Mediji, Religija, Nacionalizam i Tranziciona pravda

8/16/2019 Mediji, Religija, Nacionalizam i Tranziciona pravda

1/153


2/153

MEDIJI, RELIGIJA, NACIONALIZAM

I TRANZICIONA PRAVDA

D V N, N K,S S D G


3/153

Urednik N K

Z U R- T , N- (NED).

CIP – Katalogizacija u publikacijiBiblioteka Matice srpske, Novi Sad

316.774:[2+323.1(497.11)(082)

MEDIJI, religija, nacionalizam i tranziciona pravda / [priredili Dubravka Valić-Nedeljković ...et al.]. - Novi Sad : Centar za istraživanje religije, politike i društva : Odsek za medije Filozofskogfakulteta Univerziteta u Novom Sadu, 2016 (Novi Sad : Topolino štampa). - 151 str. : ilustr. ; 24 cm

Radovi na više jezika. - Radovi su izloženi na konferenciji “Mediji, religija, nacionalizam i tran-ziciona pravda”, održanoj 22-23. maja 2016., u Beogradu. - Tiraž 300. - Napomene i bibliografskereference uz tekst. - Bibliografija uz svaki rad. - Rezime na engl. jeziku uz pojedine radove.

ISBN 978-86-89419-06-1

1. Konferencija “Mediji, religija, nacionalizam i tranziciona pravda” (2016 ; Beograd)

a) Mediji - Religija - Srbija - Zbornici b) Mediji - Nacionalizam - Srbija - Zbornici

COBISS.SR-ID 305578759

Copyright © CIRPD 2016.


4/153

MEDIJI, RELIGIJA,

NACIONALIZAM

I TRANZICIONA PRAVDAPriredili

D V - N, N K,S S D G

C ,

O F U N S

Novi Sad, 2016.


5/153


6/153

SADRŽAJ

MEDIJI, RELIGIJA, NACIONALIZAM I TRANZICIONA PRAVDA

VJEKOSLAV PERICAESTABLISHED RELIGIOUS NATIONALISMAND ITS OPPOSITION IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA .................................... 9

ZLATIBORKA POPOV MOMČINOVIĆVLADIMIR KLAČAR

KOLEKTIVNA MEMORIJA – IZMEĐU VIKTIMOLOGIJEI TRANSFORMACIJE DRUŠTVA: NARATIVI CRKAVA U BIH ................... 28

DANICA IGRUTINOVIĆCARU BOŽIJE: JAVNI ISTUPI SRPSKE PRAVOSLAVNE CRKVEU VEZI SA PARADOM PONOSA I PITANJEM ABORTUSAU TOKU 2014. GODINE .................................................................................. 41

SERGEJ BEUKDIGITALNI MEDIJI KAO MISIOLOŠKE PLATFORME MALIH VERSKIH

ZAJEDNICA U SRBIJI: HRIŠĆANSKI INTERNET RADIO „HRAST“ ........ 53

VLADIMIR KOLARIĆRELIGIJA I POMIRENJE U FILMU „ISCELJENJE“ IVANA JOVIĆA .......... 64

SRđAN SREMACR. R UARD GANZEVOORTEROTIZOVANI NACIONALIZAM: TEORIJSKA PROMIŠLJANJAO ODNOSU RELIGIJSKOG I SEKSUALNOG NACIONALIZMA ............... 76

MEDIJI, EKSTREMIZAM I KULTURA SEĆANJA

DUBRAVKA VALIĆ NEDELJKOVIĆULOGA JAVNIH MEDIJSKIH SERVISAU PROMOCIJI NACIONALIZMA I EKSTREMIZMAU KONTEKSTU REGIONA ZAPADNOG BALKANA ................................... 87

BORIS VARGAALEKSANDAR MUDRI MEDIJI, POLITIČKI AKTERI I EKSTREMIZAM

U SRBIJI I NA KOSOVU ................................................................................ 101


7/153

MILICA DIMITRIJEVIĆ(NEO)NACIONALIZAM KAO SAVREMENI IDEOLOŠKI DISKURSPAR EXCELLENCE : KSENOFOBIJA I ANTIIMIGRACIONIZAM ............. 115

JELENA đUREINOVIĆ ISTORIJSKI REVIZIONIZAM ILI PREVLADAVANJEAUTORITATIVNE PROŠLOSTI? MEDIJI I SLUŽBENAPOLITIKA SEĆANJA NA DRUGI SVETSKI RAT U SRBIJI ........................ 128

DINKO GRUHONJIĆDESET GODINA REKOM-A: ISTORIJAT NAJVEĆE INICIJATIVECIVILNOG DRUŠTVA NA POSTJUGOSLOVENSKOM PROSTORU ...........139


8/153

MEDIJI, RELIGIJA, NACIONALIZAM

I TRANZICIONA PRAVDA


9/153


10/153

9

Vjekoslav PericaUniversity of Rijeka, Croatia

ESTABLISHED RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM AND ITSOPPOSITION IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA1

I

Since 2011, influential contemporary philosopher Slavoj Žižek has argued thatone of most vigorous nationalistic forces across the post-Yugoslav space is the

Catholic Church of Croatia. “15 years aer the 1991-1995 war in Croatia andBosnia and Herzegovina,” Žižek said in a 2011 London lecture, nationalismsin the Balkans did not subside. On the contrary, in some cases they grew evenmore extremist. Yet it is no longer Serb but Croat nationalism that seems themost forceful. Its major characteristic, according to Žižek, is Catholic clerical-ism. In Žižek’s words, “the darkest political force in the region, as far as I cansee now, is the Croatian Catholic Church. . .It is absolutely, openly pro-Ustasha.Church leaders refuse to distance the Church from this fascist ideology even ina purely symbolic, trivial way...” 2 In several subsequent interviews and lecturesŽižek went on to argue in a similar vein, by saying, among other things, that

“present-day Croatia is a Catholic clericalist nationalistic state, an exemplarycase of the return of dark medieval clericalism to Europe.” In a recent lengthyinterview with the German weekly Der Spiegel , Žižek said that contemporaryCroatian Catholicism is not a religion, religious faith, or supernatural belief,but a nationalistic ideology and a political-cultural project. In his words, “ouropponent isn’t really religion. For example, Živko Kustić, a Croatian Catholicnationalist priest, declared Catholicism to be a symbol of the fact that peopleare not prepared to renounce their national and cultural legacy -- “the wholeCroatianness.” is statement makes clear that it is no longer an issue of faith

and its truth, but rather a political-cultural project. Religion here is just aninstrument, an indicator of collective identity. It is about how much publicone’s own side controls, the amount of hegemony “our” side exerts. at’s whyKustić approvingly quotes an Italian communist who claims, “I am an atheistCatholic.” at is also why Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik, who

1 A version of this article was presented at International Conference “Media, Religion andTransitional Justice” at University of Novi Sad, Serbia, 22 May 2015. I would like to thank scholarsof religion Zoran Grozdanov and Srdjan Sremac, for comments and suggestions.

2 Slavoj Žižek, “e Silent Voice of a New Beginning” lecture at the Birkbeck Institute for theHumanities, London, UK, on the 20th November 2011. http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2011/11/

slavoj-zizek-the-silent-voice-of-a-new-beginning/

UDC 323.118:27(497.5)323.118:27(497.11)

323(497.5)”1991/1995”


11/153

D Vć - Nć, N Kć, Sđ S D Gć (.)

10

himself is not very religious, referenced the Christian legacy as a foundation ofEuropean identity...”3

While Žižek’s thesis is overall correct and even the metaphors “dark” and

“medieval” do not seem exaggerated insofar as Croatian Catholicism is at thismoment presumably the most nationalistic, clericalist right-wing Catholicismin the world; it is not sufficiently thorough and properly placed in a wider so-cial and historical context. e emphatic ethnic nationalistic course is novelty,mostly the result of the 1991-1995 war and the nationalistic homogenizationunder the regime of Franjo Tudjman. Otherwise, the Church of Croatia wasnever monolithic. Its various factions differed over various issues includingchurch-society and church-state relations, interfaith relations, and the ap-proach to the national emancipation project.4 In addition, the contemporary

clerical nationalistic turn initiated from above as the episcopate moved close toTudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union, also provoked opposition frombelow. In some cases, the new dissent has been more radical than any earlierform of anti-establishment tendency from within the church. In addition, theCroatian Church’s role can be properly understood only in the context of theBalkan conflict observed at least from the 1980s to the present. During this pe-riod, the dynamics of ethnic nationalist movements oen shied gear varyingfrom the initially reserved and cautious Church to a militant one and the otherway around. However, the contemporary Croatian nationalist movement was

not an isolated occurrence but a factor in a dynamic interaction with other na-tionalist movements among which Serbian nationalism has played a key role.

F C C T Y CT C-R C N

Socialist Yugoslavia (SFRY) was the only Eastern European country in the ColdWar era that normalized relations with the Vatican in 1965 and since 1970 main-tained diplomatic relations. While progressive clergy inspired by the SecondVatican council welcomed the change and worked on issues such as upgrad-

ing interfaith dialogue, ecumenical relations and dialogue with non-believers,the largely conservative nationalist bishops exploited the favorable climate for agradual advancement into public sphere promoting ethnic nationalism. e re-gime was forced to tolerate a series of Church-sponsored massive historical an-niversaries and jubilees called “irteen Centuries of Christianity of the Croat

3 Der Spiegel interview with Slavoj Žižek: “e Greatest reat to Europe Is Its Inertia.” In-terview conducted by Romain Leick, Spiegel Online International, March 31, 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/slavoj-zizek-greatest-threat-to-europe-is-it-s-inertia-a-1023506.html

4 See Perica, Balkan Idols, pp. 3-16, 17-42, 56-73, and 165-185.


12/153


11

People” (1975-1984). Working cautiously against the communist regime whilealso competing with the similar strategy of advancement in public sphere andchampioning ethnic nationalism managed by the Serbian Orthodox Church,

Croatian Catholicism entered the pre-war crisis of the 1990s under an unofficiallabel “the Church of the Croats”, a fully mobilized leader of Croatian national-ist movement.5 is Croatian national Church and the rival Serbian OrthodoxChurch with the third largest religion in the post-Yugoslav space, the IslamicCommunity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, participated as key members of thewarring ethnic blocks in the 1991-1995 war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovi-na.6 While Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks came out of the war as traumatized andimpoverished losers that will never recover to the level of prosperity and stabil-ity they used to enjoy under mature socialism; the three clerical organizations

allied with leaders of ethnic nationalist parties became the winners, membersof the new privileged governing castes and wealthy elites.

e Catholic Church in Croatia grew even stronger under the regime of thenationalist historian Franjo Tudjman (1990-1999) and continued the nation-alization project in the post-Tudjman era. Aer Tudjman, the Church did allit could to secure continuous stay in power for the nationalist Croatian Demo-cratic Union founded by Tudjman. During two terms in power of the le-centercoalitions, (2000-2003 and 2012-2015) Church leaders would label the demo-cratically elected government as “traitorous”, “unpatriotic,” and “against the peo-

ple”. e Church did not even tolerate the two leist terms but openly backedthe right wing opposition including movements that could be best described ascoup d’ etat attempts. e first coup attempt took place in 2000 and was resolvedby the energetic president Stjepan Mesić with discrete help of Vatican diplomacy.e most recent one shook Croatia in May 2015 when a group of war veteranstook to the streets of the capital Zagreb challenging the incumbent government,clashed with police, and found shelter in a church. Each putsch involved promi-nent display of religious symbols, public prayers, and priestly assistance. Al-though Croatian nationalist ideology insists that Croatia belongs to Western Eu-ropean civilization (thus to differ from Orthodox Serbs and Bosnian Muslims),

the post-communist Croatia is more analogous to Central and South Americancountries of the 1950s and 1970s than to Western Europe. Since 1990, Croatiahas never become successfully democratic. e Catholic Church is presumablythe most influential anti-liberal social force. It has never accepted democraticallyelected officials lacking the Church’s approval.

Under Tudjman, Croatia inaugurated a system analogous to “national Ca-tholicism” (Nacionalcatholicismo) as designed by Francisco Franco in Spain

5 Perica, Balkan Idols, chapters 4, 9 and 10.6 See Paul Mojzes, ed. Religion and the War in Bosnia. (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1998).


13/153


12

from 1939-1975.7 In a weak state with unfinished nation building process, theChurch seems as the only relatively solid national institution and history thekey substance of national identity. Accordingly, it would be a mistake to con-

sider Croatian national identity solid thanks to the Church and its consecratedmyths, cults and liturgies as mechanisms for management of historical contro-

versies and traumas. On the contrary, as the Spanish case shows,

in Spain, a chronically weak state, a divided and largely undemocratic political class,and an increasingly polarized social and political climate impeded the constructionof an effective system of national education and the emergence of a consensus on theshape and meaning of the Spanish national past. is in turn contributed to one ofthe most striking features of modern Spanish political and cultural life--the absenceof a strong sense of Spanish, as opposed to local or regional, identity.8

So, the post-Tudjman Croatia resembled Spain following Franco’s death whencoup attempts threaten democracy while the “historical amnesia” project facedmanipulations with trauma, revision, and controversy.

In Croatia today, the national Church (and perhaps, the national footballteam) are the most popular social institutions that enjoy more legitimacy thanthe state. e Catholic Church, however, is not just a state within state; it is aforce above the state. In 2004, a senior Vatican diplomat described Croatia as“the most Catholic nation in Europe.”9 e church earned this status aboveall thanks to the preservation of the ethnic nationalist cause under commu-

nism and assistance to the ethnic nationalist party, Croatian Democratic Un-ion (HDZ), in its rise to power aer the changes of 1989-1990. Since then theso-called “Church of the Croats” and the HDZ party have virtually co-ruledthe nation. e nationalist president Franjo Tudjman (1990-1999), promotedthe Church into national co-founder and the Church consecrated Tudjman’spersonality cult as the nation’s “founding father.”10 Tudjman’s successor asHDZ president and Prime Minister from 2003-2009, Ivo Sanader, as promi-nent Catholic layman, received the Church’s backing during his premiership.Sanader was later sentenced for corruption and criminal privatization to 10years imprisonment and is now in jail but the Church never explicitly con-

7 Vjekoslav Perica, “e Catholic Church and Croatian Statehood.” In Vjeran Pavlaković, ed.,Nationalism, Culture and Religion in Croatia since 1990 . e Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russi-an, East European and Central Asian Studies, No. 32 (November 2001), pp. 55-70.

8 Carolyn P. Boyd. Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875-1975 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Cited from http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/titles/6199.html

9 Vjekoslav Perica, “e Most Catholic Country in Europe? Church, State and Society in Con-temporary Croatia.” Religion, State and Society , Vol. 34, No. 4 (2006), pp. 311-346.

10 Ivo Goldstein and Slavko Goldstein, “Revisionism in Croatia: e Case of Franjo Tudman”,East European Jewish Affairs, Vol. 32, No.1, (2002), pp. 52-64.


14/153


13

demned his crimes. Although Church leaders have sporadically voiced con-cern over growing poverty in society, the Church itself has become one of thewealthiest institutions and major beneficiaries of the system popularly referred

to as “criminal privatization.”11 Church leaders also gladly receive donationsand public statements of faith even from some of the most unpopular pub-lic figures, for example, from Milan Bandić, the corrupt mayor of Zagreb, orZdravko Mamić, the arrogant owner of the “Dinamo” Zagreb football team,both of whom publicly pose as faithful Catholics and ardent patriots accord-ing to the standards of patriotism inaugurated by the Tudjman and Sanaderregimes.

As the Tudjman rule neared conclusion, the authoritarian leader workedtogether with the Vatican on the state religion project. Four treaties between

Croatia and the Vatican signed in 1998, established the Church as a nationalinstitution, Tudjman’s co-ruler and tutor of society. Among other privileges,the Church annually receives substantial amount of cash from all taxpayersregardless of their religious (non) affiliation, plus additional payments for res-titution of nationalized property, religious schools’ instructors, parishes andmonasteries.12 e Church also exercised control over public schools, the mili-tary and police forces. For example, according to military personnel’s privatetestimonies addressed to human rights groups, everyone on active duty, re-gardless of religious affiliation, is forced to attend patriotic pilgrimages and

processions. Furthermore, the Church’s pressure regarding the abortion issueforced five leading national hospitals to start refusing abortion requests dueto physicians’ conscience objection (while some of them continued perform-ing abortions in private practice). A Croatian columnist has recently writtenthat Croatia is one of the only two European countries in which women todayhave less rights and equality than ten years ago. He argues that, “the factorsresponsible for the worsening of women’s position in society are: capitalism,economic crisis and the Catholic Church...”13 Similarly, Croatian feminist au-thor Đurđa Knežević, stated in a recent interview that the Catholic Churchof Croatia is probably the most conservative among traditionally conserva-

tive Catholic countries, specifically, more conservative than the Church in Ire-land. “e influence of the Church on citizens’ worldview and values here isenormous,” Knežević argues, “while at the same time civic values and public

11 “Ailing Croatia: A Mighty Mess. Croatia is the EU’s Newest Basket Case.” Te Economist ,July 26, 2014.

12 According to a Croatian government report in November 2014, the Church received fromthe State over the last 10 years a total of 3 billion in Croatian national currency the kuna (HRK)plus additional payments for nationalized property, parishes and instructors of catechism. In thesame period all other religious organizations in Croatia received from the state 200 millionkunas.According to daily newspaper Večernji list , 14. Nov. 2014 p. 8.

13 Jurica Pavičić,”U Hrvatskoj je sve teže biti žena”, Jutarnji list , 31.Oct. 2014, p. 33.


15/153


14

opinion are weak. e Croat clergy are hardline conservatives, they find thereformist and well-meaning incumbent pope annoying...”14 Incidentally, theinfluential Croatian conservative Catholic movement “In the Name of Family”

(U ime obitelji) has recently lobbied in Ireland trying to unsuccessfully influ-ence the Irish plebiscite on same-sex marriages. Consequently, as the earliermost conservative Ireland turned progressive, the movement “In the Name ofFamily” succeeded in the 2014 Croatian referendum on the same issue seekingeven a Constitutional amendment in order to ban same-sex marriages.

One of the most striking features of contemporary Croatian nationalism ishistorical revisionism according to which the pro-Nazi Ustasha losers from theSecond World War became victims and subsequent winners. According to theChurch, no genocide took place in the pro-Axis Independent State of Croatia

and no church leader or clergy collaborated with the Ustasha regime. e war-time archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac, imprisoned by the communistswas made a martyr. Likewise, 200 military chaplains that served in Ustashacombat units that the communists executed for assisting the Ustasha in warcrimes and crimes of genocide are commemorated as victims of communism.Church leaders either deny or relativize the Ustasha genocide, Holocaust, andcrimes against Serbs, Jews, and Croat antifascists. 15 Meanwhile, ever since theTudjman era, the semi-official church newspaper Glas koncila [Voice of theCouncil] has published revisionist articles and interviews about the Holocaust

while readers’ letters to the editor and sometimes even editorials and columnsentail attacks on Jews, freemasons, communists, homosexuals, Serbs, and an-tifascist Croats. In 2015, the Church officially registered and funded the as-sociation “e Triple Myth of Jasenovac” led by a senor Catholic cleric. isassociation’s mission is to argue that the World War II concentration camp ofJasenovac run by the Croat fascist Ustasha regime where between 100,000-250,000 Serbs, Jews, Romani and Croat antifascists were tortured and murdered,is actually a myth, an anti-Croat conspiracy plotted by Serbs, Jews, and com-munists.

e Church implies that postwar crimes of communism against Croats

have been worse than Ustasha crimes. However, some Catholics are preparedto condemn Ustasha crimes. For example, the historian Ivo Banac describesthe Ustasha regime as authoritarian, criminal and pro-Nazi but he views the

14 “Feministica i književnica Đurđa Knežević: Crkva u Hrvatskoj konzervativnija je i od oneu Irskoj”, Novi list online edition, novilist.hr, 17. svibnja 2015, http://www.novilist.hr/layout/set/print/Kultura/Knjizevnost/Durda-Knezevic-Crkva-u-Hrvatskoj-konzervativnija-je-i-od-one-u-Irskoj

15 See Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Goldstein. Holokaust u Zagrebu (Zagreb: Židovska općina: NoviLiber, 2001); Slavko Goldstein. 1941.: godina koja se vraća. 2nd ed. (Zagreb : Novi Liber, 2007); PaulMojzes , Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the wentieth Century. (Lanham, Md:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).


16/153


15

Church in Croatia as an autonomous moral factor that opposed fascism andcommunism alike.16 In contrast to Banac, who, as a publicly declared Catholic,at least condemns Ustasha crimes, the official Church never completely and

explicitly condemned Ustashism while attacking antifascism and communismas major threats almost daily for more than three decades now. is tendencyreached a pinnacle at the May 16 commemoration at Bleiburg. is obscureepisode behind the Victory in Europe commemorates the Partisan capture ofretreating NDH forces at the Austrian border. e Partisan justice and revengethe nationalist narrative constructs as a myth of heroism, betrayal and suf-fering of patriotic Croat fighters and innocent civilians. e Church led theBleiburg tribute and boycotted the government-sponsored commemorationof the 70th anniversary of Second World War’s end held at the memorial site of

the World War II Ustasha concentration camp Jasenovac. Speaking to a crowdof 50,000 at the Bleiburg field, Cardinal Archbishop of Zagreb Josip Bozanićshowed compassion for the victims of antifascist revenge against fascists butno hint of compassion for the victims of Croatian fascism; he spoke about evilsof Nazism and fascism in Europe but never labeled the Ustasha regime as evil.For him, contemporary ethnic nationalism and the rise of the far right in Cro-atia is invented and exaggerated by the heirs of the communists and should notworry the Church – its primary concern is the currently governing le-wingcoalition that allegedly conceals the truth about the Bleiburg massacre and the

awakening of a new antifascism in Croatia.

17

To summarize, since the 1970s, the Catholic Church of Croatia has beenthe main channel and until the ascent of the Tudjman party the only institu-tionalized form of Croat ethno nationalistic mobilization. Consolidated withthe ruling Croatian Democratic Union and established as a state religion un-der Franjo Tudjman’s presidency 1990-1999, Croat national Catholicism hassince become a national ideology and cultural project rather than a religiousfaith, to borrow Žižek’s term. e pressure of this chauvinist ideology andpowerful institution on society has increased under the incumbent le-centercoalition seeking its overthrow and a permanent rule for the political succes-

sors of Tudjman. However, not all the clergy and active laity approved of thereligious ideology and Church practice that came out of the alliance betweenthe bishops and the Tudjman regime. Actually, the bishops, split roughly intwo factions between conservative nationalists and moderates, have not always

16 Ivo Banac, Hrvati i Crkva. Kratka povijest hrvatskog katoličanstva u modernosti. (Zagreb iSarajevo: Profil, Svjetlo riječi, 2013), pp. 86-99.

17 “Bozanić na Bleiburgu: Vladaju li u Hrvatskoj snage koje ne žele otkriti istinu o Bleibur-gu?“ Internet portal Dnevno.hr, on May 18, 2015, at http://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/bo-zanic-na-bleiburgu-za-ono-sto-ne-mogu-izreci-ljudske-rijeci-bozja-je-rijec-ipak-dovoljno-sna-

zna-801411


17/153


16

been in concord on all issues.18 e largest faction within the episcopate, no-tably represented by the Cardinal Archbishop Josip Bozanić, could be labeled“conformists.” Anyhow, recently the most prominent in the media have been

some bolder figures outside the mainstream of the episcopate. For example, onthe far right is the neo-Ustasha hawk Bishop Vlado Kosić of Sisak. By, contrast,among the moderates, the most liberal seems the Bishop from DubrovnikMato Uzinić known for his ecumenical meetings with Serb Orthodox bishopsand a recent campaign against corruption in the Church. In addition, there arefurther divisions in the Church, such as notably, autonomous theologians andprogressive clerical circles; leist and progressive Catholics and radical con-

verts. As argued earlier in this article, the Catholic Church is not monolithicbut a rather heterogeneous structure in which there are individuals, groups,

and circles that not only differ from the conservative establishment but alsodissent or turn radical due to various reasons. e following are several suchexemplary cases in contemporary Catholicism in Croatia and Bosnia-Herze-govina.

A C C:F “K S” S F

In the wake of the Second Vatican Council, Croatian Catholicism engendered

the most progressive theological circle in history of religions of the westernBalkans. e Zagreb-based theological circle and publishing house Kr ščanskasadašnjost [Christian Contemporaneity] and the clerical association “GoodShepherd” from Sarajevo publishing the theological journal “Jukić”, advanceddialogue with the government and with other faiths and voiced criticism ofethnic nationalism and clericalism in the Church. Successors of these progres-sive Church circles emerged in the 1990s among the Franciscans of the “SilverBosnia” province, notably faculty members in the eological College and theSvjetlost riječi or “Light of the Word” religious journal in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the wars of the 1990s and aerward, Petar Andjelović,

Ivo Marković, Ivan Šarčević, Ivan Bubalo, Marko Oršolić, Drago Bojić andPetar Jeleč, among others, criticized the international management of the warand peace in B&H, politicization of religion and sacralization of politics, eth-nic nationalist parties, corruption, and historical revisionism. As antiwar andhuman rights activists these priests sided with the principal victims of warregardless of their ethnicity and religious affiliation: refugees and forcibly ex-pelled, families survivors of genocide and ethnic cleansing, multiplying num-

18 See Vjekoslav Perica, “e Most Catholic Country in Europe? Church, State and Society inContemporary Croatia.” Religion, State and Society ,( Oxford, UK), Vol. 34, No. 4 (2006), pp. 311-

346.


18/153


17

bers of impoverished and jobless, and so on. As supporters of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Franciscans joined massive street protests in February 2014demanding revision of the Dayton Accords that sanctioned partition along

ethnic lines brought about by criminal practices of ethnic cleansing and geno-cide in the war of 1992-1995. ese Catholic Croats earned such confidencefrom the country’s majority Muslim community and from moderate OrthodoxSerbs, secularists, and atheists that aer the war citizens would name Francis-can leaders as candidates for state presidency, but the friars declined due totheir order’s regulations prohibiting clerics to execute political offices.

e Bosnian Franciscan theologian Ivan Bubalo went public as a radicalcritic of the international management of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovinaand expanded his criticism on ethnic nationalist parties and clerical elites. In

his essays published by the radical Croatian journal Feral ribune in aermathof the Dayton agreement, Bubalo wrote about “Dayton peace as a debacle ofour arrogant western civilization.”19 Dayton, he says, “imposes a peace basedon injustice, plants seeds for future wars, rewards the aggressor and punishes

victims of aggression”; “leads to a permanent territorial partition unless refu-gees return in significant numbers which is unlikely”; and “unmasks the post-modern western humanitarian interventionism as a fraud for the victims ofaggression who naively expect relief and justice from such interventions.”“Here in Sarajevo during the war,” testifies Bubalo, “we could daily observe all

those numerous western humanitarian workers and foreign mediators whowalk around seeking not how to help the victims but how to obtain for them-selves some kind of their own selfish gains, or how to carry out propagandaand show themselves off in the mass media”. Nevertheless, Bubalo pledges thatthe Franciscan theological school at Sarajevo will not abandon its mission ofcontributing to cultural, civilizational and spiritual revitalization of the city.. .20 Bubalo criticizes the Catholic church for “oen functioning by the logicof state or national interest thinking that it thus serves the people or ethnic-national community in which it is rooted although state and national interestand interest of the people are not always congruent.”21 “If nation substitutes

for God by becoming the only one and absolute,” Bubalo argues, “then, all hu-man values and criteria are subjugated to the following one supreme principlewhich is national interest and reason of state.”22 Bubalo admits that a Church,including Catholicism which should be universal, is oen dedicated to the de-

19 Quoted from Boris Pavelić, Smijeh slobode: Uvod u Feral ribune. 2nd. ed. (Rijeka: Adamić,2015), p. 304.

20 Ivan Bubalo, Minima varia: mali razgovori s vremenom. (Rijeka: Ex libris, 2012), pp.312-315.

21 Ibid., p. 325.22 Ibid., p. 231.


19/153


18

fense and construction of nationhood, as churches in the Balkans usually are,thus becoming alienated from the character and mission Christianity.” Churchleaders, in such a church, run the risk of becoming power hungry, because,

Bubalo writes, “the will for power cannot be put away like an overcoat at thedoorstep not even at the gate of a sacred space where life is dedicated to God...therefore, the dilemma is either God or Nation for the two cannot go hand inhand as equals; for a Christian, the question of primacy must be clear...”23

Another Bosnian Franciscan monastic leader, Ivan Šarčević, also voicedthe disappointment with the West growing in Bosnia and Herzegovina dur-ing the 1992-1995 war. “In the case of Bosnia,” Šarčević writes, “Europe madeconcession to evil... since, European politicians have lived in some sort of acorrupt peaceful conscience, in a spiritual despair, in absence of a vision, be-

cause they doubted their mission regarding the Bosnian war fearing lest theybe blamed for a new colonialism... ”24 Like his brethren, Šarčević blames Ser-bian nationalism for starting the war and perpetrating genocide in Bosnia andHerzegovina. Yet he is no less critical of Croatian and Muslim nationalismsparticularly the former because of the compassion he expresses for the Mus-lims as the principal victims of war that suffered the gravest losses. Accordingto Šarčević, leaders of Croat ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina haveconstantly exercised traitorous and immoral politics.25 In his view, the lead-ers of Croat and Serb ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are two of a

kind: “If, according to Nietzsche, a nihilist is actually a powerful man with nocompassion for the weak, nihilists are also leaders of Bosnian ethnic parties,such as the Croat Dragan Ćović and the Serb Milorad Dodik. eir policiesfollow in the footsteps of Tudjman and Milošević having no compassion forthe suffering people and victims of the war... Dodik and Ćović play Nietzsche’sOverman who is above justice. Dodik does this in a vulgar and brave way andĆović imitates him in a more subtle fashion, both using sarcastic and cynicalhumor and both eventually bring about brutal consequences.”26

e Franciscan historian Petar Jeleč wrote a doctoral thesis about theCatholic Church in the Independent State of Croatia during World War II. As

a columnist for independent journals and internet portals or through interviews he frequently speaks publicly about historical revisionism in contempo-rary Croatia. For Jeleč it is clear that “the Ustasha state was founded on crime,the Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić was a traitor to his people, the IndependentSate of Croatia is an episode from history of the Croats that caused many in-nocent victims.” However, he rejects generalizations about the entire Catholic

23 Ibid., pp. 230-231.24 Ivan Šarčević, Zečevi, zmije i munafici. (Sarajevo and Zagreb: Synopsis, 2014), p. 127.25 Ibid., p. 190.26 Ibid., p. 112.


20/153


19

Church as an accomplice in crime. He argues that many Croat Catholic clergyrefused collaboration and some opposed the Ustasha regime. He also pointsout that the role of the Archbishop Stepinac is hard to examine impartially

and critically because the Church made him into a saintly cult while the op-posite yet radical perspective adopted by Serb nationalists and communists

view him as a war criminal. 27 Regarding the Franciscans’ support for a unitedmultiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jeleč voices disappointment with the Catho-lic Church that never condemned Croat crimes in the war with Muslims trig-gered by Croat extremists in an attempt to establish a Croat enclave similar tothe Serb republic in Bosnia.28

Ivan Šarčević voices similar views about the Ustasha state. He points outthat the Franciscan order issued regulations prohibiting friars membership

in the Ustasha movement but some priests disobeyed it, joined the Ustasha,and committed crimes. Regarding the post-communist Croatia, Šarčević is

vehemently critical of the influence of the nationalistic right on the officialChurch. e right-wing propaganda retaliated by accusing the order and inparticular the Franciscans in the faculty of the School of eology in Sarajevo,for collaboration with Titoism through the regime-friendly “Good Shepherd”clerical association. Šarčević explained that Croat Catholics’ participation inthe interfaith and Christian-Marxist dialogue was crucial in the quest for eth-nic harmony, particularly in the multiethnic and religiously diverse Bosnia-

Herzegovina. Šarčević restated Franciscans’ criticism of the Dayton Accords.In his view, it ended the war but did not end or reverse ethnic cleansing andgradually legalized the results of genocide. inking of Bosnia’s future in awider global context, Šarčević affirms Bosnian Franciscans’ sympathy for theliberation theology. In a recent interview, says Šarčević that “nationalism andcapitalism today devour the heart and soul of the Church...”29

All things considered, it did not come as a surprise when in February 2014the Franciscans of Sarajevo and other friars of the “Silver Bosnia” province,openly backed massive popular protests spreading throughout Bosnia-Her-zegovina against the corrupt domestic politicians and the ineffective foreign

post-conflict management. e friars of Sarajevo marched together with re-bellious students and other Bosnians rising voices against the corrupt, unjust,and unworkable system. ey called for radical social and economic reforms

27 Petar Jeleč, povjesnicar i teolog, “Bozanić se trebao ispričati”, Globus, 23 Oct. 2014, at http://globus.jutarnji.hr/hrvatska/bozanic-se-trebao-ispricati

28 Fra Petar Jeleč, “Herceg-bosnia and NDH are founded on crime”, 19 Nov. 2013, http://www.e-novine.com/stav/94021-Herceg-Bosna-NDH-utemeljene-zloinu.html?print

29 Razgvor - Fra Ivan Šarčević, 28 Jan. 2014 at Lupiga internet portal, http://lupiga.com/vijesti/razgovor-fra-ivan-sarcevic-nino-raspudic-je-svodnik-masa-covjek-bez-morala-i-znanja-

povijesti?page=5


21/153


20

and complete reintegration of the country including the revision of the Day-ton Accords. ese Catholic friars, with a few lower Muslim clergy, were theonly prominent representatives of the major domestic religious organizations

participating in this democratic movement. e protests failed to change thecourse of the post-conflict misery and social decay but the Franciscans didnot give up their struggle for a renewal of the country hit hardest by the Bal-kan wars of the 1990s. Most recently, in a publication widely red in the wholeregion, they used humor to promote interethnic and multi-confessional coop-eration. e publication is a collection of jokes, anecdotes, and a comic book“e Friars of Bosnia – in eir Own Way.” e author is the priest, writer, andcartoonist fra Tomislav Brković who is currently abbot of the Rama monasteryin central Bosnia. He said in an interview: at’s not a product of my own

wit, I just collected stories, listened to the people, aer all, we all, regardless ofthe faith and ethnicity, laugh in our common language and the humor is theuniversal link that bring us together. In our war-weary Bosnia, we need morehumor and laughter in order to fully recover...”30

V F N C L: T C L (KŽ) I P

e progressive Catholic circle “e Cross of Life” began publishing articles

critical of the Church on the internet in 2002. e founder and Editor-in-Chiefof the “religious internet magazine Cross of Life”, Hrvoje Cirkvenec, broughttogether a diverse staff of ecumenically- oriented contributors from variousChristian churches. e magazine publishes theological essays, news from reli-gious life, political columns and interviews. To begin with, in a 2013 interviewfor “e Cross of Life,” the former Catholic journalist Branimir Pofuk statedthe following: “while Croatia is not a Catholic nation, the Catholic Churchin Croatia is emphatically nationalistic.”31 e interview touches a numberof critical issues regarding contemporary Croatia’s Catholicism as a nationalinstitution. Among other things, Pofuk argues the following: “regardless of

the Catholic majority that the census shows in Croatia, a kind of democraticsociety that most Croatian desire, must not allow obvious attempts to makeCroatia a Catholic state”; “in the Balkans various faiths join forces only againsthomosexuals but not against war, war criminals and nationalistic extremism”;“the Catholic church is behind plebiscites such as ‘In the Name of the Family’

30 „Bosanski fratri u stripu: Svi se smijemo na istom jeziku“ , Al Jazeera Balkans, 24 May, 2015,at http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/bosanski-fratri-u-stripu-svi-se-smijemo-na-istom-jeziku

31 “Branimir Pofuk: Hrvati nisu katolička nacija, nego je Crkva u Hrvata izrazito nacionali-stička”, Interview with Hrvoje Crikvenec, 30 Nov. 2013. at http://www.kriz-zivota.com/branimir-

pofuk-hrvati-nisu-katolicka-nacija-nego-je-crkva-u-hrvata-izrazito-nacionalisticka/


22/153


21

to ban abortion and same sex marriages and some other initiatives, by whichChurch leaders wish to revise the Constitution...”32

e most vehement criticism from the “Cross of Life” circle targets grow-

ing social inequality, insensitivity for the poor, corruption in the Church andpolitical elites. e example of such radical criticism is a 2014 editorial fromthe prolific columnist Marijan Vogrinec under the title “Why God doesn’t’love Croatia?!” He argues that the Croatian national project is failing due tocorruption, bad government and a politicized nationalistic Church. While theChurch is the most influential national institution it is no less corrupt than thepolitical parties and other most influential institutions in contemporary Croa-tia among which Vogrinec consider the national football team as especiallypopular but also one of the most corrupt institutions. Among other things,

Vogrinec writes as follows:It seems that Croatia has never won God’s favor. How is that possible even thoughthe father of the Nation, Dr. Franjo Tudjman (an atheist!), as soon as he came topower renounced secularism and turned the nation over into the hands of theChurch established as a state religion?! In addition, he cemented this new clerical-ism with four treaties with the Vatican (at the expense of the Croat people). Sincethen, Croatia has hosted the Holy Father three times! Meanwhile the Church hasachieved in the public domain whatever Church leaders want: imposing Church’sdogma from pre-school to higher education and even in the intimate sphere of themarried couples, families and sexual life? Why does the Creator allow faithful Croa-

tia with its 87% publicly declared Catholics to lose important international footballmatches? Why does God let the EU and its rulers in Brussels to treat the old Euro-pean Christian nation of Croatia as a primitive tribe from Africa? It seems that thetreaties between Croatia and the Vatican have been signed in order to stab Croatia’scitizens in the back. In the country of 4.3 million and the average salary of 4,000kunas every employee regardless of religious (non)affiliation has to pay annually 400kunas to the Catholic church?!33

e same “Cross of Life’s” columnist in a 2014 editorial addressed neo-fascisttendencies in Croatia. Under the title, “Reigniting the Indistinguishable Evil:

Ustashas Marching Again through the Our Miserable Homeland” (this is awordplay to the national anthem “Our Pretty Homeland”), Vogrinec writesthe following:

e episcopate and the clergy are not semi-literate folk singers (such as Mr. Perkovićompson) who do not know what the Independent State of Croatia really was.Instead of putting the fire out and explain to the people the history of Croat fascism,some of them lead the re-ignition of evil...Who are those street marchers dressed in

32 Ibid.33 Marijan Vogrinec, “Zašto Bog ne voli Hrvate ni Hrvatsku!?” 1.July 2014, http://www.kriz-

zivota.com/zasto-bog-ne-voli-hrvate-ni-hrvatsku/


23/153


22

black, waving national flags and shouting “For the Homeland – Ready” and “Kill,kill the Serb”? e Ustasha are marching again through Our Miserable Homeland.e founding father Franjo Tudjman and his émigré right hand man Gojko Susak,

made our country so close to the far right politics that nobody can rectify thesetrends anymore because fascism has become rooted in our culture... Today thepeople in black shirts celebrate the criminal madness of the Independent State ofCroatia... e same terrorists dynamited 3,000 memorials to Croatia’s World War IIantifascist struggle and rebuilt memorials to the worst Ustasha war criminals... Titoand the Partisans led by the communists temporarily halted the Ustashas in WorldWar II. Yet, today the Ustasha successors are seeking revenge on their memorialsand against the heirs of the Partisan fighters...34

e same author in a November 2014 commentary entitled “Nation andFaith under Boots of the Church of the Croats” attacked Cardinal Josip Bozanićfor supporting the war veterans and their street politics of intimidation andultimatum. Vogrines wrote, ” the Archbishop of Zagreb, by his call for prayersand solidarity with the rebellious war veterans, has again manifested his infec-tion with the virus of the political right. For a quarter of century now the same

virus had done much harm to the Church...e Archbishop and the clergy donow show by their homilies that our homeland is falling apart amidst a moraland economic crisis...”35

Although the “Cross of Life” is visible among internet magazines in Croa-tia, the Church wants to marginalize it. While top Church authorities ignore

the “Cross of Life,” Croatia’s Catholic right responds with threats and counter-attacks. According to rightist internet portals, the “Cross of Life” is written by“secularist, anti-Croat, laymen and seminarians on the margin of the Catholicpublic, individuals excommunicated from the Society of Catholic journalists...e Cross of Life advocates anti-Catholicism, same-sex marriages, anti-na-tionalism and secularism...”36

R C: Z T D P

Contrary to the triumphalist post-Cold War western media according towhich ex-communist societies of Eastern Europe saw a remarkable religiousrevival prompted by a long-time suppressed popular thirst for the spiritual andsupernatural, most of post-communist mass conversions have been motivatedby trivial earthly needs such as opportunism, careerism and redistribution ofpower and property. In Tudjman’s Croatia, crowds of ex-communists includ-

34 “Raspirivanje neugašenog zla. Ustaše opet marširaju Bijednom našom“, Marijan Vogrinec,31 July 2014. http://www.e-novine.com/stav/107124-Ustae-opet-mariraju-Bijednom-naom.html

35 Marijan Vogrinec, “Nacija i vjera pod cokulama Crkve u Hrvata” Komentar, 6 Nov. 2014.http://www.kriz-zivota.com/nacija-i-vjera-pod-cokulama-crkve-u-hrvata/

36 See internet sites katolik.hr, and hrvatski-fokus.hr, 20 Oct. 2010.


24/153


23

ing Tudjman’s himself, flocked to churches and cathedrals, received sacramentsand adopted theological terms as politically correct features of new citizenshipand political jargon. Some prominent figures earned celebrity status as radicaloutspoken converts-missionaries and activists, such as Zdravko Tomac whoconverted from communist atheism and Yugoslav patriotism to Croat ethnicnationalism and national Catholicism; and Drago Pilsel, who did precisely theopposite, namely transformed from a practicing Croat Catholic and an Usta-sha into a leist, anti-fascist and human rights advocate.

Zdravko Tomac began his political career as associate of the one of mostrigid Croat communists, Jakov Blažević, best known as Chief State Prosecu-tor in the 1946 trial of Archbishop Stepinac. In the late 1980s Tomac joineda reformist faction in the Central Committee of the League of Communists

of Croatia and became a trusted aide to the national communist party chiefIvica Račan who called for the first multiparty elections and delivered Croatiainto the hands of Tudjman, HDZ and the Church. During war years, Tudj-man entrusted Tomac with a key cabinet post in the so-called “national unity”multiparty government with Franjo Gregurić as Prime Minister. During thisperiod Tomac grew into a hardline nationalist, supporting policies such as par-tition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and restrictions on human rights activism andfreedom of speech in alleged defense of national homogenization and Tudj-man’s personality cult. In the Croatian presidential election, 1997, Tudjman

asked Tomac to pose as its challenger from the list of the Social Democratsi.e. former communists. Tomac was by then nationalistic enough to finish as arunner-up to Tudjman, with 21% of the vote. In 2003 he formally announcedhis breakup with the Social Democrats. Subsequently he has become active asa Catholic convert and missionary. He toured churches and parishes testify-ing about mystical experiences, visions, communication with God. In his nu-merous books and interviews he wrote about various conspiracies against theCroats that he in the meantime detected and unmasked. In the February 2009issue of the “Light of the World” Franciscan journal published in Sarajevo, theFranciscan writer and theologian Ivan Šarčević analyzed Tomac’s conversionand mystical experiences to conclude: “Tomac did not convert to a religion, hesubstituted one political ideology for another–the previous communist atheis-tic quasi religion he replaced by the atheistic worship of Croat Catholicism as anationalized religion and politics in a religious garb; his atheism did not changeas he transformed from a communist into an anticommunist. It is noteworthythat even though Tomac further radicalized his anticommunism getting veryclose to the Croatian far right, no Croat rightist or neo-Ustasha group backedor appropriated him while some continuously distrusted his intentions.

Drago Pilsel is an Argentina-born writer and Catholic lay theologian from

an émigré Ustasha family. His father served as personal security guard to the


25/153


24

Ustasha poglavnik (Führer) Ante Pavelić in World War II and his postwar Ar-gentinian exile. Raised and trained as a young Ustasha militant, Pilsel joinedthe Croat volunteer troops in the war of 1991-1995, got disappointed with the

Tudjman regime and the morally bankrupt Church leaders and eventually be-came Croatia’s most famous convert from fascism to antifascism. First timehe visited Croatia in 1989 as a member of the Franciscan order. He studiedmechanical engineering, literature, political science, and theology and since1979 worked as a journalist. He holds a M.A. in Christian theology from theEvangelical eological School in Osijek, Croatia. One of best summaries ofDrago Pilsel’s case comes from the pen of Croatia’s leading contemporary liter-ary figure Miljenko Jergović:

In 1991 Drago Pilsel came from Argentina with his brother to fight and die for Croa-

tia, the country about which he actually knew nothing except for the émigré myth.Several months later, his brother went missing in a senseless naval operation. Searchand rescue missions never found his body. Nevertheless, Pilsel and his bother havefulfilled duty for which they were raised and trained in Argentina. Pilsel’s native landwas actually the country of military dictatorships in which a segment of the Croatpeople lived since the end of the World War II. In Buenos Aires, they did not meetBorges and Gombrowicz but Ante Pavelić. In his name they went to fight in Croatia.In the summer of 1995 during the final battles for liberation of the country from theSerb separatist movement, Drago Pilsel witnessed Croatia’s army war crimes againstcivilians. He realized that it was easier to die for Croatia than to step on the corpses

of murdered elderly peasants. In order to understand who and why murdered these victims in the name of Croatia, Drago Pilsel had to get to know Croatia better. at’swhat Pilsel has been doing for twenty years now. His life and his fate are among thegreatest Croatian adventures in our time. By re-examining his own soul, Pilsel alsoexamines, in a puritan and original manner what it means to be a Croat and Chris-tian. While others reset their conscience and revise their past to fit the changingcircumstances, Drago Pilsel fights intellectual and moral battles with his own self.Pilsel made his biography public in order to change himself and society in which helives. We would not learn that he used to throw rocks at a synagogue and attemptedto set ablaze a crowded movie theater showing a Yugoslav movie, had he not written

that it was wrong to stone synagogues and set movie theaters on fire...Today somecareerist Ustashas accuse him of being an Ustasha, a fascist. What they actually hatemost about him today, is that he became an antifascist, anti-clerical, a leist anddefender of human rights, particularly for ethnic, religious and sexual minorities... 37

In 2013, Pilsel published autobiographical book under the title “An ArgentineNovel.” In this book Pilsel examined his ideological, professional and emo-tional transformation from an ardent Croat Ustasha fascist, anti-Semite andfar right militant into a leist, human rights activist, writer and Christian ecu-

37 Miljenko Jergović, “Drago Pilsel, stid za Hrvatsku,” Jutarnji list online, 02 Mar. 2010, drago-

pilsel--stid-za-hrvatsku/600000/http://www.jutarnji.hr/drago-pilsel--stid-za-hrvatsku/600000/


26/153


25

menical theologian.38 In addition to the autobiographical material, Pilsel setout to debunk old and new Croat nationalistic myths. Countering the myththat depicts the Ustasha führer Pavelić a national hero, Pilsel describes him as

a cold-blooded murderer and a coward. He criticizes the clerical mythmakingabout Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac. Contrary to the mythical narrative preparedfor the canonization, Pilsel portrays Stepinac as an anti-ecumenical priest, cler-ical nationalist, and opportunistic church leader who failed to use his full au-thority to condemn Ustasha collaboration with the Axis occupation of Croatiaand genocide perpetrated by the Pavelić regime. For Pilsel, the Bleiburg myth,which today Croatia commemorates as de facto a national holiday, was in real-ity intentional Ustasha sacrifice of the Croat refugees. Pilsel argues that Pavelićabandoned his people and the Ustasha retreating troops, refusing to surrender

used these civilians as a human shield. Pilsel also demystifies the new Croatia’sHomeland War myth. He writes a detailed testimony about Croatian troops’plunder and execution of elderly Serb civilians at the end of the war in Croatia.As a Christian theologian, he urges Croatians to seek true “liberation fromhatred and the burden of the difficult past.”39

As an ecumenical advocate, Pilsel tours the Balkans in a belief that inter-faith and ethnic reconciliation should come from below. It begins with pro-gressive Catholics’ dissent and moral critique of the opportunistic and corruptclerical elites in the so-called “Church of the Croats”. His ecumenical mission

reaches out to Serbs, Muslims and Jews. us, amidst rightists’ attacks on pub-lic inscriptions written in Cyrillic letters, Pilsel confronted the attackers de-fending the right of Croatia’s Serbs to use the Cyrillic script. He also shows un-derstanding for the Serbian Orthodox Church’s rejection of Cardinal Stepinacas a saintly cult. In an interview with a Montenegrin daily newspaper he callshimself a traitor to the Ustasha cause and states that the thorough liberationfrom the burden of fascism will be important for the Croats’ mental health.40

C

Two decades aer the major Balkan war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina1991-1995, the dynamic of feuding ethnic nationalisms has shied from theinitially strongest Serbian to the currently dominant Croatian nationalism.

38 Drago Pilsel. Argentinski roman: autobiografija. First ed. (Zagreb: Profil knjiga, 2013).39 Nina Ožegović, “Argentinski roman Drage Pilsela–Knjiga za sve koji živezarobljeni u zablu-

di,” Forum, 01 Mar. 2014, http://www.forum.tm/vijesti/argentinski-roman-drage-pilsela-knjiga-za-sve-koji-zive-zarobljeni-u-zabludi-1574

40 “Intervju Drago Pilsel: Jesam, izdajnik sam. Izdao sam ustaštvo!” Pobjeda, Crna Gora, 30Mar. 2013. http://www.pobjeda.me/2013/03/30/intervju-drago-pilsel-jesam-izdajnik-sam-izdao-

sam-ustastvo/#.VGECR_ldXUk


27/153


28/153


27

larly faculty members at the Franciscan School of eology in Sarajevo. ereare also radical critics of corruption and religious nationalism on the Catho-lic le such as the notably Croatian internet portal “Cross of Life”. ere are

also activist individuals, either on the Catholic right or le, including radicalconverts testifying ideologically as well as spiritually. In spite of the currentChurch-backed shi to the nationalistic far right in Croatia, rise of anotherTudjman is improbable because of the EU framework. Besides, the countryis hard to homogenize and mobilize for conflict as it used to be possible inthe early 1990s. Accordingly, it is questionable for how long this strong Croa-tian nationalism can retain the current level of mobilization. In all likelihood,Croatian nationalism will lose momentum and decline except in case of arecovery and comeback of Serbian nationalism that would primarily focus on

Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.


29/153

28

Zlatiborka Popov MomčinovićFilozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Istočnom Sarajevu

Vladimir KlačarFakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci

KOLEKTIVNA MEMORIJA IZMEĐUVIKTIMOLOGIJE I TRANSFORMACIJE DRUŠTVA:

NARATIVI CRKAVA U BIH

Sažetak: U poslijeratnoj BiH pamćenje predstavlja i dalje veliki izazov, s tim da pamće-nje nije nešto statično već se performativnim ponavljanjem petrifikuje u fukoovskomsmislu arheologije znanja kroz slojeve interpretacije koji često potiskuju i same Doga-đaje. Da bi se dublje zašlo u ove procese, u radu će se kvalitativnom metodologijom naprincipu izdvojenih primjera uz određene kvantitativne pokazatelje analizirati neki se-gmenti aspekti diskursa dveju hrišćanskih crkava u njihovoj međuigri između prošlosti,sadašnjosti i budućnosti. Posebna intencija rada je svojevrsno „razotkrivanje“ a u duhu

veberijanskog razmađijavanja sveta, diskurzivnih stragija religijskih narativa u njegovojisprepletenosti sa teopolitičkim da bi se prepoznali aspekti selektivnog pristupa prošlo-

sti radi uspostavljanje „naturalizovane“ tišine kolektivnog pamćenja. Takođe, ukazaćese i na diskurzivne niše otklona koje doprinose da se kroz odgovoran pristup pamćenjui otvorenost prema Drugome podstakne transformacija društva. Jer, deridijanski reče-no, bez bivstvujućeg Drugog, nikakva etika ne bi bila moguća.

Ključne reči: kolektivna memorija, narativi Crkava, viktimologija, transformacija dru-štva, Bosna i Hercegovina

U

U kontekstu bh. društva je postalo gotovo zdravorazumska i opšte prihvaće-

na pretpostavka da je uloga i javni značaj Crkava i verskih zajednica itekakobitan, kako za one koje ovakav jedan ulazak religija na javni trg pozdravljajutako i za one koji ga kritikuju. Religijska pripadnost, kako god je tumačili,bilo kao lični izbor ili gotovo prirodjena pripadnost da bi se tu-bivstvovalo uovdašnjem post-konfliktnom društvu i konsocijacijskom političkom sistemuima ne malu ulogu, budući da konstruiše na performativan način različiteoblike pripadnosti i njihovih međusobnih suodnošenja ne samo na verskoj

već i na etničkoj, političkoj i idejno-ideološkoj ravni. Jer, kao što ukazujeVlaisavljević, etničkom telu je, da bi opstalo iz bezdana prošlosti i svoje pred-

datosti potrebna određena kultura odn. u bh. kontekstu religija da bi osmi-

UDC 316.7:159.953.3(497.6)316.7:2(497.6)

343.988:2(497.6)


30/153


29

slila komunitarnu geneologiju (Vlaisavljević, 2015: 73). Ova pripadnost semora potvrđivati i kroz određene diskurzivne strategije koje verske zajednicekoriste da bi ju potvrdile imajući u vidu da, kako se ističe u kritičkoj teoriji

diskursa da ovi nisu samo odraz socijalne stvarnosti već i da je oblikuju (VanDijk, 2003). Oni često pretenduju svojevrsnoj hegemonističkoj artikulacijikoja često koristi i uspostavlja granice između „nas“ i „njih“ da bi stabili-zovala vlastiti, interni diskurs (Torfing, 2002: 9). Različite analize sadržajašto verskih glasila što poruka i pouka verskih lidera potvrđuju ovu činje-nicu. Srpska pravoslavna crkva svoje ime i društvenu funkcionalnost morapotvrđivati stalnim referiranjem na srpstvo, dok Katolička crkva iako nemanacionalni prefiks na ovim prostorima obitava poglovito kao „Crkva u Hrva-ta“. Islamska zajednica takođe ima nedvojbenu ulogu u inauguraciji novona-

stalog bošnjaštva, i ovi religijski narativi zasigurno tvore pojam poznat kaoetnokonfesionalnost.

No, da bi pojam bio učinkovit i operativan on se mora stalno i iznova po-tvrđivati na nivou praktičnog, nekad i pragmatskog koja se uglavnom manife-stuje kao usmerenost prema sebi i vlastitoj grupi da bi se ona samopotvrdila,a različiti religijski narativi koji struje kroz javni etar pomažu u ovom sampo-tvrđivanju. Ovi procesi se dešavaju ne samo na nivou visoke verske hijerarhije

već i verske i svake druge svakoadnevnice, ne bi li etnokonfesionalnost proi-zvela kao business as usual, a na šta je posebno ukazao Mark Billig u svojim

tezama o tzv. banalnom nacionalizmu koji na ovim prostorima ima konfesio-nalna odzvanjanja. Banalni nacionalizam ne mora uvek biti skroz vidljiv, a našta ukazuje istoimeni autor, ali se on često mobiliše u određenim vremenskimperiodima (npr. u periodima sukoba) da bi se nakon jenjavanja sukoba „po-

vukao“ na razine ljudske svakodnevnice i stvorio svojevrsni oblik „naturalizovane“ tišine kolektivnog pamćenja što pak ne znači da je manje operativan (v.Billig, 1995).

M

Cilj ovog rada je da se razotkrije ova operativnost na nivou recentne verskesvakodnevnice, koja može da ima što formu svakodnevnog verskog praznova-nja i događajnosti koje sadrže različite poruke oko kojih se konstruiše i odre-đeni red stvari u svetu, ali takođe može imati i teološko-politički označiteljkoji se kroz međuigru transcedentnog i ovovremenog pokušava što teološkipotvrditi i osnažiti ne retko u svrhu potvrđivanja ovdašnjih društvenih odnosai hijerarhija uključujući i indirektnu „legitimizaciju“ sukoba kroz kult čestogreferiranja na vlastite žrtve i požrtvovanja.

S tim u vezi, metodom izdvojenih primera uz određene kvantitativne

pokazatelje pokušalo se dublje zaći u diskurs dve hrišćanske zajednice u BiH-


31/153


30

Srpske pravoslavne Crkve i Katoličke crkve. Analizirani su portali ove dve verske zajednice, sa akcentom na Vrhbosansku nadbiskupiju i Dabrobosan-sku mitropoliju. Ovi portali imaju sličnu strukturu, a kako je sedište ove dve

administrativne jedinice u Sarajevu koje pretenduje na multikulturanost iotvorenost pokušalo se razotkriti kako se dešava, bez bitnijeg referiranja naovaj geografski lokalitet1, međuigra između prošlosti, sadašnjosti i buduć-nosti, otvorenosti prema Drugome odn. zatvorenosti, proizvodnja (selektiv-ne) kolektivne memorije ili pak „skrivene historije“ (v. Abazović, 2010: 109).Analizirani su tekstovi u rubrici vesti budući da oni uglavnom referiraju natzv. religijsku svakodnevnicu kao i govori verskih zvaničnika postavljeni naova dva portala. Islamska zajednica nije analizirana s obzirom na teškoću uporedbenosti s tim da se ova ne/poredbenost tumači u smislu Moltmanove

teze da su hrišćanske zajednice usmerene na oprost i da kod njih pojam žrtveima značajnu teološku odrednicu koja se često i društveno-politički upotre-bljava ali i zloupotrebljava.

Takođe, ono što treba istaći da je reč tek o inicijalnoj analizi: analiziranasu ukupno sto postova u rubrici vesti na ova dva portala i obrađena kvali-tativno uz referiranje na određenje kvantitavne pokazatelje u smislu zastu-pljenosti varijabli koje su se pokazale od značaja za sam cilj studije, dok suse postovi koji sadrže obraćanja verskih zvaničnika analizirala na kvalitati-

van način u smislu diskursnih repertoara koji su u njima prisutni, a u vezi

sa varijablama u kvantitativnoj analizi. U kvantitativnoj analizi varijable suse ticale prisustva viktimologije- koja je dalje operacionalizovana na načinda li se radi o viktimologiji vlastite grupe, ili su u ovaj diskurs uključeni idrugi u smislu uvažavanja i njihovih žrtava ili se pak pojam žrtve koristiuniverzalno; potom da li je viktimološki diskurs blaži ili oštriji; i na kraju

vremenski kontekst- da li je diskurs okrenut prošlosti, sadašnjosti ili pak bu-dućnosti uz mogućnost njihove kombinacije u analiziranom postu. Budućida se kolektivna memorija pogotovo u postkonfliktnim društvima gradi krozi oko viktimoloških narativa, i da se ona da bi se osnažila ne referira samona prošlost već i na sadašnjost i budućnost, kroz ove označitelje pokušalo se

ukazati kako se kolektivna memorija u okviru Crkava gradi i čuva, što nanivou uslovno rečeno izveštavanja o verskoj svakodnevnici što u teopolitič-kim govorima verskih zvaničnika. Preklapanjem ova dva nivoa, budući da i

verski zvaničnici referiraju na i učestvuju u verskoj svakodnevnici dodatnose osnažujuju različiti -izmi, uključujući i one koji su u bliskoj vezi sa kolek-tivnom memorijom.

1 Iako je sedište Vrhbosanske nadbiskupije i Dabrobosanske miropolije u Sarajevu, glavnomgradu BiH, ove dve verske zajednice imaju svoju „centralu“ van BiH te je referiranje na lokalitet,

bar u kontekstu ovog rada, od manjeg značaja.


32/153


33/153


32

vlastitoj viktimologiji. Uprkos ovoj okrenutosti sebi, možemo uslovno rečenoda se ona koristi i kao svojevrsni apel na transformaciju društva. Ipak, ovaj po-ziv na transoformaciju često sadrži i skrivenu notu okrenutosti sebi budući da

se ona često situira u probleme Hrvata povratnika te se na taj način interni dis-kurs i dalje čuva i konstruiše vlastiti identitet. Transformacija društva (okrenu-tost budućnosti) se stoga priziva da bi se položaj Hrvata povratnika popravioali opet i ne retko u kontekstu društvene saradnje i pluralnosti. No, ova okre-nutost budućnosti je ipak u većem broju slučajeva postavljena i predstavljena ukombinaciji sa usmerenosti ka prošlosti i sadašnjosti- nekadašnja stradanja sepovezuju sa sadašnjim problemima a okrenutost ka prošlosti je povezana i sasadašnjom borbom za očuvanje vlastite tradicije i proverenih vrednosti koje sepredstavljaju kao ugrožene. Stoga i ovde operiše povezanost između kreiranja

kolektivne memorije i društvene promene. Uprkos ovim trendovima uočenasu i određena odstupanja, npr. u postu Kardinal Puljić primio veleposnalicuSAD-a N. E. Gospođu Maureen (03.02.2015) akcenat je na izgradnji pomire-nja, suživota i stvaranja boljih uslova za život svih stanovnika BiH. KardinalPuljić je pri tome istakao da na prošlost „treba gledati realno, a ne mitološki...,

jer samo takav pogled na prošlost vodi u bolju i pravedniju budućnost“3. Poststoga uopšte i nema viktimološki diskurs i nije usmeren ka vlastitoj grupi većšalje pozitivnu poruku svim ljudima i zajednicama uz ukazivanje na sadašnjeprobleme (kao što su nedostatak vladavine prava, ekonomski problemi) koji se

trebaju rešiti radi šire transformacije društva.No, viktimologija, stepen njene oštrine i vremenski okviri zavise i od sameteme odn. uslovno rečeno svrhe posta. Kao što se i dalo očekivati u postovimakoji se odnose na čestitanje verskih praznika drugim verskim zajednicama, uizveštavanju o mirovnim aktivnostima (npr. u okviru projekta go4peace) vikti-mološkog diskursa i nema, prisutna je otvorenost prema drugim zajednicamas tim da se u mirovnim aktivnostima koriste sve tri vremenske dimenzije usmislu pouke i poduke radu na transformaciji društva na fonu unapređenjaljudskih odnosa i uopšte čitavog društva. Kada je o intenzitetu viktimološkogdiskursa reč on je u većini postova blaži- izuzetak čini post „U Travniku pred-

stavljen prvi zbornik radova komisije HBK i BKBIH za hrvatski martirologij“gde dominira više nego izražen diskurs vlastitog stradalništva za vreme komu-nističke vladavine. Ovo stradalništvo se poredi sa stradanjima prvih hrišćan-skih mučenika te mu se daje i teološki naboj. Apel na precizno utvrđivanjekomunističkih zločina je praćeno navodima poput „Jednom komunist, zauvi-

jek komunist!“, a sam komunizam se poistovećuje sa jugoslovenstvom i antihr- vatstvom. Izjava Alojzija Stepinca pred sudom u Zagrebu da nemaju moralnopravo da sude oni koji sve zločine pripisuju ustašama i domobranima se koristida bi se ova viktimologija pojačala, ali i da bi se zamaglio nivo i stepan strada-

3 http://www.vrhbosanska-nadbiskupija.org/?start=5


34/153


33

nja koje su ove dve uslovno rečeno ideologije proizvele. Na opasnost ovakvihstrategija ukazao je i čuveni nobelovac, književnik Hajnrih Bol u svom spisuCena pomirenja, ukazavši da se zločini ne smeju sravnjavati a žrtve tretirati posistemu vođenja bankovnih bilansa i po sistemu ponude drugih nevino stra-dalih (Bel, 2007: 22). Tzv. „pomirbenjaci u crkvenih redovima“ su smešteni uizrazito negativan kontekst mirenja sa svima po sistemu dodvoravanja, te kroztekst provejava i ton nepomirljivosti i selektivnog pamćenja uz stalno referi-ranje na vlastita stradanja u prošlosti bez ikakvog navođenja da se iz stradanjamogu izvući pouke za bolje odnose u budućnosti.

Stoga se može uslovno rečeno zaključiti da na analiziranom portalu domi-nira, kada je prisutan, blaži viktimološki diskurs uz određena odstupanja, alisa napomenom da je u većoj meri prisutna okrenutost sadašnjosti i budućnosti

bilo da je reč o boljim uslovima za život vlastite Crkve i vernika ili svih stanov-nika Bosne i Hercegovine. Stoga je i kolektivna memorija prilično hibridna

jer se simultano koriste različite reprezentacije, znaci i simboli. Oni su stogauslovno rečeno i društveno učinkovitiji jer su prilagođeni različitim situacio-nim okvirima i deluju neutralnije.

U slučaju Srpske pravoslavne Crkve uočene su određene sličnosti i različi-tosti. Kada je o uočenoj sličnosti reč, ono što treba naglasiti je da je u analizira-nom korpusu viktimološki diskurs i kad je prisutan isto tako blaži- on nije pro-praćen u slučaju oba portala negativnim emocijama, pozivima na nove sukobe

i sl. On više ima ulogu odavanja počasti žrtvama s tim da se, imajući uvidu dase uglavnom koristi u kontekstu okrenutosti vlastitoj zajednici može raditi iodređenoj isključivosti. Viktimologija je često situirana u kontekse prošlosti,sadašnjosti i budućnosti i to je takođe zajednička karakteristika oba portala stim da u slučaju portala Dabrobosanske mitropolije ima više navoda koji suokrenuti prošlosti. Vlastite žrtve se smeštaju u različita konfliktna iskustva izprošlosti- kao što su Prvi srpski ustanak, Prvi svetski rat, Drugi svetski rat i to

je specifikum u odnosu na analizirane postove na portalu Vrhbosanske nad-biskupije. Stradalništvo iz ovih perioda se kombinuje sa stradalništvom vla-stitog naroda u proteklom ratu s ciljem proizvodnje kolektivnog, selektivnogpamćenja u kojem je srpski narod isključivo bio u poziciji žrtve. Ovakav jedanzačarani krug viktimologije nosi opasnost nemogućnosti iskoračenja a na šta

je upozorila Hana Arent: Iz njega se teško može iskoračiti jer nepomirljivostnalikuje na neuspešne pokušaje čarobnjakovog učenika da razbije kletvu.

Ono što je specifikum analiziranih postova na portalu Dabrobosanske mi-tropolije je veći konzervativni pa i pomalo anahroni ton budući da se određenedešavanja a u kojima su uočene varijable koje su od interesa za ovaj rad smešta-

ju u kontekst očuvanja vlastite tradicije koja se često izmešta iz konteksta dru-gih društvenih problema koji se dotiču apstraktnijim teološkim govorom, te

se postavlja pitanje, a na šta su ukazali neki kritički nastrojeni teolozi koliko je


35/153


34

ovaj govor zapravo autentičan (Kristić, 2013: 35). Očuvanje vlastite tradicije setako proizvodi kao najveći problem i izazov sa kojim se suočava srpski narod.No, u nekim slučajevima ipak nije reč o pukom tradicionalizmu. Tako u postu

„Udaljavanje od Boga je sjedinjavanje sa strahom“ (16.03.2015) a koji se tičepredavanja vladike Grigorija je prisutna i okrenutost drugima i dominira ton

važnosti lične religioznosti radi vlastitog oslobađanja i zbližavanja sa drugimljudskim bićima. No i ovaj govor, uprkos odstupanjima od dominantnog tonaportala, je u priličnoj meri dekontekstualizovan bar u načinu na koji je preneti hrišćanske poruke stoga nemaju dovoljnu emancipatorsku snagu iskoraka izustaljenih kolektivnih narativa.

Na portalu Vrhbosanske mitropolije ima i postova koji se tiču međureligij-skih susreta, misa za mir, mirovnih inicijativa, zajedničkih molitvi, dok je na

portalu Dabrobosanske mitropolije uočen samo jedan sličan post a koji se tičeradionice održane u Istočnom Sarajevu od strane Pravoslavne omladine o ne-nasilnoj komunikaciji. No, i ovi postovi se u slučaju Vrhbosanske nadbiskupijekoriste u nekim slučajevima da bi se referiralo na probleme vlastite zajednice.Tako npr. u testku „Mons. Zovkić primio tri skupine stranih turista“ (8. Svib-nja 2014) imamo izrazito hibridan diskurs. S jedne strane radi se o susretu nakom se ukazuje na nepovoljan položaj Hrvata u BiH ali se ovaj položaj smeštau okvire vrednosti kao što su pluralnost i saradnja. Stoga i on služi samopo-tvrđivanju kolektivne viktimološke naracije ali je referiranjem na univerzalne

vrednosti ublažen te kao što smo već naveli, hibridan i naizgled neutralan. No,teoretičari i istraživači koji rade na fonu kritičke teorije diskursa ističu da senijednom diskursu ne sme prići kao nečem nevinom i neutralnom.

Na osnovu ove inicijalne ali opet šture analize, koja proizlazi i iz samestrukture analiziranih sadržaja- naime, reč je o rubrici vesti a vesti same posebi, kao što smo ukazali, predstavljaju najsiromašniji novinarski žanr, moguse ipak naslutiti određeni mehanizmi na osnovu kojih se re/konstruiše kolek-tivna/selektivna memorija. Nju svakako prožima viktimologija koja je u slu-čaju oba portala blaža jer ne poziva i ne implicira na nove sukobe i njom nedominira diskurs isključivosti osim u par izuzetaka. No i kad te isključivosti

nema, ipak je reč o nečem internom koje može da sadrži skrivene obrasce ne- jednakosti pa i diskriminacije (Van Dijk, 2003). Razlike koje su uočene je dase na portalu Dabrobosanske mitropolije da uočiti veća okrenutost prošlosti,koja seže do Prvog srpskog ustanka, s tim da se ona kombinuje sa kultom žrtveiz nedavnog rata. Portal Vrhbosanske mitropolije ima više sadržaja okrenutihsadašnjosti i budućnosti no i oni su smešteni u kontekst nepovoljnog polo-žaja Hrvata ali ne retko u kombinaciji sa pozivanjem na evropske vrednostipluralnosti, vladavine prava, ravnopravnosti naroda. Potonja takođe teži da

vlastite žrtve i konkretizuje (npr. u postu o drinskim mučenicima, o broju stra-

dalih tokom i nakon socijalističke revolucije) dok se u slučaju Dabrobosanske


36/153


35

mitropolije srpske žrtve često predstavljaju na kolektiviziran pa i apstraktannačin i povezuju sa žrtvama iz različitih vremenskih perioda. Na oba porta-la se „počinioci“ pak prikazuju na kolektiviziran način- npr. u pomenutom

tekstu o zločinima komunista nad hrvatskim narodom i sveštenstvom se ovizločini jednostrano pripisuju ovoj ideologiji i svim njenim pristašama, s timda se u postovima Dabrobosanske mitropolije počinioci ređe imenuju. Iako

je retorički ansambl sadržaja na portalu Vrhbosanske nadbiskupije bogatiji- unjemu se referira mestimično i na evropske vrednosti i tekovine (kao što su

vladavina prava, jednakopravnost naroda i sl.) oni se ipak smeštaju u okvi-re potreba vlastite grupe da bi se ova osnažila i ovim odrednicima. Sve ovoukazuje da je reč o hibridnom diskursu koji, čak i kad je okrenut budućnostiovu ne može da ostavi „neuprljanom“ vlastitim interesima koji se smeštaju u

određene društvene situacije u svrhu proizvodnje određenog društvenog po-retka i stanja svesti koji se smatra poželjnim i koji je nedvojbeno povezan saselektivnim pristupom kada je o kolektivnoj memoriji reč, čak i kad ova sadr-ži šire odrednice. To ukazuje da same verske zajednice ne retko zaboravljajusvoje univerzalne vrednosti i poruke i „sužavaju“ ih u etno-nacionalne okvire.One su praćene fenomenima „poricanja (zvaničnog i nezvaničnog) i pamćenja(skrivene historije...)“ (Abazović, 2010: 109), a vezano za različita istorijskarazdoblja i pitanja (ne)izvesne budućnosti.

P /„“ C

Kolektivna/„selektivna“ memorija se re/produkuje i na višem nivou, u istupi-ma, izjavama, besedama verskih zvaničnika. Njihovi narativi su slojevitiji testoga i zanimljiviji i teži za analizu. No i oni sadrže određene kognitivne mapei retoričke repertoare koji su prisutni i u prvoj analizi s tim da se artikulišu naslojevitije načine. Oni služe medijaciji određenih vrednosti koje su nedvojbe-no hrišćanske ali koje da bi bile operativne u postojećim konstelacijama koristereprezentacije, simbole i znakove koji reflektuju i utiču na ovdašnji društveni

kontekst.Kada je reč o objavljeni besedama, govorima i obraćanjima mitropolita Da-

brobosanske mitropolije, uključujući i nekoliko postavljenih intervjua iz dnev-nih novina, prisutna je transmisija hrišćanskih vrednosti u smislu referiranjana mir, ljubav, toleranciju, dostojanstvo svakog ljudskog bića. Viktimološkogdiskursa koji bi bio okrenut proizvodnji selektivne kolektivne memorije goto-

vo i da nema, i podvlače se važnosti saradnje između verskih zajednica i kaopozitivan primer se navodi rad Međureligijskog vijeća u Bosni i Hercegovini(MRV). No uprkos tome, mogu se iščitati slojevi kreiranja selektivne kolek-

tivne memorije koja koristi određene strategije i kako se u teorijama diskursa


37/153


36

navodi određene retoričke ansamble u svrhu kreiranja stanovitih kognitivnihmapa. Jedna od strategija je tzv. generalizacija- npr. u intervjuu za Dnevni Avazgde mitropolit ističe da zločina ima u svakom narodu, potiskivanja- u nave-

denom intervjuu gde se ističe da ga Karadžić i Mladić uopšte ne interesuju apotom i u intervjuu za Srnu gde je navedeno, a u kontekstu izgradnje i obnove

verskih objekata da to ne služi samo povratku ljudskog dostojanstva već i dase ne vide tragovi ovog rata. U intervjuu za Nezavisne novine može se uočiti istrategija retoričkog obrata- govori se o žrtvama drugih u smislu da oni iz redasrpskog naroda koji su činili zločine zapravo brukaju i čine zlo svom narodui svojoj veri. Ovakav jedan repertoar zapravo upozorava na Moltmanovu tezuda je hrišćanski sakrament pokore više usmeren na počinitelje nego na žrtve,i da žrtve trebaju „slobodan prostor priznanja da vičući iskažu ono što im se

desilo“ (Moltmann, 2013: 90). Retorički obrati se daju iščitati i u (skrivenim)tezama koje pozivaju sa jedne strane na zaborav, a s druge strane na važnostpouke i poduke iz prošlosti da bi se gradila bolja budućnost, kao i u tezama dase Crkva ne treba mešati u politiku uz istovremeno prebacivanje političarimada ne slušaju verske poglavare te je reč o strategiji koju neki istraživači nazivajudiskursna strategija oksimoron (Valić-Nedeljković, 2014: 317). Na ovaj načinse uz pomoć ove navodne depolitizacije, navodne jer spaja nespojive suprotno-sti, zapravo i „skida“ svaka odgovornost verskih zajednica koje su nedvojbenopre i tokom konflikta isti legitimizirale (v. Radulović, 2002) i kriju antinomije,

na koje je upozorio Knežević da se u isto vreme priziva pravda za žrtve i dru-gačiji odnosi a da se u isto vreme zločini potiskuju kroz strategiju generaliza-cije a što ukazuje na nedostatak kritičkog odnosa prema pripadnicima vlastitezajednice i nedovoljne empatije prema žrtvama onih drugih (Knežević, 2014:277). Time se stvara određena selektivna kolektivna memorija „kroz politič-ko-ideološku interpolaciju religijskog diskursa“ (Knežević, 2014: 274). One seogleda i u postavljenim besjedama mitropolita povodom najznačajnijih pra-

voslavnih praznika. Pozivanje na ljubav, život, radost, na pobedu života nadsmrću a koju simbolizuje Hristove vaskrsenje (Vaskršnja besjeda) ostaje nanivou apstraktnog ali ipak univerzalnog teološkog govora koji se potom politi-

zira i partikularizira tako što se u isto vreme poziva da prestanu klevete protivsrpskog naroda. Ovo se potom ublažava pozivanjem na jednakopravnost svihgrađana i pravo svakog naroda u BiH da čuva svoje nasleđe i osobenosti4. Uzpomoć ovih slojeva, religijski diskurs postaje operativniji, što ne znači da osta-

je zarobljem u okvirima vlastitog poimanja prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnostišto ga čini, kao što smo rekli učinkovitijim.

Kada je reč o Vrhbosanskoj nadbiskupiji, ono što je očigledno je prisustvomanje postova u kvantitativnom smislu. Poruke i poduke biskupa su smešte-ne u dve rubrike: Citati i misli (http://vrhbosanska-nadbiskupija.org/nadbi-

4 http://www.mitropolijadabrobosanska.org/besjeda2006vaskrs.html


38/153


37

skup/citati-misli-poruke) i Propovijedi (http://vrhbosanska-nadbiskupija.org/nadbiskup/propovijedi). Iako ima manje sadržaja, daju se iščitati podležućeporuke i poduke koje nisu uvek na prvi mah toliko vidljive, što ne znači dasu manje učinkotivite. Citati i misli pak predstaljaju kratke isečke iz periodašto konflikta što postkonflikta. I ovde je na delu hibridni diskurs, koji je na-kad situiran u kontekst BiH društva a nekad istrgnut iz istog. S jedne stranese šire individualne poruke umotane u ljudskopravaški diskurs, no opet sutransmitovane u kontekst problema hrvatskog naroda koji opet to svoje hr-

vatstvo transcendira kroz repertoare kao što su hrišćanska univerzalnost. Jer,kao što je ukazao Knežević, „Božja prisutnost se ne može porediti sa nečim

vidljivim“, (Кнежевић, 2010: 71), no s druge strane kao što istoimeni autornavodi hrišćanstvo nosi breme trenutka i putem Ad extra critique demonstrira

svoju uključenost u različite društvene probleme koje apstraktni teološki govorčesto i ne vidi (ibid, 57). Ovi aspekti su i te kako vidljivi u obraćanjima biskupaVrhbosanske mitropolije. Biskup sjedne strane adresira konkretne probleme,i uglavnom ih smešta u problem Hrvata u BiH mada ih transmituje ili krozljudskopravaški diskurs ili kroz univerzalne hrišćanske poruke. No, ljudsko-pravaški diskurs se smešta u kontekst manjeg broja Hrvata u BiH koji su stogaizloženiji diskriminaciji, te se postavlja pitanje da li bi ovakvih zahteva bilo dasu Hrvati eventualna brojčana većina u BiH. U isto vreme, biskup smatra dase svi trebaju osećati kao kod kuće na celoj BiH, a s druge strane da će Crkva

delovati bez obzira kako se država zvala. Tu vidimo preklapanje partikularnogi univerzalnog, što je u isto vreme i produkt odašnjih konstelacija. U duhu navoda autora Kneževića i teze da se Božja prisutnost ne može porediti sa nečim vidljivim, biskup u svojoj propovedi „Perspektive opstanka i povratka“ insistirana univerzalnom hrišćanskom diskursu. No uprkos tome, sad termin opstankaukazuje da je diskurs ne samo univerzalan već i etnokonfesionalno situiran jerpojam opstanka nosi biologiziran naboj koje hrišćanstvo može i treba da tran-scendira. Uprkos činjenici da biskup ističe da se snaga vidi u raspetom Kristu,a ne u partikularnoj pripadnosti univerzalnoj, svetoj, Katoličkoj crkvi. Jer, ikatolika je u svetu 18%, kao i Hrvata u BiH, što ih ne čini manje relevantnim

jer Hrišćanstvo svojom univerzalnošču transcendira partikularitete.Kada je o prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti reč, kao bitnom segmentu ove

analize, biskup koristi ove vremenske retoričke repertoare. S jedne strane, isti-če se da je baština nešto sveto, a s druge da je praštanje temelj budućnosti. No,nije jasno na konkretnom planu kako se baština može implementirati za zalogbudućnosti, i kako se rane koje se pominju mogu hrišćanski transcendirati. Ukontekstu suživota i boljih odnosa biskup upozorava na političke zloupotrebe,s tim da se ne daje konkretan uput kako „Crkva u Hrvata“ takva zloupotre-be može prevazići. Iz toga se može zaključiti da je Katolička crkva operativna

stvarajući različite kanale asocijacija u lakanovskom smislu, gde su označeni


39/153

8/16/2019 Mediji, Religija, Naciona

Documents

Mediji, Religija, Nacionalizam i Tranziciona pravda