Chapter V

MILITARY DIMENSION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

Chapter V

MILITARY DIMENSION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

The military dimension of the Western Sahara contlict must be analysed in the

context of the aim and objectives of the disputing/warring parties. Moroccan domestic

situation and its irredentist claim over Western Sahara, and Polisario's aim to achieve

independence first from the Spanish and later on from the Mauritanian and Moroccan

occupants of Western Sahara territory provided the context of the contlict. While the

aim of Morocco was to annexe the Western Sahara by legal and diplomatic means tirst

and. after having failed in its attempt to get the legal and diplomatic recognition. to

occupy the Western Sahara forcibly. Another purpose behind such a strategy was to

raise the stature of King Hassan-11 in the public so as to strengthen his position vis-a-vis

his political opponents.

The banner of revolt against the Spanish occupation was raised by Polisario since

1973. After having failed in its attempts to get independence from the Spanish. the

Polisario had to face the new occupants of the Western Sahara after the Madrid

Agreement was signed in 1975. As a result, it had to change its strategy to achieve its

ultimate goal of creating a independent Saharawi state by successful completion of war.

For this purpose it formed the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976 at

Bir Lehlou and vied for legitimacy on the international level and simultaneously waged

war with the occupants of the territory in order to force them to evacuate their territory.

After gaining recognition and legitimacy in the international community. 'the liberation

party can utilize the norms and organization of the International system to exert pressure

on the state it is fighting to achieve concessions and ultimately a termination of

136

hostilities. it is also a means for the liberation party for surmounting the realities and

constraints of military weakness. ' 1

After the visit of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara.

submission of its Report to UN General Assembly and the Advisory Opinion of

International Court of Justice on Western Sahara in 1974-75, Morocco realised the

futility of annexing Western Sahara through legal and diplomatic means and changed its

strategy to militarily occupy the Western Sahara. While ·the negotiations for Madrid

Accord were going on, the 'Green March'· was organised by the Morocco. This march

was nothing but a pressure tactic and also a test to observe the intention of the Spanish

Government and its reaction. At this juncture, Spain was in a much superior military

position and it could have easily defeated Morocco. But its intention was otherwise.

While the public attention was focussed at Green March in Tarfaya, units of Moroccan

military forces moved ~owards the towns of Bir Lehlou, Farsiya, Tifariti, Hauza and

Jdiria from the North-east to seal off the border with Al~eria. In October 1975,

Morocco had quietly moved troops into remote parts of the Spanish colony. The whole

idea and aim of taking such steps was that the moment some kind of settlement was

arrived at between Spain on one hand and Morocco and Mauritania on the other, the

Moroccan forces would immediately take-over the Western Sahara, prevent the Saharawis

from crossing the border into Algeria and crush the Polisario resistance.

Between 14 November 1975 when the Madrid Agreement was signed and

December 1975, the Moroccan armed forces seized large areas of Western Sahara and

Jeffrey M. Schulman, "Wars of Liberation and the International System: Western Sahana- a case in Point" in Irving Leonard Markovits Ed. Studies in Power and Class in Africa (New York, Oxford, 1987), p.67.

137

gained control of several key towns including the centre of the Phosphate-mining

complex at Bou-Craa and the capital EI-Ayoun.2 In January 1976, the Spanish withdrew

from the Villa "Cisneros (Dakhla) and the Moroccans captured it immediately. During

th!!se military operations, the Moroccans ground forces were supported by aerial

bombardment which overwhelmed the resistance offered by Polisario and forced the

Saharawi civilian population i" the north-east of the territory to retreat into the desert.

The camps in the desert were then systematically bombed using Phosphorus and Napalm

bombs. 3 Throughout the first month of 1976, tht: Moroccan Air Force bombed the

refugee camps. By March 1976. the Polisario provincial capital of Guelta Zemmour

sheltered some 25,000 Saharawi refugees. Following Rabat Agreement in mid-April,

1976, the Moroccan forces made a major assault on Guelta Zemmour and the battle

lasted for five days. It ended with the fall of the Polisario strong holds. The Moroccan

forces established garrisons in most of the small outlying settlement of the Moroccan-

controlled zone, as well as secured a finn hold over the larger towns.4

POUSARIO REACTIONS AND STRATEGY : FIRST PHASE OF WAR

Before dealing with the Polisario's military response to Moroccan and

Mauritanian annexation of Western Saharce, it is pertinent to mention that 'long before

the situation in the Western Sahara had become as critical as it was in 1975, Morocco

2 Dr. Simon Baynham, "The War in Western Sahara", in Africa Insight. Vol. 21. No. 1. 1991; P.50.

3 David Seddon, "Morocco and the Western Sahara"., Review of African Political Economy (U.K.), No._38, April 1987, p.24.

4 ibid, p.25.

138

had begun its preparations at the political, diplomatic and military levels'. 5 Werner Ruf

mentions that at the end of 1973, King Hassan had ordered from the US some Eight M-

60 tanks (which at that time corresponded to one-tenth of the yearly American

production}, sixty rocket equipped helicopters, field hospitals and communication

systems. Normally such deliveries last over four to six years. Hassan, however insisted

on complete delivery by Autumn 1974.6 While such information is not recorded official-

ly, nonetheless in 1973 Morocco ordered such armaments which included mostly

transport air crafts like Fairchild C-119 Packet, Lockheed C-130h Hercules, Beechcraft

King Air-100; Helicopters (Augusta-Bel 206 B); M-48 Patton tanks (MBT), Fast Patrol

Boasts, and Trainer air crafts. Most of these armaments were scheduled to be delivered

in 1974-75. Thus, in 1975, the Moroccan army numbered some 65,000 men. It was

reinforced by 50,000 para-military troops. Its armour consisted of 120 Soviet T -54s

tanks 25 old American tanks and 120 French AMX-13 light tanks. It air power consisted

of French Fouga Magisters Jet trainers (COIN), and American Northrop F-5's. It is

estimated that the troops deployed in the initial invasion of the Western Sahara numbered

roughly 20,000. 7

Moroccan invasion heralded the First Phase of war between Morocco and

Polisorio; and Mauritania and Polisario. The struggle, which the Polisario had earlier

launched against the Spanish forces was now turned against the new occupants. The only

5 Werner Ruf, "The Role of World Powers" in Richard Lawless and Laila Monahan Eds. War and Refugees (London and New York, 1987).

6 Ibid. p.90.

1 John Mercer The Saharawis of Western Sahara Minority Rights Group Report ~o. 40, London. Minority Rights Group 1979. p.9.

139

difference was that new occupants had earlier aided the Polisario against the Spanish.

While the Spanish were under pressure from the UN and the OAU to decolonise the

territory and grant i.he right of self-qetennination to the Saharawis, Morocco had annexed

the territory defying all the established norms of the international law by forcible means

with the intention to integrate the Western Sahara with Morocco. The Polisario's

resistance strengthened against the Morocco because of the atrocities committed by the

Moroccan army against the civilians, including the bombing of women, children, men

and herds as the Saharawi 's population fled to seek refuge in Algeria. Though Polisario

Front could not do much against Morocco because of the air-strike capability of the

Moroccan forces and also because of the sudden blitzkrieg launched by Moroccan forces

which the Polisario neither expected so soon nor were they militarily prepared for it.

Moreover, since December 1975, most of its forces (estimated at around 3,000) were

initially deployed for organizing and defending refugees exodus to the Tindouf region in

Algeria. Nonetheless, in the southern part of the Western Sahara, Polisario had put up

stiff resistance to the Mauritanian advance into the Western Sahara and had entrenched

itself at La Guera on the border with Mauritania. When the Polisario launched

diversionary or retaliatory raids on military posts in northeast Mauritania in mid­

December 1915, La Guera was attacked by Mauritanian forces and Moroccan Jets and'

after a ten-day seige the Polisario strong hold was crushed.

On the whole, the Polisario forces being small in number and relatively poorly

equipped were no match for the blitzkrieg launched by Moroccan anny and air force.

Their t1rst priority was the refugee evacuation operation, which was more or less

completed by the end of April 1976. It is estimated that during first half of 1976.

between 75,000 to 150,000 civilian refugees fled from the Moroccan Military operations

140

to South of Tindouf in Algeria where the Polisario guerillas were recruited organized,

trained and armed, and this force eventually carne to be known as Saharawi People's

Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA would not have seen the light of the day, had it

not received the vital assistance of the Aigerian government. The Algerian government

kept up a steady pressure against Morocco and Mauritania by providing arms, fuel. food

and water, and a territorial sanctuary to support guerilla operations of the Polisario

Front. POLISARID also received for some time financial assistance and weapons from

Libya. Eventually, the Polisario Front built up its combatant strength from about three

thousand in early 1976 to 8-10 thousand by the end of 1978'. 8

To counter the diplomatic moves of Morocco and Mauritania, the Polisario Front

proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) at Bir Lahlou to fill the

political vaccum left after the withdrawal of Spain and as the exercise of the right of self-

determination of the Saharawi people. To drive out the enemy from the territory of

Western Sahara, the Polisario assessed its capability and realized its inability to dent the

heavily defended army garrisons of the territory's urban settlements and therefore it

opted for a strategy of guerilla penetration into their surrounding desert areas. 9 For

this, the Polisario's military tactics laid stress on the lightning strike by the highly mobile

force, typically a couple of all-terrain vehicles carrying machine guns, recoil less canon,

rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns. 10 The Polisario combined their traditional

8 John Darnis Conflict in North-West Africa : The Western Sahara Dispute, (Stand ford University, Stand ford, California, 1983) p. 82.

9 Baynham, n.2, p.Sl.

10 J. Howe. "Western Sahara : a War Zone" in Review of African Political Economy no. 11, January-April 1978, p.86.

141

military skills with modem equipment and techniques and indulged in long distance raid

called Ghazzi. The SPLA units were called Kataeb.

Keeping in view the military strength of the Moroccan forces, the Polisario

strategist concentrated on weak link of the chain i.e. Mauritania and decided to attack the

economic installations in Western Sahara. Since the Mauritania's economy was weak and

depended mainly on the export of Iron ore from the Zouerate mines, therefore the

Polisario Gurillas concentrated their attacks on the mining town of Zouerate, the port

town of Nouadhibou, capital Nouakchott, Aoussert and Chinguetti. From the military

standpoint it was virtually impossible for Mauritania to patrol and police the country's

long desert frontiers encompassing 400,000 square miles of area. Its armed forces were

only 3,000 in number in 1975 and neither they were properly trained nor well-equipped

to deal with the situation. As a a result the Polisario's guerilla attacks increased in

frequency and boldness during 1976-77 against Mauritania. Polisario attacks were

remarkably effective. In June 1976, 500-600 Polisario guerillas on 100 vehicles launched

a bold and major attack on Nouakchott. Mauritania scored a decisive victory in this

attack in which 200 guerillas and their leader El Ouali Moustapha Sayed were killed.

In February 1977, the Polisa,rio attacked the Mauritanian train 60 miles south of Zouerate

destroying 3 locomotives with rocket fire. The Polisario attacks on mining centre of

Zouerate in May 1977 and disruption of the railway line between the mines and the

Atlantic Port of Nouadhibou threatened to bring iron-mining industry to a halt. On 13

May 1977 Mauritania signed a mutual defence pact with King Hassan which established

a Moroccan-Mauritanian High Command and authorised stationing of Moroccan troops

on Mauritanian territory which retlected the deteriorated military situation. In July 1977.

142

the SPLA launched a second attack on Nouakchott and they were able to shell the

Presidential Palace.

While greater pressure was put on Mauritania, the Polisario guerillas kept up

regular guerilla attacks against the Moroccans. One of the main targets of the Polisario

guerilla offensive was the phosphate mining complex at Bou-Craa, which is linked by a

vulnerable 99 l<m- conveyer belt to the port of El-Ayoun. During 1976-80 the

production of phosphate was seriously affected due to the regular disruption/harassment

along the conveyer belt by the Pofisario guerinas. In mid-1978, the guerillas destroyed

5 sections (5.5. km) of the conveyor belt and damaged the control towers and power

pylons. 11

As the military operations of the SPLA became more frequent and successful, the

Moroccan army was obliged to abandon many of the smaller, more remote out-posts they

had occupied in the early periods of the war. A gradual process of withdrawal began and

the defences of the more important towns were heavily reinforced. 12

FRENCH INTERVENTION : During the attacks by Polisario on Zouerate in

Mauritania in May 1977, two French technicians were killed and several taken prisoner.

During a raid on the railway (Zouerate-Nouadhibou) on 25 October 1977, two more

Frenchmen were seized. This further provoked the French to intervene directly into the

Western Sahara contlict in support of Morocco and Mauritania. The Franco-Mauritanian

agreement which was signed in Septem~r 1976, was widened in scope in January 1977

11 Damis. n. 8, p.83.

t:! David Seddon, "Morocco at War" in Richard Lawless and Laila Monahan ed. War and Refugees: The Western Sahara Contlict (London and New York, 1987). p.I04.

143

to allow French military personnel to be sent to Mauritania. As per that agreement

'about 50 French military experts arrived in Mauritania in the first week of November

1977 to complement 30 French officers who had been there since the beginning of

October anq the group of French instructors who had been training Mauritanians soldiers

at the Atal military school since the beginning of the war. Another 25 French military

personnel, all telecommunication expert, arrived in the second week of November 1977.

In November 1977, French navy Breguet-Altantique reconnaissance planes started a

systematic photo-survey of Mauritania's hitherto largely unchartered desert regions, a

necessary precondition for direct air assaults against the Guerillas.' 13

The French launched 'Operation Lamartin' in October 1 rr77, which involved the

direct air support to Mauritanian armed forces from French Jaguar units based at Dakar,

Senegal. In November 1977, the number of French officers and NCO's serving with

the Mauritanians was increased to 105 and an air lift operation was started to rearm the

Mauritanians. 14 The first air strikes by the French took place on 2 December 1977

following a Polisario attack on railway installations 75 kms north of Nouadhibou in

northern Mauritania. It was coordinated with Moroccan F-6 combat planes. The air

attacks on Polisario were devastating. 15 By December the French "facility" at Dakar

held six Jaguar strike aircraft with their supporting reconnaissance Breguets and mid-air

refueling C-135s, together with Nor atlas transports/aircraft ahd their search and rescue

13 Tony Hodges, "The Escalating Confrontation" in Africa Report March-April lrr78; p. 7

14 African Contempoarv Record, 1977-78, p.Bl63.

15 Keith Somerville Foreign Military Intervention in Africa (London, 1990) p 116

144

Puma helicopters. The Jaguars, unlike Morocco's F-5s, have both the range and the

counter-missile electronics necessary for operating against Polisario. 16 On 14 December

1977. Polisario announced the release of the French Prisoners, but more attacks followed

on 18 December 1977 after another Polisario raid. On 23 December, 1977, the French

admitted for the first time that their air force had participated in action against Polisario.

On 5 May 1978, the French Foreign Minister, Louis de Giringaud stated that France was

continuing to carry out. air strikes against Polisario 'within Mauritanian's International

borders and not in the contested territory of Western Sahara. ,. 7 But the air-strike and

the growing French role did not stop Polisario raids. The Polisario guerillas continued

to raid the Zouerate - Nouadhibou railway and simply adjusted their tactics, switching

to small-scale sabotage attacks to diminish their exposure to attack from the air.

COUP IN MAURITANIA

One of the Polisario's long-term strategy was to wage a war of attrition and make

the conflict so costly for the respective governments so as to provoke opposition from

the masses. Since Mauritania's economy was weaker,its defence forces were incapable

to handle the Polisario raids. It depended on the foreign forces for its security needs.

Its economy was shattered due to disruption in the supply and export of iron-ore· from

the Zouerate nines. Drought was ravaging the country and Mauritania had allocated 60

percent of the budget on defence in 1978.

16 Mercer, n. 7, p.l3.

17 Somerville, n.l5, p.ll6-17.

145

All these factors led to the Coup d'etat by armed forces on 9-10 July 1978. Two

days after the Coub, the Polisario Front announced a "temporary halt in military

operations in Mauritanian territory" as a "gesture of goodwill" toward the new

regime. 18 The Polisario's strategy was successful against Mauritania and during the

second half of 1978, Mauritania was willing for a semi-independent Saharawi state but

it was opposed by Morocco. During 1978-79, the Moroccan government did not try to

prevent Nouakchott from pursuing negotiations with the Polisario Front. Probably, it had

other plans to execute. By October 1978, Mauritania had obtained the withdrawal of

one-third of the Moroccan armed forces from its soil. The Polisario claimed in 1978.

that in the previous twelve months, it had downed two Jaguars and killed 6, 794 enemy

troops. 19

While Polisario Front was· pursuing its negotiation with Mauritania, its guerillas

engaged the Moroccan troops in other parts of the Western Sahara and Southern

Morocco. But, frustrated by the Mauritanian regime's failure to withdraw from Tiris el

Gharbia, even one year after coup d'etat, the Polisario Front lifted its cease-fire and

attacked the village of Tichla in the south of Tiris-el-Gharbia. The attack on Tichla was

meant to establish two goals. Firstly, it was timed to coincide with the OAU Foreign

Ministers meeting thereby signaling that the Sahcu-an conflict was an important issue

demanding attention. Secondly, the attack was launched on a Mauritanian held town on

the anniversary of the Polisario Front's unilateral cease-fire. Thus. the message to

18 Tony Hodges Western Sahara Connecticut, 1983) p.265.

19 'Somenville, n.15, p.l17.

The Roots of a Desert War (Westport.

146

Mauritania was that unless there was progress in the negotiations, the Polisario Front was

ready to continue the war. Subsequently, the Polisario Front achieved both the goals i.e.

movement in the OAU and movement by Mauritania. 20 It "prompted an immediate

response and, on 5 August 1979, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania signed a peace

agreement with the SADR in Algiers (also called Algiers Agreement of 1979), in which

it solemnly declared that it did not have and would not have territorial or any other

claims over Western Sahara and Qecided to withdraw from the unjust war in Western

Sahara. In a secret addendum, the new government undertook to put on end to its

presence in the Western Sahara and to hand over directly to the Polisario Front the pan

of the Western Sahara that it controlled within seven months from the date of signing the

present agreement. 21 But before it could materialize, Morocco had build up its forces

in Tiris- el-Gharbia and finally on 14 August 1979, the Moroccan forces seized Dakhla

and proclaimed it as a Moroccan Province under the name of Oued-ed Dahab.

Simultaneously with the withdrawal of Mauritania from Western Sahara contlict, the

overt and direct role of the French also ended. That marked the first phase of

Polisario's armed struggle against Mauritania and Morocco. After Mauritania withdrew

from the military confrontation, the contest was confined between the Moroccans and

Saharawis.

20 Schulman, n.l, p.84.

21 Seddon, n.12, p.l02-3.

147

SECOND PHASE OF POUSARIO'S MILITARY STRUGGLE AGAINST MOROCCO

Having successfully broken the Rabat-Nouakchott axis, the Polisario guerillas put

all their resources and attention towards removing the Moroccan forces from the

occupied territory. In such conflicts or war of attrition what is more important is the

'staying power' and the 'striking power' of the warring parties. While the 'striking

power' depends on the moral, efficiency, training, strategy, tactics and the quality of the

weapons; the 'staying power' depends on the nature of domestic support for the cause,

manpower, eeonomic condition of the country; intt:mational support through political,

diplomatic and military means; political stability and social mobilisation.

In the case of Polisario, the biggest drawback was their small population and

limited strength of combatants/armed forces. Moreover, they had to operate in the open

desert and they had no air cover. The Polisario guerillas had limited weapons but they

utilised it effectively and accurately. Their moral was quite high and they were trained

in Algeria, Libya and Cuba as f¥ as the use of anti-aircraft weaponary system was

concerned. Both Algeria and Libya supplied weapons and equipment. By 1978, the

Polisario forces were equipped with all-terrain vehicles equipped with machine guns,

rocket launchers, recoil-less canon. 122 mm Rockets, mortars, SPG-9 anti-tank missiles,

Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rit1es and SAM-7 missiles. Polisario's military strategy and

tactics retained the old tradition of rapid desert raids. Their operational unit consisted

of 10 to 15 soldiers on 3-5 land Rovers. But in bigger raids, it involved large motorized

columns consisting even of 150 vehicles. Land Rovers remains Polisario's preferred

means of transport and attack; and the Kalashnikov AK-47 its favourite light weapon.

The operational units crossed the desert at high speed for concerted attacks.

148

Compared to Polisario, Morocco's preparedness for the invasion in 1975-76 was

well-planned. It had a well-trained armed force and its weaponery consisted of individual

arms (like MAT 49, MAS 49, Kalashnikov, etc.); Heavy arms (like Machine guns.

missile launchers, mortars, etc.); Armoured force of M-48 and T -54, and Topaz and M-

113, APC's and Aircrafts like F-5, Fouga Magester C-130 and Helicopters~; .• It armed

forces numbered approximately 50,000. in 1975. The Moroccan political situation was

not very stable but over the Western Sahara issue, King Hassan was able to rally the

support of all the opposition parties. Its economy was just manageable. Moreover, since

the early stage of invasion Morocco received substantial material assistance from France.

It delivered 50 tanks and Mirage jet fighter during 1975-76. Till the Polisario could

organize and train _its guerillas, Morocco had the upper hand in gaining control over the

Western Sahara territory. Moreover, Polisario's priority to engage Mauritania first had

given Morocco enough time to prepare itself military and analyse the offensive strategy

adopted by the Polisario. The 'Royal Armed Forces' (FAR) had established garrisons in

most of the small outlying settlements of llie Moroccan occupied zone of the Western

Sahara, and secured a firm hold over the towns by April 1976. The Polisario kataeb were

able to establish in the desert hinterland an intricate network of small scattered bases,

some of tl"\em underground. to supplement their rear bases in. Algeria. '22

An important proportion of the Moroccan budget had gone for the purchase of

arms and equipment from abroad which included tanks, armoured personnel carriers,

aJlllOured reconnaissance vehicles, anillery, anti-tank weapons (both guns and missiles).

anti-aircraft defences, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, air-to-air missiles (AAM 's).

22 Hodges, n.l8, p.283.

149

air-to-ground missiles (AGM's) and electronic and radar defence system. Majority of the

advance weapons and equipments was purchased from France and United States of

America.

French arms supplies to Morocco have been on a large scale since 1974 and span

the entire spectrum from light arms to heavy and sophisticated weaponry including

crotale anti-aircraft missile system. Thes~ armaments include 60 Mirage F-1 CH Jet

interceptor aircraft, 24 Fouga strike planes, 24 Alpha Jet tactical support aircraft, 40

Puma troop carrying helicopters and 400 V AB armoured personnel carriers. The total

value of French arms sales to Morocco was probably in the range of $1.5b to $2 billion.

not including weapons supplied through military credit. French military support included

France's willingness to accept large Moroccan arrears in payment. 23

The movement of the Moroccon armed forces in the Western Sahara territory was

made difficult by ~e constant Polisario guerilla attacks. During 1976-78, the Moroccon

convoys were attacked in isolated garrissons. Even the bridge between Tarfaya and Tan-

Tan was not spared. The Port city of El-Ayoun was directly attacked. The pace of attack

was such that the Polisatio was able to force the closure of the mining operation at Bou-

Craa. The FOSBUCRAA copveyer belt was rendered inoperational as the Poii~ario was

able to destroy a significant portion of the 99-Km long conveyer belt. During this period

the Moroccans were unable to do much to stop and control the Polisario attacks. The

main reason for the Moroccan's inability to ward-off the Polisario attacks was that their

command and control was highly centralized and by the time reinforcements arrived the

23 John Damis, "The Role of Third Parties in the Western Sahara Contlict" in Maghreb Review, 17, Nos.1-2, Jan-April 1982, p.7 as quoted in Seddon, No.12. p.l06.

150

Polisario guerillas would vanish from the scene. Moreover, to control the outlying

settlements and garrisons, a large number of sophisticated weapons and resources were

required. Most of the arms agreement during 1973-79 between Morocco and its arms

supplier were concluded in the year 1975 and 1978. MOst of the deliveries took place

in 1976-77 and 1979. In 1975, majority of the arms ordered were transport aircrafts.

helicopters, fighter aircraft and armared personnel carriers. These armaments were

needed to carry the troops to the Western Sahara, and to repel any Polisario attacks. but

against a swift commando raids, aircraft tike Mirage F-1 and Nortgrop F-5E were of not

much use. as they were not titted with the electronic detection g~detry. like those in the

French Jaguars. Accordingly, a number of orders were placed by Morocco in 1978 tor

more sophisticated armaments which would be effective in counter insurgency measures.

Harassed by an elusive guerilla force, the Moroccan army adopted a defensive strategy

with a purpose 'to protect a few population centres and the large phosphate deposits in

the northern part of the western Sahara. '24 By September 1978, the Moroccan armed

forces numbered some 80,000 men, supported by over 60 combat planes, armoured cars,

tanks, transport planes and helicopters. 25 By 1978, the Moroccan annual military

budget had reached $760 million, nearly 14 percent of the national expenditure. In 1979,

the war was estimated to be costing Morocco between $2 and $5 million a day. 26

24 John Damis, "Escalation in the Western Sahara", in Middle East International, 20 July 1979, p. 10.

25 Mercer, n.7, p.12.

26 V. Thomson & R. Adloff, The Western Saharans Background to Contlict (London. 1980), p. 292.

151

Morocco's military problems compounded after the July 1978 Coup in

Mauritania, as it was left alone to tackle the Polisario's attacks. Moreover, the attacks

were concentrated not only against the Moroccan forces in the occupied territary but also

extended into the Southern part of Morocco. After the death of the Algerian President

Houari Bumedienne in December 1978, who was one of the main backers of Polisario

Front for the Liberation of Western Sahara, the Polisario launched a major campaign

during 1979-80 named 'Houari Boumedienne Offensive' in his honour. Between July

1978 to December 1978, the Polisario units attacked Fosbucraa conveyor belt on 30

September 1978; shelled El-Ayoun by mortars on 17 October }978; attacked Sidi Amara

(in Morocco) in the Oued Draa' valley on 27 August 1978 where main target was the

supply convoy; attacked supply convoys on 29-30 September 1978 etc. Polisario's

favored zone of operations remained the desert or semidesert regions of Morocco's

extreme south, notably the Ouarkziz and Bapi Mountains, the Draa Valley and the

foothills of the Anti-Atlas. 27 The successive chain of mountains and valleys, running

from west to east provided ideal ground for guerilla operations. In the year 1979,

Polisario was able to field as many as 3000-5000 men at a time with sophisticated

equipments including 'stalin barrel organs' (multiple rocket lauchen with a 20-km.

range), and for the first time Moroccan towns and major bases were assaulted and their

defenses successfully breached. 28 For example, on 28 Jan. 1979, a large guerilla force

fought its way into the center of Tan-Tan, located on the higway from Agadir to El­

Ayoun, with an air base and a garrison of several thousand troops. The guerillas

27 Hodges, n.l8, p.285.

28 ibid, p.285.

152

remained in the city for four hours, freed Saharawi prisoners and destroyed military

installations. On 31 May-1 June 1979, the Moroccon convoy between Tan-Tan and

Tarfaya was ambushed. The Polisario made the roads to El-Ayoun so vulenerable that

the overland convoys were abandoned and it had to depend on supplies through sea. On

14 June 1979, the Polisario guerillas broke through the Moroccan defenses at Assa. On

13 and 27 June 1979, Tan-Tan was attacked, on i1 August Enzaren, on 24 August 1979

the FAR's 3rd Armoured Squadron at Labouirate in Southern Morocco fell to the

Polisario attacks. The town remained in Polisario hands for more than a year during

which time the Reguibat population was evacuated to Tindouf and Morocco's large

number of weapons including 37 T-54 tanks were abandoned. On 6 October 1979,

several thousand guerillas stormed Smara and broke though the southeastern flank of the

Moroccan defense lines and evacuated 709 saharawis to the Tindoof camp. On 14

October 1979, around 1200 guerillas qverran the Moroccan base at Mahbes. killing a

fifth of the garrison's 780 men. 29

To exert additional pressure on the Moroccan forces; the Polisario forces raided

Akka, a Berber town in the Anti-Atlas, on 25 January 1980 only 110 miles southeast of

Agadir. On 3 September 1980, the Polisario groups raided Akka and Tata towns simul­

taneously. On 9 October, 1980, the Polisario raided the small Oasis town of M'hamid.

MOROCCAN INITIATIVE/OFFENCE

The series of reveases suffered by Moroccan armed forces inthe occupied portion

of Western Sahara as well as in southern part of Morocco compelled Morocco to take

29 Hodges, n.l8, p.286-7.

153

military initiative as well as make structural changes in command and control. During

1977-79, when the ·Pol isario attacks and challenge posed a serious threat to the more

remote and smaller outposts, a process of gradual regrouping began. Whilte the defenses

of the more important town and settlements were reinforced. all other outposts between

Smara and the Algerian frontier were either abandoned by Moroccans or overrun by the

Polisario. Farsi a was evacuate<f in April 1977, Haousa in October 1977, Bir Lehlou in

March 1978 arid Amgala in May 1979. Mahbes was overm in October 1979.30 The

miliary initiative resulted in the Morocaan army forming several mobile armed task-force

whose purpose was 'search and destroy mission' and to bolster the defenses of the main

towns.

The First task-force code-named, Ohoud, was constituted in September 1979, a

month after the annexation of Oued ed-Dahab (later rechristened as Tiris-el-Gharbia),

designed to reinforce the 3,000 Moroccan troops stationed at Dakhla and Argoub. This

task-force consisting of 6,000 men and 1,500 vehicles, including US-supplied M-113

armored personnel carriers, was personally commanded by Colonel-Major Ahmed Dlimi

and its sole aim was to cross Tan-Tan to Tarfaya via Oued Chebeika and finally to

Dakhla through the road. This task-force reached its destination safety without

encountering any Polisario unit.

The second task force, code-named Zellagha Force was constituted in January

1980 and commanded by Colonel-Major Abrouq. This force of 7,000 men, was to

undertake an operation in southern Morocco, known as Imam (The Faith) whose main

aim was to break through to Zaag, which has been encircled for months by Polisario, and

30 Hodges, n.l8, p.288.

154

to reestablish control over the Ouarkziz mountains. But this task force was attacked in

force by the Polisario as it tried to reach Zaag and suffered heavy losses. The operation

Imam was abandoned and the force withdrew northward, to Assa on 11 March 1980.

The seige of Zaag was broken by FAR only in May 1980, after it secured control of the

Ngueb Pass and a twenty-mile corridor to Zag.

The third special task force constituted in August 1980 under the command of

Colonel Ben Othman was code-named Larak. Its main objective was to block the

guerillas' other main route of access into southern Morocco, the pass in the Zini

Mountains to the southwest of the Ouarkziz range, through which Polisario managed to

stage its numerous ambushes against convoys on the north-south road between Tan-Tan

and Al-Ayoun, via Tarfaya. Even though Polisario had put up stiff resistance and

inflicted heavy losses on 16 September 1980 to Larak force near Ras-el-k.hanfra, it could

not dislodge the Moroccan troops from the approaches to the Zini Mountains. 31

After gaining control of the strategic pass near the border with the Western

Sahara, Moroccan armed forces were able to reverse the impression that it was loosing

militarily to the Polisario. Morocco, however, did not have the resources for

maintaining large forces in order to 'Pacify' the resistance in 100,000 sq. miles of the

Western Sahara. Moreover, this could not be the permanent solution to Morocco's

objective to 'reintegrate' the Western Sahara into Morocco as the vulnerability of its hold

and threat perception by Polisario would give the impression that it was incapable of

sustaining its claim as a political unit. Therefore, in late 1980, the Ben Othman's Larak

force embarked on a ambitious project-the establishment of a continuous defense line fron

31 Hodges. n.l8. p. 289

155

Ral ei-Khanfra to Smara, about 60 miles to the south and from there, via Bou-Craa in

a southwesterly direction to the Atlantic, in order to seal off the whole of the

northwestern comer of Western Sahara called 'Useful Triangle'.

CONSTRUCTION OF SAND-WALLS

The first stretch of the Saharan'Wall' from the zini Mountains to the old Smara

defence perimeter was complete on 2 March 1981. By 11 May 1981, the defensive wall

was extended to Bou-Craa and by May 1982, it was extended from Bou-Craa to the

Atlantic coast enclosing Boujdour. While the 'Defensive Walls' were being constructed,

the Polisario units attacked and partially overrun Guelta Zemmour (near Mauritanian

border) on 24-25 March 1981. Later, on 13 October 1981 , the 2, 600 strong garrison

at Guelta Zemmour were routed by Polisario forces killing many and capturing 230

prisoners. Even as the Moroccan reinformcements arrived, fighting continued and by

23 October 1981, the Polisario had shot down 5 aircrafts within a space of 10 days which

included 2 Mirage, one C-130 Hercules transport plane, one Northrop F-5E Jet and a

Puma helicoper. Considering the serious and costly losses, and the vulnerability of the

bases at Guelta,Zemmour and Bir Enzaren, the FAR decided to withdrew completely its '

troops from these bases on 7 November and 10 November, 1981 respectively. The result

of the sustained and continuous onslaught on the Moroccan positions in the occupied

teritory of Western Sahara was such that except the walls enclosing 'Useful Triangle·

upto Boujdour and the twin towns of Dakhla and Argoub in the Rio-de Ora bay in the

so.-<:alled Tiris-al-Gharbia, the rest of the Western Saharan teritory was totally abandoned

by the Moroccan troops. The control of Moroccan troops by 1982 within the 250 miles

156

long walls, enclosed an area of about 17,000 sq. miles only which was roughly one-sixth

of the Western Sahara's total land area.

The attack on Guelta-Zemmour by the Polisario Front was quit significant.

Firstly, it demostrated that it could launch major engagemnts and thus no cease-fire could

be achieved without its participation in negotiations. Secondly, since Guelta Zemmour

was over 350 km from Algeria, the logistics and coordination for such a battle destroyed

the usual characterisation of attacks as raids from Algeria. 32 It is also pertinent to

mention that 'during 1980 and early 1981, Libya did make strenous attempts to get

African support for Polisario and in 1981, arms supplies from Tripoli increased to such

an extent that Libya was giving Polisario around 90 percent of its weapons. 33 Polsario

and Algeria had acknowledged the use of Libyan supplied Brazilian EE-9 Cascavel

wheeled armored vechicles. King Hassan accused 'Libya of aiding Polisario and

providng SAM-6 missilles which were used against the Moroccan aircrafts. ' 34

MOROCCAN COUNTER-STRATEGY

In the wake of Guelta-Zemmour tragedy, Moroccans had to change their strategy

and seek military weapons and assistance from its supporters. The Palace ultimately

moved to a traditional military strategy based on the principle of "economy of force".

At its core was the doctrine of static defense centered on three important areas-a

geographic triangle embracing the provincial capital of El-Ayoun, the religious centre of

32 Schulman, n. 1, p. 84

33 African Contemporary Record 1981-82, p. 811

34 Somerville, n.15, p. 118

157

Smara and the Phosphate mines located at Bou-Craa. 35 The protective screen would

consist of a primary barrier in the form of defensive 'wall' or sand-walls and it was

supposed to be a continuous line of defence. The 'walls' consisted of two bulldozed

banks of sand approximately two meters high fronted by barbed wire, and defended by

minefields, occassional artillery placements and observation posts, equipped with radar

and modem electronic survelliance devices to detect movement upto several miles in the

desert beyond the wall. These defences were manned along the entire length by making

protective ditches and undergrond dugouts. The second layer of the protective screen

consisted of mechanized and artillery units positioned 10 kms. behind the second walls,

equipped with 120 mm artillery pieces, AML-90 armored cars and AMX tanks. The

Th.rd and rear pan of protective screen consisted of Rapid Intervention forces based at

camps, 30 kilometres behind the primary barrier. Their role was to quickly concentrate

superior Moroccan fire-power at any point within hours of any Polisario attack. These

fortifications required 80,000 to 100,000 troops. 36

The maintenance of troops in Western Sahara, and the arms/weapons required for

these troops caused huge dnun on Moroccan resources and in the mid-1980's it was only .

US and French military and financial aid that prevented bankruptcy. American

Assistance was irtensified after the Moroccan disaster of Guelta Zemmour in October

1981. American military instructors arrived at Morocco to join French instructors in

training special troops in counter-guerilla operations and to teach anti-missile tactics to

35 William H. Lewis, "Morocco and the Western Sahara" in Current History May 1985, p. 215

36 Baynham, n. 2, p. 51-52

158

Moroccan pilots. In January 1980, the Pentagon announced plans to sell$ 232.5 million

worth of Northrop F5E jets, OV-10 'Bronco' counter-insurgency aircrafts and Hughes

helicopter gunships to Morocco. 37 The American Westinghouse company helped the

Moroccan defence effort in the Sahara by installing sophisticated electronic sensor

systems and radar networks along the wall. 38

Other important arms supplier to Morocco included Austria and South Africa.

In 1978, the Austri?It government sanctioned the sale of 121 Kurasseier-type tanks

manufactured by the Steyr-Daimler-Puch concern to Morocco which were delivered in

1979 and in 1981, the Austrian government supplied ten Steyr-4 K7 FA type Armored

Personnel carrier to Morocco. In 1979, Moroccan government entered into agreements

with South Africa for the purchase of 150 Eland-60 Armored car, 100 Eland-90 armored

car and 80 Ratel-20 APC's. While the Eland-60 and Eland-90 were supplied during

1980-84, 80 Ratel-20 APC's were supplied during 1980-81. Morocco even purchased

arms from Israel, Argentina and Egypt. Number of arms purchased from France and

USA by Morocco during 1980-82 were reportedly financed by Saudi Arabia.

The budget level of military aid to Morocco by US was increased from $ 30

million in 1980 to $ 45 m in 1981. The US military creqits for Morocco increased from

$ 14 m in 1975 to $ 65 m in 1984. Most of the hatdwares supplied was used to

strengthen and extend the wall. In 1982, a Joint American-Moroccan military

commission was established. As a quid pro quo, in 1982 Morocco signed an agr~ment

giving the American Rapid Deployment Force transit facilities at Moroccan air bases.

37 Seddon, n. 12, p. 106

38 Africa Confidential, 15 April 1987.

159

In July 1982 it was revealed that the US was supplying anti personnel cluster bombs to

the Moroccan airforce. 39 Grants under Military Assistance Program rose from $ 30

m in 1984 to $ 40 million in 1985. In 1986, the entire security package approved by the

US Congress was worth $ 74.3~ million-slightly more than the $ 66m allocated to

Morocco for development and food aid. There was a noticeable slackening in military

sale agreements during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-81). But this did not affect

the deliveries which were particularly high. Though practically bankrupt, Morocco

continued to obtain credits for the purpose of new weapons, suggesting that France and

the US (Morocco's biggest supplier of arms) must have a vested interest in seeing the

Morocco continue its war against the Saharawis. 40

Despite massive arms build-up within the occupied territories of the Western

Sahara after the Guelta Zemmour disaster, the Moroccan defence strategy remains

basically defensive. Polisario 's military response had been to launch pin prick attacks

and mortar barrages against the wall, with occasionally heavier assaults at night. 41 To

this, Moroccan armed forces responded by air-strikes and by further strengthening the

fortifications around the occ~pied territory. In mid-July 1983, the Polisario attacked

Lemseied (behind the Sand-wall in Morocco) and major strategic points on the wall at

Smara and Zaag, by deploying over 1,500 men and 150 armored vehicles. This attack

was intended to prove the Polisario's war effort, though they suffered considerable

losses. Again in September 1983, a new offensive was launched at Smara and at least

39 New York Times, 22 July 1982 as quoted in, Seddon, n. 12, p. 106

40 Ruf, n.5, p. 79

41 Baynham, n. 2, p. 52

160

five imponant points along wall were destroyed. Morocco's efforts to counter-attack

from the air was hampered by the man-portable SA-7 missiles used by the Polisario

guerillas. 42

These offensives by the Polisario forced the Moroccans to come out of their

defensive positions and strike outside the 'sand walls' in order to dispense the Polisario

forces and prevent them from attacking the Moroccan defences. In October 1983, the

FAR launched a massive operation in the area between Smara and Tiferiti, involving over

18,000 men of four regiments. Similarly, on 20 December 1983, the FAR made an even

greater effort at Ain Lahchich (near the mining-town of Bou-Craa) involving 25,000

men. In both these offenses, the Moroccan armed force were 'supported by F-5 and

Mirage F-1 aircrafts. 43

In June 1983, King Hassan and Col. Gaddafi met in Rabat to ' discuss problems

affecting the Arab World'. In order to change their diplomatic isolation-that of Libya

over the Chad issue and of Morocco over the Western Sahara issue-Gaddafi assured

King Hassan that he would no longer deliver arms to Polisario while in return Morocco

assured Gaddafi of its political and military neutrality in the Chad dispute. Since the war

was becoming more costly and the arms provided by Libya to Polisario were proving

very effective against Morocco, Morocco would not have got a proper and better

opportunity than this to wean away one of important supporter of Polisario. This

ultimately proved to be a better dea:l for Morocco in strategic sense and relieved the

Moroccan armed forces of pressure to some extent. The agreement arrived at between

42 Strategic Survey 1983-84, p. 107

43 ibid, p.l07

161

Morocco and Libya in mid-1983 was ultimately translated into a Treaty of Union

between Morocco and Libya on 13 August 1984. Nevertheless. the mid-1983

understanding between the two countries led to the third phase of the Western Sahara

contlict.

THIRD PHASE ..

At the end of 1983, the Moroccan forces decided to construct a new'sand-wall'

stretching from Bou Craa through Amgala to the Mauritanian border, which was

ultimately completed by the end of February 1984. The main purpose of constructing

this wall was to protect the mining-town of Bou-Craa and to contain the Polisario forces

by curtailing its free access to the Southern and central areas of the Western Sahara.

With this fortitication, the Polisario forces were forced to mount the attack through

Mauritania and it could have implicated Mauritania in the conflict again.

The process of consolidation of Western Sahara by Morocco was given further

thrust when on 19 April 1984, construction of the third wall was started. This wall was

to run from Amgala ~o Zaag (in Morocco) and when it was completed in May 1984, it

brought almost all the Saquiet el-Hamra Valley. including the small towns of Hauza and

Jdiria under total Moroccan control. The construction of third wall made the task of

Polisario very difticult. Even though it launched a series of attacks on Dakhla and tried

to punch holes in the new wall in June & July 1984. it was repulsed by Moroccan forces.

On 31 October 1984, the Polisario launched the 'Operation Grand Maghreb' to prevent

the Moroccans from constructing fourth defensive wall from Zaag to the Algerian border

near Tindouf. Around 2.000 Polisario troops, armed with SA-7 surface-to air missiles

and T-54 tanks participated in these series of attacks. Even though they were able to

162

make several advances in the area initially, but the moment FAR concentrated its troops

and brought its Mirage F-5 aircrafts in action. the attacks were repelled. In mid-January

1985. Polisario attacked Moroccan forces near Mahbes (a town behind the newly

constructed sand-wall), where several Moroccan troops were killed and one Mirage was

shot down. 44 By this attack Polisario proved two things; firstly that Morocco's strategy

of defence fortification were not impregnable and secondly, that it could still mount

major attacks on it own. Both these things were true to some extent, but in the long-run,

the sand-watt strategy proved to be effective as it affected the mobility of the Polisario

attack and by the time the 'sand-walls' were breached, the second and third layer of the

Protective screen would come into the picture, by which the FAR was able to concentrate

it troops to repel the attack. Moreover, the focal poilu of struggle for Western Sahara

was shifted to the Moroccan-Algerian border, thereby substantiating the Moroccan

allegations that these armed conflict would not have been possible unless the Polisario

drew its sustenance from Algeria.

In fact, the third phase of the military dimension of the Western Sahara contlict

had gone in favour of Morocco. It was marked by the withdrawal of support by Libya

from Polisario in 1983~ The signing of Oujda Treaty in 1984 only confirmed that Libya

had compromised with Morocco only to save its interest in Chad. Even though Algeria

continued to provide enough material to Polisario for keeping its struggle alive,

nonetheless the military hardwares in the Polisario's arsenals were effected to some

extent. But this was not the problem with Morocco. Despite its loathing for Gaddafi and

disapproval of the Oujda Treaty, USA was firm in its support for Morocco and continued

44 Strategic Survey 1984-85, p. 103

163

to supply arms and technical aid in return for the use of bases at Sidi Slimane and

Beguerir for its Rapid Deployment Force. But the American aid and technology 'was

unable to prevent Polisario from remaining a military threat' .45 Although Polisario

claimed to have killed 5,673 Moroccan soldiers between 1982 and 1985, decisive

victories proved elusive, owing to Morocco's defensive strategy of building a 2,500 km

wall of sand, equipped with electronic detectors, to surround Western Sahara. 46

After more than a decade of armed struggle/conflict, the Polisario remained

committed to the struggle for independence. But, after 1986 the military struggle

appeared to have become secondary to the diplomatic and Political campaign as the

massive 'defensive walls' constructed by Morocco to enclose the Western Sahara had

reduced the level of military activity. 47 The diplomatic campaign for support by

Morocco was matched by mounting a show of force by Polisario, sometimes with

considerable effect against the 1,20,000 Moroccan troops deployed in Western Sahara.

In February 1987, on the occasion ofSADR's founding anniversary, a new offensive was

launched by the front which led to breaching the wall and a Polisario incursion 20 kms

behind the Moroccan lines. Over 200 Moroccan troops were killed in the fighting.48

But the completion of the sixth Moroccan defensive wall in April 1987 put more

constraints upon the accessibility to the territory for Polisario units. The new earthwork

45 Somerville, n.15, p.l21.

46 Middle East and North Africa, 199~. p.724.

47 David Seddon, "Polisario and the struggle for the Western Sahara : Recent development, 1987-1989" in Review of African Political Economy No. 45/46, 1989, p. 133

48 Africa Now, May 1987 as quoted Someerville, n.15, p.121

164

completed the 'fencing' of Rio de Oro zone and it ran close to the Mauritanian

border. 49 The construction of this wall further increased the tension.

In 1987, the UN and OAU made concerted efforts to settle the contlict in Western

Sahara. puring a visit by a UN-OAU technical mission to Morocco, Western Sahara and

Polisario refugee camps in Algeria, to asses conditions for holding a referendum,

Polisario announced a three-week truce in November 1987. But, as Morocco refused to

talk directly with Polisario, the true~ was broken in mid-December 1987 with a wave of

attacks on Moroccan positions by the SPLA. In January 1988, the Polisario renewed

attacks on Moroccan positions in Western Sahara. In mid-September 1988, Polisario

forces attacked Moroccan troops at the Oum Dreiga section of the defensive wall, facing

the Mauritanian border. Polisario was reported to have deployed 2,500 men, and there

were more than 200 Moroccan casualties. Polisario had mounted the offensive to

demonstrate its ability to intlict substantial damage on Morocco without Algerian support

and to emphasize the need for Morocco to hold direct negotiations before a solution could

be reached. 50

It is pertinent to mention here that during 1987-88, diplomatic relation between

Morocco and Algeria had been reestablished and a kind of Maghreb Union was in the

offing. In December 1988, King Hassan finally agreed to meet oft1cials of Polisario and

the SADR. The meeting ultimately took place in the first weak of January 1989.

Though no negotiations took place, Polisario announced a unilateral cease tire in

February, 1989. However, the scheduled second meeting between Polisario and

49 Strategic Survey 1987-88 pp. 185-6

50 Middle East and North Africa, 1995 (Europa Publications), p. 728

165

Morocco was post-poned by King Hassan on one pretext or the other. Consequently in

mid-March 1989, the Polisario resumed hostilities bringing the six-weak long cease-tire

to an end.

Towards the end of September 1989, the Polisario forces launched an attack on

a Moroccan observation post in the region of Dahlou. The attack came in the wake of

King Hassan's visit to Spain.51 In October 1989 Polisario forces launched a series of

major attacks in Guelta Zemmour area, which continued unabated for more than a month.

During the offensive, 15 km of the defensive wall facing the Mauritanian border was

reponedly destroyed, Moroccan defensive lines were pushed back by 25 kilometers and

hundreds of Moroccan soldiers were killed. During the campaign, the Polisario Front

demanded direct talks with the Moroccan government. But King Hassan refused to

'negotiate with his own subjects' and threatened to continue the conflict indefinitely and

announced his readiness to .order his troops across international borders in pursuit of

Polisario forces. 52

The attack on Guelta Zemmour was followed by a second clash in Hausa region

in which the SPLA captured six bases and observation posts from Morocco. During

October 1989, the Polisario assaulted the Moroccan forces stationed near Amgala. On

8 November 1989, the SPLA attacked Moroccan positions and engaged Moroccan troops

in a four hour battle. The SPLA overran 22 kms of the defensive walls and penetrated

deep into the occupied territory behind it. During the offensive, one Mirage F-1 was

shot down. The upsurge in military activity by Polisario was designed to put pressure on

51 Seddon, n. 47, p. 140

52 Middle East and Nonh Africa, 1995 (Europa Publications), p. 729

166

King Hassan to enter into negotiation and to speed up the UN-OAU mediated 'Peace

Plan'. 53

In July and A~gust 1990, a special UN technical commission visited Western

Sahara and the neighbouring states to investigate the practical difficulties in comJucting

a referendum on the territory's future. In April 1991, the UN Security Council

authorised the establishment of a UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

(MINURSO). In July 1991 it was announced that a cease-fire in Western Sahara would

come into effect on 6 September 1991. In early August 1991, a significant increase in

hostilities developed with the Polisario Front denouncing Moroccan air strikes, while the

Moroccan governments stated that it was engaged in clearing 'no man's land'. Each side

tried to intimidate rival elements into leaving the area before the cease-fire. The first

100 members of MINURSO, flew into El Ayoun and the cease-fire took effect on 6

September 1991. 54

WAR AT SEA

During the course of its struggle for the independence of Western Sahara and with

a purpose to extend its control over the territorial waters of Western Sahara, the Polisario

declared the territorial waters of the Western Sahara as 'War Zone'. The Polisario had

started sending its squads of guerillas out to sea to hijack Spanish fishing boats, capture

their crews and speed them to captivity in the desert. In 1980, the Moroccan, Portuguese

and South Korean ships had also been raided. In October 1978, the eight crew members

53 Seddon, n.47, pp.l40-41.

54 Middle East and North Africa 1995 (Europa Publication) p. 729

167

of Las Palmas, a Canary fishing boat was released when a representative of the Spain's

ruling party Central Democratic Union (UCD), signed a statement in Algiers recognizing

Polisario as the 'legitimate representative of the struggling Saharawi people'.

In 1978. a Moroccan freighter was attacked off Khneiffis between Tan Tan and

Tarfaya on 3 may and seven of its crew were captured while ten were killed. On 25

August, another 42 Moroccan fishermen were captured after raiding a ship. In July

1980, nearly 30 South Korean fishermen were seized in a attack by Polisario.

In June 1980, the Polisario boarded a Portuguese trawler, the Rio Vouga, and

arrested its 15 crew members. They were released on 23 June, when a Portuguese

officials pledged 'support to the right of Saharawi people to the independence,

sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country under the leadership of their sole

legitimate representative, the Polisario Front. In September, the Portuguese trawler, the

Enba and its crew were captured in another attack by Polisario.

It is pertinent to mention that Spain had been sending its trawlers to the sea near

Western Sahara since centuries. But in 1976, it negotiated with Morocco over the

continuing fishing rights to protect Canaries vital fishing industry. Therefore, the

Spanish fishing boats off the Western Sahara coast were made a special target by

Polisario. Between May and September 1980, 38 Spanish fisherman were attacked. The

negotiations took place between the Spanish officials and Polisario in Algiers on 25

October 1980, but it did not succeed as the Polisario insisted on Spain to abrogate its

fishing agreement with Morocco.

Not much information is available regarding the details of the war at sea during

1981-85. But one remarkable aspect of Polisario's operation at sea was that hardly any

Polisario guerilla band was intercepted during the sea-borne operations. During 1986 the

168

Polisario forces attacked several foreign fishing vessels in the Atlantic off the Western

Sahara coast and reiterated it to be a 'War Zone'.

CONCLUSIO~

The 15 years of war, prior to the cease-fire in 1991, between Polisario Front and

Morocco had been a war of attrition. While Polisario Front had been backed all along

by Algeria and to certain extent by Libya to achieve its goal, Morocco was primarily

supponed in its effort to crush the Polisario resistance by France, USA, Egypt, Saudi

Arabia, Italy, South Africa and Israel. What is n~essary in such war of attrition is the

'striking power' and the 'Staying power'. During the First phase of the war (1976-79).

the balance of power was in favour of Morocco. Due to its striking capability, primarily

due to its air power and armour, Morocco was able to occupy the Western Sahara

territory with the help of Mauritania. As Mauritania was military and economically very

weak, so it could not retain its grip over the southern part of Western Sahara.

Consequently, Polisario was able to force Mauritania to withdraw from the contlict in

1979. But, during this period Polisario was able to acquire sophisticated arms, recruit

guerillas and train its fighters.

The manner of training and the use of sophisticated arms by Polisario could be

easily discerned during the Second Phase of the contlict (1979-1984). During 1979-81.

the Polisario attack was so effective that Moroccan forces had to be withdrawn from

most of the occupied territory to highly protected areas of 'useful triangle' and Dak.hla

region. Not only Polisario was able to force Morocco to adopt defensive strategy. but

it was able to successfully carry the attacks in the southern part of Morocco. Polisario

Front also extended the war to the territorial waters of the Western Sahara. But the

169

timely help by USA, France. South Africa, Saudi Arabia in the form of financial help

and military support saved the situation for Morocco. Ultimately, Morocco adopted the

so-called 'defence-wall' (or Sand-Wall) strategy and by 1984 it was able to construct

four sand-walls which engulfed the 'useful triangle' and most of the Saguia el-Hamra

region. The construction of 'sand-walls' affected the mobility of the Polisario attacks,

but nonetheless it was able to mount the attack whenever it desired as it was having

sophisticated arms and equipment in its arsenal. The superior air-power and the air­

cover to its troops by Morocco was affected during the second phase of the war as

Polisario was able to shoot down a number of Moroccan aircraft with the man-portable

SA-7 missiles.

During the third phase of the conflict (1984-1991). Moroccans remains steadfast

in tlleir defensive strategy of constructing more sand-walls. Their morals was high as

Libya had stopped supporting Polisario and had joined hands with Morocco in the Oujda

Treaty signed in 1984. During this phase of war Polisario gained diplomatically as it

was admitted as a member of the OAU and more than 70 countries has recognized it.

Morocco's case was diplomatically weak. But what it lost in the international arena, it

gained on the field. By 1986, Morocco was able to complete the sixth wall which

virtu~ly engulfed the whole of the Western S$aran .territory under Morocco's control.

After 1986, Morocco and Algeria reestablished diplomatic relations and while the UN

Peace Plan was accepted by both the parties and 'cease-tire' came into effect in 1991.

After the end of the third-phase of the conflict. Morocco was able to control the

major portion of the Western Sahara territory. Morocco was partially able to achieve

its goal through military operations. But for this Morocco had to pay a heavy price in

terms of the military expenditure and had to allocate a sizable portion of its GDP for

170

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6000

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a. 0

"' c

"' u u 0 ... 0 :E .... 0 ;;e rJj

"' Cll ... ::I ~ '0 c Cll 0. X w ~ .~ ·-:E

7

6

5

4

3

2

0 +--1--+--+-+---+---+---+--+---+---l-+-·'---' _._-+--+---+-+---+-+---+-+---1---l

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993

YEAR SCALE- HORIZONTAL (Starting Year 1971)- 1 Unit= 2 Years

VERTICAL One Unit= 1 Percent of GOP.

SOURCE: Graph based on data collected from SIPRI Yearsbools-1983,1990 & 1995 GRAPH-B

military expenses. An analysis of the military expenditure by Morocco (depicted by

Graph 'A') shows that from 1971 to 1977, the military expenditure rose considerably

and this must have been utilised in ordering the purchase of arms necessary to control

its hold over its portion of occupied territory. From 1977 to 1979, the expenditure was

relatively stable suggesting that the focus of the military front had shifted to Mauritania.

Once the Mauritania withdrew in 1979, the focus of Polisario attack shifted to Morocco

and upto l982 there has been a massive procurement of arms by Morocco thereby

suggesting that militarily Morocco was loosing and it needed considerable arms and

support to sustain its war effort. But the completion of 'sand-walls' in and around the

'useful-triangle' co~stderably affected the Polisario attacks. But from 1984 onwards

again, the military expenditure rose considerably. An analysis of Graph B, which depicts

military expenditure as percentage of GOP, reveals that from 1971 to 1977, the

percentage was quite high and reached its peak in 1977. But from 1977 to 1979, it came

down. From 1979 to 1981, the percentage rose again indicating that Morocco was

forced by the Polisario to increase its military budget. But during 1981 to 1984, its per-

centage of military expenditure (GDP) came down. It increased again during 1984-85

suggesting that for constructing the sixth wall it required more resources. But from

1985, the military expenditure as % of GDP came down significantly and from 1988

onwards it is more or less stables.

So, ultimately the Moroccans were able to maintain its hold over the Western

Sahara territory due to superior staying power. Morocco was able to use its manpower

and international support base to keep the Polisario guerillas away from Western Sahara.

Though Polisario's pin-pricks attacks have been rather effective, but its inability to hold

on to the liberated areas have in the long-run proved disastrous. It is not possible for

171

a ·small guerilla force to hold any territory for long in the open desert. To achieve its

goal, Polisarip had to depend more on the UN-sponsored Referendum.

172