Medieval Hungary

 

I would like to thank Stephen Ladanyi, a Kiwi of Hungarian descent, for his invaluable assistance and recommendations on Hungarian authored History books published in English. Without Stephen's efforts to procure these books on my behalf these pages would not contain the detail they do. The most useful are listed in the Hungarian sources section. An additional thank you to Dave Madigan for introducing me to Stephen.

Hungarian History 1300 to 1444AD

 Significant Events

 

1301 AD

        The death of Andrew III last of the male line of the Arpad family plunged Hungary into a power struggle for the throne.

Charles Angevin (1308 to 1342 AD)

       After eight years of infrequent civil war and feuding Charles Robert of the Anjou family was successfully Crowned King of Hungary. Though recognised by the majority of Hungary's magnates many 'little Caesars' controlled vast areas of the Country. Charles reorganised Hungary's military forces and over a period of years destroyed his rebellious Nobles. Their lands either enriching the Crown or being granted to new blood, loyal only to Charles.     Charles restructured the royal finances and the economy of the Country. under his reign Hungary became the major supplier of Gold bullion and coins. The Country provided one third of the entire gold supply of Europe. Newly minted gold coins, called florins, similar to the Italian Florins, were soon preferred currency in much of Europe. By limiting Gold sales through ten Crown controlled Exchanges the Royal Treasury received a huge income every year. Charles broke the virtual monopoly on trade that was held by Austrian merchants by several astute treaties with Bohemia and Poland. Charles held a 'party' in 1335 for the Kings of Bohemia and Poland which cost the Hungarian treasury some 40,000 Florins. A truly vast sum but the return was ten fold when Bohemia agreed to renounce all claims on the Polish throne and to support Hungarian claims should it become vacant. Poland and Bohemia agreed to special trading status between the three that

would under cut or by pass the Austrian strangleholds. The rise of Hungary saw many European powers looking for alliances with their Royal family. One of these alliances was the marriage of the King of Naples daughter, Joanna, to Charles' second son Andrew. Charles successfully turned a divided and weak Hungary into one of the most powerful Eastern European Nations of its day. His death in 1342 left the throne to his eldest son Louis. Louis would become the only Hungary King to earn the adjective 'the Great'

Louis the Great (1342 to 1382AD)     Unlike his father Louis was not the physical ideal of a warrior King. Small in stature, with misaligned shoulders and inclined more towards peace and diplomacy he never the less achieved a reputation as an exemplary Knight. From the moment of his accession Louis was embroiled in conflict.

The Italian conflicts.

     Louis' younger brother Andrew though promised the throne of Naples had instead been outmanoeuvred by his own wife Joanna. Andrew was awarded a small duchy while his wife became heir to the throne. Andrew apparently feared for his life at the hands of the Neapolitan Nobles and appealed to Louis for help. Louis responded by sending their formidable Mother, Dowager queen Elizabeth, to Naples. By the time of Elizabeth's arrival Joanna was queen and was able to calm her angry mother-in-law by massive ceremony and flattery. Elizabeth left Naples leaving Joanna secure on the throne and believing the situation resolved. Elizabeth however stopped in Rome on her return and convinced the Pope, by way of a massive bribe, to declare Andrew King of Naples and demand his coronation. By this act Elizabeth secured her own son's assassination at the hands of his wife and her supporters.     Louis' response was an invasion of Naples, marching his army the length of Italy and routing Joanna's supporters. Joanna was forced to flee to France. Louis remained just long enough to install garrisons and then returned to Hungary. Once Louis and the bulk of the his forces had departed Joanna returned and roused the local population against the Hungarian garrisons. Joanna was restored to power. A second invasion by Louis followed in 1350 but was quickly abandoned because of the plague. Officially the invasion was stopped because of promises by the Pope to see the murders of Andrew punished. Louis would not interfere in Southern Italy again.     Northern Italy saw numerous attacks by Hungarian forces on land held by Venice. Louis on gaining the throne had begun campaigns to regain the Dalmatia coast line which had long been held by Venice. This conflict would only be ended in 1381 when Venice agreed to return her Dalmatian lands to Hungary and pay a annual tribute.

Mary and Sigismund     Louis died in 1382 leaving no male heirs. His eldest surviving daughter Mary was acclaimed by the Hungarian nobility and Crowned Queen. At the time of her Coronation she was betrothed to Sigismund of Luxembourg. However due to the interference of the Queen Mother (another Elizabeth), who hoped for a 'better' alliance the marriage was long delayed. Elizabeth's manipulation of the Queen and her meddling in Hungarian foreign affairs eventually created a back lash against her and the Crown. Several of Hungary's most powerful Barons reacted to this domination of the throne by adding their support to Louis' cousin, Charles, King of Naples who had a claim to the throne. This forced the issue and in an attempt to appease the increasingly hostile Nobility Mary and Sigismund were married. Sigismund was however reduced to the status of consort. The brief period of stability brought about by the Royal marriage was quickly overturned with the arrival of Charles of Naples and a substantial following in Buda. Mary was forced to abdicate in favour of Charles, who was promptly crowned King Charles II. Sigismund fled to his brother King Wenceslas of Bohemia.     Charles reign lasted barely three months, his supporters dispersed after his coronation and Mary and her mother were able to launch a counter coup. Charles was imprisoned and died with in a month. The imprisonment of Charles and the arrival of Sigismund at the head of a Bohemian army meant there was little resistance to Mary's return to the throne. The only area to resist Mary's return was Croatia-Dalmatia where the Nobility proclaimed Charles's infant son László King.

     Mary and Elisabeth, in a move striking by its risk journeyed into the heart of the rebellion in an attempt to face down the Nobles. The ploy backfired spectacularly, Elizabeth was strangled and Mary imprisoned. Sigismund was declared co-ruler in with Mary in 1387 and given effective control of Hungary, though a league of Barons was formed to 'assist' the King. Sigismund managed to rescue his wife from her imprisonment but her health and possibly her sanity had suffered. Sigismund became sole ruler of Hungary, which was confirmed by the Nobles on Mary's death in 1395. 1395 to 96 saw Sigismund led a crusade against the Ottoman Turks. His forces were crushed at the battle of Nicopolis and Sigismund forced to flee for his life.For the first half of his reign Sigismund can be judged to have been an effective monarch. During this time he oversaw a reorganisation of the legal system, commerce and Hungarian defences. Sigismund's organisation of defences for Hungary's borders were a major factor in successfully holding back the Ottoman advance for over a century.

     1411 however saw Sigismund successfully acquire the title King of the Germans and uncrowned Holy Roman Emperor. This effectively minimised

Hungary on Sigismund's list of priorities. Sigismund's meddling in Bohemia largely caused the armed revolt which became the Hussite wars. This and increasing pressure from the Ottoman Turks prevented Sigismund from effectively ruling Hungary. A lull in the Hussite wars briefly saw Sigismund return to the affairs of Hungary. 1428 Sigismund and some 20,000 to 25,000 men, including a contingent of Wallachians sent by Dan II attempted to take the fortress of Golubac from the Ottomans. The Ottomans surprised the army during the siege and inflicted a heavy defeat. Sigismund concluded a peace treaty with the Ottoman Sultan and adopted a defensive policy for the remainder of his reign. The parliament increasingly dealt with domestic matters and developed a sense of its own importance. The heavy role of the Hungarian parliament in ruling Hungary meant that Sigismund's death in 1437 initially had little effect on the stability of the Country.

Albert (1438 to 1439AD)     Respecting the wishes of Sigismund the Hungarian Parliament declared his son in law Albert King. Albert also became King of Bohemia and Holy Roman Emperor. Albert relied heavily on the Parliament to effectively rule Hungary in his absence and in his short reign conceded numerous privileges to them. Several of the larger landholders in Southern Hungary launched quite successful, though limited attacks on Ottoman held parts of Serbia. Magnates of Transylvania along with the 'Saxon' and Szekeler groups crushed a peasant uprising in the province (1437-38). So successfully was the suppression that Ottoman attacks into Transylvania in 1438 met with very little resistance.     Albert returned to Hungary in 1439 to be greeted with the news that parts of Southern Hungary had been overrun by Ottoman troops and that the free Serbian capital at Smedendria (Smederevo) was under Ottoman siege. The Hungarian parliament took the opportunity to extract concessions in return for troops. Eventually an army was raised and advanced towards the Ottomans. However within 15 days of the campaign starting the majority of the Hungarian Nobles left the army citing that their feudal obligations of service had been completed. Albert was forced to retreat and leave Smedendria to fall to the Ottomans. Albert fell ill during the retreat, possibly cholera and died within a month of his return. Four months after his death his wife Elizabeth gave birth to a son, christened László.

     Once again the Hungarian throne was vacant. Albert's widow Elizabeth, prior to giving birth to her son attempted to get the Parliament to appoint her Queen Regent for her unborn baby. She was supported by some of the greatest magnates of Hungary. It would however be the demands of the middle and lower Nobility for an adult King that would hold sway at the Hungarian Diet. One of the most vocal supporters for such a King was Janos Hunyadi. It was Hunyadi that proposed the 14 year old Wladislaw III of

Poland. This may not have been his or his supporters first choice but the young age of the proposed King may have swayed some of the Magnates to support the choice. Elizabeth begrudging allowed representatives to approach Wladislaw. As soon as her son was born though Elizabeth demanded the representatives withdraw their offer and return to Hungary. Under instructions from Hunyadi and other Nobles the representatives continued negotiations. With Wladislaw's acceptance Elizabeth fled Hungary to Austria with her son and the stolen Holy crown of Hungary. The scene was set for a civil war. Western Hungary and Slovakia declared for Elizabeth. Eastern Hungary and Transylvania for Wladislaw. Southern Hungary was nominally controlled by Wladislaw's partisans but contained significant estates of Magnates loyal to Elizabeth.

Ulászló I (1440 to 1444AD)     17 July 1440 Wladislaw was crowned Ulászló I of Hungary by the Archbishop of Strigoniu a staunch supporter of Elizabeth. His co-operation being secured by a large armed presence. The loss of the Royal Crown, stolen by Elizabeth, meant Ulászló's coronation could be regarded as suspect. Initially the civil war was a series of skirmishes. Elizabeth reinforced her Hungarian supporters with Hussite mercenaries under a Jan Jiskra. Elizabeth made a miscalculation with Jiskra, she gave him control of the rich mining areas of Slovakia. The local population welcomed the Hussites mercenaries with open arms and Jiskra was soon in complete control of the district. He would remain Slovakia's effective ruler until well after the death of Ulászló I. Elizabeth was forced to negotiate with her own mercenary captain for his support. This miscalculation and Elizabeth's pawning of estates in Hungary to King Frederick HRE and granting him 'tutor' rights over her son saw many of her supporters declare for Ulászló I. This was reinforced by the crushing of a pro-Elizabeth revolt by Southern magnates and the capture of her greatest supporter Ulrich Cilli. Ulrich Cilli and his family were the largest landholders in Central Europe. Ulrich was released by Ulászló I after swearing allegiance and promising to assist the King in ending the war.

     A revolt in Southern Hungary by Nobles in support of Elizabeth was quickly suppressed by the forces of Nicholas Ujlaki and Janos Hunyadi, Bans of Macva and Severin respectively. In February1441, at Bataszek the leadership of Hunyadi and the skill of his personal troops secured an overwhelming victory over Ladislas Garai and the only field army loyal to Elizabeth. This victory brought Hunyadi and Ujlaki to the attention of Ulászló I. In a move extraordinary in its largesse and trust Ulászló turned two relatively unknown nobles into the most powerful Barons of their time. Ujlaki and Hunyadi were made joint Voivodes of Transylvania, Counts of the Szekely and military commanders of Belgrade, Timisoara and all fortresses on the Danube. Along with these the King granted them all Royal revenues

from the Crown monopolies on Salt production. Ulászló's reasons for such a move appear to have been twofold, Elizabeth's support appeared to be widespread in the area and the Ottomans were making significant raids into Transylvania. Though theoretically joint rulers of Transylvania and surrounding districts, Ujlaki and Hunyadi divided their responsibilities. Hunyadi took full control of Transylvania and all districts East of Tizsa. Ujlaki took control of the transdanubian and all districts West of Tizsa, though he retained equal control over judicial matters and the monopolies on Salt. Both men were already friends at the time of their elevation, Hunyadi having served under Nicholas' elder brother.

     The task of subduing the rebellious Nobles of Transylvania was in reality a far easier process than Ulászló and his advisors had believed. The appearance of Hunyadi and his troops was sufficient to quell any outward support for Elizabeth. Hunyadi confiscated lands of anyone suspected of harbouring pro-Elizabeth feelings and granted them to his own supporters and retainers. In this way Transylvania was rapidly subdued. By his methods Hunyadi turned Transylvania into the one of the most stable and loyal provinces of Hungary. This trust was sufficiently evident from the start, within a year of his elevation Hunyadi was able to mount an attack into Serbia. This brief campaign was able to drive off Ishak, Bey of Smederevo and his forces from around the Serbian town of Belgrade.

     1442 saw Hunyadi defeat two further Ottoman armies, inflicting large numbers of casualties and providing Christian Europe with their first significant victories. Hunyadi's successes inspired an enthusiasm against the Ottomans not seen since the disaster at Nicopolis in 1396. Cardinal Cesarini, the Papal representative in Hungary attempted to settle the civil war with the aim of starting a fresh Crusade against the Ottomans. Though unsuccessful in his main aim the Cardinal managed to negotiate a truce for a year between the warring factions.

     1443 to 1444 Ulászló and Hunyadi led 'the long campaign' into Ottoman held territories. Called the long campaign because it lasted over the winter of 1443-44. Militarily this campaign achieved very little. Though Hunyadi inflicted three serious defeats on Ottomans their military capabilities were barely dented. The campaign also failed to recapture any lands lost to the Ottomans. The campaign did however prove the Ottomans could be beaten and waved the Christian banner in areas long thought irretrievably lost. The campaign caused rebellions in Serbian lands against the Ottomans. More significantly an Albanian by the name of George Castriota, a commander in the Ottoman army used the confusion of the Ottoman defeats to rebel. Called Skanderbeg, a corruption of his Ottoman Name/title Iskender Bey he managed to liberate much of Albania. The end of the long campaign was exceptionally difficult for the Hungarian troops, most of their horses died and all of their wagons were burned. However the capture of the Sultan's

Brother-in-law effectively ended the fighting and allowed an organised withdrawal back to Hungary. For more details on the campaigns and battle of Janos Hunyadi see The Battles of Janos Hunyadi

     1444 began with optimism for the Hungarians, their successes under Hunyadi made them the toast of much of Western Europe. The year would end disastrously though, their King, two senior Bishops, numerous Bans and the Pope's representative Cardinal Cesarini dead on the battlefield at Varna. The events leading up to this battle are convoluted and confused and it remains one of the most hotly debated events of Hungarian medieval history. The events are outlined in the significant Battles section.

Hungarian History 1444 to 1490AD

 Significant Events

History 1300 to 1444AD

Ladislaus V (1444-1457AD)

     The death of Ulászló I plunged Hungary into crisis. Frederick III in the name of Ladislaus V occupied the Hungarian border districts with Austria. Jan Jiskra seized Spis and the Cilli family took control of Slovakia, driving out the supporters of Ulászló I. Once again Hungary was heading for a full blown civil war. Hunyadi, in what can only be described as an act of masterful diplomacy managed to organise a settlement. Possibly playing on fears of Ottoman reprisals and from his position as most powerful landholder in the Kingdom Hunyadi was able to convene a National Diet in April 1445. The measure of the crisis can be judged by the fact that for the first time Hungarian Towns were represented. The terms of the agreement were simple enough, supporters of Ulászló I would acknowledge Ladislaus as their lawful King. Frederick III would return Ladislaus to the Hungarian people, along with the Holy Crown. Until the return of the King seven 'Captains' would be elected to maintain law and Order. Hunyadi was the first of these Captains and of the remaining six, five had been supporters of Ulászló. The final man to make up the seven was Jiskra, not even a Hungarian! The choice in Captains reflects several points. The old party of Ulászló under the leadership of Hunyadi was still by far the strongest in Hungary and that the Czech mercenary Jiskra had managed to build such a strong power base in Slovakia and surrounding districts that he had to be acknowledged as one of the seven most powerful men in Hungary. Despite the balance of power being firmly in favour of Hunyadi and his peers this temporary solution worked very well. The Counts of Cilli and Jiskra remained effective rulers of the territories they held but peace was maintained and stability restored. 

The seven ruled Hungary for over a year but by then it was clear that Frederick III was not going to release Ladislaus nor return the lands he had taken. A new Diet was called at Pest in June 1446. Outside of the Diet and by popular acclaim most of the Nobility pronounced Janos Hunyadi Royal Regent. The Diet had little choice but to ratify the popular decision. Though given Hunyadi's obvious popularity and sheer personal wealth and power the decision was never really in doubt. Never the less the Diet installed limits on just what Hunyadi could do as regent (He was given the title Gubernator (Governor)) The Diet elected a Regency Council to 'assist' the Governor in his duties. This Council was remarkably balanced in its composition. A second Diet in 1447 further codified the how the Kingdom was to be run. Ladislaus Garai, a supporter of Ladislaus V from the beginning was made Palatine. The Diet also decreed that if Ladislaus V should die without an heir it would fall to the Barons to elect a New King. Even so the Diet was unable to reassert authority over lands controlled by Jiskra or the Cilli.     The refusal of Jiskra to relinquish control to the Diet and Hunyadi immediately led to a resumption of hostilities. Over the next five years Hunyadi led a total of four campaigns against Jiskra. However he was never able to give the situation his full attention. As a result the campaigns never utilised the full force of the Hungarian army nor stayed in the field long enough to force Jiskra's army to battle. The campaigns instead of destroying Jiskra's strongholds was reduced to devastating the surrounding lands. 1451 saw a serious defeat for Hunyadi when Jiskra unexpectedly took to the field and his army surprised Hunyadi while he was besieging the fortified monastery at Lucenec. Hunyadi had no opportunity to revenge his defeat as the following year saw Frederick III unexpectedly returned Ladislaus V to Hungary. Jiskra's long support for Ladislaus V made peace inevitable.     Between 1444 and 1447 Hunyadi was unable to focus on the Ottoman threat but by 1448 he was in a position to revenge the defeat at Varna. The previous year Hunyadi had led a rapid campaign into Wallachia and replaced Vlad Dracul with a more amenable Voivode. With Wallachia secured Hunyadi gathered an army and marched into Ottoman occupied Serbia. The likely object of the campaign appears to have been to join with Skanderbeg and his rebel army in Albania. At the plain of Kosovo Polje Hunyadi rested his army, it may be that Skanderbeg was expected to march and join him. Instead it was the Ottoman army that appeared and after 3 days of fighting the Hungarian army was defeated. Hungarian casualties were heavy and included most of the senior commanders. Hunyadi was further inconvenienced in his retreat to Hungary when the Prince of Serbia George Brankovic seized his opportunity to revenge himself on the man he believed had betrayed the peace of 1444. Hunyadi was temporarily held captive until he agreed to return Brankovic's estates in Hungary to him. Once free though Hunyadi set about gaining his own measure of revenge. Brankovic was declared traitor and his lands subject to forfeiture. From 1448 to 1451 Hunyadi or his supporters waged war on Brankovic. This 'little war' combined with Hunyadi's on/off attempts to deal with Jiskra meant little was achieved

on either front. His defeat at the hands of Jiskra in 1451 saw Hunyadi accept mediation from the Barons in his dispute with Brankovic. This presumably was to free up troops for a new campaign against Jiskra. Peace was achieved with Hunyadi returning all lands seized since 1448 and paying a massive 155,000 florins in return for retaining all lands ceded over in 1444. Also Brankovic's granddaughter was betrothed to Hunyadi's younger son Matthius.     The battle of Kosovo Polje was a watershed for Hungary, her efforts against the Ottomans would for many years be almost entirely confined to the defensive. Despite losing his second major battle against the Ottomans, failing to deal with Jiskra and having to relinquish some of his rights to Royal revenues Hunyadi retained his pre-eminent position in Hungary. In part this was due to Hunyadi being the natural leader of the opposition to the Cilli who had regained much influence by their blood relationship with the King. The Ottomans still threatened Hungary and Hunyadi remained the best general of the time. The return of the King Ladislaus altered the political makeup, no longer was there a 'Loyalist' and 'Nationalist' party, represented by Cilli and Hunyadi respectively. The Nationalists transformed into the Hunyadi faction, representing only their own interests. This shift to personal politics saw significant defections to the Loyalists. These included Ujlaki and the Bishop of Oradea. The struggle for control between the two groups increased steadily and had the Ottoman Sultan not signalled his intend to renew the war, Hungary may well have found itself in the grip of a new civil war.1451 saw Mehmed II gain the throne of the Ottoman Empire. He began a concerted campaign to expand his European holdings. 1453 he took Constantinople, transferring his Capital there. 1454 he began fresh attacks on Serbia and by 1456 was in a position to attack Belgrade. The Sultan began the siege on the 4th of July 1456 and by the 22nd of July was in full retreat with the remains of his army and a healthy respect for the fighting qualities of the Hungarians. Mehmed's experiences under the walls of Belgrade appear to be the primary reason why the Ottomans would not launch any attacks on such a scale for the next 65 years. The breaking of the siege however cost Hungary dear as Janos Hunyadi died shortly after from the plague.     Hunyadi's positions and power were inherited by his eldest son Ladislaus. Unfortunately, as is often the case, Ladislaus had not inherited his Father's many talents, except ambition. By the end of 1456 Ladislaus had had Ulrich Cilli publicly murdered, Cilli was at the time Captain General of the Realm, taken the King into his 'care' and declared himself Captain General. In a move stunning in its stupidity Ladislaus released the King and then attended the Royal Court in Buda with his brother Matthius. The King had Ladislaus and Matthius arrested, charged and tried for high treason. Ladislaus was executed and the 14 year old Matthius imprisoned. The King rightly fearing the reaction of the Hunyadi party fled to Bohemia with Matthius as his hostage. A revolt against the King, led by Hunyadi's widow Elizabeth and her brother Michael Szilagyi soon broke out. The Royal army under Jiskra and

Hunyadi's former compatriot Ujlaki put up an effective resistance. Despite pitched battles and innumerable skirmishes neither side was able to gain the advantage. The situation changed on the 23 November 1457 when Ladislaus V died in Prague, once again leaving Hungary with no legitimate heir to the throne.

King Matthius (1458- 1490AD)

     There was only one realistic candidate for King, Matthius Hunyadi. No one else mustered enough support to prevent a civil war. At the Diet of Pest in 1458 Michael Szilagyi and some 15,000 supporters acclaimed Matthius King. Szilagyi gave the Barons assurances that Matthius would not exact revenge for the death of his brother. This was sufficient for the Barons to elect Matthius as King and Szilagyi as governor. Matthius after some negotiation with his captor George Podebrad of Bohemia was released and was crowned King on the 14th of February 1458.     It was apparent from the start that this 15 year old boy had inherited in full measure the talents of his illustrious father. Within three months of his coronation Matthius had sidelined, then arrested his Uncle Szilagyi and taken personal control of his Kingdom. Matthius immediately began consolidating his kingdom. He faced the same three main problems his father had been unable to deal with. That of the Emperor Frederick III, Jan Jiskra and the powerbase of the Counts of Cilli, now in the hands of a foreign Mercenary.     Frederick III was proclaimed King of Hungary in 1459 by some of the Barons of Northern Hungary, led by Garai. The revolt was quickly crushed by Matthius but it did little to persuade Frederick to drop his claims to the throne. Frederick's support in Northern Hungary was still strong. Jiskra controlled Slovakia and a Jan Vitovec controlled most of the Cilli lands. It was inevitable that Jan Jiskra would not submit to the new King and almost as soon as Matthius was elected hostilities were resumed. Jiskra at first offered to support Casimir of Poland if he wished to push his claim to Hungary. When this failed Jiskra switched his support to Frederick III. Like his earlier successful resistance to Janos Hunyadi Jiskra was able to rely on Matthius being unable to give him his undivided attention. However unlike his father Matthius adopted a systematic approach to the problem. Each campaign was aimed at reducing Jiskra's strongholds and retaining them. Never the less it wouldn't be until 1462 that Jiskra was forced to negotiate. Jiskra's willingness to negotiate was only partially due to Matthius' successful campaigns mostly though it was because Frederick had made his own peace with Matthius. The peace saw Matthius declare Frederick his successor, so long as he was without a male heir, pay a massive ransom for the Holy Crown of St Stephen and agree to Austria retaining much of the lands taken from Hungary since 1440. Jiskra was effectively isolated and knew it. Matthius though dealt honourably with Jiskra and he was made a Hungarian Baron and one of his

senior army commanders. Most of Jiskra's troops were incorporated into the Hungarian army though some preferred banditry and it wouldn't be until 1467 that the last of these marauding armies was destroyed. Another mercenary to do well under Matthius was that of Jan Vitovec. Vitovec was originally in the employ of Count Ulrich of Cilli. With Ulrich's death in 1456 the Cilli estates were vacant. Ladislaus V appointed Vitovec Ban of Slovenia and Frederick III supported him when he took control of the Cilli estates within the County. Rather than confront him Matthius gave Vitovec the title Count of Zagorje, re-affirmed him as Ban of Slovenia and allowed him to keep the Cilli lands he had seized there. In return Matthius took control of all remaining Cilli estates in Hungary and gained himself another Loyal supporter. This period of consolidation was complete by Matthius coronation in 1464 with the crown of St Stephen.

The wars of Matthius

     Bonfinius said of Matthius 'in order to rule in peace at home, he made war abroad'. The majority of Matthius' reign was indeed spent at war however despite popular perceptions of this 'Defender of Christendom' almost all of Matthius' conflicts were with his Christian neighbours.

The Ottomans

     The Ottomans had continued to gain ground even after Janos Hunyadi's heroic defence of Belgrade in 1456. This defeat though appears to have altered Ottoman objective, no longer was Hungary the primary target. Instead Ottoman armies slowly whittled away at the States surrounding Hungary. By 1459 the royal residence of Smederevo had fallen to the Ottoman armies and with it Serbia. Many Serbian Nobles and their followers fled to Hungary. Matthius welcomed them and granted them estates. These refugees provided Matthius with another excellent source of troops.1462 saw Vlad Tepes driven from Wallachia and an Ottoman puppet placed on the throne. 1463 the Ottomans successfully conquered Bosnia, killing their king in the process. 1466 Hercegovina fell to the Ottomans.      In ten years the Ottomans had successfully removed all the Countries that had previously buffered Hungary from their attacks. Matthius' response to this apparently dangerous development was surprisingly muted. Matthius limited himself to a single offensive campaign into Bosnia in 1463 which captured several strategic fortresses, these would remain part of the Hungarian defensive network until 1527.     Despite his very public anti-Ottoman rhetoric Matthius was in reality following a policy of peace with his Southern neighbour. This can be shown by numerous ways. 1463 to 1479 Venice was at war with the Ottoman Empire. This war was one of Venice's hardest fought and costly in her history

and it is clear from the sources at the time that she regarded Hungary as her most important ally. Yet between 1463 and 1674 Hungary carried out no military campaigns against the Ottomans and her southern borders were almost totally undisturbed by their raids. Further to this, Ottoman raids beginning in 1469 actually crossed through the Hungary provinces of Croatia and Slavonia to raid Venetian and Austrian lands. By 1490 over ten of these large scale raids are recorded and none of them appear to have devastated any of the Hungarian lands they past through. Certainly Frederick III accused Matthius of assisting the Ottoman raiders.     It would be the Ottomans that would force a change in policy. In 1474 the Bey of Smederevo launched a massive raid into Hungary, burning the town of Oradea and taking 16,000 prisoners. Matthius allied himself with Stephen of Moldavia and in 1474 at the battle of Vaslui a contingent of Hungarian troops assisted in the destruction of an Ottoman army. 1476 Matthius captured the fortress of Sabac and campaigned near Smederavo, constructing a series of temporary fortresses. Swift action from Sultan Mehmed II saw these fortresses destroyed and the status quo in the area restored. An Ottoman attack on Transylvania in 1479 was destroyed by the Voivode Stephen Batori. The death of Mehmed II in 1481 returned Hungarian-Ottoman relations to one of peaceful tolerance. The new Sultan Bayezid II being substantially less warlike than his predecessor, official peace treaties being signed in 1483 and 88.     Despite Matthius' lack of aggression against the Ottomans he was not foolish enough to ignore their potential threat. He maintained and improved upon the defensive border fortresses started by Sigismund. He also created a new levy of soldiers based on refugee Serbs settled in Hungary's border districts. These 'Gusars' or 'Husars' primary role was raids and counter raids. Their advantage was that they lay outside of traditional Hungarian laws on troop raising and much like the Szekely provided a reliable and determinable force.

Matthius' Western Wars

     The first major foreign campaign for Matthius was against his old captor King George of Bohemia. George's son Victorin attacked Austria in 1468 and Frederick III asked Matthius for help. In three years Matthius had successfully occupied much of Bohemia and captured Victorin. Matthius' rapid victories managed to create him new enemies. Frederick III convinced of Matthius' duplicity and involvement in Ottoman raids on his territory and support for rebels in Styria constructed an anti-Matthius league with George of Bohemia and Poland. The league achieved little until George's death in 1471 when in accordance with his will Bohemia's crown passed to Wladislas the 15 year old son of King Casimir IV of Poland. Initial attempts to exploit an internal revolt in Hungary failed because Matthius was able to subdue the rebels before

troops from Bohemia and Poland could reach them. Peace negotiations followed but almost as soon as they had been signed they were broken. In 1474 Casimir and Wladislas with a combined Bohemian and Polish army massed ready to invade the territories occupied by Hungary. Matthius responded by devastating the lands of Silesia and prepared himself for a siege behind the walls of Wroclaw. Despite their or maybe because of their massive numerical superiority Casimir and Wladislas were unable to siege Wroclaw for long and were forced to sue for peace. Matthius supplied their army with much needed food and negotiated a favourable truce between Hungary, Poland and Bohemia to last until 1477. In 1477 a permanent peace was negotiated which re-affirmed Matthius' rights to the captured provinces of Silesia and Moravia and stipulated that Bohemia could regain these lands at the cost of 400,000 florins upon Matthius' death. For the remainder of Matthius' reign Bohemia, Poland and Hungary would remain peaceful neighbours.Frederick III and Austria were conspicuously absent from the negotiations of 1474. Frederick and Matthius' relationship had deteriorated into a personal feud when Frederick had given sanctuary to one of Matthius' advisors, John Beckensloer, the Archbishop of Esztergom. Frederick formally recognising Wladislas as King of Bohemia and as Elector of the Holy Roman Emperor in 1477. Matthius' response was swift and by December of 1477 Vienna was under siege. Frederick agreed terms and recognised the treaty between Bohemia and Hungary. Frederick then further twisted the knife in 1480 by getting Beckensloer elected Archbishop of Salzburg. Matthius made in clear from the start that his feud was with Frederick as the Archduke of Austria and not Frederick, the Holy Roman Emperor. Despite this in 1482 Matthius was at war with the Holy Roman Empire. Even with imperial troops Frederick was unable to fight Matthius' army in open battle and the war became one of sieges. Over 5 years Matthius' army reduced Frederick's strongholds one by one. By 1488 Matthius had taken the major towns and fortresses of Koszeg, Bruck, Korneuburg and Vienna. The fall of the Emperor's palace at Wiener Neustadt effectively broke Frederick's will to continue and a peace was negotiated. Matthius retained all of lower Austria and Styria. Frederick would not attempt to regain his territories until after Matthius' death in 1490.

Hungarian Armies 1300 to 1492

 

Contents

Organisation

       Generalis Exercitus

       The Banderium (Bandiera)

       Mercenaries

       The Militia Portalis

       Transylvania

Army Composition

Knights

       Hungarian Knights

       Mercenary Knights (Armigeri)

Light Cavalry

        Hungarian Light Cavalry

       Hussars (Serbian Gusars)

        Szekely

       Cumans

       Wallachian and Moldavian Light horse

Hungarian Infantry

       Archers

       The Saxons

       Mercenary Infantry of the Hunyadi era

        Clipeati

        Armati

        Handgunners or Arquebusiers

        Light Infantry

        WarWagons (Tabors)

       I have taken the approach when describing the Hungarian army of placing information where I feel it makes most sense rather than sticking

rigidly to my headers. For example the Szekely and Cumans appear under the light horse heading yet the information on them includes a brief history and other notable items not really relevant to Light horse. It is also worth noting that where Hungarian is used it does not cover Transylvania. Transylvania is covered separately within the text. 

Organisation

Generalis Exercitus

        The Generalis Exercitus was a mass levy of all lesser Noblemen of Hungary. Originally the core of the Hungarian army this mass levy had provided their Kings with a large and enthusiastic army. By the 14th Century though the levy was an anachronism unable to provide any realistic military force. This was mostly due to changes with in the Hungarian society where the lesser nobility had increasingly been absorbed into the wealthier peasant class though they still insisted on the right of Generalis Exercitus as a means to distinguish themselves. This right though did not equip such men for war and throughout the 14th Century references abound to the complete lack of suitable equipment of those called by the Generalis Exercitus. Additionally the organisation of the Generalis Exercitus was limited to the 'local' or county level. There were no arsenals, leaders or basic organisational units. This situation was mostly political in origin, partially due to the King and partially due to the men of the Generalis Exercitus themselves. The men most experienced in war and most likely to be able to organise the levy into an effective military force were the Barons of the Kingdom. The Kings of Hungary though were not prepared to trust the Barons as local leaders of the levy as it represented a significant threat to their own power. Also the levy were unlikely to wish Baronial interference as in undermined their own independence. The Golden Bull of Andrew II of 1222 further limited the use of the Levy. By this Bull the Levy were only obliged to serve within the boundaries of Hungary and only for a period of fifteen days. The levy did however provide a counter point to Baronial power in Hungary. Charles Angevin used the levy to considerable affect against the rebellious Nobles on his accession to the throne. Yet even he seems to have limited its use to 'minor' wars. His son Louis followed a similar policy and we find that for his foreign wars mercenaries were the preferred troops though significant numbers of Hungarian infantry appear to have taken part in his Italian

campaigns. In the 15th century, much like the General Levy of Poland the Generalis Exercitus when called up was singularly ineffective. The last mobilisation of it was in 1439 by king Albert. The Generalis Exercitus dutifully massed and followed the King fifteen days later it disbanded itself and went home, forcing the King to abandon his campaign and retreat.

The Banderium (Bandiera)

        The decline in the Generalis Exercitus increasingly lead to the responsibility for providing sufficient military forces shifting to the senior Nobles of the realm. As with almost all feudal societies the Nobility of Hungary had their own armed retinues. These retinues were originally made up of kinsmen called Familiaris or Servientes. This gave rise to the term familiaries to describe a Noble's armed following. Unlike western practises though those that served as familiaris were not automatically vassals of their chosen Noble. Service was not equated to vassalage, the familiaris only committed himself and not his own family, lands or retainers. It also fell to the Lord in question to equip and supply his familiaries. In this way the majority of the retinues tended to be made up of Hungary's lesser Nobility. The break down in Royal authority in the 13th and 14th Century saw an increase in the size of these familiaries. No longer were they comprised solely of trusted kinsmen but included anyone willing to serve. The name of these retinues also changed, they became Vexillum (flag/banner) and they also became a significant threat to the King's power. Vexillum came into use as it was customary for the familiaries to be fielded under their Noble's personal standard and leadership. The requirement for vexillum to provide the King with troops also brought about the risk of civil war. A situation clearly shown at the end of the 13th century with the death of the last Arpad King. The Nobles of Hungary used their Vexillum in the power struggle for the throne and created a myriad of 'little Caesars' in Hungary.     The accession of Charles Angevin brought about some changes to the Vexillum system. Once Charles had successfully regained control of Hungary he altered just who was allowed a Vexillum. He limited it to those of Baronial rank only, this also included senior figures of the Church as well. It should be noted that about this time the term Banderium came to be used instead of Vexillum. This is probably due to Italian influence (banderia being the Italian). This shift in name has often been used to justify a radical overhaul of the Hungarian military by Charles. There is however little proof of new practises other than the limiting of just who could raise a Banderium. Never the less the Banderium were private armies and as such answered to their Lords. To ensure their service to the Crown it became customary for the King

to compensate Barons for their Banderium expenses. The Banderium system remained the primary source of troops for the Crown until the time of Matthius. It should be noted that Banderium was used in several contexts Firstly it described the private army of a Baron or the King and in this respect could number in the thousands. Secondly it was used to describe a unit of men fighting under a standard, much like the Polish 'banner'. In this way it was possible for Janos Hunyadi's Banderium to be made up of several Banderium. For Hunyadi we find the term Familaries being used to describe his Personal Banderium, recruited from kinsmen and his private estates and then Banderium being applied to the numerous mercenary companies that he employed. King Ulászló is described as having a Royal Banderium at Varna, comprised of some 300 to 500 Polish guards, yet another Royal Banderium is mentioned fighting alongside Hunyadi and being comprised of Hungarian guards.

Mercenaries

        Louis the Great frequently employed mercenaries. Mostly for his Italian wars but some for garrison duties within Hungary as well. In 1380 for instance the castle of Bran in Transylvania was manned by a contingent of English archers (source: Thuroczy p182). However like the later practises of Poland Hungary employed domestic mercenaries in preference to all others. These mercenaries were hired and led by Knights of the King and paid directly from the Royal Treasury. Normally these mercenaries took to the field as part of the Royal Banderium under the direct command of the King. Though under Louis parts of the Royal army fought in Italy under the command of Barons. The Hungarian mercenaries of one of these armies formed their own company when it was disbanded. This mercenary company, the Magna Societas Ungarorum played a significant part in the Italian wars of the later 14th Century.     Mercenaries were increasingly hired to serve in the Banderium of the Barons as well. Janos Hunyadi particularly employed large numbers of Bohemian and Germans. The other major mercenary presence in the Hungarian army was that of her infantry, here almost overwhelmingly ex-Hussite and Germans prevailed.     It would be under Matthius that mercenaries became the backbone of the Hungarian army forming its own 'black army'. The name 'black army' was actually first applied to Matthius' army in the early 16th century so is anachronistic but does make a convenient tag. During his reign Matthius created possibly the most formidable 'regular' army of the time. The core of Matthius army was originally mercenaries brought over by Jan Jiskra in 1462 after he made his peace with the King. Bonfini, the Italian chronicler records

that Matthius' standing army in 1463 was some 2000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry. The same chronicler records that the army Matthius used in his campaign of 1487 in Austria was some 20,000 cavalry, 8,000 infantry and 5,000 wagons. Sources repeatedly state that the core of Matthius' army remained Germans and Bohemians but that it increasingly included Serbian light cavalry as well.

The Militia Portalis

        The Militia Portalis was born out of attempts to reorganise and reform the general levy. It first appeared in documents of 1397 during the reign of Sigismund. It outlined that for every twenty serf-lots (portae) a Noble was expected to raise and led 1 archer (probably mounted). What is often assumed is that this soldier was a peasant from such holdings this though is never actually specified by the documents of this time or later. This specific levy was not to be limited by service within Hungary nor the 15 day period of service. It appears that this initial attempt failed under opposition from the Nobility. Failure of the Generalis Exercitus during the Hussite wars saw further attempts at reform between 1432-35. These appear to have been more successful and there is documentary evidence of the use of the Militia Portalis from then on.For more detailed information and examination of the evidence on the Hungarian organisation see the following articles:

Military reform in early fifteenth Century Hungary by Joseph Held, Eastern European quarterly, Vol. XL no 2

Militia Portalis in Hungary before 1526 by Andras Borosy, From Hunyadi to Rakoczi

Transylvania

        Transylvania appears to have organised differently from the rest of Hungary and was instead militarily organised along the lines of Wallachia and Moldavia. Transylvania appears to have retained an effective militia system comprised of a the 'great' and 'small' armies. The small army was a levy comprised of the wealthier Nobles of Transylvania and as such was probably fairly effective. The great army was a general levy called in times of

emergency. Janos Hunyadi is known to have called on every able bodied man in 1442 to defend against an Ottoman invasion. There is no recorded instance of a similar occurrence with in Hungary itself. Alongside these levies there was also soldiers available from the Szekely and the Saxons and these are covered below.

Hungarian Army Composition

 

 Contents

Knights

       Hungarian Knights

       Mercenary Knights (Armigeri)

      mounted crossbowmen

Light Cavalry

        Hungarian Light Cavalry

       Hussars (Serbian Gusars)

        Szekely

       Cumans

       Wallachian and Moldavian Light horse

Hungarian Infantry

       Archers

       The Saxons

       Mercenary Infantry of the Hunyadi era

        Clipeati

        Armati

        Handgunners or Arquebusiers

        Light Infantry

        WarWagons (Tabors)

 

Knights

        The core of any Hungarian army was the heavily armoured Knight of the Banderium. These Knights were equipped like those of their Western counterparts.The effect of their charge being regarded as the climax of battle. The heavy cavalry employed by the Hungarians fall into two main categories, Hungarians and Mercenaries.

Hungarian Knights

        Hungarian is used here to indicate native Nobles recruited into the Banderium of the Barons. They were equipped at the expense of their commander and only offered themselves for service. It is likely that such Knights did not come with the usual combat effective support group seen in other European Countries. Emperor Sigismund made a specific order for the Nicopolis campaign of 1396 that Knights should be accompanied by two mounted archers. The implication being that this was not a normal state of affairs. The temperament of these Nobles also appears to have been more cautious that that of their Western Cousins. There are no obvious examples of Hungarian Knights displaying the impetuous behaviour of, for example their French counterparts. This in some way may be explained by the presence of mercenaries within a Banderium which might have acted as a stabilising influence. Though it has to be said any army consistently faced with the light horse tactics used by the Ottomans tended to adopt a very cautious approach to their battles, the Polish are a prime example.

Mercenary Knights (Armigeri)

        Often referred to in the sources by the Italian term Armigeri these men were equipped as Knights and organised in the basic lance or Gleve system prevalent in Germany and Italy at the time. Each lance being a men at arms

or Knight and a support group of between three to five less well equipped retainers. Whether employed in distinct units or as individual lances they differed from the Hungarian Nobility in that they were highly disciplined professionals. There were also two distinct types of mercenary units, foreigners and Hungarians.      The Hungarian mercenary units first appear to have been recruited in Louis' reign. Knights of the Kings household were given commissions (dispositio) to recruit between fifty and eighty men at arms. These men at arms were expected to supply a support group of two to three mounted archers (pharetriarii). These archers were likely to be comparable to those raised by the Militia Portalis and are discussed under Hungarian Light cavalry.      Foreign mercenary units tended to be recruited from Germany or Bohemia. Probably for no other reason that they were the most readily available at the time. There is no evidence of how these mercenaries were recruited but it is likely that this varied from unit to unit. The core of Matthius' mercenaries originated from the army of Jan Jiskra as did many of his senior commanders so they were probably on a rolling contract, as long as they were paid they served. Others may well have been on fixed contracts. Janos Hunyadi certainly seemed to have little difficulty in recruiting and replacing these mercenaries when ever required.

Mounted crossbowmen

Froissart mentions mounted crossbowmen at Nicopolis in 1396. It is generally assumed and likely that this is a mistaken reference to light bow armed cavalry (see Light cavalry). However Bonfinius mentions mounted arbalesters at a battle in 1441 (Sava). These are deployed with the Knights on the wings of the army and are differentiated from the light horse who form a skirmish screen. Based on Hunyadi's known preference for using German mercenaries and the well documented use of mounted crossbowmen in the Holy Roman Empire it is probable that these were such mercenaries.

 

Light Cavalry

        The Hungarian army contained various types of Light horse. Hungarian Light Horse, Hussars (Gusars), Szekely, Cumans, Wallachians and Moldavians

Hungarian Light Cavalry

        These are the archers recruited by the Militia Portalis and appearing in the retinue of Hungarian Knights. They appear to have been recruited directly from the wealthier peasants of Hungary. Their role may well have varied. Those recruited as part of a Knightly retinue, be it as a mercenary or part of a Banderium, may well have been expected to form rear ranks to their Knights. Much like the western practise with retainers. This is based mostly on supposition. As stated previously Sigismund requested such archers to accompany his Knights at Nicopolis. Froissart implies the presence of these archers, though he describes them as mounted crossbowmen. However at the battle it was the Transylvanian and Wallachian contingents that were expected to clear away the Ottoman Akinji skirmishers. This feature appears time and again in Hungarian battles of the 15th Century. Reliance is placed on foreign or specialist light horsemen to act as skirmishers or counter skirmishers. These were often Wallachians (Varna and Kosovo Polje), Serbians (the long campaign and many of Matthius' battles) or Szekelers and Tatars from within Hungary itself. What is notably absent from the primary sources of the 15th Century is the use of native horse archers as massed skirmishers. The Militia Portalis may well have been an effort to create an effective light horse contingent like those of the Wallachian or Serbians. One later edict for the Militia Portalis requests light horsemen armed with bows, lance and armour. All this suggests that the native Hungarian light horsemen may not have been sufficiently skilled or equipped for a dedicated battlefield role in the 15th century and many may in fact have become the infantry element of the Hungarian armies.

Hussars (Gusars)

        Formally created in the reign of Matthius these light horsemen were the primary defence against Turkish raiders. Operating in and around Hungary's southern defences they attempted to intercept Turkish incursions. The origin of the Hussars though stems from the 1427 when Serbia submitted to Ottoman authority. Though the Serbs would periodically resist Ottoman control the Turks now had access to Hungary's borders. The instability in Serbia also led to what Hungarian sources describe as 'robbers and evil doers ' raiding across the borders. These raiders were called Gusars (mounted robbers). To combat these Gusars and their Turkish counterparts it

seems that the border districts recruited their own horsemen. Often as not these Hussars where recruited from the Gusar elements themselves. It should be pointed out that parts of Southern Hungary had until 1426 been part of Serbia and where ceded to the Hungarian Crown by Stephen Lazarevich. These first Hussars were irregulars with no position in Hungary's military. Traditionally the Hussar equipment was a large shield and light lance though whether this evident from the start is unknown and probably unlikely given the disparate sources of recruitment.     Whether these Hussars gained their place in the Hungarian army as a distinct type of soldier, in their own units, prior to the reign of Matthius cannot be proved for certain. However by the time of Janos Hunyadi's Long campaign there appear units of Rac horsemen who played a significant part in the campaign. Rac derives from the name of the Serbian fortress/city Ras and is often used to describe Serbia as a whole. The majority of the Rac horsemen where undoubtedly part of the contingent supplied by Serbia itself for the campaign. In Matthius' reign the Hussars were equally referred to in the sources as Rac. The primary reason for this being that the majority of Hussars were supplied by Serbian exiles or mercenaries. So it is quite possible that the Hungarians had either their own 'home-grown' Rac horsemen or at the very least were hiring mercenaries of their own by the time of Janos Hunyadi. Certainly Serbian troops in Hungarian employ are mentioned at the siege of Belgrade in 1456 where they were dismounted to provide crews for the boats used to break the Ottoman naval blockade. Their original duties are mentioned as being fortress garrison troops.     The numbers of Hussars available to the Hungarians rose dramatically from 1459 when the Serbian State was finally absorbed by the Ottoman Empire. This led to an influx of refugees and Noble exiles to Hungary. It is no coincidence that the formal creation of Hussar units dates from this time. The basic unit was a Turbae comprising some 25 Hussars. Recruitment was at the demand of the Crown and they were paid direct from the Royal treasury. By 1474 there were sufficient Hussar companies to allow large scale independent action. While the main Hungarian army was besieged at Wroclaw Hussar groups under Stephen Szapolyia and Paul Kinizsi captured and burned the Polish towns of Poznan and Crarow. These Hussars also completely destroyed the Polish supply lines which contributed greatly to Matthius' success.     The decline in Royal authority and more importantly finances after Matthius' death caused a rapid decline in the number of Hussars available to the Hungarians. It is worth noting that the impact of the Hussars during Janos and Matthius' lifetime was sufficient to create a permanent place for them in the Hungarian army.

Szekely

        The precise origins of the Szekely are unknown and subject to a long running scholarly debate. What is known is that they were a separate ethnic group from the Magyars and they believed they were direct descendants from the Huns.     By the 13th century the Szekely formed the largest Hungarian speaking group in Transylvania. Their lands covered some 12,000 kilometres and were divided into seven districts called szek (seats). The name Szekely does not apparently originate from this. Six of these districts, comprising the vast majority of the Szekely were in one block in the South of Transylvania, the seventh formed a small enclave near the town of Tuda. The Szekely lands were outside of traditional Hungarian law, even the Voivode of Transylvania had no authority within their borders. Instead the administration of law fell to the Count of the Szekely. The Count was appointed by the King and was usually a Hungarian Lord, often but not always the Voivode of Transylvania as well. From 1462 the two offices were combined on a permanent basis.     Through out this period the Szekely remained a semi-nomadic people who made their living from horse and cattle breeding. As such they were regarded as some of the finest light horsemen available to the Kings of Hungary. This in some way goes to explain why the Szekely were able to retain their unique life style while other ethic groups like the Cumans (see below) became absorbed into Hungarian society. The only obligation the Szekely had to the Hungarian Crown was supplying troops for military service.      The Szekely were divided into six tribes, each subdivided into four branches. These divisions were purely political and military in origin and spread over the entire Szekely lands. Each branch was obligated to provide the Hungarian Crown with 100 horsemen for military service. This gives an obligated total of 2400 horsemen. This appears to have been further supplemented by a militia only obligated to serve for 30 days. In 1473 the Szekely militia is recorded as being made up of three distinct groups, those that serve with three other mounted men, individual horsemen and finally infantry. It is probably no coincidence that this mirrors the last two 'ranks' of the Szekely Social structure. There were three orders of rank, the Primores, the Primipili and the community. The Primores were equivalent to Nobles, though Chieftains would probably be more accurate. They provided the military leadership. The Primipili have been described as a sub-officer class probably responsible for their own local militia. The community were the bulk of the Szekely Nation and would have provided the mounted common soldiers and an infantry militia. Though there is almost certainly no connection the officer and three mounted men mirrors the early Ottoman arrangement for Spahis recruitment.     So the Crown could rely on 2400 Szekely cavalry when they were needed and a militia for local defence as well. Janos Hunyadi certainly used a large number of Szekely and 'Saxon' troops at the battle of Vasaq in 1442. The Venetian Baduario reports that Matthius' army in the 1470's had some 16,000 Szekely horsemen. When compared to a figure of 4,000 from 1430,

which is the combined totals of available Saxon and Szekely troops this appears to be a massive rise. This is however not necessarily an unbelievable figure. Matthius relied on mercenaries for his army and it is more than likely given the preference for competent horsemen that the Szekely would have been prime candidates for recruitment. The figure of 1430 also matches quite closely to the numbers the Saxon and Szekely communities had to provide to the Crown so probably should not be taken as indicative of the number of soldiers potentially available.     The Szekely appear to have fulfilled a similar role to the Serbian Hussars providing Light Horse. Baduario describes the Szekely as armed with lance, Shield and bow. Given their background of semi-nomadic herders its seems more than likely that this was indeed their primary military function. There are however several anomalies with Szekely troops. At Vasaq in 1442 a group of Szekely are described as elite and assigned to a bodyguard role. At Varna Szekely are described as forming up with the heavy cavalry. It is possible that some Szekely were more Hungarian in their weapons and battlefield role. In both cases above they were Janos Hunyadi's troops so may have represented a bodyguard element associated with him as Count of the Szekely.

Cumans

        1239 is the traditional date given for the arrival of the Cumans in Hungary. These nomadic horsemen would provide the Hungarian Kings with another vital source of light cavalry. Like 'native' light horsemen the Cumans were horse archers, skilled in skirmishing. The Cumans appear to have fought under their own chieftains and formed their own tribal units. In the 13th and the early 14th Centuries Cuman units appear frequently in the sources. King Ladislas IV was known as 'the Cuman' not only because his mother was a Cuman princess but for his continual support for the Cuman people against that of the Catholic Church. The main power of the Cumans was broken in 1280 (82 in some sources) when their revolt was crushed at the battle of Lake Hod and large numbers migrated out of Hungary. Never the less Cuman light horse continued to play a part in the armies of Hungary. The Cumans supported Charles Angevin in the critical early years of his reign. Charles success against the nobles of Hungary was in no small part due to the Cumans. The Cuman troops finally disappear from the sources towards the end of the reign of Louis the Great. It appears that the Cumans merged into the society of Hungary. This settled existence not only eroded their culture but probably caused a rapid erosion of their horse and archery skills as well. Even though Cumans appear as a distinct ethnic group in later sources they are no longer mentioned in military terms. The loss of the Cuman archers may in part explain why Sigismund attempted in 1397 to enforce the creation of the Militia Portalis

for a more information on the Cumans of Hungary see Andras Paloczi Horvath's book Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians (steppe peoples in medieval Hungary)

Wallachian and Moldavian Light horse

        Hungary employed light horse from both these nationalities. For more detailed information on their light horse see the Moldavian pages. The Hungarians had an additional source of Rumanian cavalry, those from the Transylvanian region. Transylvania location put it in an ideal position to accept refugees from other Balkan states. These refugees bolstered the already substantial Rumanian population of the area. Janos Hunyadi's family were just such refugees, arriving sometime during Micea the Old's struggle with the Ottomans. These refugees and the native Rumanians of Transylvania provided significant numbers to the Hungarian forces. Janos Hunyadi's troops are invariably described as containing large numbers of Transylvanians a description unlikely to be used to describe troops of Hungarian descent. At the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1448 there was a large contingent of Wallachians, it has however been convincingly argued that these were in fact mostly Transylvanian troops and not external Wallachians. See the battle of Kosovo Polje for more details

Hungarian Infantry

        Infantry were very much a secondary concern in Hungarian warfare. They rarely appear in the native primary sources. As such it is very difficult to obtain a clear idea of just what infantry was available to the Hungarians. Sources tend to include infantry when they were mercenaries. The anonymous Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum, more usually known as the Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle mentions seventeen hundred mercenary spearmen fighting for one of Charles Angevin's rivals at the battle of Rozgony, June 15, 1312. It is only in the late 15th century under the Hunyadi's that there is sufficient evidence to form a reasonably coherent picture.

Archers

        Up until the time of the Hunyadi's the mainstay of the infantry were foot archers. These foot archers almost certainly represented the poorer elements of the various levies of Hungary. The tradition of mounted archery in Hungary and surrounding Nations makes in almost inevitable that a massed levy would produce significant numbers of foot archers as well. Theoretically the Generalis Exercitus was an entirely mounted levy however Italian sources and drawings of the Italian campaigns of Louis the Great show a significant number of foot soldiers present. These foot soldiers are described and drawn carrying composite bows and many have sabres. The drawings of these foot soldiers tally closely to that of mounted figures representing Hungarian light horse. It seems likely that at least some of these infantry were those of the militia too impoverished to afford to fight mounted or those whose mounted skills had declined to such an extent that it was no longer possible for them to serve in their expected role. Transylvanian and Szekely foot archers also appear in the sources, especially those dealing with Janos Hunyadi. The Transylvanian Great levy could have raised large numbers of peasant bowmen. Transylvania's borders were more exposed that that of Hungary itself and it suffered frequent Ottoman raids. The end result appears to have been a highly effective local militia. This militia probably did not see service outside of Transylvania except with one notable exception at the siege of Belgrade in 1456.

The Saxons

        Saxon was the name used to describe the significant German population settled in Transylvania. German immigration to the region started as early as 1150. By 1300 there were three large areas of Saxon population in Transylvania. The largest in size and importance was the settlement around the town of Sibiu (Hermannstadt in German). Sibiu was situated on of the few easily navigable routes through the Carpathian mountains to the black sea. As such it was a major trading town and defensive stronghold. In 1224 King Andrew II granted significant rights to the Saxons of Sibui. Much like the Szekely the Saxons were given practical autonomy in return for a special annual tax to the Crown and some military obligations. These military obligations were the supplying of 500 warriors for internal defence and 100 warriors for foreign service. This document, subsequently called the Andreanum, is the only direct record of Saxon military obligations. By the reign of Emperor Sigismund the Saxons of Sibui had organised into eight Seats, each centred on a different town around and including Sibui. To this Sigismund added an additional two towns, already mostly Saxon in population. The second major area of Saxon settlement was started by the Teutonic Order during their brief involvement in Hungary during the 1420's. The removal of the Order in 1225 did little to stem the tide of Saxon settlement. This area was centred on the town of Brasov and like Sibui

straddled a trade route through the Carpathians. The third geographical area was centred on the three districts of Kyralia, Rodna and Bistrita. These districts and that of Brasov appear to have enjoyed similar rights to that of the Saxons of Sibui. There were additional settlements of Saxons especially in the towns of Transylvania but they were a minority and the smaller settlements probably became absorbed into the general Transylvanian population. The precise numbers of men the Saxons could supply the Crown are unknown, even the figures of the Andreanum cannot be used as proof for the later period. A figure of 4,000 men is quoted for a combined levy of Saxons and Szekely in 1430. Given that the obligated number of Szekely was 2400 men then this would leave 1600 Saxons. A not unreasonable figure for a population that supposedly made up only 15 or so percent of Transylvania's total population.     What is not recorded is just how the Saxons fought. Given the Germanic origin of the settlers it is not unreasonable to assume that their style of warfare mirrored that of the German States. Hungarian Saxons apparently fought alongside German mercenaries employed by Janos Hunyadi. If accurate this implies that the wealthier Saxons were equipped as knights. The bulk of the Saxons though probably fought on foot as spearmen, crossbowmen and in the later period handgunners. For a population centred on towns and responsible for defending them the above would make sense. Also given the difficult terrain of Transylvania and the limited lines of communication infantry were much more effective than they would be on the plains of Hungary. The battle of Vasaq in 1422 saw Janos Hunyadi use large numbers of militia troops to defeat a Ottoman force. The army is described as including large numbers of townsmen and this is probably a reference to Saxons.

Mercenary Infantry of the Hunyadi era

        Infantry would always be a secondary arm for the Hungarian army. However under the Hunyadi's they played a much more important role. The infantry described above continued to be used but the major change was the employment of large numbers of mercenaries. Mercenary foot began to appear in significant numbers under Janos Hunyadi, first in his position as Voivode of Transylvania and then as Regent. The process continued under Matthius and at its height his 'black army' included some 10,000 mercenary infantry. The majority of Janos Hunyadi's foot were ex-Hussite troops from Bohemia and it is no coincidence that their employment dates from the same time that Janos adopted the Hussite warwagons. Matthius incorporated almost all of Jan Jiskra's Bohemian troops in 1462 and continued to employ Bohemians in preference to all others. Germans formed the next largest foot contingent followed by Silesians. 

In 1480 Matthius wrote a description of his infantry, this is the first definitive source for how they were employed.

'some are light foot soldiers, others are heavily armoured, and some are clipeati, who demand double pay because of their servants. In addition there are gun experts, but they are not efficient in firing as the rest of the infantry; they do best from behind the pavises at the start of the battle or in sieges. We make it a rule that a fifth of the infantry are arquebusiers.……We regard the heavy infantry as an immovable wall that, if necessary, would fight and die to the last man where they stood. When opportunity presents itself the light infantry make forays, but, if their attack loses its impetus or if they are hard pressed, they fall back behind the heavy infantry……All the infantry and arquebusiers are surrounded by Armati and clipeati like a fortress. The pavises all round them give the impression of a fortress, behind which the light infantry shelter and fight as from castle walls, attacking when the time is right.'

This translation is taken from Armies of the Middle Ages, Volume 2 by Ian Heath, published by Wargames research Group.

Clipeati

        The clipeati were heavily armoured men equipped with pavises. From Matthius' description they formed a solid shield wall from which other elements of the infantry could fight from. Matthius also mentions they receive double pay because of their servants. This could mean that the pavises were very large possibly mantlets and required several people to move them easily. Given Matthius' use of 'castle wall', 'fortress' and 'immovable wall' it is quite likely that these pavises of the clipeati were designed to create a defensive line. Use of such large pavises is not unknown in other parts of Europe, though they were normally restricted to siege warfare. More importantly the Hussites used man portable mantlets to create a second line of defence within their Tabors. This combined with the heavy Hussite presence amongst the mercenaries makes the use of large pavises or mantlets a reasonable assumption.

Armati

        Armati was the name applied to armoured men who usually fought alongside the Clipeati. There is no direct evidence as to what the Armati were armed with. However given the parallels that can be drawn between the Clipeati and Hussite forces it is reasonable to assume that the Armati

would act in a similar fashion to their 'support' squads. That is to say armed with pole arms which could be used to fight from, over and around wagons, or in this case the pavises of the Clipeati.

Handgunners or Arquebusiers

        The handgun was a popular weapon in the hands of the Hussites and its use spread through out the Balkans. Janos Hunyadi requested handguns, cannons and associated ammunition prior to the long campaign from the towns of Transylvania. So domestic production of these items is probable. As described by Matthius the handgun was not at that time a efficient battlefield weapon and required protection for the gunners. The use of tabor war wagons was long established as the ideal way to deploy handgunners in relative safety. The Hungarians clearly expanded on this by using the Clipeati as a protective screen. Nearly every major battle that Janos Hunyadi fought in has references to handgunners. Varna there were some 600 handgun armed Bohemians defending the Tabor. Kosovo Polje there were 2,000 handgunners defending the Tabor. Though usually described as German or Bohemian there are also references to Transylvanian handgunners as well, the army of 1475 had 2,000. Not unreasonable if the area was producing the weapons.

Light Infantry

        Though never implicitly identified in the sources the usual assumption is that these light infantry were archers or crossbowmen. KomJathy in A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war says of the light infantry,

'The main assignment of both lines was to protect the third line of musketeers and the fourth line of light infantry with bows, lances, and axes.' And

'During attack they approached the enemy lines, protected by the musketeers' fire: once the enemy line was broken, hand-to-hand combat was carried out by the light infantry.'

He unfortunately does not list the original sources for these statements though most of it is clearly based on Matthius' description. The numbers of archers available to the Hungarians and their vulnerability to hostile cavalry makes their use from behind more formidable foot a logical choice.

WarWagons (Tabors)

        Under Janos Hunyadi the Hungarians began to use warwagons, not surprising given the large numbers of ex-Hussites employed as mercenaries. These wagons appear to have differed little from their original Hussite counterparts and fulfilled a very similar role, see Hussite pages for more details on warwagons. See Hungarian Tactics and battles for a more details on how they were used.

Hungarian Tactics and significant Battles

 

Tactics

BattlesRozgony June 15 1312Ambush in Wallachia Nov 9 1330Nicopolis 1396Sava October 1441Alba Iulia late February, early March 1442Hermanstadt (Sibiu or Nagyszeben) 22 March 1442Vasaq 2-6th September1442The Long campaign 1443-1444The Battle Of Varna 1444Kossovo 1448Belgrade 1456

Tactics

       Hungary's mix of Knights with essentially Asiatic horse archers created a style of tactics broadly similar to that of Poland and the Serbians. The aim of Hungarian tactics was to create situations where the charge of the knights would be decisive. The light horse were used in open battle to clear away enemy skirmishers and prevent those of the enemy interfering with the deployment and charge of the knights. Knights through out the period either deployed in multiple lines or in deep columns. This mirrors the developments in Polish tactics. Both styles of deployment allowed maximum manoeuvrability for the Knights and provided reserves to prevent encirclement by hostile light horse.     The Hunyadi period saw a shift along the lines of the Polish armies, infantry came to play an important supporting role. Like the Polish armies the Hungarians used infantry and Tabor wagons to create a strong centre from which their cavalry could operate and anchor their internal flanks.

Bonfinius describes a Hungarian battle formation called the scorpion where infantry formed its body and the warwagons and cavalry formed the pincers. This brief description sounds very much like the Polish Crescent formation (it being based on the Mongol Grand Hunt). The objective was to sweep away the enemy flanks or force them inwards and crush their centre on the hvy infantry and wagons of the centre.

Rozgony June 15 1312     Charles Angevin defeats the last serious opposition to his rule, the 'prince' Matheus and his allies. The King's forces included local contingents from the town of Szepes and a force called 'crusaders' in the Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum. These were probably German mercenaries. Matheus' army was commanded by Demetrius and Aba, supporters of Matthius. They drew up their forces on the slopes of the valley of the river Harnad in a very favourable defensive position possibly with the Crusaders in reserve. Charles drew his army up opposite them but appears to have refused to advance. The forces of Matheus appear to have launched an impetuous charge against Charles and made significant progress,. Initially Charles' army was thrown back, the royal standard bearer and several high ranking Nobles being killed. Charles appears to have been narrowly avoided capture or death and subsequently fought under the banner of the Crusaders. The crusaders tipped the balance and when Demetrius and Aba were killed the rebels fled. The Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum records that Charles suffered significantly more casualties than their enemies.

Main Source- Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum

Ambush in Wallachia Nov 9 1330     King Louis with an army raised mostly from Transylvania and with large numbers of Cuman light horse invaded Wallachia to force them back under Hungarian rule. After initial successes Louis army started to suffer from supply problems. A truce was reached with Voivode Bazarad and Louis' army was allowed to retreat. However in a narrow defile with one end blocked by a log and stone wall the Wallachians ambushed the Hungarian army. Losses were apparently massive and the King only escaped by exchanging surcoats with one of entourage. This battle secured Wallachia's independence from Hungary.

Main Source- Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum

Nicopolis 1396     A combined army of Crusaders and Hungarians is defeated by the Ottomans. This battle is covered in detail in David Nicolles excellent book, Nicopolis 1396

Sava October 1441     Hunyadi and his personal forces along with troops raised in Transylvania attempted to drive off Ottoman troops raiding around Belgrade. Unable to pin down the Ottomans Hunyadi started withdrawing to Transylvania. An Ottoman army under the Bey of Semendria blocked the Hungarian retreat. Hunyadi deployed his army with his heavy infantry in the centre, flanked by his foot archers and auxiliary infantry. Either side of the infantry centre were the Knights and heavily armoured mounted crossbowmen. In front of the cavalry were deployed the light horse. Behind the infantry centre there was a reserve of knights under Hunyadi. Precise details of the battle are not known however the main source Bonfinius states that the reserve played a decisive role in winning it. The pursuit apparently went as far as the walls of Semendria. The lack of supporting sources to Bonfinius has lead to this battle being regarded as an inflation of a minor skirmish. It does not however detract from the deployment description which is entirely consistent with other sources for later Hungarian battles.

Main Source- Ioan Thuroczi, Chronica Hungarorum 1488Historia Pannonica sive Hungaricarum rerum decades IV et dimidia- Bonfinius

Alba Iulia late February, early March 1442     Mezid, Bey of Vidin led an Ottoman army of some 16,000 to 20,000 men in an invasion of Transylvania and besieged the city of Sibiu (Hermanstadt). Sibiu was one of the Saxon towns of Transylvania and straddled one of the few routes large enough for armies to safely traverse the Carpathian mountains. Mezid's attack was well timed as Hunyadi's army had only recently disbanded after its victorious return from Serbia. The unexpected attack by Mezid placed Hunyadi in a difficult position. If Hunyadi waited for his well trained 'regulars' to muster it was possible that the Ottomans would take Sibiu, severely weakening Transylvania's border defences. Hunyadi instead declared a general muster of all able bodied men and ordered them to mass at the fortress of Alba Iulia.     Mezid hearing of the muster either sent or lead a detachment of the Ottoman army to disrupt or disperse it, leaving the rest to continue the siege of Sibiu. Hunyadi, with all the troops that had already gathered advanced to met the Ottomans and discovered them drawn up some miles north of Alba Iulia. The Ottomans were deployed in the valley of the river Mures. Their

right flank resting on the valley heights and their left anchored on the river and occupying the near by village of Santimbru. The Ottomans apparently concealed a significant reserve within the village itself. Hunyadi took the offensive and launched a strong attack with his right flank against the Ottoman left. This was presumably because it appeared to be the weakest and/or most easily accessible. The Ottoman reserves however appeared to have successfully contained the attack while the Ottoman centre launched a counter attack against Hunyadi's centre. Hunyadi's centre is described as staggering then retreating under the onslaught. This rapidly turned into a rout. At this juncture Hunyadi ordered a general retreat back to the fortress of Alba Iulia. The Ottomans do not appear to have pursued the Hungarians as Hunyadi seems to have extracted the majority of his troops, certainly they were sufficiently intact to advance on Sibiu only weeks afterwards. The Ottomans instead scattered and looted the surrounding area before returning to the main army at Sibiu. It is probable given the lack of pursuit by the Ottomans and the relative lack of casualties that this was a small scale battle and that the Hungarians had a numbers advantage. The Ottoman deployment was unusual in that they anchored both flanks of terrain difficult to cross. Usually the Ottomans preferred open battlefields where their light horse to flank and envelope their opponents. This also suggests that their army was smaller than that of the Hungarians.

Main Source- Ioan Thuroczi, Chronica Hungarorum 1488Historia Pannonica sive Hungaricarum rerum decades IV et dimidia- Bonfinius

Hermanstadt (Sibiu or Nagyszeben) 22 March 1442     Reinforced by additional levies, including contingents of Szekeler and Saxons under the Royal 'Jude' Anton Trautenberger, Hunyadi advanced on Sibiu. The Hungarians also had a detachment of Transylvanian Wallachians under Basarab, son of Dan II, who Hunyadi wanted to place on the throne of Wallachia. Mezid, Bey of Vidin drew up his army somewhere near Sibiu, the precise location has never been identified.     Dispositions of the armies are not known however certain assumptions can be made from the source descriptions of the battle. Both armies appear to have deployed strong infantry centres with cavalry on the wings. Additionally Hunyadi strengthened at least one of the flanks with Tabor warwagons. Both armies also appear to have had a reserve. The Ottomans a infantry reserve massed behind their centre. The Hungarians had a hvy cavalry reserve under Janos Hunyadi either behind the centre or on one of the flanks.     The battle began with a general advance on the part of the Hungarians. Initially the Hungarians succeeded in pushing back the Ottoman centre. A counter attack by the Ottoman centre and reserves successfully contained the Hungarian centre, possibly killing their commander in the process (see

below). The Ottomans initiated a general attack at this point believing the battle won. Hunyadi launched his reserve along with warwagons (possibly with light guns mounted on them) against one of the Ottoman wings, breaking it. Bonfinius further describes Hungarian captives behind the Ottomans rising up and attacking them. More likely detachments of the Hungarian army had worked their way around the Ottoman flanks. The attacks to the rear and the broken flank caused panic amongst the Ottomans who fled, leaving Mezid and his son dead on the battlefield. Basarab and his Wallachians apparently pursued the fleeing Ottomans deep into Wallachia.

     There is a story associated with this battle in which Mezid ordered his army to focus their efforts in killing Hunyadi. These orders having reached Hunyadi led to a certain Simon Kamonyai wearing Hunyadi's armour and carrying Hunyadi's Voivode of Transylvania standard and leading the Hungarian centre. Simon Kamonyai was also apparently accompanied by Hunyadi's elite Szekely bodyguard. Kamonyai was killed in the Ottoman counter attack on the centre, where upon the Ottomans believing Hunyadi dead and his army's morale ruined pressed home the attack. At this stage Hunyadi unfurled his personal standard and led the attack on one of the Ottoman wings.This story may well be a heroic invention as such events are popular for the period. As with many such stories though there may be truth mixed in. At its most basic its likely that the Hungarian commander of the centre was killed and the Ottomans expected to exploit this and Hunyadi in turn exploited the Ottoman's commitment of their reserve to attack elsewhere.

Main Source- Ioan Thuroczi, Chronica Hungarorum 1488Historia Pannonica sive Hungaricarum rerum decades IV et dimidia- Bonfinius

Vasaq 2-6th September1442     Sa'd ed-din Pasha Beylerbey of Rumelia leading army of some 80,000 men was ordered by the Sultan to invade Wallachia and turn it into a Dar-al-Ahd (dependent territory). He was also commanded to invade Transylvania. His army contained Janissaries and six Bey and Sandjek Beys from Anatolia and their troops. Basarab, Hunyadi's candidate for the throne of Wallachia had been enthroned as Prince of Wallachia after the battle of Hermanstadt (Sibiu). The reality appears to be that Basarab with Hungarian support had managed to raise a revolt in Wallachia and gain control of parts of the Country. Sa'd ed-din's army was too large for Basarab to confront on his own and he retreated along with his followers into the mountains to await reinforcements from Hungary. Sa'd ed-din split of elements of his army to pursue Basrab and to plunder the countryside, the majority of his forces moved up the valley of the Ialomita river. Hunyadi and Basarab's troops confronted the Ottomans at a narrowing of the valley, described by Thuriczi

as the iron gate. This description has led to the battle been mistakenly described as being fought near The Iron Gate on the river Danube. In fact Thuriczi was actually using the name to describe the terrain of the battlefield.     The Hungarians described as 'peasants, townspeople and Szekelers' numbered some 15,000 men. They drew up in the narrowest part of the valley, the walls being described as mountainous. Once again the infantry was draw up in the centre with Tabor warwagons on their flanks and their rear as well. The wagons were in turn flanked by cavalry. The Ottoman dispositions are not described in the sources.     True to his previous successful offensive tactics Hunyadi attacked. His infantry centre may have been supported by warwagons in their advance. The battle was hard fought with the Ottoman army not breaking until near dark. The Ottomans lost some 20,000 men, 200 standards, 5,000 camels, horse and mules. Sa'd ed-din and the remnants of his army successfully retreated and crossed the Danube, Hungarian pursuit apparently being light. The majority of the Hungarians instead were hunting down the Ottoman forces that had been sent raiding the Wallachian countryside and in a series of clashes destroyed them, the last apparently being on the 6th of September.

     Both Thuriczi and Chalkondyles make the point that this battle marks a change in Hunyadi's strategic tactics. From this battle Hunyadi takes the war away from Hungary's borders. This policy would continue up until the battle of Kossevo in 1448.Main Source- Ioan Thuroczi, Chronica Hungarorum 1488Historia Pannonica sive Hungaricarum rerum decades IV et dimidia- BonfiniusLaonic Chalkondyles, Historical Chronicles

 

The Long campaign 1443-1444     Preparations for an offensive began as early as the end of 1442. Cardinal Cesarini brokered a peace between Elizabeth and King Ulászló I. News reached Hungary during June or July that Murad II had been badly defeated in Anatolia fighting against the rebels of Carmania. There are documents that show Janos Hunyadi requested wagons, gunpowder and artillery from the Transylvania towns, particularly Brasov in the months of March, June and July 1443.. Hunyadi also received large sums of money from the Serbian prince Brancovich. With this and his own money Hunyadi raised some 10,000 to 12,000 men comprised Czech, German, Poles, Serbians and Transylvanians. Mercenaries apparently making up the majority of the force, though Hunyadi also allowed serf soldiers to join his forces as well. Hunyadi also equipped some 600 Tabor warwagons. Combined with the Royal troops, Serbians

under Brancovich and Wallachian troops under their own leaders the Hungarian force numbered some 35,000 men. The army finally entered Ottoman territory in September 1443. The delay apparently being caused by Jiskra's refusal to honour the peace brokered by Cesarini until September 1st. Hunyadi was appointed military CinC of the campaign.     The lateness of the campaign start took the Ottomans by surprise and they were unable to prevent Hunyadi's rapid advance. Ishak, the Bey of Semendria attempted to stop or at least delay Hunyadi's advance at the river Morava. Fighting with the river to their rear the Ottomans were outflanked and defeated and forced to retreat over the river. Hunyadi leading some 12,000 cavalry, his Transylvanians and those troops of Nicholas Ujlaki rapidly advanced ahead of the main army and seized the town of Nis. Nis was the main muster town for the Ottoman troops of Vidin and Nis. Hunyadi's advance troops were able to attack and defeat three separate Ottoman detachments as they advanced to mass on the town. While at Nis Hunyadi received word that Murad II had made peace with the Emir of Carmania and had returned to Adrianople. With Murad II mustering troops Hunyadi returned to the main army just in time to join it in defeating another Ottoman army made up of a fresh detachment and remnants of the detachments defeated around Nis.      Hunyadi's victories led to additional Serbs from the Ottoman occupied territories joining the army. In addition a small Wallachian force under Mircea, son of Vlad Dracul also arrived to assist the Hungarians. Vlad Dracul had regained the throne from Basarab, Hunyadi's installed candidate, with the help of the Ottomans. Hunyadi's successes however led Dracul to hedge his bets and so Mircea was dispatched to provide assistance.     20th November Hunyadi defeated the Beylerbey of Rumelia, killing some 2,000 and taking at least 4,000 prisoners. Significantly more casualties were inflicted on the Ottomans by the local population as they retreated. The Hungarian army was able to advance on Sofia and take the city without further fighting.     Murad reinforced the detachments holding the mountain passes through which Hunyadi would have to march to attack Adrianople or reach Constantinople. Hunyadi instead of taking the most direct passes through the mountains instead cut east presumably hoping to overwhelm these passes before Murad could bring his army to their aid. On the 12th of December at the village of Zlatitsa Hunyadi decided to make his attempt but found an Ottoman army under the Grand Vizier Halil-Pasha already dug in behind palisades.     Halil-Pasha seeing the size of the Hungarian army decided to give battle and advanced beyond his defences. The Hungarians were successful in pushing the Ottomans back behind their defensive line but were unable to make any further headway. Hunyadi continued to probe the passes around Zlatitsa but was unable to force his way through. On the 23rd of December the Sultan arrived with additional troops and Hunyadi ordered the retreat back to Hungary. On the 24th somewhere near Melstitsa, the vanguard of

the Ottomans under the Beylerbey of Rumelia attacked the retreating Hungarians. Hunyadi reacted quickly and defeated the Ottomans convincing Murad to pursue 'at a distance' and await his chance.     The Hungarina retreat was disciplined despite severe supply problems, including the loss of most of their wagons and horses. Murad not given an opportunity to strike directly at the Hungarians instead concentrated his efforts on the forces of the Serbian Prince Brancovich which were retreating separately. Near Kunovitsa the Ottomans surprised the Serbs and scattered them. In turn Hunyadi was able to surprise the Ottoman vanguard shortly after the battle and disperse them, capturing Mahmud Celebi, the Grand Viziers Brother and the Sultan's brother in law. The capture of this man appears to have been the catalyst for a truce, Murad stopped his pursuit and the Hungarians were able to withdraw to their own borders.     The Long campaign was not an unqualified success, the army had suffered severely from supply problems and had lost all their warwagons and supply wagons. However Hunyadi had proved that with a large disciplined force of mercenaries the Hungarians were more than capable of taking on Ottomans forces far larger than their own. The army was in the field for six months, four of which in Ottoman territory. It had advanced some 300 kilometres into Ottoman territory, fought seven major battles, innumerable skirmishes and managed to retreat in good order. The campaign was seen in Western Europe as a glorious success. It did however sowed the seeds for the disaster at Varna the following year.

SourcesHunyadi's letter to Nicholas Ujlaki 8th November 1443, in Hurmuzaki, p687Ioan Thuroczi, Chronica Hungarorum 1488Historia Pannonica sive Hungaricarum rerum decades IV et dimidia- Bonfinius

The Battle Of Varna 1444

     January 1444 the Army returned from the long campaign and is disbanded. At the Hungarian Diet in April Cardinal Cesarini announced the formation of a coalition against the Turks. Besides the Pope and Ulászló, Philip the Good of Burgundy, Venice and Genoa all pledged their support for the enterprise. On April the 14th in front of the Diet Cardinal Cesarini took Ulászló's oath that with in the year he would lead a fresh campaign against the Ottomans. The basic plan put forward was that fleets from Venice, Genoa and the Papacy would block the sea routes from Asia Minor to the Balkans by cutting the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. A Crusading army led by Hunyadi and Ulászló would recapture all of the Ottomans European provinces.     Even as the Diet was discussing the forth coming campaign, Ulászló was

in negotiation with George Brankovic, Prince of Serbia. Brankovic was the father-in-law of the Ottoman Sultan Murad II. This distinction had not saved him from having his lands ravaged and two of his sons blinded for assisting their father in resisting the Ottomans. Murad II through his wife Mara Brankovic offered Brankovic the return of all his lands if he could organise a truce between Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Overtures apparently began in March with Brankovic approaching Hunyadi. It should be noted that Brankovic was also a Hungarian Noble by virtue of the massive estates he held there. In return for Brankovic's estates Hunyadi was to convince the King that peace with the Sultan was worthwhile. Ulászló did sign the treaty with the Ottomans and Hunyadi did take control over Brankovic's estates. Whether there was an intended deception of the Ottomans or not, Ulászló broke the treaty almost immediately. The King was able to mount the campaign almost immediately. An army mustered from Royal, Episcopal troops and from Transylvania numbering some 16,000 men crossed the Danube on the 20th September. Possibly because of the relatively short period between the Long campaign and this one, the Hungarian army was smaller and very imbalanced. It contained almost no infantry, except 100 to 300 Czech mercenary handgunners. There were also 100 warwagons probably with crews, though none are mentioned. The rest of the army was heavy cavalry, mostly Royal and foreign mercenaries, with some Episcopal and Noble banners as well.      The plan of the campaign is well recorded. Whilst Papal, Venetian and Genoese ships blockaded the Dardanelle straits the Hungarian army was to advance on the coastal town of Varna. There they would met up with elements of the Papal fleet and move down the coast to Constantinople, pushing the Ottomans out of the Balkans as they went.     The Hungarian advance was rapid, fortresses were bypassed and the Ottomans refused to give battle. Near Nicopolis on the 16th of October a contingent of some 4,000 Wallachians under one of Vlad Drakul's son's joined the Hungarians. The son was probably Micea though no direct evidence exists, later sources attribute the leader as Drakula but this is unreliable as it is used to show early signs of his perfidy.     Continuing their rapid advance the army reached Varna on the 9th of November. That night the Hungarians were surprised to discover a massive Ottoman army encamped to their West and South. The Hungarians were essentially trapped. The Black sea to the East and heavily forested hills and marshes to the North. The chroniclers describe the discussions of the Hungarian war council. Cesarini and many of the nobles were for fortifying themselves with in a wagon laager and waiting for the Papal fleet to arrive. Hunyadi convinced them that this course of action would only lead to disaster and that the only possible way to extract themselves was by offering battle. Hunyadi was appointed commander of the army and it was decided to give battle the next day.

Deployment     Bonfinius describes the Hungarian deployment as an arc or crescent shape between the Devina Lake and the Frangen hills. The line was some 1,000 paces long and shaped as it was so that the right of the line was facing both to the front and towards the Frangen hills. To the rear of the Hungarians, backed onto the Black sea was the camp and wagon laager, defended by drivers and the 300 Czech mercenary soldiers. The lack of any significant numbers of infantry clearly caused Hunyadi problems, his deployment was such as to minimise the risk to the right of Ottoman infantry moving through the hills and falling on the exposed end of the line.     The left of the Hungarian line was commanded by Michael Szilagyi, Hunyadi's brother in law. His force was almost entirely made up of Hunyadi's Transylvanian troops and German mercenaries and also banners of Hungarian Magnates, a total of 5,000 men, organised into 5 Banners. The centre was held by the King's Polish and Hungarian bodyguards, Hungarian Royal mercenaries and banners of Hungarian Nobles. They numbering some 3,500 men and were organised into 2 banners. The Hungarian Royal mercenaries under Stefan Batori, the rest possibly under the joint command of Hunyadi and King Ulászló. The right of the Hungarian army was the largest, numbering some 6,500 men, divided into 5 banners. The breakdown of the right wing was, in overall command was Bishop Jan Dominek of Varadin with his personal banner. Cardinal Cesarini commanding two banners of German mercenaries/crusaders, the Bishop of Erlau commanding his own banner and The military Governor of Slavonia, Talotsi, commanding one banner. Unlike the rest of the Hungarian army these banners were deployed very deep, three banners to the front and two to the rear. Behind the centre of the Hungarian army the Wallachians were deployed in reserve.

     The Ottomans deployed with the Spahis of Rumelia on their right, numbering some 15 to 20,000. The Spahis of Anatolia on the left numbering somewhere around 15,000 men. The centre was comprised entirely of infantry, the Sultan's Janissaries and the levies from Rumelia, numbering some 10,000 in all. The centre was dug in behind ditches and barricades and was deployed behind the line of the cavalry wings. There was an additional force of Janissary/ azab archers and Akinji light horse deployed in the Frangen hills.

The Battle     The Ottomans began the attack with their left in concert with the troops occupying the Frangen hills. Almost immediately the Hungarian battle plan came apart, The Bishops of Erlau and Varadin launched their banners at the attacking Ottomans, fracturing the Hungarian line and exposing the centre's flank. The Banners of the Bishops pushed deep into the Ottoman line but were rapidly surrounded. Talotsi led the remaining banners of the wing to their aid.

Opening Phase Map

     At this juncture sources differ as to What happened. Bonfinius implausibly describes Hunyadi leading the majority of the centre and the left wing in an attack on the Ottoman right, with the aim of aiding his beleaguered right! All other sources either imply or state that the Ottoman right was instead ordered to attack their Hungarian counterparts. Once the Ottoman right was engaged with the Hungarian left Hunyadi personally led Batori's Banner in an attack on the flank of the Ottomans right. Bonfinius at least agrees that Hunyadi's line was able to overlap the Ottomans causing them to recoil, then withdraw. This withdrawal may or may not have been a rout what is certain is that the Rumelia forces retreated a significant distance away from the battle. Parts of the Hungarian left pursued then began looting. The Wallachians had advanced at this point to occupy the part of the line left vacant by Hunyadi's attack on the Ottomans. The success of the Hungarian left was immediately tempered by the collapse of Hungarian right. Only Talotsi and his banner were able to extract themselves in any kind of order. They were able to withdraw to the wagon laager and take refuge within it. The rest of the Hungarian right dispersed and fled. The Wallachians moved away from their position in the centre and headed away from the battle, subsequently looting parts of the Ottoman camp before retiring in good order back to Wallachia.

Middle Phase Map

     At this stage the battle remained almost evenly matched, each army had lost a wing, though the Ottomans was arguably in reasonable order. Hunyadi lead the elements of the Hungarian left and centre that had remained in good order towards the now disorganised Ottoman left. Almost the entire Hungarian army, now including the Royal Hungarian Guards attacked the Ottoman left. Despite their disorder the Ottoman left was able to put up spirited resistance and it was only when the Beylerbey of Anatolia was killed that they broke and fled the field. Despite the odds the Hungarian army had successfully destroyed or neutralised over 35,000 Ottoman cavalry, leaving the Sultan on the battlefield, isolated with only infantry, most of dubious quality.

End Phase Map

     Bonfinius describes how what could have been one of Hunyadi's greatest victories was turned rapidly into a crushing defeat. Bonfinius records Hunyadi warning Ulászló to wait until the army had reformed before engaging the Ottoman infantry but Ulászló disregarding this advice and being urged by his Polish bodyguard to seize the opportunity for glory. Ulászló charged the Ottoman Janissaries and inevitably despite initial success was overwhelmed and killed. The Hungarian army broke up into small groups

and retreated. The Ottoman troops did not pursue for at least a day, apparently the losses were sufficient for Murad to state 'may Allah never grant me another such victory'.

The aftermath     Casualties for the battle are variously recorded in the sources. What seems certain is that Ottomans suffered significant losses, they refused to actively pursue the retreating Hungarians and retired to their camp after the battle. Hungarian casualties are often portrayed as massive, one letter stating only four Noblemen made it back to the borders of Hungary! The most common figure for Hungarian losses puts the figure at 10,000 men at of 16,000. What ever the reality of Hungarian losses they were in essence replaceable. The majority of the force were mercenaries. Unlike Mohacs of the following century the Hungarian presence was actually limited and Hunyadi's military and political power in Hungary suffered only marginally. It should also be noted that the major commanders of the army, Szilagyi, Hunyadi and Talotsi all managed to return to Hungary. Hunyadi retreated through Wallachia where according to popular accounts he was held prisoner by Vlad Drakul. Though Hunyadi was held briefly by the Wallachians it appears to have been a mistake on the part of a local Wallachian Noble rather than at the direct order of Drakul. Certainly the period immediately after Varna shows quite cordial relations between the two which is rather at odds with the popularist account of his capture.

Main Source- Ioan Thuroczi, Chronica Hungarorum 1488Historia Pannonica sive Hungaricarum rerum decades IV et dimidia- BonfiniusLaonic Chalkondyles, Historical Chronicles

Kossovopolje 1448

     In the year 1448 Hunyadi was in a position to once again attack the Ottomans. His objectives were not as ambitious as those of the Varna campaign. Hunyadi aimed to link with Scanderbeg and his Albanian rebels, then conquer Macedonia and Southern Serbia. In this way the European domain of the Ottoman Empire would be split in two. Hunyadi gathered his army on the banks of the Danube. Given the limitations of the General Levy Hunyadi preferred to rely on personal ties and troops under his direct command. As a result the core of his army was from Transylvania with the only major Hungarian contingents supplied by Franko of Talovak, Ban of Dalmatia and Croatia and his Brother-in-laws, Micheal Szilagyi and Janos Szekely. Hunyadi's army marched into Serbia making quick progress but unlike previous occasions the Serbians did not join the army in any significant numbers. At Kossovopolje Hunyadi rested the army either waiting for Scanderbeg or prior to marching to join Scanderbeg.

     On October 17th Hunyadi's forces were surprised by detachments of Murad's army moving onto the Kossovo plain to their North. An unwelcome surprise, even more for Hunyadi as he was under the belief that Murad and the main Ottoman forces were campaigning in Asia Minor.Hunyadi now faced a difficult decision, either retreat further into Serbian territory, away from Hungary and face the possibility of attacks on his marching army or stand and fight. Though not the ideal position from which to fight, the Kossovo plain at least well scouted by Hunyadi and his officers. Hunyadi's first course of action was to dispatch much of his light horse to block the passes towards Pristina, they were successful though the clashes are described as 'bloody'. By the end of the day the entire Ottoman army was deployed on the southern bank of the Lab river, with hills to their east and the river Sitnica protecting their Western flank. The Ottoman camp was positioned on the Northern bank of the Lab river. The distance between the two encampments was some 4 to 5 kilometres.

The Armies.

Hungarians     Hunyadi's army numbered in the region of 24 to 30,000. Included in this total was a Wallachian force maybe numbering as high as 10,000 men under Dan, Prince of Wallachia. Seenotes as to the likely composition of this force and why I have accredited the command to Dan rather than the more usually mentioned Vladislav II.     The rest of Hunyadi's force was a mix of infantry and cavalry. 2,000 to 3,000 German handgunners are mentioned in the sources, as are Transylvanian infantry. Along with the infantry there were warwagons, though their numbers are not known. The army was accompanied by a supply train of some 2,000 wagons. The sources say that many of these wagons also pulled cannons. Hunyadi was apparently very well equipped with artillery for this campaign, presumably to reduce Ottoman strongholds in Albania and Macedonia. One such model of cannon is mentioned by name, the Zarobotana (a corruption of the Italian Cerbottana) meaning a cannon capable of firing at longer ranges than normal. The cavalry were mostly Heavy cavalry a mix of Mercenaries and the banners of Hungarian Nobles. Light cavalry was also present in significant numbers, the bulk provided by Wallachians and Transylvanians, presumably Szekely. There were sufficient numbers of light cavalry to form skirmish screens in front of both wings of the army.

The Ottomans     The Ottoman army has been variously estimated from 50,000 to 400,000 men! The Turkish Sources closest to the time put the figure at between 50,000 to 60,000 men. The army was comprised of the Spahis levy of both Rumelia and Anatolia and the Sultans personal army of Janissaries and court

cavalry. The similarity in the sizes given and those for the Ottoman army at the battle of Varna, 60,000 seems to be the reasonable upper limit.

18 October 1448

The Hungarian Deployment, 18th October.     Hunyadi had placed his camp on a hill which dominated the land around it. The supply wagons were used to build a fortified area. His large artillery train was placed amongst and on these wagons, giving them a dominating field of fire towards the Ottoman camp.     Hunyadi deployed his cavalry in front of his fortified camp in two lines. The first line comprised of a heavy cavalry centre with wings of light horse. The heavy cavalry of the centre were the banners of Transylvania, Slovenia and Croatia under the command of Janos Szekely and Franko of Talovak. The light horse of the left flank was personally commanded by Voivode Dan, presumably his Transylvanians and Wallachians. The right flank's first line light horse was under the command of Benedict Losonczi. Behind the first line Hunyadi positioned a second line of entirely heavy cavalry. He personally commanded the centre of the second line comprised of Royal troops, mercenaries and some banners of Transylvanians. The left flank's heavy cavalry was under the command of Stephan Banffy. The right flank's were also under Benedict Losonczi who positioned his standard and commanded from the middle of the Knights. Both flanks heavy cavalry appear to have been made up of banners from the Hungarian Magnates who had been willing to follow Hunyadi. The third line of the Hungarian army was the infantry, massed behind the fortifications of the camp and the warwagons. Behind or possibly in the camp there was an additional reserve of cavalry. The description of the third line's defences is general in nature but it is not unreasonable to assume that the warwagons formed the front of the camp. Hunyadi's basic battle plan appears to have been to attack with the cavalry and if they were hard pressed to retreat behind or through the fortified third line of the infantry and regroup. The infantry, warwagons and cannons providing the protection whilst they reorganised. The total number of banners of cavalry, including light horse is given as 38.

The Ottoman deployment, 18th October     The Ottomans deployed in front of the south bank of the River Lab, their right flank resting on the Sitnica river. Going against tradition the forces of Anatolia were positioned on the right. The Rumelia were positioned on the left in advance of the centre and the right. Both flanks comprised entirely of cavalry, two lines of Spahis with multiple lines of Akinjis skirmishers and other levy light horse to their front. The centre of the Ottoman deployment was held by the Sultan and the infantry, in 3 lines. The rearmost line was that of Janissaries with the Sultan, the second line was artillery, dug in behind redoubts. Around the Janissaries and the artillery was a further

defensive ditch and surrounding this on three sides was the first line of infantry made up of Azab levies.

The Battle, 18th October     The Ottomans began the battle with an attack by the Rumelian cavalry on the Hungarian right. As soon as they advanced the Hungarian light horse line retreated in good order behind their heavy cavalry supports. Fierce fighting followed with the Hungarians holding but being unable to make head way. Hunyadi fed some of his central units into the fight on his right. The Ottomans then launched the Anatolian cavalry against Banffy and Dan's commands. Dan's Wallachians also manoeuvred behind their heavy cavalry support though then deployed on their far left, presumably to cover the exposed flank, which did not have the terrain coverage of the right. The Anatolians pushed the Hungarians back but were stopped when Hunyadi led part of the central command into the fighting.

Map- Opening Phase

At this point the Ottoman Azab infantry attacked the now weakened Hungarian centre. They cracked the centre of the line but were halted by cannon fire from the wagon fortifications. The line was sealed by a counter attack by the Hungarian infantry.     With the Ottoman centre and right held, Hunyadi fed more reserves into the fight on his right flank. Parts of the Rumelia troops broke and fled into the hills surrounding the area. The rest managed a controlled withdrawal to their camp. At this stage the rest of the Ottomans forces broke off combat and retreated. Hunyadi also retreated to his camp.

Map- End of phase

The night of 18th October      The sources for the aftermath of the first day are at odds about what happened during the night. Chakondyles states that the Hungarians launched a night attack against the Ottoman camp but were repulsed by the Janissaries. Hunyadi in a letter to the dean of Cracow (30 December 1448) merely mentions a continuous exchange of cannon fire. What does seem clear is that the Hungarians expected the Ottoman's to retreat the following day as was their usual tactic when unable to force the issue in a single days fighting. The Hungarians put the day's casualties as 15,000 to 16,000 Ottoman dead, the majority from the Rumelia contingent. The Ottomans though do not appear to have suffered any where near this number and the majority of the Anatolian contingent had not even been engaged that day. The deployment and course of the battle the next day do suggest that Rumelia forces were badly weakened.

Battle 19th October

Ottoman deployment     The Ottoman deployment mirrored the previous day. Except that the cavalry of Thessaly were removed from the Rumelia contingent and sent on a flank march around the Hungarian army. The Sultan ordered Turakhan, the Beylerbey of Rumelia to lead it himself. The remaining combat worthy troops of Rumelia were ordered to take up their previous positions.

Hungarian deployment     Hunyadi either divined that the focus of the day's battle would be his left flank or was informed of the Sultan's intentions by deserters. Either way Hunyadi strengthened his left by moving Janos Szekely and his men from the centre to the left and adding in his cavalry reserves. Bonfinius records that Szekely was placed in command of the left, all other sources say Banffy retained command. His right flank's deployment remained the same as the previous day's. Hunyadi deployed most of infantry as part of his centre, they were accompanied by the more mobile of his artillery pieces.

The Battle 19th October      The Ottomans began the attack with the cavalry of Anatolia. They were held by the reinforced Hungarian right. The weakened Ottoman left began skirmishing with the Hungarians to their front and Losonczi was hard pressed to prevent them slipping behind the Hungarian lines.With both flanks in a stalemate Hunyadi lead his centre against the Ottoman infantry. The Azabs were driven away by artillery fire and the Hungarian infantry attack. The Ottoman artillery and Janissaries were able to halt the advancing Hungarian infantry. However the addition of the Hungarian cavalry, personally lead by Hunyadi broke through the Janissary line.

Map- Opening Phase Day2

With the situation precarious for the Sultan, he ordered the main baggage camp commander, Sinan-bey to reinforce the centre with his camp guards and the army followers. This ill-armed force was sufficient to stabilise the Ottoman line and allow the Janissaries to recover their cohesion. With this failure Hunyadi retreated his centre back to its original positions.     The battle stalemated at this point, the Hungarian right was under pressure but holding and their left was unable to make headway against the Ottoman skirmishers. At this juncture Turakhan and the Thessalonians cavalry arrived behind the Hungarian left wing. Unable to manoeuvre to respond to the threat Dan and his Wallachians were rapidly overwhelmed and forced to surrender. The Anatolians began to rollup the Hungarian flank. Hunyadi ordered the retreat back to camp. The Hungarian centre and left

retired in good order but their right was decimated and Szekely was killed in the fighting.

Map- End phase Day2

The aftermath     Hunyadi decided to retreat in the early hours of that morning. Micheal Szilagyi led a feint with some of the cavalry, allowing Hunyadi to exit the camp with the majority of the army. Szilagyi would be captured in the course of this diversion. Hunyadi also left part of his infantry to cover his withdrawal. It would take the Ottomans the best part of the morning to overwhelm the camp, by this time Hunyadi and most of his army had successfully broken contact from the Ottoman forces.Over the two days the Hungarians are said to have lost as many as 17,000 men or as little as 6,000 men. The difference in the two could be due to the differing versions as what happened to the Wallachians. Excluded from the 6,000 as they had swapped sides. The Ottomans are said to have lost between 30,000 and 40,000 troops, though Chalkondyles puts it at only 4,000 men. Chalkondyles figure does seem unlikely given how badly Rumelian troops suffered on the first day and the two defeats suffered by the Azab infantry. The truth probably lies somewhere in-between the two figures. Like Varna, there seems to have been a very limited pursuit only.     Hunyadi was captured by Brankovitch, Prince of Serbia, during his retreat and it would take until December before his return to Hungary. Unlike Varna Kossovopolje weakened his domestic support and gave rise to a period of instability and the end of Hunyadi's aggressive policies towards the Ottomans.

Notes on the Battle of Kossovo

Wallachian troops and their commander?     The name of the commander is not known for certain, Later chroniclers such as Bonfinius name him as Vladislav II, Prince of Wallachia from 1447 until 1456. However there is no contemporary source that places Vladislav at the battle of Kossovopolje. In 1448 a Hungarian army under instructions from Hunyadi assisted Dan, a Wallachian noble, and his forces to depose Vlad Drakul. Once Dan was declared Vioviode of Wallachia the Hungarians withdrew. Dan however was unable to retain the throne as other nobles attempted to emulate him but with Ottoman support. Hunyadi interfered again and captured and blinded the main Ottoman candidate. Hunyadi did not however return Dan to the throne, instead he supported Vladislav another noble with links to the Ottomans. It appears that Hunyadi supported Vladislav as a compromise, at least securing the neutrality of Wallachia. Ottoman chroniclers describe Vladislav as a friend to the Ottomans and a personal friend to the Ottoman commander of Nicopolis. Given that Vladislav retained the throne until 1456 and appears to have enjoyed good relations

with the Ottomans for most of that period his appearance at Kossovopolje on the side of the Hungarians is unlikely. Voiviode Dan however had every reason to assist the Hungarians as they offered his only chance of regaining the throne of Wallachia. It is also possible that Dan had retained control of the Western part of Wallachia, with Hungarian support. It is also uncertain exactly what troops were with Dan at the battle. They are attributed as being Wallachian, it is however possible that these were a mix of true Wallachians and Transylvanian Wallachians, Muresanu in his description of the battle says Hunyadi assigned troops to his command, though does not give the source of the information. The common interpretation of the battle is that the Wallachian contingent swapped sides causing the defeat and were subsequently massacred by Murad. The Ottoman chroniclers however make it quite clear that Dan and his Wallachians were captured during the battle, after being struck in the rear by a detachment of the Ottoman army and forced to surrender. The chroniclers go as far as to name the commander of this force as the Beylerbey of Rumelia, Turakhan-Bey. The subsequent massacre makes sense if these were rebels against Vladislav II.

Belgrade 1456

In 1455 news reached the Hungarian court that the Ottomans were massing a warfleet on the Danube and mustering men and supplies. The conqueror of Constantinople, Mehmed II, made no secret of his desire to add Hungary and Serbia to his Empire.

April 1456 the Hungarian diet was convened with the purpose of organising Hungary's defence. A general mobilisation was declared and a plea was sent to the Pope for support. It was hoped that Papal ships could intercept or at least hinder the movement of Ottoman troops from Anatolia. Much to the dismay of many Hungarian Nobles king Ladislas V took this moment to go on a hunting trip, one that was based in Vienna and would only end after the Ottoman threat had passed. The nobles despite their personal mistrust of him turned to Janos Hunyadi for leadership. Hunyadi was once again in effective control over Hungary.Hunyadi reinforced the fortresses along the Danube particularily Belgrade whose strategic position made it the mostly likely target fot the Ottomans. Hunyadi is recorded as sending over 5000 mercenaries to Belgrade. Described as a mix of Hungarians, Czechs and Poles. Hunyadi's long term planning was paying dividends, not only had he initiated repairs and the building of fresh defences as far back as 1442 but he had also managed to ensure that the commander of the Belgrade fortress was an excellent soldier and his personal friend Micheal Szilagyi. As it became clear that Belgrade was the likely target of the Ottomans the inhabitants rallied to Szilagyi and provided him with an enthusastic militia but more importantly the manpower to further improve the city's defences.

With the initial defence of Belgrade taken care of Hunyadi set about raising a field army and gaining allies. Hunyadi's focus was Wallachia for two main reasons. Firstly the current Wallachian ruler, Vladislav II, was an ally of the Ottomans and had in 1455 with the assistance of Ottoman troops raided and plundered across Southern Transylvania. The effect of this was that Hunyadi was unable to remove many of his most trustworthy and reliable troops as they were required to guard against further Wallachian incursions. Hunyadi initially attempted diplomacy but this appears to have had little effect as Vladislav subsequently supported a rebellion in the Hungarian controlled city of Fagaras in early April 1456. Hunyadi responded with a rebellion of his own, he gave the son of a previous Wallachian king men and money. Prince Vlad, later famous as the 'impaler', gained rapid support from the Wallachian Boyars and by the end of June 1456 had killed Vladislav and was undisputed king of Wallachia. Vlad's rebellion was sufficently successful from the outset that Hunyadi was able to pull most of his personal troops out of Transylvania to the muster point at the city of Seghedin. Unfortunately the Saxon elements of Transylvania ignored Hunyadi's requests as it had been their lands that had suffered the greatest in the Wallachian incursions. There are three letters from Hunyadi in three weeks to the Saxon leaders asking them to join the muster at Seghedin. There is no evidence that Saxon troops arrived to help.

Hunyadi also turned to the Serbs and Albanians for support. There are no details of any communications between George Brankovitch and Hunyadi, however unlike the capaign of 1448 which ended badly for the Hungarians at the Battle of Kossovo this time Serbian support was emphatic and wide spread. The local Serb population around Belgrade added considerably to the defenders of the city. A Serbian army of some 9000 men attacked the Ottoman main army as it advanced up the pass of Moravia towards Belgrade. It was outnumbered at least four to one, and had little hope of success. The Serbs lost the engagement but in doing so gained Hunyadi more time to organise his forces.

Scanderbeg of Albania responded to Hunyadi's request for help and gathered an army but was unable to come to his aid. At the same time as the Ottoman army was advancing on Belgrade a secondary force attacked Albania directly. This was presumably to prevent Albanian assistance to the Hungarians but also as a continuation of the previous year's campaign.

A further blow to Hunyadi was the refusal of most of Hungary's senior noblemen to participate in the campaign. Many citing the King's absence as reason enough. Only those with a vested interested mustered as required. Nobles with estates in Southern Hungary rallied to Hunyadi as did many of the minor noblemen whose causes Hunyadi had championed over the years.

This gave Hunyadi a field force of some 15,000 men, about half were said to be mercenaries or transylvanian troops. Despite the small number these were on the whole very experianced, especially Hunyadi's banderium and Transylvanian troops.There was however an unexpected development throughout Hungary, Serbia and even the Holy Roman Empire . Priests and monks had been spreading the news of the Ottoman threat to Belgrade and preached a crusade to come to Hungary's aid. Chief amongst these was the Monk inquisitor John Capistrano who since late 1455 had been persecuting anyone not of the Catholic faith in Transylvania. Despite the adverse reaction to his inquistion amongst the Nobles and the general population his call to arms struck a cord and soon people were flooding to his crusading banner. Some were minor Nobles who had previously been restrained by ties to Noblemen hostile to Hunyadi but most were common people. Descriptions of these crusaders vary but all are consistant in that they were badly armed and equipped, most only having slings and clubs. Though some had spears, horses and armour. The crusaders made their way to the camp at Seghedin, many arriving after the final battle for Belgrade. By the end of June some contempories estimated that there were over 60,000 crusaders gathered at the camp. A more realistic figure is given by a fellow crusader and collaborator of Capistrano, a Giovanni Tagliacozzo, who wrote from Belgrade shortly after the relief of the city that there were some 27-28000. This figure may well include the population of Belgrade who also fought in the last days of the siege and the militias of Southern Hungary and Transylvania.

Early in June Hunyadi moved his army down the Danube to Kubin (Kovin) and just after the 22nd crossed the river to its Southern bank. In a series of skirmishes Hunyadi slowly retreated towards Belgrade. Large parts of the Ottoman army was able to bypass his skirmishers and were outside the walls of the city sometime near the end of June. The 2nd of July saw Belgrade reinforced by a large group of crusaders under Capistrano who used five large transport ships to get them into the city. Capistrano attempted to link up with Hunyadi's forces to the south with three of the ships but a storm wrecked them, abandoning them he and his troops returned to Belgrade by foot. By the 4th of July the numbers of Ottomans gathering around Belgrade and the arrival of the Ottoman fleet made Hunyadi's presence on the south side of the Danube very risky. He duly crossed over the Danube and made camp at the fortress of Zemun north east of Belgrade. The 4th was also the day that the first of the Ottoman heavy seige cannons began bombarding the city walls of Belgrade. With the arrival of the Otoman fleet Belgrade found itself under seige. Capistrano withdrew from the city before it was surrounded and returned to Seghedin where he gathered the rest of the available crusaders and marched South to join Hunyadi.Hunyadi set about commandering all naval vessels he could find and gathered them at Slankamen. Some were military vessels from the Danube fleet but most were transport/merchant ships of varying size. Outfitting these

as best he could Hunyadi had a force of some 200 ships with which to attempt a relief of Belgrade. Hunyadi was able to continue communications with Szilagyi in Belgrade and the relief attempt was set for the 14th of July. Once Hunyadi's attack had begun Szilagyi was to launch a sally from the city with the forty or so ships moored at the city docks. Szilagyi crewed the ships with Serbs from the city. The reason given in the contempory sources is that they would do anything to repel the Ottoman invaders. A more cynical reason would be that the the Serb irregulars were more expendable than Szilagyi's few professional troops.

On the 14th of July Hunyadi's fleet sailed towards Belgrade, paced by some 15-20000 infantry on the Southern bank of the river. The core of this infantry were the Transylvanian militia but a large number of Crusaders commanded by Capistrano were also present. One Source mentions a noblemen called Peter carrying the crusader banner. This Peter has never been positively identified however his inclusion and mention of the fact that he was responsible for the Crusader flag probably indicates that he was Hunyadi's man, there to ensure that Capistrano did not make any foolish errors. The role of the infantry was to prevent detachments from the Ottoman army interfering with the naval battle and to capture any Ottoman vessel or crew forced to beach.The lead ship of the fleet was described as exceptionally powerful and well built. Hunyadi made it his flagship and placed dismounted men at arms on it. The Ottoman fled advanced from the Belgrade blockade to meet them. The fight lasted some 5 hours, finally swung in the Hungarian favour by the arrival of the Belgrade ships. The ottomans lost some ¾ of their ships, either sunk, captured or so badely damaged that the Sultan later had them fired to prevent their capture. The descturction of the Ottoman fleet opened up Belgrade to resupply and each night saw fresh equipment and men shuttled over by ship.Despite the loss of his fleet the Sultan continued the siege, his artillery train rapidly destroyed the outer walls and small scale assults kept up the pressure on the defenders. The Hungarians were themselves not inactive, their limited amount of artillery were constantly in use, one lucky shot killed the Beylerbey of Rumelia who had been in over all charge of the Ottoman siege works. His death appears to have demoralised or at least dampened the spirits of the Ottoman troops. As a result Mehmed II decided on a general assault to achieve a quick, if bloody, victory.

On the 21st of July the assault was launched. The Ottoman superority of numbers quickly showed as they breached the outer defences and were able to reach the inner fortress before the draw bridge could be raised. Fierce resistance by the Hungarian defenders, including Hunyadi and his banderia saw the Ottomans repulsed from the gateway but not before Janissary sappers had successfully destroyed the draw bridge, preventing the Garrision from easily sallying against them. Despite this set back Crusader

troops were able to affect a crossing from the North side of the river Sava and successfully counter attacked the Ottoman troops within Belgrade's outer defences. Additional support from mercenaries in manouverable boats saw the Crusader troops drive the Ottomans out of Belgrade and by evening had recaptured the city.

The following day the Crusader forces and transylvanian militia within Belgrade launched a disorganised surprise attack on the Outer Ottoman seige works. This was supported by the rest of the crusaders in the camps across the Sava river. Fighting was soon heavy with groups of ottoman cavalry launching counter charges against the Hungarian foot in a desperate attempt to defend their artillery. Seeing the situation stale mated Hunyadi threw in the rest of the Hungarian forces. These well trained mercenaries and veterans quickly over turned the Ottoman resistance and captured their main artillery postitions. Hunyadi had the lighter of these pieces turned around and trained on the Ottoman camp. A full assault with artillery support was then launched on the Ottoman camp. Succesive attacks were beaten back by the Janissaries at the cost of their commander's life and the wounding of the sultan. The Sultan in turn launched his own counter attacks to recapture his guns. After three such attacks were beaten off the Ottoman army refused to try again and remained on the defensive. With night fall the Ottoman army withdrew from their camp and retreated, leaving massive amounts of valuables and equipment behind. The price was high for the Hungarians as within days Janos Hunyadi contracted the plague that was sweeping the camps and died.

I'd recommend Bob Black's pamphlet on Janos Hunyadi and the Turkish invasions of Hungary as an excellent alternative source of information. Though Bob does not list all his sources he seems to have relied on ones different to myself and it makes interesting reading. My one gripe with it, is the inclusion of several standard myths associated with the Hunyadi period, for example the Ringing of Church Bells at noon everyday to commemorate Hunyadi's victory at Belgrade. The ringing of the Bells was actually introduced before the siege of Belgrade by Pope Callistus III as part of the Catholic Angelus prayer. It is linked to the events of 1456 but only in that it was announced as part of the Papal declaration of a Crusade against the Ottoman Turks.Also the placing of the battle of Vasaq at the 'irongate' on the Danube, it is pretty clear from the available evidence that the chronicler only used the term 'irongate' as a descriptive term and not a specific location.

Sources for Hungary

 

Primary Sources

     This is the biggest problem with researching Hungarian military history. Though there are a reasonable amount of primary sources for the period, they are almost impossible to get hold of. Very few of the sources below have been published in 'Western' Europe. Some like Bonfinius have been published in German but these date from the 18th and 19th Centuries and as a result are only available, on site, at some major libraries. Additionally even though there are much more recent Hungarian translations these do not usually come with the original Latin text. The latest combined Hungarian and Latin text of Bonfinius dates from 1911 and is in three volumes, again only available in major libraries. Select quotes on military matters do appear from the sources in English. These quotes however can almost all be traced to the few Hungarian history books translated into English. These means that these quotes have been translated from the Latin into Hungarian and then into English. Obviously these multiple translations could have distorted the original meaning quite significantly and is entirely dependant on the familiarity of the Translator with Hungarian and Latin military terminology. For example I have seen Hussar lances (original was spear) translated from the Hungarian into English as pike. Not really significant for a horsemen as pike is obviously incorrect. However had it been a description of an infantrymen the possibility for confusion is far greater.I have used these English translations for the Hungarian pages, simply because they are the only 'source' material available. All I ask is that they be taken with a pinch of salt until such times as copies of the original sources become available.

Ioan Thuroczi, Chronica Hungarorum 1488

Anonymous, Chronicon Budense 1473

Marco Antonio Bonfinius (Bonfini), Historia Pannonica sive Hungaricarum rerum decades IV et dimidia- 1495Bonfinius takes much of his information from the above two sources, adds new information and unfortunately heavily embroiders his work with fanciful tales.

Two important Byzantine writers that cover the period are;

Doukas, Decline and fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks.

Laonic Chalkondyles, Historical Chronicles

For a comprehensive list of primary sources for the period, see the opening chapter of the Biography of Janos Hunyadi by Camil Muresanu.

Secondary Sources

-Realm of St Stephen by Pal Engel. By far the best English translation book on Hungarian medieval history. This book has the most balanced account of the Hunyadi period that I have come across. It also contains the most military information outside of the dedicated Journals listed below. If you want one book on Hungarian history, this is it.

-Biography of Janos Hunyadi by Camil Muresanu. A close second. The author is Rumanian and this occasionally shows through as a slight bias in his writing. That said it is still a very balanced and very well researched and detailed history of Janos Hunyadi and his times. The first chapter is an extremely detailed look at the sources for Hungary at the time of Hunyadi. Well worth buying and again good from a military point of view. My only slight issue with this book is occasionally the standard of the English translation lapses into some very peculiar syntax and word usage.

-Armies of the Middle Ages, Volume 2 by Ian Heath

- Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians (Steppe peoples in medieval Hungary) by Andras Paloczi Horvath

-Military reform in early fifteenth Century Hungary by Joseph Held, Eastern European quarterly, Vol. XL no 2

Articles of interest in From Hunyadi to Rakoczi ,-Militia Portalis in Hungary before 1526 by Andras Borosy-Society and War from mounted Knights to the standing armies of absolute kings Hungary and the West. Bela K Kiraly-The Hungarian-Croatian border defence system, Ferenc Szakaly

-Nicopolis 1396, David Nicolle, Osprey Campaign series.

-Hungary and the Fall of Eastern Europe 1000-1568, Osprey Men at Arms Series by David Nicolle. On the whole a good introduction to the area and period. One minor niggle p38 Vlad Tepes (the Impaler) is listed as 1418-56. Vlad Tepes was born in c1431 and died in 1476.

-The Hungarian Hussar, Corvina publications Hungary (English) Only the first chapter is relevant.

-A Magyar Viseletek Tortenete by Nemes Nagy Tompos, Corvina publications. In Hungarian but plenty of drawings and illustrations on Hungarian personal military equipment/costumes.

-Transylvania a short history by Istvan Lazar Corvina publications Hungary (English)

-The Magyars, their life and civilisation by Gyulo Laszlo (English) pre 1300 only.

- Once again the notes and lectures of Professor Les Collins.

 

Later Hungarian Armylist Book 4 list 43

Author: Matt Haywood

Synopsis:This list alters some of the basic elements of the original Later Hungarian list which in my opinion do not reflect the historical sources. The major items are the regrading of mercenary Knights to Kn(O), removal of Bd(O) foot and Hd(S) and inclusion of a fleet.

Proposal:

Cold, Ag 2, WW, Rv, H(G), RGo, Rd, BUAC-in-C- Irr Kn(O) @20AP 1

1 Sub Generals- Irr Kn(O) @20AP 1-2

2Nobles and Mercenaries- Irr Kn(O) @10AP or Reg Kn(O) @12AP

2-10

3 Hungarian, Cuman, Jazyges or Ruthenians- Irr LH(F) @4AP 15-24

4Semi-Nomadic Cavalry- Szekelers Irr LH(S) @7AP or Tatar Reg Lh(S) @7AP

*5-20

Hungarian Spearmen- Irr Sp(I) @3AP 0-85 Foot Archers- Irr Bw(I) @3AP with upto 1/3 Irr Ps(O) @2AP 0-24

Wagon Laager for camp- TF @1AP 0-12

6Wallachian Allies or Moldavian Allies- List Wallachian or Moldavian (BK 4) Only before 1308AD

7 Regrade Sub General as Allied General- Irr Kn(O) @20AP 1-2German City Allies- List Medieval German (Bk4) 0-12In 1285 AD only: Mongol allies- List Golden Horde and

Successors(BK4)8 Replace Sub General with Cuman allied General 0-1

 9 Only from 1322AD to 1453AD

<indented> Bosnian Allied General- Irr Kn(O) @20AP **1Regrade Foot Archers as Bosnian Archers- as Foot Archers or with Shields as Irr Bw(O) @4AP

**6-12

From 1340AD: Bosnian Nobles- Irr Kn(O) @10AP **0-2 Only between 1349 to 1382 and between 1440 to 1444Polish Allies- list Later Polish (bk4)   Only from 1382  

3Replace Hungarian, Cuman, Jazyges or Ruthenians with

Hungarian, Cuman, Jazyges or Ruthenians- Irr LH(F) @4AP6-12

   Only in 1396: Crusade of Nicopolis- options as per DBM Later Hungarian List Only from 1440 AD

10 Upgrade Generals to Reg Kn(O) @32AP 0-3Upgrade CinC to Reg Kn(S) @35AP 0-1

11 Upgrade CinC with Polish Bodyguards to Irr Kn(S) @22AP 0-1

2

Replace Nobles and Mercenaries with

Nobles and Mercenaries- Irr Kn(O) @10AP or Reg Kn(O) @12AP

2-20

Upgrade Nobles to Royal Banderium, @15AP ***0-2Serbian Husars- as per DBM Later Hungarian List

12 Armati and Clipeati- Reg Sp(O) @5AP 0-16

13Upgrade Foot Archer Bw(I) or Ps(O) to Reg Ps(O) @2AP [can support Reg Sp(O)]

0-8

Crossbowmen- as per DBM Later Hungarian List [can support Reg Sp(O)]Mercenary Handgunners- as per DBM Later Hungarian List [can support Reg Sp(O)]War Wagons -Reg WWg(O) @10AP 0-6Light Guns- Reg Art(I) @4AP 0-2

14Zarobotana Heavy Guns- Reg Art(O) @8AP or Reg Art(S) @10AP

0-2

15Replace Warwagons with entrenched Warwagons as part of the camp defences- TF @1AP

any, 2 TF per WWg

16Danube Fleet- Bt(O) [Dismounted Kn as Bd(S), any infantry] @2AP

0-4

17 General Levy and crusading foot- Hd(F) @1AP

****0-2 per

Irr Sp(I)

or Bw(I)

 Only from 1442AD to 1446ADSerbian Allies- List: Serbian Empire(Bk4) Only from 1490ADGerman or Italian Pikemen- as per DBM Later Hungarian List

 

Army Notes

A Bosnian General can only command Bosnians and must command all those present. Armies representing Jan Jiskra's mercenary forces 1440-61 cannot use Lh(S), Kn(S) or have any allies. Regular Ps(O) and Ps(S) can support Regular Spearmen. Armati and Clipeati are best represented by 2 halberdier and 2 paviser figures per element.* minima applies if any Lh(S) are used. Irreg Lh(S) must outnumber Reg lh(S) by at least 2:1. ** This applies if any troops so marked are used. *** CinC must be Kn(S) for Royal Banderium to be used.**** The maximum H(F) that can be used is 20 even if the total of Sp(I) and Bw(I) exceeds 10 elements.

 

Notes

1 I have removed the Szekely Lh General option as there is no evidence for the Counts of Szekely having a distinct battlefield role nor fighting in anyway other than as a Knight. The Counts of Szekely were appointed by the King and there is no record of a Szekeler ever holding the post. The available evidence only shows the title being given to Hungarian Nobles. As such a

Hungarian Noble would have had his own personal Banderia with which he would have taken the field. Additionally from the time of Janos Hunyadi the title and responsibilities of the Count of Szekely were almost always (with only one exception) granted to the Voiviode of Transylvania. The Counts held complete control over Szekeler lands and people, this included the militia. The only recorded time that the Szekelers operated as an semi-independent force was in putting down the 1437-38 peasant revolt in Transylvania. Even here it was an alliance of local Nobility, Saxons and Szekely. (Engel)

2 There are two basic issues here. I have allowed Regular Knights to be used from the start date of the list. I have removed the seperate entries for Armigeri and Nobles and combined them. I have also reclassified the Armigeri mercenary DBE Kn(I) as Kn(O).

Regular Knights from the start of the list and grouped mercenary/Nobles

Hungarian Kings, at least from the time of Charles Angevin appear to have employed significant numbers of mercenary Knights. As often as not these were Hungarians and were raised under a Disposito (commision) from the Crown and paid for out of the Royal Treasury. During Charles' campaign to reassert Royal control over Hungary he fought the battle of Rozgony, June 15 1312, here impetous attacks from his opponents broke his own Noble supporters. However foreign troops, labelled crusaders in the sources held and won the battle. 'Crusader' appears to have been a popular phrase for describing mercenary troops, it is certainly at odds here as Charles was a supporter of the pagan Cumans and supported by them. Charles going as far as to defy the Catholic Church on their behalf making true crusaders a little unlikely area of support for him.

Mercenary troops became common place under Charles' son Louis. Louis' campaigns in Italy appear to have been carried out by mercenary troops. The Count of Pressburg, Simon Meggyes led one such army to the aid of Pope Innocent VI. After his return to Hungary much of his army remained and formed mercenary companies on the Italian model. One such notable company was the Magna Societas Ungarorum. Levied troops and Noble Banderia are unlikely to have had such latitude nor desire to form such mercenary companies. Similarily the army sent to Naples in 1380 was commanded by 2 Barons and assisted by 15 Royal Captains, the title confered on those given commands of Disposito units. There exists a letter in which the 2 Barons are admonished from accepting any money from the Italians as they had already been supplied with sufficent to pay the troops. Again Levied and Noble troops are unlikely to be paid or if they were not on a regular basis. Louis appears to have been able to predict the amount of money required for the campaign, implying to me mercenary wages at a fixed rate. Also though Louis called on the Generalis Exercitus (mass levy) on

several occasions during his reign it only ever saw service domestically or in 'small' wars in Croatia and Bosnia.

There is also the general issue of money. The Hungarian Kings appear to have had a cash flow substantially greater than that of their contempories. Hungary had at this time large gold and salt mines, fully controlled by the Crown, making it one of the wealthiest in Europe. It was one of the few monarchies that could afford mercenaries in substantial numbers. It would only be with Matthius' massive 'black army' that cashflow would become a problem.

(Engel and Muresanu)

Armigeri mercenary DBE Kn(I) as Kn(O)

The appears to be a default assumption that all 'Germanic' Knights are to be classed as dbe Kn(I). I do not believe the evidence warrants this. Bonfinius on the battle of Varna makes the specific statement that the Knights deployed in deep formations, this includes 3 banderia of Hungarian Magnates. Despite describing earlier battles of Hunyadi, most involving large numbers of mercenary knights this is the first mention of such a deployment. The implication, especially as the battlefield frontage was very narrow (1,000 paces) makes this unusual rather than usual. Additionally although the mercenaries are inevitably describes as Bohemian or German they included, Hungarians, Polish, Silesians, Moravians, Italians, Serbs and even some Swiss. None renowned for fighting in the manner attributed to the domestic German Knights. What sources there are available make no mention of any difference in the styles of fighting between Hungarian and mercenary elements of the army. Part of the reasons for deep formations of Knights was to allow the placement of the best armoured men to the front, essentially protecting the less well equiped. The question is just how likely is it that the equipment amongst the mercenaries would have varied so drastically as to require such deployment? Given the substantial numerical distadvantage of the Hungarians when facing Ottoman forces, the varied nature of mercenary nationalities and the exception made for Varna by Bonfinius I see no reason why dbe Kn(I) should be better representative than Kn(O).

3 I have increased the minima for Lh(F) prior to 1382. We don't have any direct evidence for the composition of pre 1382 armies and as such minimums are hard to judge. However as the impression of the available sources, like the Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum is that Cuman cavalry were very important to both Charles and Louis and at this stage the Magyar population could still be providing effective troops. So a bit touchy, feely I'm afraid.

Reducing the minima to 6 after 1382 has better evidence though is still debatable. Firstly in every recorded battle post 1382 there is never a mention of Magyar or Cuman skirmishers. There is also amble evidence for the Hungarians relying on 'foreign' or specialist cavalry to act as skirmishers. These were often Wallachians (Varna and Kosovo Polje), Serbians (the long campaign and many of Matthius' battles) or Szekelers and Tatars from within Hungary itself. At Nicopolis it was planned for Transylvanians to counter the Ottoman Akinji on one wing while the Wallachians did so on the other. This is despite Sigismund ordering his Nobles to bring at least 2 mounted archers each. We also have the repeated edicts on the Militia Portalis.

The Militia Portalis was born out of attempts to reorganise and reform the general levy. It first appeared in documents of 1397 during the reign of Sigismund. It outlined that for every twenty serf-lots (portae) a Noble was expected to raise and led 1 archer (probably mounted). What is often assumed is that this soldier was a peasant from such holdings this though is never actually specified by the documents of this time or later. This specific levy was not to be limited by service within Hungary nor the 15 day period of service. It appears that this initial attempt failed under opposition from the Nobility. Failure of the Generalis Exercitus during the Hussite wars saw further attempts at reform between 1432-35. These appear to have been more successful and there is documentary evidence of the use of the Militia Portalis from then on.For more detailed information and examination of the evidence on the Hungarian organisation see the following articles:

Military reform in early fifteenth Century Hungary by Joseph Held, Eastern European quarterly, Vol. XL no 2

Militia Portalis in Hungary before 1526 by Andras Borosy, From Hunyadi to Rakoczi

The repeated edicts and changes to its requirements for domestic light horse seem to indicate a failure to produce the required results. This combined with the ever increasing use of 'foreign' light horse and lack of any evidence for domestic skirmishers has led me to reduce the numbers allowed, though not remove it entirely.

4 Here I have removed the minima for Lh(S). Again there is no evidence to support automatic inclusion in a Hungarian army. The Szekely and Tatars were obligated to provide military service to the Crown. In the case of the Szekely 2400 men for a campaign in a given year. Armies of Elizabeth's rebel supporters (1440 to 1444) and those of the Hussite mercenary Jan Jiskra would have had no access to these troops being based mostly in the North and West of Hungary.

5 Altered in keeping with prefered guidelines on bow armed troops, see point 12. I have also increased the maximum allowed. This is in part to reflect likely recruitment via the Generalis Exercitus and Militia Portalis, see Andras Borosy's article. It is also to reflect Janos Hunyadi's calling of the mass levy in 1442 and 1456.

6 Removed the option for allied contingents to be used together. The only evidence to suggest this is the list of Matthius' forces by Sebastiano Baduario (figures can be found in the WRG armies of the middle ages bk2). Here the Voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia are listed along with troop numbers. There is no evidence to suggest that either Nation actually provided troops for Matthius, at least to qualify as a DBM external ally. It is also unlikely that both would honour any assumed vassal obligation at the same time.

7 Altered the handling of allied Generals prior to 1308. Automatic reduction of all Sub-Generals to allied status seemed a little too harsh. Depending on what is being depicted I think there is still justification for 1 reliable subordinate, be it by family or other trusted counterpart.

8 The original entry in the list presumably represents the support given to Charles during his wars to control Hungary. In the early years Cuman support was the deciding factor in Charle's campaigns, they also provided by far the largest contingents for his army. Making them an option for a fourth command seems out of step, they were the predominate troops so replacing a third command seems more logical to me.

9Bosnia became a vassal of Hungary in 1322, prior to that it was part of Croatia. Given the complete lack of evidence for how Bosnian Generals fought in battle, a classification of ax(O) is pretty unjustifiable. Dismounting as Bd(S) achieves pretty much the same result. 1340 saw the ruler of Bosnia given substantial estates in Hungary, presumably part of the justification for additional Knights.

10 Representing mercenary Generals and those Hungarian Generals that saw significant service under Janos Hunyadi. The successes of Janos and his armies, even some of his defeats potray a highly disciplined force almost certainly deserving of Regular status.

11 The option to regrade the CinC to represent Ulászló I suicidal charge at Varna at the urging of his Polish bodyguards.

12 I have amalgamated the Clipeati Sp(O) and Armati bd(O) into one group, all classed as Sp(O). My justification is based on the descriptions of how the Hungarian infantry fought:

In 1480 Matthius wrote a description of his infantry, this is the first definitive source for how they were employed.

'some are light foot soldiers, others are heavily armoured, and some are clipeati, who demand double pay because of their servants. In addition there are gun experts, but they are not efficient in firing as the rest of the infantry; they do best from behind the pavises at the start of the battle or in sieges. We make it a rule that a fifth of the infantry are arquebusiers.……We regard the heavy infantry as an immovable wall that, if necessary, would fight and die to the last man where they stood. When opportunity presents itself the light infantry make forays, but, if their attack loses its impetus or if they are hard pressed, they fall back behind the heavy infantry……All the infantry and arquebusiers are surrounded by Armati and clipeati like a fortress. The pavises all round them give the impression of a fortress, behind which the light infantry shelter and fight as from castle walls, attacking when the time is right.'

This translation is taken from Armies of the Middle Ages, Volume 2 by Ian Heath, published by Wargames research Group

KomJathy in A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war says of the light infantry,

'The main assignment of both lines [refering to the Clipeati and Armati] was to protect the third line of musketeers and the fourth line of light infantry with bows, lances, and axes.' And

'During attack they approached the enemy lines, protected by the musketeers' fire: once the enemy line was broken, hand-to-hand combat was carried out by the light infantry.'

He unfortunately does not list the original sources for these statements though most of it is clearly based on Matthius' description. Musketeers is likely a bad translation from KomJathy's original Hungarian and not a 'mistake' by the author.

Matthius' description appears to show that the Armati and Clipeati worked together, all receiving protection from the Pavises and inturn protecting the handgunners and archers. Separate Bd/Sp groups gives too much flexibility to the list and probably does not reflect historical use, hence the combined Sp(O) classification.

13 Given the likely origin of Clipeati and Armati as mercenaries it seems appropriate to regrade their supporting archers as Regular and limit their numbers and preventing them being used to support Hungarian irreg spear.

14 The Zarobotana (a corruption of the Italian Cerbottana) meaning a cannon capable of firing at longer ranges than normal are recorded as being used at Kossovo and advancing with the infantry in the attack on the Ottoman infantry centre. To me a Art(O) classification is better than an Art(S) in these circumstances. I have included Art(S) as it is the DBM rule book definition for larger gunpowder artillery.

15 The battle of Kossovo saw the warwagons used as part of the usual wagon laager defences and it was sufficently large to contain all the infantry, artillery and a cavalry reserve.

16 The Hungarians had fleets on the Danube and Sava rivers. Though the only recorded use in battle was during the seige of Belgrade in 1456. Janos Hunyadi describes it as a battle rather than a siege as the city wall had mostly been collapsed and it turned into a running street fight. Bonfinius says Hunyadi used the boats as reserves, manned by his mercenaries and sent to areas of the city where they were most needed.

17 This replaces the Hd(S) classification of the original list. Hd(S) implies a fantatical enthusasism which I do not think is warranted here. There are three battles where volunteers and peasant militia were present, Alba Iulia, Hermanstad and Vasaq in1442 and Belgrade in 1456. The only evidence for impetous behaviour is at the second day of the relief of Belgrade. Here 'crusaders' attacked without orders, forcing Hunyadi to commit his regular troops to the fight. The crusaders though did not only comprise enthusastic badly armed peasants but included the general levy of Transylvania. This may explain why a third of the crusaders are described as being competent with arms, some of these including handguns.

In addition hd(F) better reflects the use of these troops. At Belgrade the 'crusaders' excelled at the fighting in the narrow streets of the city, doing less well in the open. At Vasaq the terrain was a narrow valley floor with mountainous sides.

As all the battles where such irregular militias were present included the general levy of Transylvania I have linked the use of the Hd(F) to the basic Irreg Sp and Irreg Bw of the list.

 

Sources

Ioan Thuroczi, Chronica Hungarorum 1488

Anonymous, Chronicon Budense 1473

Marco Antonio Bonfinius (Bonfini), Historia Pannonica sive Hungaricarum rerum decades IV et dimidia- 1495Bonfinius takes much of his information from the above two sources, adds new information and unfortunately heavily embroiders his work with fanciful tales.

Two important Byzantine writers that cover the period are;

Doukas, Decline and fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks.

Laonic Chalkondyles, Historical Chronicles

For a comprehensive list of primary sources for the period, see the opening chapter of the Biography of Janos Hunyadi by Camil Muresanu.

Secondary Sources

-Realm of St Stephen by Pal Engel. By far the best English translation book on Hungarian medieval history. This book has the most balanced account of the Hunyadi period that I have come across. It also contains the most military information outside of the dedicated Journals listed below. If you want one book on Hungarian history, this is it.

-Biography of Janos Hunyadi by Camil Muresanu. A close second. The author is Rumanian and this occasionally shows through as a slight bias in his writing. That said it is still a very balanced and very well researched and detailed history of Janos Hunyadi and his times. The first chapter is an extremely detailed look at the sources for Hungary at the time of Hunyadi. Well worth buying and again good from a military point of view. My only slight issue with this book is occasionally the standard of the English translation lapses into some very peculiar syntax and word usage.

-Armies of the Middle Ages, Volume 2 by Ian Heath

- Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians (Steppe peoples in medieval Hungary) by Andras Paloczi Horvath

-Military reform in early fifteenth Century Hungary by Joseph Held, Eastern European quarterly, Vol. XL no 2

Articles of interest in From Hunyadi to Rakoczi ,-Militia Portalis in Hungary before 1526 by Andras Borosy-Society and War from mounted Knights to the standing armies of absolute kings Hungary and the West. Bela K Kiraly-The Hungarian-Croatian border defence system, Ferenc Szakaly

-Nicopolis 1396, David Nicolle, Osprey Campaign series.

-Hungary and the Fall of Eastern Europe 1000-1568, Osprey Men at Arms Series by David Nicolle. On the whole a good introduction to the area and period. One minor niggle p38 Vlad Tepes (the Impaler) is listed as 1418-56. Vlad Tepes was born in c1431 and died in 1476.

-The Hungarian Hussar, Corvina publications Hungary (English) Only the first chapter is relevant.

-A Magyar Viseletek Tortenete by Nemes Nagy Tompos, Corvina publications. In Hungarian but plenty of drawings and illustrations on Hungarian personal military equipment/costumes.

-Transylvania a short history by Istvan Lazar Corvina publications Hungary (English)

-The Magyars, their life and civilisation by Gyulo Laszlo (English) pre 1300 only.

Medieval Hungarian Picture Gallery 

Pictures courtesy of Chris Pringle, from a visit to the Hungarian Military Museum in Budapest.

Replica Pavise from the time of Matthius

 

54mm model of Matthius' army besieging a Austrian castle

 

 

 

Black Army Banner, the original banner was in fact White which later oxidised to black.

Medieval Hungarian Picture Gallery 

Pictures courtesy of Emmanuel Roy, taken at the Hungarian Castleof Visegrad, not far north of Budapest.

These are scale replicas of some of the war wagons of Matthius Hunyadi. By the looks of the piccies 1/4 or maybe 1/3 size.