MFR NARA- T7- FAA- Boivin Leo- 9-17-03- 00066

8/14/2019 MFR NARA- T7- FAA- Boivin Leo- 9-17-03- 00066

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H r J \ 1 0 ~ ~ ' 7 ? \ 9 ~Event: Leo BoivinType of event: InterviewDate: September 17, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Bill JohnstoneTeam Number: 7Location: Commission Offices; GSA BuildingParticipants - Non-Commission: Leo BoivinParticipants - Commission: Sam Brinkley; Bill Johnstone; Lisa Sullivan

[Unc] Mr. Boivin served in the Air Force for 22 years (mainly in counter-intelligence), retiring in1986. He went on to work in the just-established, small (approximately 6 people) intelligenceoffice within FAA which sought to make the intelligence community aware of FAA'sintelligence needs, to establish FAA's intelligence collection requirements, and to do threatassessments. After the downing of Pan Am 103 (1988), Boivin served as the FAA intelligenceliaison with the White House Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Pan Am. 103/Lockerbie Commission). He served as the head of the FAA's Special Assessments unitfrom October 1990 until September 1, 2001, but returned briefly to the agency in the aftermathof the hijackings to aid in the response. He is currently an independent aviation consultantaffiliated with the Aviation Institute in Ashburn, VA.[Unc] The reorganization of FAA security instigated by the Pan Am 103/Lockerbie Commission,and subsequently enacted by the Congress, lead to the creation of the Special Assessments uniton October 1, 1990, which Mr. Boivin was chosen to head. The designation of the unit sought toavoid the term "Inspection" so as to make clear that it had no regulatory mission, as well as theterm "Red Team" because of certain unfavorable connotations of that phrase in military circles.The Special Assessment unit was to operate outside normal FAA testing. However, the Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait, and the subsequent U.S. deployments under Desert Shield and Desert Stormlead to Mr. Boivin being temporarily (until reassigned to Brussels, and to a.delay in theoperationalization of the Special Assessments unit.[Unc] The genesis of the Special Assessments unit was the realization, during the FAA's reviewof Pan Am 103 and the work of the Pan Am 103/Lockerbie Commission, that it had no testingcapability overseas and the big issue was how to "internationalize" the testing process, but in aless formal way so as to avoid legal and sovereignty issues. After the completion of the work ofthe Commission, Boivin was asked to help implement this process via heading up the newSpecial Assessments unit. He reported to the head of Aviation Security Intelligence (first JackGregory and then Pat McDonnell).


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~ The report on domestic screening was produced at the end of 1991, and the airlines werebriefed in early 1992. Mr. Boivin requires that the airlines were anxious to insure thaVthe resultsdidn't "get out."J

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C OMM lS SIO N SE NS IT IV E[Unc J Boivin came to the job of Special Assessments head with some definite ideas. He saw themission as a controlled counter intelligence operation and sought to hire intelligence operationspeople from outside the FAA, largely from military backgrounds. The unit worked out of leasedspace at Dulles Airport, and started small (4 or 5), with hiring begun in the spring of 1991. Thefirst task was to teach the staff about FAA procedures and how the civil aviation industryworked.~ The first project assigned to the Special Assessments unit (by FAA civil aviation securityhead "Ort" Steele) was in the latter half of 1991, and involved testing the screening capabilitiesat the 17 largest (Category X) airports in order to establish a baseline of comparison with regularFAA tests prior to the unit turning its attention to its main assignment of international testing.NOTE: In the period leading up to this 1991 project was the first, and only,comprehensive assessment of screening capability at domestic airports by the SpecialAssessments unit.[ S 8 1 ] Boivin wanted the 1991 domestic screening project to "stress test" the system, and didn'twant the checkpoints to know that they had been tested in order to allow multiple tests whichprovided a more reliable database of results. Consequently, the checkpoints couldn't be notifiedif they had passed or failed. For purposes of training his team for their international mission, thetests worked well: For each test, the unit started with surveillance of the checkpoint (to observeits tendencies and weaknesses), followed by the development of a test plan which was thencarried out. The test results were "disastrous," with only small erformance variations amongthe various check oints .

(S.8 ' f j In 1992 the Special Assessments unit began its main mission of testing the 88 overse~s'"airports visited by U.S. carriers, or which had U.S. destinations.

~ After the initial interest generated by the response to Pan Am' 103, the"biidge~.f6~'SpecialAssessments began to suffer, largely through OMB action. At a-time wheri Boivin to increasehis division (to 18 people), the unit received a no-growth (ftatjbudget.in 1993', and in 1994 wasmoved back to FAA HQ and had to begin making cuts. At th e stal1'o(1995, the unit had 8people, but the two most junior had to be laid off because 9fth~"b~d-get cuts. According to Mr.Boivin, "nobody on the Hill wanted to talk to the FAA" at this.time (mid 1990s) about boostingits security budget. , : " " < " ' "

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.; C OMM IS SIO N S EN SIT IV E~ A fte r th e destruction of TW A 800 (1996), th e atten tion and money for security "came backagain, as usually h appened afte r such a disaste r. In late 1996, S pe cial A ssessm ents w as dire cte dto sh if t its focus to th e te sting of E xplosive D ete ctive S ystem s (E DS) be cause of a statutorym andate to th e FA A to certify th at such syste ms m et prescribe d standards and could function ina n a ir po rt e n vi ro nmen t. l

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.... . ~ ~/(Boivin h ad acquired responsibility for th e E xplosive s Unit in1993, and for a sh ort tim e, also h ad re sponsibility for th e A ir M a rsh als.)~ According to M r. Boivin , th e te sting w as constrained because : a) th e airlines h ad initiallyresiste d deploying ED S so th ere "was not a lo t to te st" in 1997-98 ; b) th e capability was notm andated at th at poin t and th us "not e nforceable ," and c) th ere w as a le gitim ate w orry th at undersuch c irc um stanc es te stin g m igh t ac tu ally disco ura ge fu rth er d ep lo ym en t.

. L S B 1 J In th e afte rm ath of th e G ore C om mission, FA A got a total of approxim ate ly 300 positionsto do more "re alistic" testing of th e system , but Special A ssessm ents got only 3 or 4 of th ese ( th erest going to fie ld units unde r th e C ivil A viations O perations (A CO ) office . A s a result, A COstarte d to do focused, m ore re alistic te sting (called S pecial E mph asis A sse ssm ents or S EA s) atdom estic ch eckpoin ts in th e period 1997-99, T he Special A ssessm ents unit w as asked to h elpdeve lop th e S EA test p lans, but found th e test results to be of variable quality.~ Because of questions about th e SEA re sults, S e cial Assessm ents was asked to reth e SE A te sts, and did so in th e pe riod 1997-2000. bysc re e nin g .[ . S 8 1 1 In te rm s of assessing th e se curity system just prior to 9/11, M r. Boivin e xpresse d th eopinion th at ove r th e years, th e airline s h ad sh ow n im provem ent overseas (th rough profiling andbag passenge r m atch ), but dom estically th e m ain ch ange h ad bee n th e deploym ent of ne wde te ction tech nology. H e be lieves th ere are th re e e le ments to ch eckpoint security: 1)E ffe ctiveness (w hich is w hat h is S pecial A sse ssm ent U nit sough to test); 2) E ff icie ncy (w hich isw hat th e airline s are m ost inte re ste d in l; and 3) D ete rre nce (w hich one can 't m easure but one"can se e it." I

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~ M r. Boivin be lieves th at "ru lemaking was th e bane of security ." W hile SpecialA ssessm ents could provide a snapsh ot in tim e of w eakne sse s, pe rm ane nt im provem ent inse curity requires th e rule making proce ss, A s one illustration, th e FA A h as w anted to do m orere alistic te sting (m ore te st o bje cts, m ore re alistic te st sce narios) ba cke d u p b y b ette r e nforceme nt,all of th ese ch ange s required ch anges in rules. FA A security of ficials w ould h ave to go th rougha le ngth y proce ss including prioritization of de sire d rule s plus a de taile d cost-be ne fit analysis tojustify e ach proposal. T he B ase line W orking G roup (1996) did h ave som e succe ss in ge ttingse curity ru le ch ange s im ple me nte d, but th is involve d th eir usage of close d brie fings on C apitolH ill to m ake th eir case .

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- . C OMM IS S]O N S EN SIT IV E~W ith re spect to th e use of knives in th e 9/11 h ijackings, M r. Boivin indicated th atre gard le ss o f w hat w as said about th e le gal status of knive s, im ple me ntation of any e ffort to ke epth em out of th e cabin was "not doab le ." He re fe rred to looking at th is as a source of th e 9/] 1failure was a "fool's ch ase ." In 1993 "O rtn S te ele h ad w ante d to ban knive s, bu t B oiv in to ldh im he could try

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~ W ith re spect to cockpit door h arden ing, th is e f fo rt began with a 1998 or 1999 request byth e A via tion R ule making A dvisory C ommitte e re que st in orde r to try to im ple me nt an le AOprono unce me nt "urging," b ut no t re qu iring, such action. A ccording to M r. B oivin, th e airline sw ere adam ant th at it cou ldn 't be done in a cost-e ffe ctive m anne r. T he e nsuing rule rnaking ,w hich w as com ple te d in 2001, propose d ch ange s for ne w aircraft only; bo th th e airline s andaircraf t m an ufacture rs cite d dif f icultie s w ith re trof itting. T he re w as also conce rn abo ut th eim pact of any h arde ning of th e cockpit door on cre w safe ty (be cause of im pe ding cre w e gre ss).M r. B oivin indicate d th at w hile h arde ne d cockp it doors w ill stop knife -w ie lding h ijack ers, "youcan 't stop a de te rm ine d h ijacke r" once o n b oard a plane be cau se of te ch no log ical lim itations.[U nc] In te rm s of re comm end ation s for fu rth er im proving av iation se curity, M r. B oivin p ointe dto th e need to m ake sure any new security m easure can be shown to th e public to be valuable .H e also calle d fo r g re ate r co nsiste ncy in application of se curity m easure s (w hile p re se rv ingrand om or un pre dictab le e le me nts). M o re spe cif ically, h e th ough t th at placing th e x-ray o pe rato rin a re mote location (to avoid be ing inf lue nce d by th e appe arance of th e passe nge r) w ould beworthwhile.

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MFR NARA- T7- FAA- Boivin Leo- 9-17-03- 00066