Mfr Nara- t2- Anser- David Ruth- 6-10-03- 00189

8/14/2019 Mfr Nara- t2- Anser- David Ruth- 6-10-03- 00189

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Event: Dr. Ruth DavidType of event: InterviewDate: June 10, 2003Special Access Issues: nonePrepared by: Gordon LedermanTeam Number: 2Location: ANSER headquarters, Shirlington, VAParticipants - Non-Commission: Dr. Ruth David, President and CEO, ANSERParticipants - Commission: Bruce Berkowitz (lead), Gordon Lederman.jnotetaker)UNCLASSIFIED: She was DDS&T from Sept. 1995 through Sept. 1998. When JohnDeutch became DCI, he decided to look. outside the CIA for a DDS&T because he thought thatDS&T had lost touch with the technological state of the art. David was at Sandia NationalLaboratories and was hired as DDS&T. She was an IPA fortwo years and then stayed on for athird year. She had no background in intelligence but had a lot of experience in informationtechnology (IT) and other technology. DCI Deutch did not give her any specific instructions, butin general Deutch was concerned about the depth of talent in the CIA regarding technology andthat the CIA needed to focus on technology. Deutch was there for only 1 year of her term asDDS&T.

UNCLASSIFIED: She developed the idea of the Agile Intelligence Enterprise (AlE),which she characterized as a "vision" rather than as a concrete proposal. AlE was a multimediapackage designed to illustrate what technology could offer to intelligence, namely via ITnetworking. AlE was a complete end-to-end system, linking all parts of the intelligence cyclefrom collection to dissemination. was controversial in that it would allow consumers to accessmore information than just what the intelligence community would give them directly. Shecharacterized AlE as including some state of the art IT but also "speculative" IT. David notedthe importance of engaging non-technologists in devising plans for employing technology; as shesaid, technology does no good if it is never used. AlE was a means to reach out to non-technologists to engage them in dialogue concerning the potential offeredby IT for intelligence.

UNCLASSIFIED: David started to think about AlE in early 1996. The term "agile"came from her involvement in Lehigh University'S "Agile Manufacturing Enterprise Forum"while at Sandia. The AlE idea matured in 1996-7. She gave approximately 100 speeches acrossthe IC and DOD concerning AlE in 1.5 years.


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UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIED: However, she did not control any of the resources necessary to

translate AlE into reality. Also, AlE was intended to be implemented 011 an IC-wide rather thana CIA basis. Moreover, implementation rested in the "CIO-controlled" environment, and theCIO were evidently concerned about desktop security. David said that r p . ~ AlE concept was builton some sort of CMS idea that previously existed, but the CMS CIO had-Iittle clout to implementthe idea. The CIA appointed a CIO midway through her tenure as DDS~T, but the CIO focusedon desktop upgrades. .'

UNCLASSIFIED: The most controversial part of AlE was how to deal with security.AlE included a proposal for a biometric key that would know the holder's tickets and thus allowaccess as appropriate. David said that "everything" about AlE was controversial from a securityperspective. She said that, as DDS&T, she held tickets with other agencies but could not accessthat information directly from her desktop. She said that access-security barriers to AlE were toa large extent cultural in nature and that 80% of AlE could have been achieved if culturalbarriers regarding security were overcome. She said that strong advocacy by the DCI of AlEcould have overcome cultural barriers. Deutch embraced technology, while Tenet was notcomfortable with technology and was "not able to see technology as anything other than athreat." was difficult to convince Tenet that the benefits of technology outweighed the risks.David was attuned to the security concerns of AlE, and she built security audits into AlE to catchindividuals using AlE who were trolling for information that they did not have tickets to receive.However, she said that the people in charge of security and counterintelligence were averse tousing technology because they viewed it as a tremendous vulnerability.

UNCLASSIFIED: With respect to recommendations, she said ili~'~:thefirst thing thatmust be done is to sort out the security environment. Each agency has~aifferent way of holdingdata. Yet analysts must have access to all information relevant to their subject regardless of how

is collected. She thought that "metadata tags" and encryption can be used to protect sourcesand methods while still allowing access. She said that analysts too often develop opinions basedon limited data; for example, NSA and CIA will each develop opinions, yet such opinions will bebased on that agency's information rather than both agencies' information. Moreover, eachagency decides what information should be reported to analysts, but data that might not seemimportant at first glance still might prove to be important concerning "emerging threats" whenviewed from a broader perspective. She said that there needs to be a review of raw data from alarger perspective to determine relevance to emerging threats.

UNCLASSIFIED: Also regarding analysts, she said that advanced IT tools are needed fordealing with the high volumes of data collected by the IC. She also said that there need to becommunity standards for "metadata tagging" to allow searching. She said that analysts shouldhave the ability to access a wide range of databases (there is no need to compile all informationinto a single database). She said that there should be a system for alerting analysts as to newinformation regarding their issues; if such new information is in a compartment that an analystcannot access, then someone such as a supervisor should be notified by the system. She cited theexamples of ballistic missile tests and the IndiaIPakistan nuclear tests, in-:/whichafter-action


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UNCLASSIFIED / COMMISSION SENSITIVEreports indicated that analysts would have been able to predict such tests if they had access to allthe relevant information.

UNCLASSIFIED: She said that the issue of information access will become even moreacute in the homeland security context. For example: (1) the bridge between foreign anddomestic intelligence information is problematic, and (2) geographic divisions within theanalytical bureaucracy can hinder analysis (i.~., the transnational analysis office was weak ascompared to regional analytical bureaus).

UNCLASSIFIED: She thinks that everyone in the IC should have access to the Internet.When she came to CIA, she did not have access to the Internet, although DCI Deutch fixed thatquickly. However, getting Internet access for analysts was very difficult She said that thereason for the lack of Internet access was basically that the high cost of,~vilding a separateunclassified network. The reaction among CIA management was, "TheYtechiesmight requireaccess to the Internet, but they could not understand why a case officer would require access tothe Internet." As late as 1998, "I heard of analyst going home to use their personal Internetaccounts" to get access. David was concerned that the analysts, lacking access to the Internet"were operating in a world that wasn't the same as the one inwhich their adversaries 1 1 . ~ . ,AIQaeda] were operating."

UNCLASSIFIED: Regarding organizational changes, she said that (1) the DCI should beseparated from the CIA, and (2) the DCI should have a cadre of all-source analysts. The DCIshould focus on strategic intelligence. The DI should become part of the DCl's analytical cadre.CIA has become seen as too HUMINT oriented, presumably hurting the Drs ability to conductall-source analysis.

UNCLASSIFIED: She criticized the ORCON system. She said that we need to figure outhow to separate data from its sources/methods information. She criticized collectors ascollecting information regardless of its usefulness.

UNCLASSIFIED: In general, she said that there was no methodology in the IC forweighing security against other values such as efficiency and cost. that decisionsregarding security were very personality-driven, and collectors have g~~f.!.latituden what theydo (presumably, controlling who sees collected information). She said'that DS&T haddeveloped objectives for classification, namely protecting (1) technology, (2) ongoingoperations, and (3) data collected. However, others in the IC did not have such objectives ordiscipline. She said that the DO should have latitude regarding classification because it knowslocal conditions; however, she noted that there is no oversight of how the DO does security. Shesummed up the security issue as follows: "If we are investing to collect it, we need to be able touse it." She said that technology has not been exploited to overcome security challenges.

UNCLASSIFIED: With respect to IC management, she said that 80% was failure of will.She said that "the community was not managed" while she was there. She said that issues of


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UNCLASS IFIED / C O:MM IS SION SENSIT IV Ebudgetary authority w ere not as im portant as som e observers m ade it see~. She said that, ingeneral, "th e DCI has m ore authority th an h e routinely ex ercised." t . y : ~ : t ~. .

UNC LA SSIFIE D: She said that, due to the post-C old W ar peacedividend, the ICdow nsized and sought to do so by attritiontj.e., by not hiring new people). H ow ever, the 1990sw ere the decade of the IT revolution, and the IC 's failure to bring in new people m eant that theIe's employees were out of touch w ith IT advances. A s she, said, "By the m id-90s we had atechnologically obsolete w orkforce; the 1990s, there was a severe shortage of IT w orkersa cro ss th e e co nomy; in o rd er to attracttalen t"sh ep ro po sed ,"p ay-b ran din g," w hich m ean t p ayin gIT en gineersacco rding to m ark et rates for their specific S kills .. H ow ever, th e IC resisted th isidea,as the IC found it "unacceptable" that engineers should be paid m ore and wasreluctanrtoadm it that engineers are, paidm ore in the privatesectorShesaid that she w ould be surprise-to-find that there.ispay-branding.now. ':;';,; ;,!: ' '."

recommends that the DCI a former CEO from industiywhb, , 'h assig nifican t ex perien ce in m an ag em en t an d .reo rg an iza tio n/restru ctu rin g, T he DC I's d ep uty .. "should be someone' who knows the well. The DCI needs to be a leader who has vision andcan break: China and go m ano-a-m ario w ith bureaucrats protecting turf. The D CI should besom eone from outside the beltw ay and w ho hasmanagedlargecorporations. R ecentD CIs hav elacked those qual if ic at ions.

UNC LA SSIFIE D: R egard in g th e tension betw een DOD and nO ~!>OD intellig encea ss ets ,s he s aid th at th ere is a te ns io n b etw ee n s tra te gic in te llig en ce a nd ':'s up po rtin g warfig hte rs ,D IA should be beefed-up to support the w arfighter, w hile the D I should focus on strategican alysis. C ollectio n w ill n eed to b e b ala nced b etw een strateg ic in tellig en ce an d su pp ortin gw arfighting. S he said that, in h er exp erience, the IC focuses to o m uch o n tactical intelligenceand support for w arfighters. She attended daily m eetings, and the focus of such m eetings w asinvariably on tactical m atters. She said that the Ie's focus on tactical issues is detrim ental fortechnolog y, as techno logy that canno t deliver immediate ben efits is treated as a lo wer priority.

UNCLASSIFIED : She said that the DS&T spent abouDf its budget operatingexp~~s~ and maintenanceDon developm ent [planned op s1, anD on strategicpositioning.

U NCLA SSIFffiD : W ith respect to terrorism , she said w as not discussed very m uchseparately but rath er w as view ed as part of transn atio nal threats - narnel cou nte roliferation .'Sh e said that th e em bassy b om bing s w ere strategic w arning b ecausea t tacks were two near- s imul taneous events in prevl ,. ." .o=u=y:: -- r=o=w=-" '- r=ls-=:-r ., ,- a r=e .. ,. ,

'--r1"I'Tlo,...,wl'TFe....,vro=rel..-,"TIII~o~6nehoug ht that there w ould be an attack against the U .S .':'" there w as a reluctanceto think o f the U .S. 'ho meland as a targ et, and the foreign/domestic divide w as critical. Finally,factors such as the ease o f international travel, IT n etw ork in g, and o th erjechno lo gy helpedin div id ua ls c oo rd in ate a cro ss lo ng d is ta nc es a nd th us a llow ed te rro ris ts ;.~ d:'o pe ra te g lo ba lly -w hile the Ie w as failing to exploit technology. '

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CIA 0095


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UNCLASSIFIED / COMMISSION SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIED: Although David left the CIA after the Africa embassy bombings and

was DDS&T, she does not remember seeing the DCI's declaration of war on terrorism - but shemay have seen it in a daily briefing.


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Mfr Nara- t2- Anser- David Ruth- 6-10-03- 00189