Methods of Electricity Generation in a Wind Power Project

8/3/2019 Methods of Electricity Generation in a Wind Power Project

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Global Energy Crisis &

Energy Conservation

Researchers Name: Jibran Aftab Qureshi

Roll No: BS32 2727


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Acknowledgement

I owe a great many thanks to a great many people who helped and

supported me during the writing of this book.

My deepest thanks to Lecturer Mr. Shamyl Mooraj, the Guide of the

project for guiding and correcting various documents of mine with

attention and care. He has taken pain to go through the project and make

necessary correction as and when needed.

Iexpress my thanks to the of, Dr. Sultan Mughal coordinator

International Conference on Energy Crisis Management for extending his

support.

I would also thank my Institution and my faculty members without whom

this project would have been a distant reality.

Sincerely,

Jibran Aftab Qureshi


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Letter ofAuthorization

Dear Readers,

This letter will serve as authorization for the researcher Jibran AftabQureshi to conduct the research project entitled Global Energy Crisis& Energy Conservation a part of course GMAG 403 at GreenwichUniversity.

If we have any concerns or require additional information, we will

contact the researcher.

Sincerely,

Mr. Shamyl Mooraj


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Letter of Transmittal

MrShamyl Mooraj

Faculty of Greenwich University

Darakhshan, Karachi.

Dear Sir,

As assigned by you, I have investigated on the topic entitled GlobalEnergy Crisis & Energy Conservation a part of course GMAG 403and compiled the entire research study in the form of a report.I collected information for this report through scientific articles on the

internet and magazines and personal observat ion. Thank you

for assigning this job. I really enjoyed the opportunity to learn more

about the alternative energy sources.

If you have any questions about the report, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Jibran Aftab Qureshi


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Certificate of Originality

This is to certify that the research paper titled Global Energy Crisis &

Energy Conservation being submitted by Jibran Aftab Qureshi a partof course GMAG 403, is a record of bonafide work carried out by himunder my guidance and supervision at Greenwich University.

Mr. Shamyl Mooraj


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Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................. 1

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................2

1. Introduction .................................................................................. 4

2. Body .............................................................................................. 5

3. Analysis..........................................................................................1 2

4. Recommendations ...................................................................... 15

6. Bibliography .............................................................................. 16


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Abstract

Energy is the cornerstone of the modern era. Oil is necessary for almost all facilitationprocesses ranging from transport to production and fulfilment of daily requirements. We

live in an era of oil. Oil is the most important ingredient for life, industry, economicdevelopment, our prosperity, but unfortunately we are facing a global energy crisis due torapid depletion of natural excessive. The reasons for the global energy crisis arenumerous, based primarily on lack of foresight, lack of education amongst the general populace, an increased consumption oriented culture and the late the arrival of theconcept of sustainable development. Most of the world's energy needs are met by non-renewable energy sources such as coal, oil and natural gas. This has led to an increasedrate of depletion of natural resources. The problem of energy shortage is widespread and persistent and has plagued the developing countries for decades. However, developedcountries have also become more aware of the risks of energy supply as a result of recentdevelopments in world energy markets. Thus, with this understanding at hand long-termsolutions require a comprehensive approach.


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Executive Summary

Energy is a mounting policy and business concern in many developing countriestoday. The most cost-effective way to address these energy supply concerns is on thedemand side: through improving energy productivitythe level of output an economycan achieve from the energy it consumes. By adopting existing energy-efficient

technologies that pay for themselves in future energy savings, developing countriescould reduce their energy demand growth by more than halffrom 3.4 to 1.4 percentannually in the next 12 yearsand reduce their energy consumption in 2020 by 22

percent from the projected levels. Because of its positive returns, energy efficiency isthe cheapest form of energy we have. Higher energy productivity is a win-win fordeveloping economies and their households and businesses. By improving demand-side efficiency, countries can cut down fuel imports and scale back the expansion ofthe energy-supply infrastructure that will otherwise be necessaryreleasing resourcesto spend elsewhere. Higher efficiency would also reduce energy costs to businessesand consumers: lower energy consumption would deliver cost savings that couldreach $600 billion annually by 2020.

Public policy can play a vital enabling role, encouraging consumers and businesses tocapture the benefits of higher energy productivity. Developing countries that can pullthis off will make substantial progress toward their dual aims of energy security andsustained economic growth. Regional imbalances of energy production andconsumption (e.g., Europe consumes much more oil than it produces). Crude oil

prices escalated as robust demand for energy, particularly from rapidly growingdeveloping economies, combined with supply shock; even as crude hit record highs,economic growth and energy demand appeared to be immune. The credit squeeze andsubsequent GDP slowdown have seen energy-demand growth slow down rapidly and

prices drop sharply in response.

Looking toward recovery, it is notable that, in our moderate case, developing regions

will account for more than 90 percent of global energy-demand growth to 2020, withdemand growth most rapid in the Middle East. In stark contrast, growth of liquidsdemandincluding petroleum products and bio-fuelsand oil demand morespecifically could reach peak demand in the United States, according to our moderatecase. We project that the United States will actually cut its per capita energy demandto 2020, partly reflecting action to boost the economys energy productivitythelevel of output achieved from the energy consumed. Although the supply of coal andgas appears to be sufficient to prevent long-term price inflation for these fuels, growthin the supply of oil will slow markedly. Once GDP growth returns to its long-termtrend, we expect that energy-demand growth will also rebound.

Looking at growth in different regions, developing regions will account for more than

90 percent of global energy-demand growth to 2020. The energy-heavy developmentstrategies of Middle Eastern countries, coupled with large energy subsidies toconsumers, will continue to make growth highly energy intensive.10 During the same

period, we see energy-demand growth in both China and India increasing by 3.6percent. Energy-demand growth will be virtually flat in the United States and Japanwhile Europe will see energy demand growing at a rate of some 1 percent, reflectingthe inclusion in this region of many developing economies. Breaking energy-demandgrowth down into different sectors, we see end-use demand increasing about equally


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in consumer- and industry-driven sectors. This is in contrast to our previous report inwhich we saw consumer-driven sectors accounting for close to 60 percent of long-term energy-demand growth. Developing countries, including notably China andIndia, which are both investing heavily in long distance transportation and

infrastructure, will drive energy demand in these sectors. Efficiency improvementswill have little impact on energy-demand growth in petrochemicals and air transport,

in particular, as the opportunities to boost energy productivity are smaller in thesesectors than in others. Light vehicles will see one of the slowest rates of energy-demand growth. Although we project an increased share of EVs to 2020, there wont

be a real impact on energy-demand growth until 2020 to 2030. Five sectors withinChinaresidential, commercial, steel, petrochemicals, and light vehicleswillaccount for more than 25 percent of overall energy-demand growth. This secondgroup of five sectors represents another 10 percent of the global energy-demandgrowth we project. In contrast, several sectors in different countries will see energydemand contract. Since we project that oil supply will grow more slowly than oildemand at a $75 oil price, a change in either the oil price or policy, or a combinationof the two, will be necessary to bring demand and supply in balance. Meanwhile, gasand coal supply do not appear to be a constraint to demand grow thin most regions.

Too lower the global carbon footprint and save diminishing energy resources,biomass, biogas, bio-fuels, and other renewable energy fuels are being looked a t bymore and more governments. Energy resources are not a major constraint but theiruneven distribution across nations, and the fact that ensuring security of energysupply will lead to an increase in energy prices, are issues. Copenhagen has clearlyevidenced the critical need for new energy governance. When accompanying growth,energy accessibility and availability contribute concretely to improving the livingstandards of people.


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Introduction

Energy is a mounting policy and business concern in many developing countriestoday. Economic growth is boosting demand and imposing strain on existing energy-supply infrastructures, leading to brownouts and blackouts as witnessed recently inSouth Africa, Brazil, and Venezuela. High fuel prices are putting pressure on

consumers and businesses and widening trade deficits among energy importers,causing political turbulence and economic uncertainty. Governments are struggling tofind ways to secure sufficient energy supplies to meet growing demand, to finance theconstruction of capacity to deliver that supply, and to contain the rising cost of fuelsubsidies.

The most cost-effective way to address these energy supply concerns is on thedemand side: through improving energy productivitythe level of output an economycan achieve from the energy it consumes. By adopting existing energy-efficienttechnologies that pay for themselves in future energy savings, developing countriescould reduce their energy demand growth by more than halffrom 3.4 to 1.4 percentannually in the next 12 yearsand reduce their energy consumption in 2020 by 22

percent from the projected levels. Because of its positive returns, energy efficiency isthe cheapest form of energy we have.

Higher energy productivity is a win-win for developing economies and their

households and businesses. By improving demand-side efficiency, countries can cut

down fuel imports and scale back the expansion of the energy-supply infrastructure

that will otherwise be necessaryreleasing resources to spend elsewhere. Higher

efficiency would also reduce energy costs to businesses and consumers: lower energy

consumption would deliver cost savings that could reach $600 billion annually by 2020.

The investment required to capture the energy productivity opportunity among end users

would be some $90 billion annually for the next 12 yearsonly around half what these

economies would otherwise need to spend on the energy infrastructure.

Public policy can play a vital enabling role, encouraging consumers and businesses tocapture the benefits of higher energy productivity. The dismantling or reducing theinfluence of todays disincentives to efficient energyfuel subsidies includedis avital first step; putting in place effective incentives is the second. With supportive

public policy, companies in developing economies have a rich opportunity to innovateand create new markets for energy-efficient goods and serviceswith the potential toexport these into the worlds rapidly growing green-solutions markets.

Time is of the essence. With many developing countries building capital stock both on

a huge scale and at a rapid pace, there is a unique opportunity to ensure that this stock

has an economically optimal level of energy efficiency, thereby locking in lowerenergy consumption for a generation. Developing countries that can pull this off will

make substantial progress toward their dual aims of energy security and sustained

economic growth.


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Body

Logistics vulnerabilities are inherent to the world of energy and result for multiplereasons:

y Regional imbalances of energy production and consumption (e.g., Europeconsumes much more oil than it produces);

y Low-energy density of the majority of fuels (GJ per kilogram), stressingmodes of transportation (pipelines, mega-tankers, LNG carriers, etc.);

y The virtual necessity of immediate electricity consumption due to inefficientand costly technologies for storing electricity;

y Electricity transmission is inefficient over long distances.Worth examining are the numerous points of contact between logistics bottlenecksand manufacturing bottlenecks. In fact, the energy supply chain along starts with themanufacturing of energy equipment and energy-related facilities, such as power plants

Coal

In 2008, the Asia Pacific region was thee biggest global coal producer and consumer, both values over 3 billion tonnes61% of the global demand-and-supply. Other

regions of the world have much lower appetites for coal, although for the past severalyears, coal has been the fastest growing energy carrier from a global consumption

point of view.

Despite the high burden on the environment from burning coal and low-energydensity with respect too oil or natural gas, coal is expected to keep its major role inensuring the energy balance around the world due to its abundance and fairly even

geographical spread. Global coal production is estimated to in crease by 200% in2020, with respect to 2008, and by a further 544% by 2050. The major consumer will be Asia Pacific, and only Europe and Russia are expected to decrease their coalconsumption by 20200 and 2050.

Oil

The situation in the oil market is much more complex than the coal market. Oil lconsumer markets are often far from producer markets and most of its reserves arelimited to a few areas. Two-thirds of reserves are in the Middle East. There are greatoil importers, such as Europe (70% of annual consumption imported) or Asia Pacific(668%), which could not function without pipelines and tanker bringing in crude andoil products from exporting countries. By 2020, global consumption of oil will reach44.4 billion tonnes.

The world has been witnessing extraordinary volatility in energy prices in the past

five years. Crude oil prices escalated as robust demand for energy, particularly fromrapidly growing developing economies, combined with supply shock; even as crude

hit record highs, economic growth and energy demand appeared to be immune. Thensuddenly, everything changed. The credit squeeze and subsequent GDP slowdown


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have seen energy-demand growth slow down rapidly and prices drop sharply inresponse. Producers began to cut back on capital projects, and some companiesstruggled to find credit to drill attractive wells or build new power capacity. Amid thishigh degree of uncertainty on both the demand and supply side of the energy

equation, observers are keen to gain an understanding of how the supply demandbalance will evolve given the current global economic downturn.

Amid exceptionally high uncertainty about the future path of GDP in different regionsduring this turbulent period, we have looked at energy-demand growth projectionsusing both mainstream current GDP projections and a range of alternative scenariosaround these estimates.1 The moderate case projects a global GDP downturn

producing a total 4.7 percent gap to trendfelt mostly in 2008 and 2009and thenrecovery in 2010. Under current GDP projections, energy-demand growth willexperience a short-term lull in 2009 due to the global economic downturn and thecredit squeeze but is likely to rebound sharply thereafter across all fuel types. Asdemand recovers, CO2 emissions will grow rapidly.However, we should note that consensus forecasts for global GDP have been subjectto downward revision month after month since mid-2008. For this reason, a severeand a very severe case is necessary to reflect the successive downgrading of growth

forecasts. In the event that we find ourselves in a more severe scenario that sees areduction in credit to the non-financial sector, our severe case produces a gap to trendof 6.7 percent while the gap in the very severe case is 10.8 percent.Looking toward recovery, it is notable that, in the moderate case, developing regionswill account for more than 90 percent of global energy-demand growth to 2020, withdemand growth most rapid in the Middle East. In stark contrast, growth of liquidsdemandincluding petroleum products and bio-fuelsand oil demand morespecifically could reach peak demand in the United States, according to our moderatecase. We project that the United States will actually cut its per capita energy demandto 2020, partly reflecting action to boost the economys energy productivitythelevel of output achieved from the energy consumed.Globally, potential exists for liquids-demand growth to outpace that of supply, layingthe groundwork for a possible new spike in oil and natural gas prices.3 This is true in

both the moderate-case scenario as well as in a low-GDP casealthough theimbalance would appear at a later date in the severe case. Although the supply of coaland gas appears to be sufficient to prevent long-term price inflation for these fuels,growth in the supply of oil will slow markedly.Once GDP growth returns to its long-term trend, we expect that energy-demandgrowth will also rebound. From 2010 to 2020, the moderate case projects that energy-demand growth will recover to 2.3 percent per annum, nearly a point faster than the

period from 2006 to 2010. Even in our severe and very severe cases, the reboundoccurs, albeit in 2011 in the severe case and in 2012 in the very severe case. In thesevere case, energy demand grows 2.4 percent between 2010 and 2020, and the very

severe case at 2.3 percent, so the impact of lower GDP growth is actually isolated in theyears to 2012 in all of our scenarios.Looking at growth in different regions, developing regions will account for more than90 percent of global energy-demand growth to 2020. Middle East will have thefastest-growing energy demand of any major region, driven by the stepping up ofindustrial capacity building to take advantage of the Middle Easts oil and gassupplies, as well as high, continuing growth in the regions vehicle stock, reflectingincreasing wealth. The energy-heavy development strategies of Middle Eastern


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countries, coupled with large energy subsidies to consumers, will continue to makegrowth highly energy intensive.10 During the same period, we see energy-demandgrowth in both China and India increasing by 3.6 percent. Energy-demand growth will

be virtually flat in the United States and Japan while Europe will see energy demand

growing at a rate of some 1 percent, reflecting the inclusion in this region of manydeveloping economies. Meanwhile, our moderate case projects that demand for fossil

fuels in the United States has peaked, remaining exactly flat through 2020. Naturalgas is the only fossil fuel projected to grow, at a rate of 0.6 percent per annum.

Breaking energy-demand growth down into different sectors, we see end-use demandincreasing about equally in consumer- and industry-driven sectors. This is in contrastto our previous report in which we saw consumer-driven sectors accounting for closeto 60 percent of long-term energy-demand growth. The fastest- growing sectors will

be steel, petrochemicals, and air transportation. Developing countries, includingnotably China and India, which are both investing heavily in long distancetransportation and infrastructure, will drive energy demand in these sectors.Efficiency improvements will have little impact on energy-demand growth in

petrochemicals and air transport, in particular, as the opportunities to boost energy

productivity are smaller in these sectors than in others.Light vehicles will see one of the slowest rates of energy-demand growth. Althoughthe vehicle stock will grow very strongly in China, India, and the Middle East, veryrapid efficiency improvements across many other regions will help dampen demandfrom this sector in aggregate. Although we project an increased share of EVs to 2020,there wont be a real impact on energy-demand growth until 2020 to 2030.Five sectors within Chinaresidential, commercial, steel, petrochemicals, and lightvehicleswill account for more than 25 percent of overall energy-demand growth.Other sectors that are notable for their large contribution to overall energy-demandgrowth are Indias light-vehicles, residential, and steel sectors, and light vehicles and

petrochemicals in the Middle East. This second group of five sectors representsanother 10 percent of the global energy-demand growth we project. In contrast,several sectors in different countries will see energy demand contract. Most notableare the light-vehicles and pulp-and-paper sectors in developed economies, the formerdriven by efficiency regulations, the latter by a shift from paper to digital media.Turning to the fuel mix, this will change only modestly to 2020 given the very largeinstalled base of energy-using capital stock and relatively minor differences in growthrates among fuels. However, within this aggregate picture, coal continues to be thefastest-growing fuel and oil the slowest-growing.Coal consumption is driven by the inexorable proliferation of electricity-usingappliances in buildings and by continued urbanization in developing countries, notleast in China and India. These two countries are both particularly coal intensive andare among the fastest growing regions in the world, accounting for nearly 100 percent

of coal demand growth to 2020. Relatively slow growth in oil demand will reflect theimpact of regulation, short-term behavioural responses to price, increasing bio-fuels,and the continued migration from residual fuel oil and diesel to other fuels in the

power, industrial, and buildings sectors where they are used as boiler fuels. Naturalgas growth is again fastest in China and India, although from a lower starting point. Givenits commitment to increase natural gas prices to netbacks, Russias gas demand is

projected to be quite slow.


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The renewable/other category grows at about the rate of coal and gas. However,within this grouping, traditional biomass and nuclear demand rise more slowly, whilerenewable such as wind power and bio-fuels grow briskly. Since we project that oilsupply will grow more slowly than oil demand at a $75 oil price, a change in either

the oil price or policy, or a combination of the two, will be necessary to bring demand

and supply in balance. Many policy levers are available to achieve this rebalancing ofsupply and demand, including incentives to shift petroleum out of boiler-fuelapplications, the removal of petroleum-product subsidies, and further incentives forEVs.Meanwhile, gas and coal supply do not appear to be a constraint to demand grow thinmost regions. Although temporary imbalances could exist between now and 2020, theoverall long-term supply demand path looks relatively balanced.

Growth rate in the production and consumption off oil in 2008 according to region,with projections for 22020 and 2050.

Although some regions will decrease their dependence on oil imports, that will be due primarily to expanding production rather than controlling consumption. NorthAmerica, as an example, will switch from importing 43% oaf oil consumed in 200 8to a break--even in 202 20, but mainly thanks to expanding production by 54% ratherthan cutting consumption by 12% (according to the EPS 2050 model).

Natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG)


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Natural gas is much less convenient to transport than oil. Expensive pipelines areneeded or liqueffaction/re-gaasification terminals must be constructed next toharbours. Hence, only 12% of gas produced in 22008 was exported to other regions,while thee same indicator for oil was 48%.

Discovered reserves of natural gas are much more abundant than oil, and already ashift toward gas is observed on the global markets. By 2020, global production is

expected t to increase by 39%, and from 2020 too 2050, another 41%, according tothe EPS 2050 model.

Uranium

Uranium ore reserves, an energy source for nuclear power plants, are concentratedin just a few regions six countries (Canada, Kazakhstan, Australia, Namibia,Russia, and Niger). Together, they are responsible for over 80% off global

production. Although most uranium used in nuclear power plants has to beimported, it is the most energy dense and therefore efficient fuel in the world(around 2,250 TJ from one tonne of uranium).The total volume of uranium that hastoo be transported is insignificant when compared with oil and coal.

Growth rate inn the production and consumption of natural gas in 2008 according toregion, with projections for 2020 and 22050.

B


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Biomass and biogas

Too lower the global carbon footprint and save diminishing energy resources,biomass, biogas, bio-fuels, and other renewable energy fuels are being looked a t bymore and more governments. Entrepreneurs are being given green certificates, taxincentives, and other regulatory support.

From the logistics point of view, both biogas and biomass are still insignificant. Asfor biogas, its global production in 2008 equalled 33.11 million cubic meters. Thatwas just 1.1% of natural gas production. Biomass is a local energy sourceless than1% of global production is expected to be either exported or imported. For thesereasons, neither biomass nor biogas will be treated preferentially inn further parts ofthe study.

Electricity

After having mined, processed, and transported energy products, different types o ofenergy are received per sebe it fuel for cars and other vehicles, heat for our housesand workplaces,, or electricity for our tools, appliances, and other necessities ofliving. Regardless of the form of energy, there is no doubt electricity is fundamentalto everyday activities and lies at the heart of technological progress for countries andwhole regions. There is a high correlation on between GGDP per capita andelectricity consumption per capita throughout the world.

Electricity, after being produced inn power plants and sent along transmission lines toa distribution grid, has to be consumed on the spototherwise it is wasted, putting a

premium on just in time production. Storing electricity is booth expensive andinefficient, as is its very long-distance transportation. At the end of 2007 7,

transmission and distribution losses in U.S., for example, were estimated at 6.5%.Hence, electricity usage has many restrictions and imbalances around the globe.

Currently, electricity production and consumption are concentrated in the mostdeveloped regions of the world. Europe, with just over 9% of the global population,consumes 24% of the worlds electricity. North America, with 5%, consumes 28%.On the other extreme, Africas 14% of the worlds inhabitants must do with just 3%of the electricity.

Not surprisingly, the demand for electricity will increase for all regions in both the20082020 and 20202050 time frames. Growth will be driven especially by

emerging markets. The Asia Pacific region is projected to increase electricityconsumption between 2008 and 2020 by 60%, Africa by 86%, and Latin America by87%.

At a time when all countries are working to develop strategies for putting the crisis behind them, economic growth is an entirely legitimate and worthwhile goal. The


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problem is that the kind of growth we have pursued in the past forces us to addressthree fundamental issues:

The first is security of supply. We must invest in new sources and infrastructure to

meet demand. The crisis has negatively affected some investment plans, and therecent surge in oil and commodity prices may curb growth.

The second is environmental protection and climate change. Responsible for 60% ofglobal Greenhouse gas emissions and much of regional and urban air pollution, theenergy sector is clearly on the front line of climate change. And in terms of urbanenvironment, at a time when one out of every two people lives in a city, air quality isa major concern. And because energy goes hand in hand with development, thequestion of inequalities within And across countries is another central concern. Nowmore than ever, we must work to find a sustainable path that reconciles economicgrowth, protection of the environment and greater energy equity among peoples. Wecan do this and we have the technologies we need at hand.Energy resources are not a major constraint but their uneven distribution acrossnations, and the fact that ensuring security of energy supply will lead to an increase in

energy prices, are issues. The energy industry will need to go further a field anddeploy ever more sophisticated technologies to tap into available resources. And asthe recent event in the Gulf of Mexico dramatically reminded us, we will need torespect the highest standards of safety.But other types of resources are genuinely scarce or under stress. The environment isone example, and particularly the climate. Water and land use issues have also

become real constraints. There is also a need for the skills to conceive, build andoperate systems powered by efficient and clean technologies. The real shortage today,however, relates to governance. We need effective rules and smart policy frameworksto update our energy policies and ensure that the right resources and technologies areavailable in the right place, at the right time... and at the right price. In sum,innovation in terms of policies, institutions and governance will be just as importantas technological innovation. Copenhagen has clearly evidenced the critical need fornew energy governance. By shifting from the top-down approach of Kyoto to a

bottom-up approach based on national commitments, the Copenhagen Accord hasrightfully put energy policy at the centre of the sustainability debate.


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Analysis

In light of the above information the following issues have been identified:

First, the energy sectors new agenda

Second, the real constraints and opportunities we face inTackling our challenges;

And third, the road ahead to adjusting our energy policies and fostering internationalcooperation. Our end-goal has to be sustainable growth. At a time when all countriesare working to develop strategies to put the crisis behind them, growth is a legitimateand worthwhile goal. When accompanying growth, energy accessibility andavailability contribute concretely to improving the living standards of people.However, the kind of growth we have experienced in the past leads us to address threeissues:

The first issue is security of supply. Clearly, we must invest in new infrastructures to

keep up with demand. However, the crisis has interfered with some investment plans.In addition, the recent surge in oil and commodity prices is curbing growth. We must

bear in mind that many developing countries spend approximately 4% of their GDPon oil and gas imports, the same percentage as OECD countries did during the

previous two oil shocks. In some developing countries today this figure can evenreach 15% of GDP.

The second issue is environmental protection and climate change. The energy sector,which is responsible for 60% of global greenhouse gas emissions, is clearly on thefront line regarding the debate on climate change. Finally, the issue of inequalitieswithin and across countries is another major concern, as energy goes hand in handwith development. Inequality hinders development and depresses demand.Sustainability also means more social equity. We will see no progress towardsreaching the Millennium Development Goals if we persist in failing to efficientlytackle

More than ever, we must work all together to bring about a sound energy transition to2030-2050, that is, to find a sustainable approach that reconciles economic growth,environmental protection and greater equality. We have what it takes to do this. Thetechnologies we need are at hand. On the demand side, solutions already exist and wemust just go forward and invest on. On the supply side, there are also mature andcompetitive technologies available. Further out, we will need to invest to develop:

Generation 4 nuclear, carbon capture and storage, more efficient photovoltaictechnologies, electricity storage, and second-generation sustainable bio-fuels. Wehave, on earth, enough natural resources to meet demand. The real issue is not somuch their overall level, but their uneven distribution across nations, and the fact thatensuring security of energy supply will necessarily lead to an increase in energy

prices. Indeed, in terms of oil and gas, it is estimated that resources will last about twomore centuries, factoring in unconventional gas and oil. Nevertheless, we will have to


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tap in to more and more remote, difficult-to access resources. For this, moresophisticated and costly technologies will be required.Meanwhile, we will have to ensure that these new technologies meet with the highestsafety standards. The safety issue will be addressed as a priority in our future works.

In terms of coal, there are enough resources to last for another several hundred years.In terms of nuclear, with second and third generation technologies, todays uranium

resources will last for about two hundred more years. With Generation 4 technologythe length of time could be extended 50 times. Lastly, potential in hydropower, windand solar energy is highly significant worldwide.The use of fossil fuels is under pressure because of Environmental and climateconcerns. Water and land use become a huge challenge. By 2025, 1.8 billion peoplewill be living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity.When looking at the global picture, we realise that it will be not easy to successfullytransition towards truly sustainable growth. It will not be easy because it will becostly, sinceClean technologies are more expensive than conventional ones. At the same time, wemust work to keep the human and social cost which economic restructuring willentail, to a minimum. It will not be easy because the transition must also be

acceptable to all. If not, we will fail. We must ensure that we do not leave the mostdeprived members of society by the wayside of our path to sustainable growth. Takingaction to specifically help the poorest has to be a key priority in forging new public

policies.

Long-term policies are possible only if we keep costs in check. This will require planning the roll-out of different technologies, starting with those that are mature,while preparing others for the market. We could in fact, already organise a massiveroll-out of mature technologies over the next 20 years. And, for technologies that arenot yet mature, whose cost of CO2 avoided is usually 5 to 10 times higher, the firststep should be to encourage and support R&D and experimentation. Behaviours andhabits will also have to change. Norms and standards will play a vital role. At thesame time, energy pricing must contribute to stimulating investment, guaranteeingsecurity of supply and promoting energy savings. Some innovations like smart gridsand smart homes can be real catalysts in changing energy behaviours, making peoplemore aware of the value of the resources and therefore more eager to be efficient andresponsible. We must take up the urbanisation challenge and turn it into anopportunity, 2 billion new urban dwellers are expected by 2030 the equivalent of 7Shanghais or Jakartas, or 10 Londons each year.It should also be possible to complement efforts made at country level throughinternational cooperation. Here again, I am convinced that we can surmount theobstacles in our way. Take the climate, for instance. While some were disappointed

by the results of the Copenhagen Summit, we should not underestimate what was

achieved. Most importantly, an agreement was reached through the unprecedentedmobilisation of more than 140 heads of state and government, proof that we are, now,collectively aware of the issues at stake and willing to take action. From thisstandpoint, Copenhagen created real global impetus.In my view, what we have to do now is build on this momentum. And we must notuse the crisis as an excuse to fall back on protectionism and isolationism. There aretwo areas in which much remains to be achieved.


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First, we must design sound and effective public policies to deliver the mitigationobjectives adopted by more than 70 countries in their commitments.

Second, we must develop new tools to efficiently channel public and private funds

and foster, among other things, technology transfer.

Sustainable growth is no longer an option, it is a necessity. While the goal is clear,finding the best path to reach it will be a challenge for all. I believe that to rise to thechallenge, we will have to rely more than ever on cooperation and dialogue betweenall stakeholders: governments, businesses, researchers and NGOs.


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Recommendation

Following the analysis and realization of certain needs the actions to be takenincludes:

International recognition and prioritisation of the energy access issue;

A robust international framework that clearly articulates an energy access target; A detailed implementation roadmap, with interim targets and milestones; A mechanism for building in-country capacity; A dedicated funding mechanism for ensuring investment toward universal access; Designing an ongoing global energy dialogue focused on this area; Improving the performance of public utilities is critical; A requirement for monitoring and reporting; Ensuring a focus on productive uses.

In addition the following policies are needed:-

Energy efficiency policies

Energy efficiency is a winning strategy which can help address a variety of policyobjectives at the same time: security of supply, climate change, competitiveness,

balance of trade, investment and environmental protection. reduce energy imports and thus improve the security of supply, make up half of the reduction needed to reduce GHG emissions by 2050 in scenarioswith strong CO2 constraints, increase competitiveness of industries, especially for energy intensive industries, byreducing energy costs, limit the macro-economic impact of oil price fluctuations for oil importing countriesin terms of balance of payments, and public budget, reduce the huge need for investment in energy infrastructure in emerging economiesand free capital for other purposes, contribute to the environmental protection by reducing local pollution anddeforestation.

To be successful, energy efficiency programmes and projects need appropriatestrategies. The report introduces eight main recommendations to improve theeffectiveness of energy efficiency policies development and implementation:

1. Incentive prices: a condition for successful energy efficiency policies,2. Innovative financing to support consumers at a limited cost for the public budget,

3. Regulations need to be regularly strengthened, enforced and expanded,4. Measures should be combined in packages of complementary measures,5. The situation of less developed countries should be better addressed,6. The achievements and impacts of measures should be monitored,7. Consumer behaviour should be addressed as much as technologies,8. International and regional cooperation should be enhanced.


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Over the next four decades logistics bottlenecks are expected to occur almosteverywhere in the World, if policymakers, industry and society are not able to findsolutions in dealing with the impediments to reaching a global supply-demand

balance. To manage these expected bottlenecks, significant infrastructure investments

need to be made in the next few years. To develop the required oil pipeline and tankernetworks, gas pipelines and LNG carriers systems, as well as smart grids boosting the

efficiency of electricity distribution, more than US$200 billion will have to be spentin the next ten years and an additional 700 billion in the 202050 timeframe,signifying average annual outlays of US$21 billion. Policies and concrete actions thatallow for timely investments in the respective infrastructures and build bridges

between the private and public sectors in various regions have to be designed andimplemented. This will help ensure that the money is spent effectively, generatingdesired results for both companies, governments, and society.

The implications resulting from the above mentioned policies are as follows:-

Key Implications for Policymakers

y Rebalance strategic ambitions in light of energy sustainability goals, through atransparent consideration of policy trade-offs (for example, consumeraffordability versus emissions reduction, incentives for policy preferencesversus economic distortions).

y Develop policy frameworks that are sufficiently flexible to respond both tostrategic market disruptions (e.g., emerging gas supply opportunities) andtactical developments in fast-moving areas (e.g., renewable energyinstallation)

y Encourage technology transfer and partnership arrangements by leveragingforeign expertise and financing to support the long-term success of domestic

energy industries.y Strengthen regulatory frameworks that support the development of new

infrastructure to reduce construction lead times and ensure the reliableconnection of new generation assets to transmission grids.

y Plan for the completion of economic-crisis stimulus funding and the gradualremoval of subsidies for thermal generation, and, in due course, maturingsources of renewable energy. This will encourage ongoing investment.

y Draw lessons from the growing body of experience around the deployment ofrenewable energy and energy efficiency to pre-empt potential issues in theimplementation of policies and to reduce the likelihood of hesitancy about, orchanges in, policy.

y Review governance structures and decision-making processes with a view toenhancing stakeholder engagement and securing greater acceptance for criticalenergy sector transformations.

Key implications for the Energy Industry

y Maintain or pursue diversity in the generation mix to cope with long-termdisruptive changes in resource availability, the likelihood of significant


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regulatory impacts, changing policy priorities, and more volatile commoditymarkets.

y Leverage competitive technologies and strong balance sheets both to respondto the ongoing opening of energy markets across the globe, and to support the

growth ambitions of non-OECD countries.

y Increase energy-efficiency efforts and identify areas of potential leadership(including through participation in cross-industry alliances) to hedge againstregulatory scenarios, secure cost savings and generate revenues throughancillary businesses.

y Explore with governments how the risks of major investments can be reduced,resulting in lower costs for consumers.


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Bibliography

http://www.wisconsinenergy.com/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Efficient_energy_use

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_conservation

http://www.epa.gov/reg5rcra/wptdiv/p2pages/energy.pdf

http://www.adb.org/Documents/RRPs/PAK/42051-PAK-RRP.pdf

http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/03/energy-conservation/miller-text