Melissa Meriam Bullard - Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Favor and Finance in Sixteenth-century Florence and Rome

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN HISTORY

Editors

J. H. ELLIOTT H. G. KOENIGSBERGER

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN EARLYMODERN HISTORY

Edited by Professor Jf. H. Elliott, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and

Professor H. G. Koenigsberger, King's College, University of London

The idea of an 'early modern' period of European history from the fifteenth to thelate eighteenth century is now widely accepted among historians. The purpose ofthe Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History is to publish monographs andstudies which will illuminate the character of the period as a whole, and in particularfocus attention on a dominant theme within it, the interplay of continuity and changeas they are represented by the continuity of medieval ideas, political and socialorganization, and by the impact of new ideas, new methods and new demands onthe traditional structures.

The Old World and the New, 1492-1650J. H. ELLIOTT

French Finances, 1770-1795: From Business to Bureaucracyj . F. BOSHER

The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of SpanishVictory and Defeat in the Low Countries Wars

GEOFFREY PARKER

Chronicle into History: An Essay on the Interpretation of History in FlorentineFourteenth-Century Chronicles

LOUIS GREEN

France and the Estates General of 1614J. MICHAEL HAYDEN

Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Seain the Sixteenth Century

JOHN FRANCIS GUILMARTIN JR

Reform and Revolution in Mainz 1743-1803T. C. W. BLANNING

The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance 1516-1559J. A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA

Altopascio: A Study in Tuscan Rural Society 1587-1784FRANK MCARDLE

Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm in the Netherlands 1544-1569PHYLLIS MACK CREW

The Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeenth CenturyJAMES CASEY

Rouen during the Wars of ReligionPHILIP BENEDICT

Filippo Strozzi andthe Medici

Favor and finance insixteenth-century Florence and Rome

MELISSA MERIAM BULLARDAssistant Professor of History,

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESSCambridge

London New York New RochelleMelbourne Sydney

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© Cambridge University Press 1980

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exceptionand to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,no reproduction of any part may take place without the written

permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1980This digitally printed version 2008

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication dataBullard, Melissa Meriam, 1946-Filippo Strozzi and the Medici.

(Cambridge studies in early modern history)Bibliography: p.Includes index.

1. Strozzi, Filippo, 1489-1538. 2. Florence -History - 1421-1737. 3. Rome (City) - History -

1420-1798. 4. Medici, House of. 5. Bankers - Italy -Florence - Biography. 6. Florence - Nobility - Biography.

I. Title.DG738.14.S8B84 945'.51 [B] 79-51822

ISBN 978-0-521-22301-0 hardbackISBN 978-0-521-08816-9 paperback

Contents

Preface

List of abbreviations

Genealogical table

i Introduction

2 Filippo Strozzi's Florence

3 Marriage intrigues

4 Rise to favor

5 Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber

6 War finance and Florentine public funds

7 Financier to Clement VII

8 Epilogue

Sources

Index

page vn

viii

X

i

9

456i

9 i

119

151

173

179

187

Preface

My work on Filippo Strozzi began as a doctoral dissertation submitted toCornell University. The archival research which forms its heart and corewas made possible by funds from the Gertrude A. Gilmore and TheodorMommsen fellowships and by a grant from the Center for InternationalStudies at Cornell. I am grateful to the staffs of the various archives Iconsulted who made the treasures in their trust available to me, and to thepersonnel of the American Academy in Rome, my home during the finalstages of research. I appreciate Richard Goldthwaite's sharing his interestin Filippo Strozzi with me at the project's inception. Special thanks go tomy dear friend Reina Barile who made her home mine whenever I was inFlorence. For awakening in me a deep appreciation of the value of worksin my life, express thanks go to Ira Progoff and the Intensive Journal.

In preparing the manuscript for publication I benefited greatly fromFelix Gilbert's suggestions and from John H. Elliott's thoughtful readingand incisive comments which guided my footsteps on the path fromdissertation to book. My gratitude to Helmut Koenigsberger reachesbeyond these pages. The generosity and cheerful encouragement heextended me despite often discouraging barriers of time and distancebuoyed me along the way. Most of all I wish to express appreciation tomy helpmate and husband Jim to whom this book is dedicated. Were itnot for his unwavering faith and support to hearten my faltering stride, thisbook would never have materialized.

M.M.B.Chapel Hilly North Carolina, igj8

vn

Abbreviations(Unless otherwise indicated, all archival references are to the Archivio di Stato,Florence)

A.A.S.G.F.

A.S.CA.S.F.A.S.I.A.S.R.A.V.B.N.F.B.V.C.S.Camerale

Conv. Soppr.Dieci, Mis.Died, Resp.Div. Cam.

Int. et Exit.

M.A.P.Magi.

Monte ComuneOtto, Cond. et Stant.Otto, Delib.

Otto, Dieci, Leg. e Com.Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib.

Otto, Entrate e UsciteOtto, Resp.Otto, Stant.Sig., Cart., Mis.

Archivio della Arciconfraternita di SanGiovanni dei Fiorentini, RomeArchivio Storico Capitolino, RomeArchivio di Stato, FlorenceArchivio Storico ItalianoArchivio di Stato, RomeArchivio Segreto VaticanoBiblioteca Nazionale, FlorenceBiblioteca Apostolica VaticanaCarte StrozzianeArchivio Camerale, Archivio di Stato,RomeConventi SoppressiDieci di Balk, Carteggi, MissiveDieci di Balk, Carteggi, ResponsiveDiversa Cameralia, Archivio SegretoVaticanoIntroitus et Exitus, Archivio SegretoVaticanoMediceo avanti il PrincipatoMagliabecchiana, Biblioteca Nazionale,FlorenceMonte Comune, periodo repubblicanoOtto di Pratica, Condotte e StantiamentiOtto di Pratica, Deliberazioni, Partiti,CondotteOtto, Dieci, Legazioni e CommissioniOtto di Guardia e Balia, Partiti eDeliberazioniOtto di Pratica, Entrate e UsciteOtto di Pratica, ResponsiveOtto di Pratica, StantiamentiSignori, Carteggi, Missive

viii

Abbreviations

Sig., Cart., Resp. Orig. Signori, Carteggi, Responsive OriginaliSig., Died, Otto, Leg. e Com. Signori, Died, Otto, Legazioni et

CommissioniSig., Died, Otto, Mis. Orig. Signori, Died, Otto, Missive OriginaliSig. e Coll., Delib. Ord. Signori e Collegi, Deliberazioni, Ordin-

aria AutoritaVat. Lat. Vaticani Latini, Biblioteca Vaticana

IX

Selective genealogy of the Strozzi

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Introduction

An army of ragged exiles defeated at Montemurlo in 1537 by Duke Cosimode'Medici of Florence and a suicide note echoing the words of Cato foundbeside his body in the duke's prison a year later are the images most closelyassociated with the memory of Filippo Strozzi the Younger. When notconfused from the outset with his father who was also named Filippo,builder of the magnificent family palace in Florence, Filippo the Youngeris most often remembered as a tragic hero, defender of the lost FlorentineRepublic against her new masters the Medici dukes. But for most of hisadult life Strozzi could hardly be called a champion of Florentine libertiesagainst Medici hegemony. If anything he was one of the staunchestsupporters of the Medici both in Florence and at the papal court in Rome,personally profiting from his association with them and the favor theybestowed. He unhesitatingly abetted Lorenzo di Piero de'Medici's machi-nations to make himself sole ruler of Florence and obligingly diverted thecommune's money into the pope's war chest. Basking in the sun of Medicifavor, he enjoyed a reputation for power, wealth, education and magnanimitybefitting the brilliance of his age. As a merchant-banker and speculator heamassed a fortune of legendary size and built an international financialempire rivaling that of the famous Fugger of Augsburg. Only at the endof this long and profitable career as a financier and ally of the Medici andonly after the death of his last great patron Clement VII in 1534 did Filippofind himself feared and hated by the new dukes of Florence. Only then washe forced into his celebrated role as leader of the Florentine exiles, defiantcaptive, and heroic suicide.

Over the centuries Filippo Strozzi has suffered the unkindly fate ofhaving been remembered more for the circumstances of his death than forthe accomplishments of his active public life. His last four years as exileand political prisoner have almost completely eclipsed the earlier phasesof his career. Despite the survival of hundreds of his private papers whichportray his earlier years, few historians have ever taken note of them. Weowe this one-sided view of Filippo Strozzi and his place in sixteenth-centurystudies to nineteenth-century historians and dramatists who, caught up intheir own nationalistic and patriotic fervor, imagined that Strozzi in his final


struggles against the tyrannous Florentine dukes in the sixteenth centuryforeshadowed the political spirit of their own day. Filippo Strozzi achievedwide popularity among historians of the last half of the nineteenth century,and more was written about his final days by Italian, German and Englishwriters of that period than before or since.

The first important publication about Strozzi to influence the tone ofsubsequent treatments was the widely-read historical drama of G.-B.Niccolini entitled Filippo Strozzi, tragedia which depicted the last few yearsof Strozzi's life leading to his romantic and tragic death. The play waspublished in Florence in 1847 together with an edition of the apologeticbiography of Filippo written by his brother with an appendix of letters anddocuments edited by Pietro Bigazzi relating to the years treated in thedrama.1 After the appearance of Niccolini's play and the documents,Filippo Strozzi became a favorite romantic figure whom T. AdolphusTrollope introduced to an English audience in i860 with the publicationof his Filippo Strozzi: A History of the Last Days of the Old Italian Liberty.Even the great Leopold von Ranke produced a Strozzi piece, his ' FilippoStrozzi und Cosimo Medici, der erste Grossherzog von Toskana.'2 Italianhistorians of the same period, notably L. A. Ferrai, Carlo Capasso andAlessandro Bardi, published works treating Strozzi's resistance to thegrowing power of the dukes in Florence.3 The author of the only recentbiography of Strozzi, unfortunately a derivative account, closely followedthe pattern established by his nineteenth-century predecessors and repeatedthe now familiar refrain extolling Filippo Strozzi the tragic hero of lostFlorentine liberty.4

The present work attempts to redress the balance of romantic historio-graphy by looking at the beginning rather than the end of Strozzi's careerand by setting him into the courtly environment of favoritism and financialpatronage where he properly belongs. It is the Medici favorite and financier,and not the tragic hero, who steps forth from these pages - unless one cansay that there is heroism and tragedy even in account books.

1 A popular account of Strozzi's life had already been published in the eighteenth century, AngeloMaria Bandini's,' Vita di Filippo Strozzi,' Magazzeno toscano cTistruzione e dipiacere, II (i755-1756),r7-33> 49-66, which was perhaps inspired by the first published edition of Lorenzo's biographyas an appendix to the 1723 edition of Benedetto Varchi's Storiafiorentina. Many manuscript copiesof the biography existed in private libraries and helped keep the memory of Strozzi alive beyondthe sixteenth century.

2 Sdmmtliche Werke (Leipzig, 1875-1900), XL-XLI, 361-445.3 L. A. Ferrai, Filippo Strozzi, prigioniero degli Spagnuoli (Padua, 1880); idem, Cosimo de* Medici, duca

di Firenze (Bologna, 1882); idem, Lorenzino de^ Medici e la societa cortigiana del Cinquecento (Milan,1891); Carlo Capasso, Firenze, Filippo Strozzi, i fuorusciti e la corte pontificia (Camerino, 1901);Alessandro Bardi, 'Filippo Strozzi (da nuovi documenti),' A.S.I., Ser. v, vol. 15 (1894), 3-78.

4 Luigi Limongelli, Filippo Strozzi, primo cittadino dy Italia (Milan, 1963).

Introduction

Filippo Strozzi was born 4 January 1489, the third and youngest son ofa wealthy Florentine aristocratic family. His father, Filippo the Elder, diedin 1491 leaving his widow Selvaggia to care for her two small sons, Lorenzoaged nine and Filippo then aged two. By his first wife he had had anotherson Alfonso who divided his share of the estate from that of his youngerstep-brothers in order to go his separate way. Lorenzo and Filippo werealways very close, but Alfonso never shared their intimacy, and a series ofdisagreements over the settlement of their father's estate and the buildingcosts of the family palace clouded the relationship for much of their lives.

The earliest accounts of Selvaggia's two sons come from scattered lettersand account books, from the life of Filippo written by Lorenzo and froma biography of Lorenzo composed in 1529 by Francesco Zeffi who was thetutor of Filippo's children.5 The two biographies emphasize the nobility,education and elegant manners of the two brothers and were composed toglorify the family for the edification of later generations of Strozzi. Zefficlaimed that Lorenzo and Filippo were undoubtedly among those eminentFlorentines of their day who so exemplified civic virtues and goodcitizenship that any prince would desire to have them in his state. He notedthat Filippo was renowned for his exceptional good looks and intelligenceand for his wealth. Lorenzo was even more fulsome in praising his brother,for, according to him, Filippo 'demonstrated humanity with his equals andreverence to his superiors and was modest in his every word and deed, andsince he was graced with nobility, a handsome appearance, letters and goodmanners and the largest fortune in Florence, he was without doubt heldin higher esteem than any other young Florentine.'6 As youths the brothersmoved freely in the circles of young patricians who occupied themselvesmainly with their studies, festivities, football and amorous adventures.From a letter of October 1500 describing a party Lorenzo gave on the feastof San Donino at the family villa of Santuccio, we find that their guestsincluded young men from the Buondelmonti, Canigani, Capponi, de'Nobili,Ricci, Pandolfini and Rucellai families.7

Their mother Selvaggia sought to strengthen these aristocratic ties byarranging a series of marriages which took place after her husband's death.In 1493 Filippo's sister Fiammetta married Tommaso Soderini, nephew ofPiero Soderini the future gonfaloniere-a-vita.s In 1497 Alessandra, another

5 The letters are strewn throughout the Carte Strozziane in the Archivio di Stato, Florence, and theaccount books are in C.S., Ser. v, 87 and 90. Zeffi's biography of Lorenzo forms the foreword tothe Landi edition of Strozzi's own work, Le vite degli uomini illustri della casa Strozzi (Florence,1892).

6 G.-B. Niccolini, Filippo Strozzi, tragedia (Florence, 1847), p. xi.7 C.S., Ser. in, 145, fol. 94.8 The gonfaloniere di giustizia, or standard-bearer of justice, was the chief executive in the Florentine


sister, married Niccolo Capponi who much later was elected the firstgonfalonier e of the Third Republic in 1527. In 1502 Caterina married Neridi Gino Capponi, and after the marriage arrangements were concluded,Neri wrote a letter from Lyons to Lorenzo Strozzi expressing hissatisfaction with the strengthened union between their families: ' God hasseen fit to give both of us that joy which we desire. Even though theengagement brings us no closer tie since our families are already sointimately related, first through my mother who was born among theStrozzi and then through Niccolo [who married your sister AlessandraStrozzi], still it is a bond between us reaching beyond the intimatefriendship we had with your father.'9 In 1503 Lorenzo married thedaughter of Bernardo Rucellai. The engagement had been arranged tenyears previously while Lorenzo was a still a child. Selvaggia, then recentlywidowed, was particularly eager to secure the friendship and help ofBernardo on whose sage counsel the family came to rely for many years.She was quite content to make the match even though Lucrezia Rucellaibrought with her only a small dowry. The wedding feast alone cost theStrozzi over 1,500 florins. The groom and his attendants dressed themselveselegantly in yards of velvet, damask and taffeta. To demonstrate theirgrandeur and generosity, the family distributed food and drink to thecrowds waiting in the piazza outside the Strozzi palace.

Contemporary sources bear witness to Florentines' fascination withspectacles and feasts, and one of the major pastimes of the rich was to stageelaborate celebrations and processions during Carnival and on variousholidays. Filippo was no exception and took particular pleasure in festivals.For Carnival 1506, along with his friends Antonfrancesco and Antonio degliAlbizzi, he staged a mime in the house of Prinzivalle della Stufa. Thepainter Piero di Cosimo designed the tableau which depicted Dovitia,played by Antonfrancesco who held a cornucopia and wore a headdress ofvarious fruits. Dovitia was led by two youths, Filippo and Antonio, attiredin garments of yellow silk stamped with black velvet with sleeves made upof multicolored silk leaves. Their hats were of black velvet embroideredin gold, their boots yellow with gold laces. After them followed three singersand twelve attendants. Filippo's close friendship with his two companionsin this mime, Antonfrancesco and Prinzivalle, assumed greater importancein the years to come when both men became adamant Medici supporters.

During the next year's Carnival Filippo and his brother took part in thefamous Carro di Morte (Cart of Death), again designed by Piero di Cosimo,

government. Under the Republic a new gonfaloniere was chosen every two months. In 1502,however, the constitution was changed, and Piero Soderini became the first standard-bearer ofjustice-for-life {gonfaloniere-a-vita). He stayed in office until 1512 when his government fell withthe return of the Medici.

9 C.S., Ser. HI, 145, fol. 95.

Introduction

which Vasari described in his life of that painter. The figure of Deathbrandished a scythe and rode on top of the buffalo-drawn cart. He wassurrounded by men dressed as skeletons who hid themselves in coffins. Atevery halt in the procession they sprang from their sepulchers and sangsongs about death. Other persons disguised as corpses and accompaniedby torchbearing attendants on foot rode behind Death's cart astrideemaciated nags. This masque so impressed the spectators that on thefollowing day, the first day of Lent, preachers praised it from their pulpits.

Although festivals were a favorite pastime, they were not the onlyoccupation of young Florentine aristocrats like Filippo, for he also devotedmany hours to his studies. Filippo's later career as a successful merchant-banker was not based on formal mercantile schooling in book-keeping orwith the abacus. Instead, his early training concentrated on the study ofmanners and letters as befitted a young gentleman of his time. As a boyhe spent many months at Santuccio where he pursued his elementaryeducation in Latin letters under the tutelage of domestic preceptors, muchas his own children did later. Filippo's family noticed his proclivity forstudy, and Selvaggia encouraged his interest in letters. In choosing teachersfor her sons she valued education in manners more than erudition, and bothbrothers later lamented that their early tutors had not been more eminentscholars. When Filippo was old enough, he selected his own teachers, and,at the recommendation of Bernardo Rucellai, he attended the lecturesof Niccolo da Bucine in rhetoric and began the study of mathematics.He studied Latin with Marcello Virgilio and Greek with Fra ZanobiAcciaiuoli.l °

We can establish at least a few of the books he read from severalaccount-book entries of purchases he made between 1508 and 1511, andthey included works of Cicero, Lucretius with commentaries, various Greektranslations, a Greek grammar by Frate Urbino and one by Demetrio, andworks of Poliziano and Leonardo Bruni.11 His interest in Greek and Latinletters and in music continued throughout his life even while he wasoccupied with his business affairs and political intrigues. Like his brotherLorenzo, he composed madrigals and songs, and together they sang invarious celebrations and on feast days in Florence. Once, when Lorenzode'Medici forwarded a new French song to the papal court in Rome, Filipposnatched it from the hands of a secretary so that he could present it to10 C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 46; Niccolini, p. xi. Marcello Virgilio was a disciple of Landino and Poliziano,

and both he and Bucine taught poetics and rhetoric at the Studio Fiorentino. See the exhaustivestudy of the Studio by Armando F. Verde, Lo Studio Fiorentino, 1473-1503 (Florence, 1973), 11,476-477, 502-503.

11 C.S., Ser. v, 90, fols. 4, 12, 17. He also purchased sheets of music paper and a book designated,'problemati diversi' which was perhaps a mathematics book. Other entries are for football expenses,and there is one payment for his lessons from a duelling master, ibid., fols. 3, 9.


Leo X in person. He was always seeking fresh reading material and had hisfriend the Florentine ambassador in France search out new books for himthere. Borrowing books to read or copy was a common practice of the time,and in this way Filippo became familiar with Alberti's Delia pitturaand Dioscorides' De materia medica in translation. In 1516 he recordedpayments for purchases of a De temporibus of Eusebius, a book of proverbsby Erasmus, a new edition of Ptolemy, an unidentified book in French, andone in vulgar Italian, as well as two Latin grammars, and copies of theDonatello for his sons.12 In 1526 while he served six months in prison inthe Castel Nuovo in Naples as a hostage for Clement VII and contemplateda revolution of the government in Florence, he mentioned in his letters thathe was reading Livy and Aristotle for his political and moral instruction.He also had a life-long interest in natural philosophy, natural history andastrology and composed various commentaries and translations of Pliny andDemosthenes. In 1537, once again a political prisoner, this time in Florence,he passed the long hours of solitude by making a translation from Greekinto Tuscan of Polybius' Delli ordini dell a romana militia.13

In many ways then, Filippo Strozzi was the proverbial Renaissance man,a person of artistry, talent, education, and wealth whose reputation andinfluence always went before him. He was the accomplished humanistscholar who translated Polybius in his prison cell and the brilliantlysuccessful, often unscrupulous financier whose purse strings stretchedbeyond Europe into the New World. He served popes and potentates asa loyal, trusted companion and political confidant and was a man whoconducted himself with as much assurance and aplomb trysting with thecourtesan-poetess Tullia of Aragon in her chambers as picking his waythrough the political intrigues which hung thick as fog about the elegantsociety at the papal court.

It is easier to get a feeling for the texture of Filippo Strozzi's life thanto come to an understanding of the man himself. Autobiographicalself-revelation seems foreign to his nature. But although his personality isoften obscured and hidden behind the crush of business and politicalmatters which dominate his correspondence, brief glimpses of his complexcharacter do shine through. The carefree innocence of his early years andyouthful zeal for his studies soon gave way to a bold ambition whichalternated with consuming doubts about his proper course of action,especially at the time of his marriage in 1508. Barely beyond adolescence,

12 M.A.P., 112, fol. 38; C.S., Ser. HI, 108, fol. 4; 121, fol. 108.13 Niccolini, p. cxx. A volume of his miscellaneous translations and notes is in C.S., Ser. v, 1221,

vol. in. Two seventeenth-century copies of his translation of Polybius are in Ser. 11, 50 and 50 bis.At least two other copies exist, one in the Vatican Library and the other in Naples. See P. O.Kristeller, her italicum (London, 1963), 1, 68, 432.

Introduction

the political turmoil that arose from his betrothal to Clarice de'Medicithrust him into a turbulent political arena to do battle with the head of state,Piero Soderini, a role for which his tender years had not adequatelyprepared him. In 1513 when Clarice's uncle was elected Pope Leo X, thepomp and elegance of the papal court captivated his imagination and drewhim to Rome. But once inside the inner sanctum of the court, hisenthusiasm quickly diminished when he discovered that his pursuit ofpower and wealth necessitated his continuous attendance at an endlessround of festivities and banquets.

According to his brother, Filippo was tall, had graceful features, and couldbe immediately identified by his quick lively step, an outward expressionof his inner impatience and need to keep himself constantly occupied. Whenfriends commented on his vigorous pace, he reportedly replied that he knewno greater waste than the waste of time, and therefore he moved from placeto place as speedily as possible. But although Filippo attacked whatever taskhe had on hand with energy and zest, he always made sure that each dayincluded time for all three of his favorite activities, business, study, andpleasure.

While still a young man and confidant of his brother-in-law Lorenzode'Medici in Florence, his letters show him to have been impressionableand liberal with his affections. His intimacy with Giulio de'Medici, laterClement VII, may have surpassed the bounds of simple friendship, andhis night-time escapades earned him considerable notoriety. Armed withladders and keys, he and his companions made themselves the scourge oflocal convents, and he used a little house outside the city walls for hisassignations. Only the fury of his headstrong wife on discovering some ofhis love letters put a stop to these activities, and then only for a time.14

The high-spirited abandon with which he pursued his personal affairspermeated his whole approach to life. Calculated ambition was secondnature to him, whether in his decision to pursue the politically riskymarriage to Clarice de'Medici, or in speculative financial schemes to sellclipped coins and poor grain at inflated prices. But his arrogance wastempered by intelligence, a witty sense of humor and a penchant for earthymetaphor. His loyalty to his family was beyond reproach, and he furtheredStrozzi political fortunes in Florence to the best of his ability. He was alsoextremely devoted to his Medici benefactors, whose interests he promotedunceasingly. If his brother-in-law Lorenzo wanted to annex Piombino ormake himself captain general of Florence, a step which flew in the face ofthe city's constitution, Filippo gave him unquestioning support andcounsel. When Clement VII needed a hostage in 1526, Filippo went14 Reference to these escapades is scattered throughout Filippo's correspondence with his henchman

Francesco del Nero. See also L. A. Ferrai, Lettere di cortigiane del secolo XVI (Florence, 1884).


willingly in his stead, fully cognizant of the dangers to his person and tohis purse. His relationship with the Medici was not, however, totallyone-sided. In return for his loyalty and services he fully expected andreceived his due recompense of special favors, offices and lucrative financialcontracts that formed the foundation of his considerable fortune.

He could be as cunning and clever as Machiavelli's fox, and thesequalities served him well, helping him survive the changes of fortune hehad to endure. He skillfully rode the wave of Medici power and influenceto its crest and found himself swept far beyond the shores of Florence. Yetwhen Clement VII was a helpless prisoner in the Castel S. Angelo followingthe Sack of Rome in 1527, Filippo, ever sensitive to the tides of change,flirted briefly with the newly independent Republic of Florence. Two yearslater when Clement was restored to the Vatican and the Republic seemeddoomed to defeat, Strozzi ingratiated himself anew with his old friend andremained on intimate terms with him until Clement's death.

Filippo Strozzi's relationship with the Medici shaped his entire adult life.The years 1508-1534 which encompassed that relationship and form thetime limits of this study mark out a definite period in his career in whichhe enjoyed Medici patronage in Florence and at the court of the Medicipopes in Rome. The period began with his marriage to Clarice de'Medici,the granddaughter of Lorenzo il Magnifico and niece of Leo X, and endedwith the death of Strozzi's last Medici friend and benefactor, Clement VII.In these twenty-six years Strozzi's career as a trusted adviser and promoterof his brother-in-law Lorenzo de'Medici in Florence and of Leo andClement in Rome unfolded and reached its apex. And during this sameperiod he accumulated his immense fortune as a banker in their service.

This study of Strozzi concentrates on the period in his life most heavilyinfluenced by his connections with the Medici, and does not claim to bean exhaustive biography of this intriguing character of the High Renaissance,but rather an investigation of the milieu in which he so successfullyoperated and of his modus operandi itself. Strozzi's rise to fame and fortuneis incomprehensible without an appreciation of the personal and financialpatronage which dominated sixteenth-century social and economic life.And in the same way, the finances of the Medici governments of Florenceand papal Rome are never so clearly understood as when seen through theeyes of Filippo Strozzi, their prime manipulator. The fortuitous corrobo-ration of church records in the Vatican by public and private papers inFlorence gives us a unique opportunity to delve into the inner workingsand interrelationships between Florentine public finances and those of thepope's Apostolic Chamber in the early sixteenth century.

Filippo Strozzi's Florence

Although the Medici regime established in Florence after 1512 was heirto the earlier governments of Cosimo il Vecchio and Lorenzo il Magnificoof the fifteenth century, important differences between them show that thecity, once so fiercely proud of her republican traditions, had moveddecidedly towards a principate. The evidence that Medici patronagedetermined a person's political and economic position within the stateindicates that they had consolidated their power in the city and had securedthe acquiescence of the Florentine aristocracy in their hegemony. In thesixteenth century, as the Medici extended their control over the government,they distributed political offices and influence to their friends and supportersand denied them to their opponents. This growing dependency of theFlorentine aristocracy on the Medici had an economic side which servedto win them devoted adherents such as Filippo Strozzi.

A comparison of Strozzi's situation in the sixteenth century with thatof his father in the fifteenth shows the relationship that obtained betweenhis banking success and the favor he received. Back in the 1430s the Strozzifamily had been ostracized as adversaries of the Medici. Strozzi's father,Filippo di Matteo, was exiled as a child from Florence following the exileof his own father and other members of the Albizzi faction who had opposedthe return of Cosimo de'Medici to the city. He lived in Naples where,unmolested by his political enemies, he was able to make his fortune as abanker at the Neapolitan court. Eventually in 1466 Lorenzo il Magnificowelcomed him back to his native city. Filippo the Younger, like his father,found success in banking and was even reputed to be the richest man inChristendom after Jacob Fugger.* But within the changed context of thesixteenth century it is inconceivable that he could have accumulated hisgreat wealth without Medici support. For unlike his father, Filippoimplanted himself deeply within their party at an early age. Through Medicifavor and protection he was appointed depositor general of the papal monies

1 This was Rabelais' observation: Francois Rabelais, Les Lettres escrites pendant son voyage tfltalie(Brussels, 1710), p. 6. Bernardo Segni, a contemporary Florentine historian, gave further testimonyto Strozzi's reputed wealth in his Storie fiorentine (Milan, 1805), 11, 7, 213, in which he comparedStrozzi to Crassus.


in Rome and depositor in Florence, and through them he establishedpersonal and financial contacts with other ruling houses of Europe. Likehis father in the previous century, Strozzi also suffered exile when he fellfrom favor with the dukes of Florence, but unlike his father who hadfounded his fortune in that undesirable circumstance, Filippo nearly losthis.

During the last decades of the transition of Florence from a republic toa dukedom, the patriciate was the group of families most intimately affectedby the changes in government which took place in those years.Contemporaries designated the Florentine aristocrats by such terms asprimi, grandi, ottimati, uomini da bene, uomini principally or nobili (first amongcitizens, the great, the best, the good men, principal citizens or nobles)which emphasized their elevated position in society.2 They possessedwealth, education, experience and the strength of family tradition, embodiedin names like Acciaiuoli, Bardi, Pazzi, Pucci, Rucellai, Salviati, Soderini,and Strozzi. Upper-class Florentines held public office, conducted diplo-matic missions, loaned money to the state, and controlled a large share ofthe wealth of the city and its commerce. Since Florence was a city-state,her ruling elite was not a feudal aristocracy because, in contrast totraditional feudal societies, membership in the patriciate was not strictlydetermined by noble birth. In Florence, already in the thirteenth century,members of the great magnate families who were held suspect by thecommunal government had been deprived of their political rights, and itlater became a form of political persecution to have undesirable familiesdeclared magnates and then disenfranchised. Another distinctive feature inthe formation of the Florentine aristocracy was that entry into the rulinggroup might be made through political avenues. Some of the families suchas the Del Nero and Serristori who had been gente nuova, or new men, inthe fifteenth century, were by the sixteenth recognized among the pritni.They were then raised up to eligibility for the major political offices andfavored by the Medici as a reward for their loyalty to the regime.3 TheFlorentine patriciate was also a mercantile aristocracy, for most of themoney in these families derived from investments in manufacturing,commerce and banking. Despite a slow-down in the Florentine economyin the late fifteenth century, they were far from being an idle class of rentiers,and many still maintained active business interests.

2 We find these terms in the contemporary works of Guicciardini, Cerretani, Parenti, Nerli, Pitti,Machiavelli, Nardi, Segni, and Varchi, to name the most important authors. Felix Gilbert,Machiavelli and Guicciardini (Princeton, 1965), pp. 23-28, 49, provides a short discussion of suchsocial terminology based mainly on the writings of Guicciardini.

3 Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence Under the Medici (Oxford, 1966), pp. 44, 62-63,214-216, 244.

10

Filippo StrozzVs Florence

The Strozzi were one of the ottimati families which rose to financialand political prominence out of what had originally been old popolano stockwhich dated back into the thirteenth century. Several Strozzi householdsin the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries became rich throughcommerce and banking and achieved political eminence.4 Although theStrozzi were out of political favor and thus out of office under the Mediciin the fifteenth century following their alignment with the Albizzi faction,they were still recognized as one of the more prominent Florentine familieson account of their wealth, size and aristocratic manner, on a par with oldmagnate families such as the Bardi. The Medici, too, were from the ranksof the ottimati. Although in the course of the fifteenth century Cosimo andhis descendants had asserted themselves as the leading family of Florence,they did so with the cooperation and support of other ottimati families likethe Tornabuoni, Guicciardini and Pandolfini who joined with them formutual profit and security. This theme of cooperation between certainaristocrats and the Medici was basic to the functioning of the Medici systemof government from the fifteenth century. But as that family increased itshegemony in Florence in the sixteenth century, the relationship turnedmore into one of dependency, wherein the ottimati were eventually reducedto an essentially bureaucratic nobility,5 and, as an embittered contemporaryphrased it, young Florentines of good family were being taught to becomecourtiers rather than citizens.6

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Much less attention has been devoted to the economic condition of theFlorentine upper classes than to the city's institutional and cultural life.And without more extensive data for large numbers of individual families,it is especially difficult to come to satisfying conclusions about the generaleconomic growth or decline of the ottimati in this period.7 Patrician wealthextended over such a wide spectrum that on the one hand we find that aFilippo Strozzi made a staggering fortune which reached into hundreds of

4 On the origins of the Strozzi family see P. J. Jones, 'Florentine Families and Florentine Diariesin the Fourteenth Century,' Papers of the British School at Rome, xxiv (New Series, xi) (1956),186-196. Jones discounted claims made by the family to feudal origins. See also Lorenzo Strozzi,Le vite, and Pompeo Litta (ed.), Lefamiglie celebri italiane (Milan, 1819-1902), fasc. XLIV, dispensa68.

5 Rudolf von Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al principato: Storia e coscienza politica, trans. CesareCristofolini (Turin, 1970), p. 183.

6 Lodovico Alamanni, Discorso, published in Albertini, Appendix 4, pp. 35, 383.7 The recent studies by Richard Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968)

and Francis William Kent, Household and Lineage in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1977), thoughhelpful, do not provide a sufficient basis from which to draw general conclusions.

I I


thousands of florins, while on the other a man like Bernardo Rucellai froma very respectable ottitnati family was having to borrow on his real estate.8

Even in the instance of particular families, it is impossible to generalizeabout the economic status of a whole lineage from individual cases becausesome households within the wider family fared better than others. WhereasBernardo Rucellai had to borrow money, distant Rucellai cousins in Romewere doing quite well in the banking business. The Strozzi, too, are a casein point. Already by 1321 they constituted one of the largest lineages inFlorence, with twenty-eight households.9 By the sixteenth century theirfortunes varied considerably. Filippo was what would now be termed amultimillionaire, but some of his poorer relatives whom he employed asclerks in his banks earned only a living wage. Even within Filippo's ownimmediate family there were significant differences. His half-brotherAlfonso, who had inherited the major portion of their father's estate andwho was himself a banker, lost money in the course of his career. He couldnot keep up payments for his half of the Strozzi palace and at his deathleft only a small estate to his daughters. Filippo's brother Lorenzoparticipated for a while in Filippo's banking companies, but from 1522 hechose to withdraw his capital from the business and reinvest in land.10

Those fortunes that Florentines built in the early sixteenth century camewith few exceptions from banking and were made outside Florence, oftenas the result of some connection with papal finances. Filippo's careerprovides an example of this, for although he inherited a handsome sum,his fortune only began to grow spectacularly after 1515 when he enteredLeo X's service as depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber. From thatbeginning he built a financial empire stretching from Naples to the Atlantic.Though none were as wealthy as Strozzi, other Florentine bankers suchas Jacopo Salviati, Bindo Altoviti, and Luigi Gaddi enjoyed similar success.Their wealth came primarily from investments in foreign money marketssuch as Naples, Rome and Lyons. Extensive Florentine investment inbanking and commerce abroad had been for several centuries a mainstayof the city's economy, but we should not allow the happy circumstancesof a small financial elite to color our perceptions of the general economicpicture of all the ottitnati. The sixteenth century brought a polarization ofwealth to the ottimati of Florence. Thanks to Medici favor and to their

8 C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fol. 229. Bernardo's father Giovanni had been one of the richest bankers infifteenth-century Florence, but he had withdrawn from business before 1470 because of losses. SeeRaymond de Roover, The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 (New York, 1966), pp.374, 484-

9 Jones, p. 186.10 C.S., Ser. in, 108, fols. 83, 132. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, pp. 75"76> 104-105. Lorenzo

gradually decreased his business investments over a ten-year period. After the death of their motherSelvaggia in 1525, the two brothers made a final division of the property they held in common,CS., Ser. HI, no, fol. 221.

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own engagement in large-scale business, especially banking, the richestfamilies like the Strozzi and Salviati were getting richer. The others eitherlived off what they had without bettering their status or indeed actuallyfound themselves becoming poorer.l1

The traditional pillars of the Florentine economy were textiles, com-merce, and banking, all of which experienced considerable upheaval in theearly sixteenth century.* 2 Evidence of trouble is particularly clear in thetextile sector. The wool industry, foundation of so much Florentine wealthin earlier centuries, never regained its lost vigor. Despite a brief flutter ofactivity after 1550, it almost totally collapsed in the seventeenth century.13

Although the development of the silk- and luxury-cloth industry inFlorence had in some measure compensated for the depressed woolindustry, the recovery had been only partial, and already by the latterfifteenth century silk manufactures suffered hard times, as seen in thecollapse of five companies in November 1464 alone.14 By 1513, accordingto Florentine government documents, the silk industry and its guild, PorSanta Maria, were in such disarray that the guild consuls petitioned thegovernment to set up a commission of six to oversee the guild for five yearsfor the following reason:1 ! Various authors have suggested that there was a general weakening of the Italian nobility in the

sixteenth century. On Venice see James Davis, The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class(Baltimore, 1962), pp. 34-53; on Rome, Jean Delumeau, Vie economique et sociale de Rome dansla seconde mottte du XVF siecle (Paris, 1957), 1, 457-485; in general, Gino Barbieri, Ideali economicidegli Italiani alPinizio delPeta moderna (Milan, 1940), pp. 263-268. The situation in Florence isslightly different from most of Italy because her aristocracy maintained its mercantile traditionsand continued to invest in business well into the sixteenth century. My interpretation which suggeststhat there was a polarization of wealth among the Florentine nobles accounts for the effects of theeconomic decline on the majority of the aristocrats while it recognizes the very special situationof a few ottimati, mainly bankers, who were able to become rich by providing credit to powerfulpatrons. Anthony Molho has demonstrated in his article on 'The Florentine "Tassa dei Traffichi"of 1451,' Studies in the Renaissance, xvn (1970), 89-92 that even in the fifteenth century thewealthiest Florentine aristocrats were the merchant-bankers.

12 Although they disagree about its causes and duration, most historians have viewed this upheavalin the context of a long-term decline in the Florentine and Italian economies in the sixteenth century.See for example, Gino Luzzatto, Storia economica delPeta moderna e contemporanea (Padua, 1955),pp. 56-70; Barbieri, pp. 296-297; J. M. Kulischer, Storia economica del Medio Evo e delPepocamoderna, trans. E. Bohm (Florence, 1955), 11, 295-296, 347-354; Fernand Braudel, The Mediter-ranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds (New York, 1972),i> 3 i 2 - 3 5 2 ; 11, 826-835.

13 See the results of Carlo Cipolla's research on the wool industry in his Storia delVeconomia italiana(Turin, 1959), pp. 17,605-623 where he also makes more general conclusions about the failing healthof the Italian economy.

14 Florence Edler de Roover, 'Andrea Banchi, Florentine Silk Manufacturer and Merchant in theFifteenth Century/ Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 11 (1966), 285. See also Raymondde Roover, pp. 358—360. The Florentine silk industry has been the subject of historical debate similarto that surrounding the health of the whole economy, some historians arguing that it fullycompensated for the depressed wool industry in the fifteenth century, others that the recovery wasonly partial. See Luzzatto, p. 61; Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, p. 218; Alfred Doren, Storiaeconomica delPItalia nel Medio Evo, trans. Gino Luzzatto (Padua, 1936), p. 609.

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Since in the silk business and its guild and among its members there have been,and continue to be, serious troubles, unless precautions are taken, they will surelyincrease and multiply to the point where this guild and industry, one of theprincipal sustenances of the citizens and of the poor, will totally collapse and bringdishonor to the city and great public and private damage.15

Over the next two decades the situation of the textile industry only grewworse. The Venetian ambassador, Antonio Suriano, who served in Florencefrom 1528-1529, said in his report to the Venetian Senate of August 1533that Florence at one time had produced yearly over four thousand finewoolen cloths, panni di San Martino, and between eighteen and twentythousand cloths of Spanish wool, panni garbi, but now produced very fewof either and that the silk and gold cloth production had declined as well,partly because of the wars which interrupted transit routes to Lyons andFlanders.16 It would seem, then, that for those ottimati interested in textilesthe opportunities for investments were shrinking and that they lay exposedto substantial risks in the first part of the sixteenth century when the Italianpeninsula was wracked by war and invading armies.

Although depressed, the textile industry continued to contribute to theFlorentine economy. But by the sixteenth century the city's financial andbanking interests, which had originally developed alongside the woolindustry and catered to its needs, represented a larger capital investmentand produced higher percentage profits than textiles.17 Banking was by farthe most active sector of the economy in our period, and because the financeindustry retained its vitality it breathed new life into the city and delayedher economic decline until the second half of the sixteenth century.18 Anincrease in the intensity of international trade in the early part of the century

15 Balie, 43, fols. 102V-103. Guicciardini expressed a similar opinion in his Dialogo del reggimento diFirenze, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1932), pp. 107, 264-265.

16 Arnaldo Segarizzi, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato (Bari, 1916), 111, 112-113. Panni diSan Martino, made of English wool, were of the highest quality and sold in the 1520s for 60 ducatsapiece. Panni garbi, made of Spanish wool, sold at 22 ducats apiece. Foscari in his report of 1528gives a lower estimate of 14,000 for the production of panni garbi, ibid., p. 26.

17 The easiest and most common way to make a profit was not in industry but in high-risk, high-yieldcredit operations, Luzzatto, pp. 46, 75. Large banking companies such as the Strozzi banks at Romeand Lyons might be capitalized at 20,000-25,000 florins, whereas wool shops were organized ona much smaller scale with a capital investment of 2,000-6,000 florins. See Goldthwaite, PrivateWealth, tables 11 and 12, pp. 92, 95; and pp. 87, 88, 126-127, !72> r73> 2oo, 215, 228 and thebibliography on p. 47, note 33. Later in the sixteenth century the capital of textile companiesincreased. In 1561 the Capponi silk company had over 23,000 florins in capital, and in 1554 theirwool company had an invested capital of 8,000 florins, ibid., pp. 225-227.

18 Because of its vital role in the Florentine economy, the finance industry has been the most disputedelement in arguments over Florence's economic decline. Doren and then Robert Lopez found thebeginning of the end of Florentine banking already in the second half of the fourteenth century,Doren, pp. 609 ff.; Robert Lopez and H. A. Miskimin, * The Economic Depression of theRenaissance,' Economic History Review, Ser. 2, vol. 14, no. 2 (1961), 408-426. Raymond de Roover,however, saw only a long period of depression in the fifteenth century, pp. 358-375.

14

Filippo Strozzi''s Florence

stimulated enterprise and afforded financiers expanded opportunities toaccumulate fortunes rapidly. Gino Luzzatto held this flowering of thebanking industry to be a European-wide phenomenon so that for him theFugger of Augsburg and the Chigi of Siena were representatives of a newage, the age of the great merchants, whose heightened spirit of enterpriseand combined industrial, commercial, and especially banking interestsmade them capitalist giants.* 9

Merchant-bankers such as the Fugger and Chigi or Filippo Strozzi fromFlorence were the great financiers of their times, men who wieldedunprecedented economic power and controlled vast quantities of capital.But it would be exaggerating the case to say that the Fugger were notexceptional, and that tens of other families both in Germany and Italy hadalmost equally extensive business interests. The very scale and nature oftheir businesses differed enormously from the activities of most Europeanmerchants and bankers at this time. Jacob Fugger was banker to Charles V,and the Chigi and the Strozzi made their money at the papal court. Theirlarge-scale credit services to princes were high-risk ventures offering theprospect of spectacular yields. These bankers might be better described ascreatures of the great rulers whose ordinary financial resources providedfor only a portion of their expenses making it necessary for them to seekloans and additional credit from their bankers. They were the uniqueproducts of the political and economic structure of the early modern period,creations of princely patrons whose credit needs they filled on a grand scale.

When applied to Florence, the argument for the sixteenth century's beingthe age of the great merchants lends support to the idea that during thisperiod a polarization of wealth took place in the city, if first we accept thecaveat that there were not as many merchant-bankers on the scale of theFugger as Luzzato would have us believe. For in the first third of thesixteenth century Florence saw a late flowering of rich financiers such asthe Strozzi, Salviati, Gaddi, Altoviti, Antinori, and a few others who, asproducts of a system of patronage and privilege available only to a few, wereable to increase their wealth to a level far beyond their previous worth orthe worth of other Florentine patricians. Suriano, the Venetian ambassador,in attempting to give some idea of the status of the richest Florentinefamilies, named seven of the estimated eight or ten families whose worthexceeded 100,000 florins.20 All seven were financiers who operated on aninternational scale and were heavily involved in credit operations with headsof state. Tommaso Guadagni and Roberto Albizzi had extensive operations

19 Luzzatto, pp. 44 ff. Ehrenberg's much earlier work, Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance,trans. H. M. Lucas (London, 1928), is based on a similar premise that the end of the fifteenth andearly sixteenth centuries was best characterized as an age of great merchant capitalists.

20 Segarizzi, in, 114.

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in Lyons and were creditors of Francis I. The Antinori, Bartolini, Salviati,Soderini and Strozzi were papal bankers in Rome.21 Suriano also mentionedthat approximately eighty families had a worth of at least 50,000 florins.Although he did not name them specifically, they would undoubtedly haveincluded those Florentine ottimati who were involved in business andfinance outside of Florence in Rome and Lyons, the two centers of foreigninvestment for Florentines in this period. But since Florentine commercialactivity was more intense abroad than at home, it would be mistaken togeneralize from the example of a few successful and wealthy internationalmerchant-bankers that in Florence the ottimati were generally prosperingand that the city itself had a healthy economy. We have already seen thatthe textile industry was in trouble and that the huge fortunes in the financeindustry were those of an upper crust of wealthy bankers who wereproviding credit to princes and popes.

But the economic disruption in Florence was only made worse by theseries of devastating wars which took place in Italy from 1494 to 1530. Morethan any other single factor, the Italian wars hastened the erosion of allbut the largest Florentine fortunes. Ever since Charles VIII of France hadinvaded with his army in 1494. Italy had become the arena for the almostcontinual conflicts between France and the Empire. Attacks of plague andbands of marauding troops in the countryside interrupted the cultivation ofcrops and forced cities to import grain from outside their territories or fromabroad at inflated prices.22 Florence was only one of many cities thatattempted to control prices and the distribution of grain in this period toprevent runaway inflation, especially in the 1520s when the blows of theItalian wars struck her harshly. High food prices touched everyone, butthese wars and the siege of Florence in 1529-1530 cut deeply into the profitsof aristocrats who owned much of the income-producing farm land aroundthe city - land which now lay uncultivated.23 Guicciardini's letters attestto the sad state of affairs in the countryside for landowners and peasants21 Marc Bresard, Les Foires de Lyon aux XV* et XV* sticks (Paris, 1914), pp. 281-283; Marcel Vigne,

La Banque a Lyon du XV6 au XVIIIe siecle (Lyons, 1903), p. 177; Coriolano Belloni, Dizionariostorico dei banchieri it a Ham (Florence, 1951), pp. 194, 211-213. The Bartolini, Salviati, and Strozzialso had banks in Lyons. Suriano's figures have been cited numerous times, but no one has everbefore made the obvious connection between the wealthiest families and the source of their moneyin international banking and in loans to princes. See Luzzatto, p. 67 and Barbieri, p. 297.

2 2 The only study of Florentine prices for this period, beginning in 1520, shows a particularly steepjump in the price curve during the time of the Italian wars, Giuseppe Parenti, 'Prezzi e salari aFirenze dal 1520 al 1620,' I prezzi in Europa dal XIII secolo a oggi, ed. R. Romano (Turin, 1967),pp. 215-216.

2 3 Segarizzi, in, 119. Wealthy Florentines who owned large estates and farms in the countrysidecultivated the land not just to produce food for their families, but also to sell the surplus. In 1526,Filippo Strozzi and his brother Lorenzo held jointly forty-four separate income-producingproperties valued at over 32,000 florins, including 22 farms (poderi), various fields (terre), mills(mulini), forests (boschetti), foundries (fornact\ vineyards (vigne) and meadows (prati). In that oneyear these possessions produced a net profit of over 1,200 florins, which represented better thana 3 percent return on their investment, C.S., Ser. v, 1221, vol. 1, fols. 1-7.

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alike after the siege: 'The citizens and their means of livelihoods areexhausted; for miles around Florence and in many places in the dominionhouses are in ruin; the number of peasants has greatly diminished andhardly a poor soul remains; there will be scarcely enough grain to live onthis year and little hope for the next.'24

For those ottimati who had business investments, the most hurtful effectof the Italian wars was the disruption of the normal trade routes to the Northwhich were the vital link between Florence and her markets in France andFlanders. At one point during the Last Republic when the route throughGenoa, an ally of the Empire, was closed to Florentines, merchants wereforced at great hardship to seek entirely new routes, and they either shippedtheir goods by sea skirting Genoa on the west, or else they shipped to theeast from Ancona to Trieste and then overland to the North. Because somuch of the wealth of Florentines engaged in commerce and banking layoutside the city itself, the political and military situation in Italy duringthe first decades of the sixteenth century also exposed them to the threatof economic reprisals for political reasons. In the summer of 1521 theFrench king ordered the arrests of the leading Florentine merchants inLyons and Milan, had their possessions inventoried, and threatened to seizethem. This action in turn made it very difficult for those ottimati in Florencewho were obligated to loan money to the state for the war effort becausethey depended heavily on the Lyons money market. In 1529 the Swissrequested Francis I to confiscate the possessions of Florentine merchantsin Lyons as compensation for the 18,000 ducats owed them by the popeand guaranteed by Jacopo Salviati who had reneged on his commitment.Later that year members of the Florentine Nation residing in London facedseizure of their goods because the government of Florence had not paidits yearly tribute of £450 to King Henry VIII.25

Increased taxation constituted by far the biggest burden of war. From1512 to 1527 when Florence was under Medici domination and a party toall papal military alliances, the city spent outright almost 4,000,000 ducatsfor the Medici cause. Duke Lorenzo de'Medici and his uncle Giuliano whohad been unofficial heads of state from 1513 to 1519 cost the city 60,000ducats a year alone.26 In Rome the papal treasury was empty, and theMedici popes depended heavily on subsidies from Florence to support theirjoint armies in the field.27 By January of 1527, things had come to such

24 Cited in Agostino Rossi, 'Studi Guicciardini,' A.S.I., Ser. v, vol. 5 (1890), 23.25 Sig., Died , Otto, Mis. Orig., 10, fol. 11; Sig., Cart. Resp. Orig., 42, fols. 169, 182V, 206, 220

236.26 Segarizzi, in, 112.27 Florentines were well aware of this burdensome financial obligation. In July 1521, Jacopo

Guicciardini wrote,' I do not know where the money which is absolutely essential is going to comefrom. The pope has no more, and here the city will likewise be entirely emptied,' Sig., Dieci, Otto,Mis. Orig., 10, fol. 11.

17


a pass that no money was left in Florence to hire additional soldiers, buygrain, or mend the fortifications of the city threatened by the Imperial armyof the Connetable de Bourbon which was thought to be heading in herdirection. The Balla, the special plenipotentiary council of state, discussednew extraordinary measures to raise money because the city was financiallyexhausted, future incomes already obligated, and the purses of the citizensseverely strained. Collecting assessed taxes had always been a problem inFlorence, and the city records contain elaborate discount schemes andpenalty schedules devised to induce delinquent citizens to pay up.However, already in 1524 Balla officials had voiced an additional complaint,that many citizens were simply too poor to meet their tax obligations fromthe previous year.28 By 1529, even members of respected ottitnati familieswent into debt in order to pay their taxes. Roberto Acciaiuoli, formerambassador to France, was imprisoned for failure to pay. FrancescoGuicciardini borrowed money to meet his obligation, and Francesco Vettoriwho lacked the money to pay his tax bill was forced to sell householdpossessions and even his clothes.29 Although in previous years specialinterest-bearing forced loans had been considered a good investment, thedemands of the state for money in both taxes and loans from 1512-1530were so pressing that the majority of the ottimati found their wealthinexorably drained. A few very rich and favored men had the liquid capitalto profiteer from the state by making these high-interest war loans, but mostof the ottimati and the rest of the citizens had to struggle just to meet theirtax assessments. They found themselves getting poorer as they firstconsumed their surplus capital, then withdrew money they had investedin business, and finally were forced to sell their possessions.

The cumulative effect of years of heavy taxation and the disruption ofbusiness and agriculture brought by the constant wars in Italy forced mostFlorentines other than the super-rich to their knees. Writing in 1530 toBartolomeo Lanfredini in Rome, Francesco Guicciardini described theirills as follows:

The city is very exhausted. Those men who used to be wealthy are now all afflicted.Shops are closed and if you should pass through San Martino, you would befrightened to see that of 64 shops that used to be open before the war, only 12remain, and even they are severely weakened. The same is true in all the otherbusinesses where men used to turn a profit.30

2 8 The records of the Balla are full of tales of taxpayers' woes, for example, Balie, 43, fols. 11, 14V,i5> 72, 146, i55v, 184, 192V, 193V.

2 9 Cecil Roth, The Last Florentine Republic (New York, 1925), pp. 65,79; Rosemary Devonshire Jones,Francesco Vettori, Florentine Citizen and Medici Servant (London, 1972), pp. 203-204; Albertini,P- 438.

3 0 Cited in Rossi, p. 29.

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Guicciardini considered the ruin of the members of the monied class thedraining of Florence's lifeblood and thought it essential to preserve theirfinancial potential by not overtaxing them. His solution to the problem washeavily tinged with class interest. By protecting the ottimati and encouragingtheir investments in business and trade, the government would, as in thepast, be able to call upon them for future loans. But by overtaxing them,they would have nothing to lend later on.

Unfortunately Florence never recovered from the financial consequencesof the early sixteenth-century wars. Even Filippo Strozzi who had profitedimmensely from his association with the Medici found that his fortune haddeclined and that his investments abroad were less secure than they hadbeen before 1530. Men who, like Francesco Guicciardini and FrancescoVettori, had no surplus to fall back on cemented themselves more firmlythan before to the new Medici regime and became totally dependent onClement VII for money and favors in return for their political allegiance.

The increased concentration of power in Florence during the fifteenthand early sixteenth centuries gave the Medici greater opportunity to helptheir friends and eliminate their rivals. As far back as 1434, Palla Strozzi,who had been the wealthiest and one of the most respected citizens inFlorence, died a pauper in exile because of his opposition to Cosimo.Leaders of later attempts to supplant the Medici, like the Soderini, alsosuffered economic and political reprisals. After the Medici returned toFlorence in 1512, Piero Soderini's possessions were confiscated and sold.To ensure that no one missed the significance of the moment, the proceedsfrom the sale went to purchase silverware for the table of the MediceanSignoria.31 If in the aftermath there was no example quite so dramatic asthe fall of Palla Strozzi, the explanation can be found in the unwillingnessof ottimati families who were potential rivals of the Medici to challenge theregime. Simply put, the alternatives available to a failed opponent haddecidedly diminished. Whereas, for example, in the latter fifteenth century,Francesco Pazzi, who hated the Medici and later fomented the PazziConspiracy against them, could choose to live in voluntary exile in Romeand prosper as a banker under the protection of his ally Pope Sixtus IV,after the election of Leo X in 1513, Rome with its important market forFlorentine capital was controlled by the Medici and ceased to offer a safehaven. Furthermore, in the sixteenth century the vast majority of ottimatimerchant-bankers who were able to prosper in those difficult times, andparticularly those few who amassed sizable fortunes, did so in Mediciservice. It became increasingly in their own interests to support theirpatron.

31 Balie, 43, fol. 49.


Public finance was a prime area affected by favoritism from the Medici.Guicciardini and his friends considered the control of the city's fiscal policythe natural right of their class, and indeed long before Cosimo de'Medicilaid the foundations for his family's hegemony in the city, wealthypatricians had been investing heavily in loans to the state and profiting fromthem, especially in times of war. Even during the republican interludes of1494-1512 and 1527-1530, the well-to-do ottimati were the major creditorsof the state since they were the ones with capital to lend.32 With theconsolidation of Medici control in Florence this trend was only reinforced,and public finances came to be almost completely dominated by aristocraticfriends of the regime. The Council of Seventy, a creation of il Magnifico,had the power to appoint the officials who looked after the public debt, theMonte. Between 1482 and 1494, men from only twenty-six families allfriendly to the regime were appointed to these offices.33 This sameexclusiveness persisted as part of government policy after 1512 when Mediciallies served repeated terms as Monte officials. Filippo Strozzi served fourtimes, in 1516, 1518, 1519 and 1532. And in 1526, 1531 and 1532, he madeloans to the city under the names of other Monte officers.34

Buying stock in the public debt was not considered a bad investment.In 1518 when the price of bills of exchange to Lyons was slightly depressedbecause of an oversupply of money in Florence, Filippo Strozzi thoughtit prudent to put his capital in the Monte.*5 But by far the biggest profitfor wealthy investors came from special short-term loans. When the normaltax revenues of the city were insufficient to cover its ordinary financialexpenditures, which happened continually in our period, the governmentsought money directly from its citizens, either in the form of loans fromthe officials of the Monte, or from extraordinary taxes imposed on a smallnumber of citizens. These taxes, called accatti, were in fact high-interest,short-term loans paying 12 percent or better. They were secured throughthe future ordinary tax revenues of the city and were considered safe as32 Marvin Becker, 'Problemi della finanza pubblica fiorentina della seconda meta del Trecento e dei

primi del Quattrocento,' A.S.I., vol. 123 (1965), 437-453; Gene A. Brucker, ' U n documentofiorentino sulla guerra sulla finanza e sulPamministrazione pubblica,' A.S.I., vol. 115 (1957), 168;Anthony Molho, Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance, 1400-1433 (Cambridge, Mass.,W 1 ) * PP- 153-190; L. F. Marks, 'The Financial Oligarchy in Florence under Lorenzo,' ItalianRenaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacob (London, i960), pp. 123-147; also his 'La crisi finanziaria aFirenze dal 1494 al 1502,' A.S.I., vol. 112 (1954), 40-72; Antonio Anzilotti, La crisi constituzionaledella Repubblica Fiorentina (Rome, 1969), pp. 18-19.

33 Rubinstein, The Government of Florence, pp. 199-203; Marks, 'The Financial Oligarchy,' pp.123-127, 140-141.

34 The lists of Monte officials for our period are in Tratte, 84 and in the surviving books of the Entratee Uscite del Provveditore del Monte, Monte Comune, 2292, 2293, 2287, 2099, 2132, and 2036. Iam very grateful to Professor Molho who allowed me to use his personal inventory of the Montearchive which made it possible to consult these documents. In 1527 Strozzi provided money forGiovanbaptista di Marcho Bracci, and in 1531, he loaned under the names of Palla Rucellai, Filippodi Niccolo Valori and Lapo della Tovaglia, Monte Comune, 2132, fol. 181 sin.; 2036, fols. 182-184.

35 C.S., Ser. in, n o , fol. 89V.

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well as lucrative because they received high priority in repayment andbecause the creditors themselves were usually given control of the collectionof the revenues from the sources assigned them.36 Such financial tacticshelped the rich get richer and benefited friends of the regime, but the citypaid a stiff price in return. The size of the public debt increased, and theregular interest payments to small investors in the Monte had to be deferredin favor of payment to the high-priority creditors. In addition, the normaltax revenues of the government were committed for years in the future topay off these loans.

The papal court at Rome provided an even more fruitful field ofeconomic patronage for Florentine ottimati than did investments in thecity's public debt. From the time of the Avignonese period Florentineshad traditionally provided financial services to popes. But never had theyhad their own pope. Thus in 1513, to judge from the excitement andexpectations of profit voiced by her citizens, the election of Giovannide'Medici as Leo X was seen as one of the most propitious events inFlorence's whole history. The Medici popes, like so many of theirpredecessors, grouped their countrymen around them at court and patro-nized their friends. Papal nephews became cardinals with handsomeprovisions, and Francesco Guicciardini and others made their entire careersin papal administration. Others could count on a yearly pension. Florentinebankers and businessmen in Rome came in for a sizable share of papalbusiness under both Leo X and Clement VII. Given the state of the Italianand Florentine economies during this period, the election of the firstFlorentine pope had particular significance for Florence. Coming as it didat the beginning of the sixteenth century when Florentine industry andfinance were struggling to recover from the long depression at the end ofthe previous century, the election created a wider market for textiles, mainlyluxury cloths, and provided a stimulus to Florentine banking. Accordingto the Venetian ambassador, in the 1520s Florentine banks in Romegenerated 8,000 ducats per week in profits.37

Although some doubt remains about the actual number of Florentine3 6 In November 1512, the government needed money to pay 40,000 florins to Maximil ian I for

Florence 's contr ibut ion to the league with the Empi re . 25,000 florins were to be paid immediately,so the Balia imposed an accatto of that amoun t which paid 14 percent interest to its cont r ibutors .Since the income from the salt office was already pledged to pay back other forced loans, there imbursement of the cont r ibutors to this accatto was not to begin unti l the following Sep tember .T h e y were empowered to select their own adminis t ra tor of the salt tax, and should the salt incomesprove insufficient, the adminis t ra tor of cus toms tolls would pay them the difference, Balie, 43 , fols.57V-58. N o t all accatti were interest-bearing. Accatti a perdere or balzelli, used frequently in theLast Republ ic , were direct taxes for which cont r ibu tors were not re imbursed and from whichthey received no interest. Balzelli were unpopula r with the uppe r classes who naturally enoughpreferred to loan to the state at interest. T h e Venet ian ambassadors Foscari and Sur iano discussedthe city's budget and sources of income in this period, Segarizzi, i n , 29 -34 , 106-112.

37 Ibid., p . 112. Similarly, Sur iano reported that F lorent ine business in Naples produced 3,000 ducatsweekly in profits.

2 1


banks in Rome and whether it increased significantly after Leo's election,38

evidence abounds of their participation in papal finances, making loans andadministering various papal incomes and tax revenues in Rome and in theChurch States. For chosen Florentines, such as Filippo Strozzi, who hadthe money to invest with the Apostolic Chamber, opportunities for profit inRome far surpassed any money-making possibilities at home. The papalcourt provided a solution to the major problem that beset the Renaissancebanker: how to reinvest large quantities of movable capital in an economywhere profits tended to stabilize at modest levels. In addition to the returnon loans to the pope and the income from administrative offices or fromindividual contracts for provisions, the income from specially createdcolleges of venal offices and the papal Monte della Fede attracted investmentmoney. The papal bankers provided indispensable credit operations for theMedici popes, who were constantly in need of extra money to finance theirdynastic ambitions, wars, and elaborate building projects. The symbioticrelationship that existed between those Renaissance popes and theircreditors produced a special breed of banker.

Just as in their other appointments, the Medici chose their bankers fromamong their relatives and political allies, and in papal finance, just as inFlorentine public finances, they advanced their friends. Since the creditoperations in which these bankers engaged required heavy outlays ofmoney, only wealthy ottimati merchant-bankers could really profit fromtheir association with the Medici popes. It is not surprising then to discoverthat the biggest Florentine financiers in Rome came from distinguishedpatrician families like the Altoviti, Bardi, Bini, Gaddi, Pitti, Pucci, Rucellai,Salviati, Strozzi, and Tornabuoni. On the other side of the coin, we canalso expect to find these same families among the most loyal supporters ofthe Medici. Looked at from the standpoint of Florence, the economicopportunities provided by papal patronage tended to promote the polari-zation of wealth in the city, because patronage primarily benefited thosearistocrats, mainly bankers, who were already wealthy and who had foundfavor with the Medici. From the standpoint of the Medici, the election ofLeo X helped ensure the ottimatfs support for the regime in Florence. Untilthe financial connection between Florence and Rome was severelythreatened, no leading aristocrat attempted to challenge Medici rule.

While the presence of the Medici popes in Rome in the early sixteenthcentury had two beneficial effects for Florence, namely, to reinforce thefinancial connections between the two cities and to prolong the life of hercredit industry, it entailed certain dangers as well. Under Leo X Florentinebankers over-committed their assets in loans to support papal military38 Melissa M. Bullard, * Mercatores Florentini Romanam Curiam Sequentes in the Early Sixteenth

Century,' 'Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, vi (1976), 51-71.

22


diplomacy. They built up huge credits with the pope which made themincreasingly dependent upon his good faith to honor his debts. In 1521 whenLeo died unexpectedly, his Florentine bankers found themselves leftholding unsecured loans worth thousands of ducats which the Flemishpope, Adrian VI, was none too anxious to honor. Fortunately in 1523,another Medici was elected pope as Clement VII, and he made good manyof his cousin's debts. But in return he entangled the Florentine bankersever more deeply in papal monetary deals. When the army of theConnetable de Bourbon sacked Rome in 1527 and held the pope in virtualcaptivity, Florentines had little to fall back on and suffered disastrous lossesin merchandise, personal possessions, and credits. The Sack crippled thoseottimati friends of the Medici who had grown accustomed to, and dependedupon, the papacy for their livelihood. In addition, the Sack brought abouta severe economic dislocation in all of Rome and the Papal States. All formsof business practically ground to a halt. Despite his willingness, Clementfound it impossible to cover his debts in the normal fashion by consigningtax revenues and ecclesiastical incomes to his creditors because they werereduced to a trickle, and he had no collateral with which to launch a newcycle of loans. Even the largest and best capitalized banks suffered fromthe Sack and its aftermath, and they were able to rebuild their businessesonly gradually, if at all. To make matters worse, at this time the closeFlorence—Rome connection was broken. The new republican governmentin Florence which was strongly anti-Medici was allied with France againstthe pope and the Empire. It forbade its citizens to go to Rome and punishedottimati who were suspected of Medici leanings. The death of Clement VIIin 1534 dealt a decisive blow to the already weakened Florentine businessinterests in Rome. At one stroke the special favors they had received fromthe two Medici popes disappeared. Under Paul III, Genoese bankers beganto take over the prize patronage assignments from the Florentines, andthough Florentine banking interests remained strongly in evidence in Romeand Florentine banks continued to provide credit to the new pope, the muchsmaller scale of their activities signified the end of an era of Florentinedomination of papal finances.

Up to this point we have seen that the general economic picture inFlorence by the 1530s was not encouraging and that the financial positionof the ottimati had considerably weakened. Opportunities for investmentin industry and finance were shrinking because of competition from theNorth for the textile business and because of the general disturbance oftrade resulting from the Italian wars between France and the Empire.Finally, the development of Medici hegemony in Florence helped, over thelong run, to bring about the economic decline of the aristocracy. Attractiveprofits could be made from investments in public finance in Florence and

23


in Rome at the papal court, but these opportunities were reserved for a smallgroup of friends who came to rely heavily upon them. That the majorityof the ottimati stood only to suffer became all too clear by the 1530s. Medicidomination plunged Florence into the struggles between France and theEmpire, and through Medici papal politics the city was forced to meetfinancial demands on an international scale. Florentines were taxedunmercifully to support the Medici until 1527, and then, during the LastRepublic, they were taxed again to defend their city against her formermasters. The Sack of Rome and the death of Clement only exacerbated thesetbacks of those who had come to depend on papal patronage. Florentinebusiness in Rome which had expanded widely under the Medici popes wasforced to contract at precisely the time when Florence badly needed newmarkets to revitalize her economy.

POLITICS AND THE MEDICI REGIME

The progressive weakening of the ottimati and their growing economicdependence on the Medici ran parallel to another development in MediceanFlorence important for our understanding of the period, namely, thepolitical submission of the aristocracy to the ruling family. Both types ofsubordination, economic and political, began in the fifteenth century in theform of cooperation inspired by mutual interests. The outlines of thepolitical and constitutional changes which occurred in Florentine govern-ment under the Medici in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries arewell-known through contemporary histories which emphasized politicalevents, and through modern studies of institutional history and politicaltheory.39 They will be treated here only in so far as they contribute tounderstanding the development of the Medici hegemony in Florence andthe political structure that Filippo Strozzi supported and through whichhe operated.

Florence was one of the last medieval Italian republics to develop intoa Signoria, or despotism. In the fifteenth century the Medici had establishedthemselves as primi inter pares while maintaining, at least in outward form,Florence's republican institutions. Not until the sixteenth century did theycreate a dukedom in the city and cast aside the traditional republicancouncils. Only twice during the nearly one-hundred-year period from 1434to 1532 were there governments in Florence not dominated by the Medici,the Republic of 1494-1512 and the brief Republic of 1527-1530, and aftereach such attempt at non-Medici government, the family returned to power39 The major contemporary historians of our period are Cambi, Cerretani, Gianotti, Guicciardini,

Machiavelli, Nardi, Nerli, Parenti, Pitti, Segni, Varchi and Vettori. Albertini, Gilbert, DevonshireJones, Roth and Rubinstein have produced the most important modern studies.

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more forcefully than ever before. While the path towards a principate wasnot always clearly marked, it was continuous.

The Medici system of government in the fifteenth century was informaland not strictly constitutional. It consisted of a delicate coalk'on of amici,or friends, mostly from among the ottimati who constituted majorities inthe various offices and councils of the city. As Professor Rubinstein hasshown, the actual process of filling offices was carefully influenced by theMedici through a body of election officials called the accoppiatori. Thesemen determined which names from among those eligible for office wouldgo into the election bags for the extraction of new officials. By this methodit was possible to elect amici to the top councils of the state or to rewardother individuals whose friendship the Medici desired. Under the Medici,ottimati interests were well represented in the government, especially after1480 when, in the wake of the nearly successful Pazzi Conspiracy, Lorenzoil Magnifico instituted a powerful new governmental body, the Council ofSeventy, which became essentially a patrician senate with permanenttenure. The Settanta together with the already existing Council of OneHundred supplanted the traditional Councils of the People and of theCommune in the vital areas of finance and legislation. The list of membersof these two Medicean councils reads like a Florentine social register. Onit were represented the best Florentine families who were considered amongthe closer friends of the Medici, the uomini sicuri, men on whom they couldcount.40 Though they did not always agree with Lorenzo and were attimes capable of strong opposition, the ottimati who participated in thegovernment were generally content as long as they received the offices andfavors they desired.

After his death in 1492, the coalition which Lorenzo il Magnifico hadforged with the leading aristocratic families of Florence broke apart, andin 1494 the very ottimati who had been his close advisers turned againsthis son Piero, casting him into exile in November of that year. The forty-yearperiod from the exile of Piero until the establishment of the principaterepresented a time of crisis for the Florentine aristocracy. In the courseof the several revolutions that followed 1494, the role the aristocrats playedin each new government depended on the nature of the regime, whetherrepublican or Medicean. They found their position of political eminencethreatened on the one side by advocates of a republic such as Savonarolaand his followers, and on the other by the Medici and their supporterswhose commitment to a Signoria grew stronger with the passage of time.Though most ottimati favored an oligarchy in which their class wouldbenefit and play the dominant role, they could by no means agree amongthemselves on the exact form an ideal government should take. In the

40 Rubinstein, The Government of Florence, pp. 30-52, 116, 199—205, 309-310, 316-317.

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constitutional crisis of 1494 divisions in their ranks became apparent.41

Some ottimati advocated a broadly-based structure, a governo largo, witha large legislative body headed by a smaller aristocratic senate. Othersfavored a governo stretto, an oligarchy of a very few families who would rulethrough small legislative councils. In the ensuing discussions on the reformof the constitution, at first the idea of a stretto government seemed to carrythe day. In effect this would have left political power in the same handsas before the exile of Piero. The proposal, however, met opposition fromother aristocrats discontented that they had been excluded from power inthe past and determined that this should not happen in the future. Thesemen joined with a growing number of citizens, the popolani, who desireda significant democratization of the government and who agitated for theinstitution of a single Great Council, an idea championed by Savonarola.The Great Council was to be composed of all citizens eligible for politicaloffice. It would assume legislative and financial jurisdiction formerlyenjoyed by the smaller councils of the One Hundred and the Seventy underthe Medici.

Agitation for the Great Council became so intense that it was inauguratedin December 1494, less than a month after the exile of Piero. With theloosening of requirements for membership and the inclusion of a numberof new members never before favored with office, the Great Council allowedmore citizens to participate in the main legislative body than had beenpermitted even prior to 1434. But the government of Florence did not loseits aristocratic character, for ottimati families were amply represented inthe Council. Since the requirements for membership were based on a man'seligibility for office in the past, those same patrician families with a longtradition of government service and those who had participated in theprevious regime continued to be included. They made their presence inthe Council known in any case by virtue of their education, experience andreputation, all of which gave them a decided advantage over other lesswell-known citizens in elections to the Signoria and to the other offices filledby vote.42

Aside from a natural inclination to protect their predominance andfinancial stake in the government which set them apart from the popolaniin the Council, the ottimati were divided among themselves by conflictingseparate interests and had no political program of their own. Despite their4 T The best discussion of the political and constitutional developments following the revolution of 1494

is by Rubinstein, * I primi anni del Consiglio Maggiore di Firenze (1494-1499),' A.S.I., cxn (1954),151-194. See also his 'Politics and Constitution in Florence at the End of the Fifteenth Century,'Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacob (London, i960), pp. 148-183.

4 2 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, pp. 49-51. Lauro Martines in The Social World of theFlorentine Humanists (Princeton, 1963), pp. 18-84 also discusses the criteria for status in Florentinesociety.

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numbers and their domination of the highest offices, no sense of politicalsolidarity bound them together into a powerful block. The variety ofpolitical factions which grew up in the Great Council around the figure ofSavonarola not only testifies to the friar's impact on Florentine society, butillustrates as well the wide divergences in the views of the ottimati in eachfaction. These bitter divisions among the citizens which grew out of the1494 experiment profoundly impressed political writers of the day such asGuicciardini and Machiavelli, both of whom blamed the city's troubles onfactionalism, which the latter in particular saw as characterizing the wholeFlorentine experience.43

The broader forum offered by the Great Council fostered this factionalismand promoted the formation of special interest groups. Sensitive issues suchas city finance, the new decima scalata, or graduated tax, and the conductof the War of Pisa widened the gap between ottimati and popolani whichmade it increasingly difficult to govern the city. The persistent economiccrises which thrust these issues before the Council prompted a constitutionalcrisis which came to a head in 1502 and was only resolved with the reformof the government and the institution of a gonfaloniere-for-lik. Reformcame at a time when there was general agreement as to the need for astronger executive power to lend stability to the Great Council. But theottimati continued to be split, and the divergent alignments ranged fromthose who preferred the abolition of the Council to those who supportedit. They joined together in the creation of the new executive in much thesame way as they had summoned support from various groups for theexpulsion of Piero de'Medici in 1494. The acceptance of the gonfaloniere-a-vita was in itself a move away from the previous constitution. Itrepresented a victory for the aristocrats who were content when one fromtheir own ranks, Piero Soderini, was elected to fill the position.

But the aristocrats did not remain satisfied for long with this newarrangement either, for Soderini proved ungrateful to the very ottimati whohad engineered the reform which created his office. Instead, he turned tothe popolani for support for his policies, with the result that once again anincreasing number of oligarchs feared that their voice was not being heededby the government. Opposition to Soderini grew. At first there was nothought of bringing the Medici back to Florence because Piero de'Mediciwas universally hated for his various attempts to reinstate himself by armedforce. But after Piero's death in 1503, when leadership in the family fellto his brothers Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano, both of whom were43 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine dal 1378 al 150Q, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1931), p. 242 and the

Dialogo, pp. 29, 32, 107; Niccolb Machiavelli, I storie fiorentine (in, 1) ed. F. Gaeta (Milan, 1968),p. 169; idem, II Principe e Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, (1, 4, 8), ed. S. Bertelli (Milan,1961), pp. 105, 119. See also Rubinstein, 'Machiavelli and the World of Florentine Politics,' Studieson Machiavelli, ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Florence, 1972), p. 26.

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appreciated for their civil rather than seignorial bearing, the prospect ofa Medici return became less unattractive.44 A series of political marriagesduring this period, notably Filippo Strozzi's to Clarice de'Medici, whichwas in direct defiance of the gonfaloniere\ will, pointed to the strength ofthe opposition to Soderini's rule. The growing enmity to the regime whichled finally to the revolution of 1512, the exile of Soderini, and thereintroduction of the Medici materialized as in the past as a coalition ofmixed interests that came together conveniently on one issue. There werethose who hated Soderini more than the Medici, others who loved theMedici more than they hated him, and finally those who favored a changeof government simply in order to remove the gonfaloniere-a-vita with thehelp of the Medici if they would agree to come back to Florence as privatecitizens.45

For the next twenty years after 1512, with the exception of one briefinterval in 1527-1530, the Medici controlled Florence, ever intent onstrengthening their dominion. During this period the ottimati played anambivalent role in Florentine politics. The rough distinction betweenadherents of either a largo or stretto political philosophy remained as before,but it was not always possible to identify political groupings solely on thatbasis. If anything, the highly independent character of these aristocratspredominated. Jacopo Salviati and Lanfredino Lanfredini were among theopponents of Soderini and loyal Medici partisans. The first in fact was abrother-in-law of Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano. Yet they were at thesame time among the most adamant advocates of a governo largo andopposed many of the measures taken by Lorenzo di Piero to whom the citywas entrusted in 1513.46 Others, however, who had served willingly in therepublican government before 1512 came to be included within the circleof the closest Medici friends. Filippo Strozzi, like Salviati a parente of theMedici who had personally benefited from their favor, unlike Salviatipreferred a restricted government. However, he encouraged the anti-Medicirevolution of 1527, whereas Salviati opposed it. Strong personal reasonsovercame political ideology and motivated each man's actions in thatturbulent event.

The Medici, too, although committed after 1512 to maintaining theirposition in Florence, were still uncertain how to tame their unruly subjects.

4 4 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 323; Filippo de'Nerli, Commentari de* fatti civili occorsi dentro lacitta di Firenze da IP anno 1512 al 1537 (Trieste, 1859), 1, 158-162, 168-172; Devonshire Jones, pp.

55-59-4 5 Guicciardini, Istoria d* Italia (Milan, 1803), vi, 26-27; Cerretani, Dialogo della Mutatione, B.N.F.

Ms. Magliab. 11, 1, 106, fol. 149.4 6 Ibid.y fol. 150; Nerli, 1, 159; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p. 137; Guicciardini, Storie

fiorentine, pp. 123, 245-247, 272, 327, 330. Salviati had originally favored the institution of thegonfaloniere-a-vita and the election of Soderini, ibid., pp. 246, 251.

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Throughout this period they were careful to solicit opinions from amongthe ottimati regarding the best way to run the government. The numberof treatises on the constitution commissioned by Leo X and Clement VIIattests to their concern.47 The old issues and political questions that grewout of the events of 1494 were thus kept alive, even if the Medici did notalways heed the recommendations given. Though the constitution remainedpractically the same as it had been in the fifteenth century, their grip onFlorence after 1512 tightened. The political, social, and economic scene inFlorence and Italy had essentially changed after 1512, making it impossibleto revert to the Florence of before 1494 when Lorenzo il Magnifico hadbeen her first citizen. Three factors helped shape the course of the Republictowards the principate: the loss of diplomatic independence caused by thepresence of French and Imperial armies in Italy; the election of the twoMedici popes; and the subtle political changes within the Medicigovernment itself.

Charles VIII's descent into Italy in 1494 to pursue his claim to Milanand Naples marked the beginning of a new political and diplomatic era forthe Italian city republics and Signorie. The age of balance-of-power politicsamong the various Italian states ended with the first footsteps of Charlesand his army on Italian soil. The French and Spanish armies repeatedlyinvaded Italy to contest the eternally disputed dynastic claims of theHabsburg and Valois families. Florence, like the other Italian powers, foundthat in the altered military and diplomatic situation she had lost freedomto determine an independent foreign policy. It became necessary tomaintain an alliance with one or the other superpower which in turnentailed spending large sums of money to meet treaty obligations. Thepresence of foreign armies in Italy also affected the city's internal politics.In 1494 a by-product of the French invasion of Italy had been the exileof Piero de'Medici and the institution of the new Republic whose spiritualleader, Savonarola, sang the praises of the French king as the savior of thecity. But Florence's alliance with the French brought nothing but troublein the years that followed. By yielding to French pressure to allow theabortive Council of Pisa to meet in Florentine territory, the city so irritatedthe irascible Julius II that he thereafter supported the Medici's bid to returnto Florence. In 1512 Cardinal Medici arrived at the gates of the city at thehead of the army of the pope's ally, Maximilian I. Once the Medici werere-established, in a certain sense, their rule was bulwarked by their allianceswith first one, then the other of the big powers. Opponents of the Medicimade various attempts during this period to unseat them, but since they47 Albertini's book provides the context and an analysis of these reform proposals, also Gino Capponi,

(ed.), 'Discorsi intorno alia riforma dello stato di Firenze (1522-32)/ A.S.I., Ser. 1, vol. 1 (1842),413-477.

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had to negotiate their own outside alliances to secure a counterpoise to theMedici's foreign allies, they were hindered in their efforts to revolt. Thiswas true in 1515 and 1537 when Medici opponents sought French aid toliberate the city, and in 1527 when they appealed to the Imperial army atthe time of the Sack of Rome. After each attempt at revolution, the Mediciused their allies to regain mastery of the city. In 1529-1530, Clement VIIwent further than had his cousin in 1512 and actually allowed theImperialists to lay siege to Florence to reduce her to submission and toreintroduce his family as rulers.

The one new event after 1512 which more than any other changed thecourse of Florentine history in the early sixteenth century was the electionof the Medici popes, of Cardinal Giovanni de'Medici as Leo X in 1513 andof his cousin Giulio as Clement VII in 1523. The capture of the papacyby the Medici for a period which extended over twenty years, even morethan the intrusion of the Northern European powers into Italian affairs,cost Florence her political independence and represented a clear step towardthe principate. For under both Medici popes, Florence became not onlythe keystone of their family's position to be preserved at any cost, but alsoan instrument of papal policy. As the popes' permanent ally, Florence wasdragged into papal alliances with France or the Empire and forced to footthe bill. The Medici also drew Florence into papal wars which were notstrictly in her own interest. In 1515 she had to send troops into Lombardyagainst her traditional ally, France; in 1516-1517 she paid for much of thepapal war of aggrandizement against Urbino; and again in the 1520s shecommitted money and troops to fight first the French and then theImperialists before the Sack of Rome. The papacy determined not only thecity's foreign policy during these years, but her internal politics as well.When Cardinal Giovanni went to Rome as pope in 1513, he continued tomaintain a tight rein on Florentine affairs. He installed his brother Giulianoand then his nephew Lorenzo as actual, though not constitutional, headsof government, and he decided much of the city's policy at the papalcourt.48

The Medicean papacy had a more subtle impact upon Florence as well.More than anything else Leo's election buttressed the regime by winningthe allegiance of those citizens who hoped to benefit from their alliance withwhat was now the papal party. For the Florentines themselves, andespecially for those upper-class citizens who expected to be favored, theelection of Leo meant a sudden expansion of patronage opportunities. Themore honorific and lucrative positions were to be found with the papacy,and consequently Florentine ottimati as well as members of the Medicifamily turned their aspirations towards Rome. Giuliano, Leo's brother, was

4 8 C.S., Ser. 1, 3, fols. I2v, 24V; Piero Parenti, Istorie fiorentine, B.N.F. 11, iv, 171, fols. 87-88V.

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not content to remain in Florence after the election and moved to Romeat the first opportunity in the summer of 1513, leaving his nephew Lorenzoin charge of the city. But even Lorenzo recognized where real power layand made repeated, extended visits to the papal court to be near his uncle.49

Those Florentines who were relatives of the pope or his close political allies,such as Jacopo Salviati and Filippo Strozzi, received papal patronage, andothers, such as Giovanni Salviati, Luigi de'Rossi, and Niccolo Ridolfi,nephews of the pope, sought careers within the church. For those ottimatiwho had banking interests in Rome the special favor granted them by theMedici popes provided unprecedented opportunities for profit in papalservice. However, from the standpoint of those who felt it more necessaryto consolidate control in Florence, papal patronage entailed two drawbacks.On the one hand, it drained from the city some of the ablest and most loyalsupporters of the regime at the very time when the Medici could well haveused their talents in stabilizing the government which was not even a yearold at Leo's elevation. On the other hand, by increasing everyone'sexpectations of favor when in fact only relatively few stood to benefit, itgave occasion for much grumbling and discontent from those individualswho were not gratified. These discontented citizens were often peoplewhose support the Medici would have been wise to have cultivated.

Clearly, once the Medici became popes, Florence became a tool of papalpolicy rather than the sole object of their attention as she had been underthe Medici governments in the fifteenth century. Leo now expanded hisdynastic ambitions for his brother and nephew and used Florence as a pawnin the various bargaining schemes he offered to the ruling houses of Europe.He manipulated Florence as part of his plans to combine territory to forma principality for Lorenzo.50 Both Medici popes treated the city's revenueas a financial reserve on which to draw when they needed extra money tofight a war or support their family. The existence of a Medici pope hastenedthe development of absolutism in Florence as well. Since Leo consideredher his family's personal territorial possession and the basis of his ownpolitical power and wealth, it was doubly important to him that thegovernment there should be under control. This consideration underlaymuch of the Medici popes' policy towards Florence in our period.

Once Leo X was elected, his papacy had a steadying effect on thegovernment in Florence and helped alleviate two critical problems that theMedici had found confronting them on their return in 1512: how toconsolidate their victory in the city, and how to reward the friends who4 9 Francesco Vettori , ' S o m m a r i o della storia d 'I tal ia dal 1511 al 1527,' ed. A. von R e u m o n t , A.S.I.,

Ser. 1, App . vol. 6 (1848), 300.50 Giorgetti, 'Lorenzo de'Medici Duca d'Urbino e Jacopo V d'Appiano,' A.S.I., Ser. iv, vol. 8 (1881),

222-238; Adolfo Verdi, Gli ultimt anni di Lorenzo de'Medici Duca d'Urbino (Este, 1905), pp. 28,90-101.

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had helped them return. The emergency government which had been setup upon Soderini's exile had to be discarded. It offered the Medici nospecial status in the city or guarantee of safety. The close friends of theMedici among the ottimati feared that the Medici's as well as their ownposition in the government was not sufficiently assured. They encouragedthe Cardinal and Giuliano to take steps to strengthen their hold onFlorence, or, as one close observer said, to remove the government fromthe people and put it in the hands of the patricians.51 They counseledaltering the government in the usual way, by calling a parlamento andcreating a Balla with extraordinary powers to restore the pre-1494constitution, and this was duly accomplished. The Medici supporters firstabolished the Great Council and re-established in its place the old MediciCouncils of Seventy and One Hundred together with a gonfaloniere witha two-month term. Although the institution of the Balla permitted a tighterhold on the government, it created two conflicting problems which plaguedthe Medici in the first years of the restoration.

Their first problem, that of forming a party of trusted allies and ofwinning new friends for the regime, was complicated by two stumblingblocks. Before the Medici could distribute favors and offices to citizens theyhoped to win over, they had first to satisfy relatives and old friends whowere clamoring for attention. The Medici had a long list of political debtswhich dated back to before 1494. To that list were now added the namesof those who had risked themselves in the recent revolution againstSoderini. The second stumbling block was the resistance from one side ofthe ottimati to any notion of enlarging the government. These aristocrats,men like Paolo Vettori, preferred to see political power concentrated in thehands of a very few advisers such as themselves.52 The second problemwas to handle those discontented citizens who, after eighteen years of theGreat Council, had become accustomed to participating in the governmentof the city, but who now found themselves excluded from the Balla. If theMedici yielded too much to the desires of these men and expanded thegoverning circle too far, they faced the danger of losing control of the statefrom within. In this way the security of the Medici regime was threatenedby pressures from two opposite directions.

At first, some concessions were made to those who had been initiallyexcluded from the government. On 21 September a body of fifty citizenswas appointed to conduct a new scrutiny of all offices, and a month laterbecause of continuing complaints, its number was enlarged by twohundred. The reason given in the records of the Balla was plainly enoughstated, '. . . with the desire, as is fitting, to benefit and honor a greater51 Parenti, fol. 81; also Cerretani, Dialogo, fols. 150-152; Vettori, Sommario, p. 293; Nerli, 1, 179,

i 8 3 .52 Paolo Vettori wrote a treatise for Cardinal Medici on how to govern the city published in Albertini,

App. 1, p. 358.


number of citizens and especially those who by reputation are well-deserving.'53 In actuality, however, the underlying trend in the newgovernment was toward a more restricted rule. Made anxious by thepersistent opposition to the regime and an abortive conspiracy, the Medicipreferred to govern through the Balia. They increased its membership byeleven friends to be completely sure of its loyalty and ordered arms removedfrom those citizens they did not trust. The promised scrutiny was a longtime in execution, and the reopening of the Council of Seventy and OneHundred was put off for over a year until November 1513. In the meantimethe Balia took almost total charge of the government, and it filled themagistracies and regulated finance. A decree extended its life for anotheryear on 25 August 1513, 'to insure more control and stability.' It wasrenewed again for another three years and thereafter in five-year increments,and all the while continued to function alongside the other councils ofstate.54 The prolonged existence of this body with extraordinary legislativepowers, unprecedented in Florentine history, did much to undermine faithin Florence's republican institutions and their effectiveness. Governmentby Balia showed how the Medici intended to use a small group of friendsto run the state after 1512, a scheme which served to reinforce the alreadyaristocratic character of the regime.

We have previously noted that the success of the Medici system in thefifteenth century depended in large measure on the cooperation of a groupof mainly ottimati friends whom they used to fill the highest offices andrun the government. After 1512 with their overriding concern being theneed to safeguard the regime against the opposition and discontent of thosewho preferred the Great Council, the Medici opted for an even morerestrictive government which concentrated power into their own hands andin the Balia. As a result, the position of 'amico* became more selective,and those who entered into the inner circles of Medici councils shared alike-minded devotion to the Medici cause. During this period the Medicicompiled lists of citizens carefully grouped into various categories thatreflected the gradations of political reliability. Typical designations were'principal citizens,' 'faithful citizens of popular origin,' 'friends among thewell-born,' 'reliable youth yet to be tested with office,' 'secure citizenssuited for office,' and 'citizens who should be rewarded.' They designatedundesirables 'enemies,' 'doubtfuls,' or 'last of all.'55 From these lists theyselected office holders, sometimes as rewards to old friends, or when

53 Balie, 43, fol. 25; Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 154V. The Balia was enlarged on 19 September. A listof members is in Balie, 43, fol. 5v. See also fols. 149-150; C.S., Ser. 1, 3, fol. 19V.

54 Balie, 43, fols. 134, 156V, 171.55 Piero Parenti, fol. 130, mentioned one such list that was left with Goro Gheri who controlled the

city in Lorenzo's absence in 1516. Devonshire Jones discussed a similar listing, pp. 71-72 . I amgrateful to Dr Humfrey Butters for calling my attention to yet another list ofamici in B.N.F. , NuoviAcquisti 988 from which I have taken these various categories of friends.

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possible, to new ones. Naturally the number of petitioners always exceededthe number of posts, and the Medici correspondence for this periodcontains dozens of requests for offices from friends and friends of friendswho wanted a sign of favor.56 In addition, the Medici had to balance thecomposition of the Signoria artfully. For example, in 1516, if they madeLeonardo Bartolini, a devoted confidant, gonfaloniere, it would then be safefor them to have as priors Andrea Niccolini and Antonio Pazzi who werenot molto sicuri (not terribly secure). But if they designated another mangonfaloniere whose loyalty was less certain, they would then have to choosedifferent priors.57

Even among the amici there was a differentiation. An inner circle of selectintimates such as Filippo Strozzi, Benedetto Buondelmonti and FrancescoVettori was set apart by their special relationship to the Medici. For themthere was a difference between just any amico and a close atnico, and theyfelt that in return for his deeper loyalty the close amico should enjoy specialrewards. The words of Filippo in a letter of advice which he wrote to his'prince,' Lorenzo de'Medici, epitomize the outlook of this small group ofaristocrats:

In my opinion, Your Magnificence should consider surrounding yourself withmen of your choice who are devoted to you. Give benefits to these men becausethe regime has need of partisans, and partisans are not won except throughextraordinary benefits. Ordinary favors make a friend, but in order to make himwilling to sacrifice his life and his possessions for you, you must give him something

Basically their view coincided with the ideology of those who advocateda governo stretto, with the one difference that these men had in additionaccepted and encouraged the primacy of the Medici. Although it would betoo soon to call them courtiers, they did consider that their own positionsand futures lay in service to the Medici, and they bound their destinyinseparably to that of their patrons.' I believe that in all of their [the Medici]benefits we will also participate,' wrote Benedetto Buondelmonti.59 Manyof the treatises on the Florentine constitution commissioned from amongthe ottimati reflect this same current of thought about the rights andprivileges of the close amico within the regime.

Within the Medici system of government which sought to centralizepower and which relied upon a small number of friends, individual Mediciattracted their own personal retinues. The members of the immediate56 At one point in 1513 L o r e n z o received so m a n y letters of r ecommenda t ion from Cardina l Med ic i

and Giu l iano that he begged them to indicate discreetly which m e n were in t ru th to be favored,C.S . , Ser. 1, 3 , fols. 7V, 8.

57 Devonshire Jones, pp. 305-306. 58 M.A.P., 108, fol. 123, Rome, 12 September 1514.59 Ibid., fol. 147, to Filippo Strozzi, Rome, 17-18 May 1515.

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family - Lorenzo il Magnifico's three daughters and their families, CardinalMedici, Giuliano, Giulio and Lorenzo di Piero - all had their adherents.The presence of several members of the family in Florence after therestoration made this type of factionalism practically inevitable because ofthe growing importance of individual attachments and individual channelsof patronage. The two groups that formed around Giuliano and his nephewLorenzo respectively in the winter of 1512 provide a good illustration. Thegroups were originally founded as companies of men who got together forcompetitions and festivities, but they soon acquired distinct politicalovertones that reflected the rivalry existing between the two Medici.Giuliano's company, the Diamante, was composed of several dozen menwhose fathers had been associates of his father, Lorenzo il Magnifico, andsome people claimed that he wanted to use this group to rule the city.Lorenzo was encouraged to form his own separate company by those whothought that he, as Piero's son, should have first place in the state. Hisgroup, the Broncone, which took its name from his father's device,consisted of younger men from the best houses in Florence.60 Giulianoattracted many of those ottimati who preferred a broader power base inFlorence. Lorenzo's group of young aristocrats thought that their politicalfuture was tied to his person rather than to the public institutions of thecity. Once Giuliano had moved to Rome to be near the papal court andLorenzo had taken over as head of the family in Florence, the influenceof Giuliano's followers declined, and the men around Lorenzo such asGherardo Bartolini, Benedetto Buondelmonti, Bartolomeo Lanfredini andFilippo Strozzi began their ascent. Clearly they owed their rise to theirfriendship with Lorenzo, and after his death in 1519 their status abruptlydeclined.

The regime took on a new character in the spring of 1515 when Lorenzohad himself elected captain general at a generous stipend of 37,000 florinswith the right to command five hundred men. He became captain over theopposition of some members of his family and of those citizens who thoughthe was trying to make himself signore of Florence.61 According to the termsof the constitution, a Florentine could not hold the military command ofthe city, but, as a result of the adroit maneuvers of his supporters, andbecause the Councils of the Eight (Otto di Pratica) and the Seventy weresubmissive to his will, his election was approved. Contemporary historiansdetected a notable change in Lorenzo from this period when he becamecaptain general. He adopted princely airs and attracted a train of followers60 Jacopo Nardi , Istorie della citta di Firenze (Florence, 1856), 11, 16-17; Giorgio Vasari, Opere, ed.

G. Milanesi (Florence, 1881), vi, 250-251 ; Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 158.6 1 T h e provisions for this appointment are in Otto , Cond. e Stant., 11, fols. 8-1 iv, and Otto , Delib.

6, fol. 24V. See also A. Giorgetti, 'Lorenzo de'Medici Capitano Generale della Repubblica,' A.S.I.,Ser. iv, vol. n , 199-209. Devonshire Jones, pp. 110-111 follows Giorgetti 's interpretation.

35


from among young nobles who began to imitate his style of elegant dress.Lorenzo and his adherents clothed themselves in gold brocades and sportedbeards. He conducted all business, public and private, in the Medici palace,so much so that the Palazzo delta Signoria remained virtually abandoned.62

Beyond the centralization of executive power in the hands of the Mediciand the personal character of Lorenzo's regime, yet another extra-constitutional factor radically altered the conduct of public business inFlorence. This factor was the new prominence enjoyed by the privatesecretary or personal agent. Previously, secretaries had achieved theirgreatest influence through service in the chancellery, men such as Machia-velli during the Republic, and Niccolo Michelozzi under the Medici. Butnow that public business was being transacted more and more throughprivate channels, the confidential secretary assumed a new role. Forexample, Lorenzo de'Medici wanted his own personal representative inRome apart from the regular Florentine ambassador. Since he did not careto rely on other members of the Medici family or papal secretaries forinformation from the court, he asked Leo X to allow him to send BaldassareTurini da Pescia to Rome as his secretary, 'a man whom I can trust andwho will keep me advised of daily occurrences there.'63 In Florence,Lorenzo's secretary was Goro Gheri. He conducted the Medici correspon-dence and was privy to matters of policy which could not be trusted tothe public officials. Francesco Vettori, the Florentine ambassado o France,kept two sets of correspondence, one to the Otto di Pratica in charge offoreign affairs to which he wrote perfunctorily, and the other to Gheri orLorenzo to whom he voiced his true opinions. Vettori confided to Gherithat to him he could write without reserve, whereas, when he reported toothers, he had to be more cautious.64

During the absence of their Medici employers from Florence theseprivate agents could become almost a government in themselves. Ignoringthe gonfaloniere and the many government councils, the Medici commis-sioned them to oversee their household and all important business, publicand private. During 1514 and 1515 in the months when Lorenzo was inRome, Galeotto de'Medici, a twenty-four-year-old cousin, acted in thecapacity of overseer. At that time Lorenzo had him appointed depositorof the Signoria, but that was his only official position in the city government.In 1516 when Lorenzo was away again, his mother Alfonsina Orsini and62 Niccolo Guicciardini, who was alarmed at the election, compared Florence under Lorenzo to ancient

Rome under Julius Caesar, Discorso in Albertini, p. 370; Piero Parenti, fols. 115-116.63 M.A.P., 141, fol. 9V, Florence, 14 March 1514. Lorenzo's mother Alfonsina had strongly

recommended that Lorenzo keep his own man in Rome, O. Tommasini, La vita egli scritti di NiccoloMachiavelli (Rome, 1911), 11, 1008.

64 C.S., Ser. 1, fol. 9r and cited in Devonshire Jones, p. 122.

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then Goro Gheri took charge of the city.65 Although Gheri basically sharedthe views of the amici about the Medici system of government in that heconsidered them necessary for the security of the state and therefore to beplacated, tensions mounted between the secretary and the amici whichenhanced their distrust of his power and his distrust of them. In hiscorrespondence Gheri often cautioned Lorenzo against those amici, especi-ally parenti (relatives), whose too great ambitions threatened the state. Theottimati in turn grumbled that Lorenzo did not trust his own citizensbecause he had left everything in the hands of Gheri, an outsider fromPistoia.66

The fact that a foreigner with no government position held power inFlorence threatened the delicate balance between the Medici's desire tocentralize executive authority and their need to satisfy the amici. Theresentment against Gheri pales when compared with the animosity whicharose against another outsider, Cardinal Silvio Passerini, who came fromthe subject town of Cortona as caretaker of the government after Lorenzodied and who returned in 1524 as governor.67 Even the ottimati who hadlong been faithful allies of the Medici, such as Francesco Guicciardini,could not countenance this obvious disregard of the amici. He criticizedPasserini for trying to run the government single-handed and furthercomplained that he ran it badly.68 General dislike of the cardinal and hismode of government acted as a catalyst which precipitated aristocraticopposition to Medici rule in 1527, inciting them to revolt and make anotherattempt to govern themselves.

So far our discussion of the centralization of power and the increasinglypersonal nature of the Medici system after 1512 has focused on extra-constitutional elements, such as the use of private ministers, and onthe more subtle process of bending the constitution to extend the life ofthe Balia or to permit the election of Lorenzo as captain general. But thesame developments were in progress inside the very structure of thegovernment. Control of elections and office holding had long been anintegral part of the Medici system. The practice continued after 1512 alongmuch the same lines, although perhaps more blatantly than before. Lists65 Piero Parenti, fols. 105, 130. Galeotto served as depositor from December 1514 to June 1515, Otto,

Cond. e Stant., 11, fols. 59, 78. Piero Parenti, fol. 130, cited also in Hilde Reinhard, Lorenzo vonMedici, Herzog von Urbino (Freiburg, 1935), p. 68, note 169.

66 Anzilotti, pp. 95-97; Piero Parenti, fol. 130, reported that of all the citizens the grandi were themost upset that a man from the subject town of Pistoia should presume to govern them.

67 Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 145,165. Already in October 1521, ottimati were expressingtheir disdain for Passerini. Sig., Otto, Dieci, Mis. Orig., 10, fol. 124, Niccolo Guicciardini to LuigiGuicciardini, Florence, 8 October 1521.

68 Guicciardini, Opere inedite, ed. G. Canestrini (Florence, 1857-1867), v, 420, 427-428. Hisderogative term for Cortona was * corpassone^ fatso.

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for the various magistracies were circulated among family and amici fordiscussion and approval.69 But whereas in the fifteenth century the Medicihad been content to control only the most important councils and offices,now they began to fill even the less significant ones. The historian Parentinoted that in 1516 the administrator of the officials in control of meatsupplies, the administrator of the Otto, and the Consuls of the Sea whomthe people had formerly chosen by lot were now hand-picked by the Medici.Also it seems evident that during this period the total number of citizenswho held political offices decreased while the reverse held true for theottimati. Parenti claimed that some aristocrats held multiple offices, as manyas five at once.70 In addition, the Medici filled the most importantmagistracies again and again from the same group of friends. BetweenJune 1514 and December 1518, only thirty-two citizens filled a possibleseventy-two positions on the Otto di Pratica, and some were members ofthe board four and five times.71 The heavy representation of ottimati inoffice confirmed that Guicciardini's belief, shared by many others of hisclass, that the best governments were oligarchies run by a small group ofqualified men equal to the task, had been accepted by the Medici as theirphilosophy for running the government.

As the Medici tightened their stranglehold on the government, they gavegreater authority to selected offices. Two such offices were the Otto diPratica and the Depository of the Signoria. The Otto originated in 1376during Florence's struggle against the papacy when a special short-termboard was created with extraordinary wartime powers, the Otto di Guerra(Eight of War) known as the Eight Saints. In 1423 it resurfaced under thename of Died di Liberia e Pace (Ten of Liberty and Peace), known alsoas the Died di Guerra e Balia (Ten of War). Under Cosimo de'Medici theDied continued to function on a quasi-permanent basis. In 1480 whenLorenzo il Magnifico reformed the constitution and created the Councilof Seventy, he also established a new magistracy, the Otto di Pratica, whichhe placed in charge of foreign policy and military affairs.72 At first the Ottoonly supplemented the Died di Balia. But after the Otto replaced the Died,it came to be so associated with the Medici system that following therevolutions of 1494 and 1527 it was abolished. In both instances the newRepublic re-established in its stead the Died di Liberia e Pace which had

69 C.S. , Ser. 1, 3, fol. 24V; M.A.P . , 141, fols. 69-70 , 73V, 84.70 Piero Parenti , fols. 113, 123V, 129.71 Rosemary Devonshire Jones, * Lorenzo de 'Medici , Duca d 'Urb ino " Signore " of Florence ?,' Studies

on Machiavelli, ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Florence, 1972), p. 307.72 On the evolution of the Otto di Pratica, see Abel Desjardins (ed.), Negociations diplomatiques de

la France avec la Toscane (Paris, 1859), I, pp. lvii-lviii and Demetr io Marzi , La cancelleria dellaRepubblica fiorentina (Rocca S. Casciano, 1910), p. 775. Molho, Florentine Public Finances, pp.164-166 discusses the role of the Died in financing war in the early fifteenth century.

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the same functions, but was in name less tied to Medici institutions. Afterthe restoration of the Medici in 1512, they suppressed the Died, and theyreconstituted the Otto in 1514.73 When Lorenzo de'Medici took controlof Florence in 1513, Leo X drew up a list instructing him how to governthe city. In that set of instructions he identified the Otto, then still the Died,as one of three critical magistracies in the city, the others being the Signoriaand the Otto di Guardia (Eight of Ward).

The Died di Balla [Otto di Pratica] is terribly important for external affairs andalso internal matters regarding the hiring of mercenaries and spending money andmaking other necessary provisions that are required from day to day. You mustfill all three of these magistracies with men as loyal to you as possible.. ,74

The report goes on to say:

Because the election to the Died [Otto] is of greater consideration and because theoffice is of greater reputation, it requires a certain sort of individual who is capableand is a person of standing because in that magistracy all the affairs of consequenceare deliberated. You can choose someone who is not your confidant if he is capableand has merit, but nonetheless make sure you always have control, that is, at leastseven votes so that you can obtain your reasonable desires and block those proposalsyou do not approve.75

Primarily the Otto had jurisdiction over external affairs, dispatchingambassadors, handling diplomatic correspondence and hiring mercenaries,but, as Leo said in his letter above, it dealt with some internal matters aswell. Internal responsibilities ranged from directing the provisioning of thecity with grain from abroad to enforcing the order to remove arms fromthe citizens after the Medici returned to power. In 1515 Lorenzo arrangedfor his election as captain general with the Otto before he sought pro formaapproval from the Council of Seventy.76 Much of the Otto's prominence,however, derived from the change in Florence's foreign policy after 1513when the city had to participate in various papal alliances following Leo'selection. Since the Otto handled the payments required by treaty obligations,hired mercenary troops and, together with the Signoria, made recommen-dations for the city's defense needs, it became more and more involvedin city finances. In fact, during wartime, the Otto controlled over half thecity's budget. Although the Medici decided most questions of foreign policyand simply passed their decisions on to the Otto, it was still the instrumenttrusted to administer and implement those decisions. One of Guicciardini'scomplaints against Cardinal Passerini was that he closeted himself with the

7 3 Otto, Cond. e Stant., n , fol. i.74 A.S.I., Ser. i, App . vol. i (1844), 299-300 .75 Ibid., p . 303-7 6 O t to , Cond . e Stant . , 11, fol. 8, and Piero Parent i , fol. 115.

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Otto all day.77 Vettori realized that in 1526 as the threat of invasion bythe Imperial army increased, the Otto di Pratica bore the whole weight ofthe government.78 The magnitude of the Otto's responsibilities explainswhy the Medici showed such circumspection in selecting its members.Since the Otto had broad discretion in financial and military matters, it gaveleaders of the regime the power of the purse and control of military forces,freeing them from the necessity of seeking prior authorization for theirprojects from the communal councils. For example, tucked among theexpenses compiled by the Otto for Leo X's state visit in 1515 we find arecord that the city also paid 2,500 florins for the silver plate furnished toCardinal Giulio de'Medici for his mission as papal legate to Lombardy.79

In the war-filled years following 1515, the Otto di Pratica was the agencythrough which Florentine funds were channeled to support papal militaryexpenses. The two powers shared the costs of hiring condottieri, andFlorence gave outright subsidies to the Medici popes.80 The services ofthe Otto were essential for the smooth procurement and administration ofthose monies. The actual procedure for payment was quite simple. The Ottorequested funds from the central credit agency of the state, the MonteComune, which paid them to the Signoria who held the Otto's accounts.Often the Otto overspent its account in which case extra money wasdeposited.81 Had the Medici been forced to follow the practices which hadprevailed until 1458 and seek approval from the communal councils, theywould not have found such ready acquiescence. After 1512 the Otto'srequests for money or for additional funds to cover overdrafts were neverrefused as had happened in 1500 during the Republic when the Otto'sfinancial initiative was sharply curtailed.82

The office of the depositor was officially designated the depositor of theSignoria, and as the name implies, was simply a central place to depositand disburse the Signoria's funds. The exact origins of the Depository areunknown for no separate records for it have survived. Whether it was apart of the Medici government before 1494 is not clear. The only studywe have of Lorenzo il Magnifico's fiscal system did not examine theadministrative side of public finance and did not address the problem of

77 Guicciardini, Opere inedite, v, 427-428.7 8 F . Vettori, Sommario, p . 370.7 9 Camera del Comune , Depositario dei Signori, 1686, fol. 27V.80 Examples of assignments of condottieri, cavalry and infantry are in Ot to , Cond. e Stant . , 11, passim.

In the fall of 1521, the city paid over 200,000 florins to Leo X, vol. 12, fol. 116-126V. Many moresuch payments are in vol. 13, passim.

8 ! Examples of assignments of money to the Otto di Pratica from the Monte are in Ot to , Entra te eUscite, 2, fol. 1; 3, fol. 1; 7, fol. 1; and in Mon te Comune , 2292, fols. 104-105. These monieswere loosely designated ' t o be spent where and how the Signoria and Otto shall determine. '

82 At that time still the Died. See Marks , ' L a crisi finanziaria a Firenze dal 1494 al 1502,' A.S.I.,vol. 112 (1954), p . 44.

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actual payments.83 Quite conceivably the Depository had its origins duringthe Republic of 1494 when, at the time of the war against Pisa, the GreatCouncil attempted to rein in the fiscal initiative of the Died (the Otto) infinancing the war. In April 1496, the Great Council provided for theelection of a treasurer to keep accounts for the Died, and in 1500, whenthey reconstituted the Died after a year's suspension, they made itspayments dependent on the prior approval of the Signori, Collegi and theOtto di Guardia e Balia.*4 The idea in each case was to establish theprinciple that the financial activity of the Died should be subject to theSignoria. After 1512 the depositor of the Signoria had a dual function. Heacted as depositor for both the Signoria and the Otto di Pratica. A fewscattered account books of a depositor of the Signori from the period afterSoderini's election as gonfaloniere-a-vita record payments similar to thosemade later by the depositor under the Medici, and they include the stipendsof condottieri. One book dated just prior to the revolution of 1512 was keptby a Gientile di Francesco Cortigiani who identified himself as ' one of thesignori and depositor of the other signori?*5 Nardi in his Istoria confirmsthat at this time the office was held for a two-month term by one of thecurrent signori.*b Prior to the restoration of the Medici, some aristocratstried to free the depositor from the Signoria, but they were unsuccessful.However, once the Medici regained control, they made the Depository aseparate office and appointed the depositor for a minimum of six months.Several men held the office much longer. Giovanni Tornabuoni is listedin the city records as depositor for seven years from 1520-1527 and wasremoved only by the revolution in that year.87

In his capacity as the central payment agent of the state, the depositorformed the link between the Monte and the Otto di Pratica. Under theconstitution, the depositor had no discretionary powers. He received fundsrequested from the Monte and paid them out only on the order of the Ottoor the Signoria. But in fact, under the Medici, he possessed considerablelatitude. For example, he was sometimes empowered to seek loans fromprivate citizens in the name of the Otto, and his disbursements were notrestricted to payments previously allocated.88 He usually ran the office ata deficit and covered it by advancing his own money or by taking in loans,especially in wartime when expenses were heaviest. Accounts were balancedby having the Signoria assume his credits, and there is no evidence that83 Marks , ' T h e Financial Oligarchy, ' pp . 123-137.84 Marks , ' L a crisi finanziaria,' p . 44.85 Camera del C o m u n e , Deposi tar io dei Signori , 2795.8 6 Nard i , 1, 415-417 .87 Ot to , Cond. e Stant . , 12, fol. 70V; M o n t e C o m u n e , 2132, fol. 131 sin.8 8 In December 1522, the depositor was authorized to borrow 150 marchi. O t to , Del ib . , 7, fol. 8v;

also Otto, Cond. e Stant., 13, fol. 44; Otto, Delib., 6, fols. 151-152.

41


they ever rejected them. In 1527, to settle the accounts of the depositor,the city paid him the impressive sum of 164,000 florins.89 Small wonderthen that contemporaries considered the office financially rewarding for itsholder.

Together with the Otto di Pratica, control of the Depository enabled theMedici to dispose of the city's resources at every stage, from the requisitionof funds to their actual payment. Paolo Vettori, who wanted to be appointeddepositor, addressed some advice to Cardinal Medici in 1512 in which heclearly drew the connection between the depositor and the security andindependence of the regime. He predicated his argument on the premisethat, though in the fifteenth century Cosimo de'Medici had been able tocontrol Florence by ingenuity (industria) rather than by force (forza)y

Cardinal Medici would have to employ more forza than industria. Tomaintain order it was necessary to deploy armed guards in the city. Andto guarantee the loyalty of the guards, there should never be any delay inproviding their pay. Vettori then suggested that the cardinal have aprovision passed in the Balia which would authorize the Otto (then stillthe Died) to allocate money and direct it to the depositor of the Signoriawho would pay the guard as necessary. In this way payments could be madequickly and secretly. Aware of the credit functions of the depositor, Vettorialso recommended that above all he be a man of great personal wealth sothat in emergencies he could use his own money for the office and affordto await repayment at a later time.90

The Medici entrusted the office of depositor only to their closest andmost dependable amici. In 1514, when Lorenzo went to Rome and leftGaleotto de'Medici in charge of the city, shortly before his departure hehad Galeotto appointed depositor. In 1515, the office went to Robertode'Ricci and in 1520, to Giovanni Tornbuoni, both close amici. However,these last two men were depositors in name only. The real depositor,acknowledged in contemporary sources and known by the fact that he drewthe depositor's salary, was an even closer personal ally of Lorenzode'Medici, his brother-in-law, Filippo Strozzi.91

If we would understand the operation of government in Florence as itdeveloped under the Medici after 1512, we have to bear in mind its twoessential characteristics. The first is the alliance of mutual interest betweenthe Medici and the Florentine aristocracy and the employment by theMedici of an increasingly smaller number of aristocratic amici to rule thecity. As in the fifteenth century, their method lay in controlling electionsand office holding; but in the sixteenth century their control was tighter

89 Monte Comune, 2132, fol. 131 sin. 90 P. Vettori in Albertini, pp. 357-359.91 Piero Parenti, fol. 115V; C.S., Ser. in, 121, fol. no .

42


and more extensive than before. Increased centralized power put greateremphasis on personal relationships and personal channels of influence forfavor and advancement, as in the case of Lorenzo's coterie of young nobleswho rose to prominence with him as he took command of the city. Thesecond characteristic is the Medici's gradual subversion of the Florentineconstitution by creating a separate executive apparatus which did not reflectthe constitutional structure of the city. Executive rule through the Balia,the use of personal secretaries or agents with special executive functions,the expanded role of small plenipotentiary committees such as the Otto diPratica, and the creation of a central financial ministry out of theDepository were all a part of this process.

These basic features of the Medici government after the restoration of1512 present a problem to those who would study the period because thereis no necessary correlation between position and power, between titleholders of offices and the real executors of their functions. Political andconstitutional studies of Florence have traditionally emphasized officeholding as the key for determining the leaders of the government and thecomposition of the ruling faction. The Florentines themselves stressedposition. Families kept lists, or prioristi, of their members who had heldimportant offices and counted, for instance, the number of times they hadattained the office of gonfaloniere. Modern scholarship has quite naturallycontinued this interest in office holding. Professor Rubinstein refined thisapproach in his study on the Medici government in the fifteenth century,for which he made extensive use of the election records in the Florentinearchives.92 He concluded that the cornerstone of the Medici system ofgovernment was its faction of supporters and defined that faction in termsof those individuals and families who repeatedly sat in the highest offices,the priors, the accoppiatori, Balia and Councils of One Hundred and ofSeventy. Control of elections through the accoppiatori was the meanswhereby members of the party were brought into office and through whichthey maintained a majority on the various councils.

But however useful this method of investigation of titular standings isfor fifteenth-century studies, it is not a reliable indicator of the under-pinnings of the political structure of the Medici government after 1512,when extra levels and channels of power which did not depend on theelectoral process had been superimposed. The official records of the cityfrom this period must be used with caution as they do not necessarilyprovide sufficient information to reconstruct the chain of command in thegovernment, or even to gain a reliable picture of the Medici faction.Nothing in the election, or tratte, records would indicate that Goro Gherior Cardinal Passerini were in fact executive heads of the government instead

92 Rubinstein, The Government of Florence Under the Medici.

43


of the gonfalonierey nor, for that matter, that Lorenzo de'Medici had anymore influence in the regime than in his capacity as captain general oras an occasional member of government councils. The lists of members ofthe Balla give a good indication of Medici sympathizers in 1512, but theMedici themselves admitted privately that other deserving individuals wereexcluded. The record of the Baud's decrees is essential for understandingthe executive action of the new government in its first years, but even thesedocuments do not reveal the true power structure around the Medicihousehold and the importance of patronage there. Nothing in the recordsof the Otto di Pratica shows that Francesco Vettori was sending differentand more complete reports to the Medici than to the Otto. Although thedocuments of the Otto indicate that the city paid out large amounts ofmoney to finance wars, they provide very little information as to how thefinancing was done, at whose command, and how close the financial tie wasbetween Rome and Florence. Even the books of the depositor, those fewthat were not destroyed to protect the managers of the city's finances afterthe Medici were expelled in 1527, do not reveal that the title holder of theoffice of the depositor was no more than a figurehead. Nor is there anygovernment document which shows that Filippo Strozzi, who held only anoccasional minor office and whose highest position in the government wasas an official of the Monte, was in reality one of the most powerful andimportant men in the city, one who provided the credit behind theDepository, who was Lorenzo de'Medici's closest friend and counsellor,and of whom the young Medici once wrote, ' without you, Filippo, I amwithout myself.'93

9 3 M.A.P., 141, fol. 19V.

44

Marriage intrigues

The path that led Filippo Strozzi into the Medici family orbit was notclear-cut. Nor was the significance of his marriage in 1508 to Claricede'Medici for his later career immediately perceptible, since at that timethe Medici were out of power, exiled from Florence. In fact, until 1508Filippo himself had had no immediate contact with the Medici, and no onewould have suspected then that they would consider a parentado (betrothal)for the granddaughter of Lorenzo il Magnifico with a member of the Strozzifamily which they had abused and exiled not so many decades before.Filippo had been too young to have known the Magnifico and his systemof government. He grew up instead under the republican regime and hadbeen only five in 1494 when Piero de'Medici, the father of his future bride,was exiled from Florence and the new government set in his place. Piero'stwo children Lorenzo and Clarice were raised in Rome in the family of theirmother Alfonsina Orsini, and no evidence exists that Filippo was acquaintedwith them before 1507 when Alfonsina came to Florence to seek out ahusband for her daughter.

On the surface it might seem unlikely that a marriage alliance betweenthe Strozzi and Medici would ever have occurred, given the long traditionof enmity between the two families which had its roots in the persecutionsuffered by Filippo's father and grandfather at the hands of Cosimo. Norhad the Strozzi endeared themselves to the Medici in the more recent past.In the early 1490s Filippo's brother and sister contracted marriages of whichPiero de'Medici openly disapproved. When Piero was himself exiled,Filippo the Elder's widow Selvaggia and his eldest son Alfonso were amongthe first to acquire confiscated Medici property which was pawned to settlethe family's debts with the commune.l The Strozzi were closely associatedwith znti-Palleschi (anti-Medici) groups during the Republic, and in 1497when eminent Mediceans among the aristocracy plotted an uprising torestore Piero to Florence, part of their plan was to sack and raze to the

1 In November 1494 the city assigned 600 pounds of silver confiscated from Piero de'Medici andCardinal Medici and valued at 5,840 florins as follows: 3,400 florins' worth to Alfonso Strozzi, 1,440to Madonna Selvaggia Strozzi, 1,000 to Battista Pandolfini. The money they paid was treated asa loan to the city to be repaid in four months, C.S., Ser. 1, 10, fol. 191.

45


ground the palaces of the Strozzi and other aristocrats known for theirunrelenting opposition to the Medici.2 Rumor of these troubles reachedthe ears of the Ferrara branch of the family, and Giovanni di Carlo Strozziwrote anxiously to his brother Michele about the fate of the Strozzi shoulda revolution succeed in restoring Piero.3

However, despite their reputation of being anti-Medici, like other bigFlorentine families, the Strozzi did not present a united political front.Although no Strozzi could be found among the ranks of the Palleschi, withinthe family a broad political spectrum ranged from avid support of Soderini'sgovernment to an indifferent lack of opposition to the Medici. The headsof certain Strozzi households reflect the range of the diversity. Guicciardininamed two men whom he considered leaders (capi) of the Strozzi familyat the time of Filippo's parentado.4 One of them, Antonio di Vanni Strozzi(1455-1523), was a prominent lawyer distantly related to Filippo. Althoughhe had received his legal training and his appointment to teach on thefaculty of the Studio di Pisa under Lorenzo il Magnifico, he accommodatedhimself quite well to the Republic under which he held the most importantpolitical offices of his career including those of prior (1494), gonfalonieredi compagnia (1497), and ambassador for Soderini to Rome (1511).5 Theother, Matteo di Lorenzo Strozzi, was Filippo's first cousin, thougheighteen years his senior, and had helped Selvaggia administer and investthe estate of Filippo the Elder. Matteo was less enthusiastic about therepublican government and stayed in the background politically. Before1512 he served only twice as Monte official in 1505 and 1510 and asgonfaloniere di compagnia in 1511. Both Antonio and Matteo originallyopposed Filippo's prospective marriage to Clarice but changed their mindsand eventually worked to help bring it about. This acceptance of the Mediciresulted for Matteo in a long political career after 1512 when he held nearlyevery major political office. He was considered {veduto) for gonfaloniere in1519 and served as a trusted political adviser to the Medici until his deathin 1541.6

2 Nardi, I, 106-110. Other candidates for such treatment included the Nerli, Valori, and Giugni.3 C.S., Ser. in, 88, fol. 122; Ser. m, 139, fols. 64, 66.4 Guicciardini, Storie, p. 327.5 The sixteen gonfalonieri di compagnia, or standard-bearers of the militia companies, four from each

quarter of the city, served as an advisory college to the Signoria. A complete list of Antonio's officesis in Tratte, 177, Santa Maria Novella; Tratte, 94, fols. 31, 76; Tratte, 84, fols. 1, 105; Tratte,83, fols. 38, 84. Under Soderini Antonio Strozzi was among the opposition in the pratiche(consultative commission) called to advise the government. See Sergio Bertelli, 'Pier Soderini"Vexillifer Perpetuus Reipublicae Florentinae",' Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, ed.Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi (Florence, 1971), p. 349. At the age of sixty-seven in 1522,a year before his death, he received the honor of being veduto for prior, although he had held noimportant offices under the Medici, Tratte, 343, fol. 101.

6 Record of Matteo's positions before 1512 are in Tratte, 83, fol. 32; Tratte, 177, Santa Maria Novella;Tratte, 354, fol. 136. In 1508 he also filled the minor office of massarius camerae armorum

46

Marriage intrigues

Alfonso Strozzi, Filippo's half-brother, must also be considered animportant family leader in this context. Although he was more closelyrelated to Filippo than either Matteo or Antonio, he maintained a rigorousopposition to the Medici and never completely reconciled himself toFilippo's marriage. Alfonso had been one of the Arrabbiati, the politicalfaction which had strongly opposed Savonarola, and he had even servedas one of the examiners of the friar. He was a good friend of Soderini andhad supported his election as gonfaloniere-a-vita. He was consistentlyanti-Medici, and in 1501, according to Cambi's history, during the heightof Cesare Borgia's campaign against Florence which would have returnedthem to power, Alfonso personally hired five hundred infantry for his ownprotection.7 Because of his opposition to the Medici, Alfonso did not servein public office except under republican regimes. He was twice a Monteofficial under the Second Republic in 1496 and in 1511 and achieved hisgreatest political eminence under the Third Republic when in 1527 he wasa major contender with Niccolo Capponi for election as the first gonja I'oniereof the new government. He served as Prior, as a member of the Died diLibert a e Pace, as bank official and as Monte officer.8

During the Republic the outlook of Selvaggia's two sons differed fromthat of their older, more established relatives. Although definitely notMedici partisans, they counted among their close companions young menwho were, notably Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, Prinzivalle della Stufa andMarco Antonio Colonna, all of whom later were instrumental in restoringthem to Florence. Two of their closest family friends, Filippo Buondelmontiand his son Benedetto, also approved of the Medici. But perhaps thedecisive influence on the family was wielded by Bernardo Rucellai whosedaughter had married Lorenzo and on whom Selvaggia depended heavilyfor advice. Bernardo had once been an intimate friend of Lorenzo ilMagnifico but became estranged from Piero. However, after the electionof Soderini whom he bitterly and openly despised, he joined the group ofaristocrats who, disenchanted with the gonfaloniere, would welcome theMedici's return.9 Accordingly it was Bernardo who encouraged Selvaggiato consider a marriage for Filippo into their family.

(administrator of the arms room), Tratte, 177. Matteo held many more offices after 1512 of whichthe most important were: member of Council of Seventy and Balia, 1514; member of Otto diGuardia, 1514, 1532; prior, 1513, 1519, 1526; member of Twelve Procurators, 1515, 1517, 1519,1521, 1523, 1524, 1526, 1534; member of Set di Mercanzia, 1517, 1523; official of the Monte, 1505,1510, 1515, 1521, 1524, 1531, 1533, 1538; official of the Monte di Pieta, 1515, 1524; accoppiatore,1522, 1524, 1532-1539; conservator of laws, 1534; member of Otto di Pratica, 1533; Balia, 1530;Council of 48,1532; counsellor of the duke, 1532, 1535, 1538. Tratte, 84, passim; Tratte, 85, passim;Tratte, 83, fol. 32; Tratte, 354, fol. 446; Tratte, 94, fols. 34-36; Tratte, 354.

7 Giovanni Cambi, Istorie fiorentine, ed. Idelfonso di San Luigi in Delizie degli eruditi toscani(Florence, 1785-1786), xxi, 163.

8 Tratte, 83, fol. 3; Tratte, 84, fols. 44, 48V, 69, 70, 71V, 204; Tratte, 94, fol. 36.9 Niccolini, p. xiii; Guicciardini, Storie, p. 327; Nerli, 1, 160; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 321.

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From Selvaggia's point of view, the parentado with Clarice would beadvantageous to her sons and to herself. An alliance with Clarice's familywould secure their friendship and protect the Strozzi from a repetition ofpast political abuse should the Medici ever return to power. Though theprospect of the Medici seizing power seemed unlikely in 1508, it was alwaysa possibility given Cardinal Medici's popularity and the influence he hadwith Julius II. The Medici cardinal had made himself very dear to the oldman, and rumor spread that he was a likely choice to be the next pope.Selvaggia was also on the lookout for a large dowry for Filippo to helpfortify the family coffers, since Lucretia Rucellai had contributed practicallynothing. Much of her late husband's capital was being eaten up inconstructing their palace, while the investments of her sons' share of theinheritance had in the ten years since her husband's death yielded littlebeyond the sums needed to cover their heavy expenses.10 Clarice's dowrywas reported to be six thousand florins and made a match with her verydesirable financially. Common opinion held that suitors would havethronged around her had they not feared the grave political risks involvedin such a union. Less generous people claimed that Filippo, one of therichest of the young eligible bachelors, considered himself too good topursue an engagement with any other Florentine family.

In the old days before Piero's exile, the likelihood of the marriage wouldhave been slim. But in the years leading up to 1508, the Medici had gonethrough many changes of fortune. After his expulsion from Florence, Pierode'Medici's attempts to return by force had had the unintended effect ofrekindling the Florentines' aversion to his family and of actually strength-ening the republican government. And after the election of Soderini asgonfaloniere-a-vita in 1502, the fortunes of the Palleschi (Mediceans) ebbedeven lower. The government put a price on Piero's head, forbade CardinalMedici to stay in the Medici palace, and restricted their dealings with otherFlorentines.11

But if Piero had not been able to succeed in life, at least his death bydrowning in 1503 removed a formidable obstacle to the Medici's chances.Leadership of the family now passed on to Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano,who had never shared their older brother's military designs on Florence.Though they were no less driven than he to restore the Medici to theirformer dominance, they conducted a subtle campaign designed to wooFlorentines rather than subjugate them. This new strategy was put intopractice at Cardinal Medici's court in Rome where many Florentines

I ° From 1492 to 1502 the income from Selvaggia and her sons' portion of the estate was barely sufficientto meet their expenses. There is some evidence that by 1500 they were doing better, but still theyneeded the cash to invest. See tables 7-10 in Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, pp. 78-92.

I I Guicciardini, Storie, p. 322.

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Marriage intrigues

met him and departed favorably impressed. The cardinal peddled hisconsiderable influence with Pope Julius II to his countrymen, especiallyto the Florentine merchants who had business dealings with the curia. TheMedici court in Rome also became a gathering place for a growing numberof Florentines who were ill-disposed to Soderini's government. Young mensuch as Bartolomeo Valori, Piero Martelli, Gino Capponi, Antonfrancescodegli Albizzi, and Prinzivalle della Stufa whose fathers had opposed theMedici before 1494 eagerly sought out the cardinal, and others such asBernardo and his son Giovanni Rucellai and Filippo Buondelmonti foundthemselves drawn towards the Medici, not out of any intrinsic desire forthe primacy of their house, but out of their own dislike for Soderini.12 Atthe time of Filippo's parentado with Clarice, many of these Florentines inRome rallied openly to his cause without regard for the adverse reactionby the government at Florence which their support was bound to provoke.In addition to the increase in Cardinal Medici's popularity amongFlorentines, the growing enmity between Soderini and Julius II greatlystrengthened the cardinal's hand at court and rendered Julius still morewilling to promote his aims.

This positive response by a growing body of Florentines encouraged theMedici to entertain serious thoughts about how best to effect their returnto power. First it was necessary to test the ground in Florence itself andestablish a foothold. Alfonsina Orsini, Piero's widow, began negotiationsto reclaim her dowry which was legally owed her out of the Medicipossessions confiscated by the republican government.13 She came herselfto Florence in early 1507 ostensibly to settle the matter and to inquire afterother Medici possessions. At the same time, however, she began to negotiatesurreptitiously for a husband for her daughter Clarice. One might wonderwhy Alfonsina did not prefer to find a husband among one of the Romanbaronial families, since with the help of her Orsini relatives she could easilyhave arranged a prestigious match for her daughter. Her motives behindseeking a Florentine parentado for Clarice could only have been political,a necessary ingredient in the family's plan to reinstate themselves inFlorence. For Alfonsina the marriage of Clarice in Florence was a stepin promoting the claim of her son Lorenzo as rightful heir to his fatherand grandfather. As the stateless son of an exiled father there was no placefor Lorenzo in Rome, and the marriage of Clarice to a Roman would havebrought him no political advantage. Her marriage in Florence, however,12 Ibid., pp. 324-325. Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi is a good example of a young Florentine who

frequented the Medici court in Rome. Cardinal Medici had intervened for him in some litigation,Nardi, n, 11-12, and in 1512 we find him among the eager young men who plotted the ouster ofSoderini and the restoration of the Medici.

13 Letters concerning the lengthy negotiations for her dowry worth 12,000 ducats are scatteredthroughout Sig. Cart. Resp. Orig., vols. 31 and 32. See also Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 316.

49


would not only strengthen the Medici's connections there, it would alsosecure the support, or at least nullify the opposition to their cause, of apowerful ottimati family.

The Medici had already attempted to find a husband for Clarice inFlorence, first in 1506 with Francesco di Piero Pitti, a member of a highlyregarded family which counted itself among the Palleschi. Soderini got windof the parentado and had Pitti charged with treason. Since Francesco wasin Ancona at the time, Soderini had his father Piero dragged three timesbefore the dreaded judicial tribunal, the Quaranta (the Forty). The tribunalabsolved him only after he had disclaimed any knowledge of a parentadowith the Medici. According to Guicciardini, Soderini hoped that hisrigorous prosecution of the case would discourage any further attempt tomarry Clarice into a noble Florentine family.14 Supposedly the Medicihad proposed at one point to marry Clarice to Soderini's own nephew,Giovanbaptista di Paolo Antonio, but without success, most likely becausethe gonfaloniere did not dare risk the ire of the people which that muchhypocrisy would assuredly have aroused.

Filippo was doubtless aware of the grave political risks inherent in aparentado with Clarice, and only after many months of careful deliberationand negotiation did he agree to sign a marriage contract in July 1508.15

In the contract, written in his own hand, Filippo promised to presentClarice with a wedding ring within eight months' time or else pay atwo-thousand-ducat penalty, and the Medici were bound by the same fineshould they break the compact. Filippo kept the agreement secret even fromother Strozzi, and to protect himself against exposure he left Florenceaccompanied by his mother in mid-September ostensibly on a pilgrimageto Loreto. According to plan, he would then continue alone to Naples,16

and, after a decent interval, go on to Rome where the engagement wouldbe announced. Unfortunately for Filippo, by November rumor of theparentado leaked out in Florence, and he could no longer remain silent.

When Alfonso Strozzi heard the news he flew into a rage. Immediatelyhe wrote to Filippo in Naples and had Lorenzo write also demanding thathe explain himself. Only one letter Filippo wrote in reply to Lorenzo hassurvived from this exchange, though it refers to another earlier response.

14 Guicciardini, Storie, p. 326 and Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 309. Both historians claimed this was justa pretended parentado, but since the case went all the way to the Quaranta there must have beensome basis in fact to the charge.

15 Filippo spelled out its conditions in a letter to Lorenzo on 9 December 1508 in C.S., Ser. in, 134,fol. 50. See also Guicciardini, Storie, p. 326; Niccolini, p. xiv. Lorenzo Strozzi said that thenegotiations were arranged through some Dominican friars, probably from San Marco, Niccolini,pp. xii, xvii. See also C.S., Ser. m, 134, fol. 51.

16 Niccolini, p. xiv. He must have left in the middle of the month judging from the dates on two powersof attorney which he gave to Lorenzo to use in his absence, C.S., Ser. v, 87, Ricordo section.

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Marriage intrigues

In the extant letter, dated 9 December 1508, Filippo acknowledged hispredicament and sought his brother's advice:

Now what can I or should I do? If I sever my ties with the Medici, which seemsimpossible, aside from the penalty to pay, we would bring down their whole-heartedhostility and I would be dishonored. However, if I go through with it, you saythat I and all of us will be ruined, and you depict an inferno so black that it scaresme. And finally to you, Lorenzo, I will speak in the following way: Examine [thecase] if you will - whether to go or not to go to Rome; if you wish, make us liablefor the fine and break every link of parent ado without the least regard. Finally,put me where you will, and I will stay there, provided, God willing, I hold to mypresent opinion. But think it over carefully, and watch out that you are notfrightening yourself needlessly and that you do not put too much faith in someonewho, instead of showing you the moon as it really is, has shown you its reflectionin the bottom of a well, because if we decide to renege now, we will find ourselvescaught in a high sea where we will surely drown. I am not writing to you like thisfor my own sake, and my opinion remains unchanged; but rather because of thedanger to you, I do not want you to lose on account of me anything that I cannotrestore to you.17

When Filippo's engagement became public knowledge, most of hisStrozzi relatives vigorously opposed the idea. To them the betrothalpresaged a break with seventy-five years of proud family tradition ofopposing Medici rule, and further they feared it would jeopardize their goodrelations with the present republican government. The acerbic reaction onthe part of the other Strozzi indicates how far Selvaggia and Filippo hadset themselves against the sentiments prevailing in the family. The greaterStrozzi family, far from being just a number of loosely connectedhouseholds who shared the same surname, intimately involved itself withFilippo's decision and undertook to discover what stance they should adopton this matter of common family interest. Summoned by Filippo'shalf-brother Alfonso and first cousin Matteo, members of the family mettogether in council on 3 December. Heartfelt distress and genuineindignation that Filippo should ally himself with the Medici after all theinjuries suffered by the Strozzi at their instigation dominated theirfeelings.18 But they were also determined to orchestrate their publicreaction to the bethrothal carefully in order to lessen the danger of politicalreprisals to the family from Soderini. In particular this latter sentimentexplains why at the meeting they decided to send a group of familyrepresentatives to protest their ignorance of the marriage negotiations and17 C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 50.18 Typical reactions to the parentado can be found in C.S., Ser. in, 134, fols. 49, 52; 180, fol. 95;

Niccolini, p. xiii. See also Melissa M. Bullard, 'Marriage Politics and the Family in RenaissanceFlorence: The Strozzi - Medici Alliance of 1508,' American Historical Review, LXXIV, 3 (1979),681-687.

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their discontent with Filippo's actions. By publicly demonstrating theirdispleasure with the parent ado they hoped to clear themselves of suspicionwith the gonfaloniere.19 Members of the family went before the Signoriato declare their innocence and promised to do everything possible toprevent the marriage. With the consent of the Signoria they dispatched aspecial messenger, Benedetto di Giovanni Strozzi, to present CardinalMedici a petition signed by all the family pleading with him to cancelFilippo's contract on pain of bringing the hatred of the Strozzi down uponhis head.20 The cardinal would hear nothing of this threat; and Benedettoleft for Naples to bring Filippo messages from the family advisinghim of his grave danger and urging him to back out. Alfonso Strozzi evenvolunteered to pay the two-thousand-ducat penalty for him if he would onlybreak the contract. The case dominated the correspondence of distantStrozzi relatives. Giovanni Strozzi in Ferrara was kept informed daily ofdevelopments and he in turn advised other Strozzi in Ferrara and Mantua.Giovanni's nephew, Marco Strozzi, wrote him news of the parentado fromRome where every last detail was known, and even as far away as Venice,Strozzi associates could talk of nothing else. 'What an odious matter andone so prejudicial to everyone in the family,' and 'We know how muchgrief it is causing on many accounts, and we agree that such a betrothalis hardly appropriate in the Strozzi family' typify the reactions of thosedistant kin. Filippo's engagement even found its way into the correspon-dence of both Machiavelli and Guicciardini.21

The revelation of Filippo's betrothal precipitated a virulent scandal inFlorence, and the whole city down to her meanest citizens gossiped aboutnothing else. The impact of the case reached far beyond the simple factof Filippo's engagement to Clarice. It exploded into a volatile political issue,a caso di stato, over which the city divided itself into two camps; thesupporters of Soderini who opposed the marriage and his antagonists whofavored the match. Once Soderini made up his mind to use the issue tosquelch suspected Medici sympathizers and rally the populace behind him,the marriage question became a test of his strength. At the same time hisopponents were equally resolved not to let him manipulate the case to hisown ends.22

To Soderini it was obvious that Filippo had not acted alone, and hesuspected that the parentado was part of his opponents' grand design to

19 C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 52. Lorenzo would have us believe that he had been kept ignorant of theparentado, Niccolini, pp. xiii-xv. More than likely he maintained that posture in his own defenseuntil Soderini's reaction became clear.

20 C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 52.21 Ibid., fols. 49, 52-55, 61; 180, fol. 95; Machiavelli, Lettere, ed. Francesco Gaeta (Milano, 1961),

p. 203; Francesco Guicciardini, Carteggi, ed. Roberto Palmarocchi (Bologna, 1938), 1, 23.22 Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 326-327, 330-331; Niccolini, p. xx; Jacopo Pitti, 'Apologia de'Cappucci,'

A.S.I., Ser. 1, vol. 4, part 2 (1853), 314.

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Marriage intrigues

destroy the republic and reinstate the Medici. To him the issue of Filippo'sengagement was from the very beginning a grave political affair. He airedthe case before the Signoria, which promptly issued a summons for Filippoto appear in its presence by 25 December or else be banned in exile forten years in Naples. At the same time the Signoria commanded thatFilippo's mother and brothers should not provide him any financial ormaterial aid on pain of a ten-thousand-ducat fine.23 Soderini would havepreferred to condemn Filippo outright in absentia, but the law required ahearing before sentencing. Still, he could hope that Filippo would be toofrightened to show his face in Florence and thus ipso facto be forced intoexile. Next Soderini began to cast about among the leading opponents ofhis government for those who he suspected were the real perpetrators ofthe betrothal. In a charge placed before the Otto di Guardia which handledsecurity matters, twelve citizens were named and others implicated assympathizers with the match. Heading the list were Bernardo Rucellai andhis sons Palla and Giovanni.24 Lucrezia de'Medici, sister of CardinalGiovanni, and her husband Jacopo Salviati, a rich and powerful aristocratwho had grown disenchanted with Soderini, were also suspected asparticipants in the affair.25 Elections for the Signoria and other top citycouncils were scheduled in December and Soderini planned to exploitStrozzi's betrothal to influence their outcome in his favor. Malicious gossipincluding reported instances of Filippo's flagrant disrespect for the populargovernment already swirled through the streets. In his pre-election addressto the Great Council in which he branded the parentado part of a plot tooverthrow the republic, Soderini tried only to fan the flames higher. Publicsentiment against Strozzi climbed to such a fever pitch that he wasdenounced repeatedly in the tamburo, the receptacle for anonymous

2 3 According to Guicciardini, Storie, p . 328, members of the Valori faction including Alfonso met inthe house of Alessandro Acciaiuoli to advise Soderini , and they recommended the government actionwhich in fact took place. T h i s is not confirmed by any other source. T h e two decrees are in Sig.e Coll., Delib. Ord . , n o , fols. 124V-125. See also C.S. , Ser. i n , 134, fol. 52; Niccolini, p. xvi;Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 3 2 1 ; Cambi , xxi, 222. T h e summons was sent to the Florentine ambassadorin Rome who was to forward a copy to the consul of the Florentine Nation in Naples, Sig. Cart . ,Mis . 56, fol. 127V.

24 Pitti , 'Apologia, ' p . 313 ; Cerretani , Istoria, fol. 3 2 1 ; Guicciardini , Storie, pp. 328, 331 said thatthe principal opponents of the match among the Arrabbiatt included Alessandro Acciaiuoli, AntonioCanigiani, Pierfrancesco Tosinghi , Niccolo Valori, and Alfonso Strozzi. Both Guicciardini , Storie,p. 331 and Cerretani , Istoria, fol. 322, reported a rumor that the Arrabbiati, or according toGuicciardini, specifically Alfonso Strozzi, suggested that the only way to heal the city was to cutoff the heads of Bernardo Rucellai, Archbishop Pazzi, Fil ippo Buondelmont i , and other perpetratorsof the parentado. Bernardo wrote to the Signoria in his own defense, Sig. Cart . , Resp. Orig. , 31 ,fol. 255. T h i s letter confirms Guicciardini 's account, Storie, p . 331. Bernardo 's son Giovanni wasrumored to have made secret trips to Rome.

2 5 Others implicated included Cosimo Pazzi, archbishop of Florence, Fi l ippo Buondelmont i ,Giovanni Corsi, Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, Antonio Giacomini , and Giovanbattista Ridolfi.Fi l ippo had also sought advice from Niccolo Orlandini and Gino Capponi , his brother- in-law, C.S. ,Ser. i n , 134, fols. 50, 5 1 ; Guicciardini , Storie, p . 330.

53


accusations placed against citizens with the Otto di Guardia, the magistracycharged with the prosecution of criminal cases.26

From faraway Naples Filippo had no idea as to his best course of action,and his letter to Lorenzo of 9 December reveals the quandry he was in.Even though the automatic penalty of exile and confiscation of propertyfor not answering the Signoria's summons was compelling enough reasonto come back to Florence, it was not clear to him whether he could in factreturn safely and receive a fair hearing. On 12 December, the same daythat the first charges against him for marrying the offspring of an exile werelodged with the Otto di Guardia, Filippo left Naples, travelling incognitoto Rome to consult with Cardinal Medici, who received him the veryevening of his arrival. The ferocity of the reaction in Florence against themarriage made it imperative that each party reassure the other of hiswillingness to adhere to their agreement. Probably at this time CardinalMedici promised to pay any fine imposed by the Soderini government.Filippo slipped out of Rome and continued north to Quercia Grossa inSienese territory close to the Florentine border. In his company came Giuliode'Medici, the future Clement VII, who had been sent by Cardinal Medicito make sure nothing went awry.27 Their close association during thesesuspenseful days probably laid the foundation for Filippo's life-longfriendship with Giulio. From his hiding place Filippo received reports andsecret visitors from Florence and waited for advice on whether or not toappear on the 25th.

The energetic moves of Soderini and the early opposition to theparentado from among Filippo's family comprised only the first act in thisdrama. The second unfolded during the legal struggles over Filippo's rightto marry Clarice. The delicate and complex strategies and counter-strategieswhich accompanied the proceedings laid bare Soderini's deterioratingstrength, which encouraged others to raise their voices in support ofFilippo, and the Strozzi to make a calculated change in their position. Atfirst sympathizers with Filippo's predicament had hesitated to defend himfor fear of alienating Soderini or of being labeled Palleschi, and they hadto wait to gauge the strength of Soderini's forces before taking any step.But soon a growing number of citizens rallied in support of Filippo. Notjust Palleschi, they represented a mixed group, opponents of Soderini,friends and clients of the Strozzi, and even some who sympathized withFilippo just because they did not approve of what they considered to beSoderini's excessively autocratic manner in handling the case. Theycharged that the gonfaloniere was treating Clarice in exactly the same wayLorenzo il Magnifico had treated the daughters of the Pazzi family after2 6 Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib., 143, fol. 23; Guicciardini, Storie, p. 329; Nerli, 1, 161; Cerretani,

Istoria, fol. 321. 27 Niccolini, pp. xvii-xviii.

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Marriage intrigues

the Pazzi Conspiracy by hampering their engagements.28 A number ofSavonarola's old party, the Frateschi, lent their support to Filippo's side,and because of their popularity with the lower classes, they helped calmsome of the more rabid hostility to the match.29 There was no love lostbetween the Frateschi and Soderini who had been supported in his electionby the anti-Savonarolian party, the Arrabbiati. Additional backing camefrom Dominican friars who had helped negotiate the marriage contract inthe first place. Even Pope Julius intervened to defend Filippo's parentadofor the sake of Cardinal Medici. Very little sympathy existed between Juliusand Soderini, and the pope sent a pointed brief to Archbishop Pazzi ofFlorence for presentation to the Signoria. In the letter Julius ordered theSignoria to accept the parentado because Clarice was fatherless and still achild, and therefore under his special protection. Once again the precedentof the Pazzi daughters was called to mind, since back in 1478 Pope SixtusIV had made them his special wards under similar circumstances.30 In hisangry reply Soderini told Julius to mind his own business:

Since this matter is important for the general quiet and peace in Florence and sinceonly disorder and scandal can result from it, we are certain that if only HisBeatitude had full information on all the circumstances and the bad effects thatcould result from it, he would never have wished to arouse the displeasure anddiscontent of every person in this city by seeking such a thing from which onlyevil can result... And certainly Cardinal Medici with all his good qualities will beable to provide honorably for his niece elsewhere.31

Sensitive to the winds of political change shifting in Filippo's favor, theStrozzi held another family council and decided to abandon their publicopposition to the parentado and do everything possible to defend him inthe legal battle ahead. Family and friends busied themselves canvassingofficials to find out how safe it would be for Filippo to answer the summons.Lucrezia de'Medici Salviati, acting upon instructions from Rome, evenhastened to Soderini to plead on Filippo's behalf for clemency.32 Thefamily wanted a guarantee from a majority of the Signoria that the questionof the parentado would be treated as an ordinary judicial matter and notas an affair of state before they would advise Filippo to enter Florentineterritory. Once reassured, Filippo travelled to the villa of his close friendLorenzo Cambi at San Gaggio, less than a mile from the city. His first cousinMatteo and Antonio di Vanni Strozzi, the well-known lawyer, came to visithim in secret. Together they examined every legal aspect of the case beforefinally counselling him to answer the summons and prepare his defense.33

2 8 Guicciardini, Storie, pp . 330-331 . 29 Niccolini, p . xviii.30 Sig. Cart. , Resp. Orig. , 31 , fol. 244; Sig. Cart . , Mis . , 56, fol. 128; C.S. , Ser. i n , 134, fol. 51.31 Sig. Cart . , Mis . , 56, fol. 128. 32 C.S. , Ser. i l l , 134, fol. 51.33 Niccolini, pp . xviii, xix.

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Filippo slipped into the city quietly at sunset on Christmas day, and,flanked by members of his family, presented himself to the gonfaloniere andSignoria in assembly. Soderini tried to muster enough votes to have Filippoconfined outside Florentine territory, but the measure went down to amiserable defeat. Since charges against him were also pending before theOtto di Guardia, the Signoria decided to have the case adjudicated therefirst. This meant in effect that final jurisdiction would pass into the handsof the newly elected Signoria to be seated in January, among whosemembers was a Strozzi in-law, Neri Capponi.34

Soderini was well aware of his declining strength. He too had canvassedthe Signoria before the hearing and found insufficient votes for a harshsentence. He had tried to influence the elections to the Signoria, but thereward for his effort had been a group that was even less willing to pursuethe case than the old one. In fact, in January the new Signoria voted todrop all previous charges connected with the original summons.35 Sincethe Signoria had proved uncooperative, the remaining hope for the Soderiniparty was prosecution through the Otto di Guardia, so fresh charges againstFilippo were placed in the tamburo on 2 January. Should the Otto purposelydelay action on the matter, Filippo would face real danger. By law the casewould then be automatically transferred to the feared Quaranta, a muchlarger judicial body whose members tended to be more sympathetic toSoderini.36 At the hands of the Quaranta Filippo would probably be treatedroughly because, given its size and more popular composition, it was lesssubject to political pressure than the smaller, more easily influenced Ottodi Guardia. However, the original charges with the Otto on 12 Decemberhad barely missed the deadline for transfer to the Quaranta and had to beheld over for the new Otto to be seated in January. Just as in the case ofthe new Signoria, Soderini was much less sure of the loyalty of the enteringOtto than he had been of the old.37 In the days before his new hearing,Filippo's supporters led by Jacopo Salviati set out to protect him byblocking any attempt to remove the case from the hands of the Otto. Filippohimself wasted no time but made the rounds of leading citizens to pleadhis cause.

Filippo appeared before the Otto on 5 January and again on 12 January.He was charged with violating a statute dating from 1393 which prohibitedcontracts with exiles by virtue of his marrying the daughter of Pierode'Medici who had not only been declared an exile in 1494, but had34 His appearance on the 25th is certified in Sig. e Coll., Delib. Ord., n o , fol. 125. See also

Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 329-330; Niccolini, p. xix.35 Sig. e Coll., Delib. Ord., i n , fol. 8.36 C.S., Ser. in, 134, fols. 53, 54; Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 329, 332. Nerli, 1, 161, gave a good

description of the political make-up of the Quaranta.37 Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 321; Guicciardini, Storie, p. 331.

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Marriage intrigues

afterwards made three armed attempts against the Republic. In his defenseFilippo cleverly denied trafficking with any exiles since in his negotiationshe had dealt only with religious persons of the Dominican order and withAlfonsina Orsini, Cardinal Medici and Giulio de'Medici, who had neveractually been declared exiles. He then appealed to more recent statutes thanthe fourteenth-century one under which he had been charged, to a seriesof laws which exempted the daughters of exiles from the restrictions placedon their fathers and made their husbands liable at most to limitedconfinement away from the city, confiscation of property, and payment ofa fine.38 Finally Filippo defended himself against the accusation that hehad made the marriage out of disrespect for the Republic in order to disruptthe peace and help the Medici to return. He reminded the Otto that hecould never forget the hardships his family had endured at the hands ofthe Medici, and that colonies of exiled Strozzi, spread all across thepeninsula, were sufficient reminders of their past persecutions. First andforemost a Strozzi, he would be the last in-law the Medici could turn tofor help should they try to re-enter Florence. Little did he know at the timethat those words would be tested not once, but twice in the following threeyears.

Once again the opponents of the marriage went down to defeat. The casewas never transferred to the Quaranta, and even though new charges werehastily placed in the tamburo on 15 and 16 January, the Otto settled thematter in Filippo's favor and voted against his exile. He was permitted tomarry Clarice but made to pay five hundred gold florins and orderedconfined to the Kingdom of Naples for three years. As a warning to theMedici the Otto declared Clarice's brother Lorenzo di Piero an exile.39

Despite the Strozzi's uncertainty about Filippo's punishment and theirfears that his case would end up with the Quaranta, other evidence suggeststhat Filippo was never in any great danger of being exiled. Quite probablythe outcome of his case was a compromise worked out in advance withSoderini, and his appearances and trial before the magistrates a merepretense designed to cool tempers and maintain the gonfalonier eys reputation.Filippo would not have answered the summons of the Signoria without firsthaving had every assurance of safety; according to Guicciardini, severaldays before the hearing Soderini communicated with him through the

38 The charges are reported in the text of the sentence which is in Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib.,143, fols. 23-25. The sentence has also been published in Pasquale Villari, Niccolb Machiavelli ei suoi tempi (Milan, 1927), 11, 548-552. See also C.S., Ser. in , 134, fol. 51; Niccolini, pp. xx-xxii;Guicciardini, Storie, p. 329; Pitti, p. 315; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 321. Filippo's line of argumentcan be pieced together from the official report of the sentencing, from letters and from statementsin Lorenzo's biography.

39 Guicciardini, Storie, p. 331. Giuliano was also included in the ban. Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib.,143, fols. 23-25.

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Strozzi telling him to appear, something Soderini would not have done hadboth sides not been in close contact.40 Basically Filippo had too manypowerful ottimati friends and family behind him to have been in seriousdanger of exile. Even the transfer of the case from the Signoria to the Ottoseems to have been a planned, face-saving device for the gonfaloniere. Onceit was clear that the old Signoria would refuse to punish Filippo severely,Soderini gave way to the inevitable and had the case sent to the Otto wherea lighter sentence would be less personally embarrassing. Lorenzo Strozziand Guicciardini agreed that even the threat from the Quaranta was notso grave, for both believed that the gonfaloniere had intimated to the Ottothat they should settle the case themselves.41

But even if these suspicions of Soderini's complicity in the maneuveringsbehind the scenes were to prove unfounded, the implications of the Strozzicase for his political health were ominous indeed. At the outset he had stakedhis reputation on openly opposing the marriage but had had to shift groundearly in the game when he detected inadequate support in the Signoria. Bylate 1508/early 1509 when Filippo's case was before the magistrates,Soderini's control over the government was already slipping badly and thenumber of his opponents, especially from among the ranks of the ottimati,continued to increase.42 Although Filippo's trial would not in itself havecaused a wholesale desertion from Soderini's camp, it was a readily availableissue over which Florentines took sides and therefore serves as a measureof Soderini's weakening political muscle. Though none were as celebratedas Filippo's betrothal, other incidents revealed that Soderini's control wasslipping. He was powerless to prevent several other marriages which heopposed on political grounds. And just when Filippo's marriage plans wereunfolding, he had proved unable to halt the election of the Medici'scandidate for archbishop, Cosimo Pazzi.43 When seen together with theelection of Pazzi, the marriage of Filippo to the daughter of Piero de'Medicicould not fail to emphasize the growing influence of the Medici in Florencein 1508 and their attempts to unite with a number of aristocratic Florentinefamilies which had traditionally been their enemies.

When Filippo received his sentence from the Otto, he quickly paid hisfine and left for Rome accompanied by an old family friend messer4 0 C.S., Ser. in, 134, fols. 51, 53; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 321; Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 329, 332.4 1 Guicciardini, Storie, p. 331; Niccolini, p. xxiii.4 2 Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 147; Nerli, 1, 160; Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 322-332; Pitti, 'Apologia,' pp.

313-314. See also Bertelli's, 'Pier Soderini,' pp. 347-351 and his articles 'Machiavelli e la politicaestera fiorentina,' Studies on Machiavelli, ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Florence, 1972), pp. 29-77, a n c l'Machiavelli and Soderini,' Renaissance Quarterly, xxvm (1975), 1-16.

4 3 Francesco Guicciardini successfully married the daughter of Alamanno Salviati, a friend turnedopponent of the gonfaloniere. Later Alessandro Sachetti, who was accused in a case similar toFilippo's of making contracts with exiles, was absolved, Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib., 149, fol.155; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 320; Nerli, 1, 162; Piero Parenti, fol. iov.

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Marriage intrigues

Michelangelo Biscioni.44 Although Filippo wrote several letters back toLorenzo from Rome, only one letter from Michelangelo, dated 3 February,has survived in which he tells of their arrival and describes the difficultiesthey had maintaining a low profile and trying to avoid the crowds ofFlorentine well-wishers.

We arrived Wednesday in good time, and that night while the [Florentine]ambassador was with us, the Reverend Monsignor [Cardinal Medici] sent forFilippo. Because many Florentines had come to the house to see him, he withdrewinto an antechamber and waited there until a good part of them had gone away,but he could not prevent some from following him to the Medici palace. Fromthere the party slipped away by a spiral stair that leads out of the [cardinal's] room,and so by their exit they evaded all those people who had come to the palace todemonstrate their support. They then went to see the bride, and even there quitea number of Florentines had gathered. Once again they effected their disappearanceby withdrawing into a small salon leaving the crowds in the hall. . . And as forFilippo on the other hand, he has done everything not to make a scene, and if youshould hear otherwise in Florence, know that he has not made a single movewithout the advice of the ambassador. I have written about this to Matteo, andFilippo will inform you directly as well.45

Filippo had in fact been very careful to pay his respects even to CardinalSoderini, who had received him graciously. On the morning of 3 FebruaryFilippo and Clarice heard mass together and that evening celebrated theirnuptials without fanfare. That very night, leaving his wife behind, Filippodeparted for Naples in order to begin his sentence promptly. His goodfriend Giulio de'Medici accompanied him as far as the Neapolitan border.

Michelangelo's letter reveals how eager both families were to smooth overold rancors and demonstrate good will on the occasion of their unionthrough Filippo and Clarice. They attended to business matters before theceremony and signed contracts which arranged for payment of Clarice'sdowry, two-thirds in cash and one-third in Monte stock and gifts, and forCardinal Medici to reimburse Filippo for his fine. Michelangelo had alsobeen charged with delivering letters to the Medici, one from Lorenzo toCardinal Medici and Alfonsina, and one from Selvaggia to Clarice. Filledwith exuberance that everything was proceeding so smoothly, he joyfullyreported to Lorenzo,' Cardinal Medici received your letter with the greatestpleasure and said, " I do not look upon, nor will I ever look upon Lorenzoas any different from Filippo, as time will reveal; and [I will think of]Madonna Selvaggia as a m o t h e r . . . " ' 4 6 Madonna Alfonsina who hadshown great contentment with the whole affair admitted to him that, even44 The payment of the fine is recorded in a seventeenth-century copy in C.S., Ser. in, 97, fol. 56.45 Ibid., 145, fol. 103. See also ibid., 134, fol. 55; Niccolini, p. xxiii; Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib.,

143, fol. 24V.46 C.S., Ser. in, 145, fol. 103.

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had the Medici been in their rightful place in Florence, they would nothave married Clarice to anyone other than Filippo. Giulio de'Medici, too,offered proof of his good-will and sent back his special recommendations,telling Lorenzo to count on him as if he were one of his very own men.47

Michelangelo's report included a physical description of Filippo's newbride,'.. . your sister-in-law has a pleasing appearance. She is tall, good-looking, well-proportioned, and the rest is not bad either. Nor does she havean owl-like beaked nose as was rumored in Florence.'48

During Filippo's absence in Naples, his mother and brother did theirbest to welcome Clarice into the family. They sent her gifts of a splendidruby and pear-shaped pearl, and, after waiting a decent interval of severalmonths to allow things to cool down in Florence, with the consent of theSignoria they invited her to join them in Florence and live in the Strozzipalace.49 Giulio de'Medici accompanied her to Petrucci in Sienese territorywhere Lorenzo together with many Strozzi relatives and friends came outto greet her. They brought her into Florence at night as the gates wereclosing to avoid any trouble, and none occurred. Not long after Clarice hadsettled in, there was a movement afoot to recall Filippo from Naples. Ifwe are to believe Lorenzo Strozzi, Clarice's modest and respectful conductaroused great compassion, and townsmen openly lamented that such ayoung bride should have to stay without her husband. It is, however,probably more accurate to say that her presence in Florence created arallying point for those citizens discontented with the government and thatit was pressure from them, or at least Soderini's fear of furtherembarrassment, that made the gonfaloniere amenable. With his approval theSignoria ordered the Otto to summon Filippo back to Florence without riskof violating the terms of his confinement and voted to allow him to remainfor the entire month of December 1509.50 Even though he had stayed inNaples less than one year, Filippo never had to return there, for hecontinued to receive a series of licenses to extend his leave until theexpiration of his sentence.4 7 Conspicuous at the time, however, was the absence of any letter or communication from Alfonso,

and apparently other Strozzi still found Filippo's marriage hard to swallow. Marco Strozziencapsulated this sentiment in a letter written from Rome on the day of the wedding,' I have becomea perfect and good Ghibelline. I had been a Guelf, but this [marriage] has caused me to changein desperation. Enough of this. From these horns it is impossible to escape,' C.S., Ser. in, 134,

fol. 55-4 8 Ibid., 145, fol. 103. Malicious gossip that Clarice was unsightly had been circulating in Florence.

Marco felt the same need to reassure the Ferrara relatives about her appearance, ibid., 134, fol. 55.4 9 On 26 March 1509 Lorenzo sent the jewels to Matteo in Rome who presented them to Clarice

on 31 March, C.S., Ser. v, 87, Ricordo of 26 March 1509. Lorenzo Strozzi said that Soderini wouldnot have permitted her to come had the majority of the Signoria not been in favor of it, Niccolini,p. xxiv.

50 Nerli, 1, 162; Niccolini, p. xxiv; C.S., Ser. m, 220, fol. 99.

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4

Rise to favor

For Filippo, the conclusion of his marriage to Clarice de'Medici despitethe opposition of Soderini was a personal victory. He had gained for himselfa rich wife and for his family an important alliance with the Medici. Hehad escaped the clutches of the Quaranta and received a relatively lightpunishment at the hands of the Otto. The Signoria had lessened hissentence by allowing him to come back to Florence, and he was permittedto remain there under probation.

But he had been back in Florence barely a year when his new-foundsecurity was seriously threatened. His boyhood friend, Prinzivalle dellaStufa, with whom he had staged the Dovitia mime in 1506, tried to involvehim in a plot to murder Soderini and overthrow the government to reinstatethe Medici. One night, a week before Christmas 1510, Prinzivalle arrivedin Florence from Bologna where he had frequently visited Cardinal Medici,papal legate to that city.l He came straight to the Strozzi palace to confidein Filippo, who he supposed would be sympathetic to the plot, since Strozziwas a Medici parente and had ample reason to dislike Soderini. Prinzivalleinformed Filippo that their mutual friend and childhood companion MarcoAntonio Colonna, now a condottiere in the pay of the pope, was waitingoutside the city's gates with a band of loyal men ready to enter Florenceand strike down Soderini at some public event during the holidays. Filippoflatly refused to participate in the plot. He reacted quickly, first by warningPrinzivalle to leave town immediately, and then by reporting the incidentto Leonardo Strozzi, who was a member of the Council of Ten, and to hisfirst cousin Matteo. The next morning they all went to Soderini andrevealed the previous night's events.2

Filippo's refusal to cooperate with Prinzivalle and his disclosure of theplot to the government not only effectively terminated the conspiracy, butprobably saved Soderini's life. Presumably he considered involvement in

1 Prinzivalle was one of the young Palleschi. His father Luigi had been a close friend of Lorenzoil Magnifico, Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 77-78; Bertelli, 'Pier Soderini,' pp. 352-353.

2 The accounts of the conspiracy in contemporary histories include: Cambi, 11, 243-248; Cerretani,Istoria, fols. 355V-362; Nardi, 11, 11—13; Nerli, 1, 167-168; Piero Parenti, fols. 45-47; Niccolini,pp. xxvi-xxix; Luca Landucci, Diario fiorentino dal 1450 al 1516, ed. Iodoco del Badia (Florence,1883), pp. 304-305; see also Bertelli, 'Pier Soderini,' pp. 352-356.

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the scheme too dangerous. Nor did he have complete confidence in hisfriends' ability to succeed in their plan. By reputation neither Prinzivallenor Marco Antonio was the sort of man to be trusted with such a riskyventure, and Filippo who had known them intimately was well aware oftheir deficiencies. Twenty-six-year-old Prinzivalle was commonly consid-ered hot-headed by nature and possessing only mediocre qualities, andMarco Antonio was thought rather bizarre and crazy.3 A second equallyimportant reason why Filippo refused to cooperate must have been hisdecision not to jeopardize his own delicate legal position in Florence. Hewas still subject to the terms of the three-year sentence imposed by the Otto,and to have joined in Prinzivalle's scheme would have meant violating theterms of his probation at the risk of permanent exile and confiscation ofhis property.

Soderini reacted to the report of a plot against his life in much the sameway as he had reacted to the news of Filippo's parentado with Clarice. Hetried to use it to his best political advantage to bolster his party and toinfluence the coming elections in the Great Council, but this time he metwith even less success than before. For despite his heated denunciations ofthe plot and his best efforts to capitalize on the public outcry, his politicalopponents were still potent enough to prevent more than light punishmentfor the Delia Stufa family and to insure that no one else was prosecuted.Not even the Medici in-laws, obvious suspects, endured more than routinequestioning. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the conspiracy wasthat it marked a complete breakdown in relations between Soderini and thepope, whom Soderini implicated as Colonna's employer and CardinalMedici's benefactor.4 Soderini sent troops to the Florentine borders andrenewed a provision of 1495 which prohibited any Florentines in Romefrom associating with the exiled Medici. Not long after this, he bowed topressure from both the French and his brother the cardinal of Volterra andeffectively sealed his own fate by permitting the schismatic Council of Pisato meet on Florentine soil.

Filippo's conduct regarding Prinzivalle's conspiracy left him in aparadoxical position. On the one hand his prompt move to expose the plotshould have ingratiated him with the gonfaloniere, but he was never entirelyfreed of suspicion because the facts remained that he was still a Mediciparente, that he had been considered a likely comrade by the conspirators,and that when Prinzivalle approached him he had purposely delayed longenough to allow his old friend to escape before going to the authorities.On the other hand Filippo found his relations with his in-laws strained,

3 Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 355v; Niccolini, p. xxvi; C.S. Ser. HI, 134, fol. 162.4 Cardinal Medici swore his innocence to the Florentine ambassador, Dieci, Resp. 102, fol. 455, cited

in Bertelli, 'Pier Soderini,' p. 353.

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for by his actions he had saved Soderini's life and prolonged the regimethe Medici hoped to replace. The galling irony of the situation did notescape public attention, and Tosinghi, the Florentine ambassador in Rome,taunted Cardinal Medici with the fact that his own relative, one whom heregarded as a son, had thwarted the conspiracy designed to reinstate theMedici in Florence.5 Whether Cardinal Medici was angered is difficult tosay, but Filippo's refusal to participate in the plot did make it clear at thetime that he was not yet willing to risk his life and well-being for the sakeof his wife's family. And the question remained open, just what would hebe willing to do to help his in-laws in the future?

In August 1512 when, at the urging of Pope Julius II, Cardinal Medicimade his return to Florence by force, Filippo had no part in the ensuingrevolution and expulsion of Soderini.6 He was quite obviously not amongthose Palleschi the Medici consulted about their plans, nor was he one ofthat group of young men who plotted fifth-column activities insideFlorence. Was it reluctance on his part, mistrust by the Medici, or wasFilippo still too vulnerable as a result of the 1510 conspiracy? Accordingto Lorenzo Strozzi, his brother's opposition to Prinzivalle's plot wasprecisely the reason why the leaders of the 1512 schemes, Paolo Vettori,Bartolomeo Valori, Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, and Giovanni and Palladi Bernardo Rucellai, did not include him in their plans to overthrow thegovernment and why even Filippo's good friend Giulio de'Medici hadcautioned the young men against seeking Filippo's confidence.7

Although the Medici did not trust Filippo to help in their restoration,neither did Soderini consider him a safe ally. The Spanish army led byCardinal Medici and his brother Giuliano had made its way from Bolognathrough Florentine territory towards Prato. On 26 August ambassadors

5 Died, Resp. 102, fols. 461V-462.6 Of all the contemporary authors who wrote on the events of 1512, not one mentions that Strozzi

had any part in the revolution. Giulio de'Medici had held secret meetings with Paolo Vettori andAntonfrancesco degli Albizzi near Siena, Niccolini, p. xix; Pitti, 'Apologia,' p. 311. According toNardi, 11, 10-11, Giulio maintained a correspondence with the conspirators in the city by meansof a contadino who would hide the messages in the most private parts of his body and deposit themin a chink in the cemetery wall of Santa Maria Novella.

7 Niccolini, p. xxix. The conspirators were from noted Palleschi families and included several ofFilippo's good friends such as Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, Niccolo Orlandini, Gino Capponi withwhom he had confided about his marriage, and Benedetto, son of Filippo Buondelmonti. Othermembers of the group were Francesco and Domenico di Girolamo Rucellai, Giovanni Vespucci,Simone Tornabuoni, and other Tornabuoni relatives. See Guicciardini, Carteggi, ed. RobertoPalmarocchi (Bologna, 1938), 1, 95; Nardi, 1, 427-428; Pitti, 'Apologia,' p. 311, his 'Storiafiorentina,' published in A.S.I., Ser., 1, vol. 4, part 2 (Florence, 1853), 99-102; and especiallyNerli, 1, 172-175 who identifies the young men with the well-known group of literati who had mettogether in Bernardo Rucellai's garden. Nerli's association of the political opponents of Soderiniwith the Orti Oricellari group has inspired modern scholarship on the subject, in particular FelixGilbert's article, 'Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari? Journal of the Warburg and CourtauldInstitutes, xn (1949), 101-131; Devonshire Jones, pp. 56-59; and Albertini, pp. 67-85.

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from the Spanish viceroy Cardona outlined their peace terms to Florence.Nothing short of the removal of Soderini from office and the restorationof the Medici would satisfy them.8 In Florence Soderini stood firm againstcapitulation, but his resolution engendered increasing criticism, especiallyfrom those who saw in his reluctance to step down a needless exposure toattack and plunder by the Spanish. This mounting unrest coupled with thesabotage of an ammunition shipment designated for the defense of Pratoprompted Soderini and the Signoria to order the imprisonment of fortycitizens suspected of being Medici sympathizers, among them FilippoStrozzi.9

Their imprisonment lasted only a few days because on 29 and 30 Augustthe Spanish took and sacked Prato, increasing the pressure on Soderini toabdicate in order to save Florence from a similar fate. By Tuesday, 31August there was no other alternative to surrender. The band of youthfulconspirators, led by Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, who had been plottingto oust the gonfaloniere seized the square in front of the palace of theSignoria, entered the palace and persuaded the exhausted Soderini to leave,offering him a guarantee for his safety. Under pressure from these men theSignoria authorized the release of the prisoners, and shortly thereafterSoderini was voted out of office.1 ° With the removal of the gonfaloniere,the main obstacle to settlement with the Spanish disappeared, and the firstaction by the Florentines in control of the Palazzo was to summon thePalleschi and other leading citizens together to appoint ambassadors to theviceroy and papal legate to arrange the restoration of the Medici andpayment of an indemnity to remove the Spanish army from Florentineterritory.11 Filippo accompanied the three ambassadors who went to Pratoto greet Cardinal Medici and the viceroy and sue for peace. It is doubtfulthat he had any significant role in the negotiations, but as a relative of theMedici it was proper that he be included among the citizens who escorted

8 Landucci, p. 322; Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 148; Nerli, 1, 174-175; Nardi, 1, 420-421, 426-427.Soderini had tried to make a settlement with the viceroy who desperately needed food and moneyfor his troops, but the negotiations broke down over the amount of money Florence would haveto pay and over the problem of Soderini's remaining in office. From one of Filippo's letters welearn that Soderini had offered 130,000 ducats to the viceroy to withdraw his army, C.S., Ser. in,178, fol. 67.

9 Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 148; Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 101-102 identified Bernardo and his son GiovanniRucellai and members of the Tornabuoni among those imprisoned.

10 Filippo described how Soderini was ' check-mated' that day in a letter to Lorenzo in C.S., Ser.in, 178, fol. 67 and Bardi, p. 33.

11 Bernardo Rucellai, Archbishop Pazzi, and Paolo Vettori were the three ambassadors. Filipporeported, ibid., fol. 67, that they had some difficulty agreeing on the indemnity. The Florentineswanted to pay as little as possible, but since Soderini had previously offered 130,000 ducats, theviceroy was unwilling to settle for anything less. Filippo wrote on 4 September that the finalagreement would be for 120,000 ducats or more, which figure is confirmed by Cerretani. See C.S.,Ser. in, 178, fol. 69 and Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 149. Nardi, 11,13 said that the viceroy was eventuallypaid 150,000.

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the city's emissaries. For his own private reasons, too, Filippo was anxiousto present himself to the cardinal and congratulate him on his imminentreturn to Florence.

Even after the ambassadors had struck the accord and had committedthe city to pay 120,000 florins ransom to the Spanish army,12 Florence'stroubles had barely begun. The resignation of Soderini had left the citywithout an executive head and the terms under which the Medici were toreturn to Florence were still unclear, so that the most difficult problem nowfacing the citizens was how to reform the government to reflect the newpolitical realities. In fact, the uncertainties of the critical first two weeksafter Soderini's departure only resolved themselves on 17 September whenthe Medici resorted to the drastic measure of calling a par lament 0 to abolishthe Great Council and impose their own government by Balia.13

The problem of factionalism among the ottimati which delayed a politicalsettlement and which was a primary cause of the instability of Florentineinstitutions in this period has been discussed in a previous chapter, but atthis point it will be helpful to focus upon its effects on Filippo Strozzi andhis family. Not only is their case well-documented, but also in many waysthe Strozzi's reactions during this period of flux were typical of otherFlorentine noble families. At best, Filippo's family was uncertain as to the

12 According to Filippo, the agreement required the city to pay 40,000 florins immediately, made upof 30,000 in cash and 10,000 in cloths, C.S., Ser. HI, 178, fol. 69. Piero Parenti, fol. 80 describesthe difficulties the city had in raising the money and how even after imposing several accatti, ithad to borrow on the exchange from Florentines living in Rome and Naples at a loss. In the spaceof four months between August and November Florentines were forced to raise over 175,000 florinsin accatti and on the exchange, Balie, 43, fols. 6v, 7, 27V-28, 57V-58. Officials experiencedconsiderable difficulty in raising the money. Despite the large contributions of families like theStrozzi for the two accatti of 21 August and 21 September, over two thousand citizens had to beasked to contribute, some of whom were still delinquent in their payments over a year later, ibid.,fols. 146V, 155V. Lorenzo and Filippo had been picked for the August accatto, C.S., Ser. m, 143,fol. 7, and in October members of the family paid 2,000 florins out of a levy of 17,500 florins. Inaddition, among another twelve parties who raised 12,500 florins are included Matteo, Lorenzo andFilippo, Balie, 43, fols. 40-41 v. Still, despite such a tremendous burden of forced loans, the taxeskept coming. In February 1513 the Balia approved a one-quarter decima and arbitrio to be leviedsix times during the coming year to raise money for the city, ibid., fol. 95V, and the new Monteofficials were requested to loan 10,000 florins at 12 percent, ibid., fol. 99V. By April there were stillsome delinquents to the September accatto, fols. mv-112, and five new officials of the Monte forthe year 1514 had to be appointed twelve months in advance to loan up to 25,000 florins, fol. 108.These revenues were just the beginning of a long line of taxes and loans needed to support thefinancial burdens imposed on the city by the Medici after 1512.

13 In theory a parlamento was the means whereby in times of crisis the populace could meet in assemblyin the Piazza delta Signoria to approve or disapprove by voice vote any proposed changes in thegovernment. The Medici had first used a parlamento successfully in 1434 to recall Cosimo fromexile, and in 1512 it was an easy matter to control the entrances to the Piazza with armed guardsand to admit only their partisans who readily acclaimed the institution of government by Balia.See Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 153V; Nerli, 1, 185; Niccolini, pp. xxxii-xxxiii; Piero Parenti, fols. 81-82;Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 106-107. Nardi, 11, 5-6 said there were more Spanish soldiers and foreignersthan citizens present at the parlamento.

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course of action to follow, and Filippo's correspondence clearly illustratesjust how acutely they felt the ambiguity of the political situation eventhough they had a parentado with the Medici. The Strozzi, like many otherottimati, played a waiting game, for they were anxious to evaluate the newturn of events before committing themselves too firmly to what might turnout in the long run to be a losing position. It was a foregone conclusionthat as soon as Soderini stepped down the Medici would become thedominant political force in any new government, but no one knew whetherthey would be content to exercise their influence in the guise of primi interpares on the model of Lorenzo il Magnifico or be outright rulers, and noone knew how tolerant they would be of their adversaries. The uncertaintyof the political situation meant that many ottimati found themselvesstraddling the fence for an uncomfortably long time. The Strozzi's positionwas further confused by the diverse political allegiances within the familywhich had already complicated Filippo's marriage negotiations with theMedici several years before. Filippo's half-brother Alfonso remainedsympathetic to the Soderini government. Other family leaders such as hiscousins Matteo and Leonardo would have favored reforming thatgovernment while still preserving the Great Council. Similarly, Filippo'sbrother Lorenzo, and at this point Filippo himself, favored the Council andcertainly did not advocate a limited government imposed and controlledby the Medici.14

In the first few days after the revolution, Filippo clearly downplayed hisparentado with the Medici and restrained himself from associating tooopenly with his in-laws. Upon his release from the Palazzo della Signoriaon 31 August, he refused to join the group of Palleschi holding the palaceand hurried home, not to emerge again until the disturbance was over. On4 September Filippo wrote to Lorenzo, who had fled to Lucca with Alfonsoimmediately after Soderini's surrender, that the Medici had reproached himfor not exerting himself more on their behalf but that he had refused alltheir requests that he join with the armed guard.15 Filippo's reluctance tocommit himself completely to the Medici cause followed from his owncautious assessment of the political situation in that first week after theirreturn. In his opinion, under the moderate political reform then beingpropounded, those men who had shown themselves strongly in favor of the14 C.S., Ser. in, 143, fols. 6-7; 178, fol. 68. This was also the belief of men like Jacopo Salviati,

Bernardo Rucellai, Piero Alamanni, Giovanbattista Ridolfi, Lanfredino Lanfredini and ArchbishopPazzi who, although they had supported the return of the Medici, developed into a more moderatewing of the Palleschi party in opposition to those who wanted to abolish the Council altogetherand institute a very restricted government. See especially Cerretani, Dialogo, fols. 150-153; Nerli,1, 179, 183, 191-194; and Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 104-106.

15 C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 69 and Bardi, p. 36. The Palleschi maintained their guard and controlledaccess to the Palazzo during the first week after Soderini's ouster. See Landucci, p. 325; Pitti,'Storia,' pp. 103-104; and Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 150.

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Medici would be unpopular in the new government, or in his words, 'hewho has toiled [travagliato] the most, I believe now will wish to do less.'16

Filippo's decision to remain neutral with his in-laws met with Lorenzo'sapproval:

Since you are too young to participate in the deliberations of the city, I wouldcounsel you to exert yourself [travagliare] to the least possible extent, because youhave the advantage of always being accepted willingly; and [do this] especiallyuntil such time as the situation becomes stabilized. I know you are prudent, andif your ambition does not overrule your reason, you cannot go wrong. But do notbe surprised, for affairs like these can bring ruin (and God help us that it doesnot happen now) and I understand there are some others who are exertingthemselves more than seems wise to me.17

He also warned Filippo not to contribute more to the accatto, or forcedloan, than other citizens so that he would not appear to be over eager.18

In the short run, the Strozzi's choice not to encourage the Medici openlyand to support the retention of the Great Council seemed proper, especiallywhen the moderate reform program keeping the Great Council was actuallyapproved by Giuliano de'Medici. But unfortunately for its supporters, thisgovernment was destined to be no more than an interim measure. Whenthe new gonfaloniere Giovanbattista Ridolfi dismissed the Medici's armedguard from the Palazzo, this so upset those Palleschi who had committedthemselves openly to the return of the Medici that they scurried to consultwith Cardinal Medici in fear for their own and his family's safety.19 Adebate ensued among the Palleschi with Cardinal Medici over whether tocall a parlamento and restructure the government.

Between 9 and 15 September Filippo was in attendance at the Medicicourt in its movements between San Antonio, Campi, and Prato where aseries of sessions with relatives and friends took place.20 Filippo had keptLorenzo informed of developments and at one point felt sure that CardinalMedici would approve the existing government with the Great Council.21

16 C.S., Ser. in , 178, fol. 69 and Bardi, p. 36. Filippo's analysis is supported by Nerli, 1, 183, whosaid that the ardent Palleschi feared that once the Spanish army left the area, they themselves wouldbe thrown out of Florence and totally ruined.

17 C.S., Ser. in , 143, fol. 7.18 Ibid., fol. 7. Lorenzo had already paid 150 florins to the August accatto, and he wanted Filippo

to be sure he did not pay more than an additional 150. Later, in fact, they paid much more.19 Cerretani, Dialogo, fols. 150-152; Pitti, 'Storia, ' pp. 104-105; Nerli, 1, 183; Niccolini, pp. xxx-xxxi.

Filippo was well aware of Palleschi dissatisfaction, C.S., Ser. in , 178, fols. 67V, 69V.2 0 T h e earliest meeting between disgruntled Palleschi and the cardinal occurred in Prato within only

a few days of the ejection of Soderini, Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 150. Since Filippo had been in Pratowith the ambassadors he probably obtained his early impressions of Palleschi discontent at that time.Further discussions over the next week were held at Campi and S. Antonio del Vescovo justoutside the city walls; C.S., Ser. in , 178, fols. 68, 90. Also Pitti, 'Storia, ' pp. 104-105.

21 C.S., Ser. in , 178, fol. 68.

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But what he saw in the course of these meetings soon made it abundantlyclear that he had better change his own stance and exchange his previousaloofness for cooperation with his in-laws. He began openly to seek out thecompany and counsel of his friend Giulio de'Medici and of Clarice'sbrother Lorenzo. To please the Medici he even entertained the duke ofTraietto and other Spanish officers in the Strozzi palace when they cameto Florence at the cardinal's invitation. He also began to worry about hisbrothers' conspicuous absence and wrote them to prepare to return to thecity for the sake of their family:

As soon as I have heard the outcome I will let you know so that you can returnimmediately, and then it will look as if you left [Florence] to escape the tumultand not out of fear of the Medici. But even though now there seems to be no reasonfor us to fear their hatred any more so than that of any other well-placed person,still, while we are able, it is better to avoid it altogether. Tell Alfonso the same,and beg him to come back for his own and for our sake.22

The final stage in Filippo's change of heart came when he agreed to dofor the Medici what previously he had refused. On 17 September he tookup arms and came to the Piazza della Signoria together with Palleschi andSpanish soldiers to hold it for the Medici during the parlamento. A weekbefore Filippo had not believed it possible, but now he witnessed thePalleschi assembly in the Piazza abolish the Great Council and institutegovernment by Balia. In a letter the next day to Lorenzo, strongly hintingat his own acquiescence to the inevitable, he explained that the cardinalhad decided to stage the parlamento only after securing the approval of amajority of the citizens he had consulted.23 Filippo renewed his plea thathis brothers return immediately and reassured them it was safe because theMedici had ordered no reprisals, or, to use his expression,' not one chickenhas had its head chopped off.'24

When the list of the members of the new Balia was made public, noStrozzi were among them. Nor, to their intense consternation, were anyadded several days later when the Balia's numbers were enlarged, eventhough the Strozzi were a more prominent family than many of thoseappointed. They could not have expected to be heavily represented in thenew Medici government, but, given both their prominence and Filippo'sparentado, they certainly did not anticipate being completely excluded.Baroncello Baroncelli, long-time trusted employee and friend, wrote to22 Ibid., fol. 68.23 Ibid., fol. 90 and Bardi, p. 37; Niccolini, pp. xxxii-xxxiii. The Medici continued to maintain a guard

in the Piazza and installed four big artillery pieces outside their palace, Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 154.V.24 C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 90 and Bardi, p. 37. Filippo was not the only one to exhort Lorenzo and

Alfonso to return at this point. Baroncello Baroncelli and Donato Bonsi, close family friends, wroteto the same effect on 20 September, C.S., Ser. m , 134, fols. 76, 77.

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Lorenzo on 20 September: 'In truth it seems strange to me that there isno one from the Strozzi [on the Balia], but perhaps one could venture tosay there are reasons since the family showed itself to be a bit cold, or ratherslow to respond to their [the Medici's] favors.'25 Lorenzo Strozzi recounteda revealing incident in which one Strozzi relative accosted Filippo in frontof the Strozzi palace after the nomination of the Balia and said,' Since withthis Balia your Medici have shown us that they do not consider ourparentado with them to be worth anything, if I were you, I would pack thatwife of yours Clarice off home to them.'26 The Medici had evidently notforgotten the Strozzi family's long tradition of opposition to their house,nor did they entirely trust them either. A glance at the records of the Baliain the first month after its creation shows that no Strozzi was appointedto any of the major councils, not to the enlarged Balia of 19 September,to the Otto di Balla of 18 September, to the Twelve Procurators of 28September nor to the accoppiatori or the Died di Liberia e Pace namedon 19 October. Nor was Filippo included in the group of young men who,in reward for aiding the Medici, were declared eligible for public officedespite their youth.27 The Medici had vaguely promised that the Baliawould be enlarged again to satisfy more citizens, and apparently the Strozzistill hoped to have a family member within its ranks then, for Baroncellowrote: ' People say that they will make another addition [to the Balia] andperhaps sometime someone from the family could be included. If only oneperson should be chosen, perhaps it would be messer Antonio; if more thanone, I believe it would fall to Matteo and Leonardo.'28

The Strozzi were not the only ones disappointed to find themselvesexcluded from government. Parenti reported noticeable discontent in allthe noble houses who had enjoyed a place in the Great Council for the pasttwenty years but who were excluded from the smaller Balia.29 But onceit was clear that the Medici meant to retain control of the city, these ottimatihastened to ingratiate themselves with the cardinal and Giuliano. Withinthree days of the parlamento, on 20 September, Filippo led a delegationof six Strozzi from different branches of the family to call on the cardinal25 Ibid., fol. 76. The list of members is in Balie, 43, fols. 2v, 5V. Those appointed from the Strozzi's

quarter of Santa Maria Novella included representatives of the most prominent ottimati familiesresiding there, making the Strozzi conspicuous by their absence.

26 Niccolini, p. xxxiii.27 Balie, 43, fols. 2, 5V, 4V, 15V, 3or, 3ir. It came as no surprise that the list included many of the

young men who had forced the resignation of Soderini. The seven were Bartolomeo Valori, Giulianode'Medici, Maso di Luca degli Albizzi, Benedetto Buondelmonti, Giovanni Vespucci,Antonfrancesco di Luca degli Albizzi, and Francesco Antonio Nori.

28 C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 76. Matteo was not added to the Balia until May 1514, Tratte, 52,unnumbered. Leonardo made it on the Council of Seventy that year, but Filippo's brother Lorenzodid not become a Balia member until July 1522, Tratte, 54, vol. 6v. Antonio never got on the Balia.

29 Piero Parenti, fol. 83 and likewise Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 107-108; Nerli, 1, 191-194; and Cerretani,Dialogo, fols. 153, 157.

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and rejoice in the name of the whole Strozzi clan over Filippo's parentadowith Clarice and the Medici's return to Florence. Leonardo and MatteoStrozzi had already presented themselves earlier, apparently to discuss theStrozzi's political role in the new regime to judge from the good words andpromises they received in return.30 For their part, the Medici realized thenecessity of placating the citizens and winning new friends whose allegiancewould help buttress their regime. The cardinal and his brother Giulianopatiently endured hours of interviews to reassure families like the Strozziof their good intentions. After the Strozzi delegation had their interview,Baroncello reported to Lorenzo Strozzi,

I understand that he [Cardinal Medici] received them willingly and made a showover them. He told them he had not given it [the parentado] just to Filippo butto the whole family and that they should feel free to call upon him at any timeand that he would be most prompt to do everything in his power for them. Hesaid many words of great affection to them and it seems they came away highlysatisfied.31

Filippo began to frequent the Medici palace regularly and was often seenin the company of his brother-in-law Lorenzo de'Medici and of his goodfriend Giulio. The bonds of friendship among them seem to have beenunaffected by the recent political events. In the first days after the Sackof Prato, Giulio took it upon himself to ransom a Strozzi relative, ZaccheriaStrozzi, from the Spanish for thirty ducats.32 Giulio had guided Filippo'srapprochement with the Medici in the last days before the parlamento, and,according to Lorenzo Strozzi, he had even offered to intercede with thecardinal on Filippo's behalf to have him appointed one of the new Ottodi Balia, although technically he was too young to be eligible for office.33

Filippo, however, was not included on the Otto, and in the aftermathof the revolution of 1512, neither he nor his family held any special positionin the state. His importance to the Medici had decidedly diminished incomparison to 1508 when his parentado with Clarice had signified for themboth a reconciliation with a powerful family of former opponents and a stepforward in their efforts to return to the city. In 1512 the Medici hadachieved their goal of returning without the Strozzi's help, and their30 C.S., Ser. HI, 134, fol. 76. 3I Ibid., fol. 76.32 Another Strozzi, Marcello, was not so fortunate when he fell into the hands of the Spanish soldiers.

Filippo wrote on 2 September, C.S., Ser. 111,178, fol. 67, that he was doing all he could on Marcello'sbehalf, but that the case was complicated because it was not clear just who was holding him captiveand because even though Marcello was not wealthy, his in-laws were. On 3 September, a friendwrote to Lorenzo and Alfonso that the price of Marcello's ransom had been set at 1,000 gold ducatsbut that some scoundrels had informed his captors that he was really worth 30,000 ducats, C.S.,Ser. in , 134, fol. 75. This is undoubtedly the Marcello Strozzi whose capture at Campi before theSack of Prato is described in Nardi, 1, 422-423.

33 Niccolini, p. xxxiii.

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coolness toward them had not gone unnoticed. Furthermore, Filippo'sclosest personal friends among the Medici, Lorenzo and Giulio, were notat the center of family power at the time. They could not exert as muchpersonal influence on his behalf in comparison with Giuliano, who withCardinal Medici headed the government and worked aggressively to benefithis own special friends in the early months of the regime. In fact, it wasnot until mid-October 1512 that we find any Strozzi in political office, andthen Filippo, his brother Lorenzo, and Federigo Strozzi were only includedin the enlarged body of over 200 citizens added to the Balia for the purposeof conducting the new scrutiny. Apparently this was no special honorbecause the number of members was so large that every reputableFlorentine family was represented at least once.34 Clearly after 1512 theprice of political position was going to be cooperation with the Medici, andFilippo's family had barely begun the struggle to re-establish itself amongthe ottimati who could expect to enjoy high office. The progress they madein the years that followed the revolution of 1512 came largely as a resultof Filippo's ascent at the Medici court.

Filippo's rise within the ranks of the Medici party did not beginimmediately. But two events took place in 1513 which catapulted him intothe forefront of special Medici favorites, a position he was to enjoy for thenext twenty years. The election of Cardinal Giovanni de'Medici to thepapacy as Leo X in March 1513 and Giuliano's transfer from head of thegovernment in Florence to the papal court at Rome the following summeraltered the course of Filippo's life. The election of Leo X caused a shiftof power within the Medici family and brought about the rise of youngLorenzo de'Medici to head his family's interests and the regime inFlorence. Lorenzo's new prominence created the occasion for Filippo'ssudden access to political power and financial reward.

Filippo's relationship with Lorenzo de'Medici, commencing in 1508 atthe time of his marriage, blossomed into an intimate personal friendshipwhich lasted until Lorenzo's death in 1519. Their friendship shapedFilippo's adult career in several different ways. It thrust him into theinnermost circles of the Medici's political power and patronage in Florence;it involved him directly in the financial affairs of the regime through theoffice of the Depository of the Florentine Signoria; and it introduced himto the French court, providing him with associations which were later toprove useful to his career as an international financier and papal diplomat.But most important for his later career, Filippo's close friendship withLorenzo de'Medici secured him in effect an exit visa from Florence and34 Balie, 43, fol. 25; Nardi, 11, 6. Finally that same month Matteo Strozzi received recognition by being

named ambassador to the pope together with Jacopo Salviati, but, according to Nerli, 1, 191-192,his appointment was made only at the insistence of Salviati, who was engaged in a serious campaignto have a greater number of qualified citizens participate in office to enlarge the governing circle.

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an entree to the papal court and the world of papal finance where he couldexpand his interests and experience well beyond his native city andeventually beyond all Italy.

Filippo accompanied Cardinal de'Medici to Rome in late February forthe conclave summoned to elect Julius IPs successor, and he sent back tohis family several reports of the exciting goings-on. Five days after theopening of the conclave, Filippo informed his brother of the agreementbetween Cardinal de'Medici and his one-time opponent Cardinal Soderiniwhich made Medici the favorite candidate. Bookmakers that day placedMedici's chances at one to four and those of his nearest competitor at lessthan one to five. Filippo felt sure that either his cardinal would be electedor else would come so close that all would marvel at his great success.35

The next day Medici's odds had fallen nine percentage points, but Filippostill held firm to his previous predictions.36

The proclamation on 11 March of the election of Cardinal de'Medici asLeo X was greeted with shouts oVPalle, Pallet37 and Florentines presentin Rome were beside themselves with joy. The news reached Florence inonly thirteen hours, and the city went wild with celebrations which lastedseveral days. Bells tolled continuously and bonfires flared. The sacredimage of the Madonna da Impruneta was brought into the city in solemnceremony, and allegories of the victory of peace over discord, war, and fearwere displayed in triumphal carts.38 People considered the election of LeoX the best news Florence had ever received. Filippo exclaimed, 'Howfortunate we are to be born in this century,' and his friend Francesco Vettori3 5 C.S., Ser. in, 178, fols. 70, 84. Cardinal de'Medici was only thirty-seven years old and quite ill

at the time of the conclave, reportedly with an abscess in his leg, which some said improved hischances of being elected because he was not expected to live long. See Paolo Giovio, Vita LeonisXy in, p. 56, cited by William Roscoe, The Life and Pontificate of Leo the Tenth (London, 1876),

i ,35 i -56 C.S., Ser. in , 178, fol. 84. Filippo listed the percentage odds of various candidates as follows:

Cardinal San Giorgio, 18; Grimanni, 16; Strigonia, 13; Medici, 16; Flisco, 10; the rest from sixon down. Betting on the outcome of papal elections was quite common and was often handled bythe banking houses in Rome which employed sensali, or messengers, to scurry back and forthdelivering betting slips. Bettors watched the odds closely, and on this day, for example, when Filippoquoted Cardinal Grimanni's odds at 16 in Rome, he requested his brother in Florence to place twobets for him there on Grimanni if he could get them at ten. He did this probably to cover anotherbet in Rome.

37 Palle refers to the Medici device featuring six golden balls.38 Fifty-five hours and 500 miles later the news reached Lyons where there were great celebrations

among Florentines. Sanuto, xvi, col. 36, says news reached Florence in just ten hours. On thecelebrations in Florence following Leo's election, see Piero Parenti, fols. 85-87; Cerretani, Dialogo,fols. 161V-162; Landucci, pp. 335-336; Nardi, 11, 24; Nerli, 1, 197-198. On the special powers andcultic significance of the Madonna da Impruneta, see Richard C. Trexler, * Florentine ReligiousExperience: the Sacred Image,' Studies in the Renaissance, xix (1972), 7-41. In a letter Baroncellowrote to Lorenzo Strozzi on 19 March 1513 reporting on the festivities in Florence, C.S., Ser. HI,134, fol. 83, he mentioned that the Madonna had nine special vestments and other elaboratetrappings. For a description of the triumphal carts, see Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 162 and Vasari'slife of Jacopo Pontormo, Opere, vi, 250-255.

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wrote to Machiavelli that the election should bring Florence great honorin both public and private affairs. Leonardo Bartolini, one of the new pope'screditors, gushed,' For me it is enough that we have the most splendid popein the last 400 years of the papacy.'39

In the midst of the jubilation few people were clairvoyant enough torecognize the full consequences for the city of the elevation of a Medicito the papal throne. With that election, Florence virtually ceased to be anindependent entity pursuing her own separate political destiny, but foundherself drawn into an extensive web of papal and ecclesiastical interests.Only a few citizens stood to enjoy the privileges of expanded patronageand career opportunities the election of a Medici pope brought them. Butthe city from now on had to shoulder the burdens which Leo's electionentailed - above all, the crushing weight of providing continual financialsupport for papal wars. These negative effects were not seen in that gloriousspring of 1513 when Florentines for the most part were too busy tryingto twist the election to their own advantage to worry about such things.From the point of view of the Medici, the election had the immediate effectof solidifying their control over Florence and of diminishing the residualopposition to them among some of the citizenry. The Boscoli Conspiracyin which Machiavelli was implicated had been thwarted in the days beforethe conclave, and no other conspiracy against the Medici surfaced until 1522following Leo's death.40

Initially at least, after Leo's election the Medici received no trouble fromFlorence. Their friends and foes alike were too intent on celebrating. TheStrozzi were well represented at the festivities in Rome and were in closecompany with various members of the Medici family. Filippo, who wasalready present in the entourage of Cardinal Medici, took part in thecoronation procession through the streets of Rome on 11 April. His brotherLorenzo travelled from Florence in the company of Giulio de'Medici, andeven Alfonso Strozzi was among the forty young men outfitted in elegantsuits of clothing worth over three hundred ducats apiece who made up theretinue of Giuliano de'Medici at the coronation.41

39 Letter to Lorenzo Strozzi, Rome, 17 March 1513, C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 2. Similarly Vettori toMachiavelli, Rome, 30 March 1513, published in Niccolb Machiavelli, Lettere, ed. Franco Gaeta,Opere, vi (Milano, 1961), 237; Bartolini to Niccolo Michelozzi, Rome, 18 March 1513, B.N.F.,Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol. 30.

4 0 Nerli, 1, 196-197; Landucci, p. 334. That winter before the election the situation in Florence wastense, and the Otto had ordered arms to be taken from all citizens, Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. i6ov.Luigi Alamanni staged the unsuccessful conspiracy of 1522 against Cardinal Giulio de'Medici. SeeCesare Guasti, 'Documenti della congiura fatta contro il cardinale Giulio de'Medici nel 1522,'Giornale storico degli archivi toscani, m (1859), 121-150, 185-232, 239-267.

4 1 C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 83; 220, fol. 106. That April Archbishop Pazzi of Florence died, and Leoappointed Giulio in his place and also made him cardinal in June with the title of Santa Mariain Domenica.

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The festivities were not the only reason why Florentines scrambled toRome at this time. Contemporaries quickly noted that the ecstasy of theFlorentines over Leo's election was in large measure attributable to theirgleeful anticipation of what they as fellow countrymen and some as relativesof the new pope could hope to gain out of this fortuitous event. The electionopened the way for Florentines to profit in various ways, in ecclesiasticaldignities, in merchant affairs, and from other business in Rome. ManyFlorentines moved there just to seek favors and benefices, and in pointedsatire Pietro Aretino commented:

Since the time of Constantine never have so many Florentines come to Rome. Theytravel from Florence shouting, 'Palle, Pallet each a relative of the pope.. .Thereare those who think to capture the bark of St Peter, others his fisherman's net orsome great merchant venture. Among them are still more, willing to makethemselves priests in order to obtain a benefice.42

The same ambitions were shared in high government circles, and theCouncil of the Ten expressed the wish in its official correspondence withthe Florentine ambassador in Rome that,' His Holiness will be able to enjoyhis pontificate in peace and we Florentines to enjoy those good things weexpect to issue from it.'43

Yet the Florentines' initial exuberance over the possibility of personalgain from the papacy could scarcely be matched in actual patronage awards.Consequently many were to be disappointed. In fact, the Florentinefavor-seekers had never been realistic in their expectations, and there weresimply too many requests for the limited number of posts and titlesavailable. Leonardo Bartolini, who was handling Leo's personal financesin Rome, realized this within two weeks of the election and wrote back toFlorence on 24 March 1513, 'Such a brigade has arrived here that there isno satisfying them all, and even if we wanted to gratify a mere ten percent,we would soon go bankrupt.'44 Two months later Francesco Vettori, theambassador, conveyed the same message to his brother Paolo who wasfrustrated in his attempts to secure some income-producing office from thenew pope:' If you considered how many relatives, how many servants, and

42 The sonnet is published by Domenico Gnoli in Giornale storko delta letteratura italiana, xxn (1893),263. Ludovico Ariosto also composed a delightful satire on the same subject, Satire, ed. MarioFerrara (Florence, 1932), pp. 44-45. See also Nardi, 11, 24; Piero Parenti, fols. 85-86; and Pitti,' Apologia? p. 321 for similar comments.

43 Acquisti e Doni, 353, fol. 92. Nerli, 1, 197-198, saw the Florentines' hope for gain as the explanationfor the political calm in the city. He is also the only contemporary historian who told of anydiscomfort over the election in the minds of a few citizens who feared so much greatness in theone family of the Medici.

44 B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol. 31. In the same letter Bartolini also noted that some Florentineswho were anxious for positions and titles were bidding higher and higher for them against eachother.

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how many friends the pope has, you would realize how impossible it is toget anything at all from him. . .'45 Even when Leo had been willing, insome instances it was simply not possible to grant the requests received.In March he had apparently toyed with the idea of enlarging his householdstaff by bestowing extra titles of familiares on deserving petitioners. Butmany of those appointments could not be carried out because the proposedexpansion in the number of familiares would have decreased the value ofthe already existing offices and was vehemently opposed by the clerks ofthe Chamber who deemed the proposal uneconomical.46

Many Florentines had unrealistic hopes of receiving curial offices andtitles without having to pay commensurate prices for them. Even some ofthose Florentines who were most deserving of patronage in terms of theirpolitical assistance in the Medici's return to Florence in 1512, such as PaoloVettori and Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, could not afford the cost of theoffices they desired. Vettori had wanted part interest together withAntonfrancesco in the pope's alum mines at Tolfa, or the decima scalataof the English clergy strictly for himself, but could not raise the necessarymoney to purchase rights to them.47 Albizzi learned the hard way howdifficult it was to acquire ecclesiastical tax farms. He had negotiated secretlywith Leo for the rights to the dogana of the Patrimony of St Peter heldby the Sauli bank under Julius II, which no one else had thought to requestsince the Sauli's contract did not expire for another two-and-a-half years.Albizzi obtained Leo's signature on his supplication for a three-yearcontract for the dogana which included the unusual provision that he wouldnot have to pay anything for it in advance. But as soon as word of his prizeleaked out, the Sauli, and others as well, began to offer the pope much betterterms along with the promise of immediate payment. In an unheard ofprocedure, Leo revoked his signature on the supplication and took the officeaway from Albizzi. He offered to compensate the disconsolate man with4,000 ducats which the Florentine at first refused, and then, when he finallydecided to accept the offer, found it reduced by a quarter.48

4 5 C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fol. 2i8v, letter of 13 May 1513.4 6 Vettori revealed this information in his letter to Machiavelli of 30 March 1513, Lettere, ed. Gaeta,

pp. 236-237, to explain why his brother Toto did not get the place on the pope's household staffhe had been promised. Even the colleges of venal offices, such as the College of the Janissaries andlater the College of the Knights of St Peter which were specially created to pay regular dividendsto their title holders, had assigned incomes from ecclesiastical revenues to fund them. Any growthin the number of title holders which was not matched by an increase in assigned revenues decreasedthe value of each title or share.

4 7 C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fols. 218, 229; B.N.F. , Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol. 31.4 8 Filippo gives a very entertaining description of Albizzi's predicament in a letter to Lorenzo Strozzi

of 18 May 1513, C.S., Ser. in , 178, fol. 57, only part of which has been published in Bardi, p.16. According to Vatican documents, the Sauli retained control of the dogana for another termbeginning in October 1515 and paid 20,000 ducats for it and the Treasury of Perugia, A.V., Div.Cam., vol. 63, fol. 144V. Filippo estimated that Albizzi would have been able to earn 12,000 ducats

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Favor and offices were quite obviously not given to just anyone nor tojust any Florentine. Several criteria had to be met. First and mostadvantageous was to be a close relative of the pope, like Jacopo Salviatimarried to Leo's sister, or Filippo Strozzi married to his niece. Second,one should have been politically sympathetic to the Medici during theperiod of their exile before 1512. A third very important consideration inwinning papal patronage was wealth.49 Particularly these last two consider-ations, and above all the third, help explain why so many Florentinebankers established in Rome did find favor and successfully acquiredchurch offices. Francesco Vettori considered Jacopo Salviati the perfectexample of the type of man who succeeded at court. He was the pope'sbrother-in-law, but he was also wealthy and did not have to stoop to begfor special favors. In addition, Salviati knew how to demonstrate hislong-standing loyalty to the Medici in their presence, and, if the occasioncalled for it, his sympathy for their detractors behind their backs.50

Competition for offices was intense, and even Filippo, who filled therequirements of being a parente of the pope and of having money and who,together with his brother Lorenzo, was doing all he could to affirm thecommitment of the Strozzi to the Medici cause, still had difficulty acquiringanything substantial.

Quite obviously the Strozzi clan anticipated that Filippo would receivespecial treatment. As soon as the news of the election reached Ferrara,Giovanni Strozzi wrote a letter of congratulation to the Strozzi in Florencein which he assumed that Filippo would soon be doing business in Romewith partners of the Medici's choosing. Only half-jokingly he added thatMatteo and Lorenzo Strozzi would now be well advised to study for thepriesthood.51 Within days of the election, reports of patronage rewards hadalready begun to arrive in Florence, but much to the Strozzi's dismay, noneof them included any mention of Filippo. In a letter of 14 March Lorenzo

in three years from the dogana had he been able to keep it, C.S., Ser. in , 178, fol. 57. Albizzi receivedthe governorship of Narni but eventually had to resign that too in favor of Cardinal Bibbiena, A.V.,Div. Cam., vol. 68, fol. 129.

4 9 Leonardo Bartolini in a letter to Micheolozzi of 1 May 1513, B.N.F. , Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol.44, categorized three types of favor-seekers who thought they had legitimate claims on the pope:those who felt they deserved rewards for past friendships, others for having helped in the take-overof Florence and others because of their close blood and marriage ties. He concluded that since hisown chances for position and wealth were small, he was better off returning to F lo rence : ' And withall this, I have been forced into the background and nothing is left over for me, neither titles, norfinancial gain, such that I see myself forced to return to Florence' . [ 'Sono comparsi tanti in postee per l'ordinario et chi gli pare meritare per amicitia e chi per havere renduto lo stato e chi perparentado in modo che anche di qua sono restato adrieto et non ci resta per me, ne titoli ne guadagnoin modo sono forzato rivoltarmi di costa. . . ' ] Bartolini later came to understand the real power ofmoney in obtaining favor. He continued to be one of Leo's major creditors and by 1517 was ableto purchase part interest in the very profitable three dogane of the city of Rome, A.V., Div. Cam.,vol. 66, fol. 172.

50 C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fols. 218, 219. 5 I C.S., Ser. m , 145, fol. 107.

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Strozzi gave Filippo some brotherly advice on how to be forthright andbold in his requests for patronage:

Here it is rumored that the alum mines [of Tolfa] have been granted to JacopoSalviati, although the source of that news is uncertain. The Depository [General]is said to have gone to the Sauli and it is the same for many other offices. But ofyou there is not one word; this astounds me and disturbs all our relatives as well.Some wonder whether your politeness is not getting in your way, for in suchmatters you must put aside conventional manners and be forthright. Do not holdback on anything that can help you get what you seek most of all. And since youare who you are and in other qualities you are equal to any other, it does not seemyou should be denied your just demands. But remember this well: do not discussyour plans with too many people since each person is trying to further his owninterests over those of others. Do not be afraid to go after the really big deals becauseyou will not lack the support of either men or money... I have nothing else totell you now other than to remind you to be bold and to abandon your usual goodmanners. Otherwise, according to Madonna [Alfonsina], with whom I spend partof each day, you will have nothing. Here in Florence I am constantly in thecompany of one or the other of them [the Medici], and I solicit them as muchas seems appropriate.52

The Strozzi's expectations, like those of many others, were not fulfilledquite as easily or quite as quickly as everyone had assumed they would be.

Filippo had made several attempts to approach the pope, but a week afterthe election he wrote to Lorenzo Strozzi that he still had nothing definitein hand. He had set his sights on the office of depositor general of theApostolic Chamber but had learned that Leo was disinclined to remove itfrom Julius IPs appointee, the Sauli bank of Genoa, because he was tooindebted to Cardinal Sauli for help in his election. Furthermore, Filippodiscovered that the other revenue-producing offices such as farmer ofcustoms tolls or treasurer of a province in the Papal States and the like hadall been contracted out under Julius II and would not be free for at leasta year or even two. Still he felt optimistic that something would come hisway. Yet by mid-May Filippo had nothing and did not know whether hewould be staying on in Rome or returning to Florence empty-handed.53

Filippo was not to acquire any offices or tax farms for another year, andfor the time being at least, his future lay in Florence, not in Rome. By theend of May it was decided that he should accompany his brother-in-law

52 Ibid., vol. 134, fol. 82.53 Ibid., vol. 108, fol. 2; 178, fol. 57. He hoped that when his mother-in-law Alfonsina arrived in Rome

she would be able to assist him. Others felt Filippo at least was in a favorable position becausehe received a number of petitions seeking his aid in obtaining patronage. He was able to help hisand Lorenzo's close friend, Lorenzo Cambi, acquire a title and income from one of the papalfortresses, vol. 108, fol. 150V.

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Lorenzo de'Medici back to Florence in time for the June celebrations ofthe feast day of the city's patron saint, John the Baptist.

No significant change occurred in Filippo's position within the powerstructure of the Medici family until later that summer of 1513 afterGiuliano departed for Rome, leaving his young nephew Lorenzo in charge.The attractions of the papal court were too compelling, and Giuliano wasnot content to remain in Florence so far from the wealth and power thatwere his brother's in Rome.54 In Filippo's case the course of events showedthat before he was able to acquire the less accessible but more prestigiousand lucrative posts at the papal court which he desired, he first had toestablish himself with the Medici family as a trusted and loyal partisan andbuild a firm base of support and favor within one branch of that family.In this sense, the preparations for his long career as a papal financier werebegun not in Rome but in Florence, with the help of his brother-in-lawLorenzo.

Beginning in the fall of 1513 there was an immediate improvement inFilippo's status and political fortunes and in those of the whole Strozzifamily. Despite his youth, already in September Filippo's name was drawnas a candidate for the highest political office, gonfaloniere digiustiziay a suresign of favor. The next month his older cousin Matteo had his name drawnfor the priors, and the subsequent February Filippo's was drawn for thesame office. Leonardo and Matteo Strozzi were the first family membersactually to hold high office in this period when they were appointed to thenewly reconstituted Council of Seventy.55 In the months that followed, theStrozzi continued to enjoy political favor, often at Filippo's request. InApril 1514 Matteo Strozzi was added to the exclusive Balla, and Filippowrote Lorenzo de'Medici a letter of thanks for obliging him in this way.56

Filippo himself served as one of the Festaiuoli di S. Giovanni51 to organizethe city's celebrations of her patron saint in June which Giuliano andseveral cardinals attended as special honored guests. In August Leo was

54 Even the aging Bernardo Rucellai hankered after the position of Florentine ambassador to enablehim to transfer to Rome, M.A.P., 108, fol. 127. Lorenzo de'Medici, despite his promotion to headof his family in Florence, would have also preferred to stay in Rome near his uncle the pope. Ina letter of 29 October 1513 to Giulio de'Medici who had by then been promoted to cardinal andarchbishop of Florence, Lorenzo described the expectations of a papal nephew, C.S., Ser. 1, 3, fol.13: 'One sees so many examples of the good fortune of those who have been brothers or nephewsof p o p e s . . . and because I am young and a papal nephew, I would be extremely upset were I notsustained by this hope.'

55 Tratte, 52, unnumbered; 342, fols. 6v, 8v. The Council of Seventy was revived by the Balia on22 November 1513, Balie, 43, fol. 149, and the election of its members took place 1 January 1514.On the Seventy, see Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 80-83.

56 He was added on 19 May 1514, Tratte, 84, fol. 6v; Tratte, 52, unnumbered. Lorenzo had agreedto give Matteo a personal letter, M.A.P., 141, fol. 22. Filippo's letter of thanks dated 21 April 1514is in ibid., 116, fol. 285.

57 M.A.P., 141, fol. 30; Tratte, 84, fol. 3.

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actively considering Filippo's brother Lorenzo for the position of Florentineambassador to Rome to replace Francesco Vettori, and the same monthFilippo requested Lorenzo de'Medici to have Carlo di Niccolo Strozzi seenfor the Signoria, and so he was.58 In fact, a survey of election documentsshows that under the Medici regime from 1514 on, members of the Strozzifamily continued to be considered regularly and to be seated in the topcouncils of state together with other friends and supporters of the regime.59

In Lorenzo de'Medici's government which lasted until his death in 1519,Filippo enjoyed unrivaled prominence in Florence. No person was held ingreater esteem, nor was any citizen in the city more important than he, sowrote his brother Lorenzo.60 He was second only to Lorenzo de'Mediciand his favorite among all the citizens. Filippo's marriage to Clarice in 1508now took on a new hue, for it drew him into the very heart of Medici powerin the city. No longer just one of a number of Medici in-laws, he was theclose companion and only brother-in-law of the new leader of the city. OtherStrozzi quickly recognized Filippo's unique status, and as early as January1514, a distant relation Andrea Strozzi wrote to his son Piero, who was soonto return home from the Far East, the following appreciation of Filippo'sstature in Florence:

Filippo Strozzi has for his wife Clarice, niece of Pope Leo and sister of theMagnificent Lorenzo de'Medici, leader and master of this whole city. They loveFilippo very much for his virtue and goodness and regard him highly because heis a parente. And our Strozzi clan continues to render good account of itself asyou will see upon your return... You would be wise to find some souvenir to bringto Filippo, for such observances stand to benefit anyone who wishes to remain inFlorence.61

58 M.A.P., 108, fols. 124, 128. Obviously the Medici did not regard the post of Florentine ambassadorto Rome to be more than honorary since it did not require a ' homo fatto.' On 28 August CarloStrozzi was selected for the Signoria, Tratte, 342, fol. 16.

59 See Tratte, 342, for the extractions for the Tre Maggiori and Tratte, 177, for lists of office holdersbetween 1500-1535 by quarter. The Strozzi lived in the gonfalone of Lione Rosso of Santa MariaNovella. On the list oiamici in B.N.F., Nuovi Acquisti, 988, Matteo, Leonardo, Lorenzo and Filippoappear most often under headings of cittadini amici, cittadini che e bene remunerargli, confidanti, andprincipali cittadini delta citta.

60 Niccolini, p. xxxv. Lorenzo Strozzi did not hesitate to attribute the Strozzi family's return to politicalgood graces to Filippo's friendship and favor with Lorenzo de'Medici and to his constant effortsto have his family included in the political councils of the city, ibid., pp. xxxiv-xxxv. In 1517 Filipporequested that Lorenzo be seen for gonfaloniere and again in 1520, Copialettere di Goro Gheri, 11,fols. 300V-301; C.S., Ser. HI, 108, fol. 40. Tratte, 52, unnumbered, shows that Lorenzo was seenfor gonfaloniere in October 1520. Other Strozzi drawn for the highest office included Leonardo inFebruary 1516, Matteo in June 1519 and Antonio in October 1522. Filippo even tried to get hishalf-brother Alfonso back in Medici good graces and in 1519 was able to arrange for the returnfrom exile of a distant relative, Giovanni, C.S., Ser. in , 143, fols. 11, 15. Filippo's correspondencecontains numerous requests for favors or for his intercession with the Medici from friends anddependents which only increased in number in later years.

61 Florence, 29 January 1514, ibid., 82, fol. 96.

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But Filippo's eminence did not derive from the official channels ofoffice-holding and membership in the political councils of the city. Ratherit stemmed from what was of even more weight in this period, namely theless clearly delineated, unofficial channels of Medici family power. As wehave already discerned, in Florence after 1512 office-holding indeedsignified favor, but not necessarily power in the regime. The modernhistorian could search to his heart's content through all the Florentineelection records and still not find any substantial evidence that FilippoStrozzi was any more influential in the government than those membersof his family such as Matteo and Leonardo, and later Lorenzo, whofrequently served in the top political councils. In fact, a study of the electionrecords would seem to indicate that, if anything, Filippo was less importantthan his relatives, for his name never appeared among the members of theCouncil of Seventy, the priors, the Died or the Otto. At twenty-five yearsof age in 1514 he was really too young to be considered for those posts,and the only political office he did hold in Lorenzo's government was thatof Monte official in 1516, 1518, and 1519, and then only when the cityneeded to borrow his money.62 Furthermore, the very important financialfunction that Filippo exercised in the regime as depositor of the Signoriaand Otto beginning in 1515 was performed de facto and not ex officio. No,in order to get an accurate appraisal of Filippo's position in Florence underhis brother-in-law, we must look beyond the political records of the cityto the private correspondence that has survived, particularly to FilippoStrozzi's own letters which are essential for the study not only of his ownlife, but also of the period in which he lived.

These private letters provide the key to understanding Filippo's rela-tionship with Lorenzo de'Medici, for they show that their friendshipreached beyond a purely formal connection imposed on them by Filippo'sparentado with the Medici family. They became genuine friends with amutual affection for one another of the sort only possible between twocontemporaries of roughly the same age who shared many similar interests.The seeds of their friendship had been planted at the time of Filippo'sengagement to Clarice, and it ripened after the Medici returned to Florencein 1512. In 1513 when they were both in Rome to celebrate Leo's electionand coronation, Filippo confided to his brother that he and Lorenzode'Medici were so close that it seemed they had known each other fromthe cradle.63 Lorenzo for his part was equally devoted to Filippo. He

62 Tratte, 84, fol. 69V; Tratte, 177, unnumbered. On the list of amici in B.N.F. , Nuovi Acquisti, 988,fol. 87, Filippo's name appears under the heading of 'Cit izens to be appointed Monte official whenthere is need of money.'

63 Filippo to Lorenzo Strozzi, Rome, 18 May 1513, C.S., Ser. in , 178, fol. 57V. See also, M.A.P.,

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constantly desired his company and when Filippo was in Rome in 1514,Lorenzo sent him insistent messages begging him to hurry back.64 The tworemained close during the whole period of Lorenzo's rule in Florence, andLorenzo always required his brother-in-law at his side on all state occasions.In 1515 Filippo accompanied Lorenzo on his diplomatic mission to FrancisI after the French victory at Marignano. Although he had been selectedas one of the Florentine orators to the king of France, Filippo made it clearthat his going to Milan with Lorenzo to pay respects to Francis I wasprompted more by the wishes of Lorenzo than by those of the Otto diPratica.65 In April 1517 when Lorenzo lay grieviously ill in Anconasuffering from a head wound he had received in the midst of the fightingaround Urbino, it was Filippo he wanted near him.66 The following springLorenzo chose Filippo to accompany him on an extended trip to the courtof Francis I for the christening of the dauphin and to escort his Frenchbride Madeleine d'Auvergne back to Florence.67 And in 1519 during

108, fols. 131, 138; 116, fol. 285. Writing to Lorenzo on 8 November 1513 Filippo describedhis eagerness to return to Florence to be with his brother-in-law, M.A.P., 108, fol. 145: 'I am soimpatient, I feel myself melting like wax. You are in my thoughts in my every waking momentand in my dreams at night. My body is here, but my soul there with you.'

64 M.A.P., 141, fols. 19V, 22, 25V; Niccolini, p. xxxiv. The close companionship they enjoyed did notmean, however, that their relationship was similar to one between two close friends of equal standingin our modern sense, for it was very much in keeping with sixteenth-century hierarchical socialpatterns and with patron and client associations. Filippo always maintained a position of deferenceto Lorenzo's more elevated position as head of his family and of the state in Florence and was evermindful of the importance of being in his good graces. Filippo addressed Lorenzo as ' VostraMagnificenza^ in his letters, and in 1516, when Lorenzo was made Duke of Urbino, Filippo referredto him as 'Your Excellency.' See his letters to Lorenzo in M.A.P., 108, and Lorenzo's letters inMAP., 141.

65 M.A.P., 105, fol. 232V. On the embassy itself, see Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 117-120.A copy of the official instructions to the Florentine ambassadors, Filippo, Francesco Pandolfini,and Francesco Vettori, is contained in C.S., Ser. in , 103, fols. 101-103. Filippo also kept accountof his expenses as ambassador in C.S., Ser. v, 91. Filippo's introduction to Francis I in 1515 andthis trip to the French court in 1518 were instrumental in the development of his business affairsin France and in involving him in the highest levels of finance at the French court through loansto Francis I and his finance ministers called 'the Generals.' Filippo opened a Lyons branch of hisbank in 1517 and later stayed there during his self-exile from Florence in 1528. By 1520 he hadover 26,000 scudi invested with the Generals, ibid., 99, fol. 86. By 1533 when he became Clement'snuncio to France, his loans to the French monarch had reached over 30,000 scudi, and Clementhad a brief sent to France for Filippo trying to safeguard his outstanding credits with Francis I,A.V., Arm. XL, vol. 47, fol. 95. In a listing of his credits made before his death, those with Francehad climbed to 59,000 scudi, Niccolini, p. 338.

66 In a letter of 7 April 1517, C.S., Ser. m , 49, fol. 35, Clarice instructed Filippo to take good careof her brother since his condition was further weakened by the 'malefranzese.1 Filippo remainedwith Lorenzo in Ancona for over a month until he was fit to travel.

67 They arrived in France in April 1518 and did not return to Florence until August, ibid., n o , fol.94; 108, fols. 9-10. Filippo had to stay with the bride in a small isolated castle at Ambois for weekswhile Lorenzo was off hunting with Francis I in Brittany. He became bored with the idle life andcourtly manners and the daily language lessons he had to give to Madeleine who knew no Italian,ibid., 180, fol. 109; n o , fols. 98, 101, 95, 96-97, 100; 108, fols. n - 1 2 , 9-10.

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Lorenzo's lengthy final illness he permitted only Filippo and a few otherintimates to attend him at the Medici villa of Poggio a Caiano where hedied 4 May 1519.68

Filippo's growing intimacy with Lorenzo showed itself most clearly inhis changing political sentiments. His new posture after 1513 as Lorenzo's' cosa' (man) and ' amico' marked a turning point in the evolution that hadtaken place in his relations with the Medici since 1508. After Lorenzo'sascent to power in Florence when Filippo became part of the smallgroup of privileged friends and clients who surrounded him, he openlyadopted the views appropriate to his role as amico stretto. He advised hisbrother-in-law how always to protect his own interests, to favor his friendsto solidify their support and, whenever possible, to hurt his enemies in orderto annul any opposition. Filippo's admonitions to Lorenzo are reminiscentof the counsel Machiavelli gave him in The Prince and included suchinjunctions as to maintain a golden mean or via di mezzo as a commander;to evaluate cautiously the actions and not just the words of men who claimedto be his friends; and, when expediency required it, to say one thing butto do another.69

Filippo also abetted Lorenzo's designs to increase his hegemony byenlarging the territory under his dominion. In 1514, prompted both byFilippo and by his mother Alfonsina, Lorenzo tried to wrest Piombino fromthe hands of its hereditary ruler Jacopo d'Appiano V. Leo X, however,preferred to secure the loyalty of d'Appiano through a marriage alliancewith one of his nieces, Emilia Ridolfi. But when both the bride and groomfell deathly ill with fever, Filippo quickly saw the advantage to Lorenzoin this unforeseen bit of fortune. 'The matter is not yet closed; may Godlook out for us,' he wrote.70 With enthusiasm Filippo began to describehis grandiose vision of a domain for the young Medici. It would comprisenot only Florence and Piombino, but also a state in the Kingdom of Napleswhich would come as the dowry payment of a yet-to-be-named Spanish

68 A month before his death when Lorenzo desired a change of surroundings, Filippo readied his ownvilla of Santuccio to receive the ailing man, ibid., n o , fol. 117. A week before Lorenzo died, hiswife Madeleine also passed away after giving birth to Catherine de'Medici, future queen of France.Still the best critical treatment of Lorenzo is Hilde Reinhard's Lorenzo von Medici, Herzog vonUrbino. See also A. Verdi, Gli ultitni anni di Lorenzo de'Medici; Rosemary Devonshire Jones' verygood article on Lorenzo and the government of Florence, 'Lorenzo de'Medici, Duca d'Urbino,'pp. 297-315; and Giorgetti's articles in A.S.I. Franceso Vettori wrote a short laudatory lifeof Lorenzo for Clarice, 'Vita di Lorenzo de'Medici Duca d'Urbino,' published in FrancescoVettori, Scritti storici e politici, ed. Enrico Niccolini (Bari, 1972), pp. 259-272.

69 M.A.P., 108, fol. 123; 116, fol. 302; 105, fol. 150.70 M.A.P., 108, fols. 121-122. For a fuller account including documents of Lorenzo's maneuvers to

acquire Piombino, see Giorgetti, 'Lorenzo de'Medici Duca d'Urbino e Jacopo V d'Appiano; alsoDevonshire Jones, 'Lorenzo de'Medici,' pp. 308-315.

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bride. Included in his schemes was a comfortable income of three or fourthousand ducats from the states of the church.71

In 1515 when Lorenzo next aspired to election as captain general of theFlorentine forces, Filippo again gave him full support and worked in bothRome and Florence to realize their common goal. The election of a privatecitizen of Florence, and more especially of a Medici, to the supreme militarycommand violated the city's constitution, and the prospect aroused thejealousy of other Medici parenti in Rome who feared Lorenzo would makehimself signore of Florence in the same way as Francesco Sforza had seizedMilan. Because Filippo was a driving force in the plan, he became the buttof their angry gossip.72

Filippo's participation in Lorenzo's plottings to aggrandize his rule inFlorence and subvert the constitution reveals how willingly he cooperatedto further his brother-in-law's schemes and how closely he identifiedhimself and had come to be identified with Lorenzo's interests by 1515.73

Filippo fully understood the implications of this aspect of his life as asupportive and devoted client to his patron, and he acknowledged in a letterthat he was willing to do his master's bidding.74 However, the relationshipwas not entirely one-sided, for Lorenzo's growing power brought greater

7! The possibility of several Spanish parentadi was being considered for Lorenzo at this time. Onewas an alliance with a nipote of Ferdinand of Spain, possibly with one of the daughters of his daughterJoanna, whose dowry would include a state in the Kingdom of Naples. The proposed parentadoplayed a part in the treaty negotiations between Leo and Ferdinand in 1514. See Ludwig Pastor,The History of the Popes, trans. Ralph Francis Kerr (London, 1923), vn, 100-111. Failing thatarrangement, Leo was also prepared to negotiate with Cardinal Luigi d'Aragona, Ferdinand'snatural son, probably for one of his female relatives. In the letter of 10 September, Filippo informedLorenzo of the proposed parentadi, M.A.P., 108, fol. 121. Another possibility Leo had beenconsidering since the previous spring was a marriage to the daughter of Ramon de Cardona, viceroyof Naples, * I manoscritti Torrigiani,' A.S.I., xix (1874), ° 2 - I n January 1515 the arrangements werestill being worked out, ibid., pp. 225, 227, but when Louis XII of France died the same monththe diplomatic climate of Europe altered and they never took effect. See also Tommasini, 11, 77-78.

72 Benedetto Buondelmonti reported the dissatisfaction among the Medici parenti in Rome in aletter of 19 May 1515, M.A.P., 108, fol. 146. Among those opposed to the election were Giuliano,Lucrezia and Jacopo Salviati, Contessina, Piero and Luigi Ridolfi, Giovanni Vespucci and CardinalBibbiena. See also Giorgetti, 'Lorenzo de'Medici Capitano,' p. 204. The gossip included reportsthat Filippo was not to be trusted because he was a member of the Strozzi family who were long-timeopponents of the Medici and that he and his brother Lorenzo had had a falling-out over the issueof the election. They also raised last-minute opposition to his appointment as depositor general.

73 At the time of the election of Lorenzo as captain general, there was criticism in Florence of hispower-hungry favorites, 'whose thirst not even the Danube could quench,' Cerretani, Dialogo, fol.170. See also Piero Parenti, fol. 115 for a similar view.

74 Letter to Matteo Strozzi, Rome, 17 December 1519, C.S., Ser. in , 143, fol. 15: 'Hora sono chiaroin tutto, et sono aconcio a legare l'asino dove vuole el padrone.' ['Now everything is crystal clearto me, and I am ready to obey docilely.'] He actually wrote this line a few months after Lorenzo'sdeath when Leo X and Cardinal Giulio de'Medici were considering loosening the reins of theircontrol in Florence. Filippo, who was satisfied with the existing mode of government, hoped therewould be no change, ibid., 108, fol. 14 bis.

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opportunities to his deserving dependents to find rewards for themselvesand for their own followers. A client's expectations of favor and profit inreturn for services to his patron was fundamental to the whole patronagenetwork, and when Benedetto Buondelmonti wrote to Filippo that his ownbenefits derived from those of his signore, Lorenzo de'Medici, he was onlyenunciating the appropriate attitude of a client who anticipated some signof favor in return for his devotion.75 After Lorenzo gained control inFlorence, Filippo began to reap tangible benefits from his loyalty. Hesuccessfully promoted the political fortunes of his family who returned tomembership in the highest government councils in greater numbers thansince before 1434; and, as he reached new heights within the regime inFlorence, he found himself in a better bargaining position for the posts atthe papal court which previously had been denied him in the early monthsafter Leo X's election.

Already in the fall of 1513 Filippo recommenced his quest for theDepository General of the Apostolic Chamber. But this time he had thevery able support of his mother-in-law Alfonsina Orsini and of the newCardinal Giulio de'Medici. Those seeking favor from Leo had to take intoaccount the factions among the pope's close relatives whose foci were hissisters, Lucretia Salviati, Contessina Ridolfi, Maddalena Cibo, his sister-in-law Alfonsina Orsini de'Medici and his brother Giuliano. Each of thesefamily members had relatively easy access to Leo and strove to further hisor her own interests and to take care of the requests of their many clients.Frequently open competition broke out among them over a covertedposition which gave rise to petty jealousies and bitter opposition to theirrivals' designs. Filippo found himself in the middle of these intrigues whenhe began negotiating for the Depository General and for portions of severalecclesiastical tax farms. Since he belonged to Lorenzo's camp and was underthe protection of Alfonsina and Cardinal Giulio, he was thrown into battlewith two Medici in particular, Lucretia de'Medici Salviati and Giuliano.Lucretia fought Filippo tooth and nail for what she thought rightfullybelonged to her husband Jacopo. Giuliano was jealous of Lorenzo andapparently wanted to thwart Filippo's designs for no other reason thanbecause they reflected Lorenzo's own rise within the ranks of the family.These rivalries among members of the pope's family made it a trickybusiness to obtain patronage, and at the same time made it essential forFilippo to have a major advocate within the family with constant accessto Leo X who would vigorously push forward his suits.

Alfonsina Orsini filled that role of chief advocate for Filippo. However,

75 M.A.P., 108, fol. 146. For an appreciation of sixteenth-century client-patron relationships seeHelmut Koenigsberger's article, * Patronage and Bribery during the Reign of Charles V,' Estatesand Revolutions, Essays in Early Modern European History (Ithaca, New York, 1971), pp. 166-175.

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she promoted his candidacy for the Depository General in 1513 and 1514for one ulterior purpose, and not at all because Filippo was her son-in-lawand a favorite of Lorenzo. Rather, because Lorenzo was constantly shortof money in Florence and his 400 ducat per month allowance from the popebarely sufficed to pay his household expenses, she wanted the DepositoryGeneral under Filippo's control as a means of supplementing Lorenzo'sincome.76 She advanced her schemes personally and through the offices ofCardinal Medici at every turn. She even made plans to move herhousehold closer to the Vatican, because her normal residence, the PalazzoMedici, now Palazzo Madama, located in the center of Rome a mere mile'sdistance, kept her, she felt, at too great a distance from the pope.77 Buteven with the best of intercessors and even though Leo had promised bothAlfonsina and Cardinal Medici that Filippo should have the Depository,actually securing it proved still a thorny and protracted affair. For in thespring of 1514 new difficulties arose. Lucretia Salviati pleaded with Leoto award the Depository to her husband Jacopo so he could leave Florenceand move to the more prestigious papal court. Rumours that Leo had agreedto oblige Lucretia sparked frenzied efforts by Alfonsina on behalf of Filippoand Lorenzo. The uncertainty delayed Filippo's departure for Florence inMay for several weeks.78 Leo himself, however, remained undecided whatto do. Not only were Lucretia and Alfonsina hounding him with theirseparate suits, but he still did not feel ready to take the Depository awayfrom the Sauli bank until he had compensated Cardinal Sauli with asubstantial benefice. Finally Alfonsina's plea prevailed that the Depositorywas not merely for Filippo, but would help sustain Lorenzo as well, andin May Leo reassured her that Filippo would have the position pendingcompensation to the Sauli, but he made no firm commitment.

That same spring Filippo saw the chance to invest in another ecclesiasticalbusiness venture, this time a tax farm. With the help of Alfonsina he triedto secure rights to portions of the salt tax of the papal province of theMarches, again for both his and Lorenzo's benefit. He calculated theirinvestment would yield a healthy 2,000 ducats per year in profits and overan eight-year-contract period they would each glean a neat 8,000 ducats

7 6 M.A.P . , 114, fol. 23. Lorenzo 's letters to Rome in this period are filled with requests for moneyfor his personal needs and to buy back Medici possessions and property in Florence that had beenconfiscated and sold when his father Piero was exiled twenty years earlier. See C.S. , Ser. I, 3 andM.A.P. , 141 and 107 passim. Alfonsina explained that the reason why she particularly desiredLorenzo to receive revenues from the Depository was because they were reliable income, 'Believeme, 4,000 florins income from Rome are worth more than 10,000 from elsewhere because they arestable, ' M.A.P . , 114, fol. 23V.

77 Ibid., fols. 23V-24.7 8 Fil ippo's letters to Lorenzo de 'Medic i , Rome, 2, 6, 8 (?) May, M.A.P . , 108, fols. 138, 137, 139.

At one point Leo considered giving the Depository to Jacopo Rucellai and Jacopo Salviati and atanother to Jacopo Salviati and Fil ippo.

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apiece.79 Leo, however, had promised the salaria to Piero del Bene, aFlorentine banker in Rome, who was openly reluctant to diminish his profitsby admitting any more partners.80 The animosity between Filippo and DelBene over this issue grew so acrimonious that Filippo feared that shouldhe and Lorenzo invest in the salaria under Del Bene's management, hemight well do his best to mismanage their share. Del Bene, for his part, hadobtained Giuliano de'Medici's support against Filippo and had tried towin over to his side Cardinal Pucci, later the grand penitentiary, a powerfulfigure at court and a favorite of Leo X. Pucci, however, when informed thatthe salaria would actually profit Lorenzo de'Medici and not just Filippo,declined to get involved. Both the issues of the Depository General andthe salt monopoly of the Marches were settled that summer of 1514 inFilippo's favor. In July Del Bene lost his case and Leo pledged to revokehis contract for the salaria, promising Filippo a share. By that time, too,the pope had finally been able to compensate Cardinal Sauli for theDepository, and in early August Filippo could write to Lorenzo de'Medicithat Leo had told Alfonsina that the office was his beginning in November.81

Shortly thereafter in a remarkable show of favor towards Filippo, Leopersonally baptized his and Clarice's new-born daughter, named her Maria,and chose two cardinals, Flisco and San Vitale for her godfathers.82 Hadit not been for the important consideration of Lorenzo's income andinterests, Filippo would never have fared so well.

The year 1515 brought yet another important step upward for Filippo.Not only did he actually begin to operate the Depository General in Romethrough the new banking company he opened there expressly for thatpurpose, but he also gained control of the Depository of the Signoria andOtto di Pratica in Florence. His appointment as depositor in Florence wasan integral part of Lorenzo de'Medici's plans to increase his personal power,crowned by his election as captain general of the Florentines that May.Lorenzo aimed at placing men like Filippo who were loyal to him alonein positions of responsibility in the regime and removing the last ofGiuliano's minions. We can trace the unfolding of this plan in the eventsleading up to Filippo's taking charge of the two Depositories in the summerof 1515 when Lorenzo phased out both Paolo Vettori and Galeottode'Medici.

Paolo Vettori, a friend of Giuliano's, had played a major part in easingthe Medici's way back to Florence in 1512. In gratitude for his efforts, Leo79 Ibid., fol. 136.80 M.A.P., 141, fol. 43; M.A.P., 107, fol. 45. This angered Alfonsina who complained to the pope

about Del Bene's 'asinine behavior' and lack of devotion to the Medici house, ibid., fols. 45, 49.Lorenzo de'Medici urged that Del Bene be reprimanded and used as an example to others whopresumed too much, ibid., 141, fol. 45V.

81 M.A.P., 108, fol. 134. 82 C.S., Ser. m, 108, fol. 3.

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had appointed him depositor of the ecclesiastical decima in Florence, theproceeds of which he had granted to the city in November 1513.83 Paolowho was debt-ridden seems to have used the funds of the decima to shoreup his own sagging credit. He proved recalcitrant when Lorenzo badlyneeded the decima funds for his own expenses and for those of the regime.Lorenzo complained to Cardinal Medici, who as archbishop of Florencehad authority over the collection of the decima, that Vettori was makingit impossible for him to get at the money. He had proof that the clergy hadpaid Vettori over 8,000 ducats, and yet only with great effort had he beenable to pull 2,000 ducats away from him. Lorenzo charged openly thatVettori was misappropriating the commune's money, and in August herequested that the decima be paid straight to the Monte officials, bypassingVettori. Filippo, who approved circumventing Paolo, spoke hotly againsthim with Lorenzo and other members of the family.84 In revenge, thatsummer when Filippo was making the final arrangements in Rome for theDepository General and for the salaria of the Marches against Del Bene,Vettori spread rumors in Florence that Filippo would not be getting theDepository and was in for a nasty surprise. Enraged by the reports ofVettori's lies that reached Rome, Filippo spitefully retorted to Lorenzo thathe would enjoy nothing more than to be able to tell Paolo that he had cometo Rome for two equally important reasons, to get the Depository of theChamber for himself and to see that Paolo's Depository was taken awayfrom him.85 Filippo succeeded on both counts. He obtained his Depositoryand got the pleasure of seeing Paolo's control over the decima fundsseverely restricted, greatly diminishing his influence and prestige.86

The case of Galeotto de'Medici paralleled that of Vettori in its outlineand results. In August 1514, at the behest of Leo and Cardinal Medici,Galeotto was left to take care of Medici interests in Lorenzo's stead duringhis extended stay in Rome that fall and winter. Lorenzo also had Galeottoappointed depositor of the Signoria, according to Parenti, so that he couldenrich himself at the same time as he kept watch over the commune'sexpenses.87 But when Lorenzo returned to Florence in May 1515 bearing8 3 C.S. , Ser. 1, 3, fol. 2ov; Piero Parent i , fol. 94V, ment ioned that in Ju ly 1513 the Florent ine

ambassador had requested permission of the pope that Florence be allowed to keep the decimarevenues.

84 M.A.P . , 141, fols. 12, 15, 2 8 ; 107, fol. 2 5 ; 108, fols. 124, 128.85 Ibid., fol. 124.8 6 Ibid., fol. 128. T h e first 30,000 ducats collected from the decima would be paid to a separate depositor

selected by the Monte officials, and then, from any money left over, u p to 5,000 ducats would goto Paolo. Paolo pu t himself further out of favor with Lorenzo in Februa ry 1515 when he said inpublic that Lorenzo intended to make himself signore of Florence and had held secret meetings inRome with the pope and Cardinal Medic i to that end. O n the 14th Piet ro Ardinghell i wroteto Giul iano on behalf of Leo X and Cardinal Medic i that he should repr imand Paolo for his loosetongue, ' I Manoscr i t t i Torr ig iani , ' p . 231.

87 Piero Parent i , fol. 105; M.A.P . , 108, fol. 27. Lorenzo kept in close touch with Galeot to regarding

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Leo's reluctant approval of his plan to become captain general, he not onlydismissed Galeotto as overseer but also replaced him in the Depository withFilippo.88 Contemporaries were astounded at Galeotto's sudden fall sincehe had been well liked in the city for his benevolence, fair play, and wisecounsel. But Lorenzo had been dissatisfied with him for not carrying outall his instructions from Rome. Also he probably suspected that Galeotto,because of his popularity, might become a rallying point for the manydisgruntled citizens who disliked his own seignorial demeanor, his recentelection as captain general, and his tightening grip on the government.Lorenzo wanted to have someone like Filippo whom he could trust andwho was devoted to his personal interests in the position of depositor since,in his new dual role as captain general and head of state, he would needconvenient access to the financial resources of the city, especially shouldthere be war. Like Paolo Vettori, Galeotto was embittered against Filippo,calling him a man filled with flagrant vices who was not to be trusted despitehis parent ado and pleasing manners.89 Contemporaries suggested thatGaleotto, once having tasted power, was loath to relinquish it to someoneelse.90 Galeotto's bitter reproaches confirmed that at last Filippo hadworked his way to the very heart of the regime to the point where he hadeven replaced a member of the Medici family in Lorenzo's confidence. Butmore than a sign of favor, control of the Depository of the Signoria meantthat Filippo had attained new power and responsibility in the state, for nowhe could manipulate the purse strings of the city. And as we shall see, heunhesitatingly manipulated them to serve Lorenzo's personal and politicalneeds.

Aside from being a ready cash box for Lorenzo, the Depository servedas a device for concealing the liberal recourse of the Medici to communalfunds, since the formal summary accounts presented by Filippo's agent tothe Otto for approval frequently disguised the extent to which the publicmonies in his care had been used for their needs and those of their friends.The operation of the Depository was set up to protect Filippo because heexercised control over it two steps removed, through his business associate

the composition of the magistracies and other matters pertinent to the government and Mediciinterests. His letters to Galeotto are in M.A.P. , 141, fols. 64-116. Leonardo Guidott i had beenreappointed depositor in June 1514, but by December Galeotto had replaced him, Otto , Cond. eStant., 11, fols. 20, 21.

88 On 28 January 1515 when he first wrote to Galeotto about his ambition, M.A.P. , 141, fol. 94V,he said that Florence was to be the foundation of his realm and likened her to a breast he wouldsuckle.

89 Benedetto Buondelmonti to Filippo, Rome, 17-18 May 1515, M.A.P. , 108, fol. 147. Buondelmonti 'ssource of information was Bartolomeo Valori and not Bernardo Rucellai as Devonshire Jonesclaimed, Francesco Vettori, p. 112. Rucellai had died the previous year.

9 0 M.A.P. , 108, fol. 147.

Rise to favor

and vice-depositor Francesco del Nero,91 and behind the name of the titulardepositor, Roberto de'Ricci. Throughout the difficult times of the war inLombardy in 1515 and the War of Urbino in 1516-1517 when Florencehad to spend hundreds of thousands of florins for military expenses, Filippoand Francesco ran it together. Through Filippo the Florentine Depositorywas drawn into the vast credit mechanism of the Strozzi bank, which inturn tied it in an open-ended fashion to the financial network of the churchby way of Strozzi's control of the Depository General of the ApostolicChamber in Rome. Having the two Depositories of Florence and Rome inthe hands of one man made possible the transfer of war monies betweenthe two governments and enabled large debts belonging to the pope to bewritten off onto the books of the commune.

As long as Lorenzo was alive, Filippo's position in Florence was secureand his financial practices in the Depository remained unquestioned. WhenLorenzo died in May 1519, not only did Filippo lose a close comrade andhis most influential patron, but his death also opened the floodgates to anangry backlash against his regime and against his favorites, most especiallyFilippo. He became the subject of nasty rumors about how he and anotherfavorite Francesco Vettori had hired extra guards, ostensibly to keep thepeace in the event of an uprising after Lorenzo's death, but in fact as apretext to insure their own personal safety. They were blamed for havingurged Lorenzo de'Medici to make himself signore of Florence, again fortheir own aggrandizement.92 In the aftermath of Lorenzo's death, Filippoand Francesco del Nero met resistance in operating the Depository, for theOtto, emboldened by the loss of control at the center of the government,was reluctant to accept accounts of Lorenzo's debts and write them off onto

9 1 Francesco del Nero (i 487-1563) is one of the more picaresque personalities with whom Fil ippoassociated for both business and pleasure. Francesco was Fil ippo's cosa who devoted himself tofurthering his interests and overseeing his financial affairs from 1515 on. H e is first mentioned inFil ippo's correspondence in 1514 as a friend to whom Fil ippo loaned a cape, C.S. , Ser. i n , 108,fol. 3, but by September of that year Fil ippo already referred to h im as his braccio, or r ight-handman, M.A.P . , 108, fol. 118. Fil ippo brought him to Lorenzo de 'Medic i ' s at tention in December1514 when he recommended him for the position of provveditore of the Studio Fiorentino in Pisa,C.S. , Ser. i n , n o , fol. 3, and Lorenzo subsequently ordered Galeotto de 'Medici to see to hisappointment , M.A.P . , 141, fol. 82. Fil ippo employed him as vice-depositor in Florence the entiretime he controlled that office and had considered making him depositor in name as well, bu t decidedin 1515 that at the age of twenty-eight Francesco was still too young to hold the title, C.S. , Ser.in , 110, fol. 15. By nature impatient and quick to temper, Francesco tangled not only with Rober tode'Ricci in the Depository, M.A.P . , 115, fols. 395, 52, but with Clarice over his and Fil ippo'samorous escapades. Fil ippo and Francesco worked hand in glove in the Depository where Francescobegan building his own fortune and investing capital in various Strozzi enterprises. In Fi l ippo'sabsence he assumed equal status as a maggiore, or par tner , C.S. , Ser. i n , n o , fol. 153V and Ser.v, 99, fol. 8 iv , and Fil ippo acknowledged that their profits grew from the same source, ibid., fol.176, 14 April 1520.

92 C.S. , Ser. 1, 136, fol. 231.

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the books of the commune.93 For his own added safety in those uncertaintimes, Filippo even rewrote debts in Francesco del Nero's name.94 Hemoved his family to Rome and made plans for an extended trip to Veniceand possibly even to England and Flanders to avoid Florence until he wouldbe more kindly received. The death of his mother-in-law Alfonsina Orsiniin February 1520 intervened and prevented the trip.95

The death of Lorenzo followed shortly by that of Alfonsina ended asignificant period in Filippo's life. He had known Lorenzo since 1508 whenhe first became connected with the Medici family and they had grown tobe close friends and companions over more than a decade of intimateassociation. Filippo was Lorenzo's trusted confidant and unfailing backerin Florence, and Lorenzo in turn had made Filippo second only to himselfin power and distinction in the city. Lorenzo and his mother had beenFilippo's steadfast promoters and had attained for him the positions at thepapal court that after 1519 became his consuming interests. With theirdeaths Filippo lost his two most influential patrons who more than any otherpersons had shaped his future. However, fortunately for him their deathsdid not in the long run cause permanent hardship. Because he had alreadyestablished himself at the papal court and because of his continuingfriendship with Cardinal Giulio, he was able to remain in the Medici's innercircle. He shifted the focus of his financial endeavors to Rome and left hisassociate, Francesco del Nero, increasingly in charge of his affairs inFlorence and of the Depository of the Signoriay which he continued to headat the pleasure of the cardinal. After 1519 Filippo devoted most of hisenergies to his business in Rome and to the Depository General of theApostolic Chamber which opened the way to a new chapter in his career,as favorite and financier of the Medici popes.9 3 Thei r affairs were still not straightened out six months later. See Filippo's letters to Del Nero of

18 and 26 November 1519, C.S., Ser. in , 110, fols. 122-124. They also had trouble with Goro Gheri ,who remained in charge of the city until Silvio Passerini, cardinal of Cortona, took over at the behestof Cardinal Medici and Leo X. Filippo labeled Gheri a scoundrel for creating unnecessaryproblems for Francesco in the Depository, ibid., fol. 124V.

94 Ibid., fol. 114.9 5 Ibid., n o , fol. 153. Filippo, like many others, showed little grief at Alfonsina's death, and he

suggested to Francesco del Nero in jest the following epitaph, ibid., 143, fol. 160: 'Alfonsina Ursinacuius obitum nemo vitam deflevunt omnes iocundissimum in humano genere saluberimumquedepositum. ' ['Alfonsina Orsini whose death no one, whose life everyone mourned, and whose burialis most pleasant and salubrious to mankind. ' ]

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Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber

Clearly Filippo's career as a papal banker is one of the most significant partsof his life, but one which historians who have concerned themselves withStrozzi have consistently ignored. Rather, they have been content to regardFilippo in terms of his Florentine experiences culled exclusively fromFlorentine sources. They have ignored this other side of his life and havebeen unaware of the wealth of evidence in the Vatican and other Romanarchives which recalls not only Strozzi's financial activities, but the financialinvolvement of other Florentines in Rome as well.1 For too long historiansof Florence have been somewhat chauvinistic when it comes to recognizingimportant influences on the city's history which have come ab extra. Theyhave never fully appreciated that in our period, for two decades after the

1 Part of the problem lies in the fact that there is no comprehensive study on papal finances in theearly sixteenth century. The best specific works by Adolf von Gottlob, Aus der Camera Apostolicades is.jfahrhunderts (Innsbruck, 1889) and W. von Hofmann, Forschungen zur Geschichte der kurialenBehorden vom Schisma bis zur Reformation (Rome, 1914) are outdated and concentrate mainly onthe fifteenth century. Delumeau's treatment of papal finance in his Vie economique et sociale de Romedans la seconde moitie de XVIe siecle is sparse for the first half of the century since his main interestlies in the period after 1550. Aloys Schulte's work on Die Fugger in Rom, 1495-1523 (Leipzig, 1904)provides helpful information but is limited in scope. Luigi Nina's three-volume general study, Lefinanze pontificie nel Medioevo (Milan, 1929-1932) is of minimal use and lacking in documentation.Clemens Bauer's article, 'Die Epochen der Papstfinanz,' Historische Zeitschrift, cxxxvin (1928),457-503, provides the best summary of the development of papal finance. See also his * Studi perla storia delle finanze papali durante il pontificato di Sisto IV,' Archivio della R. Societa Romanadi Storia Patria, 50 (1927), 319-400. There is nothing in English which covers the period save PeterPartner's overview, Renaissance Rome 1500-1559 (Berkeley, 1976). William E. Lunt's PapalRevenues in the Middle Ages (New York, 1934) and Partner's The Papal State under Martin V(London, 1958) concentrate on earlier centuries. Also Partner's, 'Camera Papae: Problems of PapalFinance in the Later Middle Ages,' Journal of Ecclesiastical History, iv (1953), 55—68 and the 'The"Budget" of the Roman Church in the Renaissance Period,' Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E.F.Jacob (London, i960), 256-278 and E. Goller's ' Untersuchungen iiber das Inventar desFinanzarchivs der Renaissancepapste (1447-1521),' Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle, v (Rome, 1924),227-272. One contemporary Italian scholar, Michele Monaco, has treated aspects of papal financein our period in a very creditable fashion. See his La Situazione della Reverenda Camera ApostolicaneWanno 1525 (Rome, i960) and his articles, 'II primo debito pubblico pontificio: II Monte dellaFede (1526),' Studi Romani, anno 8, no. 5 (i960), 553-569 and 'Le finanze pontificie al tempo diClemente VII (1523-1534),' Studi Romani, anno 6, no. 3 (1958), 278-296. One frequently citedreason for the lack of scholarship on papal finances in the early sixteenth century is the loss ofdocumentary material in the Sack of Rome and later in the transfer of the Vatican Archives to Parisby Napoleon. But despite the lacunae, thousands of volumes yet remain in the Vatican and in otherarchives which can provide useful and illuminating information on the problem of papal finances.

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election of Leo X in 1513, decisions on Florentine political life were takenfrom the papacy at Rome. We have already noted how in the area of thecity's finances Leo X (and later Clement VII) regarded Florence's resourcesas a supplementary fund for papal wars and diplomacy. Filippo Strozzi wasthe central figure in this Rome-Florence connection, but even the fact thathe ran the depositories of both Florence and Rome at the same time andmanipulated and transferred funds between the two cities has gone virtuallyunnoticed. There are thus two good reasons why Filippo's activities as apapal banker merit our attention, first because this important side of hislife has never been systematically studied, and second because anappreciation of Strozzi as a banker and financer at the curia contributesto a better understanding not only of the office of depositor general andthe inner workings of papal finance, but of the links between Florence andthe Vatican in this period as well.

When Filippo began doing business in Rome, he joined an establishedcommunity of Florentine banking companies which had a singularly longtradition of serving the papacy. Florentine business relations with the popesdated back into the early thirteenth century, and by the fourteenth centuryduring the Avignon Captivity, Florentine merchant-bankers dominatedpapal finance.2 The activities of Florentine bankers at the Avignonese curia,however, came to an abrupt halt in March 1376 when Pope Gregory XIplaced Florence under interdict and ordered the entire Florentine colonyexpelled from Avignon. Pistoiese and Lucchese merchants stepped in andreplaced the Florentines as favored papal bankers. But by the end of thefourteenth century a new group of Florentines established themselves inRome, and from 1378 when Urban VI restored the papacy to the EternalCity, the Florentine community built itself up to over two hundred strong.3

In this period the Florentines were steadily increasing their business withthe curia, and companies like the Alberti, Medici, Ricci, and Spinidistinguished themselves at the papal court. In the early fifteenth centurythe Medici were patronized by Baldassare Cossa, elected Pope John XXIIIin 1410, and began to supersede other Florentine companies in theirfinancial dealings with the curia.4 Their unrivaled leadership as papalbankers and the great fortunes they amassed resulted from the specialconsideration they received principally from John XXIII, Eugenius IV, andMartin V. As the Medici's secret account books have shown, papal banking2 Lunt, 1, 51-52; Yves Renouard, 'Le compagnie commerciali fiorentine del Trecento,' A.S.I., vol.

96 (1938), 41-68 and his Les relations des Papes d? Avignon et des compagnies comtnerdales et bancairesde 1316 a 1378 (Paris, 1941), pp. I2iff.

3 Arnold Esch, 'Florentiner in Rom um 1400,' Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven undBibliotheken, 52 (1972), 482, 496-525. Since Esch used primarily notarial sources to compile hisdata, one would expect them to exhibit a high concentration of businessmen.

4 George Holmes, 'How the Medici Became the Pope's Bankers,' Florentine Studies, ed. NicolaiRubinstein (Evanston, 111., 1968), pp. 357-380.

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could be highly lucrative, for Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici's company atRome produced over 50 percent of the total earnings of all the operationsof the Medici Bank.5 Throughout the rest of the fifteenth century theFlorentine business community remained a permanent fixture in Rome,although it expanded and contracted depending on the favor of particularpopes. By mid-century the Florentines had founded their own confraternity'della Pietdy and had organized themselves into a separate nation completewith its own statutes similar to those of other Florentine commercialcommunities abroad.

Those firms which did business with the papacy are designated inVatican documents mercatores romanam curiam sequentes, merchants follow-ing the Roman curia. At one time banks had followed the peregrinationsof the papal court, and the term sequentes had had a literal meaning,especially in the fourteenth and first part of the fifteenth centuries whenthe papacy moved to Avignon and for a time stayed in Florence. But bythe end of the century the popes and their bankers had permanently settledin Rome, and even during periods of long papal absences such as at thebeginning of Adrian VFs reign in 1522, bankers continued to conduct theiraffairs at the Vatican. Vestiges of the old practice remained, however, andbusiness languished when the pope was away from Rome, even if for justa brief visit to his hunting lodge at Magliano.6 Bankers such as Strozzi mighteven accompany the pope on his trips and conclude business transactionswith him while away from Rome since the pope habitually travelled withone or more earneral clerks who recorded his fiats.

The Florentine colony and business community in Rome concentrateditself in the district of Ponte, which was the area adjacent to the Ponte S.Angelo directly across the Tiber from the Vatican. Already at the turn ofthe fifteenth century the major Florentine companies were located in theparishes of S. Orsola and SS. Celso and Giuliano surrounding the shortstreet Canale di Ponte which took its name from its origins as a drainagecanal for the river. In the early sixteenth century the Florentine colony stillremained centered in the district of Ponte, and the crowded Canale di Ponte,later renamed Via di Banco di S. Spirito, continued to function as the WallStreet of Rome. At least eighteen of the approximately thirty Florentinebanks in operation squeezed their offices into the crowded narrow-facedbuildings on that one block-long street. The desirability of its location andthe role it played as Rome's exchange mart and clearing-house forinformation helps explain why Filippo Strozzi had difficulty findingquarters for his bank on the Canale di Ponte in the winter of 1514-1515.

5 Raymond de Roover, p. 202.6 During one such papal absence in October 1517 Filippo wrote to Francesco del Nero about the

pervasive torpor which would cease only upon Leo's return. C.S., Ser. m, n o , fol. 63.

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In regard to the size of the Florentine settlement in Rome, modernhistorians such as Albertini have followed the path taken by Schulte andPastor and have numbered in battalions the Florentines who flocked thereafter the election of Cardinal Medici. By and large that assessment is basedon the opinions of contemporaries such as Aretino who so beautifullysatirized what he perceived as a great influx of Florentine favor-seekerseager to overrun the Vatican. Also, as we have seen, in 1513 manyFlorentines themselves gave way to flights of hyperbole in their anticipationof profit and favor from the first Florentine pope. Neither should be takenliterally. In fact, a closer look at the Florentine business community in Romewhich could be presumed to exhibit the most obvious effects of a greatFlorentine invasion and an overflow of patronage after Leo's election,reveals that, contrary to everyone's great expectations, no remarkableincrease in its size took place. The number of Florentine banks attachedto the curia remained constant at between twenty-five and thirty both beforeand after Leo's pontificate.7

However, if the Florentine companies in Rome did not dramaticallyincrease in number after the election of Leo X, they did expand the volumeof their business with the curia. Both Leo and Clement VII gavepreferential treatment to Florentines and directed a good deal of businesstheir way.8 In a bull of 1515 Leo gave legal recognition to the FlorentineNation in Rome, later granted it certain privileges and exemptions, andplaced it in charge of the papal mint.9 He also permitted Florentine firmsto enter areas of papal finance formerly controlled by banks of other nations.For example, the Sauli bank which had enjoyed special favor with JuliusII found that under Leo they had to be satisfied with less lucrativeappointments. He not only ejected them from the office of depositorgeneral, which they strenuously sought to retain, so that he could awardit to the Strozzi, but he also forced them out of the very desirable Treasuryof the Romagna which he passed on to his brother-in-law Jacopo Salviati.l °

7 Several lists of Florentine bankers contained in Vatican safe-conducts, the 1526 tax census of Rome,as well as figures gleaned from documents of the Florentines' confraternity in Rome combine tosubstantiate this finding in my article ' Mercatores FlorentiniJ pp. 55-59 where their names havealso been published.

8 For the involvement of various Florentine banks in the business of the curia under the Medici,see ibid., pp. 60-71.

9 The Florentine Nation was given official sanction in the bull Eas quae pro commodo of 12 June 1515,and the privileges and immunities of its officials were extended in 1519. Delumeau, 1, 209, note2, published a list of the elected consuls of the Florentine Nation from 1515 to 1620. However, oneshould exercise caution in using the list because of all the errors in transcription. Filippo Strozziserved twice as consul in 1523 and 1533. As might be expected, the consuls were regularly the mostprominent Florentine bankers in Rome. On the removal of the mint from the hands of the Fugger,see Schulte, 1, 208.

10 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 63, fol. 88; vol. 65, fol. 40; vol. 63, fols. 89 and 90V; vol. 66, fol. 3. TheSauli received confirmation of rights to the dogana on livestock in the Patrimony and the Treasuryof Perugia instead, ibid., vol. 63, fol. 144.V.

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The Medici popes did not originate the practice of bestowing specialpapal blessing upon bankers from their own or friendly nations. A new popecould choose from a large number of different banking houses. Notablysince the fourteenth century, banks of different national origins had beendrawn to Rome and had proliferated. In fact, most of the companies thatdealt with the curia were not owned and operated by citizens of Rome butwere branches of parent companies located in other Italian cities, principallyFlorence, Genoa, Siena and Lucca. Otherwise they came from the mainfinancial centers of Europe outside Italy, such as Augsburg which wasrepresented at the papal court in the early sixteenth century by both theFugger and Welser firms. The diversity in the national origins of thesebanks on the one hand stands witness to the absence of a significantmerchant class among the Romans, but on the other it reflects the outcomeof the long tradition of the various popes who had penchants for bankersof different nationalities. Appointments to the position of depositor generalserve as a case in point. To name but a few, beginning in the late fifteenthcentury, Innocent VIII Cibo preferred to deal with companies from his owncity of Genoa and selected the Usumari firm as his depositor general.Alexander VI, a Borgia, appointed the Sienese firm of the Spanocchi ashis. Julius II, a Delia Rovere from Liguria, favored the Sauli from nearbyGenoa with the same office, and as we know, the Medici popes chose Strozzifrom Florence to be depositor general. In our period changes in theadministration of the papal mint in Rome likewise illustrate the differentpreferences of individual popes and the short-term cycles in office-holdingthey could produce. The German firm of the Fugger gained control of themint in 1511 under Julius. Leo removed it from their hands and, as a specialgift to the Florentines, awarded it not just to one firm but to the wholeFlorentine Nation in Rome. When Adrian Floriszoon, Charles V's old tutor,became Pope Adrian VI in 1522, it surprised no one when he handed themint back to Charles V's bankers, the Fugger. But in 1524 after Giuliode'Medici became Clement VII, direction of the mint returned like abouncing ball to the consuls of the Florentine Nation.11

With the Medici popes, beyond a predictable preference for theircountrymen, other factors help explain the privileges given particularFlorentine merchants. Long before Leo's election to the papacy when hewas still a cardinal in Rome, he had cultivated and maintained a closerelationship with the Florentine community. Common gossip held that,when elected, he was a relatively poor pope who had many debts and fartoo many relatives to satisfy.12 But even before 1513 during the long years1T Record of Adrian VI's action to restore the mint to the Fugger in 1522 is in A.V., Div. Cam., vol.

73, fol. 7, and of Clement VIFs returning it to the Florentines in September 1524 in ibid., fol. 113.See also E. Martinori, Annali delta Zecca di Roma (Rome, 1917-1922).

12 Marino Sanuto, / Diarii (Venice, 1879-1902) vol. xvi, col. 28 reported that at his election Leo hadincomes worth only 10,000 ducats and that, the bull of Julius II notwithstanding, the reason he

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of his family's exile when they lost much of their wealth through theconfiscation of their money and property, Cardinal Medici must have reliedconsiderably on the credit of Florentines in Rome. He had had to borrowto finance his election, so much so that Lorenzo Strozzi thought his needfor Strozzi credit the major reason why he invited Filippo to accompanyhim to Rome for the conclave.13 Unfortunately no account books for theMedici or for any of the banks concerned have survived which could tellus to what extent Cardinal Medici or other members of his family availedthemselves of the credit of Florentine bankers in Rome during the yearsbefore 1513. However, some tantalizing evidence hints at the Medici'sfinancial involvement with Florentine bankers, and the early correspondenceof Lorenzo de'Medici reveals that one of the prominent financiers at Leo'scourt, Leonardo Bartolini, was already handling Cardinal Medici's privateaccounts before 1513 and that he managed loans for the cardinal with thebanks of at least two Florentines, Simone Ricasoli and Niccolo Antinori.14

It was not just coincidence that the same Simone Ricasoli and BernardoBini, another wealthy Florentine banker in Rome, were elected from amongthe members of the Florentines' confraternity to present to Cardinal Mediciin person the group's traditional candle for Candlemas in 1508.

The cozy relationship which Cardinal Medici maintained with theFlorentines in Rome stirred the republican government of Florence twice,in 1495 and 1511, to issue proclamations against any citizen who lived orworked with the exiled Medici in Rome, but the city could actually do littleto prohibit these associations. For the Florentines, particularly themerchants, the cardinal was a valuable avenue through which to approachthe pope with petitions and requests, especially as he became more andmore influential with Julius II. To win the support of Florentines, CardinalMedici acted freely on their behalf at the curia. Parenti claimed that thecardinal had personally interceded with Julius for the safe-conduct grantedFlorentine merchants in Rome when Florence was under interdict in1 5 1 1 . 1 5

When we pause to consider Filippo Strozzi against the backdrop of theFlorentine banking community and of Leo X's firm friendship with it, we

was not elected entirely by simony was because he had very little money to spend on bribes. Seealso Vettori's letter, Niccolo Machiavelli, Lettere, p. 237; E. Rodocanachi, Histoire de Rome. Lepontificat de Leon JV, 1513-1521 (Paris, 1931), p. 22. Contemporary historians all stressed the closeties between Cardinal Medici and the Florentines in Rome, e.g., Piero Parenti, fol. 47; Cerretani,Dialogo, fol. 147; Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 323-324.

13 Niccolini, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.14 C.S., Ser. 1, 3, fols. 2iv, 185-186. Such loans paid lasting rewards after 1513 as shown by Lorenzo

de'Medici's later statement in a letter, M.A.P., 141, fol. 38, that he would do anything for NiccoloAntinori. Bartolini expected to be reimbursed from the public treasury in Florence for the credithe had extended the Medici, B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol. 44.

15 Piero Parenti, fol. 79.

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can better evaluate the role papal patronage had in setting him up as oneof the biggest and most important bankers in Rome. For we cannot helpbut notice that despite the prior existence of a whole colony of well-established and eager Florentine bankers from which to appoint a depositorgeneral, Leo decided at the urging of Alfonsina and Cardinal Giuliode'Medici to fill the position with his niece's young husband who was notan experienced curial banker, who had no ready banking facilities in thecity and who would have to open a brand-new company to exercise theduties of the office. Not that Leo's appointment of Strozzi was unusual orunexpected, for in the sixteenth century it was commonly accepted thatposition and privilege should rest more on favor than merit; but contem-poraries certainly understood that Filippo Strozzi was entering the worldof papal banking at the most exalted level primarily because of hi* claimto advancement as a Medici parente. This becomes even more apparentwhen we consider that Strozzi's was one of the few new Florentine companiesto be established in Rome after the election of Leo and one of the fewerstill to have a significant share in the conduct of papal financial affairs.

Curial bankers avidly sought the office of depositor general since it wasthe most prestigious of the few positions in the Camera Apostolica, theadministrative wing of the Vatican, that had banking duties. The DepositoryGeneral was in such great demand that another Florentine banker toldFilippo to accept the office even if he did not want it. Then he would runthe Depository in the Strozzi name and give Filippo half the profits.16 Butprofit was not Filippo's only or necessarily even his most pressing motivein pursuing the Depository. A principal attraction of the office of depositorgeneral was the honor it conferred. One cannot underestimate the motivatingforce of 'honore' in this period, and when Leo asked Filippo whether hewanted the Depository General or the rights to the salt monopoly in theRomagna, he hesitated not a moment before replying that he muchpreferred the Depository General precisely because he considered it themore noble of the two.* 7

However, despite his fortunate status as a papal relative, and despiteLeo's promises, nonetheless Filippo had quite a tussle before finallysecuring title to the Depository General. As early as August 1514 duringhis stay in Rome to help prepare for Lorenzo de'Medici's arrival, he hadentered into what he thought were the final negotiations to replace the Sauli.On 13 August he had even written to his brother that he intended soonto move to Rome and to transfer his business there too.* 8 Five days laterhe wrote confidentially to Lorenzo de'Medici that when Leo had allowedhim to choose between the Depository General and the salt monopoly the16 M.A.P., 108, fol. 148.17 Ibid., fol. 126. I8 C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 3.

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pope had forecast he could take office in about six months.19 Although infact he had only Leo's word and no written agreement for his appointment,Filippo obviously thought the matter settled, for during that fall and winterwhile he remained in Rome in the company of his brother-in-law, he beganto make the necessary arrangements for assuming the duties of depositor.

First of all, Filippo had to open his own banking house which wouldadminister the Depository and take care of other business that came hisway. Although his appointment as depositor general represented anunprecedented high honor for Filippo and for the Strozzi clan, the actualbusiness of banking at the papal court was hardly new to Filippo's family.Back in 1482 his father Filippo the Elder had opened a firm in Rome whichin the space of only ten years produced the largest share of the profits ofhis total investments.20 After Filippo the Elder's death in 1491 his bankcontinued to operate for a while under the management of Berto Berti, whoapparently by 1494 had left the Strozzi to form his own company.21

Filippo's older half-brother Alfonso appears to have taken over his father'scompany, changing its name to his own. Filippo and Lorenzo Strozzicontinued to invest capital in the bank, and they received profits as late as1502 after which time it seems to have closed.22 It is difficult to say whetherthe Strozzi's prior contacts in Rome in any way eased Filippo's task ofopening his own company in 1515. He did seek his clerks from among theFlorentine community, and his letters suggest he lured some of the besttalent away from other firms. His chosen manager and distant relative,Antonio di Ser Michele Strozzi, was in Rome in early 1499 and in 1501,23

but unfortunately we do not know whether he had worked for the originalStrozzi company or for someone else. It seems unlikely that Antonio hadowned a company, since among the records of Florentine banks operatingin Rome at that time none carry his name.

On 1 November 1514 Filippo signed a five-year contract founding abanking company entitled 'Filippo Strozzi e Chompagni' which wouldbegin operations at the start of the next Florentine fiscal year on 25 March1515, presumably when his term as depositor general would also commence.The company was capitalized with 25,000 cameral ducats of which Filippowould contribute 21,000 and Antonio Strozzi, his resident manager, 4,000.Profits were to be distributed 80 percent to Filippo and 20 percent to19 M.A.P., 108, fol. 126.20 Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, pp. 57, 60, table 4, 61.21 Domenico Maffei, II giovane Machiavelli banchiere con Berto Berti a Roma (Florence, 1973), pp.

25-26.22 Alfonso Strozzi's name appears in the 1494 list of Florentine bankers in Rome in A.V., Reg. Vat.,

869, fols. 204-205. On the profits from Filippo and Lorenzo's investments in the company, seeGoldthwaite, Private Wealth, p. 78, table 7.

23 He is listed among the members of the confraternity of S. Giovanni dei Fiorentini for those years.A.A.S.G.F., vol. 357, fols. 70V-71, 122-123.

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Antonio.24 Apparently Filippo had no intimations of his upcoming troublesin the spring of 1515 in actually securing the Depository, for the wordingof the contract clearly reveals that he not only had every intention ofoperating the Depository, but that he held high hopes of entering intonumerous other facets of the very profitable business of papal banking. TheNovember contract specified that Strozzi's new firm would run theDepository General and, in addition, would have at least a one-thirdinterest in any 'contracts, tax farms, treasuries, mints, or other similarconcerns' which Filippo might acquire at a future date.25 The documentconfirms what Filippo had written to Lorenzo Strozzi in August, that heintended to reside in Rome, for it specifies that the living expenses ofFilippo, his wife, children, servants, and one household administratorwould come out of the profits of the firm and that in like manner AntonioStrozzi, the manager, would be allowed to maintain his family at thecompany's expense.26

The hardest problems Filippo had to resolve in opening a new companyinvolved hiring staff and finding a suitable location in Rome's over-crowdedfinancial district. By December he had chosen two 'giovani,' or clerks,Filippo di Simone Ridolfi, his nephew, and a son of Guglielmo Angiolini.27

But he continued to receive requests from friends seeking jobs, includingone from Roberto de'Ricci, behind whose name Filippo later exercised theDepository of Florence, who begged him to hire his son. Securing a loca-tion for the bank proved the more difficult task, and even though in earlyDecember he informed his brother that he was in the final stage ofnegotiations, the matter was still not settled by February.28 He plannedto assume the lease on part of a building on the Canale di Ponte rentedby two other Florentine bankers, Bonaccorso Rucellai and Bernardo daVerrazzano, who had agreed to vacate. A third, Jacopo Rucellai, refusedto move unless Filippo paid him compensation of nearly 1,000 florins forimprovements he had made on the premises.29 Filippo, however, had no

24 C.S. , Ser. v, 1250, unnumbered . Fil ippo's brothers Lorenzo and Alfonso contr ibuted to Fil ippo'sshare of the capital at least by the time the company was reorganized in 1516. According to thenew contract dated 10 November 1516, Fil ippo invested 11,000 ducats , Alfonso 7,000 and Lorenzo3,000, C.S. , Ser. v, 1164.

25 C.S. , Ser. v, 1250, unnumbered . T h e only exception was the right to collect certain customs duties,the Dogana di Terra, which Fil ippo already controlled at the t ime, and whose revenues thereforewould not be subject to any profit-sharing within the new firm.

2 6 C.S. , Ser. v, 1250, unnumbered .27 Ridolfi was the son of Fil ippo's half-sister Maria who in i486 had married Simone di Jacopo Ridolfi.

He later replaced Antonio Strozzi as manager of Fi l ippo's company in Rome.28 C.S. , Ser. in , 108, fol. 5.29 Ibid., fol. 7. F rom a tax record of 1525, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 75, fols. 206V-207, we know the

bank was definitely on the Canale di Ponte, and evidence suggests that it occupied part of thepresent-day Palazzo Niccolini on what is now the Via del Banco di S. Spiri to. Although thedocuments published by Frommel , Der romische Palastbau der Hochrenaissance (Tub ingen , 1973),

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intention of paying so much extra and decided to by-pass Rucellai byapplying pressure directly on the owner of the building, a young Romannoble. Filippo's tactics in this instance are indicative of the single-mindeddetermination with which he pursued all his business deals. First he offeredto pay the landlord considerably more rent than the former tenants, andthen he dangled an attractive loan before his eyes which made the younggentleman all the more anxious to accommodate him.

Staffing and locating his new bank were not the only troubles that vexedhim. Filippo complained how weary of court life he had become, yet felttrapped because he realized that to get ahead with Leo everything dependedon putting in an appearance at an endless round of parties, banquets and'musical evenings.' Despite the obvious advantages of being a member ofthe pope's family, the social obligations and pretenses inherent in his rankthreatened to interfere with his business ambitions. His critics at court evendared to question whether banking was a sufficiently honorable occupationfor Lorenzo de'Medici's brother-in-law and a close relative of the pope,as if oblivious to the Medici's recent rise from the merchant ranks and fromthe very same office of depositor general. The issue came up when Filippowas considering opening a branch of his company in Naples at the sametime that the Medici were exploring a possible marriage alliance forLorenzo de'Medici with the king of Naples. Filippo described the situationto Lorenzo Strozzi as follows:

In addition to my problems here, I am now in another mess. I had already decidedto open [a company] in Naples in my own name under the management of FilippoRidolfi and with a substantial capital investment when the matter of the betrothalof the Magnificent [Lorenzo de'Medici] cropped up. The negotiations are wellunder way but not yet concluded, and some people think that as the brother-in-lawof the Magnificent Lorenzo, prospective in-law of the king of Naples, it would notbe fitting for me to practice the merchant trade in Naples. And many condemnmy doing business here in Rome under my own name, although being depositorof the pope apparently dignifies that 'vile' profession and makes it honorable. Allthese matters are under dispute, and since the greatest difficulty is over the affairin Naples, I am inclined to give in to them. I am not sure yet under whose nameto do business there - whether Filippo Ridolfi's or Antonio Strozzi's.30

ii, 198-201, record Filippo's purchase of that palace from Luigi Gaddi only in 1530, there is mentionof a ' retrovenditione? or resale, as though Strozzi had already owned all or part of the structure.The palace itself is long and narrow and actually consists of two houses joined together with oneinterior courtyard behind the other, so it is conceivable that Filippo owned parts of it in 1515. Adocument of the Magistri Stratarum of 1524 published in Frommel, 11, 31, lists Strozzi and Gaddias next-door neighbors. Sansovino rebuilt the palace for Gaddi in its more grandiose style whichis still visible. After Filippo's death, his son Roberto, himself a banker, took up residence in thePalazzo Niccolini and hosted his friend Michelangelo there, ibid., 11, 203. The palace was decoratedornately with antiquities, some of the remains of which are still present in the courtyard. Todaythe palace is a sadly run-down apartment house.

30 C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 7.

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As the spring of 1515 progressed, Filippo's problems in Rome onlyincreased. Although we do not know whether his new company actuallyopened its doors at the end of March in accordance with the contract, wedo know that by then Filippo still had not completed the deal with LeoX for the Depository General, and that in May there was serious doubtthat he would become depositor general at all.

May 1515 was precisely the time when Lorenzo de'Medici was reachingthe final stages in his plan to have himself elected captain general of theFlorentine forces, and most likely the criticism against Filippo and againsthis becoming depositor general relates directly to his having encouragedand countenanced Lorenzo's ambitions. During the long months ofnegotiation in 1514 no one in the Medici family had specifically objectedto Filippo's taking over the Depository, but in May 1515 when all Romewas buzzing with the rumor that Lorenzo de'Medici had returned toFlorence to make himself captain general, the pope's brother Giulianobegan to counsel Leo not to give it to Filippo but to continue the term ofJulius IPs appointee, the Sauli company. Filippo's friend BenedettoBuondelmonti in fact wrote him the news from Rome that at the insistenceof Giuliano, Leo had either already promised and confirmed the Depositoryto the Sauli or would do so shortly.31 Alfonsina, however, redoubled herentreaties with Leo on Filippo's behalf and enlisted the help of CardinalGiulio. The matter remained unresolved for still another month, but finallyon 14 June, Baldassare da Pescia, Lorenzo de'Medici's secretary in Rome,wrote that Cardinal Giulio wanted Filippo informed that he had spokenwith Leo X about the Depository General and that it was imperative thatFilippo come immediately to Rome or send someone who could act forhim.32 About that same time Leo issued a Motuproprio confirming hisappointment. On 19 June in Florence at the little church of Santa Mariade'Ughi across the piazza from the Strozzi palace, Filippo signed thecontract to assume the duties of depositor general of the Apostolic Chamberand thus officially embarked upon his long and eventful career as a bankerand financier at the papal court.33

In the first year after his appointment, however, Filippo was forced torely almost entirely on his manager Antonio Strozzi to conduct his affairsin Rome. He was detained in Florence first by Lorenzo de'Medici's militarycampaign in Lombardy in August 1515, by their joint embassy to FrancisI at Milan, and then by the pope's visit to Florence on his way to Bolognato sign the Concordat with Francis that winter. Not until May 1516 wasFilippo free to return to Rome for any length of time.

31 MAP. , 108, fol. 148.32 M.A.P . , 117, fol. 60, 14 J u n e 1515.33 A copy of the contract is preserved in A.V., Div . Cam. , vol. 65, fols. 57—60.

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The actual duties of the depositor general entailed providing specifiedkinds of banking services to the Apostolic Chamber. According to thegeneral terms of the pope's Motuproprio awarding the office to Filippo, thefunction of the depositor was to receive and keep money on deposit at thepleasure of the pope and his Chamber and to have ' the honors, burdens,and earnings customary to that office.'34 The contract Filippo signed inFlorence was more specific about the nature of his duties although theretoo we find that the depositor's function was essentially to advance money;to receive funds on deposit; to issue, accept, or reject letters of exchange;to keep accounts of transactions; to obtain apostolic letters for theexpedition of benefices and other matters; and to perform any othernecessary business activities.35 As the title of the office suggests, theDepository General was the central repository of cameral monies, but thatis not to say that the depositor himself was the pope's highest financialminister. That honor fell to the camarlingo, or chamberlain, who was alsochief administrator as head of the Camera Apostolica. Subordinate to himwas the papal treasurer general who was accountable for the finances of thePapal States and various collectories.36 In fact, narrowly defined, thedepositor general had few discretionary powers, and Vatican records oftransactions involving Strozzi as depositor general show that he acted onlyon the orders of the pope, the camarlingo or the papal treasurer. Each ofhis actions was recorded and witnessed by one or more of the clerks of theChamber who also audited and approved the accounts he submitted to theCamera.31

Even though the Depository General was part of the Camera Apostolicaand the central place of deposit for cameral funds, by no means did allecclesiastical monies going in or out of the Vatican pass through thedepositor's bank, nor was it the only bank of deposit used by the pope. Anumber of other important money-handling offices within the curia kepttheir own records apart from the Depository General. They included theoffices of the datary, the grand penitentiary, and also the pope's personalchamberlain and majordomo.38 The datario had charge of the sale of venal34 Ibid., fol. 40. 35 Ibid., fol. 58.

3 6 On the general make-up of the Camera see Gott lob, pp . 70-129; Monaco, La Situazione, pp . 2 7 - 4 1 ;Lun t , 1, 15 -21 ; Partner, The Papal State, pp . 131-138.

37 Payment orders for the depositor in our period are preserved in the Diversa Carrier alia series inArm. xxix, vols. 63-100 of the Vatican Archives. T h e Introitus et Exitus are properly the accountsof the Camera although they deal mostly with the Depository. There are just a few Libri deltaDepositeria, which were books kept by the Depository, in the A.S.R. One Introitus et Exitus volumefor 1521 exists in Florence, C.S., Ser. v, 1170. Another for 1521-1522 during Adrian VI ' s reignis in A.S.R., Camerale 1, 1769, and one for 1531-1532, ibid., 1771. T h e rest of the Introitus et Exitusare in the Fondo Camerale of the Vatican Archives, of which Introitus et Exitus volumes 554-561cover the period of the Medici popes.

38 T h e one surviving account book of the Datary for our period is in B.A.V., Vat. Lat. , 10599. T h erecords of the Penitentiary have not been made available for study since they contain material

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offices, and, as that practice rapidly expanded in the fifteenth and earlysixteenth centuries, he came to exercise control over a greater and greaterportion of papal revenues which made the office of datary an increasinglypowerful arm of the curia.39 The datary had its own bank of deposit, filledin our period by the Florentine firm of the Bini. Monies coming in to thedatary from the sale of offices and from compositions passed through theBini bank which then paid out these datary funds as they were allocated.The Penitentiary, headed by Cardinal Pucci under Leo X, controlled therevenues from the sale of indulgences and pardons deriving from the pope'spowers of absolution as spiritual head of the church. Like the income fromthe datario, the revenues originating in the Penitentiary do not appear inthe accounts of the Depository and were managed separately. The pope'sprivate chamberlain, the camerario segreto, administered the TesoreriaSegreta, or pope's private accounts, while the maestro di casa who handledthe spese minute di palazzo, or household expenses, drew his operatingmoney in part from the depositor general but also from the pope, from thedatarioy and even from the incomes of the city of Rome. Other administrativeand political entities such as the College of Cardinals, the various collegesof office holders, the governor of the city of Rome, and all the provincialtreasurers, collectors, as well as the tax and revenue farmers kept separateaccounts of their own incomes and expenses. Any of their monies that showup in the income records of the depositor general were either fixedassessments or special subsidies and in no way represent the total revenuesavailable to those particular bodies. Thus it is quite evident that theIntroitus et Exitus series in the Vatican Archives which were the accountbooks kept by the depositor general for the Camera Apostolica gives onlya partial record of papal income and expenses and that the annual totalsin those books could never be used by themselves as an indication of thewhole papal budget.40

Before looking more closely at the functioning of the Depository Generalunder Strozzi's management, it is well worth considering a furtherhistorical dimension to that office which helps delimit its boundaries withinthe larger sphere of papal finances. In the fifteenth century popes beganto centralize their finances. One of the essential steps in that effort had been

concerning matters of conscience. Consequently, it is difficult to estimate the amount of revenuethat office took in. Three volumes of accounts kept by Serapica, Leo x's camerario segreto, theSpese minute di palazzo are in A.S.R., Camerale, I, 1489-1491, and they register payments to themaestro di casa, or majordomo. The College of Cardinals had its own Camera and administrativeofficials.

39 On the Datary, see L. Celier, Les Dataires du XVe siecle et les origines de la Datarie Apostolique(Paris, 1910); Hofmann, Forschungen, 1, 8off.; Felice Litva, 'L'attivita finanziaria della Datariadurante il periodo tridentino,' Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 5 (1967), 82-95. Hofmann, 202-204lists the individuals who served as datario under the Medici popes.

4 0 Bauer, 'Studi , ' p. 328; Partner, ' T h e "Budge t " of the Roman Church, ' pp. 256-259.

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fixing a single place to receive and disburse cameral revenues originatingin many different sources and coming from many different parts ofChristendom. Total centralization was obviously never achieved, and bythe early sixteenth century its progress had been substantially retarded bythe rapid expansion of auxiliary sources of revenue, particularly in theDatary, which were administered outside the Depository General.41 Incomparison with the fifteenth century, even though papal incomes hadincreased overall in our period and the depositor general was handling largeramounts of money than ever before, he was, nonetheless, responsible fora smaller proportion of total papal revenues.42

The books of Introitus et Exit us reveal many aspects of the administrationand operation of the Depository General which are not spelled out in theMotuproprio and the contract awarding the office to Strozzi. Regarding thetypes of revenues assigned to the Depository, we find in the introitusaccounts that annates, common services and the census furnished the main41 Holmes, pp. 364-365, rightly stressed the nature of the origins of the Depository. On the financial

structure and increase in the Datary's receipts, see Litva, passim. The Datary was increasingly usedto pay back loans contracted by the pope. Thus what had started out as only a supplement to theDepository, by the sixteenth century had widely surpassed it in both scope and flexibility. Itfunctioned nearly like a private treasury for the pope who enjoyed more freedom over its fundsthan he could over funds under the scrutiny of cameral officials. We find, for example, among therecords of the Datary in 1531 payments of monthly provisions to Clement VII's relatives, CardinalIppolito de'Medici (700 scudi), Alessandro de'Medici (750 scudi) and Catherine de'Medici (250 scudi)as well as many repayments of loans. B.A.V., Vat. Lat., 10599.

4 2 The incomes handled by the Depository General in the Introitus et Exitus accounts varied greatlyfrom year to year depending on, among other things, the political stance of the church. But by theearly sixteenth century they still show an overall increase, especially after the revaluation of papalmonies by about one-third under Julius II. Peter Partner gives several examples of Introitus et Exitusincomes in the fifteenth century drawn from his own work and from data compiled by Gottlob whichshow introitus totals of 114,385 cameral florins for the year 1426/1427; only 59,160 in 1436 at thetime of the Council of Basel; 471,694 in the twelve months beginning September 1461 whichincluded funds for Pius IPs Crusade; 218,068 for the year beginning August 1471; and about130,567 ducats for the year beginning December 1506. See Partner, 'The "Budget",' PP- 259-265;Gottlob, pp. 260-265. When Filippo was depositor, for those years in which accounts fortwelve-month periods have survived, we find the income handled by the Depository to be as follows:246,353 ducats for the year beginning March 1516; 86,287 ducats for the year beginning April 1517;206,843 ducats beginning April 1518; 80,712 ducats beginning April 1519; 111,085 ducats beginningApril 1520; and 103,373 ducats beginning December 1523, A.V., Int. et Exit., vols. 555-561.Increases in the amounts of money managed by the Depository are small compared to the increasesin total papal incomes according to the best available estimates, and the differences between thetwo reflect the expansion of income outside the jurisdiction of the Depository particularly from thesale of venal offices. Partner estimates the total incomes for 1426/1427 were 170,000 florins comparedwith 114,385 in the Introitus et Exitus accounts. The * budget' of the church for 1480-1481 publishedby Bauer,' Studi per la Storia,' pp. 349-392, shows a total income of 290,000 florins, and the similar'budget' of 1525 under Clement VII which is discussed by Partner and published in its entiretyby Monaco in La Situazione, pp. 70-127, represents an income of about 432,000 ducats. These' budgets' do not give complete pictures of church incomes. Nor do they take into account the vastcredit operations which composed a significant part of papal finances. Still, however, they do providea useful break-down of church incomes and are the only attempts by contemporaries to create acomposite financial picture of revenues and expenses.

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portion of its regular income. These payments usually dribbled in atirregular intervals in amounts as low as five or ten ducats, which amplyconfirmed the wisdom of having the Depository General within the schemeof papal finance as a central place in which many small sums wouldaccumulate. However, since these revenues from ecclesiastical taxes provedthemselves increasingly insufficient to balance the regular expenditures ofthe Depository, special subsidies from other sources of income had tosupplement them. In our period the Depository received a fixed allotmentof 850 ducats from the revenues of one of the customs tolls of Rome whichwas earmarked for the salaries of the pope's Swiss Guard.43 Money alsoflowed steadily into the Depository from the datario through the Bini,starting at 1,300 and then by 1521 reaching 1,600 ducats per month.44

Beginning in June 1520 the Depository was assigned an increase from 300to 500 ducats per month in the subsidy it received from three dogane ofthe city of Rome. At the same time it began to receive money on a regularbasis from the judicial taxes in the province of the Marches.45 The rapidlyexpanding military needs of the church, commencing in 1516 with the Warof Urbino, caused these special subsidies to become regular payments tothe Depository, and their increase is evident in the growing number ofexpenditure entries in the account books allocating money to the papalarmies.

The Depository General also drew income from extraordinary sourcessuch as the loan from the clerks of the Camera for 12,000 ducats in June1517 or the one from the banker Antonio Gualterotti for 2,000 ducats atthe order of Cardinal Medici in November 1516.46 In addition to itsregular subsidy, the Datary sometimes provided single large grants ofmoney, and on occasion the Depository was permitted the total sale priceof certain offices. By and large, these extraordinary, usually one-time grantsof revenue were called forth to meet specific military expenses.47 Forexample, in August 1521, 24,000 out of 26,000 ducats paid by Leo X'snephew Cardinal Cibo, probably as an installment on what he had agreedto pay for the office of chamberlain, were sent to Domenico Buoninsegni,the pope's financial agent with the army of the church in Lombardy.48 InNovember of that year, Ermellino, even more avid to become chamberlain,4 3 This was the dogana di merce. See for examples A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 555, fols. i2v, 39vff. and

C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fols. iovff.4 4 A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 558, fol. 49V; vol. 559, fol. 95 ; C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fol. iov.4 5 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fol. 154V.4 6 A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 557, fol. 34; vol. 556, fol. 71. In the latter case, the money was actually

paid to Strozzi's bank in Florence.4 7 In June 1519 the Strozzi bank received for the Depository General 7,172 ducats from the Sienese

banker Agostino Chigi which the Strozzi paid to Paolo Vettori for his stipend as captain of the papalgalleys. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 68, fol. 49V.

4 8 C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fols. 48V, 182.

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topped Cibo's bid with 50,000 ducats, of which 20,000 went to the kingof Hungary for the war against the Turks and 26,000 to Buoninsegni topay the papal troops still fighting in Lombardy.49 Money designated forspecial purposes usually just passed in and out of the Depository General,but sometimes the gap between receipt and disbursement could widen overa period of time. In July 1524 Jacopo Salviati was paid 1,125 ducats as theshare of profit due him as treasurer of the Romagna, supposedly out ofincome from the census of Pesaro, but the 1,125 ducats from the censuswere not actually received in the Depository until the following December.5 °A similar case where money designated for a definite purpose arrived lateto the Depository is provided by the example of income which the Kingdomof Naples owed the pope from the decima and a special subsidy. In February1521 Strozzi's company received on deposit Neapolitan carlini equal to thevalue of over 27,500 cameral ducats which had been collected through hisNaples branch, the company of Bartolomeo Ginori and Angelo Strozzi.51

The money paid in Rome, however, could not be used to offset the regularexpenses of the Depository. It had already been pledged to the Bini banktowards the repayment of two of their loans totaling 33,000 ducats two yearsbefore.52

The exitus accounts of the Depository General, like the introitus, aredivided between regular and extraordinary expenses. The largest share ofregular payments went to meet the salaries of officials at the curia and ofmilitary personnel, but the depositor was also responsible for smaller itemssuch as pensions assigned to the colleges of venal offices, the expenses ofthe pope's postal couriers, the provisions for the Sistine choir andmusicians, monies for part of the building costs of St Peter's and for somepapal household expenses such as linens for the pope's table and candlesfor his palace and the Sistine Chapel.53 Extraordinary expenses include

4 9 Ibid., fol. 58 and C.S., Ser. v, 101, fol. g6v. The Introitus et Exitus accounts reveal a number ofother exceptionally large sums of money credited to the Depository and paid out the same day suchas, for example, an entry in January 1517 for 240,611 ducats received from the sale of positionsin the newly enlarged College of Scutifers and Cubiculars and immediately paid out to the pope.Nothing indicates what the money was used for although we may assume it went for the War ofUrbino. See A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 556, fols. 85, 215.

50 Ibid., vol. 561, fols. 121, 185V.51 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 69, fols., 5—6, 166-167. They actually reported that 42,561 carlini had been

collected, but after deductions for expenses, only 75 percent of the total was sent to Rome. Forlack of comparative data, it is hard to say whether or not 75 percent was a typical portion of collectedtaxes to be forwarded to Rome.

52 Ibid., vol. 66, fols. 108, 142.53 A.V., Int. et Exit., vols. 55-61 passim. The 1525 'budge t ' published by Monaco, La Situazione,

pp. 70-73 gives a list of typical regular expenses for the Depository in 1525 totaling 59,040 ducatsfor the year. I have found a copy of this same 'budget ' in Florence in A.S.F., Con. Soppr. 102,vol. 333 which is clearly labeled ' l ibro della Tesoreria 1524-1525,' indicating it was compiled byor for the treasurer general Ponzetti. Neither Monaco nor Partner, who used the untitled Vatican

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both the large sums of money paid to individual bankers to reimburse theirloans or to the pope's military paymasters to hire mercenaries, and smalleramounts which paid for the occasional provisioning of various papalnuncios, part of the pope's coronation expenses, or even a personal gift suchas the gold chain Clement VII wanted to give Simone Tornabuoni in 1524for which the Depository paid over 200 ducats.54

If we may take the figure of 59,000 ducats from the 1525 'budget'published by Michele Monaco as an average for the Depository's regularyearly expenses, then, when compared with the total exitus entries for theyears for which we have records during the Strozzi administration, itbecomes quite obvious that an ever greater portion of the total expendituresof the Depository General went towards extraordinary expenses, especiallyfor the pope's military needs.55 Furthermore, a breakdown of the regularexpenses themselves in November 1520, a month when expenditures wereat their lowest that year and when there were no extraordinary payments,shows that of the total of 2,013 ducats spent that month, more than halfwent to support the normal military salaries and related expenses at thepapal court, and two-thirds of these monies constituted the monthlyallotment paid to the captain of the pope's Swiss Guard.56 It comes as nosurprise that so much of the Depository General's money was committedto the pope's regular and wartime defense needs. Throughout the reign ofthe Medici pontiffs the Holy See was engaged almost constantly in the seriesof Italian wars that started in 1515 with the war of the Holy League againstFrance over possession of Milan, followed by the War of Urbino, theprotracted Wars of Lombardy and the reconquest of Parma and Piacenzafor the church in the early 1520s, the conflicts culminating in the Sack ofRome in 1527, and finally the siege of Florence in 1529 and 1530.

The accounts of the Depository General do not provide any sort ofcomprehensive record of the costs of those wars for the papacy, even though

manuscript, was aware of the exact provenance of the 'budget.' For our purposes, its origin in theTreasury General explains why the revenues it lists are cameral revenues and not just those goingto the Depository General alone.

54 Examples of these various uses are found in A.V., In t . et Exit . , vol. 558, fol. 2 1 8 ; vol. 561 , fol.170; C .S . , Ser. v, 1770, fol. 192; A.V., In t . et Exit . , vol. 561 , fols. 142 -149 ; and A.S.R. , Camera le1, 1770, fol. 41.

55 Exitus totals for twe lve -month per iods for which accounts exist a r e : 259,717 duca t s for the yearbeginning M a r c h 1516; 85,288 duca ts for the one beg inn ing Apri l 1517; 230,924 duca ts beg inn ingApril 1518; 107,987 ducats beginning Apri l 1519; 127,850 duca ts beg inn ing Apri l 1520; and 216,471ducats beginning D e c e m b e r 1523. A.V., In t . et Exi t . , vols. 555-561 passim.

56 Ibid., vol. 560. T h e breakdown of those figures for N o v e m b e r 1520 is as follows:Ducats s. d.

Regular Military Salaries and Expenses 1310 nRegular curial salaries 678 10 8Misc. 24

2013 1 8

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it had responsibility for many military payments, for it paid varyingamounts of the total expenses. In this connection let us re-emphasize thatwhile the Depository General was the most thoroughly centralized financialoffice at the curia, it was still only one of several agencies which hadspecialized but flexible functions depending on which accounts the popechose to assign them. The payment of military stipends serves as a casein point because not all stipends were always handled by the depositorgeneral. In his letters of 17-18 May 1515 to Filippo, Benedetto Buon-delmonti had remarked that considerable profit as well as honor were therewards of the depositor general who paid the pope's soldiers.57 The Sauli,Strozzi's predecessors, had held that charge which, according to a cameraldocument, also offered them the chance to remunerate themselves.58 Butin Filippo's first years as depositor general, he never officially managed themilitary payroll.59 He did supply some of the provisions owed to thecondottieri Annibale Rangone and Francesco Maria, duke of Urbino, as wellas to the captain of the papal galleys, Paolo Vettori, but, since he did sounofficially, he had to be compensated under special arrangement.60 Ona regular and official basis he paid only the stipends of the pope's guardand the Swiss Guard at the Vatican. During the War of Urbino, CardinalGiulio de'Medici's correspondence refers to specific payments to soldiers,but not one of these appears in the Introitus et Exitus accounts. Nor is thereany record in the depositor's books of those contracts for hirings sharedbetween Florence and the church which appear regularly in the accountsof the Otto di Pratica in Florence.61 In 1521 when Leo X's army was inthe field in Lombardy, the Depository General forwarded large sums ofmoney designated for the war to Buoninsegni, but it still had no officialsanction to pay specific provisions.62 However, after Clement VII's electionin 1523 the Depository under Filippo did make sizable military payments.57 M.A.P . , 108, fol. 148.58 A.V., Div. Cam. , vol. 65, fol. 137. 59 Ibid., fol. 137.60 A.V., In t . et Exit. , vol. 555, fols. i66v, i86v. O n 30 July 1519 Strozzi was repaid 2,069 ducats ,

15 soldi, 8 denari for money he had provided in part for the st ipend of Vettori , ibid., vol. 559, fol.187V. A document from 1516 also stipulated that Strozzi be compensated from other cameral fundssince he was not handl ing the military s t ipends at that t ime, A.V., Div. Cam. , vol. 65, fol. 137.

6 1 The correspondence contained in the 'Manoscritti Torrigiani, ' A.S.I., Ser. ill, vol. 20 (1874), 391and Ser. in, vol. 23 (1876), 20-21, includes records of three payments in May 1517 totaling 59,000ducats to Gascon troops and of an order in May 1518 to the Penitentiary, Cardinal Pucci, to senda letter of exchange through the Fugger bank for 30,000 ducats to pay the provisions of the Swisssoldiers. Examples of shared contracts between Florence and the Camera are in Otto, Cond. e Stant.,vol. n . Obviously the Introitus et Exitus accounts are not reliable sources for calculating the totalamount the pope spent on war. There is no satisfactory explanation of why Strozzi was not payingthe military stipends during the War of Urbino as part of his duties as depositor general. However,the reason is probably related to his heavy financial involvement on the Florentine side of the war.His Rome bank, apart from its accounts for the Depository General, was busily aiding his Florencecompany in loaning money for the war effort.

62 C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fols. 52, 58, 192.

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At that time he began to disburse in regular installments the stipends ofthe chief condottieri and captain of the galleys together with lump sumsearmarked for the War in Lombardy and the pope's military paymaster.In the exitus accounts for the year 1524 the Depository paid out nearly50,000 ducats just in provisions to two condottieri, Guido Rangone and theMarchese di Mantua, and to Vettori.63

The Depository General's area of operations depended so much on thewishes and needs of the pope that it was never sharply defined but alwaysremained rather flexible, as in the case of the military payroll. The smoothand efficient functioning of the office was contingent upon the solvencyof the Camera and, to a degree, on the willingness of the depositor generalto advance additional credit in times of shortages. Early in Leo X'spontificate when the Sauli company still held the Depository, considerableconfusion prevailed over finances in the Camera and over settling the debtsleft by the deceased Julius II. In line with customary practice, Julius hadpledged various ecclesiastical revenues to different creditors to repay themfor their loans. But Leo wanted to regain control over those incomes forhis own purposes and to regulate the repayment of his predecessor's debts.He ordered all creditors to register their claims and refused to allow anyto be settled without his special mandate.64 All revenues whether spiritualor temporal should be assigned to the depositor general who would thenmake payments only when presented with a copy of the pope's order. Thesemeasures removed some of the confusion surrounding papal monies. Butthe Sauli claimed that the Depository was completely bereft of money, andthey would not pay a number of regular salaries. Leo was compelled to orderthe Sauli bank to pay those stipends on pain of deprivation of office.65

Contemporaries tell us Leo X was indeed short of funds by the end of1514.66 But beyond the penury of the pope, the reluctance of the Sauli toadvance the money necessary to cover normal expenses mirrors their wishto limit their credits with the Camera since they were nearing the end oftheir term as depositor, as Filippo Strozzi was originally scheduled toreplace them in just three months, in March 1515.

Leo's troubles with the Sauli in 1514 demonstrate two characteristicfeatures of the Depository General: its chronic deficit and its constant needfor more credit. The Depository rarely had enough funds to meet itsordinary expenses. It relied instead upon outside subsidies plus a steadyflow of credit from the depositor's bank to maintain normal operations. Inthe Introitus et Exitus accounts, payments from the Depository regularly

63 A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 561, fols. 151-221. This was in addition to the regular stipends he paidto the pope's Swiss Guards and crossbowmen.

64 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 63, fol. 178. 65 Ibid., fols. 183-184.66 Among others, Sanuto, xx, col. 341.

109


exceeded the rate at which income was received. A typical example froma two-month period, May and June of 1524, shows that whereas expensestotaled over 18,000 ducats, income amounted to barely 1,650 ducats.67 Aneven more dramatic example of this disparity comes from the year 1519when in January the Depository paid the pope more than 140,000 ducatsin anticipation of the ransom of 150,000 ducats owed by Cardinal SanGiorgio for his release from the Castel S. Angelo where he had beenimprisoned after the 1517 conspiracy against Leo. But the Depository didnot receive the 150,000 ducats from the Bini bank which loaned the ransommoney to San Giorgio until a month later.68

The depositor's deficit accumulated throughout each accounting yearand was registered periodically as a debt to the Camera. In June 1513 adeficit of nearly nine thousand ducats left over from Julius IPs reign wascredited to the Sauli, and Leo had them reimbursed from monies in theDepository General.69 In the first eight and one-half months that Filipposerved as depositor he quickly built up a deficit of 13,300 ducats for whichhe was to be repaid over a period of several years at the rate of 450 ducatsper month out of the monies collected from the three dogane of the cityof Rome, undoubtedly with interest.70 The years for which there arerecords show that Strozzi's yearly deficit as depositor ranged from a lowof 11,500 ducats ip 1516-1517^ a high of nearly 35,000 ducats aggregatedin 1518-1519.71 Unfortunately the documents which would allow us tocalculate the Depository General's total deficit during Strozzi's tenure are

A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 561.Ibid., vol. 558, fols. io8v, 2iov.A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 63, fol. 202V, dated 18 June 1513.Ibid., vol. 65, fol. 202.The following is a summary of the deficits for the Depository recorded in the Introitus et Exitus:

Deficit

Ducats

13,000

i4>05734,95317,66010,8037,1006,8911,709

47,145

s.

1

4174

1 0

1

157

11

d.

6

7

410 (for 6 months)

99 (for 3 months)88

Date

3/1516

3/i5i74/15184/i5i94/1520

10/1520

4/1521

7/152112/1523

9/1524

Source

Div. Cam., vol. 65, folInt. et Exit., 557, jfol.Int. et Exit., 558, fol.Int. et Exit., 559, fol.Int. et Exit., 560, fol.Int. et Exit., 560, fol.C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fol.C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fol.Int. et Exit., 561, fol.A.S.R., Cam., 1, 1770,

1. 202160

161

160

160

201V

i49v

170V

140

fol. 31 v

n o


lacking, but for those years for which continuous records do exist and inwhich the Depository is specifically credited for a deficit, from July 1515through March 1520, the total is over 91,000 ducats.72

The deficit registered periodically is, however, but a fraction of the totalcredit really advanced by the depositor during any accounting period.Frequently incomes assigned to the Depository at a later date would exceednormal expenses, and the surplus could be used to cover some of thedepositor's credit. The deficit which was finally recorded represented onlythose portions of credit still outstanding at the time of balancing. In thecase mentioned above in January 1519 when the depositor advanced 140,000ducats to the pope, that amount of credit did not turn up in the yearly deficitaccounts. It had been more than cancelled in February when the Strozzibank received a deposit for Cardinal San Giorgio's ransom. A Motuproprioof 6 August 1516 provides a more commonplace example of how evenspecial incomes assigned to the Depository to cover extraordinary expenseswere often insufficient and forced the depositor to make up the differenceout of pocket, which automatically inflated the deficit. The document isan order to the chamberlain and treasurer general to assign to thedepositor's credit a total of 5,000 ducats which Strozzi had expended forthe Chamber as follows: 1,800 ducats in Naples to the captain of the papalgalleys; 200 ducats to the ambassador to France, Antonio Maria Pallavicini;and 3,000 ducats for the Genoese fleet to fight against the Turks. Incomestotaling 4,500 ducats from the vicariates of Vetere and Castro Anticoli wereassigned to reimburse the depositor, but the remainder of 500 ducatseventually showed up on the Depository's deficit account at the end of theyear.73

The depositor's total deficit varied from year to year, but within a givenyear, even one in which the deficit was small, the average negative differencebetween income and expenses was always more than twice any positivedifference. In the year when the total deficit was lowest, March 1516-February 1517, the average in the seven months when expenses exceededincome ran at 2,833 ducats as opposed to the average of 1,294 ducats forthe five months when the Depository showed a surplus.74 Sometimes theaccumulation of the ' normal' deficit was accelerated by special circum-

72 T h e sum of the top five figures in the footnote above. Compare this figure with the actual differencebetween Introitus and Exitus figures for the same period which comes to only 85,600 ducats. If thediscrepancy of close to 6,000 ducats is really hidden interest, then Strozzi received not quite 7percent.

7 3 A.V., Div. , Cam., vol. 66, fol. 86v. In another similar case in 1519, Div. Cam. , vol. 68, fols. 49-50 ,Strozzi paid out over 9,000 ducats in st ipends, took in only 7,000 and was left carrying a creditof over 2,000 ducats.

74 A.V., Int . et Exit., vol. 556. T h e breakdown for the year looks like the following:

I I I


stances such as the need to finance an army or the financial confusionfollowing the death of a pope. This happened in the winter of 1523 in theearly months of Clement VII's reign. The death of Adrian VI and thetwo-month vacancy before Clement's election caused curial incomes toplummet while the costs of supporting the war in Lombardy remained high,forcing the Camera to depend heavily upon the credit of the Strozzi bankto meet its expenses. In the three months from December 1523 throughFebruary 1524, the Strozzi paid out 51,000 ducats while receiving in incomeless than 4,000, thereby advancing over 47,000 ducats' credit to theCamera.15 As might well be expected, the bulk of those payments went for

Months Showing

Mar.Apr.Aug.Oct.Dec.Jan.Feb.

Ducats

-14,073- 562- 549- i,349- i,757- 1,099- 444

-19,835

Deficit

s.

494

1 2

1

65

2

d.

666

8

Months

MayJuneJul.Sep.Nov.

Showing

Ducats

+ 674+ 656+ 755+ 1,169+ 3,215

+ 6,471

Surplus

s. d.

9134

1416

16

The corresponding averages for April 1519 - March 1520 when the deficit was highest are, —6,384ducats and +2,987 ducats, and the monthly figures are as follows:

Months Showing

Apr.MayJul.Aug.Nov.Dec.Jan.Mar.

Ducats

-27,865- 271- 4,462- 445- i,452— 12,662- 573- 3,335

-51,071

Deficit

s.

1885

11

2

1 2

911

18

d.

7

862

62

7

Months

Jun.*Sep.

Oct.Feb.

Showing Surplus

Ducats

+ 3,4i6+ 20,116+ 279+ 85

+ 23,899

s.

16

131616

1

d.

6

6

* The large surplus in September came from a credit of 23,915 ducats, 8 soldi collected from theNeapolitan clergy.

75 A.S.R., Camerale 1, 1770, fol. 31V.

112


military expenses, and on 30 January the Depository sent 24,000 ducatsto Bologna to pay the troops engaged in the war in Lombardy.76

The question remains just how profitable did Filippo Strozzi find theoffice of depositor general ? The position was by reputation quite lucrative,but, as we have seen, more often than not the depositor was required toadvance large amounts of credit and run the operation at a deficit.Moreover, if the Camera were tardy in providing compensation, theDepository General could cost the depositor more than it gained him. Nofigures exist listing the amount of profit made by Filippo or the other bankswhich ran the Depository General. We do know that the Strozzi bank inRome as well as the Medici bank before it in the fifteenth century prosperedgreatly, but it is difficult to determine what percentage of their profits camestrictly from their function as depositors general and what portion fromtheir participation in other business deals at the curia. Nor do Vaticanrecords always distinguish between the depositor's business qua depositorand his affairs as a Roman banker. That very omission suggests how theoffice of depositor general could be lucrative, precisely because it plungedits holder in so many different streams of papal finance where opportunitiesfor profit abounded.

Obviously no bank could afford to operate the Depository General gratisor at a loss, and we know from what Benedetto Buondelmonti wrote toFilippo that the depositor could expect handsome rewards. But neither LeoX's Motuproprio granting Strozzi the Depository nor his formal contractmake any mention of how he was to be paid for his troubles, and we haveonly indirect proof of how it was done. From what proof we have, thecommission he received from the salaries he paid to officials at the curiaand in Rome, to the papal guards, and to the pope's mercenariesundoubtedly constituted the depositor's major source of profit.77 Theactual commission or 'retensione* which he deducted from the stipends hepaid was apparently between 4 and 5 percent. An entry in a small bookof the church's military outlay for 1526 records a payment in account ofthe provvisione of the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria and states that thetotal included the depositor's commission, which in this case worked outto 4.96 percent. At that rate, from Doria's 34,500 ducats yearly stipendalone, the depositor would retain 1711 ducats.78 Further indication that76 A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 561, fol. 151. The rest of the money went for regular salaries, to the

majordomo for the pope's expenses and to the Datary for part of Clement's coronation.77 A Motuproprio of May 1516 attests that the depositor did profit substantially from his salary

accounts, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 65, fol. 137.78 Con. Soppr., 102, vol. 331, fol. 2v. This is the only statement of its kind I have discovered detailing

the depositor's percentage from the provisions of ecclesiastical condotfieri. It is located in a smallLibro di Provvisioni found together with several other volumes apparently kept by or for the treasurergeneral which somehow made their way into the archive of S. Maria Novella in Florence, now inA.S.F. The city of Florence set the terms for hire of condottieri to include a 7 percent standard


a 4 or 5 percent commission on stipends might have been standard comesfrom a comparison of identical entries in two account books for 1524, onethe Introitus et Exitus book of the Camera and the other a ' Liber depositariigeneralis anno 1524^ kept in Italian rather than Latin which was probablythe record of transactions of the Depository General the Strozzi companymaintained for its own use apart from the final cameral accounts.79 Theentries in the Introitus et Exitus for the monthly stipends of the captain ofthe pope's bowmen and for the captain of the guard are higher by factorsof 4.5 and 4.6 percent than the corresponding entries for the same stipendsin the depositor's own book and thus probably include his commission.80

If we take 4.5 percent as an average rate of return, then we can estimatethe depositor's yearly cut on salaries by using as our basis the summaryof expenses of the Depository General in the 1525 'budget'. The expenseswhich went clearly for regular salaries of officials, excluding items such asclothing allowances, subsidies to the maestro di casay to various monasteries,individuals, and to the colleges of venal offices, total 2^,444 ducats.81 A

deduction by the depositor, for example, Ot to , Cond. e Stant. , n , passim. However, one does notknow how much of that went to the depositor to cover expenses and how much to the city. In thecase of Lorenzo de'Medici , when he became captain general in 1515 with a provision of 37,000florins, it was stipulated that no commission would be deducted from his provision, ibid., fol. 82:'con soldo di R 37,000 necti d'ogni retentione l 'anno con obligo di tener C C C homini d 'arme oltrealia persona sua. '

79 A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 561 and A.S.R., Camerale 1, 1770. These two books are the only extantexamples of overlapping accounts for this period.

80 In the Introitus et Exitus account the stipend of the captain of the bowmen is listed at 365.5 ducatsper month as opposed to 350 ducats, 12 soldi per month in the depositor 's accounts which is a 4.25percent difference. In the 1525 ' b u d g e t ' the same salary is given at 362 ducats per month, Monaco,La Situazione, p . 70. In the Introitus et Exitus the captain of the guard 's stipend is given as 157ducats per month, whereas in the depositor's accounts it is listed as 150, a difference of 4.66 percent.In the 1525 ' b u d g e t ' the captain of the guard received 150 ducats. T h e stipend of the captain ofthe Swiss Guard shows only a 3 percent difference between the two accounts. A comparison ofother entries reveals that for some items such as the regular provisions paid to the colleges of officeholders or the monthly subsidy for the building of St Peter 's there was no variance between thetwo records. On other entries unrelated to stipends, such as for the repayment of a loan to JacopoCambi and another to Cardinal Farnese, the Introitus et Exitus entry is again 5 percent higher.

81 Monaco, La Situazione, pp. 70-73 . If the total in the ' b u d g e t ' already included the commission,then the Depository would have received only 1,225 ducats. For some reason the 1525 ' b u d g e t 'does not include under payments made by the Depository General those stipends paid out frommonies assigned from the three dogane which include the following yearly sums:

Ducats10,200 Swiss Guard

1,800 camarlingo as president of the Camera3,600 castellano of Castel S. Angelo2,200 senator of Rome

17,800A 4.5 percent commission on that total would add another 801 ducats to the above yearly sum forthe depositor. T h e commission he would have received from the salaries of papal condottieri arealso not included in the ' budge t ' figures and would have further increased the depositor's earningsby a significant amount.

1 1 4


4.5 percent commission on this amount would have yielded Filippo 1,280ducats. In addition to his percentage from the salary accounts, it is morethan likely that he also received a much smaller commission as a servicecharge on all the financial transactions and letters of exchange which hisbank processed for the Camera through the Depository General.82

The depositor also profited from interest charged on loans he made tothe Camera and on the accumulated deficit which was treated like a loanonce it was officially assigned to the depositor's credit at the end of eachaccounting year. The payment of interest was of course a delicate subjectat the Vatican because of the church's laws against usury, and in documentsdealing with loans it was carefully disguised.83 In a letter he wrote toCampeggio in September 1518, Cardinal Giulio de'Medici admitted thatthe Camera did in fact take out short-term loans at interest, but only intimes of special need. Judging from the records, however, those instancesof extraordinary need occurred rather regularly.84 Although private Strozzipapers mention two occasions when 16 percent interest was earned, theaverage interest on loans was probably from at least 12 to 14 percent, whichis consistent with the rates paid by the Signoria of Florence for largeshort-term loans to the city.85 In 1521 during the wars of Lombardy whenLeo X had exhausted his credit everywhere and was desperate for money,the Venetian ambassador reported that the Strozzi bank refused him a loanat even 20 percent, but such a statement is unfortunately impossible toverify.86

Vatican documents show that Filippo was making two types of loans tothe Camera. The first was in the form of advances to the Depository itself,to supplement cash shortages which were later absorbed into the82 A fee charged for the many essentially banking operations performed by the depositor 's bank for

the Camera would not have been an unusual procedure. Even the statutes of the Florentine Nat ionin Rome stipulated that a small tax of } per thousand had to be paid to the consul of that nationon any and all business transactions by its members . See A.A.S .G.F . , vol. 321, chap. 25-30. A taxof £ per thousand was levied on any money paid by a Florent ine for the expedition of a papal bull,brief or other document .

8 3 A common practice was to hide the interest in the official record of the loan. For example, a statementthat the Camera was in debt for 12,000 ducats to a bank for a loan might actually mean that, ifthe rate of interest was 12 percent for a period of one year, then the actual loan would have beenfor only 10,715 ducats.

84 ' I Manoscri t t i Torr igiani , ' A.S.I., Ser. i n , vol. 24 (1876), 15. A standard phrase in many of thedocuments recording bankers ' loans to the pope was, ''pro nostris et sedis apostolicae urgentibusnecessitatibus? See for example, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 74, fol. 9 8 ; vol. 75, fols. 96, 146V, 166; vol.76, fols. 61-62 , 82, 103; vol. 77, fols. 195, 202V, 209V, etc.

85 C.S. , Ser. i n , 134, fol. 142; 110, fol. 183. In both instances the rate was considered unusually steep.For examples of interest rates of 12 and 14 percent on accatti paid by the city of Florence, seeBalie, 43 fols. 57V, 100,108. T h e Florent ine Nat ion in Rome received 13 percent interest on a 10,000ducat loan to Clement VI I in April 1527, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 77, fol. 217. T h e Grimaldi firmof Genoa was promised 15 percent interest on a 100,000 scudi loan to pay Clement ' s ransom fromthe Castel S. Angelo in December 1527, ibid., vol. 86, fols. i v - 2 .

8 6 For a while even Agostino Chigi refused him loans, Sanuto , xxx, col. 31 .

" 5


Depository's running deficit and periodically repaid.87 The second typeconsisted of loans directed to the pope similar to those made by any otherbank, usually in large amounts and for a designated purpose. Such loanswould have commanded higher interest rates, and they carried specialprovisions for their repayment. We cannot always distinguish in the recordsbetween the two types of loans. For example, in May 1521, when the Strozzibank provided the equivalent of 10,000 ducats cash to pay the Swiss troops,the record of the transaction does not specify in which capacity and underwhat terms the bank had arranged the loan but only stipulates that it shouldbe entered in the books of the Depository to Strozzi's credit.88 Loans weretypically repaid either directly from the incomes of the depositor, as in thisinstance, or in assignments of various ecclesiastical revenues not normallycontrolled by the Depository. In May 1521 when the Strozzi bank loaned30,125 ducats, Leo pledged all the income from the Penitentiary to securethe loan, and to repay it obligated Cardinal Pucci, his grand penitentiary,to pay the Strozzi 419 ducats per month for the next six years.89 As securityfor their loans, banks such as Strozzi's also took in jewels, silver plate, orsometimes the papal miter. And as the popes in our period greatly expandedthe colleges of venal offices, it became common practice for them to granttheir creditors titles and incomes of offices, or, after its foundation in 1526,shares in the papal funded debt, the Monte della Fede.90

The arrangements made to reimburse these loans sometimes opened thedoor to new profitable ventures. We have already noted how the Strozzibank was repaid for the Depository's deficit of 1515-1516 from the incomeof the three dogane of Rome. The assignment of that deficit to the doganemust have provided Filippo with the requisite leverage to gain a controllinginterest in the very remunerative dogane themselves. By 1517 he had beenallowed to purchase the largest single share amounting to 20 percent of therights to farm them,91 and over the next decade his investment in the dogane

87 For example, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fol. 145V, records a 1519 credit of 400 ducats for the Strozzibank which it had previously paid out 'for the needs of the church.' In a similar instance, ibid.,vol. 68, fol. 60, Strozzi loaned 2,800 ducats which were listed in the accounts of the Depository.See also ibid., fols. 49V-50.

88 Ibid., vol. 70, fol. 8QV.89 B.V., Vat. Lat., 7109, fol. 97.90 Strozzi built up huge credits this way. To cite just two examples, when he loaned together with

the Bini bank 156,000 ducats to Leo X in 1521, the pope pledged them the income from the saleof all vacant offices, which totaled at that time more than two thousand, and for security they receivedthe famous miter of Paul II as well as various jewels and silver plate, C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 100-102.In 1529 Strozzi and Bindo Altoviti made a loan to Clement VII of 30,000 ducats which was tobe repaid from the decima of the Kingdom of Naples. For security Clement assigned them titlesto fifty-three venal offices with the provision that they could sell the offices if their loan had notbeen repaid within a year, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 83, fols. 106-107.

91 Ibid., vol. 66, fols. 172-173. In a letter to Francesco del Nero of 10 October 1517 in C.S., Ser.HI, vol. 110, fol. 56, Filippo affirmed that his share was the largest. The three dogane, Ripa, Merce,

116


brought him a tidy annual return of about 14.5 percent.92 When hiscontract expired in 1521, Strozzi and one other partner, Bartolomeo dellaValle, purchased a second five-year contract for the dogane and paid anadvance of 36,000 ducats.93 As a further recompense, Filippo's bank servedas Depository of the dogane.

From a broader point of view, the Depository General brought Strozziadvantages reaching beyond the mere profits associated with its normaloperations. It placed him at the center of cameral affairs, put him in closeproximity to the pope, and gave him access to the highest levels ofpatronage. His office lent considerable prestige and attracted addedbusiness to the Strozzi bank in Rome which, beyond its dealings with theCamera Apostolica, carried on a brisk trade as a private company andcounted among its clients prominent Roman citizens, members of the curiaand foreign diplomats who frequented the papal court. In the space of justa few weeks in 1521, the Strozzi bank accepted deposits from a Spanishprelate, an apostolic notary, a papal chamberlain, a cardinal, ConstantinoChumino titular duke of Macedonia, and a Roman gentleman.94 TheStrozzi bank's large accounts with the Camera also increased its operatingcapital and had a rippling effect on other Strozzi banks in different cities.After Filippo opened a branch in Lyons in 1517, his Rome companyregularly employed it as a correspondent for letters of exchange and for

and Grascia, constituted the single most profitable tax farm available in Rome, and the rights tothem were highly coveted. In 1518 Strozzi's manager reported that they were making verycomfortable profits from the dogane, lda contentarsi,' C.S., Ser. m, 134, fol. 138.

92 The account books of the dogane for the sixteenth century have not survived, so it is difficult toobtain specific figures on the amount of profit Strozzi realized on his investment in them. Thereis a record in 1522 of a final settling of accounts with two of his other partners after the expirationof the contract in 1521, which gave them a credit of 14,619 ducats, 19 soldi, 10 denari for theirseven-twentieths or 35 percent interest. If this figure represents their profits, as seems probable,then we can calculate the total profit received by all the doganieri for the contract period, whichcomes to 41,771 ducats, 7 soldi, of which Strozzi's 20 percent share would have been 8,354ducats. Since the yearly rent the doganieri paid the Apostolic Chamber amounted to 57,000 ducatsat that time, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fol. 172, the average annual yield would have been 14.6percent. Unfortunately we do not know whether the profit figures were calculated before or afteroverhead expenses had been subtracted. Delumeau, 1, 126-127, calculated from the private accountsof Prospero Boccapaduli, who farmed the dogane in the 1560s and 1570s, that his annual profit was22.6 percent. A manuscript in the Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence, Ginori Conti, 27A, reveals thatBartolomeo della Valle, who was a partner for the same period as Strozzi, made a total profit inten years as doganiero in excess of 90,000 scudi, but that figure cannot be substantiated. In the originaldocument above recording the profit of the two partners with 3 3 5 percent interest, one suspectsthat the reason the amount owed them could not be paid immediately and had to be carried asa credit in the accounts of the dogane was that the funds of the dogane had been loaned to the popeand were in short supply at that particular time.

93 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fols. 172-173. The yearly rent paid by the doganieri was increased from57,000 to 58,600 from which the 36,000 was deducted over a period of three years. See Monaco,La Situazione, p. 77.

94 C.S., Ser. v, vol. 101, fols. 81-86. Only this one account book of giornale e ricordanze of Strozzi'sRome company has survived.

1 1 7


the transfer of church funds destined for Rome. His bank in Seville handledthe shipment of revenues from Spain which it passed on to Rome via theLyons branch.95 His company in Florence received and disbursed manyof the large subsidies sent from Rome through the Depository General tothe papal armies in the north. And when the Depository General wasassigned the income of the decitna exacted in the Kingdom of Naples,Filippo's bank in Naples received the commission to manage it.96 Filippo'sbank used the Depository to engage surplus funds and to increase thecirculation of capital through letters of exchange with branch companiesin other cities. Since most of the Depository's payments were made at theend of the month, he could arrange to have his capital {mobile) from Lyonssent via Florence to Rome through several profitable exchanges and stillhave time to meet payments. With so many of the smaller payments,especially of stipends, in silver coins, his bank also engaged in money-changing and speculation on the fluctuations in the value of petty coinsin relation to gold.97

The primary advantage of the Depository General, however, for Filippowas the entree it provided into other lucrative areas of papal finance, anadvantage that Benedetto Buondelmonti had been quick to point out backin May 1515 when he wrote Filippo: ' I see this [the Depository General]to be the ladder enabling you in time to enter into many different areasof church affairs.'98 Filippo's status at the curia afforded him unparalleledopportunity to employ his manifold talents as a businessman on the highestlevels of international finance. In 1515 when he assumed the responsibilitiesof the Depository General he had reached a major juncture in his life. Hisnew company in Rome together with his connections at the papal courtwhich he began to exploit and expand were the keys to his future. Theytransformed him from just a rich Florentine aristocrat, the brother-in-lawof Lorenzo de'Medici, into a highly privileged parente of the pope andhigh-powered international financier.95 Ibid., vol. 1208, fols. 84, 109, 127, 144. 96 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 69, fols. 5v—6.97 Filippo explained the procedures in a letter to Francesco del Nero, C.S., Ser. in , n o , Fol. 148.98 M.A.P., vol. 108, fol. 148.

War finance and Florentine public funds

Before considering papal war finances and Filippo's role in them as conduitbetween the Florence and Rome depositories, we must first turn ourattention to the broader context of papal banking and the financialpredicament which engulfed the Medicean papacy. The papacy in the earlysixteenth century faced the same fiscal problems we have alreadyencountered in the Depository General, only on a much larger scale.Although the popes had regular sources of income from taxes on eccle-siastical possessions in all parts of the Christian world, substantial revenuesfrom the Papal States, and income from the sale of offices and indulgences,these monies arrived at Rome too slowly and unpredictably to alleviateimmediate needs for cash. The Introitus accounts illustrate how annates orcommon services and decima payments dribbled in often months late. Thedistance some monies had to travel whether as a cash shipment or in a letterof exchange added to the delays. Once the papal collector in Spain hadmanaged to force payment which was sometimes years in arrears, it stilltook over four months to transfer the money from Seville through Lyonsto Rome. Spanish monies collected by Giovanni Poggio from September1532 through December 1533 were not receipted in Rome until the endof May 1534.1 Even the sale of benefices and offices, which became anincreasingly productive source of revenue, was sporadic and sometimes ata standstill. A lack of vacancies such as that which occurred in August 1514when money was in severe shortage in Rome caused Baldassare da Pesciato write Lorenzo de'Medici in Florence the following observation: ' In facthere there is not a quattrino. The datario has debts of 8,000 to 10,000 ducatswith Bernardo Bini [depositor of the Datary] and there are no vacantoffices.'2

We have already noticed this chronic lack of cash at papal Rome in therecords of the Depository General where it showed up in the continualdeficits carried on the depositor's books. Filippo frequently made mentionof strettezze, or shortages of money, as in August 1514. This shortage hadapparently occurred for no other reason than that the pope had spent what

1 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 95, fols. 170-172. 2 M.A.P., 107, fol. 57.

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he had on hand at a time when there were no vacant benefices, and so hecould not expect any more income in the immediate future. In suchstraitened circumstances the court impatiently awaited the death of wealthyprelates and crassly speculated about dividing up the possessions andbenefices of the dying.3 The level of the pope's expenses similarly affectedthe supply of money in Rome in September 1515 during the War ofLombardy against the French when there was a strettezza in both Romeand Florence, while in October after the end of the war there was a brieflarghezza when cheap money was available.4 In early spring 1517 duringthe War of Urbino another acute shortage developed, but by January 1518it had been replaced by a new larghezza. In fact, Filippo was consideringinvesting capital in the Florentine Monte rather than in the exchange marketbecause so much ready money in Rome was depressing the exchange toonly a 10 percent return.5 Extreme shortages could also be caused by anunexpected crisis such as the death of a pope. When Leo X died inDecember 1521, the crippling strettezza that ensued was prolonged by thedeadlocked conclave and the long absence of Adrian VI from Rome. Duringthose months,' the whole city, and not just the financial district, was lockedup tighter than on Christmas Day.'6 Six years later the Sack of Rometogether with the war and the imprisonment of Clement VII had an evenmore disastrous effect on the economy, causing a critical strettezza andeconomic dislocation in Rome that lasted well into 1529. At that time the

3 That August the whole court had been anxiously awaiting the death of Cardinal Carlo Carrettoof Finale. But when he finally died that month, Leo X got no relief from his estate because hehad willed away all his goods and had already resigned his benefices, M.A.P., 107, fol. 54. Berton,Dictionnaire des Cardinaux (Paris, 1857), p. 635. For the same reason Filippo bemoaned that anothercardinal who was critically ill, Marco Vigerio bishop of Sinigalia, would profit them nothing bydying, M.A.P., 108, fol. n6v.

4 M.A.P., 105, fol. 150V. 'There has never been such a strettezza, and it is the same or worse atRome.' The shortage still persisted at the end of the month, ibid., 108, fol. 144. Jacopo Guicciardinireported that the subsequent larghezza was the financial effect the armistice had on Florence, C.S.,Ser. in, 220, fol. 122. However, by December of that year there was another strettezza in Florencebecause of the pope's visit.

5 Sanuto, xxiv, col. 143; C.S., Ser. in, 49, fol. 27; no , fol. 90. The larghezza was still in evidencein fall 1518, ibid., vol. no , fol. 108. Braudel in his The Mediterranean, 1, 496-497, has pointedto the shortage of precious metals in Western Europe as one of the most critical economic factorsthat created these larghezze and strettezze in the various money markets. See also his and FrankSpooner's article, 'Les metaux monetaires et l'economie du XVIe siecle,' Relazioni del X CongressoInternazionale de Scienze Storiche, Storia moderna, iv (Florence, 1955), 248-249. Delumeau,11, 687, 923-926, says that in the last decades of the sixteenth century the Rome market wascharacterized by tight money, and from my study of the documents, a general strettezza seemsto have prevailed in the first part of the century as well. The documents indicate that there tendedto be more larghezze in Florence than in Rome, perhaps because Florence received so much incomefrom foreign trade; but in the period under the Medici when the cost of the papal wars was shared,but controlled from Rome, the money markets in the two cities seem to have operated more insynchronization and Florentines suffered more frequent strettezze.

6 Sanuto, XXXII, col. 239, described the situation in Rome at length in the report of 5 December1521. During the interregnum church revenues fell off steeply as well.

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exchange business ground almost to a halt. Only one broker remained, andhe was sending less than three hundred ducats a week in bills of exchangein April 1529.7

The effects of this chronic shortage of money were only aggravated bythe unrestrained spending habits of the pope, particularly those of Leo X.Leo spent money as soon as he received it, if not before, and frequentlyfound himself without cash to cover his immediate expenses. Already inJanuary 1514 Alfonsina Orsini reported to her son Lorenzo that, 'peopleare gossiping that here he [Leo] has been pope for less than a year, andeven though he fell heir to a rich papacy, he still has to borrow against hisfuture incomes to get enough money to spend a mere fifteen days away fromRome.'8 What made matters more complicated was that Leo's spendinghabits were also highly erratic. In August 1514 during the great shortagehe had to delay sending Lorenzo de'Medici one thousand ducats to helpdefray the costs of his forthcoming trip to Rome until he received somemore cash. However, just the week before in a burst of generosity he hadgiven in to the entreaties of his sister Contessina Ridolfi for six hundredducats for her son's wardrobe.9 Leo justly earned his reputation as aprodigal, leading one contemporary to jest that it was just as impossiblefor him to keep a thousand ducats together as it was for a stone to get upand fly.10

But even beyond the particular spending habits of a Leo X, there is verylittle evidence of financial planning or budgeting on the part of the popeand his ministers which might have alleviated the imbalance caused byintermittent incomes and expenses. The only semblance of planning inpapal finances lay in the practice of obligating portions of specific incomesfor specific purposes, such as the segment of the monthly rent from thethree dogane of Rome which went to the Depository General, or revenuesfrom certain taxes which were pledged to pay pensions and stipends.Neither Leo X, Adrian VI, nor Clement VII took steps to follow JuliusIPs example of amassing a war chest in the Castel S. Angelo, nor were theyable to maintain a cash balance for anticipated expenses. The machineryof papal finance operated in fits and starts and was subject to many littlecrises when revenues were delayed. And, as a result, the pope and hisministers consumed most of their time and energy in a continual scrambleto find or borrow money to cover each new item.

7 C.S., Ser. v, 1209, fol. 34- The financial situation was complicated by the pope's long absence fromRome. After his escape from the Castel S. Angelo in December 1527 he remained in Orvieto anddid not re-enter Rome until the following October. The city was deserted and in such ruin as ' tomove a Nero to tears,' so wrote Filippo's agent Migliore Covoni 1 August 1528, ibid., fol. 154.

8 M.A.P., 114, fol. 41, 18 January 1514.9 Ibid., 108, fols. 127, 122. Competition among papal relatives became especially keen over money.

10 Vettori, 'Sommario,' p. 322. See also Sanuto, xx, col. 341; XXVIII, col. 576.

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The persistent shortage became acute when the pope needed extra-ordinary sums to pay for an elaborate coronation or more often to supportan army in wartime. Forced to resort to credit, he sought loans from bankersor members of his court, offering them his possessions and incomes assurety. Bernardo Bini gave a typical loan in 1519 for 20,000 ducats to berepaid from tax revenues from the Kingdom of Naples. Filippo, asdepositor general, received an order in December 1519 to repay Bini fromfunds on hand and then to reimburse the Depository from anticipatedrevenues from Naples.11 A single loan to the pope could cause his debtsand number of creditors to proliferate if money was in short supply whenthe loan fell due. The pope then had to borrow the sum needed forrepayment from other bankers, to borrow from Peter to pay Paul as it were.In 1516 the Antinori company made a loan for 10,000 ducats and was alsodebtor to another Florentine bank, the Bartolini, for 2,000 ducats on thepope's account. In order to repay the Antinori the 12,000 ducats owed them,Leo had to borrow that amount from three other Florentine banks, the DeliaFonte, Gaddi, and Strozzi.12

A short-term loan pegged to particular revenues represents only one formof credit transaction between the pope and his bankers. The curial officesand administrative posts which these bankers held in the provinces and thevarious revenues and taxes belonging to the church were all farmed out andrights to them acquired through loans to the pope. To get the Treasuryof the province of the Marches, Luigi Gaddi was willing to pay what wastermed an anticipazione, or advance, of nearly 11,000 ducats. In effect, theadvance constituted a loan in exchange for control over the revenue-producing office from which Gaddi as lender could then reimburse himselfplus interest and profits over the designated period of his contract.13 Inthe same way Leo awarded the papal alum mines at Tolfa which the Medicithemselves had farmed in the fifteenth century to two Sienese merchants,the Chigi and Belanti, for 75,000 ducats used for his coronation expenses.Each revenue farmer was obligated to pay a fixed amount of rent to theCamera each year from the incomes he collected, and various sums mightbe pledged to the colleges of officials at the curia. In the case of the threedogane of Rome, easily the most lucrative of the tax farms, Strozzi and hispartners paid out in advance 36,000 ducats and an annual rent of between57,000 and 59,000 ducats. From the annual rent was subtracted the monthly

11 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fols. io8v, 142V, 166-167. Another loan made in July 15-20 by the Martelliand Capponi company for 10,000 ducats for a period of eight months had been guaranteed withthe same tax money from Naples, but the actual revenues were insufficient to cover both loans,and Strozzi had to advance the difference of over 4,500 ducats, ibid., vol. 69, fol. 32.

12 Ibid., vol. 65, fol. 124.13 Ibid., vol. 63, fol. 87V. Gaddi received instructions to pay the 10,800 ducats he owed for the price

of the office to the Tornabuoni bank to reimburse them for certain credits with the Camera.

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subsidy which the depositor general used to pay the stipends of the SwissGuard and officials including the chamberlain. Other allotments from thedogane went to the College of the Knights of St Peter, to the College ofthe clerks of the Camera and to the maestro di casa. The tax farmersthemselves commonly subdivided their interests by selling shares to otherinvestors. These shares were quoted as percentages based on the divisionof a lira into twenty soldi, and into 240 denari, so that, for example, a shareof four soldi equaled a four-twentieths, or 20 percent, interest. Shares couldalso be divided further when a new investor bought an interest in a tax farmthat was composed of fractional parts of several shares. Thus Jacopo Cambiheld shares in the three dogane of Rome which were composed of a twosoldi, or 10 percent, interest in Filippo's own portion of the dogane plusa two denari, or 0.83 percent, interest under Lorenzo Cambi's name whichhad been purchased from Alexandro Corsini.14

For the most part, the business of the curial banks with the papacyconsisted of credit transactions, either making loans or administeringoffices. However, they also engaged in a variety of other activities which,while profitable to themselves, also rendered invaluable services to thechurch which she was not equipped to furnish alone, principally byenabling her to utilize their banking facilities and wide network of contactsabroad. The Florentine companies of the Gaddi, Strozzi, Altoviti, Ardin-ghelli and Capponi energetically pursued the indispensable but verylucrative trade of importing grain to Rome. No option for small fry, thegrain trade required a large initial outlay of cash and representatives abroadto buy grain in Sicily, Ancona, Naples or the Marches, transport it to Rome,and then store it, before bankers could recoup their investment plushandsome profits from the sale price of the grain in the city. Othercompanies such as the Ricasoli, Bardi, Antinori and Frescobaldi importedand sold fine cloths and brocades to the papal court. Banks also functionedas international agents of transfer and exchange. The Strozzi handledchurch revenues from the Kingdom of Naples and Spain. The Fugger,because of their vast connections in Germany and Hungary, virtuallymonopolized the transfer of monies from those countries. And Florentinecompanies such as the Salviati transferred ecclesiastical payments fromFrance through their agents in Lyons.

14 B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 27A. Needless to say, it is not always possible to tell from the officialdocument awarding the rights to a tax farm who the real investors were. In the case of the saltfarm, or salaria, of the Marches, awarded to the Sauli and Ghinucci companies in 1514, fromFilippo's correspondence we learn that Ermellino, Leo's future chamberlain, held a secret interestof at least 50 percent, most of which he had hidden behind the Sauli's name. Once Ermellino wasforced to give up his share, Filippo purchased 20 percent of the salaria for which he was obligatedto pay 600 ducats a year for four years and from which he expected to make at least 100 ducats,or 16.66 percent, clear profit each year, M.A.P., 108, fol. 122.

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In times of particular need when normal revenues proved completelyinadequate to finance a war or a crusade against the Turks, the popedesperately sought new sources of income and credit. The need for extramoney was acute in our period because of a combination of decreasingrevenues from the protestant North and escalating expenditures attributableto the expensive life style at the papal court and to the increasing costs ofpapal wars and diplomacy. Add to this the virtual impossibility ofaugmenting existing revenues because most of the church offices and taxrights and even papal jewels had already been mortgaged to the hilt.Painfully aware of their dilemma, church officials explored three differentavenues to offset the habitual insufficiency of funds which plagued thepapacy. The first approach, taken by Julius II in 1506, consisted ofrevaluing papal coins in a proportion of 13.5 to 10, which increased hisincome since the revenues from taxes levied at the old rate but paid withthe new coins effectively increased in value by about one-third.15 Themeasure was warranted at the time since papal currency was undervalued,but it did not provide a long-range solution to the problem of insolvency.In the short run, however, currency reform was a great boon to Juliusbecause it helped him pay for his wars in the Papal States and to put asidea 200,000 ducat war chest in the Castel S. Angelo for his successor LeoX, who promptly spent it in the first two years of his reign.16

A second tactic to lessen papal financial difficulties was to make existingsources of income more efficient, especially within Rome and the PapalStates, which were directly subject to the Vatican and which togethercontributed about one-half of the total income of the church. Clement VIItried this strategy and gained such a reputation for parsimony borderingon extortion that he was openly reviled by the Romans for his determinedefforts to augment his incomes at their expense. He increased revenues fromdirect taxes by levying them more frequently, raised the sale prices andpercentages due the Chamber from farms of indirect taxes, consolidatedthe administration of various smaller imposts, and even alienated churchlands.17 But it is doubtful whether his hard-fistedness brought a lastingincrease in real revenues since many of the rights to farm taxes as well asthe tax increases themselves were pledged well in advance to pay offprevious loans. In addition, the tax burden ultimately fell on the subjects

15 The Venetian ambassador, Domenico Trevisano, noted the revaluation in his report of April 1510in Alberi, Ser. 11, vol. in, 33-34. See also Hofmann, 1, 287-288; Delumeau, 11, 658-659.

16 Mention of Julius' treasure in the Castel S. Angelo appears in the early financial documents ofLeo X's reign. One such document, dated 6 May 1513, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 63, fol. 53V, is anorder to draw 20,000 ducats from the papal hoard {ex pecuniis erarii) to redeem the jewels the Saulibank held as security for a 10,000 ducat loan to Julius II made in 1511 and another 10,000 ducatloan to Leo X.

17 Numerous documents relating to increased taxation can be found in the Diversa Cameralia seriesin the Vatican Archive, in the Mandati Carrierali volumes in A.S.R., and in the record of the decreesof the councils of the city of Rome in the Archivio Segreto of the Archivio Storico Capitolino.

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of the church, and there was a limit to how many times they could be forcedto pay a hearth tax, salt tax, horse tax or decitna. Over the years Clementhad increasing difficulty collecting the taxes he had levied.18

A third approach to the financial crisis consisted of creating new sourcesof revenue through the sale of venal offices. Many historians have roundlycondemned this much abused invention of the Renaissance papacy asbordering on or even crossing over into simony and, as such, detrimentalto the church and her spiritual life. But from a purely financial point ofview, making patronage profitable by selling titles to offices which hadincomes guaranteed from tax revenues was a very creative way to raisemoney and expand available credit. Although the practice had begun in thefifteenth century, it was not fully exploited until the sixteenth. Leo X madeextensive use of the sale of these venal offices. He increased the membershipof the already existing colleges of the cubiculars, scutifers, and presidentsof the Annona and reinstituted the College of the Janissaries which had beensuppressed by Innocent VIII.19 He even put a price tag on the mostimportant appointive positions at the Vatican. As we have already seen, afterCardinal Riario's death in July 1521, Cardinal Cibo reportedly paid 40,000ducats for the office of camarlingo \ but in September when Leo needed extramoney for the War in Lombardy, he allowed Cardinal Ermellino to takeover the office for 50,000 ducats borrowed from the Strozzi bank. Manyof the thirty-one cardinals elevated in 1517 had bought their purple robes.Even Leo's closest associates had had to pay a stiff price. According toSanuto, Ferdinando Ponzetti paid 30,000 ducats for his promotion, SilvioPasserini 20,000 ducats, and Ermellino 40,000 ducats. The aging NiccoloPandolfini, bishop of Pistoia, had to fork over 20,000 ducats for hiselevation. The prospect of a cardinal's hat for a relative was addedinducement to the papal bankers to loan money to the pope. From amongthe prominent Florentine banking families Jacopo Salviati's son Giovanniwas elevated in 1517 for an undisclosed sum. The Gaddi finally achievedtheir goal with the elevation of Niccolo Gaddi in 1527, reportedly for 40,000ducats.20 The Bini practically ruined themselves in unsecured loans to Leo

18 Among the Vatican documents there is an increase in the incidence of complaints that the varioustax collectors had been unable to collect the full quota of their taxes, and in some instances theywere relieved of their duties, and rights to collect the taxes assigned to other individuals. In onecase in 1531, Bartolomeo Spinelli was ordered to replace Alexandro Ungaresi as collector of thesalt taxes in the Marches, Umbria , and Spoleto because Ungaresi had done a poor job and 'notabilispecuniarum summa inexacta remanserit' A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 92, fol. 189. Other similar examplesof reassignment of rights to collect tax residues are in ibid., vol. 88, ii, fols. 132V-133; vol. 92,fols. 72V-73, 134-135.

19 Hofmann, 11, 56-65 ; Delumeau, 1, 774. T h e titles cubicular and scutifer meant literally'bedchamber a t tendant ' and 'papal shield bearer ' but had chiefly ceremonial importance.

20 Sanuto, xxiv, cols. 451-453. Frommel, Der romische Palastbau, 11, 212. Giovanni Salviati was alsoa nephew of the pope and was elevated in 1517 at the same time as Leo's other nephew, NiccoloRidolfi, and his relative Luigi Rossi.

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with the same aspiration, and even Filippo Strozzi groomed his eldest sonPiero for the priesthood in hopes of having him made a cardinal.21

In 1520 to reduce the debt left from the War of Urbino, Leo establishedthe entirely new College of the Knights of St Peter, planning to raise401,000 ducats from the sale of its offices. In 1526 Clement, respondingto the cries of the papal army in Lombardy, created the first of a long lineof papal monti, the Monte della Fedey which was a primitive funded debtin which investors bought shares. These colleges of venal offices, andespecially the Monte della Fede, expanded the pope's credit and alsostimulated the credit dealings of the greater business community whichactively traded and discounted the shares much like bonds. For the pope,the sale of these offices and shares initially lessened his dependence on thepapal bankers and their high-interest loans by providing a means to soakup debts and prolong their repayment. The institution of funded debtscould have fortified the papacy with a great deal more financial independencefrom private creditors had anyone at the curia been far-sighted enough toconsider the Monte as a kind of endowment whose principal would bereinvested so that the interest could then have been applied to amortizethe debt. Instead, the money derived from the sale of Monte stock wasusually spent even before it was received, and a small number of largecreditors was allowed to monopolize the market.

In general, most of the efforts made to strengthen the financialcapabilities of the papacy in our period were too limited and too late becausethey were instituted in response to a particular need at a particular timeand not to solve the problem of chronic insolvency. Clement could not slipthe bonds of dependence on his bankers, and, in fact, they boasted thelargest collections of venal offices and Monte shares. When their loans werenot secured directly in tax revenues or vacant benefices and indulgencemonies, they received title to offices in the venal colleges whose yearlyincomes or salaries functioned as interest payments and whose purchaseprice represented the investment of the principal. In 1521 the Bini andStrozzi loaned Leo 156,000 ducats, for which they accepted as security thepapal miter, various jewels and silver plate, plus the right to dispose of allthe vacant offices at the curia whose total number at the time exceeded twothousand.22 Ten years later in 1531, the Strozzi and Salviati banks raked

21 Piero's name was included on various lists of prospective cardinals from 1521 to 1534, Sanuto,XXXII, col. 236; XXXVIII, cols. 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 ; XLI, col. 286; Varchi, 1, 128; Nerl i , 11, 216-217.Piero received his first benefice from the church of S. Jacopo in Campo at the age of eight in 1518,C.S. , Ser. i n , 134, fol. 125; 49, fols. 46, 53-55. Despite his tender age of sixteen in 1526, he camevery close to being elected. He was also on the list of prospective cardinals in 1534 before Clement ' sdeath, but was never selected. He chose instead a military career.

22 Strozzi 's copy of the loan agreement is in C.S. , Ser. v, 101, fols. 100-102. See also Sanuto ,xxx, col. 351.

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in 89,000 ducats worth of credits in the new Monte della Fede to securetheir loans, and subsequently Filippo was appointed depositor of the Monteto administer his holdings.23

With this general picture of the papacy's financial predicament in mind,we can now begin to understand how the pope's dependence on his privatecreditors was directly proportional to the severity of his need for money.The financial documents in the Vatican bear this out because through themwe can trace the really big accumulation of Florentine credits with theCamera precisely to the period when Leo X's expenses were heaviest andhis finances on the verge of collapse, roughly from 1516 to 1521 when hehad to support the crushing costs of the War of Urbino and the subsequentwar in Lombardy.24 Florentine banks were committed to a concentratedcampaign to loan him hundreds of thousands of ducats, and consequentlyit is to this period, too, that we can trace their dominance over papalincomes and the offices which had been assigned them as security. Amongthem the Frescobaldi bank had loaned over 20,000 ducats, the Bini by 1519,35,000 ducats and an unspecified 'large sum,' followed by the Antinori,Gaddi, Rucellai, Ricasoli, Capponi, and Salviati with sizable loans.25 TheFlorentine branches of these banks were also providing credit. Leo, inaddition, turned to his treasurer Ponzetti and to Passerini his datario formoney, and his cardinal nephews, Cibo, Salviati, and Ridolfi, advancednoteworthy sums on their benefices.26 Filippo Strozzi, then both depositorgeneral of the Camera Apostolic a and depositor of the Signoria, was alreadyheavily involved in the war effort from the Florentine side. He added thelucrative three dogane of Rome, the Treasury of Urbino, the right to collectthe decima from the Kingdom of Naples, as well as various venal officesto his burgeoning list of assignments to secure his credits.27 No accuraterecord tells the size of Filippo's credits with Leo, but even by 15 April1517 he indicated to his associate Francesco del Nero that they wereimpressive,' I will not mention here how much money the Rome companyhas provided the pope, nor for how much we are his creditors in the

2 3 A.V., Div. Cam. , vol. 8 1 , fols. 165V-166; vol. 92, fol. i i 2 v ; vol. 9 1 , fols. 75V-76.2 4 Guicciardini , Istona d'ltalia, v n , 56, 62, 6 8 ; Sanu to , x x m , col. 554; xxiv, cols. 143, 180,

274; Pio Paschini, Roma nel Rmascimento (Bologna, 1940), pp . 4 1 9 - 4 2 0 ; Verdi , pp . 7 0 - 8 8 ; Pastor,

vn, 166, 211-212.2 5 For a summary of these loans, see my ' Mercatores Florentim,' p . 66. Entr ies in an account book

of expenses of Lorenzo de 'Medic i covering 1515-1517, M.A.P . , 132, fols. 80, 9 9 - i o i v , record

Florent ine merchants who furnished loans to Lorenzo in Florence for the taking of U r b i n o in 1516

and include Fi l ippo Strozzi, Pierfrancesco Borgherini , Jacopo Salviati, the Lanfredini bank, Zanobi

Bartolini and Bernardo Bini.2 6 In one transaction Passerini loaned 32,000 ducats , and in another Ponzet t i provided over 20,000

ducats , A.V., Div. Cam. , vol. 65, fols. 1 2 9 - 1 3 1 ; vol. 66, fols. 79, 144; Sanuto , xxxn , col. 236;

Paschini, pp . 419-420.2 7 A.V., Div. Cam. , vol. 65, fol. 40 ; vol. 64, fol. 183V; vol. 68, fol. 30 ; vol. 70, fol. 47V; vol. 66, fol.

82v; B.A.V., Vat. Lat . 7109, fol. 97.

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Depository of Rome. Both accounts are very substantial, but at the momentI do not know exactly how big they are.'28

The connection between the war expenses of the papacy and theamassing of credits by Filippo and other Florentines did not end with thedeath of Leo in 1521 but continued for more than a decade through thereigns of his two successors, Adrian VI (1522-1523) and Clement VII(1523-1534), which were filled with almost continual fighting and markedby an incessant need for funds. In the last months of his pontificate Leohad stretched his credit to its limits, and his untimely death in December1521 left the papacy bankrupt and in the midst of a protracted war inLombardy. After Leo's chamberlain Ermellino and the College of Cardinals,which was sovereign during the interregnum, pawned the remaining papaljewels to raise just over 55,000 ducats from Florentine bankers to meetcurrent expenses, there was no money left in the treasury to bury the deadpope. So Filippo joined with Piero del Bene and Sebastiano Sauli in a loanfor 30,000 ducats to pay his funeral expenses.29 Despite Adrian VI's austerelifestyle he was still pressed for money and dependent on his creditors.Strozzi who continued to serve under him as depositor general advancedmoney to pay soldiers and the provisions of several papal nuncios as wellas to buy back papal jewels from other creditors.30

The election of Clement VII brought another Medici to the papal throne,but he too was unable to keep church coffers filled despite earnest attemptsto increase revenues. From the very beginning of his reign, to retain thegood will of the Florentine bankers, he had to accept their loans left overfrom Leo X's and Adrian VI's pontificates.31 Then, too, his constantswitching of allies in the struggle for Milan, now siding with Francis I, nowsupporting Charles V, and his commitment to campaigns against the Turkkept his military expenses at a disastrously high level. Even the institutionof the Monte della Fede in 1526 which enabled him to soak up some existingdebts and float more loans did not diminish his need for credit. In Aprilof 1526 Luigi Gaddi loaned him 30,000 ducats on behalf of the College28 C.S., Ser. HI, fol. 31.29 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 69, fols. 80-85; C.S., Ser. v, 101, fol. 102. Piero del Bene and Sebastiano

Sauli each carried one-fifth of the loan. After Leo's death Filippo resigned eight titles to Knightsof St Peter valued at 800 ducats apiece to the College of Cardinals and the Camera to be sold torepay other creditors. In return, for security, he received jewels which included the miter of PaulII with the condition that if he were not fully reimbursed in eight months for the price of theoffices plus their assigned incomes, he could sell it, ibid., fol. 104. He returned the miter toAdrian VI in June 1523, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 73, fol. 91.

30 A.V., Div. Cam., vols. 73 and 74, which list some of the debts Adrian assumed with the papacy,confirm that he continued to use Leo's bankers. Record of Filippo's credits with him are in ibid.,vol. 73, fols. 74-77, 91, 98, 105; vol. 74, fols. 19, 36. The one surviving Introitus et Exitus accountfrom Adrian's reign is in A.S.R., Camerale 1, 1769.

31 A.V., Div. Cam., vols. 74 and 75 contain numerous examples of the debts Clement accepted fromLeo's pontificate.

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of Cardinals to contribute to the Turkish campaign, and in July anotherFlorentine, Lorenzo Pucci, grand penitentiary, ceded Clement titles toseventy-eight shares in the College of the Portionarii di Ripa, which whenresold raised 31,200 ducats which were dispatched immediately to the warcommissioner in Lombardy.32 In September of 1526 after the Colonna hadransacked the Vatican at the instigation of the imperialists and Clement hadfled to the Castel S. Angelo, he was so hard pressed for money to makea settlement with the attackers that he had to offer as hostages his wealthyrelatives, Filippo Strozzi and Jacopo Salviati's son Giovanni. Salviati putup a 30,000 ducat bond and Filippo, who actually served six months ashostage in the Castel Nuovo in Naples, eventually arranged privately forhis release by posting a security of 50,000 ducats.33

No one knows what Clement's military obligations cost the papacy, butsurviving documents at least adumbrate the magnitude of the sums in cashthat had to be procured to support his various commitments. The sale ofMonte delta Fede shares and ecclesiastical lands in one two-month period,November and December 1526, raised 55,000 ducats for the war effort.34

Between June 1526 and October 1527, Alexandro della Caccia, governorof Piacenza, receipted 549,791 ducats from Clement in account for the warin Lombardy.35 In 1527 after the Sack of Rome and his lengthyimprisonment in the Castel S. Angelo, Clement had to borrow 100,000ducats from the Grimaldi firm to pay the first part of his ransom inDecember.36 By the end of 1529 Clement was already committed to anothercostly venture, the siege of Florence, and receipts from Bartolomeo Valori,papal commissioner in charge of the operation, show that in September 1530alone he received 100,000 ducats from the pope and in the period betweenOctober 1529 and June 1531 a total of 553,286 ducats.37

Clearly the staggering amounts needed to finance these conflicts couldnot be generated entirely in Rome either from church revenues or fromthe pope's private creditors, although both were called on to their fullest.The burden of financing the military ventures of the Medici popes cameto be increasingly borne by their dutiful ally, the city of Florence. The popes

32 Ibid., vol. 91 , fols. 29V-31; vol. 82, fol. 8 3 ; vol. 89, fols. 108-112. A document in the Florentinearchives names some of the individuals who took over Pucci 's titles and includes such familiarbankers as Fil ippo Strozzi, Francesco della Fonte , Agostino and Hieronimo Sauli, Conv. Sopp.102, vol. 332, fol. 4.

3 3 C.S. , Ser. in , 108, fols. 93a, 107. Because he was away from Rome so long, his bank reduced itsactivities for the Depository General , and another Florent ine banker, Bernardo Bracci, took overthe functions of the office unofficially as pecuniarum Santissimi Domini Nostri et suae CameraeApostolicae receptor generalis, A.S.R., Camerale 1, Mandat i Camerali , vol. 863, fol. 30V.

34 Conv. Sopp. 102, vol. 332, fols. 6 v - i o .35 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 157; vol. 81 , fols. i o v - 1 3 .3 6 A record of the loan negotiated 4 December 1528 is in ibid., vol. 86, fols. i v - 2 . T h e total ransom

amounted to 400,000 ducats. See Delumeau, 11, 759-760.37 A.S.R., Camerale 1, Mandat i Camerali , vol. 862, fol. 71V; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 82, fol. 91 .

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had ready access to Florentine resources in this period, not only in termsof the private wealth invested in Rome by Florentine banks with branchesat the curia, but also in terms of the commune's revenues which the Medicigovernment of Florence regularly used to replenish the pope's till. Part ofthe city's funds had to be applied to papal war efforts in compliance withthe treaty obligations which made her a member of all papal alliances underthe Medici. But contemporaries testified, and surviving records substantiatetheir testimony, that Florence shouldered far more than her assigned shareof the cost. Large subsidies from the commune were channeled into theWar of Urbino, and funds raised in the spring of 1517 from the Monteofficials and from forced loans went to pay for both the Florentine and papaltroops engaged in the lengthy campaign against Francesco Maria dellaRovere.38 Parenti complained that the possessions of the church were beingdefended with the money of the Florentines.39

When fighting in Lombardy recommenced over the rights to Milan andto Parma and Piacenza in 1521, Leo went practically bankrupt. The primaryreason he sent Cardinal Giulio as legate to the war in charge of the papalarmy was that, as archbishop of Florence and effective head of the Mediciregime after Lorenzo's death in 1519, he could more easily draw on thecommune's funds to support the war.40 Even after Leo died in the midstof the fighting and throughout the long absence from Rome of Adrian VI,the College of Cardinals depended on Florentine funds funneled throughCardinal Medici to finance the campaign. Clement VII, as a Medici,naturally continued to use Florentine monies to support papal militarymaneuvers in the north. In 1525 when the defeat and capture of FrancisI at Pa via obliged him to conclude an alliance with Charles V, he committedFlorence to provide the whole 100,000 florins stipulated in the accord.41

38 Estimates put the total cost of the war at 800,000 ducats. Goro Gheri revealed in his correspondencethat Lorenzo de'Medici was spending at the rate of 50,000 ducats per month in the war and thatin just four months ' time, in the spring of 1517,300,000 ducats had been consumed in the war effort,more than Charles VI I I of France had spent in taking the whole Kingdom of Naples, Copialetteredi Goro Gheri, vol. 11, fols. 103-108, 249. Pitti in his 'Storia Fiorentina, ' p. 119, reported thatFlorence's credit with the papacy by the end of the war amounted to 230,000 ducats. After thedeath of Lorenzo de'Medici in 1519, Leo granted Florence San Leo and Montefeltro in partialrepayment of her credits.

39 Piero Parenti, fol. 132V. He cited examples of Florentine money used for the war and stated thatthose citizens who had loaned money in the pope's account had their credits inscribed in the booksof the commune of Florence, fol. 133. Evidence that this actually occurred comes from the onesurviving book of Entrate e Uscite of the provveditore of the Monte for this period, Monte 2292,fol. 137, which contains an entry for 13,635 florins which had been used for the War of Urbino.

4 0 Vettori, 'Sommario, ' pp. 193-194. According to records of the Otto di Pratica, large amounts ofmoney were supplied to Cardinal Medici 's treasurer, Domenico Buoninsegni. For example,between 30 October and 7 December 1521 Buoninsegni received close to 200,000 florins, Otto,Stant., vol. 12, fols. 120V, 126V. Between August and December 1521 the Strozzi companies inRome and Florence provided him over 100,000 ducats, C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 149V-153.

4 1 Th e accord with the imperial viceroy, Lannoy, was made in April 1525, and in June Florence paidthe value of 97,650 florins, Otto, Stant., vol. 13, fol. n 6 v ; Otto, Entrate e Uscite, vol. 3, fol. 28.See also Vettori, 'Sommario, ' p. 216. Florence had also sent thousands of florins to the war that

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In May 1526 after he switched allies and rejoined with France in the Leagueof Cognac against the emperor, once again Florentine resources wereheavily taxed. Between June and December of that year the city sent 260,780ducats, and by June 1527 another 390,680 ducats, all to Alexandro dellaCaccia, treasurer for the papal armies with the League.42 In April 1527Florence bailed out Clement with a promise to pay 150,000 ducats toappease the Connetable de Bourbon and stop the advance of his imperialarmy south from Bologna.43

The financial connection between Florence and Rome for raising,administering, and distributing common war funds would make a fascinatingstudy in itself. Lorenzo il Magnifico's government in the fifteenth centuryprovided ample precedent for the liberal discretion the Medici exercisedover public funds for the diplomatic and military expenses of the city.The institutional machinery they had created for the effective control ofcommunal funds through the Council of Seventy and the officials of theMonte had remained intact since 1480.44 But in the early sixteenth century,the new feature, brought about by the election of a Medici to the papalthrone at a time when the family also ruled Florence, was the effectiveintermixing of Florentine and papal monies so that the commune'sresources no longer served just Medici policy for Florence but primarilysupported the needs of the church.

But how and by whom were communal funds actually siphoned off andsent to the wars? Exactly how did bankers like Strozzi, who routinelyhandled both Florentine and church funds, carry out the movement of warmonies raised in both Rome and Florence? The pattern for the use ofFlorentine finances to support a papal army was set in 1515 during the Warof Lombardy against the French. In the previous summer Lorenzode'Medici had maneuvered his tradition-breaking election as captaingeneral of the Florentine forces. But when his uncle Giuliano, supreme

ended at Pavia. Records of the payments are in the correspondence of the papal legate, CardinalGiovanni Salviati, in C.S., Ser. I, vol. 156, fols. 115, 116, 129, 150, 229; vol. 154, fols. 96, 224,333, 341 ; vol. 157, fols. 177, 181, 276, 331.

4 2 Otto, Stant., vol. 14, fols. iov, 14, 20, 23V, 27. Alexandro della Caccia received payments totaling549,791 ducats between January 1526 and September 1527, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 157;vol. 81, fols. iov-13 . If the 390,680 florins from the Otto comprise part of that total, then Florencecontributed over seventy percent of all the money sent to Delia Caccia.

4 3 Vettori, 'Sommar io , ' pp. 239-240. Otto, Delib., vol. 7, fol. 103V-104. T h e official documentactually says that the payment by Florence would be made contingent upon the release of FilippoStrozzi, then serving as Clement 's hostage in Naples. Once Filippo arrived in Rome, heimmediately sent 19,000 ducats to Florence to be paid when the agreement with Bourbon becamefinal, C.S., Ser. v, 95, fols. 45V-47. Bourbon, however, continued to advance south with his armyand on 6 xMay sacked Rome.

4 4 See chap. 2 above, and, for the relationship between military expenses and government loans inthe previous century, Molho's interesting study, Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance,1400-1433, tables 1, 4, and 5, pp. 10, 61 , 62, which illustrates the correlation between the costof the military payroll and the deficit.


commander of the armies of the church, became incapacitated, Lorenzowent off to the war that August not only as head of the Florentine army,but as commander of the papal armies as well. Filippo Strozzi, his right-handman, had been entrusted with the Depository of the Signoria of Florencein the name of Roberto de'Ricci in June to assure Lorenzo greater financialflexibility, and at the end of the same month he had taken up his duties asdepositor general of the Camera Apostolica. Both depositories wereproviding money for the war so that even though funding originated fromtwo separate sources, namely from the Apostolic Chamber and from thecity of Florence, it was channeled through the same agent, the Strozzibank.45 The actual ducats which were sent to a single destination and forthe single purpose of paying the papal and Florentine troops could be passedvery easily and quickly through the private channels of the bank using itsbranches in Rome and Florence. Furthermore, it did not really matterwhere the bank received the cash that was sent as long as proper accountswere maintained. Once established, the pattern was easily applied, so thatin October 1515 when Filippo received a directive to pay 1,300 ducats tothe papal legate Cardinal Giulio de'Medici in Bologna, he ordered hisBologna correspondent, the bank of Antonio Dati, to pay the sum andinstructed Francesco del Nero who was both his agent and vice-depositorin Florence to make good the money to the Dati. Del Nero would theninstruct the Rome company to remit 500 ducats to him to reimburse theaccount partially, and the rest he would receive from Filippo and his wifeClarice.46

The provisions and stipends of the Swiss troops and the condottieri, likeRenzo da Ceri, Guido Rangone and Federigo Gonzaga marchese ofMantua, employed jointly by Florence and the church, could be treatedin the same way. When the Depository General and the Strozzi branch inRome held the contract to pay those military stipends on behalf of thechurch, and Francesco del Nero and the Strozzi bank on behalf of theDepository of Florence were responsible for supplying Florence's share,once again the payment became an internal affair of the Strozzi bank. Aslong as the condottierfs representatives received their pay on time, it did

4 5 On 18 August 1515 Filippo presented the Otto di Pratica with the pope's request for 10,000 troopsto fight jointly for Florence and the papacy, M.A.P., 105, fol. 186. Filippo also took charge oforganizing the hiring and paying of the soldiers, ibid, fols. 186, 207; vol. 108, fol. 132.

4 6 C.S., Ser. in, n o , fols. 5, 8. Francesco del Nero operated the Depository for Filippo and stoodby him throughout his career almost like an alter ego. Unquestionably he was the most importantperson and perhaps the brain behind Filippo's financial successes. He came to Rome in 1529 tolook after Filippo's business affairs and Clement appointed him his treasurer general. Regrettablyhe is known to most modern scholars only in a relatively unimportant, but historicallyovershadowing, capacity, namely as Niccolo Machiavelli's brother-in-law. Francesco is buried inan elegant marble tomb in S. Maria Sopra Minerva in Rome, which his brother Agostino erectedafter his death in 1563.

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not matter where Strozzi procured the actual funds, whether from a surplusof capital from the Lyons branch of the Strozzi bank or from funds of theFlorentine Monte entrusted to Francesco del Nero. Strozzi's correspondencewith Del Nero throughout the period of the War of Lombardy in 1515,the War of Urbino and the wars in Lombardy of the 1520s is filled withcomplex instructions and arrangements to shift large sums of moneythrough Bologna to the military paymasters to meet the quarterly payschedules of condottieri and soldiers.47 Because Del Nero handled all thepayments, it is very difficult to judge from the instructions in the letterswhether any individual transaction or shipment of money was made in thechurch's or Florence's account.48

The flow of money between Rome and Florence and the jumbling ofaccounts already tested during the first War of Lombardy were only madepossible by the credit mechanisms which were a normal part of bankingoperations. If funds happened to be more convenient and plentiful inFlorence, they could easily and routinely be appropriated to fulfill theimmediate demands of the church and later be charged to the pope'saccount. Thus in the fall of 1521 when the Strozzi bank in Rome procuredand shipped over 70,000 ducats in cash to Bologna for the war, at least21,000 ducats were actually put up by the Florence branch of the bank.49

The same general practice of providing cash and credit to the pope fromthe Strozzi's reserves in Florence obtained also with respect to thecommune's funds which the Depository of the Signoria administered andwhich it diverted to the wars from 1515 on. One of the very first indicationsof what later became a regular habit of subsidizing the pope shows up inthe books of the Otto di Pratica as a record of 786 large florins which theDepository had paid out between 10 June and 8 December 1515 to couriers,of which 450 florins were really spent not for Florence, but for the pope'sown messengers between Rome and Florence and Florence and Bologna.In December the Otto approved the whole amount including the pope'sshare and charged it to the account of the commune with the provision thatwhenever the pope paid his part, his 450 florins would be credited as

4 7 C.S., Ser. in , n o passim; Sig., D i e d , Ot to , Leg. e Com., vol. 72 passim. In one case in October1515 Strozzi had Francesco accommodate the mercenary Vitello Vitelli by paying him his quarterlystipend ahead of schedule, C.S., Ser. in , n o , fol. 10.

4 8 See for example, ibid., fols. 6, 19, 122V, 130-131. In one instance in May 1524 Strozzi's Romecompany made arrangements for Guido Rangone's provision, normally paid in Rome, to be paidin Bologna with a draft on the Florence company, Sig., Dieci, Otto, Leg. e Com., vol. 72, fol.136. A similar case is recorded the following June , ibid., fol. 161. Both Strozzi's Rome and Florencecompanies made shipments of money for the pope in fall 1521 to Bologna to his military treasurerBuoninsegni, C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 8-13, 149-153. Records of money paid by the Florencecompany to Buoninsegni on behalf of the Rome branch are in ibid., vol. 102, fols. 50-52. See alsoConv. Soppr, 102, vols. 327 and 331 passim.

4 9 C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 149V-151.

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income.50 By 1521 it had apparently become a routine matter to shore uppapal finances with Florentine money. The practice had even beenincorporated into the city's regular accounting procedure. The books nolonger detailed expenses made on the pope's behalf, but rather wrote offbulk sums of 50,000, or in one case almost 150,000 florins, with noindication when, if ever, they would be repaid.51 By 1525 Francesco delNero, who as vice-depositor actually ran the Florence Depository forFilippo, had become so skilled in funneling the commune's monies to thepapal armies that he had nearly exhausted its resources. As he admittedin a letter of 8 April to Cardinal Giovanni Salviati, then legate in Parma,'[in Florence] not a penny remains either in the pious foundations or inthe secular institutions. And I have plundered everything, even the Jews,all to satisfy his Holiness the Pope.'52

The Depository and Francesco del Nero were twin keys which gavealmost unlimited access to Florence's money. Since the depositor wasaccountable for war expenses only to the Otto di Pratica and the Signoria,already in the hands of Medici partisans, Del Nero could channel moneyin a steady stream from the Monte through the Depository and on to thewar. And the flow could not easily be dammed up or halted by discontentedcitizens looking to charge the Medici or their friends in the regime withmalfeasance. The Depository was the chief agency through which fundsfrom the public treasury, including tax revenues and loans by the Monteofficials themselves, were pumped out to the papal and Florentine armies.During periods of war when extra funds were needed, it sucked in moneyfrom accatti. Yet despite their relative safety, Filippo and Francesco delNero were forever trying to augment the Depository's funds from sourceswhich would be even less subject to supervision. In both 1522 and 1524the Otto di Pratica voted the depositor extraordinary powers to seek loansat interest at his discretion.53 And Filippo regularly borrowed money on

50 Ot to , Cond. e Stant . , vol. n , fol. 89 ; Camera del C o m u n e , Depositeria dei Signori 1686, fol. 32.T h e r e is no record that the amount was ever repaid.

51 Ot to , Stant . , vol. 12, fols. 120V, 126V.52 C .S . , Ser. 1, 156, fol. 115, 8 April 1525.53 Author iza t ions were granted 31 M a r c h 1522, 22 D e c e m b e r 1522, and 7 J anua ry 1524. O t t o , Del ib . ,

vol. 6, fols. 151V-152; vol. 7, fols. 22, 34. T h e books of the Otto for J u n e 1522 list over fortyindividuals and companies who received interest payments on their loans to the city. The creditorswho received by far the most included such familiar ottimati as Giovanni Bartolini (34 florins),Camillo di Niccolo Antinori (40 florins), Heirs of Lanfredino Lanfredini (21 florins, 5 soldi, 16denari, 8 piccoli), Lorenzo and Filippo Strozzi (21 florins, 6 soldi, 17 denari, 8 piccoli), DomenicoGiugni and Co. (40 florins), Carlo Ginori (42 florins, 2 soldi, 6 denari, 8 piccoli) and Pagolo de'Medici(58 florins, 2 soldi, 16 denari) Otto, Stant., vol. 13, fol. 44V. The Strozzi apparently continued tomake substantial loans to the Depository because in June 1523 the records show that Filippo andLorenzo Strozzi were paid 75 florins in interest, over three-and-a-half times the amount they hadreceived in 1522, ibid., fol. 56V.

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the exchange market for the Depository and subsidized its deficit with fundsfrom his bank.54

The depositor's accounts were reviewed by the Otto di Pratica togetherwith the Signoria which had to vote approval before sending them to beentered into the books of the commune.55 Once the accounts wereappropriated and removed from the depositor's books, he was no longerliable for them. During our period the Otto faithfully monitored theaccounts and voted on them every six months at the end of their term ofoffice in June and December. Yet despite the intention of the laws tomaintain accountability through regular scutiny, they were easily circum-vented in a number of ways. First of all, under the Medici the compositionof the Otto di Pratica was artfully manipulated to ensure that friends ofthe regime, many of whom held the office repeatedly, dominated thevoting.5 6 Through his correspondence with Francesco del Nero about theDepository, Filippo always kept a watchful eye on the make-up of the Otto.In the winter of 1517 when he was troubled about the delicate task ofwriting off the Depository's huge expenses from the War of Urbino, headvised Del Nero from Rome regarding the new Otto to be appointed inDecember:

I must have several friends on the new Otto so that those matters we will not havefinished with the present Otto can be expedited through them. In addition toMatteo [Strozzi] you will have Roberto de'Ricci [titular depositor] who could notbe more to our liking. I believe he will appreciate the honor of the office greatly,and I have kept in mind your report that he desired it. Antonio Serristori, too,is a superb choice.57

54 C .S . , Ser. i n , 49 , fols. 19, 20 ; vol. n o , fol. 33V. Even Francesco del N e r o took the l iberty ofborrowing money for the Depos i to ry from friends, ibid., fols. 3 8 - 3 9 . F o r example , on Easterm o r n i n g when all the banks were closed, De l N e r o was still able to raise 4,000 duca t s in gold atthe urgent request of Goro Gheri, Lorenzo de'Medici's secretary and effective head of the regimein his absence, ibid., vol. 49, fol. 24.

55 O t to , Cond . e Stant . , vol. 11, fol. 138V relates an example of a mee t ing of the Otto in M a y 1517to approve all the accounts since the previous December . T h e deposi tor was supposed to obtainthe signature of two member s of that council before making any payments , for example, Otto,-Del ib . , vol. 6, fols. 48, 56V, 79, 137V. But noth ing confirms that this s tatute was adhered to.Certainly the two books of Entrate e Uscite of the Otto kept by the depositor give no indicationthat payments were counters igned, nor is there ment ion of this requ i rement in Strozzi 's and DelNero ' s correspondence.

56 Rosemary Devonshire Jones in her article, ' L o r e n z o de 'Medic i , Duca d ' U r b i n o , ' p . 307, notedthat between J u n e 1514 and December 1518 out of a total of seventy- two possible appo in tmentsless than half that n u m b e r of different individuals actually served on the Otto and that some menheld the office four and five t imes over.

57 C.S., Ser. in, 110, fol. 79, 29 November 1517. The following month Filippo reported to Del Nerowith great satisfaction that even the old Otto had accepted his accounts with no questions, andhe predicted that with the new Otto which was already full of' assai amici nostn' they would haveno further trouble, ibid., fol. 86. Beginning in May and November of each year, Strozzi'scorrespondence was increasingly filled with references to the Otto and his preparations to have

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Even though the Otto had the power to disapprove the depositor's accounts,they never did so at any time from 1515 to 1527 when Filippo controlledthe Depository. A glance at their records shows that their sanction wasmostly pro forma and ex post facto. For example, in September 1516, inorder to balance their books, the Otto accepted a debit statement for 30,000florins for unnamed extraordinary expenses stemming from the War ofLombardy and from Leo X's visit to Florence the previous Christmas.58

In 1518 to Filippo's great relief the Otto accepted in good form all theaccounts of money the Depository had loaned the pope for the War ofUrbino, and again in 1525 they approved very generous unspecifiedsubsidies to Pope Clement. By 1526 and 1527 the amounts of money theOtto approved after they had already been spent for the papal war effortin Lombardy ran into hundreds of thousands of florins.59

The accounts of the Depository voted on by the Otto are at best summaryentries of large credits, and, although they give some indication of thevolume of funds flowing into the Depository and out to the papal army,they do not paint a complete picture of how that money was manipulatedinside the Depository. Filippo's letters describe the great volume of papal,communal and private funds passing through Francesco del Nero's handsand the Strozzi bank which are not revealed in the Depository's officialaccounts finally approved by the Otto. In fact, the dominant impression leftby the letters is the care with which Filippo, Francesco del Nero and theirassociates in the regime camouflaged suspicious accounts and doctored theirrecords even before presenting them to the Otto. They also had recourseto 'retouching' the books to make them appear more acceptable. In oneinstance of April 1517, Lanfredino Lanfredini was worried that records inthe books of the Monte of creditors of the commune such as himself weretoo explicit, and he advised Francesco del Nero that the books should betouched up because they revealed too much. However, because thoseparticular accounts had already been inscribed in the books of the communeand in the books of some merchants who fronted for the Medici, to retouchthem would only increase the possibility of embarrassment or disclosure,and it was decided to let the accounts stand.60

the Depository's records approved. Rarely did he not trust a particular Otto to accept his accounts,and then only at a time when opposition to the regime had surfaced briefly, such as in the springof 1517 when the War of Urbino dragged on and Lorenzo de'Medici had been wounded. Ratherthan risk having some accounts not approved, he chose to hold them over for review by a morefriendly Otto, ibid., vol. 49, fols. 15, 4. 58 Otto, Cond. e Stant., vol. 11, n g v .

59 C.S., Ser. in , n o , fol. 88v; Otto, Stant., vol. 13, fol. 107. In December 1526 the Otto acceptedthe accounts for 260,680 florins that Francesco del Nero had sent to Alexandro della Caccia, ibid.,vol. 14, fol. iov. In June 1527 another 159,184 florins were approved that had been spent since theprevious December for the same purpose, financing the war in Lombardy, ibid., vol. 13, fol. 159.

60 C.S., Ser. in , 49, fol. 20. From information in the letter it appears that they were seeking loansfrom private individuals for the Depository to send to the War of Urbino and then, on the sly, writingthese loans into the books of the Monte so that the commune would assume responsibility for them.

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One reason for doctoring the books was to maintain the facade that publicmonies were being handled legally and in conformity with the constitution.Money given to the pope could rightfully be approved as long as it appearedon the books of the commune as a loan by the city to His Holiness, eventhough in all probability it would never be repaid. An even more importantmotive for tampering with the accounts was to protect Strozzi and Del Nerofrom being held responsible later for any adjudged misuse of funds.61

Several artifices shielded them, the first of which was maintaining a certainanonymity in the records of the Depository. The books were kept in thenames of the officially designated depositors, Roberto de'Ricci and hissuccessor Giovanni Tornabuoni, who provided cover for Francesco delNero who actually handled the business of the office. He in turn coveredfor Filippo whose name rarely appears in any of the Depository's officialrecords. Filippo took such precautions as sending a draft for 4,000 ducatsfrom Rome in May 1516 addressed to Roberto de'Ricci, depositor, but withexpress instructions that it be given only to Francesco del Nero withoutRicci's knowledge.62 Even the sometimes sizable deficits of the Depositorywhich properly were credits belonging to Del Nero and Strozzi wereshrewdly written off in Ricci's or Tornabuoni's names, lest the Strozzi nameand fortune be too closely linked with the city's finances.63 A secondtechnique meant to disguise the true nature of the Depository's activitieswas the practice followed by Francesco del Nero of keeping two sets ofbooks, one official and one private. He recorded all transactions first in hissecret quaderni before making selected entries in the official books of theDepository. Had Del Nero's secret accounts survived, we would have amuch clearer picture of how Medici finances operated.64 Yet a thirdprotective device for Strozzi and Del Nero was to have the credits andexpenses of the Depository accepted and transferred out of the depositor'sbooks into the books of the commune as quickly as possible so that theycould no longer be held accountable for them.65

To protect themselves and simultaneously maintain a high degree offlexibility in their use of public and private funds in the Depository for the

61 Back in May 1515 Benedet to Buondelmont i had told Fi l ippo to be careful to protect himself ' shouldthe political winds change direct ion, ' M.A.P . , 108, fol. 147. T w o years later Francesco del Neroreported that Francesco Martel l i had warned him how impor tan t it was for the books to appearclean since in the last twenty-five years the books of the Monte had been challenged so many t imes,C.S. , Ser. i n , 49, fol. 2ov.

62 Ibid., vol. n o , fol. 24V.63 T h e huge amoun t s totaling over 400,000 ducats which the Deposi tory funneled into the war effort

in L o m b a r d y in 1526 were all recorded in the name of Giovanni T o r n a b u o n i the ti tular depositor ,Ot to , Stant . , vol. 13, fol. 159; vol. 14, fol. iov.

64 Fi l ippo and Francesco del N e r o frequently referred to the quaderni kept separately from theDeposi tory 's accounts. See for example, C .S . , Ser. m , 49, fol. 15; and vol. n o , fol. 87. ObviouslyDel Nero ' s quaderni were highly incr iminat ing because when the Medic i government wasoverturned in 1527 both men were in danger of prosecution.

65 Ibid., vol. 49, fols. 4, 6, 7, 1 iv .

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Medici's benefit, Filippo and Del Nero had to conceal many improprietiesin their dealings. Because he transferred large sums of money from theMonte before any records were presented to the Otto, Filippo was especiallyeager to cover up just how much public money was passing through hishands. In November 1515, he instructed Del Nero to see to it that therecords would not reveal him to have been too large a creditor for the pope'sexpenses should those accounts ever come to light.66 In April 1517,according to Francesco, the amount for which they were vulnerable couldhave reached 100,000 ducats. In December of the same year, Filippo wascarrying more than 130,000 ducats in his accounts that he had furnishedLorenzo de'Medici. He was anxious to have the whole sum written off bythe Otto since the matter, as he put it, 'weighs on my stomach.' Lorenzode'Medici, mistakenly informed that the debt was recorded under his ownname, and feeling similarly discomforted, wanted to make certain that itwas rewritten in the pope's name. Filippo, however, assured him that thedebt appeared under his name only in Francesco del Nero's private bookand not in any public record. But he agreed that, for the safety of all, itwould be a wise idea to lodge everything at Leo's door.67 The next monththe appropriate entry was made in the books of the provveditore del Montelisting Leo X as debtor to the commune for 131,635 florins provided tohim in the War of Urbino by the Signori of Florence through their depositorRoberto de'Ricci.68

Strozzi and Del Nero were also covering up the liberal application ofthe Depository's funds to the private needs of the Medici and their friends.Alfonsina Orsini, Lorenzo de'Medici's mother, not only received moneybut also made occasional loans to the Depository. Francesco del Nero paidindividuals such as Benedetto Buondelmonti and Meo da Castiglione at thepleasure of Lorenzo de'Medici, and in one instance, in September 1515,Filippo was prepared to assist Jacopo Salviati with 5,000 florins taken frompledges to be collected from the new Monte officials so that Salviati couldpromote a private deal to supply salt to Milan.69 In May 1517 Francescodel Nero sent Filippo a list taken from his private records of debts in theDepository which had not yet been written off by the Otto. Although hedid not indicate the purpose, legitimate or otherwise, for which money had

66 Ibid., vol. n o , fol. 13. Fil ippo's concern to protect himself was undoubtedly motivated by theoutbreak of some discontent with the Medici government after Francis I 's victory at Marignano.

67 Ibid., vol. 49, fol. 20; n o , fols. 92, 87. Francesco del Nero noted that the income and expensesof the Depository reported to the commune for 1516 when Lorenzo de 'Medici began the campaignagainst Urb ino had amounted to over 300,000 ducats, but that they were really much greater, ibid.,vol. n o , fol. 11.

6 8 Monte Comune 2292, fol. 137, 8 January 1518. Filippo's letter of 21 December 1517, C.S., Ser.in, 110, fol. 92, makes it clear that the order to write off the debt in the books of the Monte camedirectly from Rome and that Jacopo Salviati and Lanfredino Lanfredini had lent their assistancein seeing the matter through.

69 Ibid., vol. n o , fols. 8v, n , 15, 53, 70, 86; M.A.P., 108, fol. 144.

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been provided to the individuals on that list, Francesco did note beside anumber of names that they had been paid at the order of Lorenzo de'Medicior Alfonsina. When it came time to settle their accounts in the Depository,Filippo and Francesco dreaded that the delicate matter of those citizenswho had received money (the cittadini serviti) as well as the accounts forMadonna Alfonsina might cause them headaches with the Otto.10

Apparently Filippo himself was not above dipping into the Depository'sfunds, for on several occasions he recorded a personal debt to theDepository. He also made scattered references in his letters to money andloans to Goro Gheri, Lorenzo de'Medici's secretary. Presumably the moneyusually came out of the Depository, for in one instance after a private loanto Gheri, Filippo pointedly instructed Francesco del Nero not to mix inany of the Depository's money because this was a private arrangementinvolving Strozzi's Rome company.71 Filippo regularly furnished moneyto Lorenzo de'Medici whose thirst for credit seemed insatiable. Del Nerokept a special account for these 'imprestanze del SignoreJ and afterLorenzo's death in 1519, he and Filippo wore themselves out gettingLorenzo's outstanding debts absorbed by the commune.72 Filippo's privateloans to Lorenzo had a way of showing up in the books as public debts.In May 1517 when he was with his brother-in-law in Ancona, Filippoagreed to lend him one thousand gold ducats from the exchange marketwith the proviso that Gheri would repay him in Florence. Goro, however,preferred not to make restitution on the spot, probably because the publictreasury was nearly empty, and suggested instead that Filippo shouldsimply deduct the loan, and interest too, from the 5,000 florins he wasobligated to lend the commune as one of the new Monte officials. The entire5,000 florins should then be listed with the Monte according to regularprocedure as a credit in Filippo's name to be reimbursed at additionalinterest from the city's tax revenues.73

70 C.S., Ser. in, 49, fols. 7, 8; n o , fol. 86. Some of the payments had been made at the order ofGaleotto de'Medici who had been depositor before Filippo, and one entry for 2,900 florins hadbeen paid to Galeotto himself at the order of Alfonsina. Others on the list who received moneyincluded such well-known Medici secretaries and atnici as Benedetto Buondelmonti (1,150 florins);Battista della Palle (300 florins); Giovanni da Poppi (418 florins, lire 2, soldi 5); Ser BernardoFiaminghi (100 florins); Piero Pucci (100 florins); and Bartolomeo Valori (259 florins). The totaldebt amounted to over 15,500 florins. Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vetton, p. 141 cites anothercase the following year where Medici amici helped themselves to communal funds which werewritten off in the accounts of the Otto.

71 C.S., Ser. in, n o , fols. 13, 38V, 58. The previous March, ibid., vol. 49, fol. 27, Francesco wroteFilippo that he had provided Gheri with 4,500 ducats, and in November 1517 Filippo revealedthat money he had given to Gheri was to be written off on the commune, ibid., vol. n o , fol. 79.

72 Ibid., vol. 49, fol. 28; vol. n o , fols. 122-124. The debt was not settled until the following year,

fols. 153-154, 157-73 Ibid., fols. 51V-52. Perhaps this way he earned double interest on his original loan of 1,000 ducats.

Piero Parenti, fol. 133, also noted the practice whereby private citizens provided money to Lorenzode'Medici in account of the pope and wound up as creditors in the books of the commune.

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Manipulating funds within the Depository in Florence formed the kernelof Strozzi and Del Nero's work for the Medici. But they soon enteredanother area of war financing when they began to ship money from Rometo Florence and from Florence to Bologna for further distribution to papaland Florentine troops in the north. Filippo's involvement in this facet ofwar finance grew particularly intense during the extended conflict inLombardy when Giulio de'Medici was cardinal legate in charge of the papalarmy. Filippo and Giulio had remained close through the years, and Filippohad always been generous with his credit to the cardinal and to his personaltreasurer Domenico Buoninsegni.74 When Giulio was appointed legateStrozzi's bank took over both the cardinal's personal finances and thoseconnected with the war.75 Already by June 1521 Filippo advised Francescodel Nero to do whatever Domenico Buoninsegni required of him, addingthat the two stood to gain handsomely from such obligations.76

Reflecting all we have seen above - Filippo's passion for anonymity inhis operations of the Florentine Depository and the overall inherentdiscontinuity in this period between official title and actual practice -neither the official records of the Depository General in Rome nor thoseof the Otto di Pratica and the Depository in Florence openly tell of Filippo'sextensive operations in providing the money sent to the papal forces.Evidence comes instead from two private Strozzi account books, the firstof which, a book containing entrate e uscite and ricordi, shows that theFlorence company received shipments of over 16,000 florins from the Romecompany in the fall of 1521 and made payments to Buoninsegni betweenSeptember and November of over 22,000 florins. The second account book,

74 In November 1515 when he had arranged for money to be sent to Buoninsegni for CardinalMedici in Bologna, Fi l ippo instructed Del N e r o : 'Satisfy h im the best you can because youknow how His Excellency's affairs are dear to my heart , ' C.S. , Ser. i n , n o , fol. 15V. In February1519 Fil ippo left word with his Rome company that Cardinal Medici and Buoninsegni wereto have unlimited credit there, ibid., vol. 134, fol. 142V.

7 5 A brief account compiled in February 1523 of Cardinal Medici ' s personal assets and debts , someof which were for military expenses, shows that Strozzi was his biggest creditor for over 10,000ducats, 8,400 of which had been provided by Strozzi 's Florence company. See C.S. , Ser. 1, 10,fols. 286, 299. T h i s document was used by D . S. Chambers in his article on cardinals ' finances,' T h e Economic Predicament of Renaissance Cardinals, ' Studies in Medieval and RenaissanceHistory, ed. W. Bowsky, m (1966), 306, to demonstrate that Cardinal Medici was deeply indebt. However, the document is not at all a reliable statement of his personal financial circumstancessince it includes so many extraordinary military expenses tied up with his legation to Bologna,such as payments for the provision of the condottiere Alexandro Vitelli, that ordinarily would notcome out of the cardinal 's own pocket. T h e debts with Strozzi and nine other Florent ine bankerscould well be connected with expenses for the war in Lombardy . T w o other brief lists of CardinalMedici 's expenses after he was elected pope Clement VI I show that the Strozzi bank continuedto act for him as financial agents in various capacities, C.S. , Ser. i n , 220, fol. 192 and Conv. Soppr. ,102, vol. 327 passim.

7 6 C.S. , Ser. i n , n o , fol. 191. In April 1521 Filippo received orders from the cardinal regarding thepayment of troops in Bologna, ibid., vol. 220, fols. 225a, 172, 173a. Fragmentary personal accountsshow that Strozzi made a variety of payments for the cardinal which continued after his electionto the papacy.

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one of giornale e ricordanze of Strozzi's Rome company, reveals thattransfers of even greater magnitude took place. Between 7 August and 30November 1521 shortly before Leo died, the Rome company sentBuoninsegni in Cardinal Medici's name over 103,000 cameral ducats. Ofthe total, the equivalent of over 17,000 florins was contributed by theFlorence company in account of the Rome company, and another 20,500ducats were advanced by the Rome company against certain creditors ofthe pope.77 The only Vatican document from this period which mentionsthat Filippo paid any money at all to Buoninsegni is a Motuproprio of 11September 1521 which duplicates part of the information in one entrypreserved in the second Strozzi account book. The Vatican documentacknowledged receipt by the Strozzi company in Rome of 20,000 cameralducats in account of the Depository General. It further recorded that theStrozzi company in Florence paid the equivalent in cash in four installmentsto Buoninsegni.78 What the Vatican document does not mention but whichbecomes clear from the more detailed record of the same transaction in theStrozzi account book is how the Strozzi Rome company rilled the orderonce it received the 20,000 ducats and the order to pay them to Buoninsegni.At that point it became an internal affair of the bank, and, in fact, the Strozzibank in Rome sent only half the amount, or 10,614 ducats, to Florence andthe remainder was paid to Buoninsegni out of the funds of the Florencebranch.79

Once money had been collected from its different sources and variouspoints of origin, courier or mule team still had to transport it wherever thetroops were encamped. The main supply route north passed throughBologna, and Filippo's representative in that city, the company of AntonioDati, acted as intermediary in transferring the funds. Dati's duties as anagent of transfer were more complex than meets the eye because often hereceived gold and silver bullion which had first to be minted into coin beforeit could be used to pay the soldiers' provisions. Bullion was easier to shipthan bulky coins, and since the payroll requirements of the soldiers keptreducing the supply of available specie, new money had to be constantlyminted.80 Payments to the papal condottieri and their troops, at least in the

77 C.S. , Ser. v, 102, fols. 3 -8 , 50 -52 ; 101, fols. 149V-153.78 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fols. 180V-181. T h e only difference in the amounts recorded in the

Vatican document and the Strozzi account book record is 1,386 ducats in the former which theStrozzi company in Rome kept to pay the stipend of the Swiss Guard .

79 C.S. , Ser. v, 101, fol. 150. T h e Depository in Florence also provided money. After Leo 's deathFlorence claimed to have over 144,000 ducats in credits with him, Ot to , Stant. , fol. 126V.

8 0 Domenico Buoninsegni made the point that gold could be sent by courier, but the same valuein bank, a silver coin, had to be sent by mule team which was slower and more cumbersome, Conv.Soppr. , 102, vol. 332, fol. 2v. It also stands to reason that the operation of paying the soldiersbecame more efficient and cheaper the closer the bullion could be sent to the troops before it wasminted. T h e export of gold and silver to meet the military payroll contr ibuted to the periods oftight money in Rome and Florence at this t ime.

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1520s, were commonly made in coins valued less than either the Romancameral ducat or the Florentine florin. The coins most frequently paid wereFlorentine silver barili, Roman silver giuli, gold ducats of Mirandola calledmirandolini, gold scudi di sole, and Modenese ducats, which were speciallyminted at Bologna, Modena and Mirandola.81 Filippo, Francesco del Neroand Dati collaborated to carry out the operation. The Strozzi providedmoney and credit to purchase the metals. Del Nero acquired gold and silverin Florence for shipment to Bologna, and the Dati had their own agent,Bartolomeo del Gambero, who supplied them with more of the same. InOctober 1523 Del Nero and Antonio Dati received a retroactive sanctionand guarantee of immunity from the Otto di Pratica for the 830 poundsof silver and 400 pounds of gold they had purchased between 20 Augustand 26 October. Citing a shortage of money in the city as justification, theOtto gave them permission to procure another 300 pounds of silver and300 of gold in the month of November. By April 1524 perhaps the volumeof their purchases had diminished from its October level because Dati wroteFrancesco he could accommodate fifty or sixty pounds of silver every twoweeks for minting into giuli.*2

Payment in the newly minted ducats and scudi seems to have been forcedupon the mercenaries to their disadvantage. In February 1524 Francescodel Nero consigned to the Dati representatives in Florence a certainquantity of gold scudi, cameral ducats, and Florentine large florins. Heordered the Dati company in Bologna to be prepared to pay the pope'scommissioner Paolo Vettori monies up to the value of 15,000 scudi tforodi sole, some in scudi, some in cameral ducats, and the rest in mirandolini.Apparently in order to convince Vettori to accept the mirandolini, the Datitold him that they had been ordered by Del Nero to pay him his money,but that it would be more convenient to do so in Mirandola where the coinswere being minted. What Dati then wrote to Del Nero suggests that allthese maneuvers had been prearranged to foist the mirandolini off onVettori. Once Vettori had been paid in these less valuable coins, Dati madeout the receipts to the account of the Depository in Florence in the nameof Giovanni Tornabuoni, depositor, but in the value of so many scudi,cameral ducats and large florins and not in mirandolini.83 From lack of morecomplete evidence, we cannot tell exactly who profited from these currencymanipulations and whether responsibility for them reached any higher thanFrancesco del Nero and Filippo Strozzi. However, after the revolution of

8 1 Sig., D i e d , Ot to , Leg. e Com., 72 passim. On the diversity of coins in the Papal States see Delumeau,11, 653-656; Monaco, La Situazione, pp . 59—67; E. Mart inor i , Annali della Zecca di Roma (Rome,1917-1922). On the problem of controlling the provincial mints , see Delumeau, 11, 664—665.

82 Ot to , Delib. , vol. 7, fol. 24; Sig., D i e d , Ot to , Leg. e Com., 72, fol. 120.83 Ibid., fol. 116.

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1527 some of Del Nero's questionable activities in the Depository came tolight at the time he was examined by the investigative committee called theTribolanti whose job it was to look into the abuses of the Medicigovernment. An informant claimed that Del Nero was realizing as muchas 10 to 14 percent profit by charging full value to the city of Florence forthe cheap coins he had minted from the gold and silver metal and speciepurchased with the Depository's funds. Several witnesses who hadpersonally received payments on behalf of condottieri testified that Francescocharged them an extra agio of 2.5 or 2.75 percent if he had to pay themtheir mirandolini at their current value in Florentine large florins.84

The new coins minted by the Dati were not used just for military payrollsbut were also sent back to Florence and Rome to offset shortages of specie.The Strozzi company in Rome placed large orders for mirandolini andModenese ducats with Francesco del Nero. For example, on 11 February1524 Migliore Covoni, manager of the Rome company, requested that DelNero remit the value of the company's credits in Florence in mirandolinibecause they could be easily disposed of in Rome. Nine days later on 20February the Rome company shipped 1,500 gold ducats to Del Nero toexchange for mirandolini which were to be sent back as quickly as possible,and seven days afterwards Covoni sent another 3,000 ducats to beconverted and returned to Rome.85 Filippo apparently used the Mirandoladucats in a variety of speculative ventures. In one instance in April 1524,while in Rome, he ordered Del Nero to send 2,000 mirandolini to thePiccolomini in Siena with the idea that in three months' time he would bereimbursed in Rome with ' good' money of heavier weight. Filippo toldFrancesco that he was in gleeful high spirits over the scheme and alreadyplanning another similar trick with the imperial ambassador, the duke ofSessa.86

Not all the mirandolini flooding south, however, were up to par.Beginning in December 1523 and increasingly throughout the spring of1524, enraged complainants filled the halls of the Signoria in Florence andthe chambers of the Vatican denouncing the number of bad coins incirculation, especially mirandolini. On 8 December 1523 Galeotto de'Medici,

84 Balie, 46, fols. 203V-205. Del N e r o was also charged with forcing p a y m e n t in kind and in scr ip t ;sending the c o m m u n e ' s money on the exchange marke t and pocket ing the in teres t ; and withins t ruct ing his assistant Giovanfrancesco Baroncelli to buy u p l ight-weight gold and old moneywhich he passed off as good coin. H i s accusers further charged that his profits allowed him to buyland and Monte stock, to invest capital in the Dat i company of Bologna and become a par tnerin more than one Strozzi company . In his defense Del N e r o asserted that he had not profiteeredbut had done everything for the sake of His Hol iness the pope , ibid., 202V-204. Fo r o therdocumen t s related to the case, see ibid., fols. 157V-160; 186V-189, io.6v.

85 Sig., Dieci , O t to , Leg . e Com. , 72, fols. 90—92, 100, 104.86 Ibid., fol. 121; C.S., Ser. m, n o , fol. 210. Even Jacopo Salviati wanted Filippo to provide him

with mirandolini, ibid., fol. 210.

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the Florentine ambassador in Rome, reported to the Signoria his discussionswith the pope about the damage being done to the economy by thecirculation of the mirandolini in Florence.87 By May the situation had soworsened that Domenico Buoninsegni, now a papal finance minister,threatened to place an official ban on those coins, and carried out his threatin June.88

The correspondence of Filippo, Migliore Covoni and Antonio Dati withFrancesco del Nero in Florence in the spring of 1524 deals almostexclusively with the currency scandal. Although no corpus delicti in theirletters indicts Strozzi or his friends of fraudulent dealings, sufficientevidence does exist to prove that they were willing participants in theproduction and distribution of the debased coins. In April when themirandolini came under open scrutiny, Filippo grew apprehensive when hiscoins turned out to be 10 to 12 percent light rather than the 5 percent DelNero had promised him. Since people had begun to avoid the mirandolinilike the plague, he feared that those still in their possession would be worthscarcely more than play money.89 It had even been rumored in Rome thatthe Dati were engaged in counterfeiting. In view of the scandal, Filippoand his associates switched from dealing in mirandolini to Modenese ducatswhich had not yet been investigated. They had to move cautiously, however,since they were already under suspicion.90 The Modenese ducats themselveswere at that time one-quarter grain short of passing for good, so Covonipressed Del Nero to have them minted just a bit heavier so that they wouldbe accepted. Covoni advised him in any event to vary the stamps on thedies a little to avoid suspicion, and to hold off sending too many of theducats, especially of those light in weight, until they saw what happenedwith the last of the mirandolini. According to Covoni, the weight {peso)rather than the purity (lega) of the alloy in the coins was the more criticalfactor, so Del Nero was to make sure that of those he had minted, at leastthe first ones sent should be sufficiently heavy.91 By mid-May the dangerof exposure and the probability of bans on the money had increased, andFilippo and Del Nero agreed it was time, if not to get out of the business

87 Sig., Cart . , Resp. Orig. , 4 1 , fol. 63. H e implicated none other than the duke of Sessa, the imperialambassador to whom Strozzi was supplying money.

88 Sig., D i e d , Ot to , Leg. e Com. , 72, fols. 132V, 156, I 6 I V ; and C.S. , Ser. m , n o , fol. 211. T h i swas not the first t ime that action had been taken against bad money, for the circulation of badcoins was a frequent problem faced by governments at this t ime. In 1515 the Signoria had placeda ban on bad coins because they diminished tax revenues and interfered with mercanti letransactions, Copialettere di Goro Gher i , 1, fol. 210. Back in 1513 the Balia had passed a similarprohibi t ion based on precedents in 1501 and 1509 against monies which were below value, Balie,44, fols. 144V-145. O n the problem of bad money and clipped coins see De lumeau , 11, 684-685 .Braudel , 1, 537 -541 , placed the frequent appearance of false and debased coins in the Medi te r raneanworld considerably later. 89 C .S . , Ser. 111, n o , fol. 210.

9 0 Sig., Dieci, O t to , Leg. e Com. , 72, fols. 121, 124, 141.91 Ibid., fols. 122, 124, 126, 133.

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of minting money entirely, at least to call a halt before their good fortuneturned sour.92

Unscrupulous financial dealings of the sort practiced by Strozzi and DelNero in the Depository and in their currency speculations undoubtedlyoccurred frequently in our period among powerful and well-connectedpersons operating at the highest political levels.93 The uniqueness ofFilippo's position lay in his being simultaneously depositor of the Signoriain Florence and depositor general of the Camera Apostolica in Rome. Thewillingness with which he and his henchman manipulated Florentine publicfunds reflects the mentality of two dedicated Medici loyalists. For Strozziand Del Nero were not so much obsessed with surreptitiously cheating orrobbing the city of Florence for their own private financial gain as they wereanxious to work covertly to keep their Medici patrons well-supplied withmoney which they after all ultimately commanded. It was out of their desireto serve their patrons that Strozzi and Del Nero secretly directed so muchFlorentine money to the papal armies and effectively disguised just howmuch they were actually sending.

Contemporaries like Parenti and Vettori, of course, knew quite well thatfrom the time of the War of Urbino onwards Florence increasingly suppliedeven more money for Medici military ambitions than she had beenobligated for in the treaty alliances imposed on her by the Medici popes.We have noted Francesco del Nero's revealing statement to CardinalSalviati that by 1525 he had wrung from the city and her ecclesiastical andsecular institutions'every last denaro for the sake of Clement VII. But thefinancial situation in Florence had never been so bad as it became duringthe war of 1526-1527 between the League of Cognac and the imperialistswhen the impecunious Clement pressured the city unmercifully for moneyand still could not prevent the Sack of Rome. By that time the techniqueof funneling money to the war through the Depository in Florence haddeveloped into a work of art. Several documents relating to the transferof war monies in this period have survived in an obscure section of therecords of the Convent of Santa Maria Novella in Florence. The documentsconsist of a brief register of letters, including several to Francesco del Nero,

92 C.S., Ser. in , n o , fol. 211. T h e Dati had already been subjected to a suit before the Otto inwhich Filippo and Del Nero had had to intervene, ibid., fols. 137, 139, 140, 141, 143, 145,169.

9 3 In this case the currency manipulations were undoubtedly carried on with the at least tacit approvalof Clement VII . We have already noted the distressing financial conditions that prevailed in Romein early 1524 after Clement 's election and the fact that very little income was received in theDepository General while expenses remained high. T h e absence of money in Rome explains howStrozzi could dispose of the newly minted coins so easily, and he must have been using them tocover the Depository's payments. Back in December 1523 when the currency scandal was firstcoming to light, Clement VII had summoned Francesco del Nero to Rome and had praised himhighly for extending so much credit, ibid., vol. 108, fol. 59; Ser. 1, 136, fol. 23.

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written by Domenico Buoninsegni.94 The arrangements Buoninsegni madewith Francesco to set up the financial supply route to Alexandro della Caccia,treasurer of the papal troops in Lombardy, show how closely and with whatgreat care he, Del Nero, and Delia Caccia worked together to coordinatetheir efforts to insure a steady stream of money to the war.

From Rome Buoninsegni wrote to both Del Nero and Della Caccia tomaintain accounts of income and expenses for the coming war and to keephim up to date. Alexandro would be receiving money from Rome and fromFrancesco in Florence and should keep his records with either of the othertwo men. Del Nero was to keep his accounts with Buoninsegni, beginningwith an entry for 10,000 ducats furnished by the Strozzi company.Francesco thought it best that he keep two different sets of records, theprimary set staying with his own private books. From his private books hewould then transfer entries into the book of the Depository kept inGiovanni Tornabuoni's name.95 No special explanation for this procedurewas necessary, for as we know, Francesco always kept secret accountsseparate from the official books of the Depository to protect himself andFilippo from discovery and to afford himself greater latitude in his dealings.But probably there was an additional reason at this particular time. In lightof the unprecedented amount of extraordinary funds he would have to scareup in Florence to forward to Delia Caccia for the new war, Del Nero wasexpecting difficulty and perhaps even open opposition in the city. In fact,in early June Machiavelli was already anticipating trouble among thecitizenry if, as seemed likely, Del Nero tried to hold off releasing anyDepository funds for the construction of badly needed new fortificationsaround Florence.96

By the end of June Buoninsegni reported that in Rome he and Clementhad acceded to Jacopo Salviati's recommendation that all the funds for thewar, not just those originating in Florence, be channeled through Francescodel Nero.97 Del Nero routed the money, part in cash and part in bullion,to his brother Agostino in Bologna who, together with the Dati company,forwarded it to Delia Caccia and supervised the minting of coin to pay the

94 T h e register is in Conv. Soppr. 102, vol. 332, Libro contenente lettere e carteggi fatti da DomenicoBuoninsegni agente in Roma di Clemente VII del is26. T h e earliest reference to Buoninsegni inFilippo's correspondence in the context of financing the 1515 war is in a letter to Francesco delNero of 19 November 1515, C.S., Ser. in , n o , fol. 15V. In 1527 Buoninsegni served as receptoret dispensator of the monies of the newly instituted Monte della Fede, in which capacity he wasresponsible for sending most of the money collected from the sale of shares on to the war. SeeA.S.R., Camerale 1, Mandati Camerali, vol. 861, fols. 184, 185, 194; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 77,fols. 163-164, 166-169, 211, 213V.

9 5 Conv. Soppr. 102, vol. 332, fols. i v - 2 .9 6 Letter to Francesco Guicciardini in Gaeta, pp. 467-468. Only if the pope sent a special order would

Del Nero agree to free the money. See also the letter of 1 June 1526 to the Florentine ambassadorin Rome regarding the same problem, Balie, 45, fol. 2, and similarly Filippo's letter of 19 May1526, C.S., Ser. in , 108, fol. 87V. 9 7 Conv. Soppr. 102, vol. 332, fol. 2v.

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troops. In June all arrangements had been completed and Del Nero beganshipping thousands of ducats to the war. Already by the 23rd, he had sent42,000 gold scudi and 8,000 ducats worth of silver barili to Agostino inBologna and by 3 July over 70,000 ducats.98

As it turned out, very little of that money came from Rome. By AugustFrancesco was getting desperate after repeated entreaties to Rome to JacopoSalviati, Domenico Buoninsegni and Filippo had turned up only 10,000scudi. Filippo gave a grim assessment of the financial situation in Rome and,short of Clement's selling cardinals' hats, he saw no way the pope couldlay his hands on the money required to wage a war. Filippo had very nearlyexhausted his own credit. At the end of June he had already despaired ofbeing able to forward additional money since, even then at the verybeginning of the war, he had over 103,000 ducats in credits with the popeof which only 60,000 were secured, the other 43,000 unsecured and hangingon the slender thread of Clement's life. To meet the additional needs thatwould arise for the war he foresaw having to relinquish those securities healready possessed just to help the pope a bit more." In the end the problemof locating funds was dumped on Francesco del Nero in Florence who wasgoing crazy with worry as Vettori attested: ' I tell you he hasn't a moment'srest. He is out of his mind, criticizes everything, and no one can even speakto him. Some people are stricken to the core by adversity and he most ofall. Still I marvel how that brain of his guides him through the maze oftroubles facing him right now.'100 The only solution was for Del Nero tolabor diligently in the Depository and the market place to squeeze out allthe money he could.

Alexandro della Caccia's accounts of his income and expenses for the warshow that he received a grand total of 549,791 ducats between 2 June 1526and 31 October 1527. His breakdown of that sum reveals that over eighty-five percent of the whole amount he receipted, or 458,428 ducats, camestraight from Francesco del Nero in Florence!l °1 But what portion of those458,428 ducats actually originated in Florence since, as we know, Francescodel Nero also handled funds from Rome? Within the Stantiamenti etDeliberationi of the Otto di Pratica several documents show that on 29December 1526 the Otto accepted accounts totaling 260,680 fiorini larghi

98 Archivio Guicciardini, Legazioni e Commissarie, Carteggi, vol. xxi, fols. 205, 285. I owe thanksto D r Gino Corti for obtaining photocopies of these letters for me.

99 Letter to Francesco Vettori, 30 J une 1526, published in Bardi, p . 46.100 Let ter of 5 August to Machiavelli, Gaeta, p . 475.101 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 157. A breakdown of the total figure into income and expenses

in vol. 81 , fols. i o v - 1 3 , reveals that the largest portion of the total, over 362,000 ducats, was usedto pay Italian infantry, and the next largest amount , almost 79,000 ducats , was paid to the Swissinfantry in the pope's service. Vettori had estimated that the cost of the war to the whole Leagueshould run 160,000 ducats per month , of which Francis I would contr ibute 40,000, Venice 60,000and the pope (and Florence) 60,000, Gaeta, p. 487.

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which Francesco had sent to Delia Caccia between i June and 9 December.A similar entry approved by the Otto on 7 June 1527 states that from 10December 1526 until 7 June 1527 the Depository of Florence had providedDelia Caccia with 159,184 florins.102 Thus between June 1526 and June1527 Florence had furnished Delia Caccia almost 420,000 florins, whichequaled approximately 440,857 cameral ducats, or very nearly all of that85 percent he received from Francesco del Nero. Quite obviously, eventhough Del Nero was supposed to handle all the money destined for thewar, very little of it had come from Rome, just as Filippo's and his lettershad already indicated, proof that Florence had shouldered by far the greatershare of the financial burden of the pope's war in Lombardy. Francescodel Nero had raised the funds, and the Otto had dutifully approved theirexpenditure.

The money which Del Nero forwarded to the papal armies had to bemobilized somehow in Florence, and much of it came from the purses ofwealthy ottimati who either privately or as Monte officials contributed tohigh interest loans secured with the city's tax revenues. Although therecords of the Balla are sketchy for this period, they do refer to accattitotaling 170,000 florins and to a series of special provisions passed inJanuary 1527 designed to raise money and ease repayment to creditors byenlarging the tax rolls, collecting overdue debts, extending eligibility topurchase judicial pardons and increasing the price of salt by two denari.103

Citizens chosen as officials of the Monte to make their annual loans to thecity were usually from the wealthiest families, and it is hardly coincidentalthat among the well-to-do individuals elected to this office in March 1527were none other than Francesco del Nero, vice-depositor, and GiovanniTornabuoni, titular depositor, followed by eight others, five of whom wereamong the most prominent Florentine bankers in Rome.104

The loans from the Monte officials and the money collected from theaccatti were all administered by the Monte itself. One surviving accountbook of the provveditore of the Monte which covers the war period throughDecember 1526 shows quite clearly that Francesco del Nero was receiving,or at best charging to the Monte, most of the money he sent to the papaltreasurer in Lombardy from the commune's funds. From March to earlyDecember 1526 the Monte had given the depositor 290,000 florins. Another102 Ot to , Stant. , vol. 14, fol. iov ; vol. 13, fol. 159. T h e Otto approved an additional 710 florins for

payments made in Florence to one of the League's infantry captains and for Agostino del Nero 'sexpenses in shipping the money to Delia Caccia.

1 0 3 Balie, 43, fols. 191, 192V, 193V. On 18 January 1527 the Monte officials were empowered to inscribeinto the tax rolls the names of up to 400 people who had lived more than ten years in Florenceor its suburbs , which in return granted those persons rights of citizenship. For fifteen days saltwas to be sold at 6 quattrim bianchi per pound.

104 Tra t te , 84, fol. 70V. T h e bankers were Guidet to Guidet t i , Pandolfo della Casa, Giovanni Bartolini,Ludovico Capponi, and Bindo Altoviti.

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Monte account book which has several entries beginning in April 1527records that between 13 April and 5 July when some of Francesco del Nero'saccounts of the Depository under the name of Giovanni Tornabuoni weresettled, the Monte had provided him another 278,840 florins.105 The twosums together more than equal the amount that Francesco del Nero sentto the war out of the funds in the Depository.

On 8 June 1527 the Otto approved the transfer of Delia Caccia's accountswith Del Nero from the books of the Depository to those of the provveditoreof the Monte.106 Once the depositor's accounts were officially accepted,Filippo and Del Nero were freed from any responsibility for them and couldno longer be held accountable for any of the hundreds of thousands of florinsthey had supplied the papacy. This protective device saved them in 1527from the persecutions of the five tribolanti authorized under the ThirdRepublic to re-examine the books from the Medici regime and prosecuteany misdeeds. Francesco del Nero was investigated for his work in theDepository and in coining money, but he was condemned on 28 November1527 on only two minor counts, one of mishandling funds of the StudioFiorentino for which he had been provveditore, and the other for havingcredits of some 3,333 florins with Clement in his private accounts whichproperly belonged to the city of Florence.107 Filippo was never investigated,and Niccolb Capponi, Filippo's brother-in-law, who was the first gonfal-oniere of the new republic, actually rescued Francesco del Nero before histrial by destroying one of Del Nero's private account books which datedback to the regime of Lorenzo de'Medici.108 The charges finally broughtagainst Del Nero could be based only on evidence from a more recent bookwhich showed Clement to be Del Nero's debtor for over 33,000 florins, andAlexandro della Caccia debtor for almost 30,000. The tribolanti alsoexamined the records of the Otto and in one book found debts for Clementtotaling over 212,000 florins.109 The account book in which the debts werefound was the sixth in a series labeled ' F ' and was probably a book ofDebitori e Creditori that contained accounts of still pending debts andcredits for which Del Nero had not received approval. This would explainwhy they had not yet been entered in the Otto's records of stantiamenti.The tribolanti's condemnation of Clement VII for the debt of 212,688florins which they issued on the day they sentenced Francesco del Neroraises the question why they did not charge the pope, or Del Nero for thatmatter, for any of the much larger sums that we know the Depository spentfor the pope and the Otto approved on the basis of records which clearly

105 Monte Comune , no. provvisorio 2099, fols. 131-135; 2132, fols. 130-131.1 0 6 Ot to , Stant. , vol. 14, fol. 40. I 0 7 Balie, 46, fols. 157V-160.1 0 8 Segni, in , p . 312; Devonshire Jones , Francesco Vettori, pp . 204-205.109 Balie, 46, fol. 132V.

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FHippo Strozzi and the Medici

identified Clement as debtor to the city. The only logical explanation canbe the one suggested above, namely, that those accounts which had beenaccepted, stanziato, by the Otto and transferred from the depositor's booksand charged to the commune were considered closed and beyond review,and only items still pending could be used as a basis for indictment.11 °

In the final analysis, the protective devices which shielded FilippoStrozzi and Francesco del Nero from prosecution for misappropriation offunds also protected the pope. The hundreds of thousands of florinsbelonging to the commune that had passed through the Depository on theirway to finance papal wars during the whole period that Strozzi controlledthe Depository were basically nothing more than free subsidies to theMedici popes. The Otto di Pratica reviewed the depositor's accounts andapproved his expenditures which were charged to the pope's debt, but therewas never any indication those debts would be repaid. Even when theMedici regime in Florence had been overthrown and replaced by the ThirdRepublic, only a token effort was made to assess the magnitude of theMedici's debt since 1512 and to hold accountable those of their friends whoas members of the government had willfully served up the city's resourcesto satisfy the voracious appetite of the papacy.110 The text of the condemnation of Clement VII has been published by Dr J. Stephens, 'Pope

Clement VII, a Florentine Debtor,' Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XLIX (May,1976), 138-141, but he did not consider this very interesting question of why the tnbolanti werecontent to charge Clement with just the debts listed in that one particular account book.

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Financier to Clement VII

Whether in Florence or Rome Filippo continued to stand by the Medici,ready to risk life and fortune in their service. The assistance he gave thefamily in war finance and through the depositories of the Signoria and ofthe Apostolic Chamber formed but part of his total financial involvementwith the Medici papacy. In many ways, only after he had relinquishedcontrol of the Depository General in 1527 at the time of the Sack of Rome1

did he reach the peak of his career as a papal banker. During the subsequentperiod, 1529-1534, he made his biggest loans to the pope and took thegreatest risks of his life. In the five years that ended with the pope's deathin September 1534, he devoted his energies and his wealth unreservedlyto his last remaining Medici patron and long-time friend, Giulio de'Medici,Clement VII.

We have already seen in our discussion of the Depository General inRome how Filippo's credit dealings extended his participation in churchfinance and administration well beyond the duties connected with theDepository itself. In fact, in the course of his career as a banker to the Medicipopes, Strozzi held nine other administrative positions, had title at varioustimes to at least 258 venal offices and possessed a minimum of 80,000 ducatsworth of Monte shares.2 He was one of the powerful doganieri, or customsofficers, of the three dogane of Rome for most of twenty years and servedalso as depositor of the dogane \ he was appointed treasurer of Urbino (1520);

1 The Sack of Rome, Clement's long imprisonment and his exile in Orvieto severely disrupted thefinancial transactions of the Apostolic Chamber. When Clement returned to Rome in October 1528,Filippo was given the opportunity to resume his duties as depositor general but decided againstit. Migliore Covoni, Filippo's manager in Rome, wrote to him advising against continuing asdepositor, C.S., Ser. v, 1209, fol. 33: 'Francesco [del Nero] and I have been discussing theDepository, and so that you will understand, since I have been back at the court, I have totallyavoided using that title and have not paid out as many as six mandates in the whole time. In sum,the Depository is nothing any more, and because we are not earning you a soldo here, I have reasonedwith Francesco in this way [to give it up].' Bartolomeo Lanfredini, another Florentine banker,took over the office and his appointment was confirmed by Clement's Motuproprio in A.V., Div.Cam., vol. 81, fol. 167; 82, fols. 118-119.

2 In 1530 he received 40,000 ducats worth of Monte shares for his part of a loan to Clement togetherwith Jacopo Salviati, ibid., vol. 81, fols. 165V-166. In 1533 for security of a loan he obtained another40,321 ducats, 1 soldo, 6 denari in Monte stock and 39,600 ducats in vacant offices, ibid., vol. 82,fols. 156-159.


then doganiero of the Gabella dello Studio (1522); by 1526 depositario ofthe College of the Knights of St Peter; then in 1532 depositor of the Montedella Fede and treasurer of the province of the Marches; and he served asdistributor for the Annona, or grain office, in 1532. His last officialappointment at the papal court came in 1533 when Clement VII made himnuncio to France.3

Filippo's credits with the papacy brought him a wide variety of venaloffices. At the institution of the College of the Knights of St Peter, Filipporeceived eleven titles to the office of knight which he placed in the namesof his sons.4 In 1521 he received twenty-eight more titles for a loan of 24,000ducats, and by February 1523 he held titles to thirty-four knights.5 In June1524 he added to his list of venal offices five scutifers, one cubicular andthree more knights worth 8,250 ducats.6 By January of 1529 he had titlesto nine scutifers, and in August of that year in return for a loan of 15,000ducats, Clement VII gave him rights to twenty-six offices including eightcubiculars, one protonotary, ten presidents of the Annona and sevenscriptors of the Archive. In 1530 he received six more scutifers and twopresidents of the Annona. In May 1533 for a loan of 30,000 scudi Clementgranted him the income from the following offices: one apostolic secretary,thirty presidents of the Annona, eleven cubiculars and thirteen scutifers.And finally between July 1533 and September 1534 when Clement VIIdied, he received titles to seventy-eight portioners of the port taxes{portionarii di Ripa) and twelve more knights.7

3 C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 46; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 70, fols. 44,47V; A.S.C., Archivio Segreto, Credenza1, fols. 99-100; A.S.R., Camerale 1, 369, fol. 15V; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 91, fols. 75V, 76; vol. 92,fol. 229; vol. 88, ii, fol. 2v; A.S.R., Camerale 1, Mandati Camerali, 865, fols. 78, 158, 194; A.V.,Arm. XL, 47, fol. 95. The last document also records that in 1534 Filippo had credits withFrancis I worth 30,000 scudi.

4 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 76, fol. 78V. In 1524 Clement sold him the offices free and clear for 9,130ducats. He distributed the titles as follows: three each in the names of his sons Piero, Vincenzoand Roberto, and two in his son Leone's name.

5 C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 123-124. The titles were discounted from their book value of 1,000 ducatseach, and Strozzi got them in this particular instance at 857 ducats. On the eve of the Sack of Romein April 1527 their market value had fallen drastically, and they were selling for 600 ducats apiece,C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 200.

6 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 78, fols. 82V-83. Clement assigned him the offices to satisfy a deficit in theDepository General.

7 Ibid., vol. 80, i, fols. 54V-55; vol. 83, fols. 106-107; vol. 84, fol. u6v; vol. 82, fol. 157; vol. 95,fols. 226-227. The offices he acquired in 1534 came in security for part of a loan to pay for Catherinede'Medici's dowry. The above listing of Strozzi's offices comes from cameral records and is notcomplete because fragmentary documents of the Datary for 1531-1534 show that Strozzi also heldtitles and incomes belonging to other offices ranging from registrator bullarum, procuratorpenitentiariae, scriptor penitentiariae, abbreviator parci minoris, registrator supplicationum, magisterostiariorum, collector taxae plumbi, notarius rotae, to corrector archivii, B.V., Vat. Lat., 10599 passim.Strozzi also purchased for investment purposes offices which were not directly tied to his creditswith the pope, such as the office ofplumbator (affixer of seals) he bought for 1,450 ducats in February1520 during a period of larghezza when few profits were to be made in the exchange market, C.S.,Ser. in, no , fols. 158, 163. The lists of office holders in vol. 11 of Hofmann, Forschungen, which

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These titles and positions came Filippo's way as a result of both thepatronage he received from the popes and the credit he offered them. From1515 when Leo X appointed him depositor general, Medici favor andFilippo's proximity to his patron retained their significance throughout hiscareer. During the reign of Clement VII, if anything it increased becauseof his personal intimacy and long-time devotion to the pope. In February1524, less than three months after Clement's election, Francesco Vettoridescribed to Francesco del Nero Filippo's special relationship with thepope:

Now that Filippo is consul [of the Florentine Nation in Rome], and as a papalrelative holds court like a wealthy cardinal displaying his learning, his acumen andhis judgment, I hardly see him any more, and he spends more time in the companyof Pope Clement than Niccolo [Machiavelli] spends with Barbara.8

That February, in a move that symbolized the importance of maintainingphysical proximity to the pope for anyone who stood to profit from thedecisions and financial deals that could be finalized at his instant fiat,Filippo transferred his household to the very elegant Palazzo dell'Acquiladesigned by Raphael, a stone's throw from St Peter's.9 He had free andconstant access to Clement and was literally at his elbow much of the time.Even after the plague broke out in Rome that same spring and Clementbarricaded himself behind the doors of the Vatican, Filippo was one of thefew people the pope allowed near him.

While Filippo's friendship and access to the pope increased his oppor-tunities, they also made him more dependent on the pope's good will.Already in 1524 Filippo described his livelihood as 'contingent onClement's living breath.'10 The next year he told his brother that shouldClement die he would be completely at the mercy of his successor becauseeverything he had in Rome was locked up in future securities, principallyin annates and offices, which could be stripped from him in an instant.11

By 1526 he had become so deeply and inextricably entangled in Clement's

is the standard work on offices and officeholding in the Renaissance church, provide useful but veryincomplete data. Hofmann paid little attention to the elaborate behind-the-scenes financial dealsthat took place using offices as collateral, since such deals did not necessarily involve a change oftitleholder. Thus in Hofmann's lists we find Filippo Strozzi mentioned only in connection witha handful of offices, vol. n, pp. 185, 196, 197. Elsewhere he did note quite rightly that bankerssuch as Strozzi became rich through the traffic in cameral offices, vol. 1, 218-220.

8 C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fol. 235, 16 February 1524. Machiavelli's paramour was the singer BarbaraRaffacani Salutati.

9 Sig., Dieci, Otto, Leg. e Com., 72, fol. 100. C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 6iv. Frommel, 11, 13, 19, whowas unaware of the above letters, assumed that Strozzi had only rented and not purchased the houseback in 1522 shortly after its builder Giovanbattista dell'Acquila died. The 1526 census in Gnoli,p. 446 also confirms Filippo's residence in Borgo and numbers his household there at twenty-fivepersons. I0 C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 61 v.

11 Ibid., fol. 70.

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affairs that he had tied up all his credit in unsecured loans.12 How closethese financial and personal ties with Clement had become is perhaps bestexemplified by Filippo's willingness to offer himself as a hostage inSeptember 1526. The Colonna had sacked the Vatican, sending Clementand Filippo fleeing to the safety of the Castel S. Angelo. Filippo explainedthe motivation behind his decision to give himself as hostage for Clementby saying he simply saw no other alternative if he was to preserve his ownfinancial interests with the church which were being threatened by war,and at the same time, help his friend and patron Clement who was in direneed.13

Patronage and friendship, however, do not completely explain the extentto which Filippo became enmeshed in the financial affairs of the churchunder Clement. The character of papal banking changed substantiallyduring Clement's reign when he began to rely on a smaller number of bigbanks for larger amounts of credit than had Leo X. The emergence froma field of many of a few very wealthy banks which controlled an enlargingsphere of papal finance was a consequence of the 1527 Sack and the ensuingeconomic chaos that threatened the survival of even the best capitalizedbanking institutions. The Strozzi along with the Salviati and Altoviti roseas the leading Florentine banks that had the capital and were given thechance to participate in massive credit transactions such as the one in whichFilippo Strozzi and Jacopo Salviati loaned Clement 40,000 ducats andgained a major portion of shares in the Monte della Fede. Yet as FilippoStrozzi emerged as a sixteenth-century tycoon whose wealth and businessties at the curia brought him rewards of position and profit, still none ofthe titles and administrative offices he obtained in Rome and the Papal Stateswere purely honorary, rather all required his advancing credit and loans.Even his appointment as papal nuncio to France, nominally a diplomaticpost, had an ulterior financial motive. The appointment was arranged sothat Filippo would be in France both to protect the interests of his nieceCatherine, daughter of Lorenzo de'Medici, following her marriage in12 There is plenty of other evidence in the Strozzi correspondence of unsecured loans which Filippo

made to the Medici, such as two loans for 5,000 and 3,000 ducats that he made Leo X and Lorenzode'Medici back in 1517, ibid., vol. n o , fol. 31. Unsecured loans were not necessarily recorded inofficial cameral records, another reason why the records of loans in the Vatican must be usedcautiously and cannot be relied upon to give a total picture of the credit operations at the curia.The loans listed there are mainly those that were secured in church revenues. The Vatican recordsshow that Filippo made only three loans totaling 60,000 ducats between December 1523 and August1524 which were secured in offices and annates among other things, but since the last one was madealmost two years before this letter was written, they could not be the same loans Filippo referredto, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 76, fols. 159-160; vol. 75, fols. 96V-97, 146.

13 C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 92. Filippo became hostage to guarantee the pope's observance of the peaceterms arranged with the Colonna and the imperialists. He clearly felt that had he not agreed togo as a hostage in person, or had he tried to make a payment of security like Jacopo Salviati, thenthe accord would have fallen through and Rome left to an even more terrible fate.

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France to Henry, duke of Orleans, and by his presence to guarantee thepayment of her dowry of 130,000 scudi which he had loaned to Clement.

In our period the pope usually awarded positions such as that of customsofficer or treasurer of a province to one of his creditors like Filippo whocould reimburse himself for his loans from the revenues he administered.Once in office he also had the choice of using its revenues to finance stillmore loans to the pope. In many cases these new loans surpassed the valueof the original loan which had equalled the purchase price of the office. Boththe old and the new loans were guaranteed by the future incomes of thetreasuries and tax farms. Examples of this practice abounded in theDepository General where a number of Strozzi's loans were repaid fromthe anticipated incomes of that office, and it held true while he was doganieroof the three dogane of Rome. For example, in May 1521 his loan of 24,000ducats was to be repaid from revenues of the dogane as were new creditsof 3,734 ducats and 6,000 ducats in July 1523 and August 1524.14 In thisway Filippo's administrative positions such as depositor general, doganiero,or treasurer of the Marches became perpetual credit instruments whichenabled him to multiply his loans to the pope and at the same time continueto have them fully guaranteed.

With the return of Clement to Rome in 1529 following the Sack and hisprecipitous flight to Viterbo, the Roman economy slowly began to recover.In that same year Filippo and Bindo Altoviti, another Florentine bankerat the curia, purchased a new contract for the three dogane of Rome for46,000 ducats.15 As doganieri, Strozzi and Altoviti began a series ofsubstantial loans to Clement which beautifully illustrate how Filippo's loanskept insinuating him into still further areas of church finance. In the two-yearperiod between August 1529 and September 1531, Strozzi and Altovititogether loaned the staggering sum of 181,660 ducats to Clement.16 Thefirst loan in August 1529 for 30,000 ducats, 15,000 each, was secured inthe decima of Naples for 1528 and in a long list of fifty-three offices whichthe two bankers could sell after one year if the loan were not repaid.17 InOctober they loaned another 12,000 ducats which were secured with

14 B.V., Vat. Lat., 7109, fol. 96; A.V., Div. Cam. vol. 75, fols. 105, 146.15 Ibid., vol. 82, fols. 48-50. Clement had increased the purchase price of the dogane considerably,

considering that Filippo and his former associate Bartolomeo della Valle had paid only 36,000 ducatsfor them in 1521. On Altoviti, see Coriolano Belloni, Un banchiere del Rinascimento, Bindo Altoviti(Rome, 1935).

16 I have calculated the total in the value of cameral ducats. Those loans made beginning in 1531 werein the new gold scudi which replaced cameral ducats at the papal court. The scudo contained twenty-tworather than the twenty-four carats characteristic of the ducat and was therefore worth about 91.66percent of the ducat. Beginning in 1539 the rapport between the scudo and the ducat was set at109 to 100. On the introduction of the new scudo, see Monaco, La situazume, p. 64; Delumeau,11, 636-658, 666; Varchi, 11, 309, 377. It first appears in Vatican documents in 1531.

17 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 83, fols. 106-107.

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Spanish revenues to be sent to Rome by the Spanish collector.18 Their loanof 18,000 ducats in January 1530 was to be reimbursed in one year by anincrease in the price of salt in the province of the Marches.19 In March1530 Strozzi and Altoviti advanced 30,000 ducats cash which Clementwould repay within twelve months' time from a 0.5 percent impost on allecclesiastical property. The following January they loaned Clement 37,500scudi in cash, and in return he granted them the fruits from two whole decimeimposed for the year 1531.20 Five months later in June 1531 Strozzi andAltoviti handed him another 37,500 scudi which were to be repaid inrevenues from a newly imposed hearth tax of one ducat per hearth in thestates of the church as well as in income from additional decime imposedafter those in January. The two bankers made their last loan together inSeptember 1531 for 25,000 scudi. This loan was pegged to compositionsof revenues in the provinces of the Marches and Umbria and fromSpoleto.21 The Vatican records of all these transactions never state theirpurpose, but their timing coincided with Clement's siege of Florence whichended the Third Republic and saw the reinstitution of Medici rule. Filippowrote after Clement's death that the money had been loaned specificallyfor the siege.22

Despite the guarantees for loans stated in the documents, Strozzi andAltoviti faced real problems in getting their money reimbursed in full. Taxrevenue assignments were frequently delayed and often inadequate to covertheir credits. Or the pope might decide at the last moment to divert themfor another purpose. Strozzi and Altoviti took great pains to ensure thattheir loans to Clement were well-secured and that clear arrangements hadbeen made for their repayment, but no records substantiate whether or

18 Ibid., fols. 108-109. Among the bankers in Spain who were to act as agents for Strozzi and Altovitiwas Francesco de Lapi and Associates who in May 1532 became Strozzi's partner in the new branchbank he opened in Seville. On his bank in Spain see Federigo Melis, ' I I Commercio transatlanticodi una compagnia fiorentina stabilita a Siviglia a pochi anni dalle imprese di Cortes e Pizarro, 'Fernando el Catolico e Italia (Inst i tut ion ' Fernando el Catolico' del la Excma. Diputacion Provincialde Zaragoza) (Zaragoza, 1954), pp . 129-225.

19 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 84, fols. 115V-117. They also received security in titles to various offices.T h e loan was made in Bologna where Clement VII met with Charles V from November 1529 untilMarch 1530 to decide among other things the fate of Florence prior to the emperor 's coronationby the pope. Francesco del Nero, then treasurer general, received the money in cash in Bologna,so very likely it played a part in fulfilling the terms of the treaty between pope and emperor ratifiedin January 1530.

20 Ibid., vol. 84, fols. 171-173; vol. 82, fols. 84-85. A record of concession of the decime to them isin ibid., vol. 88, i, fols. 34V-37, dated 27 January 1531. For their greater security for this loan Strozziand Altoviti received pledges of all the goods and incomes belonging to the pope, his chamberlainand datary. In the event decima revenues were insufficient, the treasurer general Del Nero pledgedto repay them from future ecclesiastical revenues. In the records of this and of the other similarloans, there is mention that the two bankers received interest but no indication of what percentagethey charged. T h e two decime in question were imposed supposedly to raise money to combat theTurkish threat. 2 I Ibid., vol. 82, fols. 86-87, 100-103V.

22 B .N.F. , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 29, also published in Bardi, p. 71.

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not the two bankers were ever fully reimbursed. It is clear, however, thattheir money was not repaid as scheduled and that Strozzi regularly soughtadditional guarantees. For in December 1531, three months after the lastloan was made, Clement removed Andrea Calcagni from his position oftreasurer of the Marches and gave it to Filippo for seven years beginningJanuary 1532 for a price of 18,000 ducats.23 Obviously Strozzi's appoint-ment as treasurer of the Marches was related to the series of loans he andAltoviti had made because a number of the loans had been secured inincomes from that particular province. Following his appointment, Filipporepeatedly received special authority to collect the taxes in the Marcheswhich were slated for repaying his credits. On 5 January 1532, barely a weekafter he had assumed the duties of treasurer, Clement issued a Motuproprioauthorizing him to exact the hearth tax both in the Marches and in the cityof Ascoli, whose revenues had been assigned him in June 1531 on theoccasion of his and Altoviti's loan of 37,500 scudi. Five days later Clementissued a second Motuproprio granting him the two new decime in theMarches which he had been promised in January 1531. He was furtherempowered to collect the hearth tax and the decime in Umbria and Spoleto.Agostino del Nero, brother of Filippo's long-time collaborator Francesco,was appointed vice-treasurer to oversee the actual collections of therevenues.24

The money that Filippo and Bindo Altoviti advanced Clement repre-sented the largest integrated series of loans to the pope by individual curialbankers.25 Their loans of 1529-1531 clearly established Strozzi's and, withhis help, Altoviti's pre-eminence among curial bankers, and the magnitudeof their credits with Clement set them in a category apart from all the rest.The ability to mobilize that much cash over a brief period of timepresupposed a substantial financial network from which to draw, andundoubtedly Strozzi called in profits and capital from his other bankingcompanies in order to sponsor these loans to the pope.

But even though repayment of these particular loans was still in progressfor months after they were due, Filippo, having severed his temporarypartnership with Altoviti, continued to advance other substantial sums toClement up until his death. In July 1532 he loaned 39,600 cameral ducats2 3 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 92, fol. 229.24 Ibid., vol. 88, ii, fols. 8V-9, 19-21 , 36-37 , 66v—67. O n 21 December 1531 Agostino was officially

appointed vice-treasurer under Fil ippo, ibid., vol. 92, fol. 230.2 5 Earlier in 1515 Jacopo Salviati had guaranteed 100,000 ducats for Giuliano's ' d o w r y ' when he

married Filaberta of Savoy, ' I Manoscri t t i Torr igiani , ' A.S.I., Ser. i n , vol. 19 (1874), 228, but heprobably paid only a portion of it himself. T h e largest loans to the church by other curial bankersusually did not exceed 20,000 or 30,000 ducats at any one t ime, and I have seen no other examplesof an integrated series of loans like these made by Strozzi and Altoviti, where the record of eachnew installment included a careful resume of all credits in the series to date. Strozzi went on tomake substantial loans to Clement after these made together with Altoviti, but not serially.

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for the war against the Turks.26 The following winter of 1532-1533Clement met Charles V for the second time at Bologna, where they agreedto a defensive league with a number of Italian cities for the protection ofItaly. Filippo opened his purse once again to Clement and brought forth30,000 scudi as a portion of the 108,000 scudi needed to fund the league.He paid the money directly to Antonio de Leva, Charles' general andcaptain of the new league. For this loan Filippo received a variety ofsecurities which included more Monte credits with a face value of 40,321cameral ducats and income from vacant offices of up to 10,000 ducats. Alltogether the value of these securities reached 39,600 ducats. In the eventthe loan was not repaid, Clement made provision that Filippo would receivethe balance regardless, including up to 15 percent interest, in Monteshares.27

By far the largest single loan that Filippo undertook for Clement wasfor the dowry of Catherine de'Medici on the occasion of her marriage on28 October 1533 in Marseilles to Henry of Orleans, Francis Ps second sonand later king himself.2 8 Filippo agreed to provide the entire sum of 130,000scudi in several installments. He paid the first 10,000 scudi immediately tothe French king in Marseilles and was reimbursed soon thereafter out ofthe strongboxes which the pope and his datary had brought with them.Strozzi then paid 20,000 scudi in Lyons from funds drawn on a letter ofexchange from his Rome company. Another 20,000 scudi fell due at theexchange fair of All Saints and were paid with money from Filippo's Lyonscompany. The Lyons company then drew a letter of exchange on theDepository General in Rome for the following January. The next 40,000scudi fell due at the spring exchange fair of the Resurrection in Lyons andthe final 40,000 scudi at the fair of All Saints the following autumn.29 Theprovisions Clement made to repay the loan within one year included pledgesof 25,000 ducats from ecclesiastical incomes from Spain, one-half of all theincomes from vacant offices up to 25,000 ducats, and the remaining 80,000in monies collected from two new decime to be imposed in the Papal States.26 A.S.R., Camcrali I, Mandati Camcrali, 865, fol. 22V and 886, fol. 40. T h e loan was paid in seven

installments during the month of July of which Strozzi paid 20,000 ducats in Rome for CardinalIppolito de'Medici, then legate to Hungary. T h e rest was paid in Ancona, Faenza and Bolognathrough agents for Strozzi. Agostino del Nero, vice-treasurer of the Marches, paid 10,000 ducatsin Ancona, probably out of the provincial revenues under his control.

27 A.V., Div. Cam., Vol. 82, fols. 155V-159. T h e offices included one secretary, 30 presidents of theAnnona, 11 cubiculari, and 13 scutiferi. Later that year Francesco del Nero travelled to Lombardyand Umbria to collect tax monies that would be applied to Filippo's credit, C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fol.86.

28 Catherine was the only child of Filippo's deceased brother-in-law, Lorenzo de'Medici. Filippoaccompanied her to France, leaving Florence 1 September 1533.

29 C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fol. 86. A Motuproprio for 80,000 scudi of the loan is in A.V., Div. Cam., vol.84, ii, fols. 177V-181. A.S.R., Camerali 1, Mandati Camerali, 865, fol. 74, dated 15 January 1534,records a payment by the Depository of 20,601 scudi in account of what Strozzi loaned in Lyons.

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In addition, by way of collateral, Filippo received 20,000 ducats worth ofjewels and a Motuproprio guaranteeing him repayment of the 80,000 scudifrom the decitne.30 Beyond the Motuproprio for that final 80,000 scudi,Filippo also demanded further security in case Clement should die beforethe debt was repaid. At Filippo's insistence Clement agreed to divide therisk into four equal parts which would be shared by himself, Filippo,Francesco del Nero (now papal treasurer general), and by Agostino Spinolahis chamberlain. In this way Filippo's personal risk for the 80,000 scudiwas reduced by three-quarters. For his part, Clement gave Filippo 20,000ducats worth of jewels, and Del Nero and Spinola agreed to make goodtheir shares should the necessity arise. Filippo had also suggested a novelplan whereby the latter three men, the pope excluded, would form a privatemonte built on the securities and income assignments due on the originalloan in which they would each hold a one-third share.31

Catherine de'Medici's dowry put a wrenching strain on Filippo'sfinances, especially on his Lyons branch which discharged the actualpayments to the French monarch. In order to bring together the sums ofmoney needed for the dowry, Filippo had to draw on all his availableresources in Rome and throughout his financial empire to aid the Lyonsbranch which was weighted down by this heavy obligation. Filippoinstructed Benvenuto Olivieri his Rome manager to settle all accounts, callin outstanding debts and remit all available monies to Lyons. To free morecapital he sent orders to delay the purchase of any real estate. Olivieri evenhad to ask Francesco del Nero to repay the 16,000 ducats Filippo had loanedhim the previous summer so that the money could be forwarded to Lyonsas well. At the end of December Strozzi instructed Olivieri to press Clementfor repayment of 20,000 scudi which had been part of the first dowryinstallment. The Lyons company had so many burdens that it could notbear the additional strain caused by unnecessary delay.32 Filippo's30 C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fols. 86-87, 9 1 ; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 84, ii, fols. 177V-180. Ibid., 187V-188

is a notification dated 29 October 1533 to Giovanni Poggio informing him of Strozzi's loan andof his part in the obligation to repay it.

31 C.S, Ser. v, 1208, fol. 86; A.V., Arm. XL, vol. 47, fols. 255-256. Although it was a commonoccurrence much later, as far as I know, such an arrangement for a private monte was unprecedentedin the early 1530s. While in France for the wedding, Filippo also provided money for membersof the wedding party. At Clement 's request he returned to him 8,800 ducats worth of jewels hewas holding in security for other loans, among which were jewels from the miter of Paul I I . Heloaned Caterina Cibo, duchess of Camerino, one of Catherine de 'Medici 's at tendants, 600 ducatsfor her expenses. He also paid for his own expenses as nuncio which, excluding extraordinaryexpenses, ran normally ten scudi per diem. In addition, Filippo had paid the cost to outfit Catherineand transport her to France, C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fols. 86, 91 , 92V; Ser. i n , 108, fol. 133; A.V., Div.Cam., vol. 84, ii, fols. 195V-196.

32 C .S . , Ser. v, 1208, fols. 86, 9 1 , ' R i p e t o spesso le medes ime cose pe rche la l ingua va dove duoleil dente.' ['I keep returning to the same things because the tongue goes where the tooth aches.']At the same time, the Lyons company had to carry most of the weight of 31,000 scudi in additionalcredits which Francis I owed Filippo through his finance ministers, the 'Generals.'

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obligation for the dowry of Catherine de'Medici exposed him to considerablerisk. He had overextended himself and tied up so much of his money andcredit with the pope that, should anything happen to Clement, he mightnever recover from the tremendous financial loss he would suffer as aconsequence. Even in Lyons the riskiness of this venture and his dependencyon the pope were so well recognized that Filippo reported back to Romethat his credit was no longer held in high regard.33 The possibility ofClement's premature death loomed as a constant threat to Filippo, and heknew well the disastrous effect it would have on him and his business. Thisawareness led him to take what extra precautions he could such as arrangingthe private monte scheme with Del Nero and Spinola.

But a banker such as Filippo whose fortune was linked to one man couldscarcely afford to alienate his patron and still hope to recover his credits.Thus, despite all the pressing financial obligations he had already incurredon Clement's behalf, in the year following Catherine de'Medici's wedding,while continuing to meet the payments on her dowry, Filippo made severalmore loans at the request of the pope. In January of 1534 he willingly loanedClement 12,000 scudi for a period of one year, but demanded heavy security.Clement awarded him rights to the income from a new tax to be levied onthe possessions of Jews in the states of the church and to portions of thedecitna from Naples. In addition, a provision was incorporated in the recordof the transactions rare in documents of this type. It stipulated that if theloan were not repaid on time, Strozzi could reimburse himself through billsof exchange to Lyons at the expense of the Camera.34 The following MarchFilippo made Clement a cash loan of almost 4,000 scudi, for which he waspromised repayment in cash plus 12 percent interest. Like the previous loan,this one had double security, and in the event that repayment was notforthcoming, Strozzi would receive clear title to eight knights of St Peterwhich belonged to the Camera but were registered in the name of thedatary.35 Clement was in his final illness when Filippo made him his lastloan for 20,000 ducats on 5 September 1534, just twenty days before thepope's death. The loan was for a period of six months to be repaid by a10 percent share of the annates and common services. For additionalsecurity Clement bound not only himself but also his successor to repaythe loan and stipulated that from the revenues collected from the annatesand common services Filippo had first claim to five-sixths of the moneyuntil fully reimbursed.36

33 Ibid., fols. 86, 91. When Filippo heard of Clement's safe return to Italy he was greatly relievedbecause, 'la vita sua al presente e congiunta con la salute mia.' ['Right now my well-being dependson his being alive.']

34 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 95, fol. 90V. 3S Ibid., fols. 140-141.36 Ibid., vol. 94, fols. 308-319. Clement was so ill at the time that his nephew had to sign it for him

in the presence of a notary. Another document dated five days later on 9 September, ibid., fol. 312V,tells us that the money was used to pay Cardinal Benedetto Accolti for giving up his position aslegate to the Marches.

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At the same time as Filippo was paying off Catherine's dowry and makingthese other loans, he commenced another absorbing venture that waslucrative but potentially disastrous, namely provisioning the city of Romewith grain. Commerce in grain was not something new to Strozzi, and astreasurer of the Marches, one of the largest grain-producing areas insidethe Papal States, he was quite knowledgeable about its trade.37 For severalyears running and at least in 1531,1532, and 1533, he had received contractsto import Sicilian grain.38 His agents purchased the grain abroad, usuallyin Sicily and Apulia, had it shipped to Rome, warehoused and then soldat current prices in the city. There is record of Filippo as official distributor{dispensator) of grain for the Grain Office in Rome in 1532, and at leastonce that year he received sole rights of distribution for a ten-day periodduring which time no grain other than his could be sold to the Romanbakers.39 In 1533 a severe shortage of grain struck the city, and theMotuproprio authorizing Filippo to purchase and import unusually largeamounts of Sicilian grain that year includes testimony to the dire needs ofthe citizens. Witnesses bluntly swore that unless Strozzi imported sub-stantial quantities of grain, prices would soon exceed their currently inflatedlevel of fifty giuli (five scudi) per rubbio.40 To meet the crisis Strozzi agreedto bring in 30,000 moggia of grain which would be sold at six scudi per

3 7 Well before 1533, as early as 1516, records show that Strozzi received a commission from the Ottoto buy, ship, and sell grain to Florence, C.S., Ser. in , 121, fol. 106. Vatican records show his periodicinvolvement in the same business with the Camera, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 69 ; iii, fol. 2 ;vol. 82, fols. 133V-134; A.S.R., Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, 863, fols. 129V, 138V. Rome wasnot at this time self-sufficient in grain and had to import large quantities, so that the grain businessbrought frequent speculative opportunities to merchant-bankers. Even Clement himself engagedin manipulating supplies and prices, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 80, fols. 218-219; v°l- 89, fol. 130. Thereare documented instances in both 1530 and 1532 when he prohibited the export of grain from theMarches during times of shortages so that he could sell it later at an inflated price in areas wherethe need was greatest, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 81, fol. 192 and C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fol. 158. On theproblem of provisioning Rome in the sixteenth century, see Luigi Guasco, 'L 'Archivio StoricoCapitolino,' Quaderni di studt romani (Rome, 1946), pp. 16-22, and Delumeau, Vie economique, II,

521-539, 583-649-38 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 69; vol. 82, fols. 133V-134; vol. 94, i, fol. 125V-127. Prices of grain

were subject to frequent vacillation depending on quality and supply.39 Ibid., vol. 88, iii, fol. 2v. Record of a similar trade restriction imposed on the city which prohibited

sale and distribution of any grain other than a certain lot of Sicilian grain for the month of May1530 is in A.S.C., Archivio Segreto, Credenza 1, vol. xvn, fol. 4. See also A.V., Div. Cam., vol.65, fol. n 8 v for sole distribution rights granted to Giuliano Levi in 1516.

4 0 Ibid., vol. 94, i, fols. 125V-127. Delumeau, 11, 626, noted that in 1539-1540 the price of grain fromthe Marches reached 5.35 scudi per rubbio which was considered very high. In April 1530 grainsold in the city for 4.5 scudi per rubbio, A.S.C., Archivio Segreto, Credenza 1, vol. xvn, fol. 4V,but according to Pecchiai, p. 289, during Clement 's reign the price of grain was high when it reachedeven 2 scudi, 20 baiocchi per rubbio, which to me seems low. Certainly in the years after the Sackof Rome the price of grain remained high. In 1531 Strozzi contracted to import Sicilian grain tobe sold at no more than 5.5 ducats per rubbio, A.S.R., Camerali 1, Mandati Camerali, 863, fol. 138V.In December 1559 during a shortage Pius IV was buying grain at 5 scudi per rubbio and sellingit at 3. According to Delumeau's figures, a rubbio measured approximately 2.3 h which was aboutthe equivalent of 200 kg, Vie economique, 1, 122; 11, 535-537, note 3.

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moggio.41 Purchase of the grain required a heavy outlay of capital at a timewhen Strozzi's other commitments were depleting his resources. Inaddition to the dowry obligation, he was also serving as an official of theGrain Office in Florence and had a 30,000 scudi investment tied up therein grain purchases.42

Filippo's affairs began to slump in the fall of 1533 when he had to leaveRome for his extended trip with Clement for Catherine's wedding inFrance, where he remained afterwards as papal nuncio to the court ofFrancis I. Not long after his departure, for reasons beyond his control, thegrain deal began to fall apart. International politics intervened and theimperial viceroy in Sicily refused to allow grain to be exported to Rome,probably to register Spanish displeasure at Clement's alliance with Francethrough Catherine's marriage.43 From Rome Filippo received reports thatthe people were growing agitated over the scarcity of grain in the city andhad begun to harass his agents, a situation predictably aggravated by theabsence of the pope from the Eternal City.44

The shortage of grain had in the meantime grown so acute that Clement,while in France, arranged with Francis I to purchase French grain fromas far away as Brittany and Picardy and to ship it all the way to Rome.He even tried to obtain Flemish and Spanish grain, though without success,since both were dominions of Charles V.45 Filippo dispatched an agent fromhis Lyons company to oversee the purchase and forwarding of the Frenchgrain, and by the end of November it was already being loaded aboard shipsfor the journey south. Filippo continued to solicit grain in Lyons, and bythe end of December he anticipated hearing reports from Rome of betterconditions. But in any event he had taken the precaution of writing toSpinola the chamberlain and Pietro Carnesecchi the protonotary to recom-mend his own actions in alleviating the shortage.46

While the arrival of the French grain helped defuse the immediate crisis4 1 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 94, i, fol. 125V; Niccolini, p. lxxi. As a measure of volume, the moggio varied

from place to place but averaged around 5.8 hi as compared to the salma at 2.75 hi and the rubbioat 2.3 hi, Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano, Naivres et marchandises a Pentree du port deLivourne {154J-1611) (Paris, 1951), 1, 84. The capacity of a small ship was 400 saltne, TommaseoBellini, ed., Dizionario della Lingua Italiana (Turin, 1861-1879), 11, i, 323; iv, i, 514. The Siciliansalma was slightly larger at 1.046 rubbio, Delumeau, 11, 536, note 3.

4 2 Niccolini, pp. lxx, 192; Tratte, 85, fol. 199; B.N.F., Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 15.4 3 The viceroy at the time was Ettore Pignatelli, duke of Monteleone, Helmut Koenigsberger, The

Practice of Empire (Ithaca, New York, 1969), p. 199; Niccolini, p. lxxi. Charles V had wantedCatherine to marry Francesco Sforza of Milan. See Pastor, x, 211-218, 228-229.

4 4 C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fol. 87.4 5 Ibid., fols. 86, 87. Filippo repeated an earlier report that Clement had successfully arranged for

the purchase of 8,000 French salme of grain from Brittany and Picardy. At the end of DecemberSicilian grain was still priced far too high, so despite the greater distance it was cheaper for themto import French grain.

4 6 Ibid., fols. 91-92. The price of grain in Rome must have been rising rapidly, because Filippocomplained about having to honor a promise made previously to sell one hundred rubbia of grainto Ottaviano de Cesis at the old price.

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in Rome, it brought no lasting relief and eventually only contributed toFilippo's difficulties with the irate populace. His ships arrived late, somewere lost at sea, and others sailed into the port of Civita Vecchia with wetand damaged cargo.47 Despite the threat of riots, Filippo's agents continuedto seek as high a price as possible from the sale of the grain to cover theextra expenses in procuring it and, as sharp businessmen, to take advantageof the inflationary pressure caused by the shortage. His agents in Rome wereable to command outrageously high prices for even inferior grain and bythe end of the summer of 1534 were selling their stocks at more than twicethe price they had originally contracted, for twelve scudi per rubbio ratherthan six.48 In August Benvenuto Olivieri wrote Filippo that the 2,000 salmeof French and Flemish wheat they had remaining were of such poor qualitythey were unmarketable and that he needed to import another 3,000 salmeof good grain to mix with the bad before daring to sell it.49 In earlySeptember supplies were short again, the pope was critically ill, and Olivieriwrote on the sixth of the month that Strozzi's agents were being threatenedby angry mobs. Several days later a Strozzi agent reported from CivitaVecchia that their ship named Dolera carrying 900 salme of quality grainhad arrived safely. Ignoring the hungry hordes but ever mindful ofmaximizing profits, he sent only 130 salme to Rome, reserving the rest. Hefeared that prices in Rome might fall since three other ships carrying grainbelonging to other companies had also anchored in port.50

On 25 September 1534 Clement VII died after a lengthy illness. In Romethe death of a pope typically ignited outbreaks of lawlessness and violence.Rival noble families imported private guards to protect them, shops closedand business at the curia virtually ceased as everyone waited for thefaction-ridden conclave to elect a successor.51 Clement had not exactly beenloved by the Romans, either rich or poor, on account of the increased taxes4 7 Taddeo Beni, Filippo's agent for the grain shipments, wrote several letters in the summer of 1534

reporting the arrival of their ships, cargo losses, and insurance claims for damages, ibid., fols. 102,103, 107, 5. At the end of June grain was selling for 6 scudi per rubbio. On 5 July he reported theloss, 'perfortuna di mare'' (through misfortune at sea) of 185 barrels of farina aboard the ship Loatta,for which he sued the sailors and was to receive compensation.

4 8 Marcello Alberini , ' Diario, ' ed. Domenico Orano, Archivio della R. Societa Romana di Storia Patna,18 (1895), 379. Lorenzo Strozzi claimed the price was only 10 scudi, Niccolini, p. lxxii; however,a report from Rome by Gregorio da Casale to Viscount Rochford, dated 25 October 1534, confirmsthat grain was being sold at 12 scudi, cited Bardi, p. 67, note 1. Alberini, p. 379, who was servingin the municipal government of Rome as a representative (caporione) of the district of Monte atthe time the case was investigated, charged Filippo with hoarding grain to inflate the price andsuggested that Clement was a willing participant who shared in Strozzi's profits.

4 9 C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fol. 117. Finally that summer they had been able to purchase grain in the imperialterritories of Sicily, Spain and Flanders.

50 Ibid., fols. 131, 133.51 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 97, fol. 95V. Pastor, x, 322-326 has a good description of his protracted illness.

Added to the usual unrest following the death of a pope was the presence of corsairs sailing northof Gaeta and threatening the coast, and fear that the Colonna would foment disturbances in Rome,Alberini, p. 382. See also Niccolini, p. lxxi.

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he had levied and for his attempts to strengthen papal control over the cityby dismantling some of its traditional prerogatives. Tension had mountedfor months during the pope's illness, and the shortages and swollen priceof grain added to the ugliness of the mood. Word of Clement's death hadhardly spread up the Tiber before the mob erupted and sacked FilippoStrozzi's grain warehouses in the Trastevere sending his agents scurryingin hasty retreat to the safety of the Castel S. Angelo. Extra guards had tobe placed at the Strozzi palace in the business district. Filippo, who arrivedfrom France in the company of the French cardinals a few days afterClement's death, took up residence in the Vatican for safety.52

Hatred of the dead pope quickly fastened on his favorites, and Filippobecame the prime target of popular wrath that fall of 1534. In an unusualproceeding he was sued by the Romans for the unheard of sum of 700,000scudi for his alleged negligence and failure to supply the city with adequategrain at a reasonable price.53 Under the circumstances Filippo had scanthopes of contesting the suit, and three days after Clement died he agreedto submit to the binding arbitration of two cardinals chosen by the Romans,Alessandro Cesarini and Giovanni Domenico Cupi, archbishop of Trani,who were given two months to study the case before rendering theirdecision. In the meantime, he was required to put up as bond the assetsof his bank in Rome including the building itself with a total estimated valueof 100,000 scudi.54 On 5 December Strozzi went before the Conservatori,the city council of Rome, to plead his case. He pointed out that he hadbeen in France the whole time as nuncio and should not be held personallyresponsible for the errors committed by his ministers in his absence. Butthat argument carried no weight; the Conservatori were most unsympathetic

52 Alberini, pp. 383-384. Niccolini, p. lxxi. Fifty guards were hired to protect merchants and theirwares, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 94, fol. 326V, and the caporioni of Rome hired soldiers to keep peacein the streets, A.S.C. , Archivio Segreto, Credenza 1, vol. xvn, fol. 2v. T h e merchants were taxedto pay for their protection, and the record of the distribution of the tax reveals that Strozzi hadto pay by far the biggest share of the cost, 60 scudi. The next largest share was 20 scudi paid bythe Genoese banker Sebastiano Sauli, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 94, fol. 333.

53 B .N.F. , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 27 and Bardi, p. 68. In his letter to Vettori of 5 December, B .N.F. ,Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 29 and Bardi, p. 70, Filippo summarized some of the charges against him,namely that the grain he had imported was so putrid that many people had fallen ill and died, andthat the seed grain had arrived too late for planting so that the fields in the Roman countrysideremained barren. The Roman people claimed 50,000 ducats in damages just for curative medicines.Most of the rest of the damages they claimed, up to the total of 700,000 ducats, were to compensatefor the crops lost for want of the seed grain. In his chronicle Alberini, pp. 379-380, added the chargesthat Strozzi monopolized the market, hoarded grain, and sold only a portion of his stores in thecity at double the price for which he had originally contracted. See also Niccolini, p. lxxii. Thesuit was entered in the name of all the people, but the prime movers behind the action were noblesand members of the City Council such as Alberini.

54 Alberini, p. 384; Niccolini, pp. lxxii, 194. Included in the bond was his property at Lunghezzaoutside Rome. On Cesarini and Trani, see Berton, pp. 649-650, 784 and Pius Bonfacius Gams,Series Episcoporum Ecclesiae Catholicae (Graz, 1957), p. 934.

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and quite brusque with him.55 He tried to win a delay to allow time fordocuments to arrive from Sicily supporting his arguments, and he alsoexerted pressure on one of the arbiters, Cardinal Cesarini, through hisfriends and fellow Medici parenti Cardinals Salviati and Ridolfi who wereCesarini's close friends.56 He even offered the Romans a private settlementof 10,000 scudi to drop the charges, but the other side, swept up in theexcitement of cashing in on the Strozzi fortune, refused the offer andremained intent on pressing its advantage.57 Filippo won a delay throughthe month of January and a final delay through February, but on 27February 1535 the two cardinal arbiters delivered their judgment againsthim and imposed the stiff fine of 17,527 scudi.58

The grain suit against Filippo was clearly part of a backlash against thedead pope with whom he had been so closely identified. Because it cameat a time when his financial resources were already severely strained andhis credit weakened following his patron's death, the suit by itself nearlyruined him. Yet it was only the beginning of a series of assaults on hisfortune in the months ahead. From the time of his arrival in Rome untilthe end of February when his sentence was delivered, Filippo had beenconstantly pestered by the grain case with the Romans. But at the sametime he had to arrange payment of outstanding portions of Catherinede'Medici's dowry and respond to other equally serious problems requiringhis close attention, 'multiplying around him like heads of the Hydra.'59

Starting in November, the Camera Apostolica began to review some of hisaccounts and demanded to audit his books. The principal matter incontention was the roughly 190,000 ducats which he and Bindo Altovitihad loaned to Clement VII in 1529-1531. Clement had settled the accountswith the two bankers privately through his camarlingo because he had notwanted the official cameral records to show how much money he had spentfor the siege of Florence. However, once Clement was dead, the clerksclaimed that Strozzi's and Altoviti's accounts were invalid.60 Strozzi

55 Let ter of 5 December , B .N .F . , Nuovi Acquisti , 515, fols. 29, 30 ; Bardi, p. 70 and Niccolini, p .

199-56 B .N.F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 30 and Bardi, p . 71 . Giovanni Salviati and Niccolo Ridolfi were

both nephews of Leo X who had been elevated in 1517 together with Alessandro Cesarini. T h ethree of them were closely associated with the Medici party.

57 Niccolini, p . 199.58 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 101, fol. 349; C.S. , Ser. i n , 108, fol. 133V. T h e fine was not the 175,000

ducats erroneously printed in Niccolini, p . lxxix and reported by Goldthwai te , Private Wealth, p .99. An interesting series of documents regarding the various proposals and discussions between themunicipal government of Rome and Paul I I I about how Strozzi 's fine money should be spent isin A.S.C., Archivio Segreto, Credenza 1, vol. 17, fols. 23V-33. A proposal to let Strozzi be depositorof his own fine was overwhelmingly defeated, fol. 23V. Some of the money was used to pay forthe celebrations to honor Charles V's visit to Rome in 1536, fols. 35-37 .

59 B .N.F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 29 and Bardi, p . 71 .60 B .N.F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fols. 29-30. Francesco del Nero ran into similar trouble for money

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anticipated a dispute over the interest he and Altoviti had received andcomplained that the ministers of the newly elected Paul III were allprejudiced against him because they claimed he had amassed an infinitetreasure solely from revenues belonging to the church. Strozzi's battles withthe Camera ran into February 1535, and, his adverse sentence in the grainsuit notwithstanding, he expected to be summoned into court regardingother old cameral accounts totaling at least 50,000 ducats.61

Filippo's financial troubles with the Camera and the Romans attractedother rapacious predators who went after him like harpies, revealing justhow much Clement's death had left him vulnerable to attack. A numberof private citizens including his fellow Florentine bankers joined the paradeof those filing claims, some hoping to recover their own outstanding creditswith the deceased pope by attaching Filippo's possessions. In one such suitthe heirs of Domenico di Massimo contended that Clement had had along-standing obligation to their deceased father worth 2,000 ducats on theCasale di Lunghezza owned by Strozzi, but that they had hesitated to bringup the matter before now for fear of Clement's authority. Conveniently,all the original documentation supporting their claim had disappeared inthe Sack of Rome. In another case, Luigi Gaddi, one of the leadingFlorentine bankers in Rome, with whom for many years Filippo had sharedthe same palazzo in the business district of Ponte, claimed that mixed inwith all the annates that Filippo had collected for the Camera over manyyears were some decima payments worth about 5,000 ducats which rightfullybelonged to the Gaddi bank. He protested vigorously that Filippo shouldbe required to make them good.62

Up until the end of the summer of 1534 repayment of Filippo's loan forCatherine de'Medici's dowry had been proceeding quite smoothly, in largepart due to the heavy security he had demanded and to his friend Francesodel Nero's industrious efforts to collect the revenues that fell under theTreasury General. On 6 August Del Nero had written an encouraging letterthat if all went well, in another month or six weeks Filippo would be freefrom the last of the dowry debt.63 However, the pope's death left Filippowith an estimated 80,000 ducats still due him, about 30,000 of which wereunsecured and now unrecoverable because he had spent them on the voyageto escort Catherine to France and on her wedding finery. As late as thefollowing February Filippo was still owed 50,000 ducats. He could not relyon the authority of Clement's Motuproprio unless it was ratified by the newpope, and Paul III understandably was none too anxious to reassign needed

he had handled for the war which deb t C lemen t had settled privately outs ide the Camera. I t wasdifficult for C lemen t to defend the siege of F lorence on g rounds of chu rch policy since it was awar fought to reinstate his family as over lords in their native city.

61 Ibid., fol. 29 and Bardi , p . 7 1 ; C .S . , Ser. i n , 108, fol. 133V.62 Niccolini , p p . 196-197. 63 C .S . , Ser. v, 1208, fol. 114.V.

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church incomes to pay the cost of a purely dynastic ambition of hispredecessor. Filippo negotiated at length with him to salvage some part ofhis credits, and at last the pope lent him a sympathetic ear.64

In December 1534 Paul agreed to confirm his predecessor's brief for oneof the three repayment guarantees for the dowry loan. He reconfirmedFilippo's rights to revenues from the Collectory of Spain but postponedconsideration of the other two, rights to the decima and assignments on thedatario.65 Unfortunately for Filippo, the papal collector in Spain, GiovanniPoggio, had sent back precious little even before Clement's death, despitethe fact that the agent with Filippo's Seville bank, Rinaldo Strozzi, wasworking with him side by side. While Poggio had been seriously ill andunable to carry out his duties as collector, the Spanish clergy had provedremarkably healthy, and few sees had become vacant whose incomes couldbe diverted to the Collectory and on to Filippo. Filippo's agent informedhis boss that collecting money in Spain was like trying to squeeze bloodfrom a stone.66 Not only had Poggio procured next to nothing, but Rinaldohad in fact loaned him most of the money thus far submitted to Rome forthe Collectory and had as well made personal loans to tide him over hisillness. Filippo should have received 12,000 ducats from Poggio by theprevious May but instead was sent less than 5,000 ducats which RinaldoStrozzi, and not the collector, had provided. To make matters worse,Rinaldo fully expected the payments to cease completely once report ofClement's death reached Spain. In fact, by the end of November 1534Poggio had still sent Filippo only 5,000 ducats.67 Thus, of the 25,000 ducatsowed from Spain, Filippo received practically nothing.

The decision on the other two guarantees for the dowry loan was notreached until January 1535. Paul III drove a stiff bargain in return for hispromise to recognize Filippo's claim to the 50,000 ducat balance. Hedemanded that Filippo relinquish to him the offices and Monte stock with

64 C.S. , Ser. i n , 108, fol. 133; B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti , 515, fol. 30 and Bardi , p . 72. According toLorenzo Strozzi, Paul was well disposed towards Fi l ippo because he had used his influence withthe French cardinals to favor Farnese 's election, Niccolini, p . lxxiii. Fi l ippo's bank also loaned Paulmoney al though on a much reduced scale from what it had provided Clement , A.V., Div. Cam.,vols. 98-106 passim.

65 B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti , 515, fol. 30 and Bardi , p . 72.66 C.S. , Ser. v, 1208, fol. 127. Even when a vacancy did occur, there were usually long delays and

other compet ing claims for its revenues. Such was the case with the money owed from 1523 fromthe vacant benefice of Saint James of Compostela which Poggio had still been unable to collect by1534 because it concerned 'signon troppo grandi in spagna' (very powerful persons in Spain) ,including the Cardinal of To ledo , Giovanni V I I Tabera , ibid., fol. 144; G a m s , p . 81 .

67 C .S . , Ser. v, 1208, fols. 127, 147. Poggio 's accounts sent to the Camera for the previous year showthat between Sep t ember 1532-January 1533 he had collected less than 5,000 ducats , A.V., Div .Cam. , vol. 95, fols. 170-172. In the period between J anua ry and D e c e m b e r 1533 he collected almost13,500 ducats , out of which a total of 4,235 ducats had been paid to Rinaldo Strozzi for F i l ippoStrozzi , ibid., fols. 172V-176.

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which Clement had secured the loan. For his part he promised not todisturb Filippo's rights to the tardy 20,000 ducats still due from the Spanishincomes nor interfere with the exaction of one of the two decime whichwould yield about 10,000 ducats. The remaining 20,000 were to be repaidin fruits from future annates but with the stipulation that Paul shouldreceive all the income from the first year, 1534, and Filippo the incomebeginning only thereafter.68 Filippo was in no position to negotiate a morefavorable settlement and had to be content with whatever Paul was willingto offer. He wrote to Vettori on 2 January 1535 the following:

So as not to argue with my superiors I am ready to concede everything to HisHoliness, offices valued at about 20,000 ducats and credits in the Monte delta Fedeworth about 25,000 ducats which I had received in security for the 80,000 ducatloan. Now I am left with unstable assignments which are subject to a thousandaccidents of fortune after having been stripped of all my good and certainsecurities.69

Exasperated and worn out from the pressure of the grain suit, Filippoexclaimed that he would prefer to live out his life a poor man, rather thanas a rich man persecuted by so many.70

But Filippo's troubles were not over, and the next blow that struck himwas the loss of the Treasury of the Marches. The Treasury was his lastimportant administrative position which he had hoped to safeguard as abastion of investment income within the ecclesiastical realm after Clement'sdeath. By right Filippo still had another three years to serve on his contractas treasurer, but contractual obligations counted for nothing when he layat the mercy of the patronage decisions of the new pope. Under protestFilippo was relieved of the office in March 1535, and Paul put the Treasuryin Bindo Altoviti's name, although, in fact, Altoviti was acting as a frontfor the real owner, Luigi Gaddi.71

Filippo was not the only one who suffered as a result of the death ofClement. In November 1534 he heard a rumor that the Camera waspreparing to investigate the four men who had had charge of churchadministration and finance in the Papal States, Francesco Guicciardini,Bartolomeo Valori, Agostino del Nero, and Bernardino della Barba.72 The

68 B .N.F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 30 and Bardi, p . 72 ; Niccolini, p . 200. Fil ippo also had toreturn some jewels to Paul including Clement 's diamond pectoral made by Cellini, A.V., Div. Cam.,vol. 106, fol. 25. 69 Niccolini, p. 200.

70 Ibid., p . 200; similarly C.S. , Ser. in , 108, fols. 133V-134; and B .N.F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol.29, ' T h e r e is nothing left of me but skin and bones for my friends, my sons, my women and mymasters now to pick clean.'

71 Fil ippo protested his removal in court but to no avail, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 105, fols. 163-166;C.S. , Ser. in , 108, fols. 134, 137. T h e Motupropno in Altoviti 's name is in A.V., Div. Cam. , vol.106, fol. 12. 72 Niccolini, pp. 198-199.

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first two were his close friends, and Agostino had been his vice-treasurerand chief administrator in the Marches. Filippo feared that Francesco delNero's turn would come next. Francesco had been relieved of his dutiesas treasurer general soon after Paul III was elected, and like Filippo's, hisaccounts were closely scrutinized, particularly those dealing with warfinances and the siege of Florence.73 Francesco wrote Vettori about hisstraitened circumstances on 27 February, the same day Filippo receivedhis sentence in the grain affair. Above and beyond his obligation asguarantor of part of Catherine de'Medici's dowry, he had had credits withClement for 38,000 ducats for the war against the Turks in Hungary, forthe league with Charles V, and for the hiring of Swiss soldiers. All of thesecredits had been secured in various offices and assignments. However,because of Clement's illness, the incomes owed him had not materialized,and after Clement's death, he had been turned out of his office as treasurergeneral. In the space of three days he had had to liquidate his holdings tocover his debts and to return to Paul all the securities and offices thatClement had given him. 'Therefore,' he wrote, 'I am denuded of incomes,of money and of securities. And I believe I can say that had Clement onlyremained healthy until October, I would have been able to save myself morethan 50,000 ducats.'74

The effect of Clement VII's death on men like Francesco del Nero andFilippo Strozzi cannot be overstated. For Filippo it brought to an abruptend a long intimate friendship and association that had been mutuallyadvantageous, both for Clement who had acted on Filippo's counsel andrelied so heavily on his credit, and for Filippo whose position as the pope'srelative and whose influence at the papal court had constituted thecornerstone upon which his thriving international banking business andprincely fortune had been built. Clement's death would have adverselyaffected Filippo's fortunes in any event, but it struck at a particularly badtime when his affairs were already going poorly and he was absent fromRome. In 1533 he had overextended his credit in loans to Clementespecially in financing the dowry and had been beset by problems connectedwith provisioning Rome with grain. His credit in France had sunk, and whatshould have been secure receipts of ecclesiastical income from the SpanishCollectory and the decima had proved themselves to be hollow reeds. In73 Ibid., pp . 195-196; Nuovi Acquisti , 515, fol. 27; and Bardi , p. 69. Del Nero had contemplated taking

a trip to Venice to avoid his persecutors .74 C.S. , Ser. 1, 136, fol. 157. Both Fi l ippo 's and Francesco 's letters to Vettori of 27 February must

be interpreted with some caution because they were undoubted ly designed to paint a very blackpicture of their financial situation which Vettori could pass along to Duke Alcssandro de 'Medic iwho was pressing them for money- T h e y stated truly enough the loss of incomes and the debtsthey had to bear, but they still had substantial wealth and were not reduced literally to penury astheir letters would seem to indicate. Fil ippo himself said that he had enough in reserve in Franceto suppor t a handsome if not princely life style.

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addition, Filippo's earnings in the first part of 1534 had already fallen offto such an extent that in early September, at a time when Clement's healthhad taken a turn for the better and he seemed to be recovering, his Romemanager still had written a warning to his employer's sons to curb theirexpenses because their father's earnings that year had been next to nothingand his losses very heavy.75 Had Clement remained alive only until the endof October as Francesco del Nero had sorely desired, these troubles couldhave been tackled more easily behind the protective shield of the papacy.By then Del Nero expected to have reimbursed Filippo for most of thedowry loan, and the grain riot, the sack of Strozzi's warehouses, and thesubsequent lawsuit by the Roman people might never have taken place. Orat least they would have occurred on a much milder scale had Clement beenalive, or had Filippo been present in Rome to take charge of his affairs.Instead, coming when it did, the death of Clement precipitated a chain ofunfortunate events with grave financial, legal, and political consequencesfrom which Filippo never recovered.

In order to appreciate fully the impact Clement's death had on Filippo,we must bear in mind that it had not come as a surprise or without warning,and that Filippo, with the help of Francesco del Nero, was really asprepared for that unhappy event as he could reasonably have expected tobe. Back in November of 1533 Filippo had demanded the extra securityof having Clement, Spinola and Francesco share the risk for the dowry loanwith him in case the pope should die and the ecclesiastical incomes pledgedin repayment be revoked. In February 1534 he had Clement issue stillanother Motuproprio reaffirming his credit for the remaining 80,000 ducatsas an additional guarantee.76 Fortunately for Filippo, his invaluableassociate Francesco del Nero was on hand as treasurer general to look afterhis interests with Clement during his stay in France. When Clement firstbecame ill in June 1534, Del Nero began to issue a number of special ordersthat ecclesiastical revenues collected in various parts of the Papal States bepaid immediately to Filippo's bank manager in Rome, Benvenuto Olivieri,who held the patents for them.77 At the same time Olivieri was workingnight and day to put Filippo's affairs at the bank in order. Both men sentFilippo regular reports on the state of Clement's health throughout thesummer so that given the word he would be prepared on short notice toreturn to Rome. Even when the course of Clement's illness inspired thefalse hope in his associates that he would survive, Del Nero and Olivieristill continued to labor diligently to protect Filippo's credits.78 Business

75 C .S . , Ser. v, 1208, fol. 137V. 76 A.V., Div. Cam. , vol. 95, fols. 195V-196.77 Ibid., vol. 94, fols. 237V-239, 243V, 245V, 255V, 279, 285.78 C.S. , Ser. v, 1208, fols. 113, 117, 126, 134, 142. Olivieri had writ ten Fi l ippo on 4 August strongly

advising him to re turn from France and devise a way to enter the conclave when the t ime came

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in Rome was almost at a standstill, but Olivieri collected what debts hecould, and Del Nero and Spinola discharged their respective obligationsfor their part of the 80,000 ducats due Filippo for the dowry.79 In the latesummer Filippo's friends also began to have his appointments and creditswith the pope re-registered in the books of the Camera in hopes of holdingthe new pope to them in the event of Clement's death. The document forFilippo's last loan to the pope stated specifically that Clement's successorwould be bound to honor it, and a brief dated 4 August reconfirmed Filippoas treasurer of the Marches. On 26 September, the day after Clement died,Olivieri hurried to the Vatican to have the clerks of the Camera record andregister that brief yet one more time.80 Francesco del Nero made specialprovisions for the security of the Marches and sent Captain Betto Rinuccini,a man who owed his allegiance to the Strozzi, to guard the fortress of Anconashould there be an outbreak of violence.81

During the summer of Clement's illness Filippo took one further stepto safeguard himself. He redoubled his efforts to have his eldest son Pierocreated cardinal. Strozzi had first tried to obtain the purple for his son backin 1521 and again in 1526 when he served as hostage for Clement in Naples,but the events of 1527 and the Sack of Rome put the matter of Piero'selevation out of the question. Filippo maintained hope and tried again in1534 using the good offices of Francesco del Nero and Clement's nephewCardinal Ippolito who was on intimate terms with the Strozzi. Severalcardinals had died that summer including Enkevoirt, Delia Valle, andCajetan, increasing the likelihood of a new promotion. Clement himself hadtold Del Nero that Strozzi's prospects were good.82 A cardinal in the familywould undoubtedly have strengthened Filippo's hand at the papal courtand might have given him some leverage over the new pope. Clement,however, decided to delay any action until he recovered. As the summerwore on, Filippo, in desperation, lowered his sights to suggest that ifClement would only agree to the elevation, Piero would accept a poorcardinalate without any incomes attached.83 Unfortunately Clement never

to summon it. Fi l ippo delayed his depar ture and planned to leave France in the company of theFrench cardinals on 26 August , but they hesitated again when they heard of the pope 's improvinghealth. T h e y finally departed Avignon 30 August . O n 25 Sep tember when Clement died, Strozzihad disembarked in Pisa but had been unable to reach R o m e in t ime.

79 Ibid., fol. 117. Both Del Nero and Spinola received s ta tements from Clement releasing them ofany responsibilities for the dowry loan, A.V., Div. Cam. , vol. 100, fol. 3 5 ; Arm. XL, vol. 47, fols.255-256. 80 A.V., Div. Cam. , vol. 94, fol. 329.

81 C.S. , Ser. v, 1208, fols. 133, 135. T h e situation in the Marches was volatile because in earlySep tember Clement decided to make his nephew Cardinal Ippol i to de 'Medic i papal legate, forcingCardinal Accolti to vacate his job. Fi l ippo 's final loan to Clement for 20,000 scudi was used tocompensate Accolti. However , as the pope got weaker and nearer to death , Accolti becameincreasingly recalcitrant about leaving the Marches , and Olivieri and Del N e r o anticipated t rouble .

82 Ibid., fols. 104, 113V, 114V, 118; Pecchiai, p . 48.83 C.S. , Ser. v, 1208, fol. 104. Another reason for Clement ' s delay in creating cardinals was that

1 7 1


created the new cardinals, so that Filippo's long-held hope for Piero finallycame to naught.

The death of Clement dealt a crushing blow to Filippo that toppled himfrom his coveted high place and hurled him into an unending sea ofadversity. He had suffered setbacks and the loss of protectors and patronsin the Medici family before, but none had had so deleterious an effect onhis career and life. The death of his brother-in-law Lorenzo de'Medici andmother-in-law Alfonsina Orsini in 1519 and 1520 had brought to an enda chapter in his life in Florence. Leo X's death in 1521 could well havesignaled the loss of his elevated position at the curia. When his wife Claricedied in 1528,84 thus severing Filippo's original tie with the Medici circle,one might easily have foreseen the breaking apart of Filippo's closeconnections with their family. But these prior losses paled before thedisaster of 1534, for on all the previous occasions Filippo had been ableto rely upon the firm support of his friend Giulio de'Medici. As a cardinalin 1519 he had protected Filippo from the popular backlash in Florenceagainst Lorenzo and Alfonsina, and he had promoted his career throughoutthe period of Medici domination of the papacy. But his death in 1534removed the last of Filippo's circle of Medici protectors and patrons. ForFilippo Strozzi it was truly the end of an era of power, prestige and accessto the highest levels of political and financial success, an era which hadbegun in 1508 with his entry into the family and had flourished for morethan a quarter of a century on the support and favor of Giulio de'Medici.

revenues assigned to the College of Cardinals were insufficient to support the additional titles.Filippo wrote to Pietro Carnesecchi about the matter, probably stating he was willing for Piero tobe given a title with no incomes, something Del Nero felt would help them realize their goal, ibid.,fol. 114V.

84 Clarice died 3 May 1528, Niccolini, p. liv. She was already critically ill in the fall of 1527, C.S.,Ser. in, 108, fol. 114. A copy of her testament, dated 24 December 1527, is in B.N.F., 11, iv, 194,fols. 74-76.

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8

Epilogue

As we have seen, following Clement's death, Filippo lost his privilegedstation at the papal court and the special protection he had enjoyed as oneof the pope's favorites. Because Clement was no longer alive to shelter andshield him, the damaging grain suit by the Roman people and hiscontinuing legal troubles of 1534 and 1535 fell upon him with ruinous force.At the same time he had to relinquish his most important administrativeoffices such as the Treasury of the Marches and most of the patronageawards and titles he had enjoyed under both Medici popes. Filippo couldkeenly appreciate how far Medici patronage had advanced his career at thepapal court when in 1534 he was shorn of the special considerations, theguarantees of tax revenues, Monte shares and the venal titles that he hadso willingly accepted throughout the years to secure his credits. And helost them all in the same way he had originally taken them over, at the wordof a pope, eager to tear them away from the grasp of his predecessor'sfavorites and ready to bestow them on others who pledged him their loyaltyand treasure.

After 1534 Filippo also lost the opportunity, and to some degree thefinancial capital, to engage in the same massive investments and loans hehad undertaken for Clement. In the more than thirteen years betweenspring 1521 and fall 1534, Filippo had made secured loans to his papalpatrons totaling over 530,000 ducats, and more than 85 percent, over450,000 ducats, had gone to Clement VII alone.1 How much higher thosefigures would climb were they to include the unsecured portions of thoseloans, like the extra 50,000 ducats for Catherine de'Medici's dowry in 1533!How much greater the total would be were we able to add together all thethousands of ducats he loaned through the Depository General andpersonally to the Medici in Florence, especially under the government ofhis brother-in-law Lorenzo!

From this point onward, Filippo's fortune no longer grew as before, andhis heavy losses and burdensome political expenses began to eat into his

1 These figures represent the total of Filippo's loans recorded in Vatican documents for the periodindicated. Those loans made after 1531 in scudt have been calculated in the value of cameral ducats.

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previous earnings.2 Under the new pope the nature of his business changedas well. Although his bank in Rome did not close, but continued to functionas a curial bank, making small loans to the pope and trafficking in offices,with Paul Ill 's papacy it undertook no operations on the scale of those underClement VII. The bank's largest loans to Paul were for 20,000 scudi in June1537 and for over 30,000 scudi in 1538 to build coastal defenses against theTurks.3 Because of his increasing political difficulties, Strozzi withdrew hisname from the company and placed it in those of two of his younger sons,Giulio and Lorenzo, under the continuing management of BenvenutoOlivieri. The bank maintained a much more modest profile at the curia thanin the past. Though it continued for a while as Depository of the Collegeof the Knights of St Peter and of the Monte delta Fede, its status was eclipsedwith the rise of other bankers such as Altoviti who now took over Strozzi'sold post as depositor general and became the favored banker at the court.

Besides costing Filippo his business with the curia, Clement's death alsohad a jarring political effect that left its stamp on the remaining four yearsof his life. For with the loss of his patron and protector he no longer hada political base available to him. The events leading to his tragic death in1538 are beyond the compass of this present work, particularly sinceFilippo's role as papal banker and international financier now ceased to beof primary importance in his life when compared with the part he cameto play as leader and financial backer of the Florentine exiles who aimedat liberating Florence from the clutches of her new duke, Alessandrode'Medici. However, it is instructive to summarize those events briefly inthat Filippo's ultimate participation in them grew directly out of the changein his circumstances brought on by Clement's death. Always before whenFilippo had lost one of his Medici patrons, Lorenzo de'Medici, Alfonsina,or Leo X, he had had Giulio de'Medici to turn to, as when he needed toleave Florence for a while after Lorenzo's death and had been able to findrefuge at the papal court. But this time not only did he no longer have ahigh-placed champion and friend in Rome, he could not even return toFlorence because he and his sons were mistrusted by Alessandro de'Mediciwhom Clement had placed in charge of the city following the collapse ofthe Third Republic.

Initially Filippo and his sons had been on intimate terms with Alessandro,and Filippo even assisted him in ruling Florence. After the reform of thegovernment in 1532 removed the last vestiges of the republican councilsand officially recognized Alessandro as duke, Filippo held high political

2 In a summary of his expenses covering the period 1526-1537 which he compiled while a prisonerin Florence before his death, he estimated that just for extraordinary expenses, losses and debtshe was 300,000 scudi poorer, document published in Niccolini, pp. 336-338.

3 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 98, fols. 158V-160; vol. 106, fols. 87-88.

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office for the first time in his career. He became a member of the Councilof Forty-eight, a small senate which replaced the old Medicean councilsof Seventy and One Hundred. He also served as one of the four counsellorsof the duke, a group which in effect replaced the old Signoria.4 Still, duringClement's life-time, government in Florence continued much as it hadbefore 1527, namely on directions from Rome. Decisions of state andpolitical appointments were made by the pope and relayed back to Florence,and Filippo, as the pope's good friend, was a frequent liaison betweenFlorence and Rome.

However, already in 1533, latent jealousies and suspicions betweenAlessandro and Filippo's family began to smoulder. Alessandro fearedthat a man of Strozzi's immense wealth, power and reputation with hislarge family of sons must be harboring secret political ambitions of his own,and a series of unhappy events - an amorous rivalry, a suspected poisoning,followed by a clash between Filippo's eldest son Piero and Alessandro'sfavorite, Giuliano Salviati, over the honor of Filippo's daughter Luisa -drove home the wedge that irreparably alienated the two men and forcedFilippo and his sons to depart. While Clement lived, he had preserved asuperficial peace between Alessandro and the Strozzi, and Filippo and hisfamily were protected. But following the pope's death, on top of all the otherafflictions he faced in Rome, Filippo now had to contend with Alessandro'senmity as well. In the midst of his pressing legal troubles, he was forcedto go about Rome heavily armed and accompanied by guards after anunsuccessful assassination attempt by two of the duke's henchmen. BecauseAlessandro accused Filippo's sons of consorting with Florentine exiles andother enemies of his regime, to avoid provoking him further, in November1534 Filippo closed his palace near St Peter's where his sons had beenstaying and sent them to different parts of Italy. In December Filippolamented that he had been unable to save his daughter as well, for thatmonth he received news of Luisa's mysterious death in Florence.

Since there was no possibility of a reconciliation with Alessandro, Filippotogether with Cardinals Ridolfi and Salviati, Leo X's nephews, drew closerto Alessandro's rival for rule in Florence, Cardinal Ippolito de'Medici. Agrowing number of Florentine exiles ardent to return to their native cityjoined forces with them under Ippolito's banner and under the protectivecloak of Filippo's bankroll. Since Charles V had agreed to guarantee theliberty of Florence under the terms of the treaty ending the siege in 1530,their plan was to appeal to him to prohibit Alessandro's marrying his

4 He also served as one of the officials of the Monte Comune, of the Monte di Pietd, of the Abbondanza,of the twelve procurators, of the Otto di Custodta, the Otto di Pratica, and the Mercanzia, Tratte,85 passim. His credit had been of great assistance during the difficult period of reconstruction afterthe siege and restoration of the Medici in 1530.

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natural daughter Margaret and to abandon the despotic duke. Throughembassies financed by Filippo to Charles in Barcelona, they unmaskedAlessandro as a cruel tyrant and offered Ippolito as an alternative head ofstate who would be more agreeable to the Florentines. Unfortunately inAugust 1535 Ippolito died in Itri on his way to meet Charles who wasreturning from the campaign in Tunisia. Charles had arranged for bothAlessandro and his opponents to present their separate cases to him inNaples that September, but the exiles' cause was fatally weakened byIppolito's death. Charles proceeded to confirm his endorsement of Alessan-dro and the parentado with Margaret, leaving Strozzi's party no alternativebut to withdraw from Naples.

At that point Filippo knew he could never return to Florence undercurrent conditions. He quietly closed his company and tried to wind uphis affairs since his estate in Florence included substantial land holdingsthat were vulnerable to seizure. For his own protection Filippo retreatedto Venice under safe conduct from the Doge. After his arrival he receivedthe news that Alessandro had declared him a rebel and that all hisFlorentine possessions including his part of the Strozzi palace would soonbe confiscated. The following January 1537 Duke Alessandro was murdered,and the assassin and self-styled Brutus, Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de'Medici,fled straight to Venice to Filippo's house after committing his bloody deed.With the encouragement of Francis I who promised French troops andextra funds, the exiles began to assemble money and troops in Bologna tomount a military assault on Florence. With Filippo at their head, anadvance party marched to Montemurlo in the hills above Prato. There indisorder and disarray after their long trek they were met with a surpriseattack by soldiers sent out from Florence by the newly-chosen successorto Alessandro, Duke Cosimo de'Medici. The exiles' motley army wasdefeated and Filippo captured on 31 July 1537. He was held prisoner inFlorence in the Fortezza da Basso for seventeen months before he finallytook his own life in despair on 18 December 1538.

In those last two years of his life when he was an exile seeking a wayto return to his native city, Filippo believed himself a defender of lostFlorentine liberties. Even after his capture, when his hopes of restoring anaristocratic republic had been dashed and he was a miserable prisoner inthe Fortezza, a pawn between Cosimo and the imperial interests inFlorence, he maintained that noble and tragic image. He modeled hissuicide on that of Cato and left a damning epitaph penned in his own handthat read:Liberty, therefore, perceiving that together with him all her hopes had perished,having surrendered herself and cursed the light of day, demanded to be sealed upin his same tomb. Thus, O Stranger, shed copious tears if the Florentine republic

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Epilogue

means anything at all to you, for Florence will never see again so noble acitizen. . .whose highest command was: in dying for one's fatherland, any sort ofdeath is sweet.5

These dramatic events at the end of his life are those best remembered todayfrom Filippo's career. They captured the imaginations of historians andnovelists of the nineteenth century who were living amidst the fervor oftheir own nationalistic and Risorgimento movements and who came to viewFilippo as the noble citizen turned soldier, a precursor of Italy's owndramatic struggle to unite the fatherland in the name of liberty. Obviouslythis one-sided view of Filippo Strozzi as defender of freedom oversimplifiesthe life and career of this extraordinary man. Such a view obscures thesignificance of the earlier and more fertile phase of his adulthood from 1508to 1534 when he supported with great dedication the very family he waslater praised for opposing as despots. For the major portion of his life upuntil 1534, Filippo was no champion of Florentine liberties. Instead he wasone of the ottimati who, in the crisis surrounding the Florentine oligarchsat the beginning of the sixteenth century, had chosen to side with the Mediciafter their return in 1512 and had prospered greatly by his choice. He hadencouraged and seconded his brother-in-law's domination of Florence andmanipulated the city's resources to his benefit. He had helped finance thesiege of Florence that reinstated the Medici in the city for good and hadbeen quite content to promote Medici interests whether in Florence, Rome,or outside Italy. He had taken a leading place alongside the Medici popesas their financier and had profited through his connections at the curia tobecome one of the wealthiest men in Europe. But all this had been possibleonly with the succor of his Medici patrons who had guaranteed him favoredstatus. Once they were gone, severing Florence's special link with thepapacy and Filippo's special standing at the curia, and once a collateral lineof the Medici family who feared and mistrusted Filippo came to power inFlorence, Strozzi was easily cast into the role of exile struggling to maintaina place for himself and his family, dangerous and powerful because of hisgreat wealth. In many ways the last four years of his life as an outcast andadversary of the government were but an epilogue to what had beenpersonal catastrophe for him when Clement VII died. More than any other

5 In a final letter published in G. Spini, Cosimo I dJMedici e la independenza del pnncipato Mediceo(Florence, 1945), p. 172, Filippo identified Cato the Younger as his model: 'L'anima mia a Dio,somma misericordia, raccomando, umilmente pregandolo, se altro darle di bene non vuole, le diaalmeno quel luogo dove Catone Uticense ed altri simili virtuosi uomini tal fine hanno fatto.' ['Icommend my soul to God, who is the highest mercy, praying humbly that, if He can grant it noother gift, at least He will place it where Cato of Utica and other similar virtuous men have foundtheir final end.'] The epitaph which Filippo composed for his memorial is published together witha fascimile in Niccolini, p. cxxiv.

177


single event, the loss of Clement sounded the death knell of the symbioticrelationship between Filippo Strozzi and the last of the direct descendantsof the family of Lorenzo il Magnifico which had endured more than aquarter century encompassing the last decades of Florence's republican eraand the splendor of Medicean Rome.

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I. ARCHIVAL AND MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

The historian of Medicean Florence in the early sixteenth century cannot relyexclusively on the official government records. Because of the growth of extra-constitutional channels of power outlined in chapter 2, the records of the traditionalcouncils of state prove woefully inadequate for a study of the inner workings ofthe Medici regime. Given this state of affairs, other kinds of documents must beused in conjunction with the official sources and merit proportionately moreattention. Contemporary histories and chronicles such as those of Parenti andCerretani provide useful interpretative data about the functioning of the governmentas they perceived it personally. Still more valuable as a source are the private papersthat have come down to us from the sixteenth century. Florentines were notoriousrecord keepers, and literally tons of letters and documents relating to variousFlorentine families have survived. In the volumes of correspondence of the Medicifamily (Mediceo avanti il Principato) and of their secretaries can be found the listsof friends of the regime, discussions of specific political schemes, as well as a wealthof material concerning various Medici and their associates. Likewise, the Strozzifamily papers have particular value for this period. Filippo Strozzi left severalthousand pages of letters, documents, and accounts, mostly unpublished, that detailhis own life and his long association with the Medici. The main body of his lettersand papers is located in the Carte Strozziane. Other letters are scattered amongthe Medici papers and in the Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence, Nuovi Acquisti, 515.A small body of business correspondence is contained in Signori, Otto, Dieci,Legazioni e Commissioni, 72. The documents which establish the nature and extentof his financial connections with the papal court and his duties as depositor generalare in the Archivio Vaticano, the Archivio di Stato, Rome, and the Archivio StoricoCapitolino. The difficulties involved in navigating through the largely unchartedwaters of the Vatican Archives are well known. I have relied principally upon theDiversa Cameralia and Introitus et Exitus series as well as those cameral recordswhich are now located in the Archivio di Stato. All these different types of records— public, private, and ecclesiastical — have contributed to this study.

179


FlorenceArchivio di Stato, Florence

Acquisti e DoniBalieCamera del ComuneCarte StrozzianeCopialettere di Goro GheriConventi SoppressiDieci di Balk, Carteggi, MissiveDied di Balia, Carteggi, ResponsiveMediceo avanti il PrincipatoMonte Comune, periodo repubblicanoOtto, Dieci, Legazioni e CommissioniOtto di Guardia e Balia, Partiti e DeliberazioniOtto di Pratica, Condotte e StantiamentiOtto di Pratica, Deliberazioni, Partiti, CondotteOtto di Pratica, Entrate e UsciteOtto di Pratica, ResponsiveOtto di Pratica, StantiamentiSignori, Carteggi, MissiveSignori, Carteggi, Responsive OriginaliSignori, Dieci, Otto, Missive OriginaliSignori e Collegi, Deliberazioni, Ordinaria AutoritaSignori, Dieci, Otto, Legazioni e CommissioniTratte

Archivio GuicciardiniBiblioteca Nazionale, Florence

Cerretani, Bartolomeo, Dialogo della Mutatione, Magi, n, I, 106— Istoria fiorentina, Ms. n. in, 76Ginori ContiMagliabecchianaManoscritti PasseriniNuovi AcquistiParenti, Piero, Istorie fiorentine, Ms. 11, iv, 171

Rome

Archivio della Arciconfraternita di San Giovanni dei FiorentiniArchivio di Stato, Rome

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Diversa Cameralia (citations to folio numbers at the top of the page)Introitus et Exitus

Archivio Storico CapitolinoArchivio Segreto

Biblioteca Apostolica VaticanaVaticani Latini n

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186

Index

accatti, 20-21, 134, 148Acciaiuoli family, 10Acciaiuoli, Alessandro, 5311.Acciaiuoli, Fra Zanobi, 5Acciaiuoli, Roberto, 18Accolti, Benedetto, cardinal, i6on., 17m.accoppiatori, 25, 43, 69Acquila, Giovanbattista dell', i53n.Adrian VI, pope, 23, 93, 95, iO2n., 112,

120, 128Alamanni, Luigi, 73n.Alamanni, Piero, 66n.Alberini, Marcello, i64n.Alberti bank, 92Alberti, Leon Battista, 6Albizzi, Antonfrancesco degli, 4, 47, 49,

53n., 63, 64, 69n., 75, 76n.Albizzi, Antonio degli, 4Albizzi, Maso di Luca degli, 69n.Albizzi, Roberto degli, 15Alexander VI, pope, 95Altoviti bank, 123, 154Altoviti family, 15, 22Altoviti, Bindo: Florentine banker in

Rome, 12, u6n. , i48n., 168; loans withFilippo Strozzi, 155-157, 165-166

amici, 25, 33, 34, 38, 79n., i39n.Ancona, 17, 81, 123, 139, i58n., 171Angiolini, Guglielmo, 99Antinori bank, 122, 123, 127Antinori family, 15Antinori, Camillo di Niccolo, i34n.Antinori, Niccolo, 96Apostolic Chamber {Camera Apostolica):

and the Depository General, 109,112-115, 117; finances, 109, 122, i28n.,151, 160, 16m., 165-166; functions,102-103

Appiano, Jacopo d', ruler of Piombino, 82

Apulia, 161Ardinghelli bank, 123Ardinghelli, Pietro, 87Aretino, Pietro, 74Ariosto, Ludovico, 74n.Aristotle, 6Arrabbiati, 47, 53n., 55Augsburg, 95Avignon, papacy at, 92, 93

Baldassare da Pescia, see Turini,Baldassare da Pescia

Balia, 18, 2in., 32, 33, 37, 43, 44, 65, 68,69, 78, i44n.

Barba, Bernardino della, 168Bardi bank, 123Bardi family, 10, 11, 22Baroncelli, Baroncello, 68, 69, 70Baroncelli Giovanfrancesco, i43n.Bartolini bank, 122Bartolini family, i6n.Bartolini, Gherardo, 35Bartolini, Giovanni, i34n., i48n.Bartolini, Leonardo, 34, 73, 74, 76n., 96Bartolini, Zanobi, i27n.Basel, Council of, iO4n.Belanti bank, 122Bene, Piero del, 86, 87, 128Beni, Taddeo, i63n.Berti, Berto, 98betting on papal elections, 72Bibbiena, cardinal, see Dovizi da Bibbiena,

Bernardo, cardinalBini bank, 103, 105, 106, n o , 116, 119,

126, 127Bini family, 22, 125Bini, Bernardo, 96, 119, 122, 127Biscioni, Michelangelo, 50, 60Boccapaduli, Prospero, i i7n.

187

i88 Filippo Strozzi and the Medici

Bologna, 61, 63, 131, 133, 176; and LeoX's visit in 1515, 101; and meetingsbetween Clement VII and Charles V,i56n., 158; and payment of papaltroops, 132, 14cm., 141, 142

Bonsi, Donato, 68n.Borgherini, Pierfrancesco, i27n.Borgia, Cesare, 47Boscoli conspiracy, 73Bourbon, Connetable de, 18, 23, 131Bracci, Bernardo, i2Qn.Bracci, Giovanbaptista di Marcho, 2on.Broncone, 35Bruni, Leonardo, 5Buondelmonti family, 3Buondelmonti, Benedetto: advice to

Filippo Strozzi, 83n., 88n., 101, 108,113, i37n.; Medici amico, 34, 35, 47,63n., 84, 138, i39n.; andre-establishment of the Medici inFlorence, 6gn.

Buondelmonti, Filippo, 47, 49, 53n.Buoninsegni, Domenico, 105, 106, 108,

i3on., i33n., 140, 141, 144, 146-147

Caccia, Alexandro della, 129, 131, i36n.,148-149

Cajetan, cardinal (Tommaso de Vio), 171Calcagni, Andrea, 157catnarlingo (chamberlain), 102, 105, m ,

ii4n., 123, 125, 159, 165Cambi, Giovanni, 24, 47Cambi, Jacopo, ii4n., 123Cambi, Lorenzo, 55, 77n., 123earnerario segreto, 103Campeggio, Lorenzo, cardinal, 115Canale di Ponte, renamed Via di Banco di

S. Spirito, 93, 99Canigiani family, 3Canigiani, Antonio, 53n.caporioniof Rome, i64n.Capponi bank, i22n., 123, 127Capponi family, 3, i4n.Capponi, Gino, 49, 53n., 63n.Capponi, Ludovico, i48n.Capponi, Neri, 4, 56Capponi, Niccolo, 4, 47, 149Cardona, Ramon de, Spanish viceroy in

Italy, 64, 83n.

Carnesecchi, Pietro, 162, i72n.Carretto, Carlo, cardinal, called Finale,

i2on.Casa, Pandolfo della, i48n.Casale di Lunghezza, 166Casale, Gregorio da, i63n.Castel S. Angelo, 8, ii4n., 121, 124, 129,

154, 164Castiglione, Meo da, 138Cato the Younger, 1, 176, i77n.Cellini, Benvenuto, i68n.Ceri, Renzo da, 132Cesarini, Alessandro, archbishop of Trani,

cardinal, 164, 165Cesis, Ottaviano de, cardinal, i62n.Charles V, emperor, 15, i62n., i6sn.,

175-176; and Clement VII, 128,130-131, J56n., 158, 169

Charles VIII, king of France, 16, 29,i3on.

Chigi, Agostino, 15, 105, nsn. , 122Cibo, Caterina, duchess of Camerino,

Cibo, Innocenzo, cardinal, 105-106, 125,127

Cibo, Maddalena, see Medici, Maddalena(wife of Franceschetto Cibo)

Cicero, 5Clement VII, see Medici, Giulioclerks of the Chamber, 75, 125, 171College of Cardinals, 103, 128-129, 130,

colleges of venal offices, 22, 103, 114, 116,119, 125; Janissaries, 75n., 125;Knights of St Peter, 75n., 123, 126,I28n., 152, 160, 174; portionarii diRipay 129, 152; presidents of theAnnona, 125, 152; scutifers andcubiculars, io6n., 125, 152

Colonna family, 129, 154, i63n.Colonna, Marco Antonio, 47, 61, 62Conservatonof Rome, 164-165Corsi, Giovanni, 53n.Corsini, Alexandro, 123Cortigiani, Gientile di Francesco, 41Cossa, Baldassare, Pope John XXIII, 92Councils: Forty-eight, 175; Great

Council, 26, 27, 32, 41, 53, 62, 65, 66,67, 68, 69; One Hundred, 20, 25, 26,

Index 189

Councils (cont.)32, 33, 43, !75; Seventy (Settanta), 20,25, 26, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 43, 78, 131,175

Covoni, Migliore, 12m., 143, 144, 15m.Crassus, 9n.Cupi, Giovanni Domenico, cardinal, 164currency speculation, 118, 141-145, 149

Datary (datario), 102-105, ii3n., 119,158, 160, 167

Dati, Antonio, bank of, 132, 141-142,H3-I44

decime: in Florence, 87; in Naples, 106,118, 127, 155, 160; in the Papal States,156, 157, 158-159, 166, 167, 168, 169

Demosthenes, 6Depository General of the Apostolic

Chamber: appointments to, 95, 15m.;competition over, 77, 85-86, 97-98;deficit and profits, 109-116, 119, 155;duties and functions, 102-115; andFilippo Strozzi, see Strozzi, Filippo;history, 92, 95, 103-104; incomes,104-106, 121, 122, i45n.; payments,106-109

Depository of the Signoria: history andfunctions, 40-43; and Lorenzode'Medici's regime, 36, 38, 44, 86-88;and war finance, 132-140, 14m., 145,148, 149-150

Diamante, 35Died di Guerra e Balia, see also Otto di

Pratica, 38, 39, 41, 61, 74Died di Liberia e Pace, 38, 69Dioscorides, 6dogane of Rome (tre dogane), ggn., 105,

116-117, 121, 122, 123, 151Doria, Andrea, 113Dovizi da Bibbiena, Bernardo, cardinal,

England, English, 90Enkevoirt, Wilhelm, cardinal, 171Erasmus, 6Ermellino, Francesco, cardinal, 105-106,

i23n., 125, 128Eugenius IV, pope, 92Eusebius, 6

Farnese, Alessandro, Pope Paul III, 23,ii4n., i65n., 166-169

Ferdinand, king of Spain, 83n.Ferrara, 46, 52, 76Fiaminghi, Bernardo, i39n.Flanders, Flemish 14, 17, 90, 162, 163Florence: economy of, 13-16; Florentine

communities abroad, see underindividual cities', Last Republic(1527-1530), also called the ThirdRepublic, 4, 17, 18, 2in., 23, 24, 47,149, 150; Medici regime in, 24-44;papal elections and impact on, 21-22,30-31, 72-75, 94; public finance, seealso war finances, 18, 20-21, 23-24;Republic of 1492-1512, also called theSecond Republic, 24, 29, 41, 45-60, 96;Revolution of 1512, 63-69; siege of(1529-1530), 16, 17, 30, 107, 129, 156,165, i66n., 169, 177; taxation in, seealso accatti, 17, 21, 24, 27, 65n., 67; warfinances, see war finances

Fonte, della, bank, 122Fonte, Francesco della, i29n.Foscari, Marco, i4n., 2in.France, French: cardinals, i67n.;

ecclesiastical incomes from, 123;Florentine ally, 30, 62; grain shipmentsfrom, 162, 163; and the Italian Wars,23, 24, 29, 120, 131, 176; papal nunciosto, i n , 162

Francis I, king of France: and Florentinebankers, 16, 17, 158, i59n., 162; andthe Italian Wars, 81, 101, 128, 130,i38n., 176

Frateschi, 55Frescobaldi bank, 123, 127Fugger bank, 1, 9, 15, 94n., 95, io8n., 123

Gaddi bank, 122, 123, 127, 166Gaddi family, 15, 22, 125Gaddi, Luigi, 12, ioon., 122, 128, 166,

168Gaddi, Niccolo, cardinal, 125Gambero, Bartolomeo del, 142Genoa, Genoese, 17, 23,77,95,111,113,11511.Germany, 123Gheri, Goro, 33n., 36, 37, 43, 9on., i3on.,

., 139

190 Filippo Strozzi and the Medici

Ghinucci bank, 12311.Giacomini, Antonio, 53n.Gianfigliazzi, Selvaggia, see Strozzi,

Selvaggia (wife of Filippo the Elder)Ginori, Bartolomeo, 106Ginori, Carlo, 134J1.Giugni family, 46n.Giugni, Domenico, i34n.Gonzaga, Federigo, marchese of Mantua,

109, 132grain provisioning, 123, 161-165, 170Gregory XI, pope, 92Grimaldi bank, ii5n., 129Guadagni, Tommaso, 15Gualterotti, Antonio, 105Guicciardini family, nGuicciardini, Francesco: economic and

political circumstances, 18, 19, 20, 21,58n., 168; and Filippo Strozzi'smarriage, 50, 52; historical opinions,ion., 16-17, 19, 20, 24n., 27, 37, 38,39,40

Guicciardini, Jacopo, i7n., i2onGuidetti, Guidetto, i48n.Guidotti, Leonardo, 88n.

Henry, duke of Orleans, husband ofCatherine de'Medici, 155, 158

Henry VIII, king of England, 17Hungary, 106, 123, i58n., 169

Innocent VIII, pope, 95, 125Italian Wars, see also Urbino and

Lombardy, 14, 16, 17, 18, 23, 30, 107

John XXIII, pope, see Cossa, BaldassareJulius II, pope: financial policy, iO4n.,

109, 121, 124; and the Medici, 29, 48,49, 55, 63, 96; patronage, 75, 94, 95;and Piero Soderini, 55, 62

Lanfredini bank, i27n.Lanfredini, Bartolomeo, 18, 35, 15m.Lanfredini, Lanfredino, 28, 66n., i34n.,

136, i38n.Lannoy, Charles de, viceroy of Naples,

I 3 o n -Lapi, Francesco de, i56n.larghezzey 120

League of Cognac, 131, 145Leo X, see Medici, GiovanniLeva, Antonio de, 158Livy, 6Lombardy: War of (1515), 30, 89, 101,

105, 120, 131, 133, 136; wars in(1520s), 106, 108, 109, 112, 113, 115,125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 133, 136, i37n.,140, 148

London, Florentine Nation in, 17Loreto, 50Louis XII, king of France, 83n.Lucca, Lucchese, 92, 95Lucretius, 5Lyons, Florentine business in, 12, 14, 16,

17, 72n., 118, 119, 123, 158-160

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 36, 73, 75n., i32n.,153; historical opinions, 8, ion., 24n.,27, 52, 82

Machiavelli, Toto, 75n.Madonna da Impruneta, 72maestro di casa, 103, 114, 123Magliano, 93Mantua, 52; marquis of, see Gonzaga,

FederigoMarcello, Virgilio, 5Marches of Ancona: grain from, 123;

judicial taxes in, 105; salaria, 85, i23n.,i25n., 156, i6on., 17m.; Treasury of,122, 157, i58n., 161, 171, 173

Margaret, duchess of Florence and naturaldaughter of Charles V, 176

Marignano, Battle of (1515), 81, i38n.Marseilles, 158Martelli bank, i22n.Martelli, Francesco, i37n.Martelli, Piero, 49Martin V, pope, 92Maximilian I, emperor, 2in., 29Medici bank, 92-93, 113Medici family: competition within, 84,

12in.; control of offices and elections,20, 25, 38, 42, 134, 138; control overFlorence, 9, 11, 19, 23, 24-44, 175;exile and attempts to return toFlorence, 45, 48-50, 58, 61, 94-96;opposition to, 9, 19, 25, 45-46, 49, 73;patronage, see also individual family

Index 191

Medici family {cont.)members, 9, 10, 19-20, 22, 32-35, 71,74-80; restoration, 63-71

Medici, Alessandro, i04.n., i6gn., 174-176Medici, Alfonsina (wife of Piero di

Lorenzo): and Clarice de'Medici'smarriage, 45, 49, 57, 59; death, 90, 172,174; and Florentine public funds,138-139; at the papal court, 121;patronage, 77, 82, 84-86, 97, 101

Medici, Catherine, 82n., iO4n., 154,i58n., i59n., 162; dowry, i52n., 155,158-160, 165, 166, 169, 173

Medici, Clarice di Piero, see Strozzi,Clarice (wife of Filippo)

Medici, Contessina, see Ridolfi,Contessina (wife of Piero Ridolfi)

Medici, Cosimo il Vecchio, 9, 19, 20, 38,42, 45

Medici, Cosimo I, duke, 1, 176Medici, Galeotto: ambassador to Rome,

143-144; depositor of the Signoria andcaretaker of the Medici regime, 36, 42,86-88, 89n., 139^

Medici, Giovanni di Bicci, 93Medici, Giovanni di Lorenzo (Pope Leo

X)AS CARDINAL: and Filippo's marriage,

52, 54, 55, 57, 59, and Florentines inRome, 48-49, 62, 95 — 96, and JuliusII, 48, 49, 62, 96, legate to Bologna, 61,and re-establishment of the Medici inFlorence, 27, 28, 35, 48, 63-67, 69, 70,71

AS POPE LEO x: conspiracy against in1517, no , death in 1521, 120, 128, 172,election and coronation, 21, 22, 30, 71,72-74, 94, and Ferdinand of Spain,83n., financial troubles, 109, 115,i2on., 121, 124-128, 130, financingpapal wars, 107, 126-128, 133, 138, andFlorentine bankers, 21, 22, 23, 76,93-96, 97, and the government ofFlorence, 29, 30, 31, 34n., 39, 42, 82,83n., 87-88, 9on., 92, and music, 5,patronage, 74-75, 84-86, 101, 122, visitto Florence in 1515, 40, 101, 136

Medici, Giuliano: circle of patronage, 35,71, 84, 86, 87n.; commander of papal

armies, 131-132; and coronation of LeoX, 73; marriage, i57n.; moves to Rome(1513), 71, 78; opposes Lorenzode'Medici's election as captain general,83n., 101; and re-establishment of theMedici in Florence, 27-28, 48, 57n., 63,67-69, 70; and regime in Florence, 17,30, 34n., 71

Medici, Giulio (Pope Clement VII): andFilippo Strozzi's marriage, 57, 60;friendship with Filippo Strozzi, seeunder Strozzi, Filippo; and Leo X'selection, 73; and re-establishment ofMedici in Florence, 63

AS CARDINAL: aids Filippo'sadvancement, 97, 101, appointment as,78n., 84, archbishop of Florence, 73n.,87, 130, conspiracy against (1522), 73n.,finances, i4on., 141, and government ofFlorence, 83n., 9on., 92, 130, andLorenzo de'Medici, 85, papal legate, 40,130, 132, 140

AS POPE CLEMENT vn: and Catherine

de'Medici's marriage, 158, death and itsimpact, 24, 160, 163-174, 177-178,election and coronation, 23, 30, ii3n.,128, financial measures, 23, 115, 116,124, 126, 128, 154-158, 160, 163-165,169, and financing papal wars, 107, 108,126, 128-150, and Florentine bankers,21, 23, 94, 95, i4on., and grainbusiness, 16m., 162, i63n., and thegovernment of Florence, 19, 29,prisoner in Castel S. Angelo, 8, 120,12m., 129, 151, and siege of Florence,30, 129, reputation, 163-164

Medici, Ippolito, cardinal, i04n., i58n.,171, 175, 176

Medici, Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco, 176Medici, Lorenzo di Piero, duke of

Urbino: biography by FrancescoVettori, 82n.; captain general ofFlorence, 7, 35, 37, 39, 44, 83, 86, 88,101, ii4n., 131; death, 82, 89, 172,174; and Filippo Strozzi's marriage, 49,57; financial situation, 85-86, 121,i27n., 138-139, 173; friendship withFilippo Strozzi, see under Strozzi,Filippo; marriage arrangements, 81,


Medici, Lorenzo di Piero (cont.)100; mission to Francis I (1515), 81,101; Piombino affair, 7, 82; regime inFlorence, 1, 17, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37,39, 42-44, 71, 78-79, 86-88, 177; tripto Rome (1514), 97; and War ofUrbino, 81, i3on., i36n., i38n.; youthin Rome, 45

Medici, Lorenzo il Magnifico: andgovernment reforms, 20, 25, 40;relationship with Florentine ottimati, 9,45> 47> 54> 6in., 66; and use of publicfunds, 131

Medici, Lucrezia, see Salviati, Lucrezia(wife of Jacopo)

Medici, Maddalena (wife of FranceschettoCibo), 84

Medici, Madeleine de la Tourd'Auvergne, 81, 82n.

Medici, Pagolo, i34n.Medici, Piero di Lorenzo: death, 27, 48;

exile and attempts to return toFlorence, 25, 27, 29, 45, 48, 56-57;opposition to, see also Medici family,opposition to, 47

Michelangelo, ioon.Michelozzi, Niccolo, 36Milan, 17, 29, 128, 138, i62n.Mirandola, 142, 143, 144Modena, 142, 143, 144Monte Comune: and the Medici regime,

20, 21, 41, 87, 131, 136; and warfinance, 40, 130, 133, 134, 136, 137^,138, 139, 148-149

Monte della Fede, 22, 116, 126, 128;Filippo Strozzi, depositor of the Montedella Fede, 127, 174; Filippo Strozzi'scredits, 129, 151, 154, 158, 168, 173

Montemurlo, Battle of, 1, 176

Naples, Neapolitan: Castel Nuovo, 129,13in.; Charles VIII's invasion of, 129,i3on.; ecclesiastical incomes from, 106,i n , n6n. , 118, 122, 123, 127, 155,160; Filippo Strozzi's exile to, 50, 52,57, 59, 60; Florentine business in, 9,12, 65n., 100, 118; Florentine Nationin, 53n.; grain shipments from, 123;visit of Charles V to, 175-176

Napoleon, 9m.Nerli family, 46n.Nero, del, family, 10Nero, Agostino del, i32n., i48n., 157,

i58n., 168-169Nero, Francesco del: Filippo Strozzi's

associate, 7n., 89n., 93n., n8n. , 127,15in., 153; investigation by theTribolanti, 143, 149; Machiavelli'sbrother-in-law, i32n.; treasurer generalin Rome, i32n., i56n., i58n., 159-160,i65n., 166, 169, 170-171, i72n.;vice-depositor in Florence, 89, 90,132-140, 142-150

Niccolini, Andrea, 34Niccolo da Bucine, 5Nobili, de', family, 3Nori, Francesco Antonio, 69n.

Olivieri, Benvenuto, 159, 163, 170-171,174

Orlandini, Niccolo, 53n., 63n.Orsini family, 49Orsini, Alfonsina, see Medici, Alfonsina

(wife of Piero di Lorenzo)Orvieto, 12m., 15 m.ottimati (patriciate): divisions among,

25-27, 32-35, 45-46, 65; economiccondition and investments abroad,11-24; political prominence, 9-11,24-38, 42-43, 66, 69, 177; and publicfinance, 18-20, 24, 148

Otto di Guardia e Bali a: and FilippoStrozzi's marriage, 53, 54, 56-58, 60,61, 62; importance, 39, 41, 69, 70

Otto di Pratica: history and jurisdiction,36, 38, 39, 16m.; and Medici regime,35, 38-41, 43, 44, 81, 88-90, 135; andwar finance, 39-41, 108, i3on., 13 m.,i32n., 133-140, 142, 148, 149-150

palaces: Acquila, 153, 175; Niccolini, 99n.,164, 166; Strozzi in Florence, see underStrozzi

Pallavicini, Antonio Maria, 111Palle, Battista della, i39n.Palleschi: and re-establishment of the

Medici in Florence, 45-46, 50, 63, 64,66-68; treatment by Soderini, 48, 54

Index

Pandolfini family, 3, 11Pandolfini, Battista, 45Pandolfini, Francesco, 8in.Pandolfini, Niccolb, cardinal, 125papal finances, see also war finances, 109,

116, 119-129, 154-155papal mint, 94, 95Papal States, 23, 77, 102, 119, 124, 161,

168, 170Parenti, Piero, ion., 24m, 69, 87, 96, 130,

139"., 145parlamento, 32, 65, 67, 68Parma, 107, 130, 134Passerini, Silvio, cardinal, 37, 39, 43, 9on.,

125, 127Paul II, miter of, n6n. , 126, i28n., i59n.Paul III, pope, see Farnese, AlessandroPa via, Battle of (1525), 130Pazzi Conspiracy, 19, 25, 55Pazzi family, 10, 54-55Pazzi, Antonio, 34Pazzi, Cosimo, archbishop of Florence,

53n-> 55, 58, 64, 66n., 73n.Pazzi, Francesco, 19Penitentiary, 102, 116, 129Pesaro, 106Piacenza, 107, 129, 130Piccolomini family, 143Piero di Cosimo, painter, 4Pignatelli, Ettore, duke of Monteleone,

viceroy of Sicily, 162Piombino, 7, 82Pisa: Council of, 29, 62; War of, 27, 41Pistoia, Pistoiese, 92Pitti family, 22Pitti, Francesco di Piero, 50Pitti, Piero, 50Pius II, pope, iO4n.Pius IX, pope, 16m.Pliny, 6Poggio, Giovanni, 119, i59n., 167Poliziano, 5Polybius, 6Ponte, banking district in Rome, 93, 166Ponzetti, Ferdinando, io6n., 125, 127Poppi, Giovanni, da, i39n.Prato, 63; sack of, 64Ptolemy, 6Pucci family, 10, 22

Pucci, Lorenzo, cardinal, 86, 103, io8n.,116, 129

Pucci, Piero, i39n.

Quaranta, 50, 56-58, 61

Rabelais, Francois, 9n.Rangone, Annibale, 108Rangone, Guido, 109, 132, i33n.Raphael, 153Riario, Raffaello, cardinal, n o , 125Ricasoli bank, 123, 127Ricasoli, Simone, 96Ricci bank, 92Ricci family, 3Ricci, Roberto de', 42, 89, 99, 132, 135,

137, 138Ridolfi, Contessina (wife of Piero Ridolfi),

83n., 84, 121Ridolfi, Emilia, 82Ridolfi, Filippo di Simone, 99, 100Ridolfi, Giovanbattista, 53n., 66n., 67Ridolfi, Maria (wife of Simone di Jacopo

Ridolfi), 99n.Ridolfi, Niccolo, cardinal, 31, i25n., 127,

165, 175Ridolfi, Piero, 83n.Rinuccini, Betto, 171Romagna, 94, 97Rome: Florentine banking community in,

see also names of individual banks,9-10, 12, 15, 16, 19, 21-23, 48-49, 76,86, 91-97, 123, 125, 127, 128, 130, 148;Florentine confraternity in, 93, 96,98n.; Florentine Nation in, 93, 94, 95,i i5n.; grain provisioning for, 123,161-165, 170

Rossi, Luigi de', 31, 83n., i25n.Rovere, Francesco Maria della, duke of

Urbino, 108, 130Rucellai bank, 127Rucellai family, 3, 10, 22Rucellai, Bernardo: adviser to the Strozzi,

4> 5> 47, 53; death, 88n.; economic andpolitical circumstances, 12, 49, 53, 64n.,66n., 78n.; Orti Oricellari, di>n-

Rucellai, Bonaccorso, 99Rucellai, Domenico, 63n.Rucellai, Francesco, 63n.


Rucellai, Giovanni, i2n., 49, 53, 63, 6411.Rucellai, Jacopo, 8sn., 99-100Rucellai, Lucrezia di Bernardo, see

Strozzi, Lucrezia (wife of LorenzoStrozzi)

Rucellai, Palla, 2on., 53, 63

Sachetti, Alessandro, 58n.Sack of Rome, 8, 30, 9m., 107, 13m.,

145, 171; economic effects of, 23, 24,120-121, 129, 15m., 154, 155

St Peter's, 106, ii4n.Salutati, Barbara Raffacani, i53n.Salviati bank, 126-127, 154Salviati family, 10, 13, 15, i6n., 22Salviati, Alamanno, 58n.Salviati, Giovanni, cardinal, 31, 125, 127,

129, 134, 145, 165, 175Salviati, Giuliano, 175Salviati, Jacopo: ambassador to Rome,

7in.; and Filippo Strozzi's marriage,53, 56; Florentine banker, 12, 17,i27n., 138, i43n., 15m., 154, 157;Medici parente and patronage, 31, 76,77, 85, 125, 129; political stance, 28,66n., 83n.; treasurer of the Romagna,94, 106

Salviati, Lucrezia (wife of Jacopo), 53, 55,83n., 84, 85

Sansovino, Jacopo, ioon.Santuccio, Strozzi villa, 5, 82n.Sauli bank, 75, i23n.; as depositor

general of the Apostolic Chamber, 77,85, 95, 97, 101, 108, 109, n o

Sauli, Agostino, i29n.Sauli, Bandinelli, cardinal, 77, 85, 86Sauli, Hieronimo, i29n.Sauli, Sebastiano, 128, i64n.Savonarola, Girolamo, 25, 26, 27, 29, 47Serapica, Giovanni, iO3n.Serristori family, 10Serristori, Antonio, 135Sessa, Luis de Cordoba, duke of, and

imperial ambassador in Rome, 143,Seville, 118, 119, i56n.Sforza, Francesco I, duke of Milan, 83Sforza, Francesco II, duke of Milan,

i62n.Sicily, Sicilian, 123, 161, 162, 163, 165

Siena, Sienese, 95, 105, 122, 143Signoria: abolition of, 175; and Filippo

Strozzi's marriage, 52-58, 60, 61;jurisdiction, 39, 40, 41, 46n., 64, 115;and war finances, 134, 135, 144

Sistine Chapel, 106Sixtus IV, pope, 19, 55Soderini family, 10Soderini, Francesco, cardinal of Volterra,

59, 62, 72Soderini, Giovanbaptista di Paolo

Antonio, 50Soderini, Piero, gonfalonier e-a-vit a:

conspiracy against in 1510, 61-63;election as gonfalonier e-a-vit a, 4n., 27,48; enmity with Julius II, 55, 62;expulsion in 1512, 19, 28, 64-65; andFilippo Strozzi's marriage, 7, 50-61;opposition to, 27, 28, 47, 49, 52, 54-58,60; and Strozzi ties, 3, 46

Soderini, Tommaso, 3Spain, Spanish, 82, 83n., 162, i63n.; army

and restoration of the Medici toFlorence, 64, 65, 68, 70; ecclesiasticalrevenues from, 119, 123, 156, 158, 167,169

Spanocchi bank, 95Spinelli, Bartolomeo, i25n.Spini bank, 92Spinola, Agostino, 159, 160, 162, 170-171Spoleto, 156, 157strettezze, n 9-121Strozzi banks; Florence, 89, io8n., 118,

i3on., 132, i33n., 136, 140-141, 176;Lyons, i4n., i6n., 8in., 117, 118, 133,158-159, 162, i69n.; Naples, 100, 106,118; Rome, i4n., 86, 89, 98-99, io8n.,112, 114-117, 122, 123, 125-128, i3on.,i32-i33, J39, HO, H1, H3, 154, 158,174; Seville, 118, 156, 167

Strozzi family: attitude toward Filippo'smarriage, 46, 48, 51-52, 54-55; history,11, 12; marriages, 3-4, 45; oppositionto the Medici, 9, 19, 45-46, 51, 57, 69;political divisions, 46-47, 65-67;political fortunes under the Medici, seealso individual family members, 68,69-71, 76-80; wealth and prominence,10, 13, 19, 22

Index

Strozzi palace in Florence, 1, 3, 4, 12, 48,68, 69, 176

Strozzi, Alessandra, 3-4Strozzi, Alfonso: economic circumstances,

3, 12, 98; and Filippo's marriage,50-53, 60; friend of Piero Soderini, 47,66; opposition to the Medici, 45, 47;political career, 47, 79n.

Strozzi, Andrea, 79Strozzi, Angelo, 106Strozzi, Antonio di Ser Michele, 98-99,

100, 101Strozzi, Antonio di Vanni, 46, 55, 69, 79n.Strozzi, Benedetto di Giovanni, 52Strozzi, Carlo di Niccolb, 79Strozzi, Caterina, 4Strozzi, Clarice (wife of Filippo), 86, 132;

appearance, 60; death, 172; andFrancesco del Nero, 89n.; and Lorenzode'Medici, 8in., 82n.; marriage toFilippo Strozzi, 7, 28, 45-61, 69, 79, 80

Strozzi, Federigo, 71Strozzi, Fiammetta, 3Strozzi, Filippo di Filippo: and

Alessandro de'Medici, 174-176;banishment to Naples, 57; and Battleof Montemurlo, 1, 176; and Catherinede'Medici's dowry, 158-160, 165, 166,169, 171, 173; and conspiracy ofPrinzivalle della Stufa, 61-63; andcurrency speculation, 118, 141-145;depositor general of the ApostolicChamber, 9, 12, 83n., 84-90, 92, 95,97-98, 101, 102-118, 122, 127-128 129,132, 140, 141, 145, 151, i52n., 155,173; depositor of the Signoria ofFlorence, 10, 42, 44, 71, 80, 86, 88-90,92, 127, 132-140, 145, 149, 150;devotion to Medici, 7-8, 34, 145, 151,153; education and youth, 3-6; andelection of Leo X, 72-73; embassy toFrancis I in 1515, 81, 101; exile, 1, 10,174-177; and Giovanni de'Medici(Pope Leo X), 12, 63, 65, 72, 97, 172,174; and Giulio de'Medici (PopeClement VII), 7, 8, 54, 59, 68, 70, 71,84, 85, 90, 97, 140, 151-160, 169, 172;and grain provisioning, 152, 161-165,169, 173; historical reputation, 1-2,

91-92, 176-177; hostage for ClementVII, 6, 7-8, 129, 13m., 154, 171;impact of Clement VII's death,164-178; imprisonment and death, 1,174; investments in Florence, i6n., 120,166, 176; investments in France, seeStrozzi bank in Lyons; investments inSpain, see Strozzi bank in Seville; andjealousy of other Medici parenti, 83, 86,101, 175, 177; loans to Giovannide'Medici (Leo X), 127-128, 133, 138,141; loans to Giulio de'Medici(Clement VII), i3on., i4on., 146, 147,151-152, 154-160, 165, 166, 173; andLorenzo di Piero de'Medici, 1, 7, 8, 35,42, 44, 68, 70, 71, 78-84, 86, 88-90,100, 101, i27n., 131, 172, 174, 177;marriage to Clarice de'Medici, 7, 28,45-61, 70, 76, 79, 80; Medici parente,28, 31, 61, 62, 79, 97, 100, 118, 153,169, 172; Monte della Fede credits, 129,151, 154, 158, 168, 173; nuncio toFrance, 8in., 152, 154, 164

OFFICES AND POSITIONS IN FLORENCE:

Abbondanza official, 162, 175, Balia, 71,Council of Forty-Eight, 175, depositorof the Signoria, see separate listing above,Dodici Procurator}, I75n., ducalcounsellor, 175, Festaiuolo di S.Giovanni, 78, Mercanzia official, I75n.,Monte official, 20, 44, 80, i75n., oratorto Francis I in 1515, 81, Otto diGuardia, i75n., Otto di Pratica, i75n.

OFFICES AND POSITIONS IN ROME:

consul of the Florentine Nation inRome, 94n., 153, depositor general ofthe Apostolic Chamber, see separatelisting above, depositor of the College ofthe Knights of St Peter, 174, depositorof the Monte della Fede, 127, 174,depositor of the tre dogane of Rome,151, grain official, 161, nuncio toFrance, 8in., 152, treasurer of theMarches 152, 155, 157, 161, 168, 171,173, treasurer of Urbino, 151

papal financier, 15, 22, 90-93, 96-98,101, 115-118, 126-128, 151-174, 177;and Paul III, 167-168, 174; politicalviews, 28, 66-67, 82-83; promoter of


Strozzi, Filippo di Filippo (cont.)Strozzi political fortunes, 7, 69-70, 76,78-79, 84; and re-establishment ofMedici in Florence, 63-71; rise tofavor, 71-90, 97, 118; size of fortune,11-12, 169; tax farms and venal offices,85-87, 97, 99, 116-117, 122-123, I27>i28n., i29n., 151-152, 154-160,166-170; trip to France in 1518, 81;trip to France in 1533, i59n., 162; andwar finances, 1, 89, 108, 109, 118, 119,127-128, 131-150

Strozzi, Filippo di Matteo (the Elder), 1,3, 9, 45, 46, 98

Strozzi, Giovanni di Carlo, 46, 52, 76Strozzi, Giulio, 174Strozzi, Leonardo, 61, 66, 69, 70, 79n., 80Strozzi, Leone, i52n.Strozzi, Lorenzo di Filippo di Filippo,

174Strozzi, Lorenzo di Filippo di Matteo:

advice to Filippo, 67, 77; biography ofFilippo, 3, 63, 69, 70, 79, 96, i67n.;and Filippo's marriage, 50-51, 53, 54,59, 60; investments and loans, 12, i6n.,98, i34n.; marriage, 4, 47; politicalcareer, 66, 69n., 71, 79, 80;rapprochement with the Medici, 73, 76

Strozzi, Lucrezia (wife of Lorenzo), 4, 47,48

Strozzi, Luisa, 175Strozzi, Marco, 52, 60Strozzi, Maria, see Ridolfi, Maria (wife of

Simone di Jacopo Ridolfi)Strozzi, Maria di Filippo, 86Strozzi, Matteo di Lorenzo: and

conspiracy of 1510, 61; and Filippo'smarriage, 46, 51, 55; political career,46, 66, 69, 70, 7m., 76, 78, 79n., 80,135

Strozzi, Michele di Carlo, 46Strozzi, Palla, 19Strozzi, Piero di Andrea, 79Strozzi, Piero di Filippo, 126, i52n.,

171-172, 175Strozzi, Rinaldo, 167Strozzi, Roberto, ioon., i52n.Strozzi, Selvaggia (wife of Filippo Strozzi

the Elder): acquires Medici property,

45; and Bernardo Rucellai, 4, 47; death,12; and Filippo's marriage, 48, 50, 51,53> 59 > guardian of Filippo andLorenzo, 3, 5, 46

Strozzi, Vincenzo, i52n.Strozzi, Zaccheria, 70Studio Fiorentino, 5n., 46, 89n., 149Stufa, Luigi della, 6in.Stufa, Prinzivalle della, 4, 47, 49, 61-62Suriano, Antonio, 14, 15, 16, 2in.Swiss, 108, 116, 132, 169Swiss Guard, 105, 107, 108, iO9n., ii4n.,

123

tamburo, 53-54. 5^, 57Tesoreria Segreta, 103Tolfa, 122Tornabuoni bank, i22n.Tornabuoni family, 11, 22, 63n., 64n.Tornabuoni, Giovanni, 41, 42, 137, 142,

148Tornabuoni, Simone, 63n., 107Tosinghi, Pierfrancesco, 53n., 63Tour d'Auvergne, Madeleine de la, see

Medici, Madeleine de la Tourd'Auvergne (wife of Lorenzo, duke ofUrbino)

Tovaglia, Lapo della, 2on.tratte, 43Treasury General of the Apostolic

Chamber, 102, io6n.-iO7n., i n , 159,166

Trevisano, Domenico, i24n.Tribolanti, 143, 149Trieste, 17Tullia of Aragon, 6Turini, Baldassare da Pescia, 36, 101, 119Turks, 106, i n , 124, 128-129, 158, 169,

174

Ungaresi, Alexandro, 125Urban VI, pope, 92Urbino: Treasury of, 127; War of and its

financing, 30, 89, 105, io6n., 108, 120,126, 127, 130, 133, 135, 136, 138, 145

Usumari bank, 95

Valle, Andrea della, cardinal, 171Valle, Bartolomeo della, 117, i55n.

Index 197

Valori family, 46n., 53n.Valori, Bartolomeo, 49, 63, 6gn., 83n.,

129, i39n., 168Valori, Filippo di Niccolo, 2on.Valori, Niccolo, 53n.Vasari, Giorgio, 5Venice, Venetian, 14, 15, 16, 52, 90, 115,

124, 176Verrazzano, Bernardo da, 99Vespucci, Giovanni, 63n., 69n., 83n.Vettori, Francesco: ambassador to France,

36, 44, 8in.; ambassador to Rome, 74;biographer of Lorenzo de'Medici, 82n.;economic circumstances, 18, 19;historical opinions, 24n., 40, 72-73,75n., 76, 145, 153; Medici amico, 34, 89

Vettori, Paolo: captain of the papalgalleys, 105, 108, 109; Giuliano

de'Medici's friend, 86, 87n.; papalcommissioner, 141; patronage, 42,74-75, 86-87; and re-establishment ofthe Medici in Florence, 32, 63, 64n.

Via di Banco di S. Spirito, see Canale diPonte

Vigerio, Marco, cardinal, i2on.Vitelli, Alexandro, 14cm.Vitelli, Vitello, i33n.Viterbo, 155

war finances: Florentine public funds and,J7> 73> 89, 92, i2on., 129-150; papal,see also under individual popes, 124-131,134, 136, 138, 140-142, 146-149

Welser bank, 95

Zeffi, Francesco, 3

Documents

Melissa Meriam Bullard - Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Favor and Finance in Sixteenth-century Florence and Rome