible outcomes and

failed to translate short-term gains into long-term influence. But both UAE and Qatar are

expected to remain engaged in long term proxy war till outcomes align with their charted path

but that definitely alienates larger public. It becomes harder for players to avoid appearance of

taking sides and picking winners when political spoils were handed out.

5.3.3.2.3. TURKEY

Turkey was among one the few countries who maintained links with the Qaddafi regime during

the time of the crisis. On this account it was criticized by both the pro and anti-Qaddafi factions

for not taking a clear stand and sacrificing one‘s interests for the sake of other. With business

interests worth $15.3 billion at stake, it was particularly difficult for Turkey to out rightly oppose

Qaddafi.65

When NATO started military campaign against Libya, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan,

expressed his conditional support and publicly stated: "NATO should go in with the recognition

and acknowledgement that Libya belongs to the Libyans, not for the distribution of its

underground resources and wealth."66

Throughout the crisis, Turkey kept pressing for finding a

political solution and proposed a plan in the fourth Libyan Contact Group meeting.67

However, the crisis in Libya seemed to place Ankara in a difficult situation while balancing its

aspirations to become an effective major player in the Middle East and simultaneously

maintaining its traditional alliances intact became problematic. Besides it wanted to be seen on

the right side of history and position itself reflecting people‘s aspirations in the region. The crisis

64

Adam Goldman and Karen DeYoung, ―Qatar played now-familiar role in helping to broker U.S. hostage‘s release‖ Washington Post, August 25, 2014. ―Turkey wants Libyan intervention over quickly,‖ Reuters, March 21, 2011.

Ibid.

Susan Fraser, ―Turkey proposes ‗road map‘ to end Libyan Crisis,‖ Associated Press, July 14, 2011.

244

opened the fissures between Turkey and NATO as well as some of the alliance‘s member

countries, in particular France.68

In the post-Qaddafi period Turkey‘s backing of the Muslim Brotherhood has landed it in the

proxy war being played in the region. Along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it has joined forces

to squash the Muslim Brotherhood while on the other hand it has joined the Qatar-Turkish bloc

along with Sudan by playing a role in Qatari weapons shipments to Libyan Dawn, a

superstructure of militia forces dominating Tripoli.69

Given Turkish stakes, it will not be

ambitious to state that it is likely to remain engaged in the proxy war till its ultimate conclusion.

5.3.3.2.4. SAUDI ARABIA

When the Arab uprisings unfolded in 2011, the Saudi monarchs looked on with horror as series

of Arab autocrats backed by Riyadh were replaced by chaotic, fledgling democracies. When

pressured to back airstrikes on Libya by Western Allies, it tried to deflect US criticism of Saudi

Arabian intervention in Bahrain. A Saudi official admitted: ―We backed air strikes on Libya in

exchange for the US muting its criticism of the slaughter in Bahrain‖.70

Saudi role in Libya became more apparent in post-Qaddafi Libya. Riyadh along with UAE has

launched a campaign across the region to roll back what they regard existential threat to their

authority by Islamists groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Military ouster of the Islamist

President in Egypt not only served as a hope, but has pitched the regional players against each

other. This regional polarization has resulted in the formation of opposing blocks – Saudi Arabia

and UAE on one side, Turkey and Qatar on the other side- and so far has proved to be gigantic

impediment to international efforts to resolve Libyan crisis.71

Currently Saudia has competing regional priorities, with focus on the protracted Operation

Decisive Storm in Yemen; it is expected to play more of a supporting role in the Libyan conflict; Yigal Schleifer, ―Libyan Crisis a Missed Opportunity for Turkey,‖ World Politics Review, March 28, 2011.

Fehim Tastekin, ―Turkey‘s War in Libya,‖ Al-Monitor, December 4, 2014.

Adrian Blomfield, ―Bahrain hardliners to put Shia MPs on trial,‖ Telegraph, March 30, 2011.

David D. KirkPatrik and Eric Schmitt, ―Arab Nations Strike in Libya, Surprising U.S.,‖ New York Times, August 25, 2014.

245

thus leaving UAE and Qatar as the main GCC players with contradictory aims in the Libyan

crisis.72

5.3.3.3. Key Extra-Regional Players in Libyan Crisis

When a local/regional hierarchy undergoes power transition, it produces a power vacuum and

extra-regional players get involved. Some of these players may have deeper strategic interests

related to the region while others just try to reinforce their global standing. Libyan crisis of 2011

saw France and the United Kingdom as other extra-regional players that played pivotal role in

Libyan military intervention along with US.

5.3.3.3.1. FRANCE

When unrest broke out in Libya in February 2011, there was an array of hostile political actors

happy to see prospect of getting rid of Qaddafi forever. His rapprochement with the West,

surrendering of weapons of mass destruction program and willingness to cooperate on counter-

terrorism had failed to undo years of distrust and hostility. However, France had more than just

one score to settle with Qaddafi. The mercurial leader rising influence in the African continent in

decades preceding revolution and especially his willingness to bankroll regimes in West Africa

had direly threatened not only France‘s economic interests but its cultural influence was also at

risk of being further curtailed till Qaddafi occupied the mantle of power in Libya.

With no significant trade or other interests at stake in Libya, France took a lead role along with

other like-minded states interested in seeing Qaddafi go at the earliest possible time. France

eventually led the aerial campaign that precipitated international military intervention.73

Their

interests shaped their post-Qaddafi behavior too, with France leaning towards Mustafa Abd al-

Jalil- a lawyer with Islamist slant, when the US and the Emiratis were favouring Mahmoud Jibril.

This competition to promote their local allies complicated already existing complex maze of

ideological and tribal interests. However, unlike the regional competing states of Qatar and UAE,

France preferred to work behind the scenes aimed at securing lucrative business deals.74

The

Total French Energy Company was taking advantage of Paris leading role to augment its position ―A larger role for Saudi Arabia in Libya?,‖ Means Associated Limited (Blog), August 19, 2015.

―Libya: US, UK and France attack Gaddafi forces,‖ BBC News, March 20, 2011.

Meiloud, ―Foreign Actors and the Libyan Civil War.‖

246

in Libyan oil sector once the conflict ends at the expense of oil companies of other countries.75

Similarly Paris Conference held on September 1, immediately after the fall of Tripoli, also

helped secure French interests in the aftermath of the conflict. They secured the right to exploit

35% of Libyan oil resources in exchange for total support during the conflict by NTC, an

agreement later denied by both.76

The French government of Nicholas Sarkozy, is also reported to have used the Libyan campaign

to sell Rafale fighter. Developed at a great expense but unable to secure export orders, despite

strenuous efforts; the French were trying to sell them to Qaddafi also as late as 2010, though

successfully. During the Libyan revolution the very first aircraft to attack Qaddafi forces was

Rafales. It even led many analysts to speculate that whether the operation, as in words of the

Foreign Policy magazine, was ―an advertisement for the Dassault Rafale fighter jet‖. Thanks to

the Libyan campaign, now the export prospects have improved considerably.77

Recently disclosed emails from Hillary Clinton‘s adviser Sidney Blumenthal have unearthed

more disturbing motives of NATO Libyan intervention, including Qaddafi‘s plan to create a

gold-backed currency to compete with euro and dollar. With regard to French motives it was

claimed that Nicholas Sarkozy led the attack on Libya with ―five specific reasons in mind: to

obtain Libyan oil, ensure French influence in the region, increase Sarkozy‘s reputation

domestically, assert French military power, and to prevent Qaddafi‘s influence in what is

considered ―Francophone Africa.‖78

Most astounding revelation about the true French motives was the threat posed to French franc

(CFA) circulating as a prime African currency. Qaddafi‘s estimated 143 tons of gold and similar

amounts of silver were intended to be used to establish a pan-African currency based on the

Libyan golden Dinar. If implemented the initiative would have provided the Francophone Africa

with alternative to the French franc (CFA).79

A higher degree of North African economic

independence under the new pan-African currency led by Libya was to be avoided at all cost.

David N. Gibbs, ―Power Politics, NATO, and the Libyan Intervention,‖ Counter Punch, September 15, 2011.

Richard Rousseau, ―Libya: A Very Long War over Competing Energy Interests,‖ Foreign Policy Journal, November 19, 2011.

Gibbs, ―Power Politics, NATO, and the Libyan Intervention.‖

Brad Hoff, Hillary Emails Reveal True Motive for Libyan Intervention,‖ Foreign Policy Journal , January 6, 2016.

ibid.

247

Given immense French stakes in post-Qaddafi Libya, it is expected to remain engaged in the

post-conflict re-building and re-construction. French would most probably want to avoid another

scenario with a hostile regime in Libya is again in a position to threaten its wider economic and

strategic interests in the region.

5.3.3.3.2. UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

Apart from France, another extra-regional player with most prominent role in Libya at the time

of intervention was the United Kingdom. Tony Blair government was one of the first in the West

to reopen a dialogue with the Qaddafi regime following its renunciation of terrorism and nuclear

and chemical weapons programs. UK maintained its close relationship with Qaddafi until his

hold on power got doubtful following massive unrest against his regime. Qaddafi government

had been working closely with both US and British intelligence services in the distasteful process

of ―extraordinary rendition‖ – a process that allowed transportation of suspected terrorists

overseas and whereby they were interrogated and tortured by Libyan operatives.80

Besides

British oil firms benefitted from lucrative contracts and also from Qaddafi‘s family billions of

dollars in assets to London, estimated around £20 billion in liquid.81

The unrest in Libya in February 2011 quickly saw a shift in UK policy towards Qaddafi already

marked by a number of contradictions. It then became one of the leading states to enforce no-fly

zone on Libya following UNSC resolution 1973 passed to enforce protection of civilians through

international use of force.82

On the first anniversary of the start of the Libyan revolution, Prime

Minister David Cameron remarked Britain was ―proud‖ of the part played in the revolution.83

Cameron said that the military action against Qaddafi was "necessary, it is legal and it is right."

Right, "because I don't believe that we should stand aside while this dictator murders his own

people."84

However, a recent scathing report published by the Foreign Affairs Committee held Cameron

―ultimately responsible‖ for instability in Libya following the death of Qaddafi and remarked Gibbs, ―Power Politics, NATO, and the Libyan Intervention.‖

Simon Hooper, ―A brief history of UK-Libya relations,‖ Al Jazeera English, December 11, 2015. ; Robert Winnett and James Kirkup, ―Libya: Gaddafi‘s billions to be seized by Britain,‖ Telegraph, February 24, 2011.

Ewen MacAskill, Nicholas Watt, Ian Black, Ed Pilkington and Luke Harding, ―Libya crisis: Britain, France and US prepare for airstrikes against Gaddafi,‖ Guardian, 17 March 2011.

―Britain ‗proud‘ of part played in Libyan revolution,‖ BBC News, February 17, 2012.

Michael Elliott, ―Viewpoint: How Libya Became a French and British War,‖ Time (USA), March 19, 2011.

248

that resultant bloodshed and chaos had not only sparked ―violent reaction‖ fuelling conflict

across MENA but conversely strengthened ISIS and al Qaeda too in the region. Libyan weapons

have been found in more than 20 countries, while its conflict has fuelled war, insurgencies and

terrorism in at least 10 other nations.85

Another recently published Hansard Report , Suart Blair Donaldson, member Scottish National

Party, criticized UK government policy in Libya and described it as ―an unmitigated disaster‖

reminding ―(you) reap what (you) sow‖. Government catastrophic involvement had even

attracted criticism from US President Barak Obama who suggested that Prime Minister had taken

his eye off Libya after being ―distracted by a range of other things‖86

UK has both short-term

and long-term interests at stake with both the conduct and outcome of the civil war, hence it

could be expected to be a persistent player in the ongoing transition period too.

5.3.4. Legitimacy

As stated in Theoretical Framework Chapter 2, legitimacy of the dominant state (in this case the

global hegemon) is at stake when internal disturbances within a state upset hierarchical balance

in a key regional hierarchy and outside interference by both regional and extra-regional players is

apparent. If the outcome of the conflict alters regional status quo contrary to the vital interests of

the dominant state, it amounts to acceptance of overt loss of influence in a regional hierarchy - an

outcome that ought to be avoided for sake of maintaining credibility as the sole dominant state

with ability to lead the system.

Hegemons usually co-opt leading international organizations and institutions to assume

semblance of international support, if and when they want. The military intervention in the target

state is thus framed as an untoward situation, externally imposed through ―irresponsible‖ actions

of the target state rather than a matter of choice that could be avoided. Threat securitization

becomes implicit in this stage. Local disturbance in the local setting then assume ―existential

threat‖ character, expressed through political speeches of the elite actors.

85

Lizzie Dearden, ―How David Cameron‘s intervention in Libya is fuelling war and terror around the world,‖ Independent, September 15, 2016. ; Rupert Stone, ―In Libya, Britain‘s ignorance triumphed over caution,‖ Al Jazeera, September 15, 2016. ―UK Foreign Policy on Libya,‖ House of Commons, Hansard 609, May 03, 2016, accessed October 15, 2016, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-05-03/debates/1605032000002/UKForeignPolicyOnLibya.

249

A detailed analysis of the international military intervention in Libya also reveals an underlying

pattern identified in Threat Securitization Model (Figure 2.13). Not only were major regional and

international organizations co-opted but analysis of the speeches reveals the dominant state‘s

actors were able to generate the normative structure for international military intervention while

discourse from the target state was de-legitimized as propaganda.

An analysis of Obama speeches of March 18 and 28 (Table 5.1) clearly show how American

superpower identity was superimposed while constructing threat for Libya. One thing that

remained prominent during the period was Washington‘s hesitation and the time it took before

choosing a position in the Libyan crisis. Dominant opinion within Washington argued that

intervention was a bad idea but Senator John McCain (R) and Senator John Kerry (D) advocated

for US action.87

Others like Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, Vice President Joe Biden,

National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon and Counterterrorism Chief Jhon O. Brennan

however, urged for caution.88

Considering that public opinion also remained skeptical for

dominant US role in the crisis in spite of the concern shown about the deteriorating conditions

within Libya,89

made the task of leading from the front very problematic for the Obama

Administration.

Table 5.1: Obama on Libya

(Obama, March 18) ―…the United States is prepared to act as part of an international coalition. American

leadership is essential, but that does not mean acting alone – it means shaping the conditions

for the international community to act together.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―Now the United States did not seek this outcome. Our decisions have been driven by

Qaddafi‘s refusal to respect the rights of his people, and the potential for mass murder of

innocent civilians. It is not an action we will pursue alone. Indeed our British and French

allies, and members of the Arab League, have already committed to take a leadership role in

the enforcement of this resolution, just as they were instrumental in pursuing it…… And, this

is precisely how the international community should work, as more nations bear both the

responsibility and the cost of enforcing international law.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―We have made clear our support for a set of universal values, and our support for the

Ben Smith, ―The Security Council‘s No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya,‖ House of Commons Library, SN/IA/5911, 18 March 2011. ; Simon Tisdall, ―Obama is being driven towards Libya‖, The Guardian, March 7, 2011. ; J. McCormack, ―McCain Praises Obama‘s Libya Speech,‖ Weekly Standard, March 28, 2011.

Smith, ―The Security Council‘s No-Fly Zone Resolution on Libya.‖

See Polling Report, ―Libya‖. http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm.

250

political and economic change that the people of the region deserve.‖

(Obama, March 28) ―I said that America‘s role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya;

that we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we

would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.‖ (Obama, March 28) ―To brush aside America‘s responsibility as a leader and – more profoundly – our

responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a

betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other

countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I refuse to wait for the

images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.‖ (Obama, March 28) ―There will be times, though, when our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and

values are. Sometimes, the course of history poses challenges that threaten our common

humanity and our common security……….In such cases, we should not be afraid to act – but

the burden of action should not be America‘s alone. As we have in Libya, our task is instead

to mobilize the international community for collective action. But contrary to the claims of

some, American leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all the burden

ourselves. Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for others to set up as well; to

work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of burden and pay their share of the

costs; and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by all.‖

Though Obama called on Qaddafi to relinquish power on March 03 citing he had lost legitimacy

but his low profile throughout proceedings to the military campaign earned him a lot of

criticism.90

This cautious and reluctant approach simultaneously frustrated US European

partners especially Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy, who anticipated a more

forward stance from US considering the stakes involved for them.91

The uncertainty displayed

by Obama led one analyst to conclude: ―The days leading up to Obama‘s decision were

perplexing to outsiders. American Presidents usually lead the response to world crisis, but

Obama seemed to stay hidden that week. From the outside, it looked as though the French were

dragging him into the conflict.‖92

It was, however, after the Arab League requested action from the UN Security Council on March

12 that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seemed to have worked actively for imposition of NFZ 90

Jeanette Torres, ―Obama a Hesitant Crisis Manager,‖ Human Events, March 21, 2011. ; Frank W. Hardy, ―Reluctant President becomes Eager partner in UN No-Fly Resolution,‖ Suite 101, March 19, 2011. 91

Nigel Morris and David Usborne, ―Cameron frustrated with Obama‘s refusal to act over no-fly zone,‖ Independent, March 17, 2011. Rayan Lizza, ―The Consequentialist,‖ The New Yorker, May 2, 2011.

251

and pressed for intervention in Libya.93

Clinton‘s assertive role for Libyan intervention could

have to do with her vision of the US ―indispensible‖ leadership role that she expressed at the

Council on Foreign Relations94

(Table 5.2). Even with explicit acknowledgement of ―a different

world‖ where nations gain ―influence through the strength of their economies rather than their

militaries‖ Clinton‘s assertion was that US is the only state to lead the world and ―to act alone

whenever necessary‖. Thus, the declinists speculations about US ability to lead were brushed

aside. In spite of the lofty claims, Libyan campaign presented a picture where US instead of

leading was unreservedly in a back-seat role. If it was leading it no doubt was ―leading from

behind‖.

Table 5.2: Clinton‟s Remarks on American Leadership

(Clinton, January ―You know why we have to do all of this? Because we are the indispensible nation. We are

31, 2013) the force of progress, prosperity and peace. And because we have to get it right for

ourselves…. So because the United States is still the only country that has the reach and

resolve to rally disparate nations and peoples together to solve problems on a global scale, we

cannot shirk that responsibility. Our ability to convene and connect is unparalleled, and so is

our ability to act alone whenever necessary. So when I say we are truly the indispensible

nation, it‘s not meant as a boast or an empty slogan. It‘s a recognition of our role and our

responsibilities. That‘s why all the declinists are dead wrong. It‘s why the united States must

and will continue to lead in this century even as we lead in new ways.‖

Conclusion

This chapter traces the developments of events in Libyan uprising and the interplay of unit and

systemic level variables that played part for threat securitization in the next chapter. Libyan crisis

is just not one isolated incident that culminated in regime change in the context of the Arab

uprisings. The events in Libya had to be connected with unprecedented changes taking place in

the global and regional hierarchy. Before analyzing that link it was imperative to discuss in detail

93

Joanathan Alter, ―Woman of the World,‖ Vanity Fair, June 2011. ; Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, ―Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After Shift by Clinton,‖ The New York Times, March 18, 2011. Hillary Rodham Clinton, ―Remarks on American Leadership at the Council on Foreign Relations,‖ Washington,

DC, January 31, 2013 accessed October 15, 2016, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/203608.htm.

252

the stakes of the regional and global players involved in the Libyan intervention. Libyan

geopolitical importance; its government structure and policies; its internal and external

opposition; and its national and global standing all contributed to the course of events that

eventually displaced the four decades-old Qaddafi regime.

In spite of the up-front role played by France and Britain, the US was deeply committed to

shaping the outcome of events. Its image as the ―indispensible nation‖ that led the world during

times of crisis was at stake. But the waning US power and influence and its over-commitment in

Middle Eastern theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq and its publics‘ war fatigue made the task of yet

another military intervention problematic. US preferred to go for the strategy of ―burden sharing‖

and let its European partners run the show. However, this strategy of ―leading from behind‖ had

important global implications too. With both the allies and the partners already skeptical of US

commitment to consistently undertake the leadership role in crisis affecting their core interests,

the back-seat role emboldened peer challengers who read this as a sign of a waning hegemon

with constrained resources to put its global agendas into action. The Libyan episode had a

decisive effect on the Syrian crisis, which led to even more disillusionment on part of allies and

overt resistance form challengers like Russia. For the peer competitors the long-awaited systemic

changes were on the horizon.

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Chapter 6: Threat Securitization for International Military

Intervention in Libya

The international military intervention in Libya in 2011 ignited a new debate in the academic

circles as US back-seat role in the entire episode was dubbed as ―leading from behind‖1. US

reluctance to lead the anti-Qaddafi campaign and President Obama‘s clear assertion that mission

would be limited in both ―nature, duration and scope‖2 spread skepticism especially in the

Western circles that interpreted this as shift of US focus eastwards, leaving Europe to handle its

own neighbourhood. While in another simultaneous debate analysts and scholars kept arguing

that the unprecedented era of US preponderance is already drawing to a close and drift towards

post-hegemony has forced US to take a back-seat role in the Libyan campaign.3

This dissertation supports the argument that post-hegemonic transition in the systemic hierarchy

has caused a change in the intervention behavior and anti-Qaddafi campaign had been the prime

example of how US recalibrated its identity of global responsibility and unique superiority

towards a strategy of ―burden sharing‖, ―engagement‖ and ―leading from behind‖ that leaves US

less directly militarily engaged but more aligned with its allies and others. This chapter also

explores the link between the global and regional hierarchies and how extraordinary events in

MENA triggered great powers involvement. The threat securitization for Libyan campaign

explains the contradictory fusion of US identity of American leadership with a US foreign and

security policy that anticipates but has yet not fully arrived in a post-hegemonic international

system.

However, the military intervention in post-hegemonic international system follows a distinct

path that has already been theoretically elaborated in Chapter 2. Libyan case study will

The term was first coined in Ryan Lizza, ―Leading From Behind‖ The New Yorker, April 26, 2011 accessed April 23, 2017, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/leading-from-behind. See also max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, ―Did Libya Vindicate ‗Leading From Behind?‘‖, Council on Foreign Relations, September 1, 2011. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ―Letter from the President regarding the commencement of

operation in Libya,‖ March 21, 2011. Argument about post-hegemonic drift has been dealt at length in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.

254

empirically corroborate whether variables identified for military intervention and path delineated

can be substantiated. The post-hegemonic international system and the conditions it trigger in

vulnerable hierarchies have also been explained in preceding chapters. This chapter will deal

with ―threat securitization through political discourse‖ for international military intervention and

it considers the period from the onset of uprisings (February 17, 2011) until NATO officially

ends Operation Unified Protector (October 31, 2011) in Libya.

The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will deal with ―discursive threat

securitization‖ and explain how political discourse has been employed for constructing threat for

military intervention in Libya. For this purpose political statements from Libyan leadership as

well as US-led coalition will be analyzed. The analysis of news stories during the period will

also help us understand how narrative for war was framed and constructed to legitimize anti-

Qaddafi coalition and actions they undertook to justify ―their violence‖. Besides this section will

help us determine how international organizations were co-opted to legitimize military

intervention against a regime that threatened to kill its own population. The next section will

further elaborate the ―war legitimation discourse‖ and shed light on its significance in the post-

hegemonic system. The third section will help us understand that US reliance on legitimation

discourse increased as its ability to lead became compromised because of gradual erosion in

perception of US legitimacy as the undisputed leader of the international system. Last few lines

on Post-Qaddafi will tell us what NATO actually achieved as compared to the lofty claims anti-

Qaddafi coalition boasted before and during intervention.

6.1. Threat Securitization for Libyan Military Intervention

As stated in Chapter 2 great powers seldom interfere in local hierarchies inter/intra-state disputes

until and unless the outcome of events is consequential to them. But when a key local hierarchy

is in transition like MENA after the Arab uprisings rocked the entire region, extra-regional

players get involved to shape the regional environment amenable to their interests. When the

peaceful protests in Tunisia and Egypt replaced decades-old staunch allies, US was caught in a

dilemma. On the one hand, long-held popular aspiration for democratic rule was asserting itself

in a region still immune to these developments while on the other hand, the pace and scope of

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events was harbinger to the configuration of a new regional hierarchy not necessarily aligned

with US short and long-term interests.

While the allies were losing, Qaddafi regime in Libya seemed determined to nip this nascent

movement in the bud through its long-practiced repressive policies. Survival of anti-US regime

was an outcome that ought to be avoided as it would send wrong signals to potential global

challengers who already saw US decline in a region where it held undisputed and unprecedented

sway since the end of the Cold War. It would simultaneously put a question mark on US ability

and its legitimacy as the global sheriff that it had been acting since the initiation of unipolarity in

the international system and displayed in its global military campaigns in Kosovo, Afghanistan

and Iraq. Besides removal of Qaddafi will reiterate that international system is still very much

the product of hegemon‘s preferences and influence and contrary to the prevalent speculations

US is well-entrenched at the apex of the international system.

As stated in threat securitization model this question of legitimacy of the declining hegemon is

directly linked with how the dissatisfied members within the international status quo perceive US

leadership role. Though not in a position to directly challenge the declining hegemon on one-to-

one basis; the challengers resort to power display by supporting regimes not acceptable to the

state occupying apex of the international system. Russian and Chinese role in the Libyan

campaign reflects the skepticism whether the drift towards post-hegemony is inevitable. Later

Syrian case in the subsequent chapters will confirm that this reluctance and hesitation to take US

head-on in matters vital to their interests would be overcome, especially by Russia and hence to

construct ―war legitimation discourse‖ for Syria would be even more difficult for US.

The resort to unilateral use of coercive force is not the most preferable intervention behavior

sought by the intervening state i.e. US, even if it still retains predominance in key sectors of

power. Hence, the intervention logic is built around ―existential threat‖ that gains acceptance and

audience within unit and systemic levels. As delineated previously, role of the securitizing actor

is key to constructing ―war legitimation discourse‖ which consistently generates narrative

pertaining to the securitization of threat. Hence, political statements issued by US President

Barack Obama, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other US officials and departments as

well as those of US coalition partners during the Libyan unrest will be analyzed for Libyan

intervention threat securitization.

256

As stated in previous chapter, the positioning of the securitizing actor (US) within the systemic

level and its ability to manage a successful securitized move within the relevant (domestic and

global) audience plays the key role. With US was at the helm of the international affairs ―war

legitimation discourse‖ generated by US and its allies resonated more closely with relevant

audience while the alternative dissenting discourse by Qaddafi and his team was discredited and

delegitimized as propaganda and an attempt to divert attention away from atrocities being

committed during the unrest by the ruling regime. Obama and his team then aggressively

campaigned for construction of threat narrative against Qaddafi by employing relevant means

(electronic and print media). The ―war legitimation discourse‖ then followed the path identified

in Figure 6.1. whose subsequent delineation will help us understand the role discourse played in

constructing ―legitimate‖ narrative for military intervention in Libya.

Regional hierarchy in transition

Arab Spring 2011

Target State

Intervener

Post-Hegemonic Phase

Intervener

US

(declining hegemon)

Libya

Unrest against the Qaddafi regime

Threat Legitimacy

Securitization Crisis

International & regional Institutions

UN, Arab League, African Union, ICC

Extra-Regional involvement

Mainly UK & France

Intervener

Post-Hegemonic Phase

Figure 6.1: Libyan Military Intervention Threat Securitization

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For countries like US, UK and France who played key role in the Libyan military campaign, the

rationale of political discourse employment is intrinsically rooted in the consent of their

audience. Being leading members of the democratic club, the need to take relevant audience on

board and to have genuine display of their formal sanction is pre-requisite for political systems

that define themselves as democratic. Considering the fact that Arab uprisings came against

stagnant repressive authoritarian regimes, the relevant audience in states advocating intervention

in Libya could easily identify with the urge to exercise democratic rights among masses.

Thus by employing ―existential threat‖ discourse to an endangered object (Libyan protestors) and

constructing a shared understanding of what it is to be considered and collectively responded as a

threat by the ones advocating intervention, war against Qaddafi regime in Libya was presented as

most urgent and justified. Once the threat posed to protestors by Qaddafi was securitized it was

easier for political elites to operate in a different mode than they would have otherwise. This

inter-subjective construction of threat squarely resonated with their domestic audiences; hence

once the threat seemed imminent and genuine, the military intervention in Libya was accepted as

the logical possible outcome even though it wasn‘t employed as a ―last resort‖ and without full

exploration of ―other means‖.

A detailed analysis of political statements issued during Libyan intervention by parties to the

conflict, will help us validate three assumptions initially presented in Chapter 2 as they

correspond with the threat securitization model identified above (Figure 6.1).

6.1.1. Target State‟s Ruling Regime as a Threat to international Peace &

Security

Assumption 1: Target state‘s ruling regime is constructed as ―existential threat‖ to international

peace and security. Dissenting discourse within the target state is given wide

acceptance while target state‘s official discourse is marginalized (or dismissed as

propaganda) and discredited internationally.

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Libya that had been on US list of countries sponsoring terrorism since December 29, 1988

bombing of Pan Am103 Flight till May, 20064 when the State Department announced to remove

it, had been a pariah all along. When the Arab uprisings in Libya made headlines across the

world and news of Qaddafi forces opening fires against unarmed peaceful protestors demanding

release of a human rights activist emerged; anti-Qaddafi Arab and World Media quickly

highlighted the grave risk posed to unarmed civilians because of excesses committed by Qaddafi

and his ―shoot-to-kill‖ policy. Al-Jazeera placed the dead toll to be more than 100 in initial six

days of unrest. It quoted a local businessman in Benghazi stating: ―It‘s a big, big massacre‖ and

hospitals ―overwhelmed‖ with the number of dead and injured.5 The Guardian (UK) quoted

local newspaper Al-Zahf al-Akhdar to highlight Qaddafi regime‘s resolve to ―violently and

thunderously respond‖ to protests.6

Since the start of the uprising, Qaddafi‘s image in the international media was projected as a

grave threat to unarmed civilians who was willing to go to any extent to safeguard his regime.

The UNSCR 1973 validated the assertion that ―the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security.‖7 Qaddafi had to ―go‖

8 to

remove the threat he himself posed; though regime change was never explicitly authorized by the

UNSC resolutions. Throughout the period of uprising ―the threat to civilians‖ in Libya would

then be juxtaposed with the very person of Qaddafi so that his regime could become the

―legitimate‖ target and international intervention has a justified and legitimate basis.

And when the debate started among coalition partners whether he himself was a legitimate target

or not within the mandate of UNSCR 1973, after British missiles hit Qaddafi‘s compound. The

later view prevailed though dissenting opinion persisted in UK military.9 Thus the scope of

UNSCR 1973 was expanded without authorization from the body itself. Analyses of the

statements made during the period reveal how the gap in the interpretation of the UN resolution

facilitated intervening parties to exceed mandate. Similarly the same UNSCR 1973 was used to Kirit Radia, ―Libya Is Off US Terrorist List,‖ ABC News, May 15, 2006.

―Libya forces ‗open fire‘ at funeral,‖ Al-Jazeera, February 20, 2011.

Jo Adetunji, Peter Beaumont and Martin Chulov, ―Libya protests: More than 100 killed as army fires on unarmed demonstrators‖ Guardian, February 20, 2011.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, accessed April 30, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011). President Obama also voiced his views in his tour to South America quoted in Patrick Wintour and Ewen

MacAskill, ―Is Muammar Gaddafi a target? PM and military split over war aims,‖ The Guardian, March 22, 2011. Wintour and MacAskill , Is Muammar Gaddafi a target?

259

relax arms embargo on Libya imposed by previous UN resolution to selectively facilitate rebel

groups. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated after a conference on Libya in London in

March 2011 that: ―It is our interpretation that 1973 amended or overrode the absolute prohibition

of arms to anyone in Libya so that there could be legitimate transfer of arms if a country were to

choose that,‖ thus opening avenue for arms transfer to rebels.

Throughout the London conference on Libya Qaddafi was projected as a heartless leader who let

people bleed in the streets of Misrata. Even though the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon

indicated that he kept receiving ―disturbing reports‖ about ―various abuses of human rights by

the parties to the conflict.‖ The picture in international media was predominantly one-sided and

military intervention was justified as it averted massacre by Qaddafi‘s killing machines. Earlier

Clinton had reiterated the same point by stating that ―We have prevented a potential massacre.‖

David Cameroon addressing the conference said:

―Gaddafi is using snipers to shoot [the people of Misrata] down and let them bleed to death in the street…..That is why there has been such widespread support among the Libyan people – and in the wider Arab world – for the military action

we are taking. It has saved lives, and it is saving lives.‖10

Similarly, it was altogether ignored that some of the anger that Qaddafi loyalists directed at the

West stemmed from the belief that after Qaddafi abandoned Libya‘s nuclear and chemical

weapons program and opened country to Western investment in oil, telecommunications and

other sectors in the past decade, even then he had drawn Western wrath in the shape of NATO

ceaseless bombing campaign. It was anticipated by analysts that ―As Tripoli goes, so goes the

nation‖ so the rebels were being provided with ―additional support‖ without thought to the

problem it would create ―for the end game politically.‖11

Though Tripoli was under firm government control but Obama kept insisting that Qaddafi‘s

departure was inevitable. While speaking about the Middle East, Obama reiterated that, ―Time is

working against Qaddafi. He does not have control over his country. The opposition has

Nicholas Watt, ―US paves way to arm Libyan rebels,‖ The Guardian, March 29, 2011.

Carolyn Presutti, ―Libyan Resistance Fighters Make Presence Known in Tripoli,‖ VOA News, May 18, 2011.

260

organized a legitimate and credible interim Council.‖12

The reality on ground presented a

different scenario. Actually the conflict by that time had entered a deadlock in military terms and

Western governments were left with counting on Qaddafi‘s administration collapse from within

after defection of high profile figures like former Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa, Interior

Minister Abdul Fattah Younis, Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil, Libyan Oil Minister Shurkri

Ghanem and a number of ambassadors.13

Libyan authorities were confident when they kept

reminding US: ―It‘s not Obama who decides whether Muammar Qaddafi leaves Libya or not. It‘s

the Libyan people.‖14

For West, the only way to ascertain the choice of Libyan people was to

first remove Qaddafi at all costs.

Apart from defections of high profile figures in the Libyan government, the rebels in the east and

anti-Qaddafi coalition were hoping that as one of Africa‘s largest oil producer country, where

gasoline had been plentiful and cheap – less than 50 cents a gallon, was now experiencing fuel

shortages and other hardships; they hoped it would motivate people in the west to rise up against

Qaddafi where he still enjoyed support. Besides, according to Libyan officials NATO continued

bombing telecommunications and other civilian infrastructure, thus making it more difficult for

the regime to run and manage cities under its control.15

During the uprising Qaddafi kept asserting the rebels were elements of al-Qaeda and the action

was taken against those criminals rather than civilians but the West denied that rebels ―are not a

bunch of Al-Qaeda fanatics‖ adding ―there is an Islamic element in the politics of Libyan

opposition at the moment, but it is a mild Islamic political trend, which is welcome and will have

a role in the national dialogue which they envisage. Their focus is national, it‘s a liberation

struggle and they are doing their best to expand representation in the Council of the cities still

under regime control.‖16

Libya officials were apprehensive that NATO had become a party with

Alister Bull and Joseph Logan, ―WPAPUP1-Obama says Gaddafi‘s departure from Libya inevitable,‖ Reuters,

May 20, 2011. ―Libya: Oil Minister Shukri Ghanem ‗defects‘,‖BBC News, May 18, 2011.

Alister Bull and Joseph Logan, ―WPAPUP1-Obama says Gaddafi‘s departure from Libya inevitable,‖ Reuters,

May 20, 2011. Patrick J. McDonnell, ―Gas lines and empty roads in an oil-producing nation,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2011.

Valentina Pop, ―EU gears up for post-Gaddafi role in Libya,‖ EU Observer, May 19, 2011.

261

the rebels and exceeded their mandate. ―They are claiming that they are protecting civilians, but

what they are doing, they are siding with the rebels.‖17

Time and again the theme of Qaddafi as the ultimate threat to his own population was invoked

by the US. In a bilateral meeting with Italian Foreign Minister, Clinton reiterated that ousting the

Libyan leader was the best way to protect population. She said: ―The best way to protect

civilians is for Qaddafi to cease his ruthless, brutal attack on civilians from the west to the east,

to withdraw from the cities that he is sieging and attacking and to leave power.‖18

The military intervention model thus illustrates the domestic political, military and economic

conditions of a state along with its geopolitical location and regional/international standing may

make it more prone as a target for military intervention. In case of Libya, during 2011 unrest the

simmering discontent of decades had been brought to fore by extraordinary circumstances

prevailing in the region. As the events in Libya gained momentum at a time when democratic

fervor in the region was at its peak and the whole world stood in awe for a region where such

indigenous movements were unthought-of because of the sheer absence of independent political

activity and strict hold of region‘s ruling dictatorships. Hence, the heavy handed measures

adopted to bring a swift end to this nascent movement, unexpectedly brought unnecessary

spotlight and attention on the ruling regime.

The Qaddafi regime already was suffering from decades of diplomatic isolation and had been

associated with terrorist activities especially against US and the West. When the opportunity

arose to permanently get rid of a person who had been consistent source of irritation for the

West, it was not to be overlooked. Besides it was easier to construct narrative employing his past

transgressions and harnessing sentiment for popular aspiration both in the region and abroad.

Hence, the regime and its actions were successfully ―securitized‖ and with UNSCR 1973 in

place it was easier to construct the regime as the very threat not only for its people and the region

but for the international peace and security too.

6.1.2. “Us” versus “Them” Binary Employed

―Libya: Govt troops may pull out of Misrata,‖ NDTV (India), April 24, 2011.

―Libya Rebels Get Cash Injection From Contact Group,‖ VOA News, May 04, 2011.

262

Assumption 2: Regional and Extra-Regional Players favoring or opposing military intervention

are presented through ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary.

The previous chapter discussed in detail the role regional and extra-regional players played in the

Libyan episode. However, apart from their individual relations with Qaddafi and interests at

stake the countries supporting and opposing the Libyan campaign were projected through ―Us‖

versus ―Them‖ binary. Those that supported the Western governments in their desire to ―protect

civilians‖ by ―all necessary measures‖ and to demand Qaddafi‘s exit from the scene were all part

of the international community seeking to rid world of a tyrant that brutalizes his own subjects

and those opposing were otherwise. Resultantly the actions taken by the anti-Qaddafi regime

were to be endorsed and justified while any attempt to hinder them would place the opposing

parties in the opposite camp.

This assertion can be gauged from the fact that one month after French, British and Italian

military trainers were sent to help rebels, clearly becoming a party to the conflict in flagrant

violation of the UNSC resolutions, the EU announced to open its own liaison office in Benghazi

to give long-term institutional support to TNC. It also leaves no doubt then that the invading

parties were not looking to just settle for ceasefire by mid-May but had already been gearing for

a post-Qaddafi role in Libya.19

Those representing ―Us‖ had the same goals and hence every single success that was achieved in

the intervention was presented as not only the combined success of the anti-Qaddafi coalition but

reflected the resolve of the international community to protect civilians. The ―Us‖ category

gained further legitimacy when countries that previously refused to become part of the anti-

Qaddafi collation came forward to join the alliance. Italy that initially stated that it would not

take part in any airstrikes reversed the decision and announced it would make four of its Tornado

jets available for airstrikes against ―specific and selected‖ military targets in Libya. The change

of heart was prompted by regime‘s sustained attacks against civilians in Misrata.20

The ―Us versus Them‖ binary also facilitated construction of a framework where ―Them‖ oppose

the legitimate aspiration of the people by siding with a ruthless dictator. Especially with UN

Pop, ―EU gears up for post-Gaddafi role in Libya.‖

―UN Takes Libyan Human Rights Mission to Tripoli,‖ CBC News, April 27, 2011.

263

Security Council Resolution mandating international community to employ ―all necessary

measures‖ to stop the ongoing bloodshed in Libya; the opposition to clear directive would place

dissenting parties endorsing illegal actions of an unpopular and discredited regime. Thereby,

Germany that initially abstained in the United Nations Security Council Resolution authorizing

military action against Libya could not go too far in its opposition and did not make any

significant effort to hinder action when NATO took command of the military campaign.

Nevertheless when anti-Qaddafi coalition exceeded their mandate, parties not in favour vocally

registered their discontent. That‘s why, when Britain planned to send over military officers to

advise Libyan rebels to help improve their fighting capabilities; China stopped short of directly

accusing London of violating the UNSC resolution over the Libyan conflict. Reuters quoted

Chinese Foreign Ministry‘s stern response: ―China believes that the United Nations Security

Council has primary responsibility for protecting international peace and security, and the

various sides should strictly abide by the Security Council mandate in handling matters.‖ It

further added: ―China disapproves of taking any actions that exceed the mandate of the Security

Council.‖21

Similarly Russian Foreign Minister slammed Britain and French decision to send military

advisers, warning it would pull ―the international community into a conflict on the ground‖.

Russia clearly stated that ―the choice of Libya‘s path of development is without question the

prerogative of the Libyan people‖ and ―the international community must cooperate to help

resolve the conflict by peaceful means without interference in the internal affairs of this state.‖22

The Libyan military intervention shows that though the post-hegemonic transition has started in

the global hierarchy as reflected in the US reluctance to get involved militarily in the third

Muslim country within a decade and in its decision to let France and Britain take the lead and

assuming itself a back-seat role, it could still assert significant influence and without US backing

neither the military campaign nor the toppling of Qaddafi could had been possible. Hence, the

―Us versus Them‖ binary was effectively employed and the resistance to military intervention

was not very pronounced due to the legal sanction of the United Nations Security Council

―China warns Britain over Libya advisers,‖ Reuters, April 23, 2011.

Alexei Anishchuk, ―U.N‘s Ban urges Libyan authorities to halt violence,‖ Reuters, April 21, 2011.

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Resolution giving explicit mandate to protect civilians though ―all necessary measures‖. But the

same reluctance could not dispel image of waning US leadership role.

The Syrian episode that erupted simultaneously and reflected US inability to deal with yet

another dictator engaged in similar and in certain cases worst abuses against civilians; left no

doubt that the post-hegemony has arrived. Besides Russian and Chinese opposition that had been

less explicit in the Libyan conflict, would assert more vocally in the later case. The lack of

credible and vocal opposition in Libyan case and successful securitized discourse in case of

atrocities committed by Gaddafi regime made threat construction for Libya relatively easy.

6.1.3. Co-opting International/regional Institutions

Assumption 3: In post-hegemony the intervener (i.e. the declining hegemon) co-opts

international/regional institutions and relies on ―legitimation discourse‖ for

authorization of force against the target state.

Co-opting international/ regional institutions provide irrefutable basis of legitimacy as it reflects

the combined will of the international community. US had received scathing criticism for by-

passing international institutions in case of both Kosovo and Iraq. But the conditions in 2011

were different than they had been either in 1999 or in 2003. The unprecedented era of undisputed

US leadership had been drawing to a close, and US public war-fatigue and reluctance to take

unilateral military interventions was also asserting itself. Domestic constraints were being

reflected in active opposition to yet another military campaign in the Middle East23

and US

Congress was simultaneously not forthcoming.

Although Obama had already demanded that Gaddafi ―must go‖ on March 3; he didn‘t make a

public case for military intervention till March 17 when the UNSCR 1973 came. That eventually

happened on March 28 when the rationale for the Libyan intervention was put before the public.

Though the speech was well received but it still fell short of convincing public of US

involvement in the military campaign, polls showed. According to Jeremy Mayer, an Associate

Professor of Political Science in George Mason University, ―This was the lowest level of support The poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre between March 10-13 found that 63% stated that ―US does not have responsibility to act in Libya‖ as compared to 27% that said it had. Figures quoted from ―Public Wary of Military Intervention in Libya: Broad Concern that U.S. Military is Overcommitted,‖ Pew Research Centre, March 14, 2011.

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for a large-scale use of American military forces in early stages of an engagement that we have

seen.‖24

Similarly in Congress both Republicans and Democrats remained unconvinced of the US role

too. Some criticized Obama for doing too little too late, other opposed for attacking without

Congress approval and more specifically without the authorization of the controversial War

Powers Act of 1973. In such a scenario approval of the international / regional institutions

assumed greater importance and played a role in not only deflecting public criticism but placed

an undisputed stamp on the legal legitimacy of the intervention that theoretically violated the

―sovereignty‖ of a UN member state.

The most forceful and legally justified authority in the said case was that of the UN and its

Security Council. The interveners continued stressing that military action had the full backing of

regional bodies, especially Arab League. Later African Union was co-opted to grant broader

legitimacy to the mission. Similarly prestigious international institutions like the International

Criminal Court‘s verdict against Qaddafi and his inner circle laid the basis for forced regime

change as it constrained already narrow space for negotiations between Qaddafi and the

opposition and further isolated Qaddafi internationally. Besides being implicated in ―war crimes‖

by ICC rendered AU attempts of ceasefire void while it encouraged defections within the Libyan

regime thus facilitating the installation of TNC as a proxy government including ex-Qaddafi

officials. By insisting that he must leave the country and stand trial in the ICC, the choice left to

Qaddafi was go down fighting. It only left military option for him and thus in prospect many

more civilian casualties.

In the UNSC 1973 resolution the point was stressed that this intervention was the unanimous

decision of the will of the international community, ―particularly through the League of Arab States‘

call on the Security Council to enact a no-fly zone and the African Union‘s strong call for an end to

the violence.‖25

It was easy to get sanction of regional institution like the Arab League for

intervention in Libya as Gaddafi was already controversial in the Arab world.26

Consequently when

the demand for imposition of a no-fly zone (NFZ) came from the Arab League to UNSC Michael Knigge ―US Public, Congress remain skeptical of Libyan Mission,‖ DW News, April 1, 2011.

UN Department of Public Information, ―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya, Authorizing ‗All Necessary Measures‘ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,‖ March 17, 2011.

Michael Slackman, ―Dislike for Qaddafi Gives Arabs a Point of Unity,‖ New York Times, March 21, 2011.

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on March 12, 2011 it projected the stakes of regional states into the initiative. Rather than a

Western-led campaign against another oil-rich Muslim country, it was highlighted as a collective

international effort where the world community came together to protect the civilian population

of Libya under the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1973.

Similarly when the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced in mid-

May that he was seeking arrest of Qaddafi and two senior figures for ―widespread and systematic

attacks‖ on civilians; thus co-optation of a prestigious international body facilitated coalition

members to achieve their target that by said time had effectively turned into ―a regime change‖

campaign. The ICC press release made frequent reference to ―direct evidence‖ but failed to cite

any of this evidence in detail.27

Besides these regional / international bodies provide validity to

the pretext on the basis of which an international military intervention against a sovereign

member of the United Nations was undertaken. The reliance on these bodies also helped US to

dispel the negative image that the intervention in yet another oil-rich Muslim country was for the

sake of US vested interests. Rather the invocation of international humanitarian laws and

international bodies and organizations centered the narrative on the theme for the protection of

the unarmed civilians.

6.2. War Legitimation Discourse

Chapter 2 explained in detail the need to employ war legitimation discourse for intervention in

the post-hegemonic system. As discussed ―legitimacy‖ is one of the key variables identified for

both the declining hegemon and for undertaking a military campaign against a target state. The

declining hegemon seek to reinvent and reinforce its superpower identity in the world.

Legitimation may not be necessary in normal course of events when no challenges to

institutional power and authority are imminent.28

But the drift towards post-hegemony and

waning US influence especially its ability to direct events on the Arab streets necessitates the

resort to legitimacy criteria. The legitimation discourse then involves developing rapport with

both the domestic and international audience through ―positive self-perception and

Andy Dilks, ―The ‗International Criminal Court‘: Prosecuting Gaddafi With Questionable Evidence While

Ignoring NATO-Israeli Atrocities,‖ Global Research, May 17, 2011. See T. A. Van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (London: Sage Publications, 1998).

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representation‖ and ―negative other-perception and representation‖; thus providing the

intervening parties under the US leadership supporting conditions for effective policy.

Constructing war legitimation discourse through invoking ―existential threat‖ not only provides

the necessary basis for the use of coercive force against the target state but simultaneously

establishes ―legitimacy‖ of the system whose rules and norms had been shaped by the declining

hegemon. Thus perpetuation of the system, its stability and security is constructed as the

principal duty of the most powerful nation on earth, along with its duty to take timely action

against threatening culprits. The Libyan crisis was thus presented as a kind of threat where

persuasive (or manipulative) discourse not only became acceptable but morally justified and

politically defensible too.

As stated before, the responsibility of presenting case and justifying intervention is often carried

out by political actors. In case of Libyan conflict the war legitimation discourse will be traced

through utterances and political statements of key political figures of pro and anti-Qaddafi actors

through the categories identified below:

6.2.1. Legitimation by reference to authority

According to Van Leeuwen it is the form of legitimation that derives from ―because I say so‖

theme, where the ―I‖ is someone in whom some authority is vested.29

It can also be authority of

tradition, custom and law which is then referred to, to legitimize violence and to construct

narrative for war.

In case of Libyan military intervention the ―authority‖ reference had been repeatedly invoked to

legitimize military action and thus the violence that accompanied it. Apart from the international

humanitarian law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its recent extension into pragmatic

humanitarian, the most forceful and legally justified authority was that of the UN and its Security

Council. The interveners continued stressing that military action had full backing of regional

bodies, especially Arab League. Later African Union was co-opted to grant broader legitimacy to

the mission. Similarly prestigious international institutions like the International Criminal

Court‘s verdict against Qaddafi and his inner circle laid the basis for forced regime change as it

T. Van Leeuwen, ―Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,‖ Discourse & Communication 1. no.1 (2007):

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constrained already narrow room for negotiations between Qaddafi and opposition. Lastly, the

TNC‘s recognition by the international community accorded the kind of legitimacy to the rebels

and opposition that made them ―credible and legitimate interlocutor‖ for negotiating a Libyan

future sans Qaddafi.

Once UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, agreed to send his special envoy to Libya and stated

that it is clear: ―…the Libyan regime has lost both legitimacy and credibility, particularly in

terms of protecting its people and addressing their legitimate aspirations for change‖ and ―the

Libyan people want to determine their own political future – they must be given the chance to do

so‖30

the legitimacy of the Qaddafi regime and its resolve to stick to power as well as the claim

to act on behalf of the public became questionable. It got further boost when the UN team started

probe to look into whether what was happening in Libya amounted to ―crimes against humanity‖

and to ask Libyan government ―a number of questions dealing with indiscriminate bombing of

civilians and civilian areas, civilian casualties, torture and use of mercenaries,‖31

the narrative to

legitimize violence against such a reckless and insensitive regime had already been in place.

During the uprising it was asserted time and again that Qaddafi regime was disregarding

humanitarian law and was blocking humanitarian aid to people in besieged towns. It was alleged

regime bombed vessels containing humanitarian aid. Similarly once TNC was accepted as the

legitimate government of Libya and recognized internationally; it gave further boost to anti-

Qaddafi coalition and legitimized their mandate to act against an unpopular and de-legitimized

regime. US-led coalition members went beyond normal procedures to grant acceptance to the

TNC which came into effect on March 5. Importance of recognition of the TNC could also

gauged by the fact that moments after Obama‘s speech on Middle East and North Africa on May

20, Libyan Ambassador to the US, Ali Suleiman Aujali resigned and assumed immediate

responsibilities as the US representative for the Libyan rebels, who then insisted on US to

recognize the group as it ―would give us the credibility to deal with the international

community.‖32

―UN chief says special envoy for Libya traveling to Benghazi on Friday,‖ Xinhuanet, April 26, 2011.

―Libya: UN team to start probe of human rights abuses,‖ BBC News, April 27, 2011.

―Libya Opposition Rep Responds to Obama Middle East Speech,‖ ABC News, May 20, 2011.

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Thus the authority of custom, law and tradition were all employed to discredit Qaddafi regime

and lay the basis of a justified intervention into Libya as a mark of responsibility of the

international community to protect the people of Libya from a ruthless tyrant. While the majority

of the international community felt the need to respond to grave humanitarian crisis emerging in

Libya, the legal basis of UNSC, ICC and the ―legitimate‖ opposition through TNC provided the

basis for military intervention to be launched against the Qaddafi regime.

6.2.2. Legitimation by reference to values

To analyze moralized legitimation for war, the ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ category use negatively

valued nouns and processes almost exclusively to represent ―Them‖ and their actions while

relatively positive / neutral nouns and processes are used to represent ―Us‖ and our actions.

Through these categories the use of force is then justified while at the same time diminishing or

euphemizing the killing that this use of force compels. These value-laden words then enact clear

identities for Us versus Them and it operationalizes positive Self-presentation and negative

Other-presentation. This kind of lexicalization then assigns war/intervention a kind of

legitimacy.33

One of the most consistent themes, continuously evoked throughout the Libyan operation was

the will of the masses to exercise democratic power. As Arab Uprisings came against autocratic

regimes and dictators who had denied their subjects the freedom of expression and the right to

choose their own representatives; the values that are considered fundamental rights and duly

incorporated in the United Nations Charter, it was easy to draw legitimacy for the intervention

employing language expressing democratic aspiration of the people and Qaddafi‘s resolve to

brutally suppress this demand. Obama kept justifying US intervention by stating: ―When Gaddafi

inevitably leaves or is forced from power, decades of provocation will come to an end and the

transition to a democratic Libya can proceed.‖34

Excesses committed by the intervening forces were painted in a different context and language

used to justify ―Our‖ violence portrayed an alternate reality that resulted from ―Their‖ provoked

John Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse: Representing ‗US; and ‗them‘ in four US presidential addresses,‖

Discourse & Society 22, no.3 (2011): 294, 296. Alister Bull and Joseph Logan, ―WPAPUP1-Obama says Gaddafi‘s departure from Libya inevitable,‖ Reuters,

May 20, 2011.

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violence. For example, when NATO forces destroyed eight Libyan ―warships‖ in the ports of

Tripoli, Al-Khums and Sirte in May 2011, Libyan officials were adamant that they hit the

commercial port - the main food and supply line for Libya and not the nearby military port, thus

leading to humanitarian crisis. But NATO‘s military spokesman Mike Bracken justified the

military assault by stating: ―He was using maritime forces to lay mines. These were legal

targets,‖35

thereby denying allegations from Libyan government that NATO exceeded its

mandate and was now targeting Qaddafi and its forces to oust the regime.

Similarly when British chief of defence staff, General Sir David Richards, was quoted saying

that NATO would have to broaden its bombing campaign to include infrastructure targets like

telecommunication sites to prevent Qaddafi from ―clinging to power‖ and to ―demonstrate that

the game is up and he must go‖.36

Even this was justified through Libyan official assertions of

posting ―human shields‖ at sites under threat of NATO bombing. The Libyan strategy was

dubbed as ―borrowing a page from Saddam Hussein‘s old playbook,‖37

thus equating Qaddafi‘s

savagery with that of Saddam. In the same breath Qaddafi regime attacks against rebels were

condemned by the British Foreign Minister Alistair Burt as ―wanton disregard‖ for international

law.38

French position in the UNSC was that while revolutionary transitions in other countries had not

met with extreme violence, Qaddafi was mercilessly targeting his own population and the will of

the Libyan people had been ―trampled under the feet of the Qaddafi regime‖.39

Qaddafi and his

troops were framed in worst possible scenario. When the ICC arrest warrant against Qaddafi and

two senior officers was issued for ―crimes against humanity‖, it was alleged that Qaddafi forces

were using sexual enhancement drugs as a ―machete‖ and gang-raping women as they stopped at

checkpoints.40

Thus the worst possible wartime abuse was attributed to pro-Qaddafi forces. But

the abuses by rebels were toned down and didn‘t receive wide coverage in the international

media. Although stories kept emerging that rebels in Misurata were involved in desecration of

Jomana Karadsheh, ―Libya says NATO causing humanitarian crisis,‖ CNN, May 21, 2011, accessed April 27, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/05/21/libya.war/. Martin Chulov and Richard Norton-Taylor, ―Koussa among defectors ‗helping Nato bomb secret Gaddafi sites‘,‖

Guardian, May 15, 2011. John F. Burns, ―Libyan Officials Threaten to Use ‗Human Shields‘,‖ New York Times, May 16, 2011.

―Cameron and Sarkozy restate Libya ‗determination,‖ BBC News.

UN Department of Public Information, ―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya.‖

―Rebel forces in Libya‘s western mountains issue call for help,‖ CNN, May 18, 2011.

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dead Libyan soldiers. It was reported some fighters disposed of dead Qaddafi soldiers by

dumping them in the sea- a behavior that would mimic accusations the rebels themselves have

made against Qaddafi government of hiding and defiling dead bodies.41

The anti-Qaddafi coalition tried to legitimize even those actions explicitly out of the mandate of

UNSCR 1973. In May, 2011 rebels wanted Qaddafi ―propaganda‖ TV silenced as it was alleged

to incite ―hate and violence‖. According to Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, vice-chairman of the NTC

―without a doubt [the regime had] used media as a weapon, as a bullet,‖ thus they were broadly

viewed as an extension of the regime. While rebels were urging them to be targeted, Mohammed

Abdel Dayem, programme coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa at the New York-

based Committee to Protect Journalists stated: ―While Libyan state broadcasts have certainly

been engaged in propaganda and at times provocative and instigator acts, they do not currently

constitute legitimate targets for disruption.‖42

However, when the conflict in Libya entered a stalemate and chances for a quick victory receded

in spite of unceasing NATO bombing campaign, Qaddafi held ground and his message kept

constantly reaching the public; NATO struck Libyan TV in August, killing three people and

injuring 15 in violation of international law and UN resolutions.43

This time NATO

spokeswoman Carmen Romero asserted that there was evidence that TV was increasingly used

by regime to incite violence against civilians. However, Brussels-based International Federation

of Journalists‘ Secretary-General Beth Costa dismissed the explanation. She said: ―Our concern

is that when one side decides to take out a media organization because they regard its message as

propaganda, then all media are at risk.‖44

Everything associated with Qaddafi was a legitimate target and interpreted the same way even if

it involved his children and grandchildren. For example, when a NATO strike unabashedly killed

Qaddafi‘s son Saif al-Arab who was a student in Germany and three of leader‘s grandchildren in

May; the head of NATO‘s military operations in media stated that the attack was on a ―command

and control building‖ and all targets were ―military‖ in nature. He refused to comment on killing

C.J. Chivers, ―Libyan City Buries Its Attackers Respectfully,‖ New York Times, May 17, 2011.

―Libya rebels want Qadhafi ‗propaganda‘ TV silenced,‖ DAWN, May 07, 2011.

The International Federation of Journalists stated that this bombing was in contravention of the Security Council Resolution of December 2006 that explicitly condemned such attacks against journalists and media.

―Media Group Condemns NATO Bombing of Libyan TV,‖ CBC News, August 3, 2011.

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of Qaddafi family members. Though China and Russia clearly expressed concern that alliance

had gone beyond the mandate, British PM Cameron insisted targeting was ―in line with the UN

resolution.‖ The operation was actually a direct attempt to assassinate the leader.45

The impact of using such moralized discourse can also be analyzed by focusing on representation

of ―Our Violence‖ and the most common violent material processes for which ―We‖ are

represented, implicitly or explicitly as responsible actors through selection of relatively positive

or neutral lexical resources. The impact is not only justification of the use of force by ―Us‖ but

simultaneously diminishing or euphemizing killing associated with ―Our Violence‖, which then

doesn‘t seem violent at all. Table 6.1 analyzes statements uttered by the Obama Administration

as a build up to Libyan intervention and during the length of campaign, and explains how the

narrative for intervention was constructed – ―Our violence‖ involved protection of the group

against which the Qaddafi regime and his militias were engaged in unprovoked violence.

Table 6.1: Positively moralized processes representing „Our‟ violent actions

Process Prototypical example

Strike ―On March 19, 2011, at President Obama‘s direction, U.S. military forces began a series of

strikes in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States to enforce UN

Security Council Resolution 1973.‖ (Harold Hongju Koh, March 26)

―We struck regime forces approaching Benghazi to save that city and the people within it.‖

(Obama, March 28)

Protect ―And that‘s why the United States has worked with our allies and partners to shape a strong

international response at the United Nations. Our focus has been clear: protecting innocent

civilians, and holding the Qaddafi regime accountable.‖ (Obama, March 18)

―…..the reason we intervened in Libya, was to protect the people on the ground and to give the

Libyan people the space that they needed to bring about a change towards democracy.‖ (Obama,

May 25)46

―Nato Strike ‗Kills Saif al-Arab Gaddafi‘, Libya says,‖ BBC News, May 01, 2011.

―Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom in Joint Press Conference in London, United Kingdom,‖ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 25, 2011, accessed April 27, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/25/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint-.

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By contrast, when it comes to representing Their Violent actions, relatively negative material

processes are selected and their violence is so moralized that it appears unprovoked, inexcusable

and maximally lethal. Thus their ―violent‖ material processes are so constructed that implicitly or

explicitly portray them as responsible actors (Table 6.2). The prototypical examples quoted

below leaves no doubt that ―Their‖ side was involved in deliberate violence with explicit aim to

suppress resistance to Qaddafi regime at all costs.

Table 6.2: Negatively moralized processes representing „Their‟ violent actions

Process Prototypical example

Threat ―The suffering and bloodshed is outrageous and it is unacceptable. So are the threats and orders

to shoot peaceful protestors and further punish the people of Libya.‖ (Obama, February 23)

―And so we are strongly committed to seeing the job through, making sure that, at minimum,

Qaddafi doesn‘t have the capacity to send in a bunch of thugs to murder innocent civilians and

threaten them.‖ (Obama, May 25)

Attack ―Hospitals were attacked and patients disappeared.‖ (Obama, March 18)

―His attacks on his own people have continued.‖ (Obama, March 19)

―Faced with this opposition, Qaddafi began attacking his people.‖ (Obama, March 28)

―In the face of the world‘s condemnation, Qaddafi chose to escalate his attacks, launching a

military campaign against the Libyan people.‖ (Obama, March 28)

Kill ―Innocent civilians were beaten, imprisoned, and in cases killed.‖ (Obama, March 18)

Imprison ―Innocent people were targeted for killing….. Journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and

killed.‖ (Obama, March 28)

Bomb ―Cities and towns were shelled, mosques were destroyed, and apartment buildings reduced to

Destroy rubble.‖ (Obama, March 28)

Exploit ―He has denied his people freedom, exploited their wealth, murdered opponents at home and

Murder abroad, and terrorized innocent people around the world – including Americans who were killed

Terrorize by Libyan agents.‖ (Obama, March 28)

Torture ―…the deeply troubling actions by the Libyan government and its security forces – including

incidents in which Qaddafi forces fired at civilians, reports of torture, rape, deportations,

enforced disappearances, the use of cluster munitions and heavy weaponry against civilian

targets in crowed urban areas, and blocking humanitarian supplies.‖ (Susan E. Rice, May 3)

Violate ―These actions violate international norms and every standard of common decency.‖ (Obama,

February 23)

Intimidate ―A campaign of intimidation and repression began.‖ (Obama, March 18)

Repress

274

Similarly, our and their sides are represented with highly moralized titles, attributes and

qualifiers.47

Thus in ―Us category‖ are the words used to describe Us: the attributes we naturally

posses; the concepts we value, promote and protect; and the qualities that are threatened when

they attack us (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3: Our side‟s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions

Free / Freedom ―And throughout this time of transition, the United States will continue to stand up for

Justice freedom, stand up for justice, and stand up for the dignity of all people.‖ (Obama,

Dignity February 23)

Global Security ―For generations, the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor

of global security and as an advocate for human freedom.‖ (Obama, March 28)

Peace ―But the United States will not stand idly by in the face of actions that undermine

Security global peace and security. ―And that‘s why the United States has worked with our

allies and partners to shape a strong international response at the United Nations. Our

focus has been clear: protecting innocent civilians, and holding the Qaddafi regime

accountable.‖ (Obama, March 18)

Liberty ―This is Libya‘s moment. This is Libya‘s victory and the future belongs to you. The

Revolution United States knows something about revolution and liberty. That is how our nation

was born more than 230 years ago.‖ (Clinton, October 18)

Democracy ―The democratic values we stand for would be overrun.‖ (Obama, March 18)

Rights ―The United States also strongly support the universal rights of the Libyan people.

That includes the rights of peaceful assembly, free speech and the ability of the

Libyan people to determine their own destiny. These are human rights. They are not

negotiable. They must be respected in every country. And they cannot be denied

through violence and suppression.‖ (Obama, February 23)

On the contrary, the negative value-laden words are often used in noun groups associated with

them in way that reflects the attributes they naturally posses; and the goals they value and

promote or they aspire to bring about (Table 6.4).

M. A. K. Halliday and C. Mattiessen, An Introduction to Functional Grammar, (London: Hodder Education, 2004): 311-335.

275

Table 6.4: Their side‟s negatively moralized titles, attributes, ambitions

Fear ―Last month, Qaddafi‘s grip of fear appeared to give way to the promise of

freedom.‖ (Obama, March 28)

Danger / Dangerous ―Qaddafi has not yet stepped down from power, and until he does, Libya will remain

dangerous.‖ (Obama, March 28)

Violence ―This violence must stop.‖ (Obama, February 23)

―Like all governments, the Libyan government has a responsibility to refrain from

violence.‖ (Obama, February 23)

―In this particular country- Libya – at this particular moment, we were faced with

prospect of violence on a horrific scale.‖ (Obama, March 28)

Tyrant ―For more than four decades, the Libyan people have been ruled by a tyrant-

Muammar Qaddafi.‖ (Obama, March 28)

Oppression / suppression ―…. voices are being raised together to oppose suppression and support the rights of

the Libyan people.‖ (Obama, February 23)

―Instead of respecting the rights of his own people, Qaddafi chose the path of brutal

suppression.‖ (Obama, March 18)

No mercy ―…. he threatened, and I quote: ―We will have no mercy, no pity‖…no mercy on his

own citizens.‖ (Obama, March 18)

―Qaddafi declared that he would show ―no mercy‖ to his own people. He compared

them to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment.‖ (Obama,

March 28)

Thus the strategy of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation is clearly at work

in these speeches48

through which ―Our side‖ is glorified and sanitized while ―Their side‖ is

vilified and demonized assigning the war/intervention a kind of legitimacy. Thus as ―Our‖ war is

for all good things and against all evil then it is the war that has to be waged, not for the sake of

our vested interests but for the good it will bring. Libyan conflict and analysis of statements

above reveals how the threat posed by the Qaddafi regime was constructed in moralized terms to

justify military intervention in Libya.

See Van Dijk, Ideology.

276

6.2.3. Legitimation by reference through rationalization

Rationalization legitimation is also analyzed by referring to effect-oriented legitimation where

―purposefulness is looked at from the other end, as something that turned out to exist in

hindsight, rather than as something that was, or could have been, planned beforehand.‖49

It typically involves overview of negative consequences of previous practices and foreseen or

expected benefits. As stated in Chapter 2 here legitimation is done ―by reference to the goals, the

uses and the effects of institutionalized social action.‖50

As Van Leeuwen elaborated they legitimize actions ―because they correspond to the criterion of utility, namely ‗in reference to the

purpose or function they serve, needs they fill‘‖.51

―In the past, we have seen him hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a

thousand people in a single day. Now we saw regime forces on the outskirts of the

city. We knew that if we wanted – if we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city

nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated

across the region and stained the conscience of the world……. I refused to let that

happen……I authorized military action to stop killing and enforce UNSCR

1973.‖ (Obama, March 28)

The speech Obama delivered to explain to American public why the decision to intervene in

Libya was taken had to rely on rationalization legitimation too. The American public was

presented with a context that forewarned a scenario unacceptable to any human being based on

Qaddafi‘s tendency to employ violence in the past. By painting the horrific prospect of mass

murder by a ruthless dictator with no regard for human lives, the urgency of the extreme action

was justified. American public was informed that the delay of a single day could have cost a

thousand lives, thus making the very human conscience to shudder thinking about such a

probability.

Though the justification to American public came as late as March 28, there were countries like

France who had been calling for enforcement of a no-fly zone on Libya as early as February

2011.52

In a surprise move France also became the first country to recognize the National

Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate government of Libya. When French jets fired first Leeuwen, ―Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,‖ 103.

Ibid., 91.

Ibid., 105.

Nicholas Watt and Patrick Wintour, ―Libya no-fly zone call by France fails to get David Cameron‘s backing,‖

Guardian, February 23, 2011.

277

shots against Qaddafi troops and initiated the campaign on March 19, the hasty step here too was

interpreted as ―time running out‖ as Qaddafi tanks were advancing on and subsequently

attacking Benghazi civilians. The city which was the base of the NTC was about to fall and there

was believed to be a real threat of massacre.53

Poll conducted in April 2011 also showed that

support for military action was greatest in France where almost 64 per cent voted in favour.54

The move was also rationalized as France displayed responsibility as a permanent member of the

UNSC.55

Other controversial actions like arming and training Libyan rebels were again rationalized for the

purpose they were supposed to serve once Qaddafi was removed from the scene and internal

political situation was bound to become messy because of non-existence of any political training

and institutions during Qaddafi‘s era. The narrative in the international media rationalized

NATO bombing campaign even though it would have inevitably caused collateral damage and

altered empowering narrative of the revolutions.

James Zogby, president of the Washington-based Arab American Institute cautioned: ―This isn‘t

people liberating themselves…. It alters the course of the movement‖. Los Angeles Times quoted a blog where the writer enthusiastically sends ―group hug to everyone‖ over authorization of

UNSCR 1973 and writes: ―It was some weird alternative reality where you‘re asking people to

through bombs on your own country.‖56

Through such narrative Western-backed media aimed to

dispel the negative perception that people‘s liberation was hijacked by anti-Qaddafi collation to

settle its old scores.

Many other absurd actions undertaken by the anti-Qaddafi coalition were in a similar way

rationalized for the purpose they were supposed to serve. West chose to ignore the grave threat

posed by terrorists associated with al-Qaeda who were speculated to be assisting anti-Qaddafi

forces. As the grip of Qaddafi loosened over rebel-held areas and the ceaseless war gave rise to

chaos within the country, the thought of al-Qaeda‘s Sahara wing getting its hands on Libyan

Madelene Lindstorm and Kristina Zetterlund, ―Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO,‖ Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R-3498-SE, October 2012, 18.

Ipsos, ―Military action in Libya- Ipsos polling in Great Britain, USA, France , Italy: Topline results 12th

April 2011,‖ http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/Reuters-Libya-topline-Apr11.PDF ―French president‘s military interventions are logical,‖ Financial Times, Editorial, April 10, 2011.

Raja Abdulrahim, ―Libyan Americans feel caught in the middle,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2011.

278

surface-to-air missiles became chilling for the West. Especially after speculations from

governments in the Sahel that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), who was increasingly

active in the Sahara region, had received convoys of weapons including SA-7 missiles from

Qaddafi‘s abandoned arms caches, leaders in Mali and Chad were fearful that those weapons

would then make AQIM the best-equipped force in the region.

It was not just Qaddafi‘s weapons that were a threat to region‘s peace but his recruited fighters,

especially Tuareg nomads.57

The historical images of the past and bitter memories of 1990s

rebellions in Mali and Niger were invoked to de-legitimize Qaddafi‘s survival strategy. These

mercenaries by default then became legitimate targets for West-backed rebels who strived to take

their country back from a despot and his foreign agents.

The anti-Qaddafi collation was so eager to stage exit of Qaddafi that they employed questionable

means that could only be legitimized through ―rationalization- for the purpose they serve in the

end.‖ One such incident included enlisting of former prisoner turned American ally –Abu Sufian

Ahmed Hamuda bin Qumu – a ―dangerous man with no qualms about committing terrorist acts‖-

captured from Pakistan after US invasion of Afghanistan. According to released classified

documents by Wiki Leaks, he was a ―former member of the [al-Qaeda-linked] Libyan Islamic

Fighting Group (LIFG), [a] probable member of al Qaeda and a member of the North African

Extremist Network.‖ He was among those jihadists in Afghanistan who were funded, armed and

trained by US before turning against it and many American officials believed he represented a

―medium-to-high risk‖ and ―likely to pose threat to US, its interests and allies‖. He was sent to

Libya in 2007 to lead a band of anti-Qaddafi rebels known as the ―Darnah Brigade‖.58

This opportunist US policy was aptly explained by the New York Times: ―The former enemy and

prisoner of the United States is now an ally of sorts, a remarkable turnabout resulting from

shifting American policies rather than any obvious change in Mr. Qumu.‖59

Qumu wasn‘t the

only terrorist turned ally, another was Abdul-Hakim al-Hasidi whose Libyan Islamic Fighting

Group (LIFG) was still on US State Department‘s terror list posing ―one of the most immediate David Lewis, ―Analysis: Stray Libyan small arms may threaten region,‖ Reuters, May 11, 2011.

Alex Newman, ―Former Guantanamo Prisoner Now U.S. Ally In Libya,‖ New American, April 26, 2011.

Rod Nordland and Scott Shane, ―Libyan, Once a Detainee, Is Now a U.S. Ally of Sorts,‖ New York Times, April 24, 2011.

279

threats‖ to US security. He turned out to be another prominent leader in the Libyan rebellion.60

Thus by supporting dictators and terrorists across the globe and later turning against some of

them illustrated absurdity of America‘s foreign policy that only sought Qaddafi‘s exit from

power at that time.

6.2.4. Legitimation by reference to temporality

In this type of legitimation representations of time also legitimize violence rhetorically and the

technique is referred as ―temporal proximization‖ by Piotr Cap which he explains as ―a construal

of events…. as momentous and historic and thus of central significance to the discourse

addressee.‖61

It involves construal of impact of past events in such a way that they seem to effect

the current situation.62

But this is not the only type of temporal proximization as rhetors might

shift from what will happen in the future to what must happen now.63

Particularly significant is

the way ―utterances are modalized to enact interpersonal relationships with the audience‖.64

When politicians speak they speak with a high level of conviction to make what is possible to

appear certain. Their political language intends to remove the doubt because a well-defined

future action plan rather hypothetical abstraction is the demand of the people. Both the degrees

of commitment and certainty, and levels of modality are represented in the Table 6.5 and Table

6.6.

Table 6.5. Modality – degrees of commitment and certainty65

Must, have to, will, ought Highest degree of commitment to truth or obligation

May, could, should, might, Lowest degree of commitment to truth or obligation

Should not, could not, must not Negative degree of commitment to truth or obligation

Newman, ―Former Guantanamo Prisoner Now U.S. Ally In Libya.‖

Piotr Cap, ―Toward the Proximization Model of the Analysis of Legitimation in Political Discourse,‖ Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008): 35.

Ibid.

P. Dunmire, ―The Rhetoric of Temporality: The Future as Linguistic Construct and Rhetorical Resource,‖ in

Rhetoric in Detail: Analyses of Rhetorical Text and Talk, ed. B. Johnstone and C. Eisenhart (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2008): 83. Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse,‖ 297.

Jonathan Charteris-Black, Analyzing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse and Metaphor (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 112.

280

Table 6.6. Levels of modality66

Truth Obligation Modal verb

High certainly required to must/ have to

Medium probably supposed to could/would/should

Low possibly allowed to may/might

Here we will analyze two types of modalities i.e. epistemic and deontic modality. While

epistemic modality refers to the level of commitment a speaker can express in relation to truth,

certainty or accuracy of what he is saying and is concerned with how likely, possible or probable

something has happened, will happen or is happening. According to Coates epistemic modality is

not only ―concerned with the speaker‘s assumptions or assessment of possibilities‖ but also

―indicates the speaker‘s confidence (or lack of confidence) in the truth of proposition

expressed.‖67

While deontic modality expresses speaker‘s belief about the ―necessity or probability of acts

performed by morally responsible agents‖68

i.e. the extent to which he is obliged to do

something, needs to do something or has permission to do something. These ideas of obligation,

necessity and permission assume that shared norms exist for evaluating right or wrong without

even making those norms explicit.69

Legitimacy of military action against Qaddafi required that ―temporal maximization‖ technique

to be employed as well. Qaddafi regime‘s propensity to violence was invoked through references

to his troubled past (Table 6.7). This technique left no room for negotiated settlement to the

crisis. It demonstrated that Qaddafi drawing from his own past and prevalent international

practices would settle not less than massacre of his population if he is given room enough to

survive. That‘s why when US public was not forthcoming about US military involvement in

Libyan mission, references form grim historical episodes of the past were invoked. As expressed

in the statement of a political science professor in George Mason University. He said: ―The Ibid., 113.

J. Coates, The Semantics of the Modal Auxiliaries (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 18.

J. Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 823.

Charteris-Black, ―Analyzing Political Speeches,‖ 114.

281

specter haunting the White House was Rwanda. This was a 550 million dollar intervention to

prevent a massacre in Benghazi.‖70

Table 6.7: Temporal Maximization in Obama Statements

(Obama, March ―For decades, he demonstrated a willingness to use brute force through his sponsorship of

18) terrorism against the American people as well as others, and through the killings that he has

carried out within his own borders.‖

(Obama, March ―….when people were brutalized in Bosnia in the 1990s, it took the international community

28) more than a year to intervene with air power to protect civilians. It took us 31 days.‖

(Obama, May ―We have a broad range of partners under an international mandate designed to save lives and

25)71

ensure that we did not have the sort of massacre that would lead us then to look back and say to

ourselves, why did we stand by and do nothing.‖

(Obama, June ―Muammar Qaddafi, who prior to Osama bin Laden, was responsible for more American deaths

29)72

than just about anybody on the planet, was threatening to massacre his people…..we would be

supportive of it because it‘s in our national security interest and also because it‘s the right thing

to do.‖

Even France sought legitimation by reference to temporality in advocating imposition of no-fly

zone over Libya. French Ambassador presented the Arab revolutions as ―a breath of fresh air‖

that would ―change the course of history‖ and asserted ―this new Arab springtime is good news

for all‖.73

But the situation in Libya was painted as grim. French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe,

while introducing the resolution asserted: ―the situation on ground is more alarming than ever,

marked by violent re-conquest of the cities that had been released‖ and ―We have very little time

left – perhaps only a matter of hours,‖74

thus implying if UNSC failed to take the decisive action

Knigge, ― US Public, Congress remain skeptical.‖

―Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom in Joint Press Conference in London, United Kingdom,‖ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 25, 2011.

72―Press Conference by President,‖ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 29, 2011, accessed April

26, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/press-conference-president. UN Department of Public Information, ―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya, Authorizing ‗All Necessary Measures‘ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,‖ March 17, 2011, accessed

April 26, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. UN Department of Public Information, ―Security Council Approves ‗No-Fly Zone‘ over Libya.‖

282

the nascent uprising against Qaddafi is finished earlier than anticipated along with prospect of

large scale massacre.

Time theme was invoked to provoke Qaddafi loyalists to defect. On April 27, the U.S.

Ambassador to Libya in an interview with Fox News said: ―It has become clear that Qaddafi and

his henchmen have no intention of stopping the violence.‖ Thus he urged members of Qaddafi

government, ―the time is fast approaching where they have to make a decision. And they have to

decide whether to go down with the ship.‖75

While the ones advocating intervention showed higher commitment to truth and obligation, and

painted grave threatening scenario if they didn‘t act in time and decisively. The ones opposing

reflected lowest level of certainty and truth in their assertions as evident in Germany‘s negative

vote in the UNSCR 1973. Thus the successful utilization and legitimation through temporality

accorded wider acceptance to anti-Qaddafi coalition and its extreme measures to protect

civilians.

6.2.5. Legitimation by reference to group demarcation – Us versus Them

category

One of the most important categories invoked for war legitimation is usually ―Us‖ versus

―Them‖ demarcation. Through this demarcation friends/allies and enemies are identified and

placed in their respective categories. As the war against Libya was led by US so ―We are the

World‖ category was constantly invoked to construct this side: that is vast and inclusive of all

civilized world. It legitimizes violence by reference to conformity76

and it implies if all the good

civilized people are participating in violence the audience must too. This is the category that was

constantly invoked as by reference to the ―international community‖ representing the will of the

people of the world.

This category is then juxtaposed with the ―Dangerous Minority‖ theme which is few dangerous

naysayers among Us opposed to Our plans. They thus are delegitimized and discredited for

opposing something being done for the collective good. For ―Their‖ side, ―They are Fringe‖

theme is invoked to convey the point how this small segment threat entire humanity. Since they ―U.S. Ambassador to Libya on Qaddafi: ‗He Has Got to Realize That The Game is UP‘,‖ Fox News, April 27, 2011.

Leeuwen, ―Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,‖ 91-112.

283

are in minority it is achievable to defeat them. ―Co-Conspirator‖ theme is also invoked to

describe their connections with other enemies or their intention of connecting to them. This is the

most dangerous assertion as mere implication of a relation between two makes violence and

aggression legitimate against non-aggressors as it is easier to link future potential enemies with

the one already constructed and whose recent transgressions against Us are obvious.77

The buildup to Libyan intervention shows how Obama Administration and those supporting

them consistently presented their actions by making reference to international community.

Qaddafi‘s regime was constructed as a threat not only to his own subjects but his actions

constituted threat to the ―peace and security‖ of the global community. Thus the military action

taken against his regime and those on his side was not only justified but a necessary evil to rid

the world of a ruthless and dangerous despot. By juxtaposing statements of ―Us‖ and ―Them‖ the

contrast brings forward the difference in our and their approach for bringing an end to escalating

violence. Qaddafi, through his adamant and ceaseless violence left ―international community‖

with no other choice except military intervention (Table 6.8 & Table 6.9).

Table 6.8: We – the International Community

―The entire world is watching and we will coordinate our assistance and accountability measures with the

international community‖ and ―… we join with the international community to speak with one voice to the

government and the people of Libya.‖ (Obama, February 23) ―In the face of this injustice, the United States and the international community moved swiftly. Sanctions were put

in place by the United States and out allies and partners.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―Yesterday, in response to a call for action by the Libyan people and the Arab League, the U.N. Security Council

passed a strong resolution that demands an end to violence against citizens.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―…the United States is acting with a broad coalition that is committed to enforcing UNSCR 1973…. And it brings together many of our European and Arab partners.‖ (Obama, March 19) ―But make no mistake: Today we are part of a broad collation. We are answering the calls of a threatened people.

And we are acting in the interests of the United States and the world.‖ (Obama, March 19) ―In this effort, the United States has not acted alone. Instead, we have been joined by a strong and growing coalition.

This includes our closest allies - nations like the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain,

Greece, and Turkey – all of whom have fought by our sides for decades. And it includes Arab partners like Qatar

Oddo, ―War legitimation discourse,‖ 303-304.

284

and the United Arab Emirates, who have chosen to meet their responsibilities to defend the Libyan people.‖

(Obama, March 28) ―In just one month, the United States has worked with our international partners to mobilize a broad coalition...‖

(Obama, March 28) ―This is an important effort that has garnered the support and the active participation of nations who recognize the

significance of coming together in the international community, through the United Nations, to set forth a clear

statement of action to be taken in order to protect innocent civilians from their own government.‖(Clinton, March

24)

Table 6.9: They against Us-the International Community

―Once again, Qaddafi chose to ignore the will of his people and the international community. Instead, he launched a

military campaign against his own people. And there should be no doubt about his intentions, because he himself

made them clear.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―Even yesterday, the international community offered Muammar Qaddafi the opportunity to pursue an immediate

cease-fire, one that stopped the violence against civilians and the advances of Qaddafi‘s forces. But despite the

hollow words of his government, he has ignored that opportunity.‖ (Obama, March 18) ―Ten days ago, having tried to end the violence without using force, the international community offered Qaddafi a

final chance to stop his campaign of killing, or face the consequences. Rather than stand down, his forces continued

their advance, bearing down on the city of Benghazi, home to nearly 700,000 men, women and children who sought

their freedom from fear.‖ (Obama, March 28) ―But Colonel Qaddafi and those who still stand by him continue to grossly and systematically abuse the most

fundamental human rights of Libya‘s People.‖ (Susan E. Rice, March17)

Germany risked the label of ―dangerous minority‖ when Berlin chose to abstain on the vote on

UNSCR 1973, landing itself in the company of Russia and China on the matter of military

intervention in Libya.78

It is interesting to note that emerging powers like Brazil and India also

chose to be ―on the wrong side of the history‖ when they refused to become part of US-led

collation of willing to eventually ―de-seat‖ Qaddafi. Domestically too German government faced

severe censure when former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer called the abstention a

78

UNSCR 1973 was adopted by 10 votes in favor (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, UK, South Africa and the US) and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia). United Nations Security Council, press release, 17 March 2011.

285

―scandalous mistake‖, adding ―Germany has lost its credibility in the United Nations and in the

Middle East‖.79

When German vote was negatively being interpreted in the international media, German Defence

Minister de Maiziere rhetorically asked in a Television show ―Could the fact that we are

suddenly intervening now have something to do with oil?‖ This was an interesting observation

considering the fact that TNC‘s first sale of oil was to a US oil refiner.80

He simultaneously

exposed selective international approach against Qaddafi by stating ―We cannot remove all the

dictators in the world with an international military mission‖.81

While Development Minster

Dirk Niebel also commenting on Western hypocrisy stated: ―It is notable that exactly those

countries which are blithely dropping bombs in Libya are still drawing oil from Libya.‖82

However, Berlin was not ready to go too far in its opposition, lest the world see it squarely in

bed with the Libyan dictator. After facing stinging criticism from within Germany and

internationally, Chancellor Merkel at the Libyan Summit that followed UNSCR1973 vote stated

that the resolution was now ―also our resolution‖83

and on another occasion said, ―We share the

goals of the resolution unreservedly. Our abstention should not be confused with neutrality.‖84

Similarly, AU was discredited for failing to bring kind of pressure on Qaddafi to step aside. Its

efforts to negotiate with opposition were undermined. It was highlighted that AU‘s efforts to

handle crisis either in Libya or Cote d‘Ivoire illustrated that hopes that decade-old AU was

improvement over its predecessor the Organization of African Unity were over-stated. The road

map presented by AU during the Libyan crisis was termed as ―a classic OAU formula-save our

shaggy dog‖ referring figuratively to phrase ―a shaggy dog, but our dog‖. As AU didn‘t respond

to overwhelming Western desire to force Qaddafi relinquish power, hence neither their formula

nor their narrative was accepted by anti-Qaddafi coalition.85

Helen Pidd, ―Germans voice disquiet over absence from Libya military action,‖ guardian.co.uk, 24 March, 2011.

Jamie Crawford, ―Libyan rebel group sells first oil to U.S.,‖ CNN, June 8, 2011.

Ralf Beste and Dirk Kurbjuweit, ―SPIEGEL Interview with Defense Minister De Maizere ‗We Will Not Get Involved‘ in Sibya,‖ Spiegel Online International, June 20, 2011.

―German Minister Hints at Libya Mission Hypocrisy,‖ Spiegel Online International, March 25, 2011.

Wittrock Philipp, ―Paris and Berlin at Odds over Libya Operation,‖ Spiegel Online International, March 24, 2011.

Quentin Peel, ―Merkel explains Berlin abstention,‖ Financial Times, March 18, 2011.

―AU fails in bid to strike deal on Libya conflict,‖ Daily Nation, May 15, 2011.

286

This ―dangerous minority‖ theme was simultaneously invoked for internal dissenters too - those

who didn‘t back Obama and were creating hurdles citing War Powers Resolution of 1973. In a

letter from Obama to Congressional leaders, President defended the Libyan operation by stating:

―Congressional action in support of the mission would underlie the U.S. commitment to this

remarkable international effort‖ which he labelled as ―important national security matter.‖86

Thus the violation of the resolution was justified ―in the national interest‖ and thus those

objecting were endangering nation‘s interest.

While on the one side there was ―international community‖ that saw those fighting against

Qaddafi and forces loyal to him, acting on behalf of the international society to save unarmed

civilians. Qaddafi‘s threatening narrative was quoted to describe him and those fighting for him.

Even as late as August 2011, in an audio message on Al-Arabiya TV Qaddafi was seen urging

his loyalists to stay in Tripoli and resist invaders. He said: ―Don‘t leave Tripoli for rats. Fight

them, fight them and kill them.‖87

With the passage of time, numbers of countries endorsing Qaddafi‘s exist from political power

increased and that further accorded legitimacy to the anti-Qaddafi collation‘s ongoing military

assault. In May 2011, Senegal‘s President Abdoulaye Wade termed the process of Qaddafi‘s

removal from power ―irreversible‖ and recognized Benghazi-based rebels as legitimate

opposition. He urged they should get international support to lead country‘s transition to

democratic elections – a position that went further than AU which had urged ceasefire but hadn‘t

recognize rebels then.88

One of the chief reasons of increasing international pressure was Qaddafi‘s diplomatic isolation.

While countries advocating intervention and strict measures against Qaddafi were vocal, those

like China and Russia did not publicly assert themselves until the regime change agenda was in

full display and the mandate of UNSCR 1973 had been effectively stretched without the

council‘s formal approval. For example, when Russia hosted a representative of Qaddafi

government in May, 2011 and called on Tripoli to stop using force against civilians and fully

comply with UNSC resolutions- ―The answer we heard cannot be called negative,‖ stated Michael J.K. Bokor, ―Libya: A major test case for Barack Obama,‖ Modern Ghana, May 22, 2011.

John Throne, ―Rebels, regime in fierce fight; Qaddafi says ‗kill them‘,‖ The National (UAE), August 26, 2011.

―Senegal‘s Wade: rebels should lead Libya transition,‖ Reuters, May 20, 2011.

287

Foreign Minister Sergie Lavrov. But the West and the rebels were not ready to look into

ceasefire proposals suggested by the AU and the only deal they said they would accept was one

under which Qaddafi relinquished power.89

6.3. Leading from Behind

In the Libyan intervention, US undertook a back-seat role that was inconsistent with its previous

stunning military adventures in the Middle East within a decade. The last two performances had

in their foundation an eternal belief in American exceptionalism reflected in the discourses and

narratives that reproduced this exceptionalist definition of the American Self. According to

Trevor McCrisken: ―This belief in American exceptionalism provides an essential element of the

cultural and intellectual framework for the making and conduct of US foreign policy.‖90

The

discourses generated through belief in this exceptional identity then formulate a geopolitical

vision of American hegemony, superiority and national mission.91

This nation that had a strong belief in not only being ―unique but also being superior among

nations,‖92

thus exercised its equally ―exceptional‖ leadership role in the world and more so

during the crisis that confronted the world. The belief in exceptional US identity rested not only

on American material power base i.e. both economically as well as militarily but ideationally

from the belief in the American values of freedom and liberty. For decades this fusion of

hegemonic identity and superior power was reflected in the political utterances of American

political elite.

With Obama in the White House, the exceptionalism of America was framed not only on its

outstanding military and economic power, but more on a strategy of cooperative engagement that

relies less on military power centric approach to world politics. But the very approach was

fraught with contradiction that instead of creating discursive interlinkage between American

Joseph Logan and Tarek Amara, ―Libya‘s top oil official defects: Tunisian source,‖ Reuters, May 17, 2011.

Trevor McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2.

James Ceaser, ―The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism,‖ American Political Thought 1, no. 1 (2012): 13-21.

McCrisken, American Exceptionalism, 4.

288

exceptionalism, hegemony and its selective engagement strategy, generated debate for a post-

American, post-hegemonic century. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century –

the onset of global financial crisis, US dragged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the mounting

domestic challenges from healthcare to public debt, brought cherished American global

leadership role under intense scrutiny.

In the same circumstances, the Arab uprisings caught Americans as off guard as the rest of the

world. The question that had been in circulation for a while if America can still be ―the

indispensible nation‖ with the ability to act as ―a policeman of the world‖, surfaced again with

US hesitant, reluctant, uncertain and delayed response to unprecedented Arab developments. In

the military intervention that followed in Libya, US did not seek spotlight for itself but sought to

exercise its role in a more limited fashion through allies and partners. The new restrained

American approach was then named ―leading from behind‖ that seemed to encapsulate a new

geopolitical vision, a new way to exercise American power. According to the author of the term,

Ryan Lizza, ―At the heart of the idea of leading from behind is the empowerment of other actors

to do your bidding.‖93

However, everyone in America or abroad was not ready to buy this definition and for

Republicans especially this meant an acknowledgement of diminishing American power globally

and acceptance of its decline.94

According to George Lofflmann: ―On Libya, the discursive re-

framing Obama applied to the world political role of the United States was matched to a new

material reality of less exposed US assets, and greater constraints on the use of military power, in

order to save money.‖95

Leaving aside the debate if American financial condition and constraints

led to this decision, the approach has definitely altered the way America was being perceived in

the world.

The declinist narrative has increased acceptance and US selective approach towards Libya and

its non-existent and irregular policy in Syria has doubled these assertions. For those, depicting Rayan Lizza, ―Leading from Behind,‖ New Yorker, April 27, 2011. ; see also Charles Krauthammer, ―The Obama Doctrine: Leading from Behind,‖ Washington Post, April 28, 2011. ; Michael Boyle, ―Obama: ‗Leading from Behind‘ on Libya,‖ Guardian, August 27, 2011. ; Katy Steinmetz, ―Top 10 Buzzwords: 10. Leading from Behind,‖

Time, December 7, 2011.

Krauthammer, ―The Obama Doctrine.‖ ; Roger Cohen, ―Leading from Behind,‖ New York Times, October 31, 2011.

95George Lofflmann, ―Leading from Behind – American Exceptionalism and President‘s Obama‘s Post_American

Vision of Hegemony,‖ Geopolitics 20 (2015): 322, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2015.1017633.

289

the drift towards post-hegemony, Libyan intervention was the first global military campaign that

left no doubt about waning US influence and hegemony. The allies and partners who were

supposed to get emboldened with new global leadership role, seemed frustrated with American

reluctant approach and this frustration since then has been a source of friction between America

and its Arab allies over developments in Syria too.

6.3.1. Post-Qaddafi Libya

Alan J. Kuperman says; ―Indeed, the United States seemed to have scored a hat trick: nurturing

the Arab Spring, averting a Rwanda-like genocide, and eliminating Libya as a potential source of

terrorism.‖96

But in retrospect the verdict proved to be immature and Libyan intervention was an

―abject failure, judged even by its own standards….failed not only to evolve into a democracy; it

has devolved into a failed state…. Libya now serves as a safe haven for militias affiliated with

both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).‖97

The intervention which was supposed to bring peace, democracy and exercise of universal rights

for the Libyan people has conversely left Libyans in a far worse situation. The most recent

House of Commons report on Libyan intervention lay thread bare the overstated threat and the

objective of NATO intervention. It states:

―This policy was not informed by accurate intelligence. In particular, the

Government failed to identify that the threat to civilians was overstated and that

the rebels included a significant Islamist element. By the summer of 2011, the

limited intervention to protect civilians had drifted into an opportunist policy of

regime change. That policy was not underpinned by a strategy to support and

shape post-Gaddafi Libya. The result was political and economic collapse, inter-

militia and inter-tribal warfare, humanitarian and migrant crises, widespread

human rights violations, the spread of Gaddafi regime weapons across the region

and the growth of ISIL in North Africa‖98

Alan J. Kuperman, ―Obama‘s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,‖ Foreign Affairs 94, no.2 (March/April 2015): 66-77.

Ibid.

For details see ―Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK‘s future policy options,‖ Foreign

Affairs Committee, House of Commons, Third Report of Session 2016-17, HC 119, published on September14, 2016.

290

Thus the NATO intervention inadvertently created the very conditions, it was precisely launched

to thwart in Libya. And it is difficult to disagree with Obama‘s pithy assessment that described

post-intervention Libya as a ―shit show‖ in April 2016.99

Conclusion

Being the fourth largest country in Africa by area, Libya had also been one of the richest in the

region because of its large petroleum reserves until recent protests and social unrest has plunged

it into deadly civil war. It was a regional power hub in North Africa, shaping in part the policy of

the African Union. Its booming economy attracted thousands of workers from the neighbouring

countries, a fact of high importance for the weak labour markets in Tunisia and Egypt. But

events in 2011 brought those regional and extra-regional players in the Libyan conflict who for

decades had been coping with a regionally unpopular despot Qaddafi.

The uprisings started as a genuine expression of the democratic aspiration of the people of Libya

but the trajectory of events led to the involvement of regional and global players with interests at

stake at systemic and local levels. Ben Ali and Mubarak‘s exit from power had upset the fragile

hierarchy in place since the end of the Cold War. US allies were deposed by peaceful protestors.

The armies in respective countries stood aside as they saw decades-old authoritarian regimes

crumbling before eyes.

Libya was a different society. The tribal structure in place and the non-existence of institutional

structures made it more difficult for Libyan protestors to get rid of Qaddafi. Besides the

country‘s west enjoyed significant Qaddafi hold, though east simmered with disturbances and

revolution. However, the stakes for the regional and extra-regional players were too high to let

Qaddafi reach a negotiated or otherwise solution to the uprising. A historic opportunity to get rid

of Qaddafi was not to be wasted. Hence, without applying all diplomatic tools to resolve a crisis,

a hasty military intervention was launched with implicit objective of a regime change.

The Libyan military intervention revealed the link between regional and global hierarchies. At

the systemic level US power that had already been subjected to scrutiny by peer challengers, kept

99

Jeffrey Goldberg ―The Obama Doctrine,‖ The Atlantic, April 2016.

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assessing American resolve and will to enter into yet another Middle Eastern conflict. With US

―leading from behind‖ campaign, the peer challengers like Russia assessed that long-awaited

systemic changes are due, at least in the Middle East. Hence, the Syrian crisis would deepen the

fault lines that first appeared with US reluctant and back-seat role in Libya.

The global implications of the Libyan crisis could be summed in a single line – we are officially

in the post-hegemonic international system.

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Chapter 7: Syria – The US quandary

As already discussed in the previous chapters, post-hegemonic transition at the systemic level

while triggering significant changes within the global hierarchy, affects unstable, conflict-prone

and diffused regional hierarchies too. MENA has seen unprecedented changes recently. The

region‘s landscape has always been fluid, and power relations had remained uneven which

changes rapidly, and external pressures can affect regional balance of power in dramatic and

often unpredictable ways. The case study of Syria sheds light on how with the dawn of post-

hegemonic phase in the international system, why the same military intervention model has not

been replicated against another dictator, accused of similar brutal and at times worst tactics and

suppression against its own population.

While analyzing Syrian case regional realities stayed the same but considerable changes in the

global hierarchy affected threat construction for military intervention. US could not even enlist

token Russian and Chinese cooperation as was done in case of Libya. As the power transition

from a US centered unipolar world to a more uncertain international order is taking place, US

hegemony is also fastly eroding. With the waning of unparalleled power potential, come the

limitation of US influence to direct events on the international stage. The rise of peer challengers

and countries with significant financial and economic clout are increasingly frustrating

acquisition and implementation of US policy goals in key regions like MENA.

Syria case-study is particularly interesting as it is meant to explore the linkage between global

and regional hierarchies explicated in Military Intervention Threat Model in Chapter 2. It

establishes further clarity about how the diminishing US power and hegemony will create power

vacuum, to be attempted to fill up by other resurgent global and regional actors like Russia and

Iran. Besides Iran, the trajectory of conflict is being shaped by other regional states like Saudi

Arabia, Turkey, Qatar etc for whom Syria serves an arena for proxy war. The threat

securitization model through political discourse will also be discussed in Syrian civil conflict

case and with reference to the international dimension the conflict has taken.

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This chapter will also follow the pattern similar to the one in case of Libya. It will be divided

into three sections. First section will deal with Pre-Bashar al-Assad era to place contemporary

Syria in historical perspective. The second section will trace developments in Bashar al-Assad

period till the massive unrest against government and the bloody civil war till date ie mid 2017.

The chronological development of Syrian unrest traced in the previous section will then help us

understand the interplay of unit and systemic level variables as identified in Military Intervention

Model in the third section. However, this will remain limited to key regional players, considering

the number of actors involved in the conflict. Extra-regional players will be analyzed in the next

chapter. An in-depth analysis of these variables will then help us ascertain why Syrian conflict

still has lingered on with neither full scale international military intervention nor near end in

sight.

7.1. Pre- Bashar al-Assad Syria

One of the oldest countries in the world, Syria always enjoyed a distinctive position in the

Muslim Middle East. The country has been crucial in the development of all the three main

Arbahamic religions, amid being a site of contestation between ideologies, religions, and sects.

The Ottomans ruled it from 1516 until 1917 but modern Syria is a recent phenomenon; a product

of Western imperialism after it was carved out of the historical and geographical Syria (bilad al-

sham)1 in 1920 and doesn‘t coincide with ancient Syria that occupied the region between the

eastern Mediterranean coast and the desert of northern Arabia.2

Syria was the place that gave birth to Baathism – the movement that aimed at unifying the Arab

states. This Arab nationalism was inclusive in nature and fact that all Sunni, Shiites, Christians,

even rural and urban populations could identify together, added to its wide appeal to all segments

of society. The dissatisfaction with the truncated Syria and this nationalist tide was such that

Syria even surrendered its sovereignty to Egypt in 1958 in the name of pan-Arabism and

throughout 1960s focused its struggle for Palestine. However, the loss of Golan Heights to Israel

‗Bilad al-sham‟ was a cultural and qusai-administrative unit under the Ottoman Empire and included current states of Syria, Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, Jordan and parts of southern Turkey.

Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila Al-Shami, Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 4-5.

294

in 1967 gave a ―Syrian territorial dimension to Syria‘s Arabism‖, as its recovery became single

most important objective in Syrian foreign policy.3

Map 7.1. Map of Syria (Source: CIA The World Factbook accessed online

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html)

By 1990s the pan-Arab identity in Syria underwent further transition owing to distinctive

regional realties that included series of setbacks like separate deals struck by Egypt, Jordan and

the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) with Israel at Syria‘s expense; cost of its own

persistent struggle with the Jewish state; simmering anti-Syrian sentiment in Lebanon besides

failure of hitherto much cherished pan-Arab projects. Raymond Hinnebush rightly asserts: ―If

identity and geopolitics shaped a fairly constant agenda for Syria‘s foreign policy makers, their

capacity to pursue it varied according to Syria‘s level of state formation.‖4

3 Raymond Hinnebush, ―The Foreign Policy of Syria,‖ in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 2nd ed.

Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 208. Hinnebush, The Foreign Policy of Syria, 210.

295

As against the first quarter century of its independent existence when foreign policy shifted

according to the consequent balance of domestic power,5 Hafez al-Assad enjoyed wide latitude

in foreign policy making. With consolidation of power, Hafez in 1980s steered the foreign policy

himself with little interference from either hawkish or dovish factions within bureaucracy.6

Consequently public opinion ceased to be the major driver behind the foreign policy making

which hitherto had been an important factor. Under his leadership, Syria was seen to ―punch

above its weight‖ in regional politics and he was seen adept in maintaining the delicate balance

between Syria‘s limited resources and vulnerable geopolitical position and responding to the

looming external threats to its national security.7

Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila Al-Shami aptly sum up Hafez al-Assad‘s Syria as ―fascist in the

most correct sense of the word. It sought to replace class conflict with devotion to the absolute

state….Beneath the froth, Syria‘s was a one-party system,…controlled by one man. The state cultivated a surveillance society, everyone spying on everyone else and no one in secure

position, not even the top generals and security officers.‖8 By the end of his reign most of the

political opposition had either been crushed or co-opted and quiescent. Consequently when

succession fell on an unlikely candidate like Bashaar al-Asad due to the accidental death of most

favoured eldest son Bassel, the absolutist regime built by Hafez was about to dominate the

country‘s life until 2011 when the unprecedented uprisings in the entire region would drag Syria

in a bloody civil war still going on with no nearby end in sight.

7.2. Syria under Bashaar al-Assad

The death of Hafez al-Assad was announced on June 10, 2000 and Bashaar al-Assad inherited

the powerful presidency forged by his father and in spite of all the apprehension and speculation

that it may lead to a violent change and contested between Rifaat, his brother and Hafez‘s

Generals, the transition went smooth. Before coming to power, Bashaar‘s personal image was

5 For more information on Syria in its initial years see Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1965). Patrick Seal, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 340-344.

Hinnebush, The Foreign Policy of Syria, 216.

Kassab and Al-Shami, Burning Country,14.

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skillfully constructed as outward-looking modernizer through his role as head of the Syrian

Computer Society that is credited with the launch of internet within the country. The image led

to the hopeful speculation about the dawn of a new age in Syrian politics as the elected President

called on ―every single citizen to participate in the process of development and modernization,‖

and for ―constructive criticism‖ to this end.9

A significant change was observed in the country when by the end of 2000, a number of forums

(muntadiyat) established in and beyond Damascus led to hotly debated reform ideas and it was

soon hailed as ―Damascus Spring‖ in the international media. This unprecedented tolerance

displayed by a regime that usually thrives on brutally suppressing political dissent proved short-

lived. The participants within these discussion forums were quickly dubbed as foreign agents – a

smear campaign was launched that we were soon to witness again in 2011 uprising. Soon

Bashaar himself joined the official circle denouncing this embryonic movement.10

Hence effectively by autumn 2001 the ―Damascus Spring‘ had deteriorated to winter. Despite

these measures, Bashaar retained his personal popularity as many believed the old guard to be

behind regime‘s sadistic approach. He was able to capture the Syrian public and the wider Arab

street through his anti-Western, anti-Zionist and pro-Arab rhetoric. Amid regional turmoil of

2003 Iraqi invasion and Hizbullah-Israel war of 2006, Bashaar was credited not only for

maintaining domestic stability but simultaneously hosting around 500,000 Iraqis and 200,000

Lebanese refugees.11

The regime even tried to enlist US cooperation by collaborating in the ―war on terror‖ and

became a popular destination for ―torture by proxy‖ policy where terror suspects were illegally

extradited by US to third countries. But instead of bridging the gap between the two, Syrian

international isolation increased during Bush era and further sanctions were imposed in 2004

citing issues like Syrian regime undermining security in Iraq, its persistent occupation of

Lebanon, its support for militant Islamic groups and its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass

destruction. The intensification of bilateral hostility gave further impetus to fears that Syria Speech delivered by Bashaar al-Assad on his inauguration as President of Syria in 2000, full text available at http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=438:president-assad-2000-inauguration-speech-july-17-2000-3&catid=106&Itemid=496 (accessed January 16, 2017). Bashaar al-Assad was interviewed by Ash-Sharq al-Awsat in February 2001 and also quoted in Kassab and Al-Shami, Burning Country, 20.

Figures quoted in Ibid., 25.

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might be next on the US invasion list and it probably became a factor in shoring up domestic

support for Bashaar.

The regime suffered a huge blow when the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-

Hariri in February 2005 threatened to seriously damage the President. The Damascus regime‘s

widely speculated implication in the murder gave rise to unprecedented protests throughout

Lebanon and finally led to Syrian withdrawal in April, bringing an end to its three-decade

occupation and significantly denting Bashaar domestic standing.12

His forced evacuation from

Lebanon along with his inability to respond to Israeli and US provocations during this period not

only squandered the wider Arab public support that he earned when he stood against US invasion

of Iraq in 2003 but was seen loosing ―geopolitical cards‖ his father had accumulated throughout

his tenure. It was not until Syrian stand against Israel in its war against Hezbollah (2006) and

Hamas (December 2008) and its claim as a bulwark of stability against the rising Islamist threat

created by US in the wake of its war against Iraq that aided recovery of Bashaar‘s image

internationally and especially among the wider Arab public.

On the other side, Bashaar‘s economic agenda introduced by him after gaining power stifled

because of high levels of corruption, nepotism and economic inertia. Resultantly, inequality grew

up to the extent that 5 percent of the population had almost 50 percent of the country‘s wealth in

its possession.13

The severe drought plaguing country since 2006 worsened the situation and by

2010 between two and three million Syrians had been pushed in extreme poverty, forcing

hundreds of thousands off their lands.14

The massive internal displacement, the mismanagement

and neglect resultantly alienated the cross-sectarian peasant constituency, once loyal to Bashaar.

By 2011, Bashaar regime failed to fulfill any set of political, economic or national bargains that

it claimed to bring. The system erected through all these years was unable to either contain or

absorb dissent when the country was shaken by uprising. Finally when the region was embroiled

in unprecedented upheavals, the calls for reform within the country quickly turned into vocal

cries for revolution. Ibid., 26.

Omar S. Dahi and Yasser Munif, ―Revolts in Syria: Tracking the Convergence between Authoritarianism and Neoliberalism,‖ Journal of Asian and African Studies 47, no. 4 (2011): 323-32.

―SYRIA: Drought Pushing Millions into Poverty,‖ IRIN, September 9, 2010.

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7.2.1. Anti- Bashaar al-Assad Unrest 2011

Bashaar was on its way to put Syria on its international image recovery path following years of

diplomatic isolation over Iraq and Lebanon; and seemed to have gained significant regional clout

by virtue of its close relations with Hezbullah, Hamas, and Iran when the winds of change

touched Syrian shores after Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. It was an unexpected development

because initially the uprising was read as a resistance against the pro-Western regimes and

Bashaar administration with its vocal anti-Western stance especially against the United States

and Israel, his proximity with his people and recent reforms undertaken expected it would be

spared such a fate.15

It ironically speculated to gain from the uprisings as a regional rival and a

long-term US-ally Mubarak was brought down within months and events seemed to be unfolding

in favor of its staunch regional ally-Iran.

Even though when two main economic and urban centres like Damascus and Aleppo remained

relatively calm and quiet initially due to heavy security presence but their suburbs and other

cities saw large anti-Bashaar protests by mid-April and occurred in cities like Baniyas,

Lattaqiyah, Deir El-Zor, Homs, Hama and the Kurdish area in the northeast. To suppress the

dissent military units deemed loyal to the regime were heavily mobilized while conventional

army units, whose loyalty could be questioned, were kept away from these centres of protests.

The regime‘s public response since the eruption of early protests had been couched in security

discourse and conspiracy theory; and it refused to acknowledge presence of genuine resentment

among public against government‘s discriminatory policies and prevailing social-economic

conditions. It kept blaming ―infiltrators‖, ―armed gangs‖, ―foreign parties‖ and ―Salafist

terrorists‖.

Though, the uprising against Bashaar united people across religious, sectarian and ethnic

boundaries but regime continued to read the revolution through ethnic and religious lens. It

absolutely side-lined role of non-Islamist civil activists that represented the greatest threat to

regime‘s avowed secular credentials. Even after the repeal of the hated Emergency Law, large

demonstrations against the government went ahead in almost every region of the country and

people started demanding fall of the regime. While both US and European Union tightened

Such a conviction was expressed by Bashaar in an interview with the Wall Street Journal as Egypt was undergoing massive upheaval.

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sanctions against Bashaar and his senior officials and imposed arms embargo also. The UN

reported on June 3 that almost 1000 people died in the first three months of the uprising.16

In August 2011, international pressure kept mounting on the regime and President Obama for the

first time explicitly called for Bashaar to step down while simultaneously freezing Syrian

government assets.17

UK and European Union backed US call while Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and

Kuwait recalled their ambassadors during this month. While in October 2011 attempts to pass a

UNSC resolution condemning Bashaar regime was vetoed by Russia and China.18

In another

major development Arab League in an unprecedented move suspended Syrian membership in

November upon failure of Bashaar to implement Arab peace plan.19

Situation kept getting worse and in another UN resolution Bashaar was asked to step down in

February 2012, which was again vetoed by Russia and China.20

UN during this month sought

services of Kofi Annan as Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League (AL) to the crisis.

Annan resigned in August 2012 after he failed to broker a cease-fire and was then replaced with

Lakhdar Brahimi.21

The flux in situation on ground prompted a very harsh statement till date by

the US President Obama on the Syrian crisis in August 2012 when he asserted that the use of

chemical and biological weapons by regime would be a ―red line‖ to which America may

respond militarily.22

The statement intensified speculation of yet another military intervention by

the US in the Middle East and started a heated polarized debate both politically and

academically.

Syrian government was increasingly seemed on a back foot when rebels made gains in Damascus

suburbs taking over military bases in December 2012 and started closing in on the city‘s

airport.23

2013 started with another pledge from Bashaar to introduce reform to end the civil war

within the country but violence surged with bombings in Aleppo and Damascus. The number and

―UN Chief Voices Alarm at Escalation of Violence in Syria,‖ UN News Centre, June 3, 2011.

Jason Ukman and Liz Sly, ―Obama: Syrian President Assad must step down,” Washington Post, August 18, 2011.

―Russia and China veto UN resolution against Syrian regime,‖ Guardian, October 5, 2011.

Anup Kaphle, ―Timeline: Unrest in Syria,‖ Washington Post, Jan 20, 2014.

―Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting

Arab League‘s Proposed Peace Plan,‖ February 4, 2012, accessed February 17, 2017, http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10536.doc.htm. ―Syria: Lakhdar Brahimi replaces Kofi Annan as UN envoy,‖ Telegraph, August 17, 2012.

John Beck, ―Syria After Four Years: Timeline of a Conflict,‖ Washington Post, August 16, 2011.

Kaphle, ―Timeline: Unrest in Syria.‖

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influence of foreign jihadists kept growing as the conflict entered in its advanced stages. There

were increasing reports that Jabhat al-Nusra was imposing Islamic Law in areas under its control

and then came audio statement from Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq

in April 2013 that al-Nusra was extension of their group and would soon be merged with it. Their

advances, however, were spurned by al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammad al-Joulani. While on the

other hand Bashaar support also got emboldened as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasurallah openly

pledged support for the regime and admitted fighters from his group were fighting for Bashaar.24

In one of the most significant developments in the conflict, Bashaar was accused of using

chemical weapons in Damascus suburbs that had reported to kill nearly 1500 Syrians in August-

September 2013. Before Syria was accused of using chemical weapons in April 2013 against

rebels and Britain and France had informed UN of the existence of credible evidence to the

effect. President Obama blamed the regime for the attack and expressed willingness to consider a

military strike option of limited scope and duration, designed to serve as punishment for

Bashaar‘s alleged use of chemical weapons and as deterrent. He also stated that US had

responsibility to respond forcefully in Syria but not without Congressional approval.25

However,

David Cameron, UK Prime Minister, who simultaneously called for a military response, was

blocked in a parliamentary vote.26

On the other hand, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) declared a self-styled Islamic

―caliphate‖ in territory form Aleppo to eastern Iraqi province of Diyala in June 2014. It also took

control of the largest oil field, Omar, after fierce battles with al-Qaeda‘s Syrian affiliate – al-

Nusra Front. Brutal practices and serious human rights abuses by ISIS made headlines

throughout the world when it released video of beheading American journalist James Foley; the

first of five westerners to be beheaded by the group on August 19.27

It then began offensive

against Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani on the Turkish border in mid-September. The town‘s

defence became a symbol of resistance against ISIS involving the FSA, collation airstrikes and

Peshmerga fighters from Iraq‘s Kurdish Regional Government. The consistent advance of ISIS

Beck, ―Syria After Four Years.‖

Catherine E. Shoichet and Tom Watkins, ―Strike against Syria? Obama backs it, but wants Congress to vote,‖

CNN, September 1, 2013. ―Syria Crisis: Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action,‖ BBC, August 30, 2013.

Chelsea J. Carter, ―Video shows ISIS beheading U.S. journalist James Foley,‖ CNN, August 20, 2014.

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forced US and five Arab countries to launch air strikes around Aleppo and Raqqa against ISIS

targets.

The OPCW reported in September 2014 that it had ―compelling confirmation‖ that a toxic

chemical had been ―systematically and repeatedly‖ used by Bashaar troops as a weapon against

anti-government rebels.28

Kurdish fighters with the help of US coalition were able to retake

control of Kobani in January 2015 after four months of fighting.29

As the Islamists kept making

progress throughout 2015 and Bashaar acknowledged serious setbacks for his military, Russia

entered the conflict on the side of regime and launched its first air strikes in September 30.30

Though Russia claimed it targeted Islamists but West and the Syrian opposition blamed that the

attacks were principally targeting anti-Bashaar rebels.

The year 2015 ended with the adoption of Vienna road map for transitional period by the UNSC

Resolution 2254 on December 18.31

However, by the end of the year government forces

achieved significant victory when the Syrian Army allowed rebels to evacuate remaining areas of

Homs, returning country‘s third-largest city to regime‘s control after four years of conflict.

Indirect peace talks between the Syrian government and opposition collapsed after a few days in

Geneva on February 3, 2016 over a Russian-backed army offensive in Aleppo. UN Syrian envoy

indicated that indirect talks to be resumed in Geneva on March 14.32

US and Russia announced a

partial ceasefire on February 22 and Vladimir Putin announced on March 14 that his armed

troops will begin withdrawing from Syria.33

While in December 2016, one of the greatest

victories came to Bashaar when government troops with the help of Russian air power and

Iranian-sponsored militias retook Aleppo, driving rebels of their last major urban stronghold.34

In January 2017, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to enforce a ceasefire between the government

and non-Islamist rebels after talks between the two sides in Kazakhstan.35

However, another Beck, ―Syria After Four Years.‖

―Kurdish forces retake 70 percent of Kobani,‖ Al-Bawaba News, January 1, 2015.

Ed Payne, Barbara Starr and Susannah Cullinanae, ―Russia launches first airstrikes in Syria,‖ CNN, October 1, 2015.

―Syrian civil war timeline,‖ Independent (UK).

Hugh Naylor, ―Syria peace talks open in Geneva with no ‗Plan B‘ on table,‖ Washington Post, March 14, 2016.

―Putin says Russians to start withdrawing from Syria, as peace talks resume,‖ Reuters, March 15, 2016.

―‘Aleppo is back,‘ Syria TV declares after army completely retakes city from rebels,‖ CBC News, December 22, 2016.

Raja Abdulrahim, ―Russia, Turkey and Iran Agree on Syria Truce Monitoring,‖ Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2017.

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chemical attack in Idlib in April 2017 has reignited Syrian intervention debate in international

media and its repercussions for the Syrian regime are still being assessed.36

The civil war in

Syria continues to date and the various factions and Syrian government are engaged in fierce

battles to gain decisive upper hand in the ongoing conflict. The decisive victory in favour of any

is still a far-fetched reality. However, the chronological development of the unrest in Syria traced

in this section will help us explore the linkage between the interplay of systemic and unit level

variables involved in the Syrian conflict in the following section.

7.3. Interplay of Systemic and Unit-Level Variables

As stated in previous chapters the interplay of systemic and unit-level variables are important in

facilitating the construction of securitized discourse for international military intervention. A

detailed analysis of key variables identified in Military Intervention Model (Chapter 2) will help

us understand how the case of Syria could be compared and contrasted with that of Libya.

The US hegemonic decline and its increasing realization not only among the emerging global

competitors but within the US administration itself had been significant in not undertaking overt

military intervention against Bashaar‘s regime in spite of crossing stated ―red line‖ threshold.

Besides the power transition in the global hierarchy, resurgence of Russia in the Middle East and

its resolve to play a major role in the ongoing conflict with already reduced US presence in the

regional affairs leaves no doubt that the post-Cold War decades of undivided US influence in the

region are over.

Using the same variables for analysis in both Libyan and Syrian case will help us shed light on

how far drift towards post-hegemony has taken place within the international system; thus

making it more difficult for US to employ a unilateral use of military offensive against Bashaar

al-Assad. It will help us determine how the declining US influence within the region along with

resurgence of peer competitors like Russia and Iran have changed dynamics of conflict in Syria.

Martin Chulov and Kareem Shaheen, “Syria Chemical Weapons Attack Toll Rises to 70 as Russian Narrative is Dismissed,” Guardian, April 05, 2017.

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Civil war in Syria is still in progress with no nearby end in sight. The dynamics of conflict are

constantly in flux due to emergence of new actors and shifting loyalties of existing players. This

chapter covers changes occurring in Syria since the start of 2011 uprising to February 2017.

However, the political discourse threat securitization will evolve around the period when US

speculated undertaking overt military intervention option against the Syrian regime and how it

failed to materialize it. Again the analysis of these variables is significant for understanding US

non-intervention in Syria.

7.3.1. Geography

With a limited manpower base, lack of strategic depth, non-existent natural boundaries and

exposition to stronger states, what nevertheless distinguished Syria have been its geopolitical

location and its pivotal position in the Arab-Israel conflict and peace process. As a noted

American journalist observed: ―Syria has no strategic minerals and produces relatively little oil.

It has no important seaports or military bases. But it has something any real-estate agent would

envy: location‖.37

Over the years Syrian assumption of a ―swing‖ position between the

conservative and revisionist camps within the Arab world has tilted the region decisively to one

or the other side as witnessed first in 1950s Baghdad Pact and then in the Gulf War in 1990-

1991. The similar pivotal position has attracted increased interference from international and

regional players in Syrian domestic politics too. But with the assumption of power by Hafez al-

Assad the vulnerable geopolitical location was utilized to strike alliances and to seek material

resources from diversified sources that could allow Syria to balance threats and evade

isolationism or submission to enemies.38

The mid-1950s saw successive nationalist governments aligning with both Nasser‘s Egypt and

Soviet Union for arms procurement and protection from both Western, Israeli and conservative

Arab pressures. Initially Syria had adopted balanced approach between pro-US Middle Eastern

allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia and anti-US Iran and Lebanon‘s Hezbollah. But the US drive

to further isolate Syria under Basher al-Assad finally pushed it closer to Iran and Hezbollah in

2003 while still trying to maintain a modicum of balance by courting US ally Turkey

37

Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect (Prometheus Books, 2014). Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 1-9.

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simultaneously. The Syrian uprising of 2011 finally allowed Iran to emerge as the greatest

beneficiary of the squeezing geopolitical space to Bashaar while at the same time reverting Syria

as an arena for rival forces.39

The Syrian geopolitical location and its significance in the Middle East would again be a

significant factor in the ongoing Middle Eastern power transition. If Bashaar survives the

disastrous civil war like he had been for the past six years and able to protect political and

territorial integrity of the country, its strong inclination towards Iran and Russia will draw a clear

dividing line in the emerging bipolar structure within the regional hierarchy. Iran stands to gain

the most from the emerging scenario as it would be able to assert power and influence within the

Arab world denied to it for decades since the Iranian Islamic revolution. The influence in Syria

would simultaneously allow Tehran edge over other major Arab players like Egypt previously

firmly aligned with the archrival Saudi Arabia as well as non-Arab Israel.

The battle for Syria is the battle for the regional hegemony and for re-drawing configuration of

the Middle Eastern hierarchy which had been in transition since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The Arab Uprisings of 2011 have accelerated the trend as old alliances and loyalties fracture and

evolving regional dynamics give rise to new trends. Besides reduced US presence and influence

in the region has made the competition among regional rivals existential for their national

interests. In such a scenario, because of its strategic geopolitical location, Syrian prize will

remain hotly contested among all competing players and amicable solution to deadly civil war

remains elusive.

7.3.2. Intra-State Conflict

As detailed in previous chapters, another very important variable for international military

intervention involves state‘s internal domestic political-military situation and social-economic

conditions. A thriving stable state with public standing firmly behind it rarely becomes open

target for external military intervention. The detailed analysis of Syrian domestic situation just

before and during the 2011 unrest will tell us conditions were already ripe for mass discontent

within the general public and the situation was at boiling point when external factors triggered

call for reform within the country which eventually subsided into long, bloody, protracted civil

Hinnebush, ―The Foreign Policy of Syria,‖ 210.

305

war due to regime‘s failure to acknowledge genuine resentment prevailing within the society and

inability to adopt concrete policies aimed at the amelioration of public discontent.

7.3.2.1. Government Structure and Policies

After independence several attempts were made at establishing constitution in Syria from 1950

to 1966. But finally the constitution of March 12, 1973 embodied principles like Syria to be

considered a socialist republic, head of the state to be a Muslim and recognized Islamic law to be

the main source of legislation. The constitution vested strong executive power in the President, to

be elected by a popular vote to a seven-year term and nominated by the Ba‘ath party. The

president then appointed the cabinet headed by a Prime Minister, and served as secretary-general

of the Ba‘ath party and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The unicameral Majlis al-shaab

(People‘s Assembly) consisted of 250 members who were elected for a term of four years but

lacked real powers. The country had been under a state of emergency since 1963 (except for

1973-74) which proved to be a major source of discontent during the civil unrest of 2011 and one

of the initial public demands included lifting of this law, which Bashaar did comply to placate

the public.40

Freedom of political activity, assembly and association remained negligent in Syria. The Arab

Socialist Ba‘ath Party remained country‘s dominant political institution and remained far

dominant and influential than five of its partners in the National Progressive front (NPF) which

included the Communist Party of Syria (SCP) and small leftist parties like the Arab Socialist

Party (ASP), the Democratic Socialist Union Party (DSUP), the Socialist Unionist Movement

(ASUM) and the Syrian Arab Socialist Movement (ASU) besides the Ba‘ath Party. The Ba‘ath‘s

were dominated by the minority Alawi sect, who had been awarded key and influential official

positions within the government and rural sector of the population generally.

The economy, which mainly thrived on oil prices and foreign aid, continued to be dominated by

the state despite repeated announcements of economic reforms. The time before the civil unrest

depicted a period of meager GDP expansion at a rate of 1.5% per year. The major socioeconomic

dislocations including droughts, black market activity, the declining oil production, depopulation

in rural areas, dramatic increase in semi-urbanization and informal housing, the hostile political 40

The info on the section on government structure and policies has mainly been retrieved from http://www.encyclopedia.com/places/asia/syrian-political-geography/syria.

306

environment and government‘s inability to attract foreign investment made the future outlook of

the economy bleak. The regime‘s efforts to satisfy the demands of the populace remained

inadequate, as well as its ability to train and absorb growing workforce in country‘s weak

economy.41

Besides the frail economy the human rights situation remained worse and arbitrary

arrests and incommunicado detentions remained widespread. Human rights organizations

remained banned within the country and public criticism of the Ba‘ath party officials was not

allowed. Besides nearly all communication facilities were owned and operated by government

that included postal service, telegraph, radio, television and telephone.42

It would not be wrong to assert that the interests of minority-led Alawi regime were divorced

from the majority of those citizens it ruled. It was not accountable to any meaningful

constituency save few individuals who held reins of power in the society. It had little incentive to

enact democratic reforms or to improve public services. Bashaar initial steps to implement

economic reforms and eventually allowing greater political freedom failed on both counts and

only contributed to even greater cronyism and concentration of resources among the ruling elite.

Though the elder and junior Assad had been effectively controlling public discontent through a

combination of politico-military tools for decades but the combination of political repression,

deteriorating socioeconomic standards and spillover effects of Arab uprisings did not leave

Syrian regime unaffected and the unlikely city of Deraa became the channel through which

decades of unspent grievances manifested themselves.

7.3.2.2. Internal and External Opposition groups

At the onset of Syrian uprising, the Bashaar regime seemed strong and deeply entrenched and

initially was confident that it was not vulnerable to significant popular unrest due to its powerful

domestic security apparatus.43

Even though the opposition to the regime was multifaceted but

the ruling regime had little to suspect; it was confident that with the very credible threat of arrest,

torture or death in place, nothing could induce public to mass protests. The regime was also

confident it enjoyed loyalty of minority communities such as Alawis, Druze and Christians who

were apprehensive that a popularly elected Islamist government would infringe upon their

Lindsay A. Gifford, ―Syria: The Change That Never Came,‖ Current History 108, no. 722 (December 2009): 418.

Ibid., 420.

David W. Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 39-54.

307

religious right by instituting some form of Islamic law and hence they would lose the real or

perceived spoils they already enjoyed under the secular Bashaar regime.

Nevertheless opposition existed; secularists, socialists and communists that enjoyed affinity with

the Baath ideology decried regime for infringement on their basic rights such as those of free

speech and assembly. Kurdish activists, who were fighting for their civil rights such as the right

to speak their native language, were routinely incarcerated. While Islamists like Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood were harassed, suspected and imprisoned for their alleged revolutionary

inclinations.44

Unlike their North African and Jordanian counterparts, Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood had never been part of the political process for decades and hence never been

―tamed‖. Damascus regime accused them that they had never left their militant phase. After 1982

defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood, a few of their leaders went in exile in London and Paris while

the actual fighters with their goals intact had nurtured their wounds and grudges for decades and

were ready to exact revenge.45

On the top of this US invasion of Iraq has bred new generation of jihadists who went east to fight

Americans and their Shiite allies. From 2003-2007 Bashaar support for these jihadis against

Americans was clearly there. These jihadists had valuable urban warfare skills and were

significant in offering tough resistance to Damascus regime. Moreover, between 2012 and 2013

a ―new‖ Syrian opposition emerged in the context of the uprising, consisting of both local and

exiled activists as well as armed elements in the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Unfortunately, the

creation of these political and military wings did not lead to unification of opposition and its

fracturing and inability to bring about a political change is one of the chief reasons why Bashaar

regime has proven so resilient till date.

When the uprising started, organizing and mobilizing protestors became extremely difficult in

the absence of central authority that could provide political, logistical and financial resources to

sustain protests. To address this challenge, Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) started

organizing whose initial members were mostly media activists who viewed these committees as

opportunity to collect and disseminate information to Syrians and the outside world about Gifford, ―Syria: The Change That Never Came,‖421.

For more details see Yvette Talhamy, ―The Syrian Muslim Brothers and the Syrian-Iranian Relationship,‖ Middle East Journal 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2009): 561-80.

308

protests. Soon LCCs became more than media centers and became pivotal in organizing and

mobilizing protestors which gave them increasingly national character.

While the exiled Syrian political opposition mobilized to support uprising and represent them

before international community. It led to the establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC)

around August 2011 consisting of nationalists, liberal and Kurdish oppositionists; the Muslim

Brotherhood and independent activists joined too.46

SNC soon gained international community

support which entertained it as a potential government in waiting in case the regime collapsed.

However, it suffered from same political, financial and logistical shortcomings as in case of

internal opposition and soon became the battleground where regional powers like Saudi Arabia,

Turkey and Qatar could vie for control and influence over the Syrian opposition. Resultantly, it

has undergone dramatic changes in their core alliances and membership as the conflict

progressed.47

By the summer of 2011, sustained repression from regime resulted in organization of citizens

and army defectors under the banner of FSA. It actually had been a lose structure of various

armed groups and its attempt to portray itself as parallel national army in both command and

composition was never successful. The units fighting under FSA did not coalesce into a parallel

army and its command structure remained vague and fluid that failed to facilitate distribution of

resources among brigades. The failure was then reflected in the armed opposition that emerged

in the latter half of 2011.

FSA, the LCCs and SNC represented the main arms of the uprising but the weakness of the

institutional linkages between these three was apparent. Shift in regional powers (Saudi Arabia,

Turkey, and Qatar) responses to Syrian conflict from reform to regime change and availability of

significant resources from these players gave further momentum to opposition forces on ground

as well as fostered infighting, mistrust and lack of coordination among them. Besides SNC also

suffered from legitimacy crisis as most of its exiled leadership was far removed from the

uprising and shared little in terms of social background with the protestors. The rapidity with

which the events unfolded and the absence of preexisting institutional structures, both SNC and

For more on SNC see Seda Altug, ―The Syrian uprising and Turkey‘s ordeal with the Kurds,‖ Dialectical Anthropology 37, no.1 (March 2013): 124.

Abboud, ―How Syria Fell to Pieces,‖ 338.

309

LCCs proved incapable to marshal resources to sustain protests. Besides very little material

support was offered to LCCs from the Western countries and they provided little but moral

support to SNC.

Such realities exposed both LCCs and SNC, while the former was unable to sustain its

momentum of organizing society amid the tumult, SNC proved incapable to generate resources

to overthrow regime. FSA which had heavy reliance on light weapons stolen from government

depots or smuggled from neighbouring countries won initial battlefield victories, also proved

unsuccessful to maintain territorial control in the face of regime counterattacks. Thus the FSA-

LCC-SNC opposition umbrella movement did generate tremendous political and military

pressure on Damascus regime initially but not enough to bring about a political transition or a

regime change thus paving way for further militarization of the conflict and general

fragmentation of the Syrian territory into competing sites of authority.48

As the opposition failure to manifest control and bring about political change registered itself,

more armed groups vied for territorial control of northeastern and northwestern part of the

country from where regime had retreated. By 2012, the borders with Turkey were free of regime

control and take over of key border crossings by elements of FSA or Islamist brigades portended

further fragmentation of Syrian territory into micro-sites of armed rebel control. While the FSA

model faltered, the scope of violence in the conflict also increased significantly.

But the greatest challenge emerged in the shape of Islamist brigades by 2012 that had ample

regional sponsoring too and today there are well over a thousand armed groups operating in

Syria whose loyalty to a particular group is at best tenuous and extend beyond ideological

boundaries such as wartime economic opportunities. According to Samer Abboud, ―it is perhaps

more appropriate to think of armed rebel groups not as cohesive fighting units in which the

loyalty of the rank and file ensures the stability of a central leadership, but rather as networks of

violence in which different fighting units and individual fighters support certain armed groups

based on their specific needs and opportunities at particular moment.‖49

Ibid., 339.

Ibid., 340.

310

These fighting units typically emerged in a particular neighbourhood to offer security to

residents and were largely immobile and locally focused. In some cases they would morph into

brigades of few dozes or several hundred fighters and would then adopt flag, slogans and a loose

command structure in which leaders enjoyed nominal control over fighters. The FSA, a mere

conglomeration of smaller brigades, for example, cooperated with central leadership in some

circumstances but not in others. These patterns were replicated in formation of fronts that served

as centralized commands for brigades but here too the loyalty of brigades is tenuous at best. The

Islamic Front (IF) created in 2013, for example, has seven large Islamist brigades including

Salafi elements and brigades like Ahrar as-Sham and Liwa al-Haqq joined IF after defecting the

Syrian Islamic Front. IF then became the Levant Front which brought other Islamist-leaning

brigades into it by 2014. Another front the Syrian Revolutionaries Front formed in 2013 was

later dissolved when most of its fighters defected to brigades associated with Jabhat al-Nusra.50

The regime‘s retreat from more than half of the country did not lead to the monopolization of

authority by one group. It on the other hand accelerated political, geographic and administrative

fragmentation of the country into competing zones of authority with almost four large areas

under different groups: the regime controlled areas, Kurdish areas under autonomous

administration, areas held by ISIS and those under the control of FSA. According to BBC news,

ISIS has lost almost a quarter of the territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria over a period of 2016.

They were in control of about 60,400 sq km in December 2016 as compared to 78,000 sq km of

January 2016, making a loss of 14% compared to 2015.51

In such conflicts group‘s ability to

control captured territory depends upon governance and provision of services. LCCs suffered

from lack of financial resources then armed groups took control of key institutions and assumed

more responsibility of governance and financed these governance projects through participation

in Syrian war economy.

The fall of Aleppo in December 2016 means now Bashaar controls Syria‘s four biggest cities,

though still large parts almost 15% of Syria territory held by other armed groups including rebel

fighters and allied jihadists according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Kurdish

forces, who are neither with government nor the opposition, also control much of Syria‘s border 50

A detailed study on the presence of jihadi groups in Syria is done by Aron Lund. Details can be viewed at http://www.ui.se/up/files/77409.pdf. ―Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps,‖ BBC News, January 20, 2017.

311

with Turkey as well as large part of the country‘s north-east.52

The role of these opposition

groups is very important as the conflict entered in its sixth year. Their inability to present a

unified front against Bashaar has provided the life-line to Damascus regime which is

simultaneously being exploited by both anti and pro-Bashaar regional players. Besides the

excesses committed by few of rebel armed groups has strengthened Bashaar‘s narrative against

Islamists and it had posed difficulty in constructing credible securitized threat against Bashaar to

be explained in subsequent sections.

7.3.3. Regional and Extra-Regional Players

As stipulated in the Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model (Chapter 2) the regional

and extra-regional players are a key variable. An inter-state or intra-state conflict may or may not

involve regional and extra-regional intervention but when the state has geopolitical significance

like Syria; having the ruling regime on its side can tilt regional balance of power in anyone‘s

favour. Hence, role of key regional and extra-regional players become more pronounced in such

a scenario. The ongoing civil war has thus activated key actors who are determined to carve a

larger role for themselves in both the global and regional hierarchy in transitions. The outcome

of the Syrian conflict will not automatically trigger a new configuration of the international

system but it can definitely enhance standing of global and regional competitors determined to

bid farewell to US hegemony. The Syrian conflict can be considered as the prime example of

post-hegemony in advance as it has already brought a considerable advantage to Russia and Iran

in both global and regional scenarios and enhanced their respective standing.

7.3.3.1 Key Regional Players

The MENA region has been in flux since Arab uprisings rocked region‘s long-established

authoritative regimes. After unparalleled peaceful change of dictatorial regimes in Egypt and

Tunisia, the region witnessed a bloody civil war in Libya that ultimately brought an end to four-

decades-old autocratic establishment through an international military intervention. The removal

of old regimes upset the fragile balance of power in place since the end of the Cold War and

simultaneously created incentives for a new power hierarchy to be established within the region.

―Why is there a war in Syria?‖ BBC News, March 13, 2017.

312

The Syrian civil war has just added to the stakes of the major stakeholders determined to secure

the new balance of power in their favour and its geopolitical significance has made the Syrian

prize all the more worth fighting for. This section will discuss key regional players and their

stakes involved in the Syrian conflict.

7.3.3.1.1. Iran

Among the regional players Iran has been the most prominent in shaping the outcome of the

ongoing civil conflict in favour of ruling Bashaar regime. In fact, Syria-Iran bilateral relations

since the last 30 years had been the mainstay of the Middle Eastern politics that had evolved

around such contentious issues like the Islamic Revolution in Iran 1979, the joint opposition to

Saddam Hussain during 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, support and training of Shiite militias in Lebanon

since 1982 Israeli invasion and the Palestinian groups like Hamas which had deepened the

strategic partnership between the two on basis of shared interests rather than just cultural and

religious affinity.53

Basically an economically and militarily weak state, Syria has gained a

disproportionately larger role for itself based on its regional activism. Over the period of time the

partnership went through significant changes, as the profile of Syria changed from the one

dominating the alliance to that of Iran‘s junior partner in the ―axis of resistance‖ and as non-state

proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah has also steadily gained an upper hand and now exercise

considerable influence on the politics of the region.

Even before the unrest against the Bashaar regime in 2011, debate continued in academic circles

whether Syrian alliance with Iran depended on pragmatic or revolutionary approach and if an

agreeable solution to the Arab-Israel issue was to be tabled, would it dent the strategic Iranian-

Syrian alliance, with optimists favouring the odds. While the pessimist school argued that the

bilateral relations were much deeper and based upon the geopolitics of the region that evolved

around shared concerns over Iraq, support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and countering Israel54

.

These shared strategic interests have the tendency to survive temporary hiccups in the bilateral

relationship. Thus ―ideas of ‗flipping Syria‘ out of the Iranian orbit seem superficial in

For details see Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power in the Middle East (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006).

For a skeptical analysis of long-term prospects of Iran-Syria relations see Yair Hirshfeld, ―The Odd Couple: Ba‘athist Syria and Komeini‘s Iran,‖ in Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, eds. Moshe

Ma‘oz and Anver Yaniv (New York: Routledge, 1986), 105-124. ; For the exceptional work that considered Syria-

Iran relations to be deep rooted see Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East, 349-363.

313

hindsight.‖55

Another dilemma that Syria faced in recent history has been that it is surrounded

by strong US allies like Israel, Turkey and Iraq in the region whom Syrian regime tried to

counter through seeking its own alliances particularly with Iran.

The desire to control Lebanon either directly or indirectly, which always had been viewed as

artificial creation by the French colonists by the hard-line Syrian nationalists, brought Bashaar

closer to Iran. Since the evacuation of Syrian forces from Lebanon after Rafiq Hariri‘s murder,

Iranian-backed Hezbollah serves as Syria‘s primary local partner and indispensible tool for

influencing favourable outcome in Lebanese domestic politics. While it‘s a win-win situation for

Iran too; Without Syrian territory as a transit point for weapons bound for Hezbollah,56

Iran

would be denied an entrée into the Levant and its long cherished desire to project power far

beyond its immediate borders and to threaten Israel by proxy could not be materialized. In

November 2009, the Israeli Navy claimed to intercept a ship Francop carrying hundreds of tones

of Iranian weapons for Hezbollah in Lebanon.57

More recently, Israel again captured the

merchant ship Klos C on its way to Palestinian forces in the Gaza strip in March 2014, which the

former claimed carried Iranian weapons, thus highlighting the risks involved in alternative route

by sea.58

With Golan Heights still under Israeli occupation, the bilateral arrangement with Iran

serves Syrian interests too.

As the major breakthrough in either of the two cases – a major change in Lebanese domestic

politics and the Arab-Israel process – was not very likely, the bilateral relation remained strong

throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century and both signed a defence cooperation

agreement in December 2009, despite Arab and Western attempts to cause a split between the

two. However, tensions may have risen over issues of Syrian talks with Israel when the former

attended US-sponsored Annapolis Peace Conference in November 2007. But the opaque nature

of both regimes did not let the differences highlighted much in the media.59

However, Saudi-

owned Al Hayat pan-Arab daily based in London reported in 2008 that Bashaar‘s recent trip to

Glenn E. Robinson, ―Syria‘s Long Civil War,‖ Current History 111, no. 749 (December 2012): 334.

US State Department‘s 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism says that Syria allows Iran to use its territory for weapons bonds for Hezbollah.

―Israelis ‗seize Iran arm ships‘,‖ BBC News, November 04, 2009.

Isabel Kershner, ―Israel Says It Seized Ship in Red Sea with Load of Iranian Rockets Headed to Gaza,‖ New York Times, March 5, 2014.

Jeremy M. Sharp, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy (CRS Report for Congress, R40849, October 07, 2009), 31.

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Iran had been a ―failure‖ as he was unable to ally Iranian concerns about the indirect Syrian-

Israeli peace talks.60

In spite of the entire negative reporting in the foreign media over the 2011

unrest in Syria against Bashaar, Iran decidedly sided with the ruling lot against the popular

uprising due to religious, cultural and above all strategic concerns.

Iran publicly asserted that the fate of Syrian regime should be exclusively determined by its own

people without interference from outside and throughout the civil war which continues unabated

Iran seemed determined to keep Bashaar in power despite his secular ideology and the kind of

excesses committed by his forces to quash the insurgency. Tehran seeks to end the civil war in

Syria that establishes Iran as a leading participant in any political process and what it considers

on acceptable terms.61

It was speculated as early as May/June 2011 that Iran was poised to walk

away from the Arab Spring as winner.62

By securing Bashaar regime, Iran purposely gain

another equally important objective of securing Hezbollah from attacks of Sunni extremist

groups from across the border in Syria, as both the territorial and regional ambitions of Syria and

Iran require Hezbollah as leverage against Israel.

Syria without Bashaar may well remain hostile to Israel but Iran would definitively lose the kind

of coordination it currently enjoys with existing regime and transfer of equipment and weapons

to Hezbollah might undergo unprecedented hurdles, not easily to be overcome by government in

Tehran. Besides Tehran has strong reasons to oppose potential replacement of secular Ba‘athist

regime by the powerful anti-Shiite Islamists currently dominating the Syrian opposition among

them groups like Al-Nusra Front and its splinter, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) are

irreconcilably hostile to Iran. These groups have registered their staunch opposition to Shiite

faith through destruction of Shiite mosques and holy places.63

Iran has provided the Syrian regime with substantial amount of material support and it covers

funds, weapons, Islamic Revolutionary Guard - Quds Force (IRGC-QF) advisors, recruitment of

BBC Monitoring Middle East, ―Iran concerned about Israel-Syria talks Arabic article,‖ August 10, 2008, AL-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 10 Aug 08/BBC Monitoring.

For details see W. Andrew Terrill, ―Iran‘s Strategy for Saving Asad,‖ Middle East Journal 9, no.2, (Spring 2015): 222-36.

Michael Scott Doran, ―The Heirs of Nasser: Who Will Benefit from the Second Arab Revolution?,‖ Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 17-20, 21-25.

Anne Barnard, ―Muslim Shrine Stands as Crossroads in Syria‘s Unrest,‖ The New York Times, April 8, 2014. ; Ali Mamouri, ―Shiite Faithful Day Defy Danger to Visit Shrines,‖ trans. Pascale Menassa, Al-Monitor, February 15, 2015.

315

Hezbollah and non-Syrian Shiite militia fighters according to US reports.64

As recently as

November 2015, a regional security source quoted by Israeli authorities claim that around 1300-

1800 personnel including some regular army special forces, had been deployed by Iranian forces,

although actual numbers might fluctuate somewhat.65

The most unprecedented, however, is the

deployment of regular army special forces as they historically had been confined to operations

within Iran only. According to a report in Telegraph, almost 700 troops and militias fighters have

been killed in Syria to preserve the regime up till May 2016.66

However, the National Council of

Resistance of Iran (NCRI) in a report entitled, ―How Iran Fuels Syria War‖ quoted that Iran

deployed 70,000 Iranian and non-Iranian forces in Syria. According to them non-Iranian

mercenaries number around 55,000 men and includes Hezbollah, Iraqi, Afghani, Pakistani and

Palestinian Shiites while composition of IRGC forces are around 8,000 – 10,000 men and the

regular Iranian Army numbers 5,000 – 6,000 personnel.67

Similarly the amount of economic and military assistance provided by Iran to prop up Bashaar

regime has been staggering too. According to Staffan de Mistura, from the office of the U.N.

Special Envoy to Syria, reported in June 2015 that Iran‘s aid which includes both military and

economic aid, totaled $6 billion per year. While the director of the Fares Center for Middle

Eastern Studies, Nadim Shehadi at the Tufts University claimed that his research showed Iran

spent between $14 and $15 billion in military and economic aid to the Damascus regime in 2012

and 2013, though there is no independent way to corroborate any estimate.68

But at the same

time it can‘t be overlooked that Iranian material and diplomatic support was one of the main

drivers behind Bashaar aggressive posture in curbing the uprising against his regime, especially

at a time when it faced increasing regional and international isolation.

Iran‘s relevance and significance for any solution to the Syrian conflict had been established

beyond doubt few years back when the conflict seemed to have entered a stalemate. US also had

to drop its objections against Iran in the wake of JCPOA and invited Tehran to participate in

Vienna process as it potentially had been in the best position to contribute to a Syrian solution. It Details and analysis on the full spectrum on Iranian assistance to Bashaar al-Assad is provided by the Institute for the Study of War. ―Iranian Strategy in Syria,‖ by Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, May 2013.

Dan Williams, ―Israel says 55 Iranians killed in Syria‘s war,‖ Reuters, November 19, 2015.

David Blair, ―Almost 700 Iranian troops and militia fighters ‗Killed in Syria‘ to preserve Bashar al Assad,‖

Telegraph, May 10, 2016. Majid Rafizadeh, ―Iran‘s Forces Outnumber Assad‘s in Syria,‖ Gatestone Institute, November 24, 2016.

Eli Lake, ―Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Asad,‖ Bloomberg View, June 9, 2015.

316

was the first time Tehran was invited to attend an international summit- then the four year long

war.69

Till the time of writing Bashaar regime seemed to have made significant gains on the

ground though still rebels and Islamists hold key places and territory under control and regime‘s

authority in the entire country is far from established.

For Iran, Bashaar and Syria represent a key tool in the ongoing regional transition undergoing

since 2011 Arab Uprisings. The struggle against their arch-rival Saudi Arabia for regional

ascendancy in the Muslim Middle East depends to a larger extent on the outcome of conflict in

this key Arab state that Iran is determined to keep within its fold even at considerable cost. Iran

is committed to stop the emergence of a Gulf-backed, Sunni-led successor to Bashaar regime that

most likely had hostile intensions to Iranian resurgence and its enhanced regional activism.

Besides Bashaar defeat would politically and diplomatically benefit Saudi Arabia since they are

the most active and vocal supporters of the Syrian opposition. With Iraq already under pro-Iran

government, a stable unified Syria though under Bashaar‘s secular regime will entrust the kind of

leverage to Iran in the Middle East, not available to it since the Islamic revolution of 1979 and

Iran could emerge with a sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to the

Mediterranean (the latter via Hezbollah).70

It goes without saying that Syrian role and access to Hezbollah through Syrian territory had

already been significant in pressuring Israel and checking its nefarious designs vis-a-vis Iran.

Thus Iran will continue spending billions to prop up the Damascus regime in open-ended

commitment as to abandon Syria would now not undermine a great deal of Iran‘s credibility as a

revolutionary regional power but potentially cost Tehran its only Arab ally in the region. It has

invested decades into this strategic alliance and removal of a pro-Iranian regime may partially

close its access to Lebanon, depriving it of its frontline state against Israel.

Besides the prospect of Islamist Sunnis or even secular Sunnis gaining foothold in Damascus,

would bedevil Tehran for decades. Following seizure of vast tracts of territory by ISIS in

northern Iraq in 2014, which Iran considers a national security threat and anathema to Iranian

religious values, the most nightmarish scenario for Iran had been the permanent safe haven for Sam Wilkin and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, ―Iran Accepts Invitation To Syria Peace Talks in Vienna,‖ Huffington Post, October 28, 2015.

George Friedman,‖Syria, Iran and the Balance of Power in the Middle East,‖ Geopolitical Weekly, November 22, 2011.

317

Islamists in northern Iraq and eastern Syria that would pose a direct threat to Iran and its interests

on both Iraq and Syrian fronts. For Iran, the battle for Syria isn‘t over and it won‘t till Bashaar

regime regains control over whole of Syria and tilt regional balance decisively in Tehran‘s

favour.

7.3.3.1.2. Saudi Arabia

Since 2003 Saudi Arabia and Iran had been grooming themselves as region‘s dominant local

powers and also been increasing their respective stakes in the Levant and the Arab-Israel theatre.

Traditionally Iran and Israel are perceived as ―missionary‖ actors in terms of having a clear

mission in their conceived roles and in their drive to achieve their objectives. But Arab Spring

changed region‘s dynamics; on the one hand, it reduced Egyptian and Syrian role as leading

Arab powers to considerable extent; on the other hand, Saudi Arabia tried to adjust to the new

dynamics and the region simultaneously witnessed enhanced Saudi assertiveness in bid to carve

a larger role for itself. Riyadh‘s game can be summed up to consolidate its position as the ―first

among equals‖.71

The polarization and rapid fragmentation of the Arab region followed by Iraq‘s invasion of

Kuwait in August 1990 increased the tendency of uneven distribution of power, and following

2003 US-led intervention in Iraq new power lines are being firmly drawn cementing intense

rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. But the Arab uprising of 2011 expanded their jockeying

from their immediate neighbourhood and effectively turned it pan-regional. Syria occupies a key

place in realization of Iranian regional ambitions; a firmly aligned Syria with Tehran could

decisively boost latter‘s credentials as regional hegemon. Saudi Arabia is determined to thwart

any such development that can compromise its standing and effectively curtail room for

maneuvering in regional politics.

Syrian conflict has so far proved to be the most intense and vicious playground for Saudi-Iranian

proxy war in the region other than Yemen where Saudi role is more pronounced. Saudi relations

had been conflictual with Syria since Bashaar al-Assad‘s accession to power in 2000. The fact

that an Alawite minority had been ruling over Syria‘s Sunni majority had since long been a thorn

for Al-Sauds. Besides Riyadh deemed Syria‘s strong backing of Hezbollah along with its close Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ―The Middle East‘s New Power Dynamics,‖ Current History 108, no. 722 (December 2009): 400.

318

ties with Iran, detrimental to its core interests. Murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri,

a close Saudi ally and Syrian regime‘s alleged involvement in the murder further increased rift in

bilateral relations.

Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia simultaneously had interest in Bashaar regime‘s stability too because

of border-transcending ethno-sectarian civil war that might have followed his overthrow without

reducing Iranian influence. Such intra-Syrian conflict besides affecting Iraq would have fueled

precarious domestic situation in Lebanon too. An escalation in the Arab-Israeli conflict could

also be not ruled out. Bashaar‘s political survival could then be considered as the lesser evil for

Al-Saud. Hence, efforts were being made to normalize bilateral relations before the Arab Spring

and Saudi King Abdullah made a historic visit to Syria in October 2009 and resumption of

normal ties and enhanced investment was speculated in Saudi-Syrian relations.72

When Arab Spring touched Syrian shores, Saudi Arabia‘s initial reaction was a statement of

support for Bashaar,73

followed by public silence on Assad troops‘ excesses against mostly

peaceful demonstrators. This public silence finally ended in the summer of 2011 when King

Abdullah in unusually strong criticism stated: ―What is happening in Syria is not acceptable for

Saudi Arabia‖ and announced recall of Saudi Ambassador to Damascus.74

This change in stance

can be associated with concurrence of major development like the formation of Free Syria Army

(FSA) and the refusal of protestors to give up less than the change of regime in Damascus. A

new political order appeared to be written on the horizon and Saudi Arabia from strategic point

of view considered switching side with Syrian opponents to be in its best interest.75

Subsequently, Saudis became one of the strongest and most active supporters of Syrian

opposition.

Riyadh supported suspension of Syrian membership from Arab League in November 2011 and along

with Qatar started providing FSA with financial aid for procurement of weapons.76

Reports appeared

in February 2013 that Saudi weapons purchased from Croatia were reaching rebels via shipments

shuttled through Jordan and resulted in small tactical gains by them. This also ―Syria and Saudi end tariff war,‖ The National (UAE), November 2, 2009.

Neil MacFarquhar,‖Saudi Arabia Scrambles to Limit Region‘s Upheaval,‖ New York Times, May 27, 2011.

―Saudi Arabia calls for Syrian reforms,‖ Al-Jazeera, August 8, 2011.

Rieger, ―In Search of Stability.‖

Karen De Young and Liz Sly, ―Syrian rebels get influx of arms with Gulf Neighbor‘s Money, U.S. Coordination,‖

Washington Post, May 15, 2012.

319

reflected a marked shift in Saudi activist support to Syrian opposition.77

Riyadh‘s arm shipments

were reportedly intensified in late spring 2013 and included anti-aircraft and anti-tank

weapons.78

These developments while on the one hand increased Saudi backing to rebels, it

simultaneously enhanced Tehran‘s support for Bashaar and effectively turned Syrian civil

conflict into a proxy war between two arch-rivals. Fall of Assad could give rise to a Saudi-

friendly Sunni government in Damascus that could tilt regional balance of power in Saudi

favour. Conversely if Bashaar survives this gravest threat to his regime‘s stability it will further

cement Damascus-Tehran axis, and instead of curtailing Iranian presence and influence in the

region, it will be markedly augmented.

However, the battle for Syria isn‘t just the quest for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi

Arabia; it has serious political ramifications for Riyadh even if they emerge victorious in this

hitherto hotly contested conflict. A Sunni victory in Syria also means strengthening of the Syrian

Muslim Brotherhood which ought to be avoided at all costs by Al-Saud because of irreconcilable

politico-ideological differences.79

Riyadh effectively lobbied for reducing Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood‘s influence within the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition

Forces; several new rebels groups were accepted as part of Syrian opposition in May 2013 thus

weakening Muslim Brotherhood‘s influence within the organization. About the same time in a

policy reversal Riyadh started supporting Salafi groups in the fall of 2013 because of gradual

loss in power and strike strategy of FSA. Saudis blamed US and its inadequate support through

weapon shipments and military action, especially after August 2013 chemical attack, for

disintegration of FSA as its splinter groups left the organization to join other groups.

With the decline of FSA, al-Qaeda and other Islamists groups were gaining upper hand in the

conflict and Riyadh thought it prudent to adjust its Syria policy as the heterogeneous opposition

groups against Bashaar and radical Islamist factions against more secular groups and civilian

population engaged in pitched battle against each other. Subsequently, almost 43 rebel groups

operating mainly around Damascus and ranging from more moderate to Islamist fundamentalist

groups formed Jaish al-Islam (the Army of Islam) on September 29, 2013 thus undermining

C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt, ―Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria with Croatian Arms,‖ New York Times, February 25, 2013.

Ian Black, ―Saudi Arabia: Syria Rebels Must be Armed,‖ Guardian, June 24, 2013.

See Haykel, ―Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution.‖

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FSA‘s dominance in its previous stronghold Syrian ―southern front‖. Liwa al-Islam, which is the

leading faction of the Army of Islam, had backing of Riyadh. It led to the marginalization of

other radical militias like Ahrar ul-Islam supported by Qatar and al-Qaeda linked Jabhat al-

Nusra as well as the FSA but simultaneously intensified the struggle between extremists and

moderates and religious moderates.80

What Riyadh wanted to achieve was to stimulate overthrow of Bashaar and to rollback gains and

influence of al-Qaeda associated affiliates in Syria. However, large parts of Jasih al-Islam

themselves being radical Islamists were involved in sectarian war crimes like the Latakia

province incidents documented by Human Rights Watch.81

The fact that new groups and

alliances keep emerging and previous allies turns into deadly foes, points to the inherent dangers

involved in promoting salafist groups. Riyadh is also simultaneously concerned about

fundamentalist blowback hitting the Kingdom and hence, wants to reduce the likelihood where

Saudi volunteers join the Syrian rebels and later return as radicalized threats to Kingdom‘s

domestic security.82

Aptly stated by Yezid Sayigh ―The Saudi leadership should be careful what

it creates in Syria: Muhammad‘s Army may eventually come home to Mecca.‖83

While on the one hand within the Arab world Saudi Arabia had been projecting its image as

patron and protector of Sunni interests in the region; On the other hand spared no effort to

safeguard its own core national interests viz a viz Shiite Iran and Sunni Turkey and Qatar. In

September 2015 King Salman and President Obama jointly reiterated their call for lasting

solution to Syrian conflict for which Bashaar has to leave power as the only way forward to

―preserve unity and territorial integrity of Syria‖.84

Saudi Arabia had been most consistent

advocate of increasing pressure on pro-Bashaar forces and had even agreed to train vetted Syrian

opposition members prior to Obama Administration‘s decision to alter Syrian train and equip

program in October 2015.Kingdom‘s stance on Assad had been his removal from seat of power

either through negotiations or through military means and this formulation is taken as Saudi

Hassan Hassan, ―The Army of Islam is Winning in Syria and that‘s not necessarily a bad thing,‖ Foreign Policy Magazine, October 1, 2013.

Edward Dark, ―Syrian FSA Fades in Shadow of Saudi-Backed Opposition Front,‖ Al-Monitor, December 11, 2013.

Asma Alsharif and Amena Bakr, ―Saudi Steers Citizens Away from Syrian Jihad,‖ Reuters, September 12, 2012.

Yezid Sayigh, ―Unifying Syria‘s Rebels: Saudi Arabia Joins the Fray,‖ Carnegie Middle East Center, October 28, 2013.

Adam Stump, ―US withdraws staff from Saudi Arabia dedicated to Yemen planning,‖ Reuters, August 19, 2016.

321

commitment to provide continued military support to anti-Bashaar elements.85

Up till now Saudi

Arabia has shown consistence in providing additional support to armed opposition forces in the

face of failing negotiations and the cessation of hostilities.

Saudi most assertive and aggressive involvement on the side of insurgents in Syria since 2015

has up till now produced unintended consequences. Instead of Syrian allies defeating Bashaar or

luring US to do it for them, Saudi greater military pressure has only made him seek more help

from Russia and Iran and precipitated Russian intervention in Syria in September 2015 which US

was not prepared to oppose. Saudi allies had been defeated in their big last urban centre in east

Aleppo in 2016 and instead of Iranian influence being curtailed by direct Saudi involvement

within Syria and the region, the exact opposite has happened.86

The most cherished Saudi desire

and prospect of getting a chance to enact post-Bashaar order at Tehran and Hezbollah‘s expanse

through using its religious authority and economic resources over 74 percent of Syrian Sunnis is

dwindling day by day. Besides Riyadh‘s has no means or inclination to intervene directly in

Syria and its capacity to ensure its money end up in hands of intended recipients barring specific

Islamist extremists is limited, specifically when Jabhat al-Nusra is being funded by wealthy

Saudis.87

Hence, Syrian ongoing civil unrest will continue to shape region‘s dynamics and as well as

foreign policy orientations of Saudi Arabia and Iran viz a viz each other and other players

involved in the conflict. The competition will only intensify existing deep-rooted ethno-political

and sectarian fault lines and will make the quest for seeking regional hegemony worth fighting

for by both Tehran and Riyadh.

7.3.3.1.3. Turkey

Syria and Turkey share a 511 mile long common border with no geographical boundaries and

their bilateral relations had been marred due to differences over Kurdish militants that Damascus

harbored throughout. When 1980s were drawing to a close, their belligerent attitude towards

Christopher M. Balanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report, RL33533, September 20, 2016), 25.

Patrick Cockburn, ―Saudi Arabia‘s Dream of Becoming the Dominant Arab and Muslim Power in the World has Gone Down In Flames,‖ Independent (UK), January 6, 2017.

Daniel Wagner and Giorgio Cafiero, ―Saudi Arabia‘s Dark Role in the Syrian Conflict,‖ Huffington Post, accessed March 24, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/saudi-arabias-dark-role-i_b_3402447.html.

322

each other intensified as Ankara expressed growing dissatisfaction over Damascus failure to rein

in Armenian and Kurdish militants from carrying out attacks against Turkish targets.88

Besides

launch of Anatolian Project in Turkey in late 1980s brought the water problem which had been

on the backburner for decades to the fore also. However, Syria took a sharp turn away from

confrontation with Ankara in October 1998 in the wake of crisis that erupted between two

states.89

In the face of Turkish saber-rattling, Damascus vowed to stop supporting the Kurdistan

Workers‘ Party (PKK), to establish links between internal security services of both countries and

take steps to enhance bilateral economic activity by reducing long-standing barriers. The Adana

Protocol signed between Turkey and Syria then paved the way for a new era in the bilateral

relations and two countries took measures to build trust and used diplomacy to encourage

cooperation.90

The bilateral relations kept accelerating in the months following the death of Hafez al-Assad in June

2000 and Turkey stopped viewing Syria as a threat to its territorial intergrity. A ―memorandum of

understanding‖ was being contemplated that was supposed to consolidate the bilateral ties.91

A group

of senior Syrian military officials travelled to Ankara to propose full restoration of bilateral ties in

January 2001.92

By spring 2002 the bilateral relations had improved to the point that strong

speculation was being made for joint military exercises between Syrian and Turkish armed forces.93

An unprecedented crisis management pact was signed between the two countries after discussions

between Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Syrian President Bashaar al-Assad in Damascus in

January 2003. Besides certain regional developments also intensified the cooperation.The two

governments expressed willingness to organize a regional conference in Istanbul to promote foreign

policy coordination among six Middle Eastern states

88

Suha Bolukbasi, ―Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad and the Regionalization of Turkey‘s Kurdish Secessionism,‖ Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies 14, no.4 (Summer 1991): 15-36. Mahmut Bali Aykan, ―The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View,‖ Middle East Policy 6, no. 4 (June 1999):174-191. ; Yuksel Sezgin, ―The October 1998 Crisis in Turkish-Syrian Relations: A Prospect Theory Approach,‖ Turkish Studies 3, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 44-68. ; and Meliha Benli Altunisik and Ozlem Tur, ―From

Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,‖ Security Dialogue 37, no.2 (2006): 229-48.

Kilic Bugra Kanat, ―Continuity of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy under the JDP Government: The Cases of Bilateral Relations with Israel and Syria,‖ Arab Studies Quarterly 34, no. 4 (Fall 2012):238.

―Damascus and Ankara Make Up,‖ Daily Star, November 13, 2000.

―Syria: Onward March,‖ Middle East International, February 9, 2001.

Yusif al-Sharif, ―Turkish-Syrian Relations Remain Steady,‖ Al-Hayat, March 1, 2002.

323

(Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Turkey) to review the situation in the light of US

escalating threats to carry out military operations against Iraq.94

Just before the Arab Spring President Bashaar al-Assad in an interview to Turkish Television

cited three positions for enhanced Turkish-Syrian ties i.e. Turkish support for the Palestinians; its

refusal to allow Turkish territory to be used by US to invade Iraq in 2003; and its steadfastness to

stand by Syria when pressure was being exerted to isolate Damascus internationally.95

By 2009,

the bilateral trade between the two countries had totaled $ 1.8 billion. Turkey was actively

pursuing its ―zero problems with neighbours‖ policy when the Arab Spring of 2011 created a

dilemma for Ankara‘s foreign policy between ethics and self-interest. The Syrian crisis

especially forced Turkey to shift its idealistic foreign policy and engage actively in the Middle

Eastern politics because Syria has traditionally been viewed as a matter of national security, one

that affects its ―strategic depth‖ towards the Arab and Islamic worlds.96

Turkish concerns about security risks from Syrian Kurds whose nationalism got a boost in the

ensuing crisis and connections with Iraqi and Turkish Kurds were enhanced. It actively

supported regime change in Syria when the winds of change were blowing against Bashaar and

sought to be ―an active agent of a post-Assad political order in line with its own domestic and

regional political and economic realities, especially with respect to the management of the

Kurdish issue.‖97

Turkey‘s Erdogan calculated that his regional aspirations obliged him to ride

wave of popular revolution and revolutionary change.98

Turkey calculated that ―when Assad

falls, as he must, Turkey will have a chance to play a central role in the economic and political

restructuring of its neighbour.‖99

But its Syrian policy aggravated tensions with Iran and Russia. The former retaliated by

brokering a ceasefire agreement with PKK‘s (Kurdistan Worker‘s Part) branch in Iran by 94

Sa‘ti Nur al-Din, ―The Istanbul Conference: A New Role for Turkey,‖ Al-Safir, January 23, 2003. ; Oxford Business Group, Syria: Weekly Briefing, January 26, 2003. 95

―Turkish Television (TRT) Interviews Syrian President on Regional Issues,‖ BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 7, 2010. Ibrahim Natil, ―Turkey‘s Foreign Policy Challenges in the Syrian Crisis,‖ Irish Studies in International Affairs 27 (2016): 75-94.

Altug, ―The Syrian uprising,‖ 124.

Oray Egin, ―The Game Changer: Syria, Iran, and Kurdish Independence,‖ World Affairs176, no.1 (May / June 2013): 65.

Jenna Krajeski, ―Taking Refuge: The Syrian Revolution in Turkey,‖ World Policy Journal 29, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 67.

324

reversing its anti-Kurd policies to bolster Asaad, thus prompting it to focus its fight against

Turkey.100

These shifting alliances provide Kurdish fighters with degree of logistical support

and free passage unimaginable few years ago. Once thought to have been defeated, the Kurds‘s

are stronger than ever.While the confrontation with Russia got more serious over its intervention

in Syria and its unflinching support for Bashaar regime in December 2015. During this period a

Russian plane that allegedly violated Turkish air space was shot down by Turkey. Russia also

kept blaming that Turkey through its INGOs was sipping weapons and supplies to ISIS and other

jihadist groups in Syria.101

Apart from tensions with Russia and Iran, Turkish relations with US over Syria weren‘t

comfortable either. Turkey sought Washington‘s intelligence and air support and diplomatic

backing to create 10k-wide safe zone or ―secure strip‖ inside Syria but it failed to persuade either

US or its NATO allies, which created extreme tensions in the bilateral relations.102

In July 2015,

Turkey allowed Turkish territory and airspace to be used by US-led coalition for attacks against

ISIS in Syria and Iraq.103

Erdogan‘s decision to overtly oppose Bashaar brought both countries on the brink of armed

conflict. Things got worse when Syrians shot down a Turkish military jet. Turkey‘s NATO allies

persuaded Ankara to refrain from direct military response that might spread the war but when

Syrian forces (accidently, Syria claimed) fired a shell into Turkey, Turkish Parliament passed a

resolution authorizing government to send troops if needed.104

Turkey and Syria nevertheless,

avoided direct military conflict but continued to engage in war by other means. Turkey gave safe

harbor to refugees flowing from Syria including the Free Syrian Army headquartered inside

Turkey. However, when Turkey suffered major terrorist attacks in 2016 appeared to be ISIS-

linked, it took direct military action against the Islamic State in Syria and detained hundreds of

terrorism-related suspects.

Soner Cagapaty, The rise of Turkey: the twenty-first century‟s first Muslim power (Nebraska, 2014), 8.

Chase Winter, ―Russia claims Turkish NGOs are main supplier of extremists in Syria,‖ Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany‘s International Broadcaster, April 1, 2016.

Soner Cagaptay and Cem Yolbulan, ―A Turkish ‗secure strip‘ in Syria: domestic concerns and foreign limitations,‖ Policy Watch 2565, (Washington institute, February 19, 2016).

Chris Kozak, ―Turkey Expands Campaign Against ISIS and the PKK,‖ Institute for the Study of War, July 25, 2015.

Daren Butler, ―Turkey fires artillery into Syria after shelling,‖ Reuters, October 7, 2012.

325

Besides tensions with regional and extra-regional players Syrian crisis created additional

pressures on Erdogan government in domestic and economic spheres also. The most significant

development so far had been that it breathed new life into Turkish Kurd‘s long struggle for

independence. Turkey had failed to stem the further advancement of Kurdish PYD in the north,

to allow or accommodate Syrian refugee problem and to provide ground for Ankara-based rebels

being bombed by Russian airstrikes and ground advances of Damascus regime and its allies. The

Kurdish Nationalist People‘s Democratic Party (HDP with 59 seats in the parliament) rejected

proposal to renew authorization for the government to continue fight against PKK or to create

safe zone in northern Syria in December 2015. Besides the conflict aggravated sectarian tensions

within Turkey too.

Turkey is particularly worried about US coordination with and recent gains by the Syrian

Democratic Forces (SDF) – an umbrella organization led by the People‘s Protection Units

(Yekineyen Parastina Gel or YPG) composed of various Kurdish, Arab and other Syrian militias.

With SDF gains comes the possibility of enhanced YPG control over most, if not, all of northern

Syrian border. Though Turkey claimed to have US assurance that YPG will not occupy territory

west of the Euphrates River, but this proposition was tested in the wake of YPG‘s participation

in capture of Manbij from IS in August 2016.105

However, Turkey‘s capacity to direct events in

Syria was greatly affected as a result of July 2016 failed military coup and military shakeup.106

In August 2016, US supported Turkish incursion into the Syrian town of Jarabulus across the

border and nominally intended to clear town of IS fighters but even US official was cited as

saying that the operation simultaneously intended to ―create a buffer against the possibility of the

Kurds moving forward.‖107

Clearly Turkish operation ―Euphrates Shield‖ aimed at neutralizing

threats from the Islamic State and the YPG which are both viewed as direct threats in Ankara.108

In the beginning of 2017, Turkey made public its shift in Syrian policy as rapprochement with

Russia took place and differences with US heightened over failed coup attempt. Turkish Deputy

Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek while speaking at the World Economic Forum on Iraq and Syria ―Turkey expects Syrian Kurdish forces to withdraw after Manbij operation: minister,‖ Reuters, August 15, 2016.

Yaroslav Trofimov, ―Fallout from Turkey Coup Leaves Syria Rebels in the Lurch,‖ Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2016.

―IS conflict: Turkey-backed Syrian rebels take Jarablus,‖ BBC News, August 24, 2016.

Amberin Zaman, ―Turkish Troops Enter Syria to Fight ISIS, May also Target U.S.-Backed Kurdish Militia,‖

Woodrow Wilson Center, August 24, 2016.

326

stated: ―We have to be pragmatic, realistic. The facts on the ground have changed

dramatically…Turkey can no longer insist on a settlement without Assad. It is not realistic.‖109

Turkish stance on Syria remains in flux and more local and regional developments will affect

future course of action with regard to Syria.

Turkey‘s interventionist attitude towards Syria is not primarily driven by its ideological and

religious proximity with the Sunni Syrian Islamists as popularly speculated rather than its fantasy

to shape the post-Assad Syria in accordance with its own domestic and regional, political and

economic priorities. Preventing the emergence of ―an autonomous Kurdish

political/administrative [unit] in Syria has become a key marker and a top priority item

….together with securing regional ideological hegemony and post-war subcontracting in

Syria.‖110

Oray Egin, a Turkish journalist, aptly remarks: ―If the Arab Spring was a stone

dropped in the waters of Middle East politics, the waves it created, passing through Syria, now

lap upon the shores of Turkey‘s domestic politics, creating uncertainty even more than

conflict.‖111

Considering the importance of Syrian conflict for Turkish local, regional and

international standing, it is bound to remain an active and effective player in the Syrian crisis

shaping its outcome.

7.3.3.1.4. Qatar

In the wake of unprecedented 2011 regional developments Saudi Arabia and Qatar adapted

polices that served their cherished twin purpose of extending regional influence vis-à-vis Iran

and preserving regime security. Their role is a marked contrast compared to other GCC members

where UAE expresses fear of Islamist rise within the region, Bahrain‘s preoccupation with its

internal crisis, Kuwait‘s sensitivity because of its on restive Shiite population, Muscat‘s

traditional non-interventionist, non-sectarian, neutral foreign policy and Oman‘s cordial ties with

Tehran bar them from playing more assertive role in Syrian conflict. These regional realities

have conversely enabled Qatar to project its role as a new player whose active regional

interventionism has redefined its relations with Saudi Arabia. Qatar which held Arab League‘s

―Turkey Softens Stance Towards Bashar ul-Assad in Syria Settlement,‖ DW, January 20, 2017, accessed April 02, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-softens-stance-towards-bashar-al-assad-in-syria-settlement/a-37211975. Altug, ―The Syrian uprising,‖ 127.

Egin, ―The Game Changer,‖ 72.

327

rotational presidency in 2011 played a lot more active public role and resultantly overshadowed

Saudi Arabia which nonetheless remained active behind the scenes.

Qatari-Saudi competition shaped the development of Syrian opposition in exile in subsequent

period where Qataris gained initial upper hand and were successful in installing many of their

allies in influential positions within the Syrian National Council founded in August 2011 and the

National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces established in November

2012. Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was backed by Qataris while the more secular rivals were

cultivated by Riyadh. Finally after months of infighting, Saudi candidate Ahmad Jibra was

chosen as leader of the National Coalition. The alliance then occupied Syria‘s place in the Arab

League in Doha‘s summit in March 2013.

This Qatari-Saudi competition followed similar trajectory for Syrian insurgents where Qatar and

Turkey preferred groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood but simultaneously provided

assistance to salafists and jihadists by early 2012. During this time Riyadh waited for meaningful

decision by Washington112

and there were isolated reports of meager Saudi assistance to Syrian

deserters. Other than Saudis, Doha up till now has been most ardent backers of Syrian rebels and

time and again expressed resolve to continue supporting them with material assistance even if

Trump ends US role in Syria.113

Doha‘s interest in Syrian conflict is divergent from Saudi Arabia. While simultaneously viewing

Iran‘s growing influence as a strategic threat; its focus is on enhancement of its own role within

the Arab world as a promoter of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic causes and views ―the Sunni-majority

country as an area for the Persian Gulf emirate to empower the local Muslim Brotherhood and

boost the Qatari-backed movement‘s franchises elsewhere.‖114

In spite of its desire to de-seat

Bashaar from the seat of power, it has had minimal direct military involvement in Syria and

participated only in US-led campaign against IS where its role was mainly logistical. Unlike

Libyan conflict where the Arab Gulf Sheikdom was able to sway the outcome by using its

financial resources, Syrian conflict involvement has not paid off yet.

Adam Entous, Nour Malas and Margaret Coker, ―A Veteran Saudi Power Player Works To Build Support to Topple Assad,‖ Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2013.

―Qatar Will Help Syrian Rebels Even If Trump Ends US Role,‖ Reuters, November 26, 2016.

Giorgio Cafiero, ―Qatar‘s Diminishing Returns in Syria,‖ Lobelog Foreign Policy (weblog), accessed March 24, 2017, http://lobelog.com/qatars-diminishing-returns-in-syria/.

328

It remains to be seen how Doha will maintain it rigid stance against Damascus regime while

Russia and Iran are demonstrating willingness to beef up Bashaar even by incurring risks to

considerable extent and US continuing unwillingness to step up substantial support for anti-

Bashaar elements. Nevertheless, Doha will remain relevant actor shaping region‘s dynamic till

the time Syrian conflict takes a decisive turn.

7.3.3.1.5. Egypt

Egypt for decades had been the central axis towards which Arabs had traditionally gravitated but

the vacuum had deepened in 1990s; the Arab region became more atomized and fractured and

non-Arab states like Iran and Israel became more influential in regional power politics. Even

before the events of 2011 Arab Spring could alter region‘s dynamics significantly, Egypt‘s

traditional standing in the region had been dented by its ―inability to bring order to Palestinian

ranks, to help stabilize Lebanon, to rebuild Arab partnerships in the Maghreb and with the Gulf

Arab states, and to moderate the impact of the Iranian-Syrian alliance in the Levant‖.115

With regard to Arab Awakening it was precisely the uprising in Egypt and January 2011 events

that inspired the revolution in Deraa in mid-March 2011. The initial popular aspirations were

similar to those in Egypt and were first and foremost ―Syrian‖ in character. Hence, as early as

March 2011 Egypt‘s diplomatic stance was based on twin principles of Syrian people universal

right to decide their own fate through free political process and preserving territorial integrity

and sovereignty of the Syrian state. Thus the government in Cairo advocated bringing all parties

on negotiating table and ending bloodshed and suffering of the Syrian people. ―Armed Syrian

Opposition‖ in their view was basically made up of terrorist groups devoid of any mercy or

conscience towards civilians, who wanted to topple Assad even if it means obliterating Syrian

state.116

When all the regional players were igniting the conflict in Syria, Egypt was the only country that

did not contribute to the mayhem taking place there by siding with neither government nor the

opposition. It was the only player with good relations with both peaceful opposition and the

Damascus regime. Cairo kept channels of communication open with all to find a peaceful and

Ehteshami, ―The Middle East‘s New Power Dynamics,‖ 398.

Hani Ghoraba, ―On Egypt‘s Towards Syria,‖ Al-Ahram Weekly 1316 (20-26 October), accessed March 26, 2017, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/17635.aspx.

329

practical solution to the Syrian conflict and kept insisting al-Assad has to be part of the solution

so as to realistically preserve the territorial integrity of the Syrian state. Thus Egypt was

subjected to incredible amount of diplomatic and economic pressure to modify its pragmatic

stance in the Syrian conflict and put its weight behind the so-called opposition.

During Egyptian President Morsi‘s short stay in power, he seemed more inclined towards Iran

and Syria, suggesting at one time that Iran should join Turkey and Saudi Arabia to form four-

way commission to handle Syrian crisis without seeking opinion first from either the Kingdom or

Turkey. The move was intended to restore Egypt as regional power centre and diplomatic

mediator but the initative went nowhere as Riyadh not only rejected working with Tehran but

was more than a little suspicious of Morsi‘s intentions too.117

One of the first policy shifts after

Morsi‘s overthrow in July 2013 by the interim government was to downgrade profile of Syrian

opposition in the country. The association of mainstream Syrian opposition with Morsi and the

Muslim Brotherhood prompted the new government to discontinue support as they suspected

Morsi had discrete contacts with Damascus. Diplomatically Cairo continued supporting political

settlement without defining Bashaar‘s potential role in Syria‘s future.118

However, in a marked turn of events, Egyptian ―Yes‖ vote for both French and Russian

resolutions on Syria in October 2016 was taken as a conflicting position that angered traditional

allies like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. It also reflected Cairo‘s desire to forge independent

political decisions regardless of pressure from friends and foes. Nevertheless, that approach had

limitations and constrained by Egypt‘s desire to stay on good terms with both Saudis and

Emiratis. But in November 2016, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi moved openly to

support Syrian army by taking a position at odds with country‘s Gulf benefactors in a surprise

move. He said: ―Our priority is to support national armies, for example in Libya, to exert control

over Libyan territory and deal with extremist elements. The same with Syria and Iraq.‖119

Egypt

took considerable risk by incurring wrath of Saudi government who had so far pumped around

Marc J. Sievers, ―Question‘s About Egypt‘s Syria Policy,‖ The Washington Institute, January 12, 2015, accessed March 26, 2017, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/questions-about-egypts-syria-policy. Ibid.

―Egypt‘s Sisi Express Support for Syria‘s Military,‖ Al-Jazeera, November 24, 2016.

330

$25billion in financial assistance since Sisi took power in military coup in 2013 to prop Cairo‘s

struggling economy.120

Subsequently the Kingdom suspended oil shipments to Egypt in October.

Such a turn in Egyptian foreign policy could be the result of its burgeoning relations with Russia

at a time when relations with decades-old ally US is at its lowest ebb. Besides according to Ofir

Winter, an analyst at the Institute for National Security Studies Muslim Brotherhood is

considered the principle threat in Egypt and not Iran. ―In Egypt‘s view, a victory for the Syrian

opposition could give a push to Brotherhood in Egypt. And a defeat of the Syrian military regime

could be an introduction to similar occurrences to the regime in Egypt.‖121

Sisi still tends to

count on Saudi support despite his backing of Bashaar regime because an alternative to him is

Brotherhood which Al-Saud can‘t afford. With Egypt‘s - the most populous Arab nation -

support for Bashaar, the dynamics of regional conflict are again in flux, intensifying Saudi-

Iranian drive for attaining regional ascendancy.

7.3.3.1.6. Iraq

Syria‘s relations with Iraq had been characterized by animosity since the split in Baath party

leadership and ideology in the 1960s, a split that widened with the assumption of power in Iraq

by Saddam Husain in 1979. At the time of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Syria

immediately condemned and joined Saudi Arabia and Egypt in orchestrating the emergency

summit meeting of the Arab League to resist Iraqi occupation by force on the pretext that Arab

governments should not devolve responsibility to handle inter-Arab conflicts to outside powers

and secondly Baghdad‘s aggression weakened Arab world as a whole in its struggle against

Israel.122

―Syria‘s ardent stand was all the more blatant against the background of the hesitant

and dithering attitudes taken by most Arab countries in the first stage of crisis.‖123

However, a brief period of rapprochement followed in the bilateral relations during the late with dramatically marked improvement in 2000-1. By January 2001, some

15,000

Ben Lynfield, ―Egypt Shifts to Open Support For Assad Regime in Syrian Civil War,‖ Jerusalem Post, November 26, 2016.

Lynfield, ―Egypt Shifts to Open Support for Assad Regime.‖

Gerald Butt, ―Seizing the Opportunity,‖ Middle East International, August 31, 1990;

Eyal Zisser, ―Syria and the Gulf Crisis – Stepping on a New Path,‖ Orient 34, no. 4 (December 1993): 567.

Murhaf Jouejati, ―The Syrian-Iraqi Rapprochement,‖ Middle East Insight, November-December 1997. ; Ed Blanche, ―Syria and Iraq Find Common Cause,‖ Jane‟s Intelligence Review, October 1, 2001. ; and Ahmad S. Moussalli, ―The Geopolitics of Syrian-Iraqi Relations,‖ Middle East Policy 7, No. 4 (October 2000): 100-109.

331

1990s

124

barrels of oil per day started to flow through long-abandoned pipeline that linked northern Iraq to

the docks at Baniyas.125

Damascus tried to resuscitate relations with Iraq after the exit of

Saddam Husain from the political scene as 2003 progressed and re-established transportation and

commercial links to post-war Iraq.126

Syrian gesture to repatriate some $200 million in 2004

deposited in Syrian banks was also in the same direction.127

Another substantial improvement in

bilateral relations took place when Iraqi Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for National

Security Affairs were welcomed by Bashaar in July 2004.128

Problems persisted, however, in bilateral relationship and after two massive bombings rocked

Baghdad on August 19, 2009, killing almost 100 people, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry blamed

Syria. It was alleged that Damascus regime harbors insurgents loyal to ex-President Saddam and

militants pass with impunity over the Iraq-Syria border as no organization unbeknownst to the

country‘s security forces can operate. This led observers to speculate that these foreign groups

had de facto approval of Syrian authorities and they might have made a deal with the militant

Islamic groups that they would not attack minority Alawi community in exchange for freedom of

passage through these territories.129

When the dramatic events of 2011 jostled Syrian politics, Iraq was in no position to affect

outcomes of events in a country which had traditionally been important as it was itself battling

with immense domestic security problems. It initially took a minimalist non-partisan stance so as

not to aggravate cleavages within its own population but soon the overriding concern of Shiite

dominated government of Nuri al-Maliki was that a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus

would strengthen its already alienated Sunnis in Iraq‘s western provinces. It therefore abstained

from Syrian suspension vote from Arab League in 2011, rejected US call for toppling of Bashaar

regime, opposed further sanctions and toppling of Damascus regime by force and argued for

resolution of Syrian crisis through political reforms. Similarly, instead of downgrading ties with

Mona Ziade, ―Iraq-Syria Pipeline Opens Soon, With Tripoli Next,‖ Daily Star, November 13, 2000. ; Barbara Plett, ―Syria and Iraq Strengthen Ties,‖ BBC, January 29, 2001. ; Gary C. Gambill, ―Syria‘s Foreign Relations: Iraq,‖ Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 3, no. 3 (March 2001), accessed May 25, 2016, https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0103_s1.htm. Nabil Yassin, ―Normal Relations, Not Just a Card,‖ Al-Hayat, December 12, 2003.

―Syria to Return $200 Million,‖ Bloomberg News, January 9, 2004.

Sha‘aban Abbud, ―A Syrian-Iraqi Rapprochement,‖ Al Ra‟i al-Amm, July 23, 2004. ; Zeina Karam, ―Allawi Plans to Restore Syria Ties,‖ Associated Press, July 24, 2004. : Cilina Nasser, ―Baghdad-Damascus Ties Improve Despite US-Syria Rift,‖ Daily Star, July 26, 2004.

Gifford, ―Syria: The Change That Never Came,‖422.

332

Bashaar regime, Iraq conversely expanded ties, providing Damascus with much needed material

support and diesel fuel and also evaded US and EU demand to cut Iranian arm deliveries to

Syria. Baghdad kept its lines of communications opened with some opposition groups too and

Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari tried to dispel the image that Iraq‘s foreign policy towards

Syria was shaped by Iran.130

However, with the passage of time it left no doubt that Syrian conflict had rapidly spilled into

Iraq, with each affecting the other. Public opinion in Western Iraq‘s Sunni majority areas

gravitated towards support for uprising. The Euphrates River Valley intimately connected Syrian

and Iraqi tribes and they soon became conduits of Gulf States‘ anti-Bashaar and anti-Iranian

policy.131

ISIS after gaining the momentum in Iraq surged back across the border and put its

rivals on the defensive. Resultantly, it left no one guessing that the escalating sectarian violence

between ISIS, Iraqi forces and the Syrian civil unrest were intertwined. Neither can be resolved

without the other. ISIS advancement from its existing base and seizure of key Iraqi cities

including Mosul made them control ―a swath of contiguous territory form Raqqa in Eastern Syria

to Bagdad‘s doorstep‖ in 2014 that highlighted more clearly than ever the growing symbiosis

between the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.132

US inability to reach a security arrangement with Iraq before complete withdrawal of American

forces from region, coupled with its reluctance to provide assistance to Syrian rebels to blunt

Bashaar‘s onslaught have brought the convergence of al-Qaeda and Islamists forces that

subsequently led to the horror we are witnessing today. The bloody civil conflict raging in both

countries and resulting chaos enabled ISIS to establish an Islamic Sunni state encompassing Iraq

and Syria. ISIS threat has brought non-Sunni dominated Iraqi and Syrian governments not only

closer to each other but simultaneously increased their dependence on Iran. It has also pushed

Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia to assume the leadership of their respective sects and wage

proxy wars in Iraq and Syria to preserve the hegemony if not the survival of their regimes. Even Raymond Hinnebush, Syria-Iraq Relations: State Construction and Deconstruction and The MENA State System (LSE Middle East Center, Paper Series /04, October 2014).

See Mohammed Abeer, Sunni-dominated Anbar province in aid fundraising drive in support of Syrian rebels (ICR issue 3897, February 2012).

Juliien Barnes-Dacey, ―Syria and Iraq: One Conflict or Two?,‖ European Council of Foreign Relations, June 27, 2014, accessed March 25, 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_syria_and_iraq_one_conflict_or_two280.

333

if ISIS is defeated in Iraq and lose much or all of its territorial gains there, it would still hold

large swaths of Syrian land from where it can continue to fight for the realization of its goals.133

The Syrian uprising has also strengthened Kurdish separatist ambitions, which have effectively

become independent of Damascus and with trans-state links with Kurdish Regional Government

in Iraq. Although Sunni regional involvement in Iraq is insignificant as compared to Syria but it

could escalate because if Syria is ground zero, Iraq is more important in the grand regional

struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia once Syrian conflict subsides. Hence, the sectarian

mobilization will intensify as the civil unrest in Syria enters into a stalemate and it has widened

the prospect of full-fledged sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites engulfing both Syria

and Iraq in what would be the most dangerous of mergers. Thus the domestic-politico situation

and role of external actors will keep both Iraq and Syria relevant to each other as long as the

situation gets settled in either or both the countries.

7.3.3.1.7. Lebanon

Lebanon is a country most direly affected with repercussions of the Syrian conflict as it rages on

and possible fallout once the conflict ends. In the course of uprising, it has become the country

with the highest numbers of refugees per capita in the world.134

Besides this exploding refugee

situation the Syrian conflict has intensified political tensions in a country already marred by

political stagnation and sectarian tensions for years. The most pressing question at the moment

being how the thousands of Hezbollah fighters fighting currently in Syria for Bashaar, will affect

the delicate political balance in Lebanon once the conflict ends.

Lebanon currently has a power-sharing system between various sectarian communities following

the devastating Lebanese civil war between 1970 and 1990 that left almost 15000 dead. While

the post-civil war system ensures inclusion of all communities in the political process and public

institutions to stop domination by any group but simultaneously it led to systemic corruption and

patronage networks. Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri‘s murder in 2006 has curtailed Syrian

interference in Lebanese politics but nevertheless, polarization continues unabated as reflected in

133

Alon Ben-Meir, ―Deconstructing the Iraq and Syria Conflicts,‖ Huffington Post, accessed March 25, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/deconstructing-the-iraq-a_b_5508517.html. Almost a quarter of the total population in Lebanon represents Syrian refugees. Figures quoted from Lina Khatib,

―Regional Spillover: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict,‖ Carnegie Middle East Center, June 09, 2014, accessed April 03, 2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/06/09/regional-spillover-lebanon-and-syrian-conflict-pub-55829.

334

division of political parties into broadly two camps with diametrically opposite views on foreign

policy. The so-called ―March 8‖ coalition includes main Shiite parties Hezbollah and Amal

movement, the Christian Free Patriotic Movement along with other smaller parties traditionally

aligned to Syria and Iran. While the ―March 14‖ alliance contains the strongest Sunni party

Future Movement and the two Christian parties Kataeb and Lebanese Forces with closer

relations with Saudi Arabia, Western countries and the Syrian opposition groups. A division, that

not surprisingly is reflected in their approach towards the Syrian conflict.135

Parliamentary elections initially scheduled for June 2013 have been postponed twice and now

also unlikely to take place according to the new date: June 2017. The current caretaker

government of Prime Minister Tamman Salam is as deeply divided which nearly collapsed

several times. Government‘s ability to provide limited administrative services have forced

sectarian groups to look towards their own communities for support. This fragile

administrative/political setup has exacerbated tensions between political factions in Lebanon.

The influx of more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees has strained economic resources while the

memories of Palestinian militias groups in Lebanese civil war are already fresh. But the most

worrying aspect regarding Syrian refugees is that they are mostly Sunnis and if permanently

settled they can significantly alter demographic balance jeopardizing delicate balance of power

between sects. These concerns might have been the reason behind Lebanese decision to close

border with Syria in January 2015 and introduction of visa system for Syrians.136

There are increasing concerns that ISIS will gradually encroach into Lebanon as November 2015

bombing in Shiite neighbourhood of Beirut reflected that resulted in 40 deaths.137

A dilemma for

Western policies in such a situation involves their approach towards Hezbollah designated as a

terrorist organization by US because of its targeting of Israel and close relations with Iran.

Indeed, Hezbollah is an unavoidable political and social reality and with its popular social

welfare service holds the ability to take control of Lebanon. While Sunni community is too

fragmented and its inability to gel together has frustrated traditional ally Saudi Arabia to the

extent that it has also turned away from them. Aptly remarked by John Bell: ―Whether through Dominik Tolksdorf, ―Lebanon in the Light of the Syria Conflict: Resilience Despite Polarization and Tensions,‖

Heinrich Boll Stiftung (blog), October 31, 2016, https://us.boell.org/2016/10/31/lebanon-light-syria-conflict-

resilience-despite-polarization-and-tensions. Tolksdorf, ―Lebanon in the Light of the Syria Conflict.‖

―How Exposed is Lebanon to Syria War?,‖ Al-Jazeera, November 14, 2015.

335

clever manipulation, veiled or less-veiled threat, its considerable military might and the more

considerable disorganization of its opponents, the political future of the country has fallen into

[hezbollah‘s] hands.‖138

No doubt the situation in Syria has made Iran the conquering shadow in both Syria and Lebanon

and considering the stakes involved for Iran in the ensuing conflict. Iranian dominance will

continue to shape domestic, regional and international dimension of its allies in both countries.

7.3.3.1.8. Jordan

Since the outbreak of Syrian unrest, the official Jordanian position seems to be characterized by

hesitation, uncertainty and controversy and remains unclear till date. ―Its calculated position has

been described as one of the most difficult balancing acts that the [Jordanian] regime has had to

play.‖139

Amman has tried to limit its official role in the conflict by giving advice to Syria and

accepting refugees‘ influx while distancing itself as much as possible from directly being

involved. The popular opinion in Jordan, however, appears to be starkly different from the one

being professed by the government. While the former are in favour of Bashaar departure and

providing full support to uprising; the latter group, until 2012 upheld belief that survival of

Syrian regime is a better option rather than salafists gaining control over Damascus with the

potential to turn Jordan‘s northern border with Syria, extending until Iraqi city of Anbar, into a

political hotbed for Salafists and al-Qaeda.140

Being a staunch US ally, Jordanian position traditionally reflects Washington‘s stance on the

conflict. King Abdullah of Jordan had been among the first leaders to ask Bashaar to resign but

his stance at the same time reflects political realities on ground as he regularly affirms his

support for both Syrians and peaceful transfer of power. Jordan threw its full weight behind the

Arab League and supported Syrian opposition to take Syrian seat in the council. But the

overriding Jordanian concern had been to safeguard its own political, social and economic

stability directly at risk because of unabated Syrian conflict, the advancement of ISIL, the Iraqi

paradigm, the unceasing Israeli and Palestinian conflict and the complicated management of

Syrian and Palestinian migration flows. Thus the Hashemite Kingdom tries to maintain John Bell, ―The blending of Lebanon and Syria,‖ Al-Jazeera, October 23, 2016.

Osama Al-Sharif, ―Jordan‘s Balancing Act on Syria,‖ Al-Monitor, January 27, 2014.

Khaled Waleed Mahmoud, ―Where does Jordan Stand on the Syrian Crisis?,‖ Middle East Monitor, January 24, 2014.

336

harmonious relationship with regional and international players as well as Damascus regime.

Amman has serious concerns in military and security domains as Syria‘s Daraa province in

proximity with the Kingdom began to fall to Islamist forces. The repercussions of deteriorating

situations in Syria on Jordan‘s national security will determine the deeper involvement of Jordan

in the conflict.141

Jordan as an actor has such credibility that when plans to bring stability in and around Damascus

were being speculated and if gone into effect under UN Charter Chapter VII, Lord David Owen,

former British Foreign Secretary, wrote: ―Such a mandate for Damascus cannot be physically or

politically run by the UN or NATO, nor by Russia…..It can only come from one country in the region – Jordan – with a credible military and administrative capacity that could be supported

and backed by regional countries.‖142

In the ongoing crisis too Amman is expected to keep

offering its dual role of buffer zone and mediator, a role accorded to it because of it geographical

and strategic collocation.143

Besides since the rules of the game of have changed in Syria due to

intense Russian involvement and US reluctance, Jordan King Abdullah met Russian Putin in

Moscow to negotiate future of Southern Syria.144

Outstanding Syrian issue still, however, remains refugees‘ problem. Jordan hosts 635,000 of the

4.6 million Syrians registered as refugees with the UN and now seems to be at ―boiling point‖.

The government says more than one million other Syrians live there including the ones who

arrived before 2011.145

More than Bashaar regime‘s survival or demise, Jordan will remain

occupied with its own resilience as Syrian conflict enters into its seventh year. Humanitarian

crisis and risk of Jordanian jihadists returning with extremist ideology will haunt Hashemite

Kingdom and hence they would be more perturbed by the risk of state collapse in Syria and

country‘s potential transformation into an ungovernable space – with threat of breeding ground

for jihadists.146

Ibid.

Lord David Owen, ―How Jordan Is Key to Ending the Syria Crisis,‖ Huffington Post, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lord-david-owen/jordan-syria-crisis_b_8118734.html. Federica Fanull, ―The role of Amman in the Middle East crisis,‖ Mediterranean Affairs, Nov 28, 2014.

Osama AL-Sharif,‖Has Jordan Acquiesced to Assad Regime Offensive in Southern Syria?,‖ Middle East Institute, January 12, 2016.

―Syria Conflict: Jordanians ‗at boiling point‘ Over Refugees,‖ BBC News, February 2, 2016.

Julien Barnes-Dacey, ―Syria: The View From Jordan,‖ European Council on Foreign Relations, June 17, 2013, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_syria_the_view_from_jordan138.

337

7.3.31.9. Israel

For Israel the issue of conflict in Syria is linked to its wider implications on the regional balance

of power and how the outcome might affect Iran‘s regional standing. A much weakened Iraq

sans Saddam Hussein was a welcoming development initially but coming at the cost of enhanced

Iranian influence which was reflected in the intense one-month Israel-Hezbollah war widely

interrupted as Arab world‘s first victory over Israel in 60 years, created a dilemma. The Shiite

organization sponsored by Iran emerged as the champion of the ―Arab street‖. The Shiite

penetration of the dominant Sunni order has not let up since and Syrian conflict has become

impetus for enhanced Iranian influence within the region further.

Israel and Syrian bilateral relations had a long hostile history and since the Arab defeat of 1967

and capture of Syrian Golan Heights by Israel, it has been the prime Syrian foreign policy focus

for decades. Tensions heightened with Israel again in 2006, as Bashaar precluded any resumption

of peace talks with Israel. He told Arab Bar Association convention in January that ―targeting

Syria and Lebanon is a part of an integrated project to destroy the identity of the region in order

to reshape it under new titles to meet Israeli aspirations with aim at imposing its hegemony on

the region and its resources.‖147

The steady deterioration of relations prompted Israeli

Ambassador to United Nations to charge both Iran and Syria as constituting a ―new axis of evil

and terror‖ that was sowing ―the seeds of the first world war of the twenty-first century.‖148

By

mid 2006, hostility had spiked in bilateral relations when Israeli warplanes bombed a training

camp for Syrian-backed Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon.149

Tel Aviv drew a harsh response

from Damascus when Israeli forces pushed across the border into southern Lebanon and Syrian

Minister of Information warned that Damascus ―will not stand with our hands tied‖ in the face of

Israeli aggression.150

Syria is viewed in Tel Aviv as the last remaining potential strategic threat to Israel with shared

borders but since the start of Syrian civil unrest, Israel has mainly stood on the sidelines,

―Assad Speaks about International Plot against Syria, Says No Chance of Peace with Israel,‖ Al-Bawaba, January 21, 2006.

Edith M. Lederer, ―Israel Warns that New ‗Axis of Terror‘ Iran, Syria and Hamas is Sowing Seeds of War,‖

Associated Press, April 18, 2006. Anthony Shadid and Scott Wilson, ―Israel Blockades, Bombs Lebanon While Hezbollah Rains Rocket Fire,‖

Washington Post, July 14, 2006. ―Syria Threatens to Act if Israel Approaches its Territory,‖ Xinhua News Agency, July 24, 2006.

338

intervening sporadically for rather limited objectives. The events of Arab Spring caught Israelis

by complete surprise too as the initial reaction was one of curious spectator expecting Bashaar to

quickly crack down dissenters. ―When this failed to materialize, a realization sunk in that Israel

could only play a marginal role in such a complex and unpredictable conflict. It could neither

impact the overall outcome nor the direction this country was taking.‖151

Hence, it was reluctant

to get embroiled in this horrific regional war and left with no option but to watch whether the

developments in Syria and a potential regime change in Damascus will strengthen or weaken the

Damascus-Tehran-Hezbollah axis.152

One cynical view suggests that Israel continues to prefer the ―devil they know‖- Bashaar al-

Assad and thus they are perfectly content to watch Syrians continue to suffer.153

In fact the

Israeli position is far more complex. The idea of a Sunni government controlled by the Muslim

Brotherhood on their northeastern frontier was frightening enough to prefer Assad but the shift in

regional balance of power and reconfiguration in regional hierarchy is prompting novel approach

to the Syrian conflict. Now they have to choose between the hostile Sunni force in Syria and an

emboldened Iranian presence on Israel‘s northern frontier. As aptly remarked by Yossi

Mekelberg: ―The current strategic thinking in Israel is that the worst outcome for it would be that

through the fog of war in Syria, the Golan Heights would gradually become Israel‘s border with

Iran.‖154

However, a change in Israeli policy towards Syria was advocated with Russian intervention in

the conflict which has tilted the scales of conflict in Bashaar‘s favour. Damascus regime‘s

victory would actually be an Iranian victory, which is least desirable option for Israel. Hence,

Israeli officials advocated to intervene in favour of moderate rebels in early 2016.155

Regardless

of its preferred outcome, Israel is in no position to influence events inside Syria. In fact Tel Aviv

now has to adjust to the reality where threat of Iran shaping politics of the region will become

paramount.

Yossi Mekelberg, ―Five Years That Changed Israeli-Syrian Relations Forever,‖ Al-Arabiya English, March 13, 2016.

Nicos Panayiotides, ―Is The ‗Arab Spring‘ Israel‘s Winter? Strategic Instability in the Middle East,‖

International Journal on World Peace 29, no. 1 (March 2012): 25. Erlich, Inside Syria.

Mekelberg, “Five Years That Changed Israeli-Syrian Relations.”

Amos Harel, “Israel Is Changing Its Approach to Syria War Amid Assad’s Battleground Advances,” Haartez, February 21, 2016.

339

Conclusion

The dynamics of the Syrian conflict are constantly in flux with the entrance of a number of

regional and extra-regional players. All have vested interests and the parties opposing Bashaar

regime are unable to align their basic priorities in a way that they could get Bashaar out of the

Syrian political picture. While on the other hand those supporting Bashaar have upped their ante

too. The stakes involved in the survival of the Damascus regime are too high to let Bashaar

relinquish power at the moment. This chapter analyzed the unrest against Bashaar in depth and

involvement of the key regional players. This lays basis for the next chapter that helps us explain

not only the intricate dynamics of the more than seven-year old civil war but simultaneously help

us determine why threat securitization for Syria could not follow the path delineated in case of

Libya.

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Chapter 8: Syria and Threat Securitization for Military

Intervention

The Syrian civil war up till now has proved to be US quandary as its incoherent and inconsistent

policy, and confused and disjoined response has failed to clarify US role in the conflict that is all

set to change region‘s balance of power and its dynamics forever. Libyan and Syrian conflicts

are usually juxtaposed with one another to analyze why US selective engagement strategy could

not materialize in case of Syria, even though the excesses committed by the Bashaar regime

against his own civilian population has long crossed the atrocity and barbarity threshold set for

Libya. The fact that Libya was ―doable‖ since it was a country constituting 90 percent of desert

and well suited for air combat, has less to do with Syria‘s geography and more with the intricate

pattern of conflict raging within the country and the role regional and extra-regional players are

playing to pursue their interests.

The Syrian conflict, more than the Libyan episode explains the link between the regional and

systemic levels. The dawn of post-hegemonic era in international relations has coincided with

US diminished role in effecting the outcome of events on the Arab streets. Arab world for more

than a decade has been seething with anti-American sentiment and the result of two ambitious

military campaigns before Libya has already significantly tarnished American image in the

Muslim Middle East. However, now the pronounced changes in the global hierarchy in the form

of rise of peer challengers and their assertive policies in their respective regions have tested US

resolve to exercise its global leadership role with the vigor it was pursed in the decades after the

demise of the Cold War.

The global changes and their impact on regional hierarchy in transition are not clearer than in the

MENA region where Arab Awakening has already upended the regional balance. With entry of

extra-regional great players like Russia into the Syrian conflict and other unwavering regional

actors like Iran and non-state actors like Lebanese Hezbollah on the side of the Bashaar regime

has frustrated US and her allies to shape the emerging regional hierarchy in line with their

341

desired regional objectives. This chapter is meant to explore the intricate and complex pattern of

unceasing Syrian conflict in the context of post-hegemonic drift in the international system.

It will be divided into four sections. First section will deal with key extra-regional players

involved in the conflict and discuss how their equation with the Syrian regime is changing the

dynamics of the conflict. The second section will discuss ―legitimacy‖ variable and explain the

way US under the Obama Administration made American legitimacy questionable after failing to

implement ―crossing the red line‖ threat. Next section will delineate how threat securitization for

military intervention within Syria is being consistently framed and why it so far has not

succeeded whereas the much dubious threat construction for Libya did. Last section will dwell

on failed ―war legitimation discourse‖ in Syrian case and its implications in the post-hegemonic

system.

8.1 Key Extra –Regional Players

Besides neighbours and regional players having dire stakes in the emerging Syrian scenario, key

extra-regional players have their vital interests involved too. Considering the extent to which

these players have directly implicated themselves in the civil war, the outcome of the Syrian

conflict will significantly alter their global standing. Thus they are determined to either shape the

conflict dynamics in their favour or reduce the damage in case of undesirable outcome.

8.1.1. France

French role within the Syrian conflict became pronounced at the earliest stages and The Voice of

Russia reported on September 19, 2012 that France mulled arms for Syrian opposition after its

ambassador to Syria, Eric Chevallier stated that he had been instructed by President Francois

Hollande to get in touch with opposition cells within Syria in a bid to get them better organized

in their fight against Bashaar.1 France even invited Syrian opposition the National Council to

appoint an ambassador to France after rebels seized control of Hamadan airport in Deir Ezzor on

―France mulls arms for Syria opposition,‖ Voice of Russia, September 19, 2012.

342

November 2012.2 It became the first European country to recognize the Syrian Coalition as a

legitimate opposition to Bashaar al-Assad. As the stalemate entered in 2013 French government

reiterated its resolve to stand with the Syrian opposition and ―strengthen‖ them in their battle

against Bashaar regime.3

Previously France enjoyed cordial relations with Baathist Syria. Bashaar‘s takeover of power

was trumpeted as a new era for Syrian politics, who was praised for protecting Syrian Christians

by the former French President Nicholas Sarkozy. But the shift came with August 2011 French

statement that ―irreparable damage‖ had been done by Bashaar‘s violence against his citizens. In

one of the harshest condemnations in January 2012 France demanded resignation from Bashaar

after the massacres caused ―disgust and revulsion around the world‖. France then proposed a UN

resolution against the Syrian regime and was the only country that demanded military

intervention in Syria for its alleged use of Chemical Weapons in 2013.4

French staunch support for the Syrian opposition in the ongoing civil war led to vociferous

condemnation by Syrian regime. Bashaar blamed French Syrian strategy for deadly attacks in

Paris in November 2015 that left 129 dead. Proclaiming he already warned the West of such

repercussions; he presented himself as fighting the menace of extremism and tried to justify his

excessive use of violence, besides fishing for Western support including French on the issue.

French President Hollande, however, at that time resisted opening any channel of communication

with the Syrian government.

France had already taken an unprecedented step of launching airstrikes in Syria on September

27, 2015 even when other European governments like Germany and Britain had yet to legally

authorize it. This hawkish attitude towards Syria has been interpreted as an attempt to reinforce

French self-perception as a great power, its international identity; to fulfill its historic role as

alternative foreign policy to that of US where its rapid military escalation in contrast to US

incremental approach is drawing widespread international attention; and to bolster security

―Syrian rebel collation sends ambassador to Paris,‖ Voice of Russia, November 18, 2012.

―France, three Arab countries to ‗strengthen‘ support for Syria rebels,‖ Voice of Russia, September 13, 2013.

Samuel Ramani, ―Why France is so deeply entangled in Syria,‖ Washington Post, November 19, 2015.

343

cooperation with anti-Bashaar Sunni countries within the Middle East, who share French deep

distrust of Iran as well.5

Moscow-backed Syrian offensive had simultaneously soured French relations with

Russia. President Vladimir Putin cancelled his visit to Paris after his French counterpart

Hollande labelled Russian airstrikes in Syria as ―war crimes‖.6 French government was seemed

to be taking a u-turn on Assad when Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stated in December 2015

that he no longer believed that Bashaar al-Assad‘s departure is necessary before any political

transition in Syria.7 In spite of the obvious u-turn French position of Bashaar‘s future is clear. By

recognizing the Syrian opposition as the true representative of the people of Syria, France is

looking for an enhanced role in post-Assad Syria, which to them is the most-likely scenario no

matter how much more time it may take.

France recognizes diminished American presence in the Middle East and more assertive Russian

presence will contradict its vital interests in the region. Considering the staunch stance it has

already taken on the issue, France is expected to remain involved in the Syrian conflict and

continue to actively shape the strategic environment in line with its interests.

8.1.2. Britain

British relationship with Syria over the last decade has been created through a web of personal

links based on Bashaar‘s British education and his marriage to a British-born woman.8 Based on

this history, when the uprisings started against Assad, British Foreign Sectary, William Hague

still viewed Assad as a reformer and expected him to ―do the right thing‖ by implementing the

reforms its people were calling for and avoid sanctions being imposed. Contrasting the ―very

different situation‖ in Syria from that of Libya in a BBC Radio program, he asserted that Syria

was at a ―very different stage‖ and could still choose the path of reform. Critics accused that tone

was much softer for Bashaar though by that time 400 civilian casualties had been reported in a

Ramani, ―Why France is so deeply entangled in Syria.‖

Karina Piser, ―Will Tensions Over Syria Derail France-Russia‘s Long Term Relations?‖ World Politics Review, October 14, 2016.

―France: Assad‘s departure not necessary before transition,‖ Times of Israel, December 5, 2015.

Julian Borger, ―Bashar al-Assad‘s crackdown kills UK hopes of a new dawn,‖ Guardian, April 27, 2011.

344

month of protests in Syria.9 With the passage of time this long history of British overtures to

Damascus would prove to be a source of embarrassment.

Gradually British tone and approach towards the Damascus regime hardened and by June 2011,

William Hague was calling for the Security Council to act against Bashaar al-Assad. Britain

circulated a draft for the SC resolution asserting ―the security council has a responsibility to

speak‖ and condemning the regime attacks on anti-government protestors but it fell short of a no-

fly zone mandated against Libya a year earlier that launched NATO intervention against Qaddafi

forces. But regime change call was embedded in the message "President Assad is losing

legitimacy and should reform or step aside."10

Before that William Hague had outlined Britain‘s policy on Syria in the House of Commons on 6

February 2012 and asserted that Britain would continue to support the Arab League‘s mediation

efforts; intensify contacts with the Syrian opposition; play an active role in the Friends of Syria

Group meetings; and continue to raise the issue at the UNSC.11

By February 2012, UK was all

set to recognize the Syrian National Council as a ―legitimate representative‖ of the country after

Assad regime had ―forfeited the right to lead‖ by ―miring itself in the blood of innocent

people.‖12

Despite recognition, it opposed arming the rebels initially.13

Like Libyan case, UK‘s participation and its acquiescence in the Western narrative on Assad

regime has significant importance in threat securitization for Syria. But British action in Syria

has been constrained by US policy and its response to the evolving situation. The fact that US

does not want any of the three main contending parties - the ISIS, the forces headed by al-Qaeda

affiliate al-Nusra Front or the Bashaar forces – to gain upper hand in the conflict, has made

things complicated for UK too. In this scenario the only alternative for Washington had been to 9 Helene Mulholland, Julian Borger and Ian Black, ―Not too late for Syria to do the right thing, says Hague,‖

Guardian, April 27, 2011. ―William Hague calls for UN security council to act against Syria regime,‖ Guardian, June 8, 2011.

W Hague (UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), ―Syria,‖ United Kingdom, House of

Commons, Debates, February 6, 2012, columns 23–25, accessed May 08, 2017, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120206/debtext/120206-

0001.htm#1202063000001. ―UK boosts Syria opposition ties, William Hague reveals,‖ BBC News, 24 February 2012.

W Hague (UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), ―Written answers: Syria,‖ United

Kingdom, House of Commons, Debates, 19 March 2012, columns 483–486, accessed May 09, 2017,

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120319/text/120319w0002.htm#12031939

000090.

345

pretend that ―a moderate Syrian constituency opposed to these three parties capable of taking

power in Damascus‖ exist. Following the same narrative David Cameron numbered this force to

be 70,000 and claimed that many of them were the members of the Free Syria Army- an

umbrella group that largely disintegrated way back.14

Chair of the Commons Defence Committee, Julian Lewis, in recently published report

highlighted the lack of moderate rebels in Syria, in whose support the UK could act and warned

against military action under the current circumstances.15

By mid October, 2016 even amid the

news that Russian campaign in Aleppo had ―pulverized‖ neighbourhoods, military intervention

was mostly off the table.

As a response to Syrian regime‘s yet another chemical attack that killed dozens of civilians in

Idlib in April 2017, US hit the al-Shayrat airbase near Homs, allegedly responsible for the deadly

chemical attack. The immediate response from the Downing Street hastily issued statement

―fully supported‖ the actions of the US President and added they believed the action was ―an

appropriate response to the barbaric chemical weapons attack launched by the Syrian regime, and

is intended to deter further attacks‖. British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson insisted that ―all the

evidence‖ pointed to Assad‘s regime ―using illegal weapons on their own people.‖16

The Syrian

civil war in the seventh year continues unabated; but UK by becoming an active party to the

conflict has been unable to offer political and diplomatic resolution of the conflict. As in words

of Andy Baker, who leads the Syrian response team for Oxfam: ―It‘s not only Russia, it is other

nations too, Britain among them, that have fuelled the fire of this conflict, continuing to support

one side or another and failing to deliver peace.‖17

8.1.3. Russia

Syrian civil conflict assumed more than local and regional dimension once Russia entered the

fray on the side of the Damascus regime. Moscow had long been flexing its muscles to reassert Patrick Cockburn, ―Syria air strikes: Britain is only dipping a toe in this war on Isis,‖ Independent, December 5, 2015.

Joe Watts, ―UK and US both consider military options amid warnings Russia will ‗flatten‘ Aleppo,‖ Independent, October 13, 2016.

―Arab League: Syria chemical attack a ‗major crime‘; UK says all evidence point to Assad,‖ Arab News, April 5, 2017.

Adam Withnall, ―UK Government must stop ‗fuelling the fire‘ of Syrian civil war, says Oxfam,‖ Independent, March 15, 2016.

346

its presence and to register itself once again as a great power with interests at stake in key

regions. This reassertion drive started in its own backyard even before the annexation of Crimea

in 2014 and on-going Georgian and Ukrainian conflicts. However, Syrian conflict proved that

other than the European theatre, Kremlin was ready to spread its tentacles deep into the Middle

East as well. Russian re-entry into the region more than anything else is the harbinger of post-

hegemony in the international system. US diminished presence and its unwillingness to get

embroiled in yet another Middle Eastern conflict, gave Russia a much larger space for

manipulation and now the stakes involving the final resolution of the Syrian conflict has become

so intricate that no final durable resolution of the Syrian conflict is conceivable without active

Russian involvement.

Moscow and Damascus have enjoyed close, quasi-alliance relations from 1960s to the

early 1990s when Syria was under Hafez al-Assad, Bashaar‘s father. A treaty was signed

between Syria and Soviet Union in 1980s that provided for consultation in case of threat to peace

and for military cooperation but overall Hafez remained a full master in his own house and in

Syria‘s ―near abroad‖ as evident in Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Syria titled to Soviet

camp after defection of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to US in 1972 and remained as

Soviet Union‘s staunchest ally in the Middle East till 1991. The close bilateral relations thrived

even after the break-up of Soviet Union.

The period following Soviet Union‘s demise, Russia withdrew from geopolitical competition

from the region; its approach towards the region also became more balanced after restoration of

relations with Israel. However, the dramatic developments in the wake of the Arab Spring drew

mixed response from Russian policymakers who feared Islamist takeover might lead to

overthrow of secular authoritarians or a more brutal regime following the ones public did away

with. The fear was even more pronounced in case of Syria where the opposition consisted of

jihadi elements with links to al-Qaeda and a danger of a sectarian war between Sunnis and

Shiites, Arabs and Kurds, Muslims and Christians was very real. Even Arab Spring to some in

Russia ―was but the newest form of Western-inspired, Western-led regime change.‖ 18

Ibid.

347

After few initial setbacks especially in the latter part of 2012 and the beginning of 2013 when

Bashaar al-Assad appeared increasingly vulnerable and likely to fall to a domestic insurgency;

the Syrian regime has benefitted from intervention from friendly foreign forces like battle-

hardened Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shias and far more important has been substantial Iranian

on-the ground support. To this background, the flow of Russian arms had been crucial to keep

Syrian regime afloat with which Assads‘ decade-old ties had survived and kept it shielded from

Western and Arab-backed sanctions in the United Nations Security Council. Russia significantly

increased its military presence in Syria in support of Bashaar, thus further negating any chance of

sustained Western military intervention, long advocated by FSA and the external opposition.

When Moscow sent its only aircraft carrier to the Syrian coast in January 2012 and Russian

guided-missile destroyer – the Smetlivy – arrived at the Syrian port of Tartus in the first week of

April to carry out unspecified tasks,19

it was more than apparent that Kremlin was all set for

more penetrating regional presence denied to it since the end of the Cold War.

In August 2013 when Syrian government‘s highly publicized use of chemical weapons made

Obama to threaten to launch a punitive military strike – a move that got indefinitely postponed

due both to Obama‘s failure to obtain Congressional approval and Russian initiative of placing

Syrian chemical weapons under international control - it was Moscow that eventually got

Damascus regime out of existential threat to its survival. According to Mark N. Katz, a professor

of government and politics at George Mason University: ―In short, as a result of not just Russia‘s

own actions, but also the actions, inactions, and preferences of others, Moscow‘s policy towards

Syria appears to be working , at least for now.‖20

As the civil conflict is getting long-drawn-out, the Kremlin leadership has been successful in

conveying the impression that Russia ―won‖ and the West and the US ―lost‖ in Syria – the

impression that further strengthens the perception that American ability to successfully run the

global affairs has considerably been reduced and hence the world is gradually drifting towards

post-hegemonic phase. Without Russia, Syrian regime might have been in a totally different

position now. It was the arrival of the Russian warplanes in September 2015, along with its

Ribal al-Assad, ―Syria and The Arab Spring: The Middle East on the Verge of War,‖ India International Centre Quarterly 39, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 85.

Mark N. Katz, ―Is Assad‘s Syria a ‗Win‘ for Moscow?‖ Current History 112, no. 756 (October 2013): 283.

348

ferocious bombing campaign that breathed new life into Bashaar‘s ground forces and turned the

tide of the war in his favour.

There were speculations that Russian military intervention has never been as substantial as

Moscow claimed and Assad forces failed to earn decisive on ground victories around Aleppo and

even retreated in few cases. But six months later, having turned the tide of the war in his ally's

favour, President Vladimir Putin ordered the "main part" of Russia's forces to withdraw, saying

their mission had "on the whole" been accomplished. Russian air campaign and missile strikes

went on to play a major role in the government's siege of rebel-held eastern Aleppo, which fell in

December 2016.21

However, Russia since then has paid the price for such sustained involvement

in Syrian conflict. A Russian civil plane was blown by ISIS and the Turks shot down a military

jet in November 2015 that drastically deteriorated bilateral relations between the two countries

for the time being. It could have produced unintended disastrous consequences for entire region,

had Moscow and Ankara not deliberately de-escalated the tensed situation.

Russia has tried to play the part of peacemaker too by brokering a ceasefire agreement between

opposition‘s main advocate-Turkey, Syrian chief ally-Iran, Syrian government and opposition in

Astana, Kazakhstan in January 2017 even after Russian ambassador to Turkey was assassinated

to sabotage the process. However, after the second chemical attack in Syrian province of Idlib in

April 2017, US, UK and France again blamed Bashaar regime as the international reaction to the

horrific development escalated; Russia insisted that the rebels had been behind these attacks,

asserting the poison gas contamination resulted from rebel-held chemical weapons hit by

government airstrikes – a theory not deemed credible by senior White House officials. Moscow

simultaneously threatened to veto a draft resolution proposed by US, UK and France to

―condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons," terming it "unacceptable" based

on "fake" information and reflecting "anti-Syrian" bias.22

Russian approach towards the Syrian conflict has been decisively in favour of Assad regime and

it has not shied away from taking a strong disagreeing position from that of the US and Europe.

Kremlin believes its approach is evenhanded as it has refused to use its influence to force

Bashaar to step aside while simultaneously working towards reconciliation. This approach, in ―Why is there a war in Syria?‖ BBC News, March 13, 2017.

Connor Sephton, ―Donald Trump: Russia‘s role in Syria atrocities ‗disappointing‘,‖ Sky News, April 06, 2017.

349

fact, reflects Moscow‘s vision of a global order that ties the use of force with the explicit

authorization of the UNSC and rejects regime change from abroad using any pretext, as is visible

through its vocal disapproval of extension of UNSCR 1973 to affect regime change in Libya.

Besides Moscow had voiced concerns about the tendency of the Arab Spring to be dominated by

extremists and the region becoming more radicalized – a perception not wholly unfounded that

later developments in the region confirmed.

Overall, Russian intervention in Syria has enhanced its international standing. Russia cannot be

ignored in international calculus, especially with respect to latest developments in the Middle

East. Whether it has long-term regional designs, only time will tell but at the moment a durable

and sustainable resolution of the Syrian conflict without Moscow‘s role and approval remains

elusive. Besides Russian entry into the region has tilted regional balance of power and enhanced

Iranian bid for more assertive regional leadership role too.

8.1.4. US

US policy in the Middle East for more than half a century has evolved around several core

strategic objectives i.e. preventing any regional power from attaining hegemony within the

region; ensuring the free flow of still vital to the world economy energy resources; and to broker

a durable peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours along with settlement of the

Palestinian issue. In the post-Cold War Middle East, US was running the show till the emergence

of Iran in the past decade as a principle challenger to all three core objectives.23

On the top of

that, Arab Spring toppled decades-long US allies and regional dynamics changed to an extent

that prompted concern in US policy circles that American influence within the region was being

tilted in favour of its adversaries. Any upheaval that ends with regional governments either too

weak or too anti-Western in their orientation was naturally unwelcomed and had to evoke US

strategic concerns.

Syrian uprising and Iranian assertiveness in the region to re-write the regional hierarchy that

might have undesirable effects on US interests in the region, had to be viewed through this lens.

Syria is a country that already had an acrimonious past with the US and successive Syrian

regimes were always suspicious of the Americans. Being in the Soviet camp, strained bilateral Henry A. Kissinger, ―A new doctrine of intervention?‖ Washington Post, March 30, 2012.

350

relations existed during the Cold War and hence seeking Syrian cooperation in the first Gulf War

in 1991 was a watershed event as Syria itself was eager to establish cordial relations with the

West.

However, the thaw did not last long between US and Syria even though Syria immediately

condemned 2001 terror attacks and provided significant intelligence sharing on al-Qaeda Syria.

The simmering differences between the two nations were once again brought to the fore in 2003

US invasion of Iraq where both drastically diverged in their approach towards Saddam‘s Iraq.

Nevertheless Syria‘s pivotal position in the Middle East and its determination to lead the struggle

against Israel in the region despite its weak military and lackluster economy, kept it relevant to

US policy calculus. Especially its ability to act as a ―spoiler‖ to US interests by hosting

Palestinian militant groups like Hamas and facilitating the rearmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon

had also been a thorn in the bilateral relations.

Another sore point between the two had been very cordial Syrian-Iranian relations. Syria has

served as a conduit for Iranian interests in the Middle East for decades. Some analysts had been

describing this relationship as a ―marriage of convenience‖ and others opine that the common

goal is ―not to be the next Iraq‖.24

Both countries have been designated as states that sponsor

terrorism by the US State Department and along with North Korea constitute the ―axis of evil‖ as

per President Bush. Thus the stakes of the survival of Bashaar regime are far too much for the

Iranian strategic interests that led to unprecedented Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil war.

This Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah troika and its ability to create mess for Israel has kept US engaged

in the region.25

However, there had been efforts to ease the tensions within the bilateral equation

before the unrest in Syria. Obama administration made no secret of its intention to renew

dialogue with Syria and by December 2009 had already dispatched seven official delegations to

Syrian capital. But these gestures did not last long as the Arab Spring caught region‘s long-

reigning despots in bloody upheavals.

Just as the back-seat role in Libyan intervention came under intense criticism by those who

thought such an approach raises question on US ability to lead the world engulfed in crisis. Dr Stuti Banerjee, ―The United States and Syria: The Way Ahead,‖ World Focus 379 (July 2011): 424.

For more details see Alfred B. Prados, Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United States After the Iraq War (CRS Issue Brief for Congress, RL32727, updated February 28, 2005). ; and Alfred B. Prados, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues ( CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB92075, updated March 13, 2006).

351

Similarly for critics ―US policy towards Syria since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 has been a

litany of miscalculation, frustration and tragedy.‖26

Instead of a military intervention initiative in

Syria, just like Libya, the response to the evolving situation in Syria has been disappointing for

US Arab allies who wanted to see quick Assad‘s departure like Qaddafi. Throughout his term

Obama expressed ambitious goals regarding Syria that involved removing Bashaar; destroying

ISIL and stabilizing Syria but the tension between these lofty ends and incoherent, limited effort

to achieve those ends further wounded Obama‘s ailing credibility with regional allies. Even after

claiming in August 2011 that ―the time has come for President Assad to step aside,‖ it appeared

to be a rather casual statement ―reflecting the moment rather than genuine determination to oust

Assad‖.27

The US approach during the conflict seemed hamstrung to pursuing a diplomatic path that is the

most obvious alternative to military engagement and use of force. It initially worked with UNSC

members in approving a joint UN-Arab League six-point peace plan but US insistence on

Assad‘s departure as a pre-condition turned this into faux diplomacy that was doomed from the

start. Second option pursued was replicating ―leading from behind‖ strategy by delegating

Middle East to regional allies and letting Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to fight and remove

Bashaar. But here the divergence in allies‘ objectives with that of US and their failure to

harmonize their efforts to outdo Iran made the achievement of Assad‘s departure goal

unattainable.

A less ambitious alternative had been to contain Syrian conflict without trying to fix it by

supporting immediate neighbours like Iraq, Turkey, Jordon, Lebanon and Israel; and by

preventing the conflict to spilling over into their territory through support for refugees. The final

option had been to arm Syrian opposition with sufficient power to remove Assad. Here too US

hasty withdrawal from Iraq and its slow program to arm the opposition ended up in emergence of

groups like ISIL and al-Qaeda-linked Al-Nusra Front. Besides, the debate surrounding so-called

moderates remained simplistic and self-deceptive as the groups involved in the conflict are ―far

more interested in co-opting the American power than adopting American values.‖28

Michael O‘ Hanlon, ―Deconstructing Syria,‖ The National Interest 140 (Nov/Dec 2015): 23.

Paul J. Saunders, ―Choosing Not to Choose,‖ The National Interest 141 (January/February 2016): 5-6.

Saunders, ―Choosing Not to Choose,‖ 7-8.

352

The greatest challenge to American credibility came in summer of 2013 when in spite of earlier

clear assertions form Obama Administration that a chemical weapons attack is a ―red line‖ for

US, he failed to implement the threat and to launch punitive strikes for Damascus regime‘s

documented war crimes and chose to settle for Assad willingness to turn over its chemical

arsenal to the United Nations. This neither isolationist nor idealistic approach not only

questioned American credibility as a great power but revealed US skepticism about its ability to

shape events in the Middle East.29

Under the undeniable rubric of ―humanitarian intervention‖

Obama in case of Libya, established a precedent of the authority of the president to intervene

virtually anywhere without the consent or approval of the congress, at his own discretion and as

long as he wishes. In spite of this humanitarian precedent employed in case of Libya, Obama

throughout his term remained reluctant to invoke it for direct military intervention in Syria.

It is also widely held that US disjointed and confused response failed to tilt the battlefield

balance in favour of anti-Assad forces. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary

Leon Panetta among other officials insisted to train and arm non-jihadist Syrian opposition

forces, which the President rejected in December 2012, could have changed dynamics of the

conflict at that time. Turkey, several Gulf States as well as private donors in the Gulf at that time,

were providing extensive support to jihadist militias but their strategic interests were divergent

from that of Washington. Chemical weapons attacks in April 2017 has rekindled debates on

Syrian policy but world has failed to see any drastic deviation from its already practiced Syrian

policy. Currently US operations in Raqqah are focused on the recapture of the city from ISIS.30

As the conflict will drag on, it will continue to complicate diplomatic priorities of US with Iran

over its nuclear program; will threaten to weaken global norms with international humanitarian

law as well as straining international humanitarian response system but the greatest challenge

would be the questions raised on its credibility and effectiveness of its foreign policy

commitments and international institutions like the UNSC.31

America can‘t afford to back off

from its global responsibilities but responding to global threats with the vigor seen in the first

two decades after the Cold War is also not possible. World has changed in far more ways than Augustus Richard Norton, ―Obama‘s Middle East Headaches,‖ Current History 113, no. 767 (December 2014):

Carla E. Humud, Christopher M. Blanchard and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response (CRS Report, RL33487, May 16, 2017), 1.

Ibid., 25.

353

even most in the US policy making circles would acknowledge and US ability to shape the world

and direct outcomes of events is far constrained with the emergence of equally assertive peer

challengers. It may be interpreted as drift into post-hegemonic era where US reliance on friends

and allies as well as international / regional bodies has increased. The longer Syrian conflict

lasts, the more visible would be the signs of this post-hegemonic drift.

8.2. Legitimacy

George W. Bush era unleashed US military might into the most turbulent region and entire world

is still saddling with the consequences of those imperialistic policies and hegemonic practices. It

is one of such crucial world regions where external powers have strong presence yet they have

been unable to regulate its policies. US military interventions had critically impacted on the

regional system adding to underlying tensions as aptly analyzed by Anoushiravan Etheshami that

―the US intervention in Iraq disrupted the region‘s notoriously contested and nebulous balance of

power and, not surprisingly, reinforced anarchical behavior patterns. A power vacuum in the

Arab world invited al Qaeda into Iraq. It also emboldened Iran, Israel and Turkey to become

more assertive in their regional dealings.‖32

Iran among the regional players identified has gained the most leverage in recent years, resulting

in region-wide apprehension compounded by concerns over its ambitious nuclear program. Iran‘s

rise has alarmed Israel, Turkey and core Arab states in equal measures, giving rise to further

networking of regional balance of power. Containment of Iran has become a major driver of

regional balancing either through confrontation or appeasement. Regional US allies attribute the

rise of Iran to US invasion of Iraq which they vociferously supported but to their dismay, ―non-

Arab Shiite Iran overnight acquired an unrivaled voice and presence in the historically and

strategically important Iraq. The Arabs‘ ‗eastern gateway,‘ which Saddam Hussein had so

painstakingly strengthened in order to check Iran, had suddenly become a paved highway over Anoushiravan Etheshami, ―The Middle East‘s New Power Dynamics,‖ Current History 108, no. 722 (December 2009): 395.

354

which Tehran could spread its influence and unique brand of political Islam to the heart of the

Arab world.‖33

When Obama stepped into White House as American President, he seemed to present a new

outlook and promising set of priorities but the inability of US to separate the Iranian and Israeli

theaters in the region and their persistent aggressive intent toward each other with zero-sum

approach to regional diplomacy has created difficulties. Even before the unprecedented

developments of Arab Spring rocked the region, US ability to shape events was increasingly

questioned. US though region‘s dominant external actor and simultaneously acknowledged as the

greatest outside ―local‖ power because of considerable local political and military presence; its

actions had for long proved decisive in tipping the balance of power among regional rivals.34

When Arab Spring, displaced decades-old allies like Ben Ali and Mubarak, region‘s surviving

authoritarian allies developed skepticism towards US commitment to defend allies. United States

was already widely being perceived as ―non-committal, wavering, ‗fatigued‘ and thus an

unreliable partner and protector‖ in the Arab world.35

The US inconsistent policies toward the

Arab uprisings (the varying response to Bahrain, Libya and Syria) offered more fodder for Iran‘s

resistance narrative. For local public, it simultaneously highlighted the illegitimacy of Arab

rulers by stressing their dependence on US and their impotence on pan-Arab issues (Palestine,

Iraq, Lebanon etc). A US back-seat role in the Libyan campaign gave further boost to this

narrative but Syrian conflict more than anything else in recent history has let US regional allies

to question American willingness and ability to direct events in the Arab theatre. ―Perhaps the

contest for predominance in a post-Arab Spring Middle East concerns whether the United States

could end up losing more than Iran wins, and thus, Washington needs to be careful not to create

opportunities for Iranian mischief.‖36

Iran figures so prominently in regional calculus that for regional allies any existential threat in

the region including that of ISIS is less threatening than Iranian victory in Syria. Toppling of

Bashaar is thus important for the sake of delivering a staggering blow to Hezbollah and

Ibid., 398-399.

Ibid., 396.

Abdullah Al Shayl, ―Gulf allies are losing faith in the US,‖ Gulf News, October 27, 2013.

Dalia Dassa Kaye, Frederic Wehrey and Michael Scott Doran, ―Arab Spring, Persian Winter: Will Iran Emerge

From the Arab Revolt?‖ Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (July / August 2011): 186.

355

especially Iran.37

Besides as Saudi Arabian King Abdullah pointed in 2011: ―Nothing would

weaken Iran more than losing Syria.‖ The view was reflected by Obama‘s national security

adviser, Tom Donilon, when he asserted that the ―end of the Assad regime would constitute

Iran‘s greatest setback in the region – a strategic blow that will further shift the balance of power

in the region against Iran.‖38

Thus regional US allies want decisive American interference in the

region that could drastically constrain Iranian maneuverability. For them American legitimacy lo

lead partly rests on its ability to nip Iranian evil that has posed existential threat to their regimes.

US Arab allies got disillusioned with delayed and reluctant American response to developments

in the heart of the Middle East. For them US was doing too less and too late. US on the other had

had been stressing interference in the internal affairs of states through humanitarian lens and

actions against Bashaar regime has also been justified citing grave human rights violations.

That‘s why Obama‘s decision of June 13, 2013 to send light weapons and ammunitions was an

attempt to reflect ―a fundamental reality in the dialectic of American foreign policy‖ that view

humanitarian intervention as the inevitable default position for policy makers. This is underlined

with a belief that ―America must act to salve the wounds of humanity wherever suffering is

intense and prospects for a democratic emergence are even remotely promising.‖39

The

opposition to the Damascus regime has consistently relied on this narrative throughout the six-

year war.

American approach and policy has so far failed to impress upon the allies. Dramatically evolving

situation in Syrian conflict and increased intervention of Bashaar allies has further constrained

US ability to shape the outcomes of the conflict. However, US prestige suffered a serious blow

when after declaring itself committed to a change in battlefield dynamics in the wake of first

chemical attacks in August 2013, it proved more difficult to achieve than anticipated. In the first

chemical attack on August 21, 2013 White House claimed 1,429 civilians were killed and after

asserting attack crossed the ―red line‖, it failed to launch a punitive military strike. For US The similar thoughts had been expressed in the Arab Islamic American Summit in May 2017. For details see

―Trump accuses Iran of fuelling ‗fires of sectarian conflict and terror‘,‖ Dawn, May 22, 2017. John J. Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ The National Interest 129 (January/ February 2014): 14.

Robert W. Merry, ―America‘s Default Foreign Policy,‖ The National Interest 127 (September/October 2013):5.

356

critics, this development has serious consequences for Iran too that could now count that US

threats of attack if Tehran acquires nuclear weapon would be equally hollow.40

Facing severe criticism for failing to implement the threat, Obama‘s national Security Adviser

Susan Rice stated in September 2013 that US cannot be ―consumed 24/7 by one region,

important as it is.‖41

The US strategy resultantly emboldened regional actors to make

independent bid to achieve their objectives and their actions at times had drastically been at odds

with US interests. Even the second chemical attack in Idlib that reportedly killed 72 people failed

to bring a decisive change in the course of its practiced policy on Syria. Though President

Donald Trump in a rare criticism on Russia urged Moscow ―to think carefully‖ of its support to

Assad after the attack ―crossed many, many lines‖ but stopped short of specifying how he would

tackle the crisis.42

Then there are others who believe that American credibility hasn‘t suffered after backing down

from ―red line‖ implementation because according to Daryl G. Press: ―A country‘s credibility, at

least during crises, is driven not by its past behavior but rather by power and interests.‖43

Just as

American defeat in Vietnam did not prompt Soviet Union to think its commitment to defend

Western Europe isn‘t credible. Fact remains that by broadcasting his reluctance to use force,

President Obama vitiated Syrian warlords chief motivation to speak and act like moderates and

thus the most formidable threat that they could lose US support in case of non-compliance was

rendered null and void. For the world counting on US lead role, the principal product of Obama‘s

policy had been more terrorism, more destruction, more casualties, more refugees and more

spillover effects on the region as reflected in destabilizing flood of refugees into Europe; terrorist

bomb attack on a Russian plane; murder of Russian ambassador; horrific Paris attacks; and

threatening Turkish-Russian confrontation.44

The protracted Syrian conflict and US inability to coordinate and influence its allies and

adversaries has multiplied challenges posed to US national and global interests. The brutal civil

war has descended into a multifaceted regional security crisis, emergence and empowerment of Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ 15.

Norton, ―Obama‘s Middle East Headaches,‖ 371.

Sephton, ―Donald Trump: Russia‘s role in Syria atrocities,‖

Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Saunders, ―Choosing Not to Choose,‖ 8.

357

violent armed Islamist extremist militias and groups, mass displacement of civilians, gross

human rights violations and war crimes, proliferation of arms as well as use of chemical

weapons, and overt and covert intervention of outside players. The regional allies and opponents

have diversified their approach and no longer look only towards US as the ultimate arbiter of the

conflict. The realization that without Russian consent and approval, a viable solution to the

conflict is unlikely, already point to the acknowledgment of a peer presence in the Middle East

conflict.

The years of ineffective policy on Syria has already dealt a blow to its legitimacy as a world

leader. In 2012 State of the Union address, Obama asserted ―America remains the one

indispensible nation in world affairs – and as long as I‘m President I intend to keep it that

way.‖45

But throughout his term he failed to implement this notion of indispensability with

regard to Syria. The vision conceives America to be de facto global hegemon hence it would be

calamitous for Washington to step back from its current global role and will damage US interests

as well as global peace and prosperity.

However, with major regional powers in disagreement over the likely solution to the Syrian

conflict, no credible or legitimate political process could lead to a negotiated solution. Hence,

political and military stalemate continues along with territorial fragmentation of the country and

the proliferation of the networks of violence. Humanitarian crisis is beyond imagination. US

ability to bring about a political transition process remains immensely restricted as long as

Russia, Iran and Hezbollah are committed to propping up Bashaar regime. In Middle East at least

the post-hegemonic international era has registered its presence and any likely Russian-Iranian

gains in the Syrian conflict will further strengthen this perception.

8.3. Threat Securitization for Syrian Conflict

Syria is geopolitically and strategically too important to be ignored by players interested in re-

writing the configuration of the region in flux since the first Gulf War. The Saudi / Iranian

rivalry and decades-long quest for hegemony was finally brought to the fore when Arab Spring

Ted Galen Carpenter, ―Delusions of Indispensability,‖ The National Interest 124 (March/April 2013): 47.

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upended the regional balance of power and key Arab players like Egypt and Libya were left to

grapple with their own domestic imbalances and upheavals. Syrian proximity to Israel and its

importance for Iranian grand designs in the region, threatening US and her allies‘ interests,

quickly led a civil war to be converted into a proxy battleground for parties to the conflict.

To build narrative for response to the Syrian conflict in line with that of Libya proved more

difficult than was being anticipated. The deadly conflict has entered in its seventh year and still

US and its allies have been unable to securitize Syrian threat that could have produced a

unanimous UN resolution for a decisive millary action against the Syrian regime. Russian

forceful entry on the side of Bashaar al-Assad, with a veto card in the United Nations Security

Council shows that only a negotiated solution rather than a direct military intervention would end

the conflict.

The conflict is thus testing not only credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations,

especially its Security Council but those of the players involved too especially US to play its

traditional hegemonic role. The result had seen both sides incessantly involved in presenting

alternative narrative that so far has failed to establish credibility of any player. US and its allies

have painted Bashaar regime involved in gross human rights violations against unarmed civilians

but the dynamics of conflict quickly evolved and registered a number of armed players, some of

them involved in worst war crimes and human rights violations than the Damascus regime. Fact

that groups that loathe US dominate the armed opposition to Assad has left Washington with few

choices to maneuver on-ground situation and manufacture a credible threat securitization for

Syria too.

Another reason why it has been so difficult to securitize threat for Syria has been the way

American public responded to the speculations of punitive strikes against Syria after the first

chemical attacks in 2013. The resistance to the initiative had been so apparent that Obama

refused to go for Congressional approval even after announcing that strikes would be limited. As

columnist Peggy Noonan puts it, it seemed as ―a fight between the country and Washington,

between the broad American public and Washington‘s central governing assumptions.‖46

The

analysis seem to be corroborated by the Wall Street Journal and NBC News poll in September Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ 29.

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2013 when some 74 percent voted for the belief that their country was ―doing too much in other

countries, and it is time to do less around the world and focus more on problems here at home.‖47

When America was busy to construct narrative to implicate Syrian government for chemical

attacks, others projected alternative view refuting US claim. Reese Erlich, an American

journalist, in his book Inside Syria, judiciously concluded ―Both sides quite possibly used sarin.

Both sides lied and manipulated evidence. At a minimum, the Obama administration exaggerated

its case to justify a military attack on Syria. At worst, the White House fabricated intelligence.

Bottom line: No one has yet presented convincing evidence of who perpetrated the horrific Al

Ghouta attack.‖48

Apart from lacking public endorsement, the attempt to paint Bashaar regime involved in

systematic genocide also failed. According to John J. Mearsheimer: ―Regardless of what is

happening in Syria is not genocide or anything close to the systematic murdering of a particular

group.‖ Those who are trying to portray Assad ―as a modern-day version of Hitler and arguing

this is the West‘s ‗Munich moment,‘ implying he will engage in mass murder if not dealt with

immediately. This is hyperbole of the worst kind.‖49

On top of that Obama Administration‘s

assertion that if strikes were to be conducted against Assad they would be ―unbelievably small‖

as per Secretary of State John Kerry, that would not definitely topple or end civil war; thus

rendering strategy certainly at odds with previous claim that denounces Assad as a contemporary

version of Hitler who must be dealt with immediately.50

Assad regime came up with its own very strong anti-rebel narrative that reverberated throughout

the region especially among the Shia community. It says: ―Local people taking up arms in self-

defense is a far cry from CIA/Israeli/Saudi-sponsored rebels attacking the Assad government,‖

which is what Syrian media incessantly kept reporting.51

The more the conflict in Syria took a

sectarian turn, the more it favoured Assad who then capitalized it by drawing Shias from across

the Muslim world. They are ready to fight this ―existential threat‖ to Assad regime because

Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ 29-30.

Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect, (Prometheus Books, 2014).

Mearsheimer, ―America Unhinged,‖ 20.

Ibid., 21.

Max Weiss, ―Syria in the Abyss,‖ Current History 113, no. 767 (December 2014): 372.

360

Assad‘s ouster is equated with bitter historical memory of centuries of persecution under ruthless

Sunni rule.

Regional hierarchy in transition

Arab Spring 2011

Target State

Intervener

Post-Hegemonic Phase

Intervener

US

(declining hegemon)

Syria

Unrest against the Bashaar regime

Threat Legitimacy Securitization

Crisis

International & regional Institutions

UN, Arab League, ICC

Extra-Regional involvement

Russia UK

France

Intervener

Post-Hegemonic Phase

Figure 8.1. Syrian Military Intervention Threat Securitization

Considering the fact American ―allies‖, some of which may not be so moderate or dependable,

constitute perhaps the fifth largest force in the conflict other than Bashaar troops, al-Nusra Front,

ISIS and even Hezbollah, has further weakened threat securitization that stresses Assad as the

single largest evil in the conflict. Given the complexities of the conflict dynamics, an actual

large-scale US military intervention or even the one on pattern of Libya, appears to be off the

table for the time being. However, the US still is the most dominant actor within the systemic

level and had wider credibility to securitize Syrian conflict then the Russian counterpart. But

with active resistance in narrative construction in both systemic and unit levels from Russia and

Iran, Syrian conflict so far has proved to be difficult for threat construction. This difficulty

registers itself in construction of ―war legitimation‖ discourse as identified in Figure 8.1. The

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Libyan case revealed that the threat securitization was mostly unidirectional that facilitated

interveners but here the resistance to US-backed narrative is equally compelling, hence Syrian

conflict continues unabated with all contending actors projecting and protecting their interests in

the fog of the war and still neither in a decisive position to prevail yet.

8.3.1. Target State‟s Ruling Regime as a Threat to international Peace &

Security

Assumption 1: Target state ruling regime is constructed as ―existential threat‖ to international

peace and security. Dissenting discourse within the target state is given wide

acceptance while target state‘s official discourse is marginalized (or dismissed

as propaganda) and discredited internationally.

Uprising against the ruling Bashaar regime and its sudden violent character led prospect of

another regime change in a geopolitically vital Middle Eastern state whose leader‘s staunch anti-

Israel policies proved to be a source of irritation in the West. Though the whole region was

shaking with democratic fervor in the wake of Arab Spring and people were protesting against

economic stagnation, prevalent poverty and corruption in their societies, and their

marginalization in the political processes but rulers in respective countries chose to respond

through token measures that could subdue and suppress resistance temporarily. Bashaar al-Assad

turned out to be no different from his lot and as expected resorted to extreme measures when the

popular will for change gained momentum within the country.

Considering the importance Syria possessed in geopolitical terms and its alliance with the Iranian

regime that frantically sought to expand its regional clout, the threat construction in Syrian case

was bound to be problematic for those interested in making another intervention case like Libya.

Syria was not only Iran‘s staunchest Arab ally, its loss could have seriously dented the upward

thrust that Tehran had recently gained in regional politics, empowering arch-rival Saudi Arabia

and those aligned with her. But it was not just Iran, Russian entry in the Syrian theatre enlarged

the stakes of outcome of this civil war more than its indigenous parties to the conflict initially

could have calculated.

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On the other hand, the US and foreign partners taking part in the Syrian conflict on the side of

insurgents aimed not to defeat the insurgency but to support and empower them to bring about

defeat of Bashaar regime. This strategy produced partial success initially and then settled into a

stalemate. After Obama‘s ―red lines‖ demarcation, it was expected that firm and resolute US

policy and position on the civil war would halt advance of Bashaar troops and may even result in

the formation of another ―coalition of willing‖ with the aim to de-seat Assad. But once the

Americans failed to implement their overly stated threat in case of chemical attack on civilians, it

emboldened pro-Syrian forces and made framing of Syrian regime as ―existential threat‖ to

international peace and security more difficult. The more time Damascus regime got, the more

rift in international narrative on Bashaar posing as threat emerged.

The West got its golden opportunity to frame Bashaar regime as ―existential threat‖ to world

peace and security when the first chemical weapons attack was reported in August 2013. Those

seeking a pretext for Libyan type intervention could not have missed it. A detailed analysis of the

statements issued during the period could draw the similarity between Libyan and Syrian case

threat construction. For example, UK government made its position clear on the legality of

military action in Syria:

―The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime is a serious crime of

international concern, as a breach of the customary international law prohibition

on use of chemical weapons, and amounts to a war crime and a crime against

humanity. However, the legal basis for military action would be humanitarian

intervention; the aim is to relieve humanitarian suffering by deterring or

disrupting the further use of chemical weapons.

The UK is seeking a resolution of the United Nations Security Council under

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations which would condemn the use of

chemical weapons by the Syrian authorities; demand that the Syrian authorities

strictly observe their obligations …… ; and authorise member states .... to take all

necessary measures to protect civilians in Syria….. ; and refer the situation in

Syria to the International Criminal Court.‖52

―Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal position,‖ (Prime Minister‘s Office, 10 Downing

Street, part of Peace and Stability in the Middle East and North Africa and Syria, 29 August, 2013), 1-2.

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The use of ―humanitarian intervention‖, ―crimes against humanity‖, ―all necessary measures‖

and the ―International Criminal Court‖ all rung familiar bells in the mind and a military

intervention very similar to Libya was on the table. But what the interveners failed to realize that

apart from those Libyan ingredients for military intervention, the changes in the global and

regional environment had outdated previous action plan. Syrian context was much complicated

than Libya. Syria though suffering from larger diplomatic isolation still had staunch allies like

Russia and Iran who were as aggressively involved in constructing a counter-narrative for

Bashaar regime.

US and the allies‘ frustration to come up with a unanimous UNSC resolution is evident from

implicating Russia in Syrian government crimes. In a UNSC emergency session on Aleppo the

UK, US and France openly accused Russia and stated that it is the Bashaar and Russian side that

has ―plunged to new depths and unleashed a new hell on Aleppo‖.53

While US criticism was

even sharper, Samantha Power told the meeting: ―Instead of pursuing peace, Russia and Assad

make war. Instead of helping get life-saving aid to civilians, Russia and Assad are bombing

humanitarian convoys, hospitals, and first responders who are trying desperately to keep people

alive.‖ Russia in a firm response told that it will not put up with US and UK ―tone and rhetoric

used‖, finds it ―unacceptable‖ and warns it ―can seriously damage the settlement process and our

bilateral relations‖.54

In spite of all the attempts of anti-Assad camp the UN Security Council

could not even agree on the wording of a statement condemning Syrian government violence.

Russian role was most pronounced that said ―events in Syria do not pose a threat to global

peace.‖55

Presently the world and more specifically those involved in the Syrian conflict could be seen

divided into two camps. Pro-Assad camp is hell bent to save the regime at all costs and reject any

narrative that implicates Bashaar in gross human rights violations as propaganda to force him to

step down. While anti-Bashaar camp would want to see Assad gone and would settle for less

than nothing. Since the conflict has raged for more than six years now, the parties to the conflict

has adopted non-negotiable positions and resultantly the discourse generated from both sides has

also hardened and failed to bridge the gap between the parties. ―Syria conflict: US and UK rhetoric ‗unacceptable‘-Russia,‖ BBC, September 26, 2016.

Ibid.

―How Syria and Libya compare,‖ Guardian, April 28, 2011.

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8.3.2 “Us” versus “Them” Binary Employed

Assumption 2: Regional and Extra-Regional Players favoring or opposing military intervention

are presented through ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary.

It was far easier to construct ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary in case of Libya whose regime was

internationally isolated and lacked credible allies to support it diplomatically in international

bodies and forums. But the case of Syria is not just linked to its own local and regional standing.

The allies supporting Bashaar espouse a distinct worldview which has been their guiding

principle in their approach towards the civil war. Russia particularly has increasingly diverged

from the West and has not shied about offering alternative solutions to international issues. With

veto power in the United Nations Security Council, it can effectively block US policies at the

Security Council, rendering them illegal from International law‘s perspective, should

Washington chose to still proceed with the body‘s consent.

Besides Russian determination to take overt stand in the UNSC has important ramifications too.

China which up till now has been reluctant to oppose the West alone on issues not directly

affecting its own immediate interests, has occasionally joined Moscow in opposing selected

issues. Though in such scenarios Russia takes both the lead and the heat but it eventually give

rise to a pattern of Sino-Russian opposition to the US and Europe. Both have been vocal in their

support for traditional ―state sovereignty‖ and ―nonintervention‖ principles and have

vociferously opposed Western practice of ―humanitarian intervention‖ and ―regime change‖

what they profess West carries out under the garb of humanitarian intervention.

The general chaos in post-Qaddafi Libya witnessed after NATO no-fly zone campaign gave rise

to a de facto breakup of the country and proliferation of the deposed regime‘s weapon stocks

throughout MENA. Probably more important were the lessons learnt when Russian companies

contracts were not renewed while Western companies were quickly back in business in Libya.

This material injury along with NATO exceeding its mandate has been instrumental in shaping

the response towards Syria. Without Russia, the international community‘s narrative that

unanimously condemns another ruthless dictator killing its own civilian population for sake of

prolonging its regime can‘t get through UNSC and hence loses its significance. Conversely,

staunch Russian support has given rise to wide international coverage of Assad‘s perspective and

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exposed ―Islamist extremists and fundamentalists‖ dubbed as ―rebels‖ involved in worst kind of

human rights abuses too.

This Russian lead has frustrated US and its allies efforts to present Syrian case chiefly through

evil representation of the Syrian regime in Us versus Them binary. Rather it gave rise to debates

centering around the views of an alternative global order, on the issues of sovereignty and human

rights, on the use of force and the responsibility to use force. Syria exemplifies, in many ways,

the quintessential struggle that is harbinger of a new world order reflecting waning US

hegemony and the rise of peer challengers who challenge the narrative being constructed by US.

This confrontation and contestation is being reflected in terms of Syrian war narrative by the US

and the Russia and has pitted Russia against the West and the Arab world at the Security

Council.

Nevertheless, US continue to employ ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ binary especially after the first

chemical attacks made headlines in the world and anti-Assad parties to the conflict squarely

blamed Bashaar for the horrific attacks. It had been repeatedly asserted that those with Us are on

―the right side of the history‖ and by voting against Assad regime this side fulfills its moral

obligation but those who are ―unable to, or unwilling to, then that will be their responsibility to

bear,‖ told Susan Rice, US ambassador to UN in a closed Security Council meeting on Syria.56

This moral responsibility theme was invoked by British PM too who told MPs in London, ―If

anyone votes against that resolution or tries to veto it, that should be on their conscience.‖57

British PM in a telephonic conversation with President Obama stressed for ―the need for a tough

and robust response to the appalling war crime committed by the Assad regime in Ghouta‖ but

made simultaneously clear the House was against British military action.58

Although a letter

from the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Jon Day, published on August 29, 2013

about reported chemical weapons use in Syria in the early hours of August 21, 2013 that resulted

in at least 350 fatalities and to assess Assad regime‘s responsibility for the attack, had clearly

stated that the Syrian regime had used lethal chemical weapons on 14 occasions since 2012 and

Ian Black and Nidaa Hassan, ―UK and France seek UN action on Syria as thousands flee,‖ Guardian, June 8, 2011.

Ibid.

―Prime Minister‘s Phone Call with President Obama‖ (Prime Minister‘s Office, 10 Downing Street, part of Peace and Stability in the Middle East and North Africa and Syria, 30 August, 2013)

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the judgment was made ―with the highest level of certainty‖ and it established a clear pattern of

regime involvement.59

It further stated: ―Unlike previous attacks, the degree of open source reporting of CW use on 21

August has been considerable.‖ And the JIC concluded that ―it is highly likely that the regime

was responsible for the CW attacks on 21 August.‖ While the Syrian regime narrative of the

attacks ―either faked or undertaken by the Syrian Armed Opposition‖ was rejected altogether. It

asserted: ―There is no credible intelligence or other evidence to substantiate the claims or the

possession of CW by the opposition.‖60

Both the sides are still constructing their narrative and justifying their approach towards the

conflict. While swing actors like Egypt and Turkey and their contradictory stances on few

occasions made things difficult for anti-Assad coalition. After more than six years of war and

two deadly chemical attacks reported in the media, the humanitarian argument got weakened

with more players getting involved and taking contradictory stances. Syrian conflict has long

out-grown its local and regional dimension and involvement of extra-regional players has made

it crucial for long-term effects on evolving global hierarchy too.

8.3.3. Co-opting International/Regional Institutions

Assumption 3: In post-hegemony the intervener (i.e. the declining hegemon) co-opts

international institutions and relies on ―legitimation discourse‖ for authorization of

force against the target state.

The case of Libya revealed that it is far more convenient for the interveners to legitimize

intervention if the regional and international institutions and bodies could be co-opted. The

unanimous narrative generated through these bodies legitimize not only the threat constructed for

military intervention but it simultaneously signal the influence and ability of the hegemon to get

things done through these bodies.

―Syria: Reported Chemical weapons Use- Letter from the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)‖

(Cabinet Office, part of Peace and Stability in the Middle East and North Africa and Syria, 29 August, 2013), 1-3 , accessed May 25, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-reported-chemical-weapons-use-joint-intelligence-committee-letter. Ibid.

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The Arab League‘s role had been very pronounced in Libya and its call for a no-fly zone

ultimately resulted in NATO military campaign. In case of Syria, it took a lead role again in

urging UNSC to act. It not only acted through its intermediaries in Syria but once the

government crackdown resulted in violent deaths, it suspended Syria from organization‘s

meetings.61

However, first public response condemning Syrian government‘s actions came in

mid-June 2011with Amr Moussa, the Secretary General, stating that Arab countries were ―angry

and actively monitoring‖ the crisis situation.62

But the member states differed in their views63

and it was difficult to come up with a strongly worded condemnation against the Syrian regime.

However, the next Secretary General of the Arab League, Nabil el-Araby, issued a stronger

statement on 6 August 2011, expressing the League‘s ―growing concern and strong distress over

the deteriorating security conditions in Syria due to escalating violence and military operations in

Hama and Deir al-Zor [sic] and other areas of Syria.‖64

During this period an Arab League ―mission‖ announced for Syria was postponed on September

07, 2011 for unknown reasons65

that a London-based Arab newspaper later claimed because of

el-Araby meeting with Syrian dissidents in late September.66

Later a 13 point peace plan67

announced by Arab League in September was accepted by Damascus regime that called for a

comprehensive cease-fire, the withdrawal of Syrian troops from civilian areas, the release of

prisoners and the beginning of a ―national dialogue‖.68

The Syrian government was then accused

of non-adherence to the plan and was suspended in mid-November form Arab League. By end

November economic sanctions were also imposed on Syria.

Another prominent attempt in Syrian crisis was the signing of an agreement regarding

deployment of the Arab League observers to monitor the situation in Syria on December 19,

More detail on the Arab League‘s response to the Syrian uprising is available in M, Küçükkeleş, ―Arab League‘s Syria policy,‖ SETA Policy Brief 56, April 2012, accessed May 09, 2012, http://setadc.org/policy-briefs/434-arab-leagues-syrian-policy. Cited in M. Chulov, ―Arab League issues first condemnation of Syria violence,‖ The Guardian, 14 June 2011.

―Excerpts: Arab League's Mussa angers Syria: Syrian crackdown intensifies,‖ Independent Media Review Analysis, 15 June 2011.

Ibid.

―Arab foreign ministers to meet on Syria after League visit delayed,‖ Haaretz, 7 September 2011.

S. Abu-Husain and S. Jumaa, ―Syria‘s Arab League membership under threat,‖ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat , 9 August 2011.

A. Blomfield, ―Arab League presents Syria peace plan to Bashar al-Asad,‖ The Telegraph , 11 September 2011.

―Syria agrees to end crackdown, Arab League says,‖ CNN, November 3, 2011.

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2011.69

However, by end January 2012, all observers were withdrawn, with Arab League

Secretary General al-Araby citing the ―deterioration of the situation in Syria and the continued

use of violence‖ as the reason for the suspension of the observers‘ activities.70

By the time first Chemical weapons attacks were reported by Syrian regime, Arab League

condemned the ―horrible crime carried out with internationally prohibited chemical weapons‖

and put ―entire responsibility‖ on Assad‘s government. In spite of Arab League being in the US

list of allies ―ready to respond‖ to alleged attacks according to Secretary of State, John Kerry;

influential League members like Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia and Algeria expressed opposition

to foreign military intervention in Syria.71

A failure to get a unified green light from this

prestigious Arab body significantly weakened whatever military intervention plan US had in its

box at that time.

Even in March 2017, the Arab League chief Ahmad Abul Gheit urged Arab governments to do

more to resolve the Syrian crisis and "find an effective way of intervening to stop the shedding of

blood in Syria and end the war", rather than to let ―this kind of terrible crisis gets passed over to

international and regional powers to manage as they like and control according to their own

interests‖.72

Even after the Idlib chemical attacks in April 2017 that Gheit called ―a major crime

and a barbaric act‖ but he failed to specify who should be held responsible when he stated:

―Whoever carried it out will not escape from justice, and must be punished by the international

community according to international law and international humanitarian law.‖73

Apart from Arab League, the UNSC has also been not very forthcoming in Syrian case. Libyan

episode and extension of NATO‘s mandate has kept Russian and China away from any other no-

fly zone implementation resolution. Another difference from Libyan case could be observed the

way Syrian regime is perceived by Russia and China. The rise of Islamic fundamentalist and

extremists groups in Syria and their active backing by anti-Assad actors has weakened their

position in international bodies and they have failed to frame Bashaar al-Assad as the single most

threat to be eradicated first of all from Syria. Pro-Assad actors particularly Russia and Iran have

―Syria signs deal to allow Arab League observers into country,‖ The Guardian, December 19, 2011.

A. Samir, ―Arab League suspends Syria mission as violence rages,‖ Reuters, January 28, 2012.

―Arab League discusses Syria crisis,‖ Al-Jazeera, September 01, 2013.

―Arab League chief urges action on Syria,‖ Al-Araby, March 28, 2017.

―Arab League: Syria chemical attack,‖ Arab News.

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refused to condone this narrative. Hence, as a permanent member of UNSC Russia is giving full

backing to Assad and has threatened to veto drafts of resolution inconsistent with its policy on

the Syrian conflict.

US and her allies strived to implicate Bashaar in human rights violations and war crimes through

US resolution; In response Russia and China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution in October 2011

that would have strongly condemned Syrian regime for its alleged ―grave and systematic human

rights violations and the use of force against civilians‖. Russia in rejecting the resolution stated:

―Today‘s rejected draft was based on… the philosophy of confrontation. We cannot agree with

this unilateral, accusatory bent against Damascus. We deem unacceptable the threat of an

ultimatum and sanctions against the Syrian authorities. Such an approach contravenes the

principle of a peaceful settlement of the crisis on the basis of a full Syrian national dialogue.‖74

Libyan UNSCR 1973 and the way it was imposed, was also cited as a reason.75

Then the second draft resolution in February 2012 was again vetoed by both Russia and China

that likewise would have condemned the Syria regime for ―the continued widespread and gross

violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms‖. On this occasion, the Chinese

representative at the UNSC justified its veto by arguing that Security Council members were

attempting to ―put undue emphasis on pressuring the Syrian Government‖ and were aiming for a

―prejudged result of the dialogue‖ (meaning regime change).76

Russia argued that:

―In the Security Council, we [Russia] have actively tried to reach a decision for an

objective solution that would truly help to put a prompt end to violence and start a

political process in Syria. The decision of the Security Council should be just that,

but from the very beginning of the Syrian crisis some influential members of the

international community, including some sitting at this table, have undermined

any possibility of a political settlement, calling for regime change, encouraging

the opposition towards power, indulging in provocation and nurturing the armed

struggle.‖77

UNSC, 6627th meeting: S/PV.6627: provisional, New York, UNSC, 4 October 2011, pp. 3–4, accessed May 09, 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627. Ibid., 4. ; on UNSC Resolution 1973 see N Brew, N Brangwin, M Harris and N Markovic, Libya and the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, FlagPost, Parliamentary Library, 24 March 2011, http://parliamentflagpost.blogspot.com.au/2011/03/libya-and-united-nations-security.html. UNSC, 6711th meeting: S/PV.6711: provisional, New York, UNSC, 4 February 2012, p. 9, accessed May 09, 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6711. Ibid., 9.

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Finally the third draft resultantly was vetted to avoid third Chinese / Russian veto and the

UNSCR 2042 adopted on April 14, 2012 condemned the ―wide spread violations of human rights

by the Syria authorities‖, as well as ―any human rights abuses by armed groups‖.78

Russia‘s

representative told the Security Council that ―the initial draft resolution underwent substantive

changes to make it more balanced, appropriately reflect realities‖.79

Thus the inability of the

Western nations to unanimously construct Assad regime as either the sole perpetrator of human

rights violations or to get the unanimous world opinion behind it made threat securitization even

more problematic. It could be gauged from the fact when Houla massacre took place that resulted

in killings of dozens of children, women and men and the wounding of hundreds more, only a

press statement – which is weaker than a presidential statement and does not go in the council‘s

record- was issued condemning the massacre.80

Thus the threat securitization for Syrian conflict

by co-opting regional / international bodies and organizations has also remained problematic so

far, pointing towards yet another failure of anti—Assad camp.

8.4. War Legitimation Discourse

The need to employ war legitimation discourse has been discussed in previous chapters. The

more post-hegemonic drift in the global affairs becomes apparent, the more reliance on war

legitimation becomes eminent. With the waning of US hegemony and rise of peer challengers in

global and regional politics, declining hegemon seeks approval of regional and international

bodies and war narrative reflects increased reliance on ―positive self-perception and

representation‖ and ―negative other-perception and representation‖.

However, Syrian case shows that when resistance in both the regional and global hierarchy

manifests itself openly and aggressively, then war legitimation discourse becomes problematic.

In this conflict US can still be seen imposing its superpower identity but active and aggressive

UNSC, Resolution 2042 (2012), New York, UNSC, 14 April 2012, accessed May 09, 2017, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/295/28/PDF/N1229528.pdf?OpenElement. UNSC, 6751st meeting: S/PV.6751: provisional, New York, UNSC, 14 April 2012, accessed May 09, 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6751. UNSC, Security Council press statement on attacks in Syria, media release, 29 May 2012, accessed May 09, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10658.doc.htm.

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resistance from Russia and Iran has successfully generated counter-narrative that has provided

Bashaar regime with its breathing space even after six years of conflict.

8.4.1. Legitimation by reference to authority

As narrated before legitimation by reference to authority derives from ―because I say so theme‖

and it can be the authority of any tradition, custom or law which can be referred to legitimize

violence against the target state and construct narrative for war. Analysis of Syrian conflict

shows that failed war legitimation by reference to authority could be seen as the highest

international body authorizing the use of force and thereby making legitimation through

―international humanitarian law‖ and ―responsibility to protect‖ norm could not be utilized

without sanction of the United Nations Security Council. This failure is manifested in failed

UNSC attempts to implicate Syrian regime in past six years since the start of the uprising.

Here Russia had been playing the lead role in negating US and Western narrative that squarely

lays the blame on Assad regime for excessive and gross human rights violations and war crimes.

Russian veto and opposition from China has so far frustrated US and her allies to come up with a

Security Council resolution that binds Syrian government for ensuring a swift end to the

protracted civil war. Arab League being the most important regional body has also failed to

produce the kind of pressure on the Syrian regime in spite of annulment of its membership. Even

in the recent chemical attacks in Idlib in April 2017, the statement from Arab Leagues did not

pin the responsibility on Damascus regime and condemned the horrific attacks by stating

―whoever carried it out‖ thus without overtly laying the blame on the regime.81

The chemical attacks in Syria gave employment of anti-chemical weapons conventions to be

employed against the regime. Chemical weapons are banned under the Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC) 1997. It bans the development, production, transfer, stockpiling and use of

chemical and toxin weapons. 189 countries are signatory to this convention but Syria along with

Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea and South Sudan are not parties to the CWC.

However, Syria signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol that asks for the Prohibition for the Use in War

of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare bans the

―Arab League: Syria chemical attack a ‗major crime‘; UK says all evidence point to Assad,‖ Arab News, April 5, 2017.

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use of chemical or biological agents in warfare against other states. The Geneva Protocol does

not address the use of these weapons in internal conflicts. But when Syria gave up its chemical

weapons stock under international monitoring and Russian backing, war legitimation employing

this convention has now dubious significance.

Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict could be gauged from the fact that when President

Donald Trump ordered direct military strikes in Syria over chemical weapons episode in April

2017, this first major Trump foray opened up a serious rift between Moscow and Washington.

Russian deputy UN envoy, Vladimir Safronkov, in a meeting of the UN Security Council

expressed Kremlin response by stating: "We strongly condemn the illegitimate actions by the

U.S. The consequences of this for regional and international stability could be extremely

serious.‖82

Even US, like its allies from Asia, Europe and the Middle East who somewhat expressed

cautious support for the attacks, called this intervention to be interpreted a ―one-off‖ intended to

deter future such chemical attacks rather an expansion of US role in the Syrian civil war.83

It

clearly reflects US recognizes Russian stakes involved in the survival of Bashaar regime and

Kremlin determination to go all out for its ally‘s defence. All this has further complicated a

unanimous response to condemn violence by Syrian regime from UNSC forum and thus war

legitimation narrative by reference to authority of international humanitarian law.

Besides in Libyan case there was an umbrella opposition during the uprising against Qaddafi that

was presented as an alternative to the ruling regime during the conflict. But Syrian opposition is

not only fragmented but most active and most-effective anti-Bashaar groups are also the most

staunch fundamentalists and extremists involved in worst humanitarian abuses as well. Even the

moderate rebels referred by US, are not so moderate and have raised concerns in US policy

making circles over their ability to take on the Syrian regime and avoid extremist Islamist

tendencies too. The dynamics of the Syrian conflict are far more complex and involvement of

regional and extra-regional players and their competing and irreconcilable interests are providing

Michelle Nichols, ―Andrew Osborn and Tom Perry, ―Russia warns of serious consequences from U.S. strike in Syria,‖ Reuters, April 8, 2017.

Ibid.

373

not only breathing space to Bashaar but simultaneously has made it difficult to get international

bodies sanction for an international military intervention on the pattern of Libya.

8.4.2. Legitimation by reference to values

Legitimation by reference to values evolves through representation of relatively positive and

neutral nouns and processes for ―Our‖ actions while negatively valued nouns and processes are

used to represent ―Their‖ actions. This lexicalization then operationalizes positive Self-

representation and negative Other-representation as discussed in previous chapters. This category

has also been problematic in Syrian conflict. Instead of bifurcation of parties to the conflict in

evil versus good category that might have casted Bashaar regime as the prime evil involved in

abuses against its civilian population, emergence of armed hardliner Islamist groups with links to

al-Qaeda and ISIS has made representation of their violence problematic. Initially the term

―rebels‖ was coined to represent any armed group against Assad and this term then neutralizes

the presence of extremists groups and their violence perpetrated against their fellow community.

The chemical attacks in August 2013 provided US to squarely frame Bashaar regime as they

deemed fit. American President Obama in address to the nation said: ―…what happened to those

people, to those children, is not only a violation of international law, it's also a danger to our

security….Let me explain why. If we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop

using chemical weapons.84

The barbaric and horrific acts of Damascus regimes were contrasted

with American values and American exceptional role in such circumstances was highlighted.

Obama in the same speech asserted: ― …after careful deliberation, I determined that it is in the

national security interests of the United States to respond to the Assad regime's use of chemical

weapons through a targeted military strike. The purpose of this strike would be to deter Assad

from using chemical weapons, to degrade his regime's ability to use them and to make clear to

the world that we will not tolerate their use. That's my judgment as commander in chief.‖85

He

further added: ―What kind of world will we live in if the United States of America sees a dictator

brazenly violate international law with poison gas and we choose to look the other way?‖86

―Barak Obama‘s speech on Syria in full,‘‖ Telegraph, September 11, 2013.

Ibid.

Ibid.

374

Rhetorically Bashaar and his regime have consistently been framed by anti-Assad camp in

deliberate violation of human rights and war crimes. This negative Other–representation involves

Syria and its allies like Russia and Iran who are providing material and logistical support to

Assad. For example, Amnesty International claimed in March 2016 that Syrian regime along

with Russia was ―deliberately‖ targeting hospitals with the aim to pave way for advance of

Syrian ground troops to northern Aleppo which is gross human rights violation as no government

should prevent people from accessing medical care. These actions amount to ―war crimes‖

according to laws of war that accord special protection to hospitals and medical units unless they

function outside their humanitarian domain to commit ―acts harmful to the enemy‖ such as to

store weapons. Since no evidence of military vehicles, checkpoints, fighters or front lines near

hospitals attacked were reported by AI,87

hence malicious intent of attackers was obvious.

During the siege of Aleppo by Bashaar troops, the narrative constructed by anti-Assad media

highlighted how the Syrian-Russian combination during bombardment targeted civilians and

civilian institutions, like hospitals, markets and like. Once the city was captured by Bashaar

forces they went door to door hunting for fighters‘ families, executing children and women and

whoever happened to be there. But in a debate on Russian role in Democracy Now, Stephen

Cohen busted this narrative by stating its ―only one of the two or three competing narratives.‖ He

explained how the terms ―terrorists‖ and ―jihadists‖ had been removed from the New York Times

and the Washington Post in the days following Assad‘s assault on Aleppo and replaced with the

word ―rebels‖ which had a positive connotation. Until September United States was telling that

terrorists were holding large parts of eastern Aleppo and not letting civilians use the multiple

corridors out of the city but with the Russian-Syrian victory all the terrorists and jihadists

apparently disappeared. By removing terrorists and jihadists from the equation the ―liberation‖ of

Aleppo was converted into ―slaughter‖ house by regime.88

The attempt by anti-Assad group has failed to construct war legitimation through values on a

number of counts: US has been seen reluctant to take a lead role in Syrian conflict. In September

11, 2013 speech, Obama clearly stated: ―I have resisted calls for military action because we

cannot resolve someone else's civil war through force, particularly after a decade of war in Iraq ―Hospitals have become the new front line,‖ Amnesty International UK, March 03, 2016.

―Slaughter or Liberation? : A Debate on Russia‘s role in the Syrian War & the Fall of Aleppo,‖ Democracy Now, December 14, 2016.

375

and Afghanistan.‖89

When the state sitting at the apex of the global system is shying away from

lead role it will definitely put allies on a back foot. This reluctance has simultaneously given

room to pro-Assad group to frame their narrative where a military action against a sovereign

state is questionable. Secondly the rebels fighting Assad are Islamists who actually pose

―existential threat‖ not only to Damascus regime but to world peace and security too. West in

spite of focus of their narrative on ―moderate rebels‖ cannot disclaim that territory under control

of these rebels had seen worst human rights abuses comparable and at times exceeding in

magnitude to that of regime in Damascus. Pro-Assad camp is exploiting this lack of genuine

moderate opposition and even chemical attacks reported hitherto have been hotly contested if

Assad regime had actually perpetrated them. With the extension of the civil war into yet another

year and the involvement of complex number of players and their affiliations, war legitimation

through values will continue to be problematic.

Few examples will show how the attempt to present ―Our‖ positively moralized process and

―Their‖ negatively moralized process had been represented during the Syrian conflict so far (See

Table 8.1 and Table 8.2).

Table 8.1: Positively moralized processes representing „Our‟ violent actions

Process Prototypical Example

Silence Assad‘s ―Our main focus and the focus that we have with our partners is on trying to get the guns

guns silenced, first and foremost, Asad‘s guns silenced and then, as Kofi Annan has said, as he takes

steps to implement the promises that he made, then Kofi Annan in the first instance, but

everybody with influence working with the opposition to make clear that their guns should be

silenced as well.‖ (A senior State Department official, March 30, 2012)90

Strike ―In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming

humanitarian necessity, military intervention to strike specific targets with the aim of deterring

and disrupting further such attacks would be necessary and proportionate and therefore legally

justifiable. Such an intervention would be directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian

catastrophe, and the minimum judged necessary for that purpose.‖

(UK Government, August 29, 2013)91

―Barak Obama‘s speech on Syria in full,‘‖ Telegraph, September 11, 2013.

Senior State Department official, Special briefing: senior State Department officials en route to Riyadh, Saudi

Arabia, media release, 30 March 2012, accessed May 27, 2017, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/187218.htm.

―Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal position,‖ Prime Minister Office.

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Negative moralization of Assad regime and the rhetoric used remind us threat construction

employed against Qaddafi during Libyan intervention. (Table 8.2)

Table 8.2: Negatively moralized processes representing „Our‟ violent actions

Process Prototypical Example

Attack ―Hospitals, water and electricity are always the first to be attacked. Once that happens people no

longer have services to survive.‖ (A doctor from Anadan, March 2016)92

Bomb ―We condemn in the strongest terms the continued use of ―barrel bombs‖, ballistic missiles and

heavy artillery by the regime against the Syrian people, in full contradiction with the Geneva

process as well as basic human rights principles.‖

(Media note, Washington, DC: January 31, 2014)93

Kill ―This was the systematic killing of peaceful and unarmed citizens by security forces.‖

(Radwan Ziadeh, head of the Damascus Centre for Human Rights, April 2011)94

Gass to death ―The situation profoundly changed, though, on Aug. 21st, when Assad's government gassed to

death over a thousand people, including hundreds of children. The images from this massacre

are sickening, men, women, children lying in rows, killed by poison gas, others foaming at the

mouth, gasping for breath, a father clutching his dead children, imploring them to get up and

walk.‖ (Obama, September 11, 2013)95

Massacre ―….tyrants like Bashar al-Assad, who drops barrel bombs to massacre innocent children….‖

(Obama, September 28, 2015)96

―We also warn the regime to not repeat the massacres of Houla, Banyas, and Baida and to not

use limited evacuations of civilians as an excuse to attack those residents who remain behind.‖

(State Department Spokesperson, October 18, 2013)97

Slaughter ―Nowhere is our commitment to international order more tested than in Syria. When a dictator

slaughters tens of thousands of his own people, that is not just a matter of one nation‘s internal

affairs—it breeds human suffering on an order of magnitude that affects us all.‖ (Obama,

September 28, 2015)

Execute ―They will shoot anything that moves. And if soldiers refuse to fire on people, they are

―Hospitals have become the new front line,‖ Amnesty International UK.

Washington, DC (Office of the Spokesperson), London 11 Communiqué, Media note, January 31, 2014, accessed May 29, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/221088.htm. Katherine Marsh, ―Syrian mourners say government snipers carried out massacre,‖ Guardian, April 03, 2011.

―Barak Obama‘s speech on Syria in full,‘‖ Telegraph, September 11, 2013.

Polly Mosendz, ―Read: The Full Transcript of President Obama‘s Speech At the United Nations General Assembly,‖ Newsweek, September 28, 2015.

Jen Psaki (Department Spokesperson), Siege of Mouadimiya, press statement, October 18, 2013, accessed May 29, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215666.htm.

377

executed. These are all the fourth division soldiers in uniform.‖ (A

resident of Derra village under siege, May 1, 2011)98

―When Assad‘s forces captured al-Bustan al-Qasr neighborhood and al-Fardos neighborhood,

Assad‘s forces, when they entered—when they entered these neighborhoods, they executed 82

people. And the relatives of the victims, who are now with us, told us they were executed,

including like 13 kids and seven women. All of them were executed. And what we are now—

and what we worry about, about our [inaudible], that maybe the genocide—that genocide will

happen in the coming days, if nothing will stop them in the coming hours.‖ (Ismail Al Abdullah,

White Helmet, December 14, 2016)99

In Syrian conflict again ―Our side‖ is being expressed through the attributes, concepts and

qualities that is generally inherent in us and our societies as opposed to them (Table 8.3). The

struggle against Assad is thus for the preservation of those attributes we naturally posses, the

concepts like democracy we cherish and qualities like leadership we have displayed in times of

crisis.

Table 8.3: Our side‟s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions

Peace ―And we hope that as long as America stands for justice that peace and harmony will in the end

Harmony prevail.‖ (Trump, April 06, 2017)

Security ―My fellow Americans, for nearly seven decades the United States has been the anchor of

global security. This has meant doing more than forging international agreements. It has meant

enforcing them. The burdens of leadership are often heavy, but the world's a better place

because we have borne them.‖ (Obama, September 11, 2013)

Leadership ―Our ideals and principles, as well as our national security, are at stake in Syria, along with our

leadership of a world where we seek to ensure that the worst weapons will never be used.‖

(Obama, September 11, 2013)

Humanity ―On Aug. 21st, these basic rules were violated, along with our sense of common humanity.‖

(Obama, September 11, 2013)

Exceptional ―But when, with modest effort and risk, we can stop children from being gassed to death and

thereby make our own children safer over the long run, I believe we should act. That's what

makes America different. That's what makes us exceptional.‖ (Obama, September 11, 2013)

Civilized ―Tonight I call on all civilized nations to join us in seeking to end the slaughter and bloodshed

in Syria, and also to end terrorism of all kinds and all types.‖ (Trump, April 06, 2017)

―In Syria‘s rebel city ‗they will shoot anything that moves‘,‖ Guardian, May 1, 2011. 99

―Slaughter or Liberation?‖ Democracy Now.

378

Democracy “I'm also the president of the world's oldest constitutional democracy.‖ (Obama, September

11, 2013)

Again the negative attributes of Assad regime, equates him at par with dictators like Qaddafi

who naturally repress their citizens and employ brutality to suppress their genuine demands

(Table 8.4).

Table 8.4: Their side‟s highly moralized titles, attributes, ambitions

Terror ―Tragically, Syrians are threatened not only by ISIL‘s grotesque violence and repressive

ideology, but also by the Assad regime‘s unrelenting campaign of terror.‖ (State Department

Spokesperson, February 24, 2015)100

Repress ―Assad reacted to peaceful protests by escalating repression and killing that, in turn, created the

environment for the current strife.‖ (Obama, September 28, 2015)

―Those who repress their own people in Syria will not survive. The time of autocracies is over.

Totalitarian regimes are disappearing. The rule of the people is coming.‖

(Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, September16, 2011)101

Imprison ―The regime continues to imprison tens of thousands of Syrians without fair trials, including

Torture women, children, doctors, humanitarian aid providers, human rights defenders, journalists, and

others who it routinely subjects to torture, sexual violence, and inhumane conditions.‖

(State Deputy Department Spokesperson, July 24, 2015)102

Dictator ―On Tuesday, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad launched a horrible chemical weapons attack on

innocent civilians using a deadly nerve agent.‖ (Trump, April 6, 2017)103

Brutality ―They have braved ferocious brutality at the hands of their government. They have spoken with

their peaceful marches, their silent shaming of the Syrian regime, and their courageous

persistence in the face of brutality—day after day, week after week. The Syrian government has

responded with a sustained onslaught.‖ (Obama, August 18, 2011)104

Death ―The United States strongly condemns the Syrian regime‘s continued siege of Ghouta and other

Damascus suburbs, …..This siege has led to unprecedented reports of children dying of

100Press Statement, Recent Attacks on Civilians in Syria, Jen Psaki, State Department Spokesperson, Washington

Dc, February 24, 2015, accessed May 17, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237871.htm. ―Syria's oppressors will not survive, Erdoğan says in Libya,‖ Today‟s Zaman, September 16, 2011.

Press Statement, Charges Against Syrian Activists, Mark C. Toner, Deputy Department Spokesperson, July 24, 2015, accessed May 17, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245261.htm. Kelcie Wills, ―Read: Full Transcript of Trump‘s speech on US Syria strike,‖ AJC.com, April 06, 2017.

B. Obama (US President), Obama on the situation in Syria, media release, August 18, 2011, accessed May 28, 2017, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/08/20110818094932su0.1070019.html#axzz1YiyXhh

379

malnutrition-related causes in areas that are only a few miles from Bashar al-Assad's palace in

Damascus.‖

(State Department Spokesperson, October 18, 2013)105

Murderer ―Assad choked out the lives of innocent men, women and children. It was a slow and brutal

death for so many. Even beautiful babies were cruelly murdered in this very barbaric attack.‖

(Trump, April 06, 2017)

8.4.3. Legitimation by reference through rationalization

This effect-oriented legitimation typically involves overview of negative consequences of

previous practices and foreseen or expected benefits. As the actions fulfill the criteria of utility

for the purpose or function they serve, hence the war legitimation discourse relies on

rationalization. The diplomatic isolation of Qaddafi made it easier for anti-Qaddafi coalition to

construct war narrative by justifying actions against him through rationalization discourse.

Even before the chemical attacks in Syria in August 2013, President Obama made clear in

August 2012 that use of these weapons necessitate a response of some kind. Echoing similar

sentiments he against stated in an interview on August 28, 2013 that ―I have no interest in any

kind of open-ended conflict in Syria, but we do have to make sure that when countries break

international norms like chemical weapons that could threaten us, that they are held

accountable.‖ Similar views were expressed by Secretary Kerry on August 26 that ―all peoples

and all nations who believe in the cause of our common humanity must stand up to assure that

there is accountability for the use of chemical weapons so that it never happens again.‖106

When possible intervention against Syria was being speculated, Secretary of State John Kerry

discussed hypothetical contingencies that presented intervention in Syria a not very unlikely

scenario. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he said:

―in the event Syria imploded, for instance, or in the event there was a threat of a chemical weapons cache falling into the hands of al-Nusra or someone else, and it

was clearly in the interest of our allies and all of us – the British, the French and others – to prevent those weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of the

Press Statement, Siege of Mouadimiya, Jen Psaki.

Christopher M. Blanchard and Jeremy M. Sharp, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress (CRS Report, R43201, September 12, 2013), 14.

380

worst elements, I don‘t want to take off the table an option that might or might not

be available to a president of the United States to secure our country.‖107

This speculation had in its background a concern that Syrian allies such as Iran, Lebanese

Hezbollah or other non-state actors may gain access to chemical or biological weapons or

components. Thus Representatives Chris Van Hollen and Gerald Connolly circulated a draft

resolution for the use of military force authorizing American President ―to use the United States

Armed Forces to prevent and deter the further use of chemical weapons in Syria or by Syria

against any other group or country.‖108

Besides the potential of the proliferation of these chemical weapons to parties hostile to US other

reasons cited by US officials included the unacceptability of the use of chemicals weapons

because of international consensus on these weapons malicious qualities; large scale targeting of

civilian population, irrespective of the weapons employed; and the potential ramifications of

escalated or expanded violence in Syria, including their loss and/or use on neighbouring

countries and US interests in the region.109

These reasons could have been framed as compelling

enough for anti-Assad coalition, had US planned to go ahead with its punitive strike against

Syria. The failure to get through Congressional and UNSC backing, however, made war

legitimation through rationalization difficult.

8.4.4. Legitimation by reference to temporality

An aggression against a target state is usually justified using temporal maximization that

involves constructing events that are capable of exerting an impact on both the speaker and the

addressee and may involve construction of past events in such a way that they seem to effect the

current situation (discussed Chapter 6). The chemical attacks in August 2013 helped anti-

Bashaar camp to construct threat by reference to temporality by presenting the horrific attacks as

deliberate strategy of the regime. This legitimation helps in constructing ―their transgressions‖ as

responsible actors and present ―them‖ in unchallengeable ways that highlight their evil nature

Ibid., 11.

Draft circulated to legislative staff via email, September 03, 2013, accessed May 27, 2017, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/165278488-House-Van-Hollen-Connolly-Syria-Resolution.pdf. Blanchard and Sharp, Possible US Intervention in Syria, 12.

381

and our innocence. For example with regard to the attacks, it was stated: ―The U.S. intelligence

community assesses that the opposition has not used chemical weapons and the scenario in

which the opposition executed the attack on August 21 is highly unlikely.‖110

The brutality and atrocities of Bashaar regime were framed using both past and present. Najib al-

Ghadban, a US-based Syrian academic and political activist, equated the events in 2011 to a past

bitter legacy of 1982 when Hafez-ul-Assad carried out Hama Massacre. "You cannot separate

what happened in 1982 from what is happening now. It's the same trend, but of course the world

has changed so it cannot be on the same scale."111

Throughout the conflict actions of Assad regime and his allies are framed as evil. The fall of

Aleppo has been presented as a victory against terrorists and jihadists by Russia. But the United

States decried the Russian-backed offensive and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

Samantha Power asserted: "Aleppo will join the ranks of those events in world history that define

modern evil, that stain our conscience decades later—Halabja, Rwanda, Srebrenica and now

Aleppo". The U.N. said at least 82 civilians, including women and children, were shot on sight

by Syrian government troops in recent days.112

Temporal maximization strategy helps interveners to construct war legitimation discourse by

presenting with a degree of certainty and authority the intention of the target state to continue

with its killing drive. The speaker needs to convince the audience that the target is bent upon

something contravening international law, norms and traditions. Assad regime and his actions

during the conflict are described in similar manner by anti-Assad group (Table 8.5). By

highlighting his killing tendency for the sake of regime survival, his legitimacy to stay in power

is made questionable. However, the international coverage of brutalities committed by extremist

groups like ISIL has made it easy for pro-Assad camp to justify their violence by framing it as

fight against Islamist fundamentalists and thus weaken Western narrative of Assad crimes

against humanity.

110

White House (Office of the Press Secretary), Government Assessment of the Syrian Government‟s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013, press release, August 30, 2013, accessed May 29, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21. ―Syrian forces kill at least 34 protesters at anti-government protest,‖ Guardian, June 3, 2011.

―Slaughter or Liberation?‖ Democracy Now.

382

Table 8.5. Temporal Maximization for Syria

(White House, ―The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian government

Office ofthe

carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013. We Press Secretary,

further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack. These all -source assessments August 30,

2013)113

are based on human, signals, and geospatial intelligence as well as a significant body of

open source reporting.‖

(Prime Minister ―The Syrian regime has been killing its people for two years, with reported deaths now over

Office UK, 100,000 and refugees at nearly 2 million. The large-scale use of chemical weapons by the

2013)114

regime in a heavily populated area on 21 August 2013 is a war crime and perhaps the most

egregious single incident of the conflict. Given the Syrian regime‘s pattern of use of chemical

weapons over several months, it is likely that the regime will seek to use such weapons again.

It is also likely to continue frustrating the efforts of the United Nations to establish exactly

what has happened. Renewed attacks using chemical weapons by the Syrian regime would

cause further suffering and loss of civilian lives, and would lead to displacement of the civilian

population on a large scale and in hostile conditions.‖

8.4.5. Legitimation by reference to group demarcation – Us versus Them

category

While it was easier to construct ―US versus Them‖ group demarcation in case of Libya because

those opposing the Libyan military intervention had already given token approval in the form of

abstention on UNSCR 1973 rather than outright veto. Syrian case got complicated with firm

Russian resolve to protect Bashaar regime and to overtly project Syrian case in different

international bodies. With time Russian involvement has gone to an extent where US and her

allies are juxtaposing both together. But instead of helping Moscow pull away from involvement

this juxtapositional narrative has hardened Moscow‘s stance on the conflict.

While US and allies were busy in diplomatically isolating Assad by recognizing rebels, Russia

continued to counter this by providing consistent diplomatic and military support to Syrian

regime and by asserting Bashaar currently represents the legitimate government of Syria and thus

asserted its sovereign rights to provide arms to regime under existing arm sales contracts.

113 White House (Office of the Press Secretary), Government Assessment of the Syrian Government‟s Use of

Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013. ―Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal position,‖ Prime Minister Office.

383

Following chemical attacks in August 2013, when anti-Assad camp came together to produce a

unanimous resolution condemning the Damascus regime; President Putin in an interview on

September 3, 2013 raised the possibility that the rebels may have gassed civilians to trigger

Western action against regime. The fact that faulty data had been presented by the US in the past

on Iraq Putin alleged, thus Russia would only be convinced to support a resolution if the

evidence was compelling beyond the shadow of doubt.115

Putin also tried to justify support for Bashaar by referring to the very norms and traditions

utilized by the West to build case against him. In the same speech he stressed Russia wasn‘t

defending Assad but upholding the norms and principles of the international law and warned if

the force was to be used against Damascus regime it again might be used ―against anybody and

on any pretext.‖ At that time it was made clear by the Russian President that Moscow would not

become militarily involved in the Syrian conflict.116

Later the next day Russian Foreign

Ministry exonerated Assad regime of chemical attacks in March 2013 and August 2013 by

blaming rebels.117

Similarly it was Russia that countered the narrative that Assad regime was the

gravest threat, asserting that US support to rebels indirectly strengthens Syrian terrorist groups

that will later expand their operations elsewhere in the Middle East.

Similarly to construct narrative for war against Syria Chinese support or abstention was

important in the UNSC. To Western dismay, China joined Russia in blocking draft resolution by

UK on August 28, 2013 that would have authorized use of force against Syria. China‘s Foreign

Minister, Wang Yi though emphasized that ―China firmly opposes any use, by anyone, of

chemical weapons in Syria,‖ nonetheless added: ―External military intervention contravenes the

purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and the basic norms of international relations, and

will add to turmoil in the Middle East.‖118

Asking UN inspectors to carry out their investigation

with ―no interference‖ and ―no prejudgment‖ of their results, China thereby out rightly rejected

Western narrative that squarely laid blame on Assad‘s regime. 115

Blanchard and Sharp, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria, 33. ; President of Russia, Interview to Channel One and Associated Press News Agency, September 4, 2013, at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5935 . 116

Blanchard and Sharp, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria, 33-34. 117

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commentary by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the situation concerning the investigations into the use of chemical weapons in Syria, September 4, 2013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China, ―Foreign Minister Wang Yi: China Calls on All Parties Concerned to Exercise Restraints and Calmness on Situation in Syria,‖ statement, August 28, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1070757.shtml.

384

When Obama Administration held Assad regime responsible on August 30 in its assessment with

regard to chemical attacks Chinese Ministry spokesman again asserted that ―any action taken by

the international community should be based on the results of the U.N. investigation, which will

answer questions like whether chemical weapons were used and who used them.‖ Adding China

was ―gravely concerned‖ about possible US unilateral action.119

China unlike Russia is not

interested in propping up Assad regime but its vetoes has only strengthened Russian stance on

the Syrian conflict.

With the passage of time US attempt to operationalize Us versus Them category got more

problematic as Russia increased its military presence in Syria and its stakes simultaneously

increased too. Russian tone became more aggressive after US airstrike took place on the Syrian

airbase in April 2017 after Idlib chemical attacks were reported. Even Bolivian ambassador to

UN strongly reacted to US strikes on Syria terming them as ―an extremely, extremely serious

violation of international law‖ and ―they represent a serious threat to international peace and

security.‖ 120

Till the time veto holding UNSC members Russia and China refuse to toe the US-led Western

line along with other influential members like India and Brazil, the ―Us‖ versus ―Them‖ group

demarcation would remain problematic and more countries would find it convenient to remain

neutral rather than being alleged on the wrong side of history later on.

Conclusion

Syrian civil war has entered in its seventh year and such protracted civil wars have the potential

to shake foundation of regional orders. When the regional hierarchy is in transition, neighbouring

countries rush to provide arms to fighters or even intervene with militias to protect their interests.

This inadvertently not only increase the bloodletting but change the local conflict into a regional

one and draw extra-regional players too at times, thus spreading the conflict even further. Syrian 119

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China, ―Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei‘s

Regular Press Conference on September 2, 2013,‖ transcript, September 2, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1072085.shtml . Joel Gehrke, ―Bolivia: US strike against Syria an ‗extremely serious violation‘ of international law,‖ Washington Examiner, April 7, 2017.

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case has to be understood in the light of its importance in linking the global and regional

transitions and how it has accelerated international trend towards post-hegemony.

Syria is a geopolitically important state. Its importance can be gauged from the way it played key

role in evolving regional dynamics even before the Arab Spring. It has been vital to the survival

of Hezbollah of Lebanon with land access only through Syria on the east and north, and Israel to

the south. Though Hezbollah‘s first loyalty is to Iran and its supreme leader Ayatollah Ali

Khamenei but access to Tehran has been possible because of links with Dasmacus. It would not

be wrong to claim their links with Syria are the linchpin of alliance between Tehran and

Damascus. Fall of Assad means, loss of Iran‘s only Arab ally in the region. Besides Damascus

hosts at least ten Palestinians factions, most prominently Hamas and Islamic Jihad which Assad

has used to play against US and Israel in negotiations to win back Golan Heights.

But Syria has troubled neighbourhood too. Iraq has accused Syrian regime of harboring former

Ba‘ath party‘s leadership and facilitating fundamentalists inside Iraq. Turkey is concerned about

its Kurdish problem besides side effects of mass exodus of refugees from Syria since the

uprising. Meanwhile, behind closed doors, leaders in Israel fear the replacement of the known

devil with alternative conservative Islamic regime, and end to their fragile stability since 1967. It

was rightly anticipated that upheaval in Syria will not only affect its immediate neighbours – it

will reshape the balance of power in the Middle East more than any event in the Arab Spring

thus far. The Syrian conflict has drawn other regional players like Saudi Arabia and Qatar deeply

into the fog of war.

The stakes involved for neighbours has increased their interference in Syrian politics but Syrian

politics is far from simple. Advancement by one external player and its domestic proxy is

counter-matched by another player. It would not be wrong to assert that nothing happens in Syria

in isolation form regional struggle between Shias and Sunnis and between Iran and Gulf

monarchies. Saudi policy in the region became more aggressive after successful US-led

negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program. Their competing and irreconcilable differences

have left Syria in a regional mess.

Key players like Saudi Arabia and Qatar are not only anti-democracy whose greatest fear is

arrival of democratic tide in the region but they are hoping to benefit from increased sectarian

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division and extremism. They are actively involved in undermining democratic wave as evident

in their injection of petro-dollars to accelerate cross-border arms to unstable nations emerging

from ―Arab Spring‖, even while they are playing lip-service to democracy. The battle for

regional hegemony is not limited to Saudi Arabia and Iran but Turkey is simultaneously

desperate to develop power-base across the Middle East. This Turkish ambition is bound to clash

with Iran grand regional designs with roots already in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain.

The recent developments have shown that this shifting regional balance of power is not confined

to regional sectarian alliances but has drawn in global players with Russia and China on one side

and US and its NATO allies on the other. The peer challengers to US-led international order see

the Syrian conflict as the opportunity to project their interests. The Russo-Chinese veto of draft

Security Council resolution asking Assad to step aside showed how the international spectrum is

being reshaped also. These complex and inter-woven interests have not only hardened views

inside regime in Syria but simultaneously strengthened the status quo with support of Iran,

Russia and China. It would not be wrong to claim that Syrian conflict has finally emerged as the

harbinger of post-hegemony in international politics. Keys regions like MENA are no longer

under US hegemony and rival powers as well as traditional friends now acknowledge loss of US

leadership and influence in the region and thus take more independent approach to safeguard

their regional interests.

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Conclusion

The study was undertaken with the aim to explore the problem of foreign direct military

intervention in an era when the global power hierarchy is in transition and the rise of China along

with other power centers have raised specter of impending arrival of post-hegemony in the

international system. War, conflict and foreign direct military interventions have kept scholars

and analysts engrossed with intricacies of the subject since time immemorial. These very

concepts are still being explored through historical and theoretical lens till date.

The study dwells on how the ―use of force‖ has given rise to prickly questions involving legal,

moral, operational and political dimensions; how the concept has been applied through centuries,

taking into account its timeless attributes as well as the changes which advancement in time and

practice have brought; and, finally theoretical perspectives pertaining to the subject were

explored through ―levels of analysis‖ framework. The research undertaken thus opens possibility

of further exploration of the subject through Power Transition Research program. It

simultaneously creates scope for exploration of discursive dimension in IR literature on war and

conflict. The detailed study creates possibility of formation of a model that could trace and test

declining hegemon‘s military intervention behavior in post-hegemonic international system.

Military Intervention Threat Securitization Model

The ―military intervention threat securitization model‖ developed within the study was

constructed with the elaboration of the Power Transition Theory of A. F. K. Organski and its

extension into Multiple Hierarchy Model by Douglas Lemke. The exploration of these two

theoretical models had been done with the view to identify the scope for further extension of this

lively research program. The study points out limitations of the existing theoretical constructs.

Power Transition Theory with its primary focus on major wars between great powers during

periods of power transitions at the systemic level, and the Multiple Hierarchy Model (MHM)

with its limitation to exploration of regional hierarchy, left no space for joint exploration of the

concept linking global and regional power hierarchies in transitions. The former limits itself to

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the global system and has been concerned about systemic changes involving major powers only

while the latter‘s focus has been the regional sub-systems. MHM mentions that great powers

seldom interfere in regional set ups unless the changes occurring and the outcomes in the

regional hierarchy undergoing transition are consequential to them. A literature gap was

identified with respect to global and regional hierarchies‘ linkage. The detailed study of

Organski‘s and Lemke‘s model provided scope for exploring power transition and military

intervention behaviour of the declining hegemon when the system is still in flux and shape of the

new global order is far from clear.

The study elaborates how the contemporary global and regional environment has necessitated

scope for further investigation to be undertaken within the same research program. Structural

changes within the contemporary era are too important to be left aside till a new global power

hierarchy is evident. It elaborates by laying thread bare the dynamics surrounding this period we

can not only ascertain how the transition from hegemony to post-hegemony is taking place but

simultaneously find out what these changes have in store for important events like military

interventions; especially with regard to the scope and substance of a military intervention

exercised by a global power now in decline. It thus creates scope for emergence of a theoretical

construct for the investigation of the problem.

The gap between global and regional hierarchy has been bridged through formulation of the

military intervention model. This model which the study labels as ―Threat Securitization Military

Intervention Model‖ is the contribution of the study to existing International Relations literature

and has simultaneously provided scope for more research in the uncharted territory so far. This

model illustrates when there is a power transition at the global level; it affects conflict-ridden,

unstable strategic regions also. Such regions are more vulnerable to interference / intervention

from the top but post-hegemonic transition is evident in the shape of assertive behaviour of local

and extra-regional players. Free from the hegemonic constraints of the declining hegemon, these

players take a more aggressive and assertive stance, at times in contravention of the dominant

global state‘s strategic interests; thus giving indications of the arrival of post-hegemonic

international relations.

Thus the model developed within the study not only attempts to elaborate that periods of power

transitions within the global hierarchy give rise to competitive behaviour at the systemic level

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but these global changes are also significant in terms of regions. The vulnerability prevalent

within the global hierarchy emboldens regional actors to follow more assertive foreign policy

behaviour in line with their self declared foreign policy agendas. The dawn of post-hegemonic

phase within the contemporary international system has created scope for same assertive

dynamics by regional and global players.

Post-Hegemonic International System

At this point it is pertinent to remove the ambiguity whether the study announces the ‗end‘ of US

dominance or merely the transition is in progress. This confusion was specifically addressed at

length within the study. The frequent usage of terms like ―unipolarity‖, ―primacy‖,

―hyperpower‖ or ―empire‖ in international relations creates ambiguity. All these terms are used

to denote unprecedented US power and hence easily interchanged with the term ―post-hegemonic

international system‖ employed within this study. However, it is to be kept in view that terms

like ―unipolarity‖ refers only to the material primacy and the comparison with peer competitors

is based with respect to one‘s position in military, economic, technological, financial etc. sectors.

Post-hegemony on the other hand approaches the issue from the perspective of social legitimacy.

Besides a detailed analysis of the term ―hegemony‖ has been done within the study both in the

introduction and in the theoretical part. The attempt had been made to elaborate the term from

realist, liberal, constructivist, Gramscian and neo-Gramscian perspective. While earlier

perspectives take power relations as given and help maintain prevailing social relations with all

their injustices, critical theories explore the problem more deeply by questioning why these

hierarchies of social and power relations are consented by ones lacking economic power. It calls

them into question by taking into account origins of such social and power relations and whether

they might be in the process of changing. This study takes into account concept of power which

is not a relationship based on force and coercion but one resting on legitimacy of the leading

dominant state. The legitimacy variable takes into account hegemon‘s ability to obtain consent of

the members of the international community drawing on political and ideological leadership

rather than by blunt exercise of force. With respect to US the study elaborates this shows the

glaring discrepancy in America‘s self goal and image and others perception of it. Nothing more

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than US extraordinary military and economic strength and its increasing inability to get others do

what it wants, aptly characterizes this discrepancy. Thus this study explores the question of

hegemony taking Barry Buzan‘s concept rooted in social legitimacy. The ability of US to recruit

followers in the contemporary era is not directly corresponding with its material primacy in

political, economic and military sectors. Hence, this drift away from hegemony is a reality of the

international system and it is gradually becoming evident in the evolving dynamics of

international politics too.

The study first establishes conditions characterizing post-hegemonic international system

through a pentagonal pyramid (Figure 2.9) that explains global power hierarchy in contemporary

international environment, to be distinguished from pervious Cold War and post-Cold War eras.

It asserts that US still occupies the apex of the international system though its ability to obtain

―desired outcomes‖ is being increasingly constrained with the emergence of other key actors

with significant resources and power e.g. China, Europe, Japan, India, Russia and Brazil. Thus

analyzing US position within the contemporary international hierarchy based on material

primacy alone will give with a distorted image of the American power. Approaching the same

issue form social legitimacy places a greater emphasis on the ability of the hegemon to extract

outcomes too. This angle reveals the decreasing space being available to the erstwhile hegemon

to affect preferable outcomes. This ability is thus directly linked with hegemon‘s status as the

undisputed leader of the global system too. The dominant state‘s increasing reliance on assertive

unilateralism and blatant disregard of the norms and traditions that it itself created and

championed, leaves a void in the global leadership role. Besides ―America First‖ approach being

particularly evident in President Trump‘s administration has generated more resentment in

staunch allies too. Even traditional friends has started lamenting absence of US resolve to fulfill

its global leadership qualities with the kind of fervor displayed in the Cold War and Post-Cold

War era.

The rise of peer challengers has resulted in gradual shift in the dynamics of the international

system. Not only the shift has allowed peer challengers to assert themselves in political domains

but it is also gradually reducing US influence in other sectors too. This study specifically reflects

the impact of such a drift towards post-hegemony in the domain of foreign direct military

interventions taken under the leadership of the declining hegemon. It explains how the

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hegemon‘s legitimacy to claim the leadership of the system is at stake when peer challengers

start asserting themselves in local, regional and global theaters. Though the systemic changes are

still incremental as US still retains unprecedented dominance in the military sector but power in

the economic and financial sectors is becoming diffused as China and other actors are catching

up. These peer competitors can be seen lobbying individually as well as collectively for greater

voting rights in important international bodies. Increased presence of such actors will

automatically constrain US ability to frame agendas and affect outcomes as per its own interests.

We can already see actors as diverse and having contradictory interests like China, India and

Russia at times collaborating with each other though they might be actively competing in other

domains. This has constrained US ability to obtain desired outcomes in international bodies and

previous hegemonic practices like ―pre-emption‖ and assertive ―unilateralism‖, pursued with

vigor a decade before, have now given way to strategies like ―retrenchment‖, ―offshore

balancing‖ and ―leading from behind‖.

In the contemporary era, increasing effort by emergent and resurgent actors to aim for their

rightful place in changing global environment has increased US reliance on regional and

international bodies. Hence, a foreign direct military intervention strategy relies on securitization

of threat through political discourse. The study sheds light on how ―threat construction‖ for

military intervention takes place and how it assumes paramount importance in era of dwindling

legitimacy. Threat discourse though always employed by the intervener in a target state but when

the hegemon‘s ability to affect outcomes is constrained, it forgoes unilateral pursuits and prefers

multilateral approaches involving regional and global bodies. The endorsement of policies from

such platforms testify that the declining hegemon still enjoy considerable legitimacy to lead the

system.

The study also discusses how drift towards post-hegemony in the global system sends very

strong signals to regional / local hierarchies that try to take advantage of the vulnerability

prevailing in the global hierarchy. The effect of global power transition in unstable regions is

thus explored within the study. Previous studies undertaken have not dwelled at length on this

variable. The study establishes an indirect linkage between the two. Changes occurring at the

global level are significant and they do affect unstable, conflict-ridden regions. Power transition

within the global hierarchy keeps dominant state focus on countering peer challenger. Such a

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focus also diverts attention away from troubled regions as more pressing issues gain priority. The

diffused global power hierarchy and ongoing struggle among major players then emboldens

regional challengers to attempt to re-write the rules of the regional hierarchy as the threat of

fierce resistance from the declining hegemon subsides. Hence, these regional hierarchies become

the play ground where local, regional and global challengers to declining hegemon could be seen

with their assertive foreign policy behaviour.

It is then the inter-play of regional and global hierarchies which attains significant importance in

this post-hegemonic phase and these regional power struggles also expose dominant state‘s

ability to effectively lead the system. The study relies on variables of geography, intra-state

conflict, legitimacy of the declining hegemon and regional and extra-regional players to ascertain

the impact of interplay of unit and systemic level variables for international military intervention.

The detailed analysis of these variables explain also why certain states will become victim of

regional and global power intervention while others would be left alone by major powers to

affect outcomes of their intra-state and inter-state disputes. Hence, the study explains

inconsistency in the application of direct military interventions by great powers. Only

contemporary global politics and events assign significant importance to a state. A state that is a

victim of foreign aggression at one time may become irrelevant at other point in time. Conditions

specified through these variables then can also help us locate the reliance on threat securitization

discourse for direct military intervention.

As the changing global environment constrains application of pervious assertive foreign policy

behaviours like pre-emption, unilateralism etc., hence declining hegemon‘s reliance on threat

securitization for foreign direct military intervention increases. Barry Buzan‘s Securitization

Theory along with insights from Van Dijk and Van Leeuwen‘s discourse analysis technique

provides scope for threat construction for military intervention in post-hegemonic system (Figure

2.13), based on which case studies of Libya and Syria were undertaken. Threat securitization

helps bring critical perspective in the analysis of military interventions. Up till now the studies

on war, conflict and military interventions focuses on factors other than how threat is

constructed. They usually take into account political, economic, military or other tangible

factors. Usually power struggle is taken as a reality of international politics and threats

emanating from states are taken for granted too. Deconstruction of ―threat construction‖ adds a

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novel perspective, hitherto still less explored in literature. By explaining how sense of threat and

vulnerability is constructed, the study adds to the securitization domain. It seconds the assertions

made in securitization theory that no really endangered object is to be secured. By constructing

shared threat emanating from the target state, intervener articulates it as the object to be

countered through justified military intervention. Such a successful threat construction is

legitimized through active involvement of relevant regional and global organizations.

Political speeches are important in uncovering how they are helpful in uncovering social power

inequalities permeated and represented in societies. When political actors address they have the

audience in mind and they are cognizant of the fact how it is to be received and analyzed by

concerned sections. It is specially tailored to be simultaneously addressed to diverse sections of

society. Such speeches are also used to stroke strong emotions among audience. Similarly

addresses by the heads of states and important government representatives explain the intent and

motives of various states or how they want the world to interpret them. The use of political

speeches for analyzing threat construction also sheds light on the power of elite actors to utilize

their privileged position. These privileged actors are not only individual elites in states but

certain states too. Critical theory perspectives help uncover these actors and their abuse of power.

The language these elite actors use to construct ―threat‖ is intended to evoke strong emotion

among global audience. This emotion is related with respect to vulnerability and fear and

impressing upon the international community to the urgency of the foreign direct intervention.

Dominant state sitting at the apex of the international system enjoys far greater leverage to

present a target state as ―existential‖ threat though its material abilities can never pose a credible

threat to any great power. Elite actors then utilizing their privileged position have access to

leading regional and international platforms that they use to articulate threat from the target state

as real and tangible. This threat construction through ―war legitimation discourse‖ is at length

analyzed by the study. It is built around reference to authority, values, rationalization,

temporality and group demarcation. Employment of this war legitimation discourse helps in

constructing target state as ―existential threat‖ to international peace and security. It also helps

intervener in marginalizing target state‘s official discourse and dismissing it as propaganda.

Deliberate efforts are made to give wider coverage to dissenting opinion within the target state.

Any effort by the target state to retaliate is portrayed as aggression. This also helps in

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marginalizing regional and international actors determined to stand aggression against another

sovereign member of the international society. Through ―Us versus Them‖ demarcation the

international institutions and community are co-opted for authorization of force against the target

state. The world out there then actually becomes manifestation of the threat representation rather

than actually presented or present.

The argument developed in the rest of the dissertation is basically validation of the Threat

Securitization Model. It was imperative to first validate theoretical assertions made about the

arrival of the pot-hegemonic phase in the international system. The concept was explored

through academic debate between the ―primacists‖ and ―declinists‖ school. The ambiguous times

and the uncertainty prevailing about US ability to sustain leadership of the international system

have already led scholars to speculate about a ―post-American world‖. An increasing number of

scholars are coming forward with concepts like ―rise of the rest‖ thesis, ―three-dimensional

chessboard‖, ―age of nonpolarity‖, ―apolarity‖, ―no-one‘s world‖ , ―G-zero world‖ and a

―multiplex world‖ etc. These and other such concepts discuss how the mantle of US power is

gradually eroding and the world is moving away from US controlled and dominated patterns of

interaction. However, the opposite school has equally convincing arguments with regard to the

durability of the ―unipolar moment‖ and another ―American Century‖. But the fact cannot be

ignored that this school of thought too recognizes diminishing US ability to lead the world with

previous assertive display of power. It comes forward with concepts like ―retrenchment‖,

―offshore balancing‖ to arrest downward trend, which in itself is another recognition of a drift

towards post-hegemony.

It is not only the comparison of the material capabilities and whether others are catching up

especially in the military, economic and financial domains but it is the ―power over outcomes‖

that has visibly been reduced with the march of rest of the emerging and resurgent powers.

Though most of the major powers have showed reluctance to resort to traditional hard balancing

strategies but they have actively collaborated with each other when their vested self-interests

have been ignored. Especially emerging powers are really concerned about their newly hard-

earned place and their dissatisfaction with the established rules of the international system -

written before their present status – have time and again manifested in influential international

bodies. Though a direct major power confrontation with explicit objective to overturn or

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overwrite the existing international hierarchy and structure is still far from speculation but a

sectoral approach to key international issues is very much there. Even very recent episodes like

Paris Climate Accord, Iranian Nuclear Deal crisis, Jerusalem as Israel‘s capital etc have

validated this sectoral approach from friends and allies too. They are cooperating with US where

the interests are aligned and overtly resisting where they found them divergent. The study

provides room for further elaboration of this sectoral and divergent approach and explains the

coming decades will increase the trend as emergent and resurgent powers existing status quo

unable to accommodate their rising demands. The incremental approach by peers competitors

also explain their deliberate attempt to chaotic change within the global hierarchy that might

arrest their upward thrust also. These players display their intent to work within the existing

international structure as long as it is inadvertently also constraining its chief architect – the

declining hegemon.

Finally, this study resolves the debate that the international system is at the dawn of the post-

hegemonic era. As usual with previous power transition periods, this era too reflects the

ambiguity which accompanies such periods of flux. The abundance of available literature

previously analyzed explains that US was unable to realize the unipolarity of the international

system in the years immediately following demise of Soviet Union. This ambiguity was then

reflected in the preferred multilateral approach rather than the later assertive unilateralism of the

Bush junior period. Similarly, it will take a while for the peer competitors to resort to traditional

hard balancing strategies but sectoral approach in issues affecting their core national issues as

well as those aiming at countering American influence is already visible. A decade or two down

the lane 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 2011 Arab Spring and Russian coercive diplomacy will be

recalled as the events that heralded post-hegemony within the international system.

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in Post-Hegemony

Three major events in the first decade of the twenty-first century i.e. the Global Financial Crisis

2008, Russian resurgence in its ―near abroad‖ and the Arab Spring had been cited as tangible

events within the study as manifestation of the dawn of post-hegemony within the international

system. The Arab Spring then was selected for detailed study and for exploring the interplay of

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unit and systemic variables developed in Chapter 2. It was thus important to establish if the

regional hierarchy was in transition and how post-hegemony in the global hierarchy was

affecting major regional players and their foreign policy behavior.

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after the Arab Awakening shook not only the long-

entrenched leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya but nowhere in the world, the Old World

Order under the US leadership felt the jolts as much as MENA. The region and its politics matter

because it continues to be strategically important as primary source of energy. It has significant

importance because of its financial power, geopolitical competition and of course, religion. But it

is simultaneously one of the most volatile regions which have acquired further strategic edge

because of increase in demand of its hydrocarbon resources due to surge in Chinese, Indian and

other pivotal economies. The region has always occupied a distinguished position in US strategic

calculations and ever since the days of Cold War, US has been the undisputed largest ―outside

power‖ and broker with stakes in regional disputes. The dramatic events of 2011 caught US as

off guard as rest of the world, though they for long had speculated about simmering discontent

and seething anger over prevailing corruption, unresponsive regimes and below par socio-

politico-economic conditions.

When the unprecedented events struck MENA, although US spoke of the need for democratic

change in lofty terms; it practically preferred to back these pro-American dictators for short-term

stability in their policies towards the region. This approach significantly dented its legitimacy

among the Arab publics and created strong anti-Arab sentiment even before the first Gulf War. It

won‘t be an overstatement to assert that the beginning of the end of the Old World Order within

the Middle East can be traced to US-led first Gulf War in 1990 against Iraq after Saddam

Hussein invaded the little oil sheikhdom of Kuwait. Though there were constant rumblings

beneath the surface against the established status-quo reflected in incidents like the bloody 1975-

1990 Lebanese civil war; the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran; and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.

The invasion not only led to increased American military presence within the region but the

ensuing decade of US military actions and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq

deepened the anti-American sentiment already thriving within the region. It eventually became

evident with the emergence of a wave of Islamic civic expression suppressed for decades in

Egypt and Tunisia by their autocratic rulers.

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This expression and before it the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, in particular, upended the fragile

regional balance of power in place since the end of the Cold War, and inadvertently led to the

empowerment of anti-US Islamic Republic of Iran held in check for more than a decade by the

Iraqi counterweight. The regional balance tilted in Iran‘s favour with the expansion of its

influence in Syria, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and the new pro-Iran Iraqi government in Baghdad.

The street demonstrations in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring left region changed

forever and there is no reason to believe that the region has emerged from the state of flux it

entered in 2011. The outcome of Arab Spring instead of strengthening democratic tendencies

within the region as popularly speculated in the initial days, led to empowerment of extremist

and fundamentalist forces. Besides it inadvertently made anti-US regional actor as one of the key

players to affect outcome of the new regional power configuration. An outcome that US was then

determined to avoid as it would have send signals to competitors in regional and global hierarchy

that US ability to shape a strategic region is being constrained. However, the way things

unfolded in MENA after the Arab Spring it has wrested region away from its firm control and

had left it as a battleground where other great and middle powers are fighting for enhancement of

their respective sphere of influence.

While on the one hand, the Arab Awakening empowered anti-US forces in the region, it

simultaneously made staunch US allies like Saudi Arabia to question US resolve to stay engaged

in the region and shape its outcomes. US seemed at ease to do away with erstwhile allies like

Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali who remain fixated on the status quo and enforced the Old World

Order that swiftly got faded with the Arab Spring. Instead of US brokering another transition

from the top, the tendency of this crucial region being remade from the bottom up was evident.

The writing on the wall stated that not only will public opinion direct much of events in the

domestic as well as foreign policy but the political Islam will also be a major force in the

MENA, if Arab Spring successfully ushered in a new opening. Although all ambitious

speculations about drastic changes in a region yet frozen in history proved wrong as Egypt

returned to dictatorship after a failed experiment with democracy and drowning of the

revolutionary fervor in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain but it did give rise to unprecedented changes

in regional power hierarchy. With US already grappling with repercussions of its misadventures

in Afghanistan and Iraq and caught up amid domestic political concerns, it further dented its

legitimacy in reluctant Libyan intervention. This yet another ill planned foreign military

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intervention not only shifted focus away from chaos prevailing in Iraq that US failed to stabilize

for almost a decade but simultaneously let lose fundamentalist and extremist forces beyond

capacity of any single regional government to manage or control effectively.

Saudi Arabia and Iran through their overwhelming Sunni and Shiite orientations had been

battling a historic unending dispute since the departure of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon

Him), got this rare opportunity to play it out again as US presence and interest in the region

touched all time low. Both players are all set to affect outcome of regional conflicts that would

firmly place region in hands of its lead player. Removal of Saddam Hussain has provided rare

opportunity to Iran to aim for regional hegemony as it is no longer hostage to security dilemma

of its erstwhile enemy state. The government in Iraq has been replaced with a pro-Shia Iranian

government. This outcome in Iraqi politics has freed Iran to focus more on broader regional

conflicts and aim for consolidation of newly created political space.

US reluctance to involve itself in yet another disastrous Middle Eastern conflict emboldened not

only anti-US regional players like Iran but created unprecedented scope for extra-regional

players like Russia too. Russia had already displayed its resurgence through its belligerence in its

―near-abroad‖. Now the Syrian conflict along with alliance with Iran provided rare opportunity

to emerge as a bigger outside player within the regional hierarchical structure in flux since

fateful events of 2011. As the ―military intervention threat securitization model‖ postulated

involvement of extra-regional actors within inter-state and intra-state conflicts is either for

protection of their core interests or to enhance their position as global player with ability to alter

local status quo. Russia did not per se have any core interest threatened with an adverse outcome

in the Syrian conflict. Kremlin had been striving for a long time to reclaim its status as a major

global player. MENA with Arab Spring upheavals provided long-awaited opportunity to register

its presence within the region. Russian reassertion in the region had far reaching impacts. It will

definitely play a significant role in the emerging power configuration of the region once the

ongoing conflict in Syria ends. Russian eagerness and refusal to be written off from a strategic

region and US inability to stem the tide of this overarching Russian presence gave another proof

that US hegemony within the region has been effectively and irrevocably dented for at least the

coming few decades. These signals had impact on assertive foreign policy orientations of other

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regional players too. MENA more than anything explained the linkage of the effect of power

transition in global and regional hierarchy.

Battle for regional hegemony is not limited to Iran and Saudi Arabia but another major actor is

Turkey whose orientation to establish itself as influential Middle Eastern player became more

prominent as its outstanding differences with European Union became public and chances of

Turkey joining the EU as its first Muslim majority nation became negligible in the near future.

Turkey is too large, too powerful and too ambitious a regional player to permanently align itself

with either Saudi or Iranian camps. The desire to be a distinguished leader, effectively displayed

in the bold and challenging behavior of its leader Tayyip Erdogan made the regional battle for

hegemony even more complex. In case of Turkey too, as the conflict in Syria changed with overt

Russian interference on the Assad regime side, Ankara‘s relationships with Washington got

complicated. US support for Syrian Kurds have clearly been a significant threat to Turkish core

territorial interest. Hence, a NATO member and a staunch US ally is seen collaborating more

actively with Russian on the question of Syria rather than with the US. The divergent interests

brought a public condemnation of each other‘s stance and brought decades-long bilateral

relationship on all time historical low. This sectoral approach displayed by Turkey is not

exclusive and is visible with respect to other US allies too.

Besides Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, other regional actors like Qatar‘s desire to play a role

larger than its weight has landed it in direct conflict with Saudi Arabia which is determined to

keep hegemony of the Sunni block under its leadership. The resulting chaos and further Sunni-

Sunni rift will favour Iranian grand designs who for decades had been trying to carve a place for

itself in Sunni-led GCC. How far the intra-GCC rift empowers Iranian influence only time will

tell; as the region dynamics are so fragile since US invasion of Iraq 2003 that a single major

diplomatic row threatens stability of the entire region. Besides the Qatari crisis elaborates how

local players are always actively involved in craving an improved status for themselves when the

local hierarchy is still in flux and outcome of a conflict in lines with their agenda could

significantly enhance their position within the regional hierarchy. Qatari backing of the Muslim

Brotherhood and Saudi particular dislike for the group along with support of rival rebel groups in

Syria and Libya explains that Sunni-Sunni fault lines are fragile too and it did give Iran a greater

leverage to exploit the rift for its own ends. US so far again have failed to end the diplomatic

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crisis and this is another proof that US hegemony in this oil-rich strategic region is a thing of the

past. This rupture in intra-GCC alliance has definitely constrained US ability to recruit followers

for anti-Iranian coalition in the region.

As the global power hierarchy is increasingly getting diffused with China on the march and

major players with their assertive foreign policy behaviours, visibly at odds with US strategic

interests; key US allies in strategic regions are simultaneously getting ambivalent of continued

US resolve to stand by them. The Arab Spring was a rude shock for staunch, traditional allies

and they kept speculating whom US would throw out of the bus, should similar circumstances

arise after Ben Ali and Mubarak. Hence, instead of pinning hope on US promises, as was a

practice for the last few decades allies like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are all engaged in a

fierce regional battle at times overtly at odds with US declared strategic objectives.

The MENA is still in transition and hostile policies of US allies like Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia

and Egypt against each other and sometimes against US interests along with traditional rivals

like Russia and Iran have created more problems for disjointed, directionless and incoherent US

regional foreign policy. The region has visibly shifted away from overwhelming US influence

and its ability to restrain either Iran and Russia on the one hand, or to force Saudi Arabia, Qatar,

Turkey and Egypt, on the other hand, to align themselves collectively against the Russian-Iranian

nexus is extremely limited. Thus MENA in transition and the region‘s dynamics has validated

the study‘s hypothesis how US ability to effectively run the global system and obtain desired

outcomes has been constrained, making visible the first signs of the arrival of post-hegemony in

the international system.

Threat Securitization for Libya and Syria

The study outlines how these significant changes in global and regional hierarchies have

increased US reliance on securitization of threat through political discourse for military

intervention. The case-studies of Libya and Syria deal with the same assertion and the ―military

intervention threat securitization model‖ developed in Chapter 2 was applied to both cases. The

study elaborates how the promise of Arab nationalism stirred by the new leaders upended the

post-WWII order of the Middle East under colonial powers and their proxies but soon their

401

idealism gave way to dictatorial repression and corruption. This coupled with economic

stagnation, social frustration, unemployment and nepotism, turned into seething anger. The

status-quo exercised through the iron-fisted resolve of succession of state leaders held at least till

the start of the Arab Spring.

While loss of Ben Ali and Mubarak might not had been a very welcoming development as these

allies for decades have ensured stability of US endorsed policies for one of the most volatile and

restive region but it at the same time brought rare opportunity to get rid of offensive regimes like

Qaddafi of Libya and Assad of Syria. US tired to portray itself as champion of the peoples‘ cause

and endorsing their long-cherished desire to do away with corrupt and stagnant regimes

unresponsive to masses and their most basic and fundamental demands. But its selective

application especially in case of Libya and Syria, while simultaneously supporting the status quo

forces in Bahrain and Yemen, exposed lameness of US rhetoric.

Why Syria and Libya were singled out by global players while activists fighting for the same

human rights and democratic tendencies in Bahrain and Yemen were left at the mercy of their

respective rulers has been validated with respect to the assertions made for the choice of the

target state as identified in the model within the study. For a target state to attract foreign direct

military intervention especially from the top involving dominant state of the international system

and other major powers has to have a strategic value. As Multiple Hierarchy Model postulated

major powers rarely involve themselves in minor powers territorial disputes, but only when their

core interests are at stake or outcomes of the conflict are consequential to them. The Arab Spring

events in 2011 allocated unprecedented importance to both Libya and Syria. Had both these anti-

US regimes survived the onslaught on their sovereignty, the MENA region that already lost pro-

US allies like Mubarak and Ben Ali would have irreversibly shifted away from US influence at

least for few coming decades and would have made US presence in Iraq more complicated.

Already the reverses on ground in Iraq were making tall premature claims of victory of the Bush

Junior administration embarrassing for the ruling administration in White House then.

Besides the internal politico-military situation and economic conditions which had rendered both

Libya and Syria vulnerable to extra-regional interference / intervention, role of respective

regional players was also the key in determining outcome of the situation. As stated earlier

regional actors have different stakes. Being permanently caught in the geographical dilemma

402

which they can neither escape nor undo they try to affect outcome of the events in line with their

self-identified regional agendas. The disturbances in Libya and Syria provided opportunity to

local players to settle their scores with the ruling regimes and to actively get involved for

reconfiguration of the regional power hierarchy that was bound to change with departure of

decades-old regimes in power.

In case of Libya, regional regimes tried to equal the score with its vocal but disliked ―Brother

Leader‖ who had been at odds with majority of the ruling Arab regimes since decades. However,

anti-West Libya in the days after the uprising against Qaddafi seemed to be on a determined path

to contain the rebellion and anti-Qaddafi forces experienced heavy reverses. It became clear

without an overt foreign military intervention they did not stand a chance against a professional

army. While immediate neighbours were either neutral or too weak to militarily support rebel

forces, regional players did come to aid and played a role in toppling of the regime. But the role

of extra-regional players like UK and France was most prominent. Removal of Qaddafi could

have permanently removed the threat posed to Francophone Africa that his pan-Africa imitative

was posing. European players sensing US selective engagement strategy took the lead in

campaign against Qaddafi. US instead of leading from the front chose to ―lead from behind‖ - a

term coined to capture the magnitude of lesser US involvement in first foreign direct military

intervention in the wake of the Arab Spring. This strategy was viciously criticized by the

Republicans as abdication of American leadership role in the world. It provided substance to the

debate for a post-hegemonic, post-American world already announcing end of the unprecedented

era of US dominance. It is to be noted that American misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan and

resulting chaos in both countries was also the factor in opting for this back-seat role in Libya.

The study relied on political statements of US elite and its allies as well as those of Libyan

leaders to elaborate how threat to international peace and security was constructed through

discourse analysis technique. This discursive threat securitization gains special place in a society

that declares and frame itself as democratic. Exorbitant cost of military adventures in

Afghanistan and Iraq were making American public more inward focused as health care and

public debt has persistently occupied American domestic debates. Besides, the language of

security is not enough to automatically frame an issue into a security question. It has to be

accepted by the relevant audience too, which in the said case was both the American public and

403

the global audience. Hence, semblance of support from regional and global bodies was a pre-

requisite to re-establish US legitimacy as leader of the international system which had been

dented significantly because of militant unilateralist adventures of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The technique also exposed the gradual loss of global standing and how far US position and

circumstances have changed from rhetoric of ―either with us or against us‖ that aligned allies as

well as foes with US cause in Afghanistan after 9/11. At that time preferable foreign policy

behavior was pre-emption and unilateralism and no single major power chose to overtly register

her resentment against these novel concepts not covered through international legal norms and

practices. How the international chessboard was in flux could be gauged from the fact that Iraqi

invasion of 2003 and threat construction for it did not go as smooth as that of Afghanistan but

still US was able to launch military campaign against Saddam on a pretext that turned out to be

false later.

However, Libya was a different case. Global power hierarchy was in transition though the trend

was not very prominent. The financial and economic burdens of last two Middle Eastern

adventures had ignited fierce debate within the US domestic public about the legality and

morality of another direct foreign military intervention. Unable to get endorsement from either

public - as surveys conducted during the period revealed – or Congress, President Obama

launched a quick and short campaign without congressional approval to achieve another

controversial objective of regime change in Libya. However, the time it took before taking a

position and the hesitation displayed frustrated US European allies too. They were looking for a

more forward position as their core interests were at stake in Libya. The extra-regional

involvement of other major players was not just for enhancing their sphere of influence. But they

became more skeptical of the US commitment and willingness as the back-seat role emboldened

challengers as a sign of waning hegemony with constrained resources to put its global agenda

into action.

Once US consented to the foreign direct military intervention, action within Libya became a test

of dominant state‘s systemic legitimacy. The threat emanating from Libya has to be constructed

as imposed by the irresponsible actions of Qaddafi regime rather than something which could be

side-stepped. The study reveals how throughout the campaign the primary objective was

disguised under the garb of humanitarian intervention, and how the regime was constructed as

404

existential threat to its own people and the world peace and security. Elite actors within the US

administration played key role in labeling Qaddafi as existential threat. The analysis of the

political statements and the published new stories of the time period uncovered the subtle

campaign through which threat was securitized and sold to domestic as well as international

audience. The global power transition made it contingent upon US to seek approval of

international and regional bodies. Hence, the United Nations Security Council as well as the

Arab League endorsement for foreign military intervention was taken. To impose the urgency of

the military action international body such International Criminal Court was also involved and it

exaggerated the number of deaths occurred during the initial days. Though the later studies

exposed this threat amplification both in case of ICC and British Parliament Foreign Affairs

Committee Report also endorsed this exaggeration in terms of involvement of UK. The

intervention was undertaken though it was not employed as a ―last resort‖ or full exploration of

―other means‖.

The study substantiates the variables identified for the interplay of unit and systematic levels and

validates the ―threat securitization military intervention model‖ of Chapter 2. All regional and

extra-regional powers took advantage of the prevailing chaos in the wake of lack of established

independent local institutions in Qaddafi‘s Libya. Once the centrally concentrated local

administration collapsed because of the unrest and NATO‘s military campaign, the country

became open for proxy battle of the ambitious regional and extra-regional players. The study

discusses these players and their foreign policy orientations at length; and validates the assertion

that such regions ridden with conflict, instability and chaos then become arenas for power

struggle within region‘s contenders. The situation in Libya till date remains volatile and instead

of bringing ―freedom‖ and ―peace‖ to the country and the region, Libya has become one of the

most dangerous places on the face of this earth where groups like ISIS are thriving taking

advantage of prevailing anarchy. It is to be noted that successful threat securitization in case of

Libya did not prove it as a deviant case because the study at length elaborates US shift away

from pre-emption and assertive unilateralism of the 9/11 era. This ―leading from behind‖ strategy

was a quick short campaign of US that was limited in ―nature, duration and scope‖. Europe

basically was left to handle its own neighbourhood as US shifted its focus eastwards during

Obama Administration. Overall Libyan case established the link between global and regional

hierarchy and how period of power transitions affect outcomes in such cases.

405

Similarly, the Syrian case study was undertaken to test similar hypotheses as applied to Libya.

The study reveals why the selective engagement strategy could not materialize in case of Syria

through the excesses committed by Bashaar regime had long crossed atrocity threshold set for

Libya. The fact that Libya was doable and ninety percent desert and more suitable for air combat

has less to do with Syria‘s more complicated geography and more with intricate pattern of

conflict ranging within the country. Regional realities stayed the same but considerable changes

in global power configuration affected threat construction for foreign direct military intervention

in Syria. US was unable to enlist token Chinese and Russian cooperation as it had obtained in

case of Libya. The failure to securitize the threat posed by Bashaar testifies that the world is

transitioning from a US centered unipolar order to a more uncertain international order where US

hegemony has already eroded. With the waning of this unparalleled power potential and rise of

peer challengers, comes the limitation of US influence to direct events on the international stage.

These rising and resurgent actors are undoubtedly frustrating acquisition and implementation of

US policy goals in regions like MENA. This case established more than the previous case-study

that world has moved away from US controlled patterns of interaction and US capacity to direct

events on the Arab street has suffered significant loss.

What made a country like Syria with limited manpower base, lack of strategic depth and non-

existent natural boundaries, target of major powers had been its geopolitical location and its

pivotal position vis-a-vis the Arab-Israel conflict and the peace process. Besides Syrian critical

relevance to Iranian ambitions within the region, its access to Hezbollah through the Syrian

territory and subsequent role as Iran‘s frontline state against Israel made Tehran‘s commitment

to survival of Bashaar regime as tied to its own national interests. Syria is the only Arab ally in

the region and any prospect of Islamist Sunnis or even secular Sunnis gaining foothold in

Damascus was to be fiercely resisted by Tehran.

Besides Syria attracted greater regional and extra-regional involvement because of its

geopolitical significance and having the Syrian regime on its side could have tilted regional

balance of power in anyone‘s favour. The outcome of the Syrian civil conflict, hence, added to

the stakes of the major regional stakeholders and it made Syrian prize all the more worth fighting

for. Syrian conflict had proved far more intense and vicious playground for Saudi-Iranian proxy

war but it is not just a quest for regional hegemony between the two arch rivals. It has serious

406

political ramifications for Riyadh as any Sunni victory that empowers Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood with whom Al-Saud has irreconcilable politico-ideological differences would be as

distasteful as Iranian presence there. The regional battle for the Syrian prize got more

complicated with Sunni Turkey determination to safeguard its own interests. Turkish interest in

the outcome of the conflict means that Riyadh‘s desire to safeguard its image as patron and

protector of Sunni interests in the region would not go uncontested. Turkish interests in Syria has

brought it in direct confrontation with it NATO ally – US. Ankara is particularly worried about

any gains by Kurdish-led YPG. Turkey in conflict could be seen actively collaborating with both

Iran and Russia. Thus the outcome of a conflict when consequential to any power can

significantly alter its foreign policy orientation too. Similar approach brought Doha in conflict

with Riyadh who sees its interest in Syria as divergent form Saudi Arabia. The simmering

discontent brought the two in the first even major GCC crisis since its inception. The crisis

continues unabated and it is brought a re-alignment in regions players too. The competition has

already intensified existing deep-rooted ethno-political and sectarian fault lines and the quest of

regional hegemony is likely to keep major regional players embroiled in it. The role of these

regional actors validated ―threat securitization military intervention model‖. As all the players

interested in seeing Bashaar abdicate power are unable to align their basic priorities, hence those

interested in his survival has upped their ante. This shows the kind of smooth sailing for threat

securitization available in case of Libya would not be possible in Bashaar case.

Syrian case also revealed resurgence of other global players like Russia that did not shy away

from exhibiting traditional hard-balancing strategies against the declining hegemon. As already

stated Russian interference in Syrian conflict was to enhance its position as a major global

player. Outcome of events so far has raised Russian position and influence within the Middle

East. A durable and sustainable solution to the Syrian question without active Russian

involvement is neither possible nor desirable. Russian presence on side of Bashaar regime has

favoured Iran more. In order to counter negative repercussions of such a development Saudi king

visited Russia for the first time in history. A Saudi multi-billion dollar deal with Russian can also

be read that Riyadh not only acknowledges Russian enhanced influence within the region but it

is not ready to put all its eggs in the US basket alone. US policy responses in Syria have

bewildered one of its staunchest ally within the region too. The civil war in Syria continues

unabated and these seven years of conflict exposed US foreign policy‘s incoherence for as

407

important a region as Middle East. US so far seemed to be responding to case to case

developments within the conflict rather than acting like a hegemon with a clear vision and plan

for the region. Recent US decision to end CIA covert program to arm Syrian rebels is again

testimony that after more than six years into the conflict US has fairly limited chance of affecting

regime change in the face of determined Iranian and Russian efforts to prop up the Assad regime.

In the contemporary environment, not only global players like Russia have clearly taken a lead to

reshape region‘s emerging dynamics but local actors like Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar

etc. are all independently battling the Syrian civil war and trying to affect the outcome that might

enhance their regional standing vis-a-viz each other. Syria is geopolitically so important that if

Iran is able to sustain Assad regime through this unprecedented turmoil, it will provide Tehran

with significant leverage in the Arab world. Besides Russia has already re-entered the region as a

major broker in the Middle Eastern disputes. So far the trajectory of the conflict has favoured

anti-US camp in the region and in spite of relentless effort of anti-Assad forces to wrest the

regime away from the House of Assad, he is still surviving and gradually recovering the lost

territory too.

The case-study reveals that with staunch regional and extra-regional allies like Iran and Russia

the threat securitization for military intervention in Syria had not been easy. Assad‘s allies have

provided him with both regional and international forums to construct counter-narrative. Besides

having a permanent Security Council member on its side, ensures that direct foreign military

intervention, if planned and executed would lack international legal basis and hence would

always be treated as an aggression against a sovereign member of the international community.

Hence, threat securitization model was modified to reflect contemporary situation. But even the

modification validated the original hypothesis that the drift towards post-hegemony is changing

international military intervention behavior of the US.

The Syrian case has exposed flaws in US threat securitization endeavors and how counter-

narrative continuously dispelled Assad‘s image as the only ruthless actor annihilating his own

population to retain a grip on power. The counter-narrative exposed existence of extremist

groups like ISIS and their funding and sustenance by US-allies in the region and their mass

murder campaigns have dented anti-Assad camp efforts to portray him as the ruthless monster.

Besides existence of these groups have cast doubts on involvement of Assad regime in such

408

gross incidents like use of chemical weapons against unarmed civilians and non-combatants.

Thus it has been elaborated in the study that an adverse final outcome of Syrian conflict will

fairly dent US standing in the global hierarchy and its legitimacy to lead will come under further

scrutiny if the regional hierarchy is structured to empower Iran at the cost of Saudi Arabia within

the region.

Both these case-studies validated the dissertation hypothesis that power transition within the

global order and the dawn of the post-hegemonic international system has led to the

marginalization of US military interventionist policy. The study contributes to the extension of

Power Transition research program and incorporates discourse analysis technique to view the

problem of foreign direct military intervention from a discursive perspective. This study has

created the linkage between global and regional power transitions. It validated that events

shaping the global hierarchy can directly impact regional power struggles too. Major regional

players sensing vulnerability in global hierarchy, free from hegemonic constraints of the

declining hegemon pursue their self-identified regional agendas with more vigor. It has extended

the burgeoning research program by looking at the effects of post-hegemony on foreign direct

military interventions in troubled regions like MENA in post Arab Spring scenario.

The study provides scope for further exploration of the post-hegemonic phase and its impact on

other significant domains like effect on US financial aid, US ability to set agendas in

international bodies and on any region other than Middle East undergoing transition. This study

also did not take into account nuclear weapons / capabilities of states as a variable because none

of the target states had nuclear weapons. However, this is a very important variable and its

incorporation can significantly alter ―military intervention threat securitization model‖. It was

beyond the scope of this study but any further research in the aforementioned direction will

further enrich this discipline and therefore begs to be explored at length interested in determining

effects of this variable. Any future research within the aforementioned fields will help us

broaden our understanding about post-hegemonic system and help us validate effectively the

dawn of this era in International Relations.

409

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Newspapers, Magazines & Media

Al Arabiya; Arab News; Al Monitor; An Nahar (Beirut); Al Akhbar; Al Jazeera; Al Hayat; Al

Jazeera Center for Studies; Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo); Al Bawaba; Al Sharq Al Awsat; Al Ra‘I

Al Anm; ; Associate Press; Asia Times; African Review; ABC News; American Interest;

Amnesty International UK; BBC News; Bloomberg; Carnegie Middle East Centre; CBC News;

CBS News; CNN News; Christian Science Monitor; Daily Star; Deutsche Welle (DW) News;

Democracy Now; Diplomat; Daily Nation; Dawn (Pakistan);Economist; Egyptian Streets; EU

Observer; Fox News; Gatestone Institute; Gulf News; Geopolitical Weekly; Global Security

Organization; Guardian (UK); Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey); Independent (UK); Iran Tracker;

Independent Media Review; Institute Arabe des Chafs d‘Eterprises; Institute for the Study of

War; Jerusalem Post; Jane‘s Intelligence Review; Khaleej Time; Los Angeles Times; Metro

Magazine; Mada Masr; Middle East Institute; Middle East Eye; Middle East Mirror; Middle East

International; Muftah; Newsweek;New York Times; Project Syndicate; Pulitzer Center; Policy

Watch; Reinventing Peace; Reuters; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Saudi Press Agency

(Riyadh); Saudi Gazette; Haaretz; Spiegel Online International; The Star; The Washington

Institute; Telegraph; The National (UAE); The Tower Magazine; Times of Israel; Time; Times

(USA); The New Yorker; The Atlantic; USA Today; Voice of America; Voice of Russia; Vox

Eu; Vanity Fair; World Politics Review; World Peace Foundation; Washington Post; War on the

Rocks; Wall Street Journal; Woodrow Wilson Center; World Politics Review; Xinhanet; Xinhua

News Agency; Yahoo News;

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