Sweeney, James Ross. Innocent III, Hungary and the Bulgarian Coronation - A Study in Medieval Papal Diplomacy

8/10/2019 Sweeney, James Ross. Innocent III, Hungary and the Bulgarian Coronation - A Study in Medieval Papal Diplomacy

1/16

merican Society of Church History

Innocent III, Hungary and the Bulgarian Coronation: A Study in Medieval Papal DiplomacyAuthor(s): James Ross SweeneySource: Church History, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep., 1973), pp. 320-334Published by: Cambridge University Presson behalf of the American Society of Church HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3164389.

Accessed: 18/11/2014 11:23

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University PressandAmerican Society of Church Historyare collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

preserve and extend access to Church History.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.93 on Tue, 18 Nov 2014 11:23:55 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aschhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3164389?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3164389?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aschhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup


2/16

Innocent

III,

Hungary

and

the

Bulgarian

Coronation:

A

Study

in Medieval

Papal

Diplomacy

JAMES

ROSS SWEENEY

During

the twelfth

century

the

papacy

in the

interest

of

peace

within the

Christian

community

gradually

took a more

active

part

in

the

mediation and

settlement of

secular

disputes.'

Innocent

III

regarded

such

mediation as

an

obliga-

tion of

his

office,

and

throughout

his

pontificate

he

sought

to

promote

more har-

monious relations

among

Christian

princes.

In

his

correspondence

he

referred

on

several

occasions to the

words of the

Psalmist,

". .

.

seek

peace,

and

pursue

it." He often cited Christ's counsels of

peace

as in the

Gospel

of

John,

"Peace I

leave

with

you,

my

peace

I

give

unto

you."2

At the

beginning

of

the thirteenth

century peace

was

not

only

a

worthy

end

in

itself;

it

could have the additional ad-

vantage

of

freeing

the

European princes

to

fight

as crusaders in

a cause which

In-

nocent

zealously

fostered.3

King

Imre

(Emeric)

of

Hungary (1196-1204)

was

a

monarch

who

had

bene-

fited from

papal

attempts

to

end

a serious

civil war and

who in

consequence

had

taken

crusader's vows.4

Imre

was also

an

important

ally

in

the

struggle

against

the

Hohenstaufen

party

in

Germany.

From

its

location

along

the

ecclesiastical

frontier between the

Latin West and

the

Greek

East,

the

kingdom of Hungary ac-

quired

an

importance

in

papal plans

for

the reunion

of

the

eastern

church

with

Rome.

Innocent

during

the

first

third

of

his

reign

showed

considerable

favor to

the

Hungarian

king

and

his interests

in

central

Europe.

But when

the

pope

de-

cided to

send

a

legate

to crown

Joannitsa

(Kalojan)

of

Bulgaria

(1197-1207),

there ensued

the most serious crisis

in

papal-Hungarian

relations of

the

entire

This

essay

is

a

revised

and

expanded

version of a

paper

read

at

the

joint

meeting

of

the

Medieval

Association

of the

Pacific

with

the

Medieval

Academy

of

America at

Los

An-

geles,

California,

April

13,

1972.

1. P. L.

Ganshof,

The Middle

Ages:

A

History

of

International

Belations

(New

York,

1970), pp.

136-137;

J.

Gaudemet,

"Le

r81e

de la

papaut6

dans

le

r6glement

des

conflits

entre Etats

aux

XIIIe

et

XIVe

sikles,"

Becueil de

la

Societe

Jean

Bodin

pour I'histoire

comparative

des

institutions

15

(1961),

pp.

81-83.

2.

The

Biblical

quotations

from

Psalms 33:15

(A.

V.

34:14)

and John

14:27

appear

for

example

in

Innocentii

III

Bomani

pontificis

regestorum

sive

epistolarum,

ed. J.

P.

Migne,

Patrologia

Latina

cursus

completus,

vols.

214-217

(Paris,

1858,

reprinted

1890),

I, 355,

hereafter

Beg.;

A.

Potthast,

Begesta

Pontificum

Somanorum

I

(Berlin,

1874),

no.

351;

and

Reg. VI,

68;

Potthast,

no. 1921.

The

best edition

of Book

I

of

the

register

is

now 0.

Hageneder

and A.

Haidacher,

eds.,

Die

Begister

Innocenz'

III.

(Graz-

Koln,

1964),

hereafter

H.

and

H.,

Register.

3.

Gaudemet,

pp.

86-87. See also A.

Luchaire,

Innocent

III

(Paris,

1904-1908),

4:1-8;

H.

Tillmann,

Papst

Innocens III.

(Bonn,

1954),

pp. 220-223;

and

Helmut

Roseher,

Papst

Innocenz

III. und die

Kreuszage

(Gottingen,

1969),

esp. pp.

51-58.

4. For

Innocent's

intervention

in

the civil war see

Beg.

I,

10

(H.

and

H.,

Register

1/10);

Potthast

no.

4;

also

Beg.

I,

271

(H.

and

H.,

Register

1/271);

Potthast no.

285;

and

A.

Theiner,

Vetera monumenta

Slavorum

meridionalium

historiam

illustrantia

(Rome,

1863);

1:47,

no.

19

(Potthast

no.

977).

1:51,

no.

156,

157.

For

Imre's

crusading

vow

see

ibid.,

1:59,

no.

112,

115;

Potthast

mo.

1431,

1434;

also F.

Kempf,

ed.,

Begestuw

Innocentii III

papae super negtio

Romani

imperio

(Rome,

1947), p. 194,

no.

70;

Potthast no.

1736;

and

Chronica

regia

Coloniensis,

ed.

G.

Waitz,

Monumenta

Germaniae

Historica,

Scriptores

in

usum

scholarum

(Hanover,

1880),

pp.

168-169.

Mr.

Sweeney

is

assistant

professor of

history

in

Wayne

State

University,

Detroit,

Michigan.

320

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/16

pontificate.5

This

episode exemplifies

the

operation

of

medieval

papal

diplomacy

and

allows us in

a

specific

case to

evaluate

Innocent

III's

effectiveness

as a

diplomat.

I

From the

correspondence

surviving

in Innocent's

register

we

can trace

the

course of

events

leading up

to

Joannitsa's

coronation

on

November

8,

1204. The

first

recorded

diplomatic

exchange

occurred

in

1199

when

Innocent,

in

response

to earlier contacts

between

Rome and

Bulgaria,

wrote to

Joannitsa

announcing

his intention

to

dispatch

Dominic,

the

archpresbyter

of

the Greeks

at

Brindisi,

as

a

papal

legate

to

Bulgaria.6

In the

following years

communication

between

the

two courts

increased.

Joannitsa,

who

from the outset

styled

himself

imperator

Bulgarorum

et

Blachorum,

desired

confirmation of

his

imperial

pretensions

and

the elevation of the archiepiscopate at Trnovo to a patriarchate.7 Papal support

for his

regime

could

be turned

to

good

use

in

his

dealings

with

two troublesome

neighbors,

the

Hungarians

and the

Byzantines.

For

Pope

Innocent,

the

Bulgarian

negotiations

provided

an

exceptional

opportunity

to

further

the

reunification

of

the schismatic

churches

of the

East

with

the

Holy

See. He

valued

the

reunion of

Christendom

under

papal

aegis

as

among

the chief

goals

of his

pontificate.

This

is

amply

demonstrated

throughout

his

correspondence

with

other

Balkan and

Near

Eastern

leaders.8

Furthermore,

in

the

case of

Bulgaria

the

papacy

would

be able

with

dramatic

point

to

demonstrate the inherent

superiority

of

the

apos-

tolic

see

over

temporal

affairs

through

the bestowal

of

a crown

and

the

royal

dignity.9

Although

the

papacy

moved with caution-these

negotiations

stretched

over

a

five-year period-the

project

for

the reunion of

the

Bulgarian

church

and

the coronation

of

Joannitsa

became

one of

Innocent's most

important

undertak-

ings

in

eastern

Europe.

A measure

of

the

pope's

increasing

interest

in

the

Bulgarian

project

was

the

selection

of clerics

of

successively higher

rank

as

envoys

to the

Bulgarian

court.

After

the

return

of Dominic

the

Archpresbyter,

Innocent's

personal

chap-

lain

John

of

Casamari

was

delegated

to

lead a new mission

to

Bulgaria.

John

was

a

cleric

who

had

acquired

a

knowledge

of

central

European

affairs on

papal

missions to Dalmatia and Serbia.10 In 1202, at the time the new legate was given

his

instructions,

he

had

already

been commissioned

to

investigate

reports

about

the

spread

of

heresy

in

Bosnia,

a

province

then

nominally

subject

to

the

king

of

Hungary.

During

the

spring

of

1203

John

the

Chaplain

was

active

in

Bosnia,

and

by

April

30

arrived

at

the

Hungarian

court,

where

he remained

for more than a

5.

On Joannitsa's

career

see

W.

N.

Slatarski,

Geschichte

der

Bulgaren

(Leipzig, 1918), pp.

99-113;

and

R. L.

Wolff,

"The

'Second

Bulgarian

Empire.'

It's

Origin

and

His-

tory

to

1204,"

Speculum

24

(1949),

pp.

118-203.

6.

Beg.

II,

266.

Ivan

Dujeev,

"Innocentii

III

epistolae

ad

Bulgariae

historiam

spec-

tantes." Godishnwik

a

Soffiiskya

Universitet:

1st.

-

Fil.

Fak. (Annuaire

de

l'universit6

de

Sofia,

Fac.

Hist.-Phil.), 38,

no.

3

(Sofia,

1942),

pp.

3-116,

is

the best modern

edi-

tion of the papal correspondencewith Bulgaria; see p. 21, no. 1; Potthast no. 931.

7.

Beg. V,

115;

DujEev,

p.

22,

no.

2;

and

Beg.

VI, 142; Duj6ev,

p.

30,

no.

9.

8.

For the

importance

of

church reunion

to

Innocent

see

Tillmann, pp.

212-218,

and

Wilhelm

de

Vries,

"Innozenz

III.

(1198-1216)

und

der

Christliche

Osten,"

Archivum

Historiae

Pontificae

3

(1965), pp.

87-126.

9.

W.

TUlmaTin,

rinciples

of

Government

and

Politics

in the Middle

Ages

(London,

1961), pp.

82-83.

10.

Beg.

VI,

116; DujEev,

p.

23,

no.

3;

Potthast

no.

1775.

For

John's

earlier

activities

see

Beg.

I,

525

(H.

and

H.,

Register,

1/525);

Potthast

no.

566;

also

Beg.

I,

526

(H.

and

H.,

Register,

1/526);

Potthast no.

567;

and

Beg.

I,

535

(

H.

and

H.,

Reg-

ister,

1/533);

Potthast

no.

578.

INNOCENT

III

321



4/16

CHURCH

HISTORY

month

at the

king's

behest.11

If

King

Imre of

Hungary

had

been

unawareof

In-

nocent's

negotiations

with

Joannitsa

up

to this

point,

the

legate's

visit

provided

an

opportunity

o learn

something

of their nature.

When

messengers

rom

Joan-

nitsa arrivedat the Hungariancourt to escort the legate to Bulgaria,the Hun-

garian

king

compelled

hem

to

swear on the

gospels

that

they

would conduct

the

papal

chaplain

n

safety.

Imre himself assured

the

legate

that

Joannitsa

was

de-

voted

to the Roman church.

The

legate

also receivedImre's

guarantee

hat mes-

sengers

from

Bulgaria

might pass

in

safety

through

Hungary

whether

going

to

or

returning

rom

Rome.12

John

the

Chaplain

eached

Bulgaria

no

later

than

Au-

gust

1203.13

There he examined

he

state of the

church,

received

Joannitsa's

ub-

mission

to the

apostolic

see

and

in

September

bestowedthe

pallium

on the

arch-

bishop

of

Trnovo.14

From

the

papal

point

of

view,

the

Hungarian

king's cooperative

behavior

must have

seemed

reassuring.

In

light

of

past Hungarian

enmity

toward

Bulgaria,

Imre's readiness

n

1203

to

foster

closer ties between

his

neighbor

and

Rome

may

have

been

unexpected.

But

at that moment

he

held

a

strong

position

in

the

lands

south

of the

Danube.

In

1202 he had forced

Serbia to become

for a

brief

time a

client

state

of the

Hungarian

monarchy,

and from then

on

he

styled

himself rex

Serviae.l

John

the

Chaplain's

ecentmission to

Bosnia,

which

followed

a

success-

ful

Hungarian

campaign

here,

hadthe effect of

strengthening

mre's

control

over

that

semiautonomous

egion.ls

At the time of the

legate's

stay

in

Hungary

(May

and

June

1203),

Imre and

Joannitsa

were at

peace.

The

papacy,

moreover,

had

not yet decidedupon formal recognitionof the legitimacyof Joannitsa'stitle.

Papal

letters from

1203

persist

in

addressing

he

Bulgarian

ruler

as

dominusBul-

garorum

et

Blachorum

(not

rex,

still less

imperator).7

The

Hungarian

king

had

little cause for

complaint.

On

the

contrary,by

compelling

he

envoys

to

swear

to

escort

the

legate

in

safety,

Imre could

pose

as the

defender

of

papal

nterests,

both

before the

pope's

chaplain,

who

reported

he incident o

Rome,

and

the

Bulgarian

representatives,

who

undoubtedly

elated

the

incident

at

Trnovo.

During

the

summer

of

1203

political

conditions

in

the

Balkans

changed.

Joannitsa

sent

military

support,

including

large

numbers

of

pagan

Cumans,

to

Stephen

of

Rasca,

who

drove the

Hungarian

client-prince

Vukan

out of

Serbia.18

11.

For

John's

activities in Bosnia see

Beg.

V,

110;

Potthast no.

1768;

and

Beg.

V,

141;

VI,

212.

For

his

stay

at the

Hungarian

court see

Beg.

VI,

140;

DujEev,

p.

29,

no.

8.

12.

Beg.

VI,

140:

"Unde

recepi

securitatem,

quod

si

voluerit

mittere

nuntios

ad

sancti-

tatem

vestram

in eundo et

redeundo nullam

per

totum

regnum

Ungarie

et

amicitie

ipsius

et

parentele

lesionem

patientur."

13. The

date

of John's

arrival is deduced from

Beg.

VII,

5;

DujEev.

p.

44,

no. 16.

See

also

my

"Basil of

Trnovo's

Journey

to Durazzo. A

Note

on

Balkan

Travel

at

the

Beginning

of the

Thirteenth

Century,"

Slavonic

and

East

European

Beview,

no.

122

(January

1973),

pp.

118-120.

14.

Beg.

VII,

6;

DujEev,

p.

47,

no.

18.

15.

Innocent

congratulated

Imre

on

his Serbian

victory

in

Beg.

V,

18;

Potthast

no.

1797.

Imre first

added

Serbia to his

royal

style

in

a charter

of

1202;

G.

Fejer,

Codex

diplomatious

Hungariae

ecclesiasticus

et

civilis

(Budapest, 1829-1844), 2:395;I.

Szentp6tery

and I.

Borsa,

Begesta

regum

stirpis

Arpadianae

critico-diplomatica

(Budapest,

1923-1961),

no.

197.

16. The

son of

the

ban

of

Bosnia

had

been

forced

to

give

Imre

personal

assurances

that

the corrections

instituted

by

the

legate

would

be

carried

out:

Reg.

VI, 212;

Szentpetery,

no.

67.

17.

At

first

Innocent

addressed

Joannitsa

merely

as

"nobilis

vir,"

see

Beg.

II,

266;

DujEev,

p.

21,

no.

1;

and

Beg.

V,

116; DujEev,

p.

23,

no.

3.

See

Wolff,

pp. 190,

193.

18.

Beg.

VII,

127; DujEev,

p. 59,

no.

28.

See also

Stefan der

Erstgekronte,

"Das Leben

des

hi.

Simeon

Nemanja,"

in

Stanislaus

Hafner,

Serbisches

Mittelalter

(Graz, 1962),

pp.

108-109.

322



5/16


6/16


7/16


8/16

CHURCH

HISTORY

vague

and

improbable.

It

is

barely

an

explanation

to ascribe

this last-minute

at-

tempt

to

impede

the

Bulgarian

coronation

merely

to the

king's

enmity

for

Joan-

nitsa.37

A

more detailed

study

has

suggested

that

throughout

the

legate's

stay

at

the Hungarian court Imre was kept uninformed of plans for the coronation. After

the

legate's

departure

the

king

learned

of this

project

(although

we

are

not told

how),

and

in

fury

he

ordered

the cardinal

to

be detained

at

the frontier.38

This

interpretation

is

highly

unlikely.

It

presupposes

a

deliberate

attempt

on

the

part

of Innocent

III

and

his

legate

to

deceive the

Hungarian

king by persuading

him

to disband

his

army

and

then

crowning

his

enemy.

Nor would the

Hungarian

court

have

long

remained

ignorant

of

the

mission of the

legate,

in

whose

baggage

were a

crown,

a banner

and

numerous

papal

documents.

It is far

more

probable

that Imre was

discreetly

informed of the

impending

Bulgarian coronation by the cardinal. Although the pope's public declarations

tactfully

omitted

any

reference

to the

coronation,

the

pope's

communications

trans-

mitted

orally by

the

legate

could

hardly

have

neglected

such

an

important

event.89

During

his

lengthy

stay

the

legate

had succeeded

in

persuading

the

king,

probably

in

the

higher

interests

of

the

church,

to

disband

his

army.

He

may

also

have con-

vinced

Imre that

once

Joannitsa

was

bound

to

the

Holy

See

through

his corona-

tion,

the

papacy

would

be better

able

to

satisfy legitimate

Hungarian grievances

against

him.

This

was

the

argument

later used

by

the

cardinal

and the

pope.

Once

the

legate

set out

for the

frontier,

however,

Imre

came

to

question

the

ef-

ficacy

of

ecclesiastical

penalties

in

resolving

serious

secular

disputes

and

to

doubt

the

wisdom

of

deferring

his

dynastic

interests to those

of

the church.

He realized

that

Joannitsa

might

be

pressured

to

make territorial

concessions

before

his

cor-

onation but

not after

it.

It

was

in

his

own

interest to

obtain

a

postponement

of

the

Bulgarian

coronation;

any

delay

would increase the

possibility

that

Innocent's

mind

might

be

changed

and

that

this coronation like the

proposed

coronation

of

Vukan

of Dioclea

might

be

quietly

forgotten.40

A remarkable

example

of

Innocent's

deference to

the

Hungarian monarchy

is

the case

of

Vukan

of

Dioclea.

This

incident is

frequently

mentioned

in

the

cor-

respondence

about

Bulgaria

and

is

important

for

our

understanding

of

the entire

controversy.

Sometime

probably

in

1201,

after formal consulation

with the

Col-

lege

of

Cardinals,

Innocent

offered

a

royal

crown

to

the

Grand

Zhupan

Stephen

37.

Most accounts

treat the

imprisonment

of

the

legate

as the

natural

outcome

of

Imre's

hostility

to

Joannitsa,

see

P.

T.

'Halusynskyj,

Acta Innocentii PP. III

(1198-1216)

(Vatican

City,

1944), "Introductio,"

p.

88;

Wolff, p.

197;

and

Tautu,

p.

369.

38.

Luchaire,

5:110.

39.

It would not

have

been unusual

at the

beginning

of the thirteenth

century

for

the

pope

to

have

instructed his

legate

verbally

to

deliver

an

oral

message

to

the

king.

For

general parallels

in

secular

practice

see Donald E.

Queller,

The

Office

of

Ambassador

in

the

Middle Ages

(Princeton, 1967),

pp.

7-8,

122;

and

Ganshof,

p.

131.

40. Such

precipitous

behavior

is

consistent

with

Imre's actions

in other

circumstances;note

for

example

his

physical

assault

upon Bishop

Boleslaus of

Vci in 1199 as de-

scribed in

Reg.

II, 96;

Potthast

no. 748.

Compare

the

king's

version

of this

event

in J.

L.

A.

Huillard-Br6holles,

Examen des chartes de

I'Eglise

romaine

contenues

dans

les rouleaux de

Cluny

(Paris,

1865),

75,

no.

xviii; Szentp6tery,

no.

187.

Imre's

clumsy,

last-minute

attempt

to

postpone

the

Bulgarian

coronation

appears

to be a

return to

the

delaying

tactics which had often

characterized

his

dealings

with the

papacy.

Beyond

the Serbian

coronation

mentioned

here,

see

also his initial

reluctance

to

proceed

against

the

Bosnian

heretics,

inferred

from

Beg.

III,

3;

Potthast

no.

1142;

and

Beg.

V,

110;

Potthast

no.

1768;

and also the effort

to defer'his

crusading

obligation

in

Reg.

V, 103;

Potthast

no.

3820

(where

the

year

is

incorrectly

given

as

1209).

326



9/16

of Rasca.41

John,

the

cardinal

bishop

of

Albano,

was

designated

to

perform

the

coronation.

King

Imre

protested,

however,

and

Innocent

thereupon

abandoned

these

plans.

At

Hungarian

urging

he offered the

Serbian

crown

instead

to

Vukan

of Dioclea and entrusted his coronation and the

reorganization

of the Serbian

church

to

the

Hungarian

archbishop

of

Kalocsa.

By

the

fall

of

1204

more

than

two

years

had

elapsed,

and

the

pope

knew of no

action

undertaken

by

the

Hun-

garians

to

implement

this

decision. This

policy

reversal,

Innocent

confessed,

was

accomplished

"with

no

little

embarrassment"

to himself.42

From

the

pope's

dis-

cussion of

the

Serbian

case it

is clear

that he had

painfully

learned

of

the

un-

reliability

of

the

Hungarian

king

and that

he

was

unwilling

to

allow

plans

for

the

Bulgarian

reunion

to

collapse

in

a

similar

way.

For

Imre

the Serbian

case

was

a

precedent

which

he

might

repeat

in

the case

of

Bulgaria.

His

protests

had

secured

papal

concessions

for

the

Hungarians

in

one

Balkan

kingdom;

similar

results

might

be

expected

in

the

Bulgarian

situation.

In

August

or

early

September

of

1204 Imre sent

an

embassy

to

Rome

headed

by

a

Hungarian

nobleman

to

whom

he

entrusted

a

long

letter of

protest

bitterly

challenging

the

pope's Bulgarian

policy.43

The

king

cited the

traditional

loyalty

of

his

dynasty

to the

Holy

See,

despite

which

the

papacy

had chosen

to honor

Joannitsa

of

Bulgaria.

Imre

maintained

that the

dowry

of

the

Byzantine

Em-

press Margaret,

his

sister,

had

been

occupied

and

held

by

Joannitsa

and

that

Joan-

nitsa had

invaded

Serbia,

a

land

subject

to

his

crown,

at a

time when

Hungarian

armies,

at

papal

request,

were

fighting

in

alliance

with

the

king

of

Bohemia

in

support

of Otto of Brunswick.44 He declared that

Joannitsa

had no

rightful

pos-

session

to

the

lands which he

occupied

since

part

of

these

lands

belonged

to

Hungary

and

the other

part

to the

Eastern

emperor.

Nonetheless

the

pontiff

proposed

to crown one

of his

declared enemies

without

consulting

him. He called

upon

the

pope

to abandon

the

Bulgarian

coronation

entirely,

or

at least

to

suspend

the

project

until his

differences

with

Joannitsa

were

resolved.

If

the

pope agreed

to

this,

Imre

would submit

to

papal judgment

or to

the

arbitration of a

papal

legate.

The

king

reminded the

pontiff

that

despite papal guarantees

to

him,

the

participants

in the Fourth

Crusade

had seized Zara. Two

years

had

elapsed,

and

he

had

not

yet

received

justice through

the

agency

of

the

Roman

church.

He

feared that

in

a similar

way

the

church would

fail

to exhibit

justice

in

the

Bul-

garian dispute

if

Joannitsa

were crowned.

II

The

king's

imprisonment

of

the

legate

and

his

explicit

challenge

to

papal

41.

Beg.

VII, 127;

DujEev,

p.

59,

no.

28. See

M.

L.

Burian,

"Die

Kronung

des

Stephan

Prvovencani

und

die

Beziehungen

Serbiens

zum romischen

Stuhl,"

Archiv

flr

Kul-

turgeschichte

23

(1933),

pp.

148-150;

and S.

Hafner,

"Das mittelalterliche Serbien

zwischen

Rom

und

Byzanz,"

Veriffentlichungen

des

Verbond

isterreichischer

Ge-

schichtsvereine

18

(1970),

pp.

203-204.

42.

Beg.

VII, 127;

DujEev, p.

59,

no.

28.

".

.

.intellecto

tandem, quod

hoc

tue sublimitati

plurimum displiceret, ob tui gratiam non sine quadam nostri confusione destitimus

ab

incoepto."

43. This

missing royal

letter

is mentioned

as

having

been

brought

to

Rome

"per

dilectum

filium nobilem

virum

G. militem,"

ibid.

See

Szentp6tery,

no.

212. We

have

here

reconstructed

the

king's

letter

from

the

pope's

itemized

reply.

Luchaire

adapts

it in

the

form

of a

dialouge

between

king

and

pope

in

Innocent

III,

5:112-116.

It

is this letter

that the

author

of

the

Gesta

Innocentii

termed "litterae

excusatoriae,"

P.

L.

214,

col.

cxxix, cap.

lxxix.

44.

In

the

campaign

against

Otto

IV,

Imre's

cooperation

with his

brother-in-law Ottokar

of Bohemia

is

corroborated

by

Arnold

of

Liibeck,

Chronica,

M.

G.

H.,

SS.,

21,

p.

216.

See also

Gesta

Episcoporum

Halberstadensium,

M.

G.

H.,

8S.,

23,

p.

117.

INNOCENT II

327



10/16

CHURCH

HISTORY

policy

aroused

in

Innocent a

vigorous

response.

The

pope's

threefold

task

was

to

obtain Cardinal Leo's

release,

to

demonstrate

good

faith

by working

toward

a

solution of the

territorial

dispute

and

generally

to

defend

his Balkan

policy

in

a

way reassuring to the Hungarian king.

After

learning

of

the cardinal's

imprisonment,

Innocent

wrote

directly

to

Imre

to

warn

him

to

make

amends

for

his

injury

to

the

church.45

Innocent's

tone

was

moderate;

his

purpose

was

to

persuade

the

king

to

release

the

cardinal

rather

than

to

condemn

the monarch. He

hailed

the

king

as a

Christian

prince

in

whom

the

papacy

took

special joy

because of

his

loyalty

to

God

and

the

pope.

He

urged

him

to merit

this

special

apostolic

favor

and

grace

by

his words

and

by

his

example (non

solum

indicia

sed

exempla).

Innocent

recalled

Imre's

promise

at

the

time

of

John

the

Chaplain's

mission to

grant

safe

conduct

to

all

envoys

going

and

returning

to

Bulgaria.

After

describing

what

he

had

learned

from

Cardinal

Leo

concerning

his

imprisonment,

the

pope

exhorted

the

king

to

repair

the

damage

done

to

the cardinal

and

through

the

cardinal

to

the

pope

and

to

Jesus

Christ

himself.46

He

singled

out those

royal

counsellors

who had

attempted

to

mislead

the

king:

Oh

alas

dearest

son,

where

is

your

royal

clemency?

Where

is

the

Christian

religion?

Where is that

special

devotion

which

you

are

proclaimed

to

have

for

us and for

the

Roman

Church? Altered

is that

outstanding

brilliance,

and

gold

is

changed

into dross.

So

may

God

spare

those

who

have

seduced

your

soul

through

wicked

counsel

and

who

wish to sow

discord

between

the

regnum

and the

sacerdotium. ...4T

In a confidential postscript he remarked that his letter was written in a milder

and

kindlier

tone than the situation

warranted,

so

that

if

anyone

else

chanced

to

see

it,

he

would

not conclude

that Imre

had

lost

favor with

the

Holy

See.48

When Imre's

embassy

bearing

his

letter

of

protest

arrived

in

Rome,

Innocent

was

compelled

to

respond

more

forcefully.

He wrote to

the

king

again.

A

copy

of this

letter was

enclosed

in

a

message

to Cardinal

Leo,

which

has

been

recorded

in

the

papal register

for

September

15,

1204.49

Although

it was

more

sharply

worded

than the

pontiff's

earlier

letter

it

was

still

conciliatory.

Imre's

violation

of

his

safe-conduct

guarantee

and

the

imprisonment

of

the

legate

to

whom

he

had

given

the

kiss of

peace

constituted

a

serious

affront

to

diplomatic

convention

and

to

papal

authority.

It is

surprising,

therefore,

that

nowhere

in

this

correspondence

is there

any papal

reference

to

the

immunities

of

a

diplomatic

representative.

No

mention

is

made of a violation

of

the

ius

gentium

or of the

relevant

canons

in

Gratian's

Decretumn.5

Rather

Innocent

quoted

a

line

from the fifth book

of

Ovid's

Tristia,

"It is

more

humiliating

for a

guest

to be

expelled

than not

to be

received."'1

The

pope

added

that

it

would

have

been less

indecent

had

the

king

forbidden

the

legate

to

depart

at

the

outset

rather

than

to

have

impeded

his

jour-

ney

once

he had

begun.

But

Innocent

significantly

refrained

from

threatening

45.

Reg.

VII,

126;

Duj?ev,

p.

57,

no. 27.

Tautu

published

a modern

French translation

with notes in "Le Oonflit entre Johanitsa Asen et Emeric," pp.

375-378.

46. Innocent's

statement

reflects

the

accepted

canonical

view of

the

status

of

legates.

See

Gratian's

Decretum,

D.

21,

c.

2.

47.

Beg.

VII,

126;

Dujcev,

p.

57,

no.

27.

48.

Ibid. Luchaire observed

that

his

postscript

appeared

in

a

form

separate

from

the cen-

tral

text

and

possesses

a

confidential

quality,

5:111.

49.

Beg.

VII,

127;

DujEev, p.

59,

no.

28.

The text

of the

letter to

Imre

has no date.

Tautu's

translation of

this

letter

inexplicably

omits

three-quarters

of

a

column

of

Migne's

text,

pp.

369-375.

50.

Compare

Queller,

pp.

175-176;

and

Ganshof,

p.

299.

51.

Tristia,

V,

vi,

13.

328



11/16

the

king

with

spiritual

penalties.

He dismissed

the

king's

reasons

for

imprison-

ing

the

legate

with a

quotation

from

the book of

Proverbs,

"Surely

in

vain

the

net is

spread

in

the

sight

of

any

bird."52

The

pope rejected

Imre's

proposal

for

abandoning

or

postponing

the

Bul-

garian

coronation on the

grounds

that the

legate

was

not

qualified

to act

as a

common

mediator or

as

an

impartial

judge.58

He

noted that

Cardinal

Leo

had

spent

a

long

time in

Hungary

and had been

magnificently

honored.

Omitting

the

legate's

objection

that

to follow the

king's

plan

would constitute

the

appearance

of

simony,

the

pope

explained

in

more

worldly

terms

that

suspicions

would

be

aroused

in

Bulgaria,

and

the

legate

might

not

be

received there

with

the

same

kind

of welcome.

Further,

Joannitsa

could neither

be

coerced

into

making

peace

nor

exhibiting justice

until

he

had

accepted

the

"yoke

of

apostolic

discipline"

and

subjected himself to papal teaching and obedience.54 The central purpose of the

cardinal's

mission,

according

to

Innocent,

was the

propagation

of

the sacraments

of

the

Christian

faith and

the enhancement

of the

respect

to the

apostolic

see. To

prevent

the

fulfillment

of

this

mission was to risk

divine

wrath,

offend the

Holy

See and

rekindle

Joannitsa's

enmity.

Imre

would

not

profit

from

impeding

the

legate,

the

pope argued,

because

"we

are

able

to

implement

the

object

of our will

by

other

means."

"Take

heed

wisely",

he

continued,

"what

you

would

then think

if

we

should wish

to

prevent

your earthly

son

from

being

crowned

king,

and

know

that we would

think

the

same

if

you

would

try

to

prevent

our

spiritual

son

from

being

crowned."55

This

thinly

disguised

threat

to

delay

the coronation of Imre's

young

son Laszlo

was the most serious

papal

countermove.

Innocent

was

aware of

the

importance

Imre

attached

to

the

coronation of

Laszl6.

The

preceding

April,

in

response

to

a

royal

request,

the

pope

had ordered the

archbishop

of

Esztergom,

the

primate

of

Hungary,

to

perform

Prince

Laszl6's

coronation

because

Imre

planned

to

join

the Fourth Crusade.58 The

anonymous

author

of the

Gesta

Innocentii,

writing

during

the

pope's

lifetime,

singled

out this

passage

as the

principal

reason for

the

cardinal's

release:

The king [Imre] was greatly frightened because, since he had caused a solemn

court

to be

assembled

for

the

purpose

of

crowning

his little son

king,

he

strongly

feared

the

lord

pope

would

prevent

his

coronation. Thus

when

the

lord

cardinal

sent

messengers

to his

court,

they

finally

obtained

from the

king

a

permit

to

travel.

The

legate

therefore

proceeded,

and he

accomplished

everything just

as it had been

planned....67

According

to this

interpretation,

papal diplomacy

and

the

threat of

papal

retalia-

tion

triumphed

over

the

waywardness

of a secular monarch. Numerous

modern

52. Proverbs

1:17-19.

Innocent

quoted

the same text in a letter

reproving

John of

En-

gland

for

his

opposition

to the

election

of

Stephen Langton;

C.

R.

Cheney

and

W. H.

Semple,

Selected

Letters

of

Pope

Innocent

III

Concerning

England

(London,

1953),

p. 86, no. 29; Potthast no. 3111.

53.

Reg.

VII,

127;

Duj&ev,

p.

59,

no.

28.

".

.

.

non

posset

esse mediator

communis

ad

concordiam

reformandam,

aut index

equalis

ad

controversiam

dirimendam.

.

..

54.

Ibid.

"Preterea non

posset

illum

compellere

ad

faciendam

concordiam

vel

iustitiam

exhibendam,

antequam

iugum susciperet

apostolice

discipline

nostroque

se subiceret

magisterio

et

precepto."

55.

Ibid.

"Attende

nichilominus

diligenter,

quale

denique

reputares,

si

nos

impedire

vellemus,

ne filius

tuus carnalis

coronari

posset

in

regem,

et tale

nos

reputare

cognosce,

si tu

impedire

coneris,

ne

filius

noster

spiritualis

in

regem

valeat coronari

...."

56.

Seg.

VII, 57;

Potthast

no.

2196.

57.

Gesta

Innooentii,

P.

L.,

214,

coll.

cxix-cxxx,

cap.

lxxx.

INNOCENT

III

329



12/16

CHURCH HISTORY

authorities, too,

have

ascribed the cardinal's release to

this

papal

pressure.58

They

are

mistaken. All

of

Innocent's efforts as we

know them

from

the

register

were without

effect.

Papal

diplomacy

did

not

procure

the cardinal's

freedom.

He

was released by Imre before the pope's letters arrived in Hungary, for reasons

which are

not

explained.

This

information is

contained

in

a letter

of

congratula-

tion

sent

by

Innocent

to

Imre

on October

4,

1204: "We now

see

and

rejoice

thoroughly

that

without

having

received

our letters

or even

awaiting your

mes-

sengers,

you

corrected

by yourself

what

might

have

appeared

as

an

attempt

to

injure

the

apostolic

see."59

Even

had

the

legate

not

been

released,

Innocent's threat

to

impede

LAszlo's

coronation

would not have achieved the desired

effect.

LAszlo

was crowned

on

August

26,

1204,

nearly

three

weeks before

Innocent,

who

obviously

was

ignorant

of the event, threatened to prevent it.60 Only in a manner unforeseen in Rome

might

this

threat

have

caused distress at

the

Hungarian

court.

The

coronation

had been

performed

by

the

archbishop

of

Kalocsa,

a candidate

for

the

vacant

see

of

Esztergom,

in

technical

violation

of

the

rights

of

the

primatial

see.61 On

these

grounds

the

papacy

might

have

challenged

the

coronation as

defective. But

there

is

no

evidence

to show

that the

papacy

ever took such action.

Once

freed,

Cardinal Leo

crossed the Danube into

Bulgaria

where on

Oc-

tober

15

he

was

received

with

great

ceremony

at

Trnovo.

On

November

8,

1204,

the cardinal crowned

Joannitsa king

of the

Bulgars

and Vlachs.62

III

The

territory disputed

between Imre and

Joannitsa

consisted

of

three

areas:

Serbia,

the

Empress

Margaret's dowry

and

the

five dioceses

pertaining

to

Joan-

nitsa's realm.

Serbia in

this

context refers

to the

grand

zhupanate

of

Rasca,

which

had

been

contested

by

Vukan,

Stephen Nemanja's

eldest

son,

the

ruler of

the coastal

province

of

Dioclea,

and his

brother

Stephen,

who

ruled

at Ras

until

1202. In

that

year

Vukan with

Hungarian

help

dispossessed

Stephen,

but a

year

later

Stephen

with

Bulgarian

aid retook

Rasca.

The location

of the

other

disputed regions

has

been

a

matter of

scholarly

debate.63 The most persuasive modern treatment has located the dowry of Imre's

sister

Margaret

in

the

districts

around

Belgrade

and

Branicevo

on

the

right

bank

of the

Danube,

Nis in

the Morava

river

valley,

and

around the

important

Balkan

town of Sardica

(Sofia).64

This

region

had been

conquered

by

Imre's

father,

Bela

III,

in 1182-1183

and

was

restored

to the

Byzantine

Empire

at the

time of

Margaret's

marriage

to

Isaac

II

Angelus

in 1185.

This

marriage

and

King

Bela's

earlier

ties to

Byzantium

committed the

Hungarian kingdom

to

a

generally

pro-

58.

I. A.

Fessler,

Geschichte

von

tUngarn

(Leipzig,

1867),

1:304:

B.

H6man,

Geschichte

des

ungarischen

Mittelalters

(Berlin,

1940-1943), 2:8;

Halus?ynskyj,

pp.

88-89;

and

Tautu,

p.

374,

n. 24.

59.

Reg. VII, 137; DujSev, p. 64,

no.

29.

60.

Chronici

Hungarici

compositio

saecuh

XIV,

in

I.

Szentpetery,

ed.,

Scriptures

rerum

Hungaricarum

(Budapest,

1937-1938),

1:463.

61.

Reg.

VII, 159;

Potthast

no. 2328.

62.

Reg.

VII, 231; Duj6ev,

p.

66,

no.

31. See

Wolff, pp.

197-198.

63.

See

Tautu,

p.

381,

for

a review

of

the

literature. See

also his

"Margherita

di

Ungheria

Imperatrice

di

Bisanzio,"

Antemurale 3

(1956),

pp.

51-79.

sicle),"

in

his

Studia

Byzantina

(Amsterdam, 1967), pp.

309,

312.

Moravesik

re-

64.

Gyula Moravesik,

"Pour

une

alliance

byzantino-hongroise

(seconde

moiti6

du

XIIe

si6cle),"

in

his Studia

Byzantina

(Amsterdam, 1967),

pp.

309,

312.

Moravcsik re-

stated his conclusions

in

Byzantium

and

the

Magyars

(Amsterdam,

1970),

pp.

92-94.

330



13/16

INNOCENT

III

Byzantine

policy

particularly

directed

against

the

Bulgar

and

Vlach

princes

who

established

the

Second

Bulgarian Empire.65

A recent discussion has shown that the five dioceses and the empress' dowry

are to

be

found

in

roughly

the

same

region.66

The

fragmentary

nature

of the

evidence does

not

permit

the

identification

of

these sees to

be made

with

cer-

tainty.

Listed

among

the

active

bishops

of the

Bulgarian

church

in 1203

were

Blasius of

Branicevo

and

Kirikus

of

Nis,

both of whose

sees

fell within the

lands

of

Margaret's

dowry.67

No

mention is

made

in

the records

of

bishops

for

Bel-

grade

and

Sofia.

These sees

may

have

been

vacant,

and thus

Joannitsa's

claim

that

they

had

been

annihilated

may

not be without

foundation.

The fifth

diocese

-one that

lay

beyond

Margaret's dowry-may

have

been

Vidin,

which

possibly

suffered

from

Hungarian

military

activity

in

1195.

Vidin

was

an

active

see

whose

incumbent in 1203 was named Clement.68

Beyond

the

conflict

over

Serbia,

the substance

of the

territorial

dispute

was

Imre's

claim that

Joannitsa

had

wrongly occupied

lands from

Belgrade

to Sofia

which once constituted

Margaret's

dowry. Joannitsa

maintained

that the

Hun-

garians

had invaded and held

the

same

area,

including

Vidin,

where

they

had

done

grave

harm

to the churches.

Each

argument

was

calculated to elicit

papal

sympathy

and each was

considerably

exaggerated.69

The

pope's

refusal

to

entertain

Imre's

plan

for a conference

on the

Danube

to

precede

the

Bulgarian

coronation

did

not

constitute

an

abandonment

of his

in-

tention

to

adjudicate

the

dispute.

On

the

contrary,

Innocent

appears

to

have

yielded

in

part

to

Hungarian

pressure.

The

pope

forbade Cardinal

Leo to

crown

Joannitsa

king

of

any

land

but

his

own,

a statement which

suggests

that

In-

nocent

had

given

weight

to

the

complaint

regarding

the

occupation

of

Margaret's

dowry.

Innocent

promised

to

secure

satisfaction

for

the

Bulgarian

invasion

of

Serbia

and

restoration

of other

Hungarian

lands

unjustly

held

by

Joannitsa.

He

also

commanded

the

legate,

once

he had learned the

full truth

concerning

the

con-

troversy,

to

bring

about

an end to the discord

between

the two

kings,

showing

justice

to both

sides.

The

legate

was

to

enforce

his decision

with the threat

of

65.

C.

M.

Brand,

Byzantium

Confronts

the West,

1180-1204

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

1968),

pp.

80,

88-89,

96.

66.

Tautu,

"Le Conflit

entre Johanitsa

Asen

et

Emeric,"

p.

391. His

argument

that

the

contested

area

lay

in

large

part

north

of

the Danube

is

not

persuasive.

67.

Beg.

VII,

5a; DujEev, p.

46,

no.

17;

and

HaluScynskyj,

pp.

90-91.

68.

Reg.

VII,

5a;

Dujcev, p.

46,

no. 17.

For the

Byzantine-Hungarian

plan

for an

attack

on

Vidin

see

Brand,

p.

96.

69.

King

Imre's

claim to

the

lands of

Margaret's

dowry

was not

strong.

These lands

were

acquired

through

conquest

and

had

not been

regarded

as

integral

parts

of the

Hungar-

ian

kingdom.

After

Isaac

II's

death

early

in

1204,

the best claimant

to the

dowry

would

have

been

Margaret's

son,

Prince

Kalojan.

Of

course

Imre

may

have

been

acting

in

his

nephew's

behalf.

Bulgarian

occupation

of

this

region

took

place

during

the

last

decade of the twelfth century. Joannitsa's countercharge that the Hungarian king

1180s and

1190s,

despite

the

doubtful

allegation

that Imre

still retained

them.

An

obscure reference

in

Innocent's

letter to

Imre of

November

9,

1202

reprimands

the

king

for

having

borne

arms

against

Christians

after

he had

become a

Crusader

(that

is,

after

1200);

Reg.

V,

103;

Potthast

no.

3820.

This

may

well refer to

the

Serbian

campaign

of

1202,

but Fessler

asserts

that Imre also

invaded

Bulgaria

at this

time

and

conquered

an

unspecified region

containing

the five

dioceses

in

Geschichte

von

Ungarn

1:297.

It is

conceivabIe

that

the

Hungarians

may

have

inflicted

injury upon

Joannitsa's

lands as late as

1202,

although

it remains

doubtful

whether

Imre would

have led

two

sep-

arate

campaigns,

one into Serbia on

Vukan's

behalf and

the

other

against

Joannitsa

di-

rectly.

331



14/16

CHURCH

HISTORY

ecclesiastical

censures.70

Thus Innocent in

part

negated

his earlier

argument

about

the cardinal's

unsuitability

as

a

common

mediator. He could

make

this conces-

sion

to

the

Hungarians

without

capitulating

on his

major

goal

of

binding

Joannitsa

to the Holy See.

Whether Cardinal

Leo was able

to

find

an

equitable

solution

is

open

to

doubt.

In

mid-November

1204

in

a letter

to

Innocent,

Joannitsa

disclaimed

all contact

with

the

Hungarians

and

denied

that he had

injured

the

Hungarian

king.71

He

declared

that

it was

Imre

who had

disparaged

and harmed

his

empire.

Cardinal

Leo,

so

Joannitsa

said,

had seen

and would

report

to the

pontiff

the

justice

or

injustice

of his case.

He

asked

the

pope

to

write

to the

Hungarian

king warning

him

to

keep

away

from

his

empire,

for

if Imre

attacked

and was

defeated,

the

pope

would

then know that

Joannitsa

was

free from blame.

The

tone

of

the

message

suggests that Joannitsa was ill disposed to accept a settlement. The entire ques-

tion

appears

to have

been

referred once more to

Rome.

Perhaps

the cardinal

had

not received

his

instructions or

failed

to

carry

them

out.

Perhaps

he was

pre-

vented

from

doing

so

by

Joannitsa.

We cannot

say.

By

the

spring

of 1205

the

prospect

for

a

settlement

had decreased

even

more.

King

Imre

had died

at

the

end of November

1204,

and

the domestic

troubles

which

followed his

death

temporarily

forced

the

Hungarian

government

to focus

exclusively

upon

internal

problems.72

Joannitsa,

at

about

the

same

time,

became

embroiled

in

a

bitter feud with the

Latin

Empire

at

Constantinople,

dur-

ing

which

he

captured

the

emperor

Baldwin

of

Flanders.73

In the

last

of

Inno-

cent's

letters

that

mention

the

friction between

the

two

kingdoms,

the

pope urged

Joannitsa

to strive

for

peace

both

with the

Latins and the

Hungarians.

The

pontiff

warned

that an

army

of

westerners,

which

in

fact

did

not

exist,

was

ready

to

set

out for

Greece,

and he

allowed the

king

to

draw his own conclusions.74

By

this time Innocent's

attitude toward

Joannitsa

had shifted

perceptibly,

and

his

urging

of

peace

with

Hungary

may

have

been

little more than

pro

forma. No

more

is

heard

of

efforts

to

mediate this

dispute

during

Innocent's

reign.

A

set-

tlement

had not been worked out

either

before

or after the

Bulgarian

coronation.

On

this issue

papal

diplomacy

failed. Warfare

along

the

frontier between

Hungary and Bulgaria persisted throughout the first half of the thirteenth century.75

IV

The

present

case

illuminates

the

difficulty

Innocent faced

when

separate

central

elements

of

papal

policy

collided.

Papal

relations with

the

Arpad

mon-

archy

were founded

upon

a tradition

dating

from

the time of Saint

Stephen

of

70.

Beg.

VII,

127;

DujEev,

p.

59,

no. 28.

".

.

.

ad

termninandam

iscordiam,

que

vertitur

inter

ipsum

et

prefatum

regem

Ungarie,

cognita plenius

veritate,

iustitia

mediante,

procedas,

faciens

quod

decreveris

per

eensuram

ecclesiasticam, appellatione

postposita,

firmiter

observari."

71.

Reg.

VII,

230;

DujEev, p.

65,

no.

30.

72. The correct date of Imre's death (November 30, 1204) is given in Chronicon Zagre-

biense

cum

textu

chronici Varadiensis

oollatum

in

SzentpAtery,

Scriptores

rerum

Hun-

garicarum,

1:211.

For

Innocent's

intervention

in

the

ensuing

domestic conflict

see

Beg.

VIII,

36-42;

Potthast

no.

2473-2479.

73.

Beg.

VII,

230;

Dujcev,

p.

65,

no.

30.

Beg.

VIII,

131;

DujEev,

p.

70,

no. 34.

Beg.

VIII,

132;

DujEev,

p.

73,

no.

35.

Beg.

IX,

198;

DujEev,

p.

74,

no.

36.

See

Slatarski,

pp.

107-113.

74.

Beg. VIII,

129-

DujEov,

p.

69,

no. 33. See

R. L.

Wolff,

"The

Latin

Empire

of

Con-

stantinople,

12d4-1261,"

in

K. Setton

et

al.,

A

History

of

the

Crusades

(Madison,

Wise.,

1969),

2:202-203.

75.

H6man

2:12,

34,

111-112;

and

Slatarski,

pp.

114,

124.

332



15/16

the

reciprocal xchange

of

royal

devotion and

papal

affection.

Earlier

popes,

In-

nocent

noted

in

his

letter

of

September

15,

1204,

had

repeatedly

avored

Hun-

garian

kings

with

"a certain

special grace."76

Most

recently

he

had

demonstrated

the continuingnatureof this relationshipby energeticallyntervening n the civil

war

between Imre and his

brother

Andrew and

by

sending

a

papal legate

specifically

o work

out

the

terms for

peace

between

them.

Imre for

his

part

had

aided

militarily

the

cause of

Otto of

Brunswick

and

was still

bound

by

oath

to

lead

a

crusadefor

the

relief

of the

Holy

Land.

Although

the

capture

of

Zara

by

the

Venetians

and the soldiersof the Fourth Crusade

nded

any

real

hope

of Imre's

participation

n the

crusade,

the

pope appears

to have

believed

that the

Hun-

garian

king might

still

be

persuaded

o fulfill his

pledge.77

In

addition to

these

larger

considerations,

he

pontiff

had

a

personalregard

for

Imre. In

spite

of

his

violation of

the

peace agreement

with Andrew

and

his

imprisonment

f Cardinal

Leo,

the

Hungarianking

remained

he

beneficiary

f

papal

favor.

In

a

strikingly

candid declaration

f the

priorities

of

his affection

Innocent

assured

Imre,

"How-

ever

muchwe

may

esteem

he

often-mentioned

oannitsa,

nonetheless

we

esteem

you

incomparably

he

more."78

But

by

1204

Innocent was

prepared

o

pursue

an

in-

dependent

Balkan

policy

no

longer

linked with the territorial

aspirations

of

the

Hungarian

monarchy.

After five

years

of

negotiation

he was

assured

of the

reconciliation

and reunion of

the

Bulgarian

church

with Rome.

Through

the

mission of Cardinal

Leo

the

ideal

of

the

unity

of Christendom

appeared

sub-

stantially

closer to realization. The strain

in

papal

relations

with

Hungary,

par-

ticularly f it were temporary,79 ould be more than offset by this advancement

of one

of

the

pontiff's

paramount

aims.

Moreover,

through

the coronation

of

Joannitsa

Bulgaria

became a new

papal

ally

whose influence

in

eastern

Europe

promised

o be of considerable

alue.80

This

episode

demonstrates

he

limitations

as well as

the

strengths

of

papal

diplomacy.

The

pontiff's

efforts to

free Cardinal

Leo exhibit

considerable

diplo-

matic

finesse.

Where

we

might

expect

stern

reproval

and

the

invocationof ec-

clesiastical

penalties

against

the

Hungarian king,

we

find

restraint.

The

only

serious

political

threat

was that

made

concerning

he

coronationof

young

Laszl6,

who in fact had alreadybeen crowned. Yet the legate was freed without refer-

ence

to the

pope's

efforts,

and

papal

diplomacy

an

take no

credit for

his

release.

76.

Beg.

VII, 127;

DujEev,

p.

59,

no.

28.

Innocent's

correspondence

contains several

ref-

erences

to an

exchange

of

royal

devotio

and

papal

delectio.

See

for

example

Beg.

I,

271.

(H.

and

H.,

Begister,

1/1271):

Potthast

no. 285.

77.

At

the

end

of

February

1203,

somewhat

more

than three

months after the fall

of Zara

and while

the Venetians

and the

Crusaders

still

occupied

the

city,

Innocent

informed

Imre

that

his

vow

could

not

be

postponed;

Beg.

VI, 8;

Potthast

no. 1845.

78.

Beg.

VII,

127; DujEev,

p.

59,

no.

28.

". .

.

quantumeunque

sepedictum

Joannitium

diligamus,

te tamen

diligimus incomparabiliter

magis.

..."

79.

How

long

the

bad

feeling

between

the

Hungarian

court and

the

Holy

See

would

have

persisted

is

problematic.

The

long-range

effect

of

the

papal

shift

in Balkan

policy was negated by Imre's untimely death and by the virtual collapse of papal-Bul-

garian

amity.

80.

In

defending

his

authorization

of the

Bulgarian

coronation Innocent

adopted

the

historiographical

perspective

of the

Bulgarian

court.

He stated that ancient

Bulgarian

kings

had

been

crowned

by

papal

authority,

but that later

the

Bulgarians

had

lost

the

royal

dignity.

The

princes

Peter and

Joannitsa,

self-proclaimed

descendants

of

ear-

lier

kings,

attempted

in

the

rebellion

against

the

emperors

of

Oonstantinople

merely

to

recover

their

patrimony.

The

coronation of

Joannitsa

was

valid, therefore, only

for

the

recovered

lands

which

he

held

de

jure:

"Unde

nos

eum non

super

alienam

terrain,

sed

super

propriam

ad

instar

predecessorum

nostrorum

regem

interldinmus

oronare

.. .'

Beg.

VII,

127; DujEev, p.

59,

no.

28.

333

NNOCENT

III



16/16

The

pope's

ignorance

at

the time

he drafted

his

letters to

Imre of

both

LAszlo's

coronationand

the

legate's

release underscores

he

slowness

of

communication

n

the

diplomaticpractice

of

the

period.81Popes

and

princes

often made

decisions

on the basis of partialor faulty information.82The ability of a pope or papal

representative

o serve as

a mediator

also

depended

upon

the

desire of all

parties

to

the

negotiations

o

reach a

compromise.

Here

because of

their

mutual dis-

trust

Joannitsa

and

Imre

appear

to

have

had

little enthusiasm

or

an

equitable

settlement.

Beyond

the

good

offices of the

pope, papal diplomacy

placed

primary

reliance

upon

a

system

of

spiritual

rewardsand

punishments

which,

as

in

the

case of

Zara,

often failed

to

produce

he

desired result.83

Although papal diplomacy

had

succeeded

in

averting

a

Hungarian

attack

upon

Bulgaria,

n

reconciling

he

Bulgarian

churchwith Rome and

in

forging

an

alliancewith Joannitsa,none of these accomplishments rovedto be lasting. The

underlying

cause

of

Hungarian

hostility

toward

Bulgaria

remained.

Despite

the

pope's

recognition

of his

obligation

o

restore

peace

among

Christian

princes

and

his

specific

commitment

o

adjudicate

his

territorial

dispute,

he

appears

neither

to have

drafted

nor

proposed

a settlement.

Although

the

argument

had

been

made

that

the

papacy

would

be better able

to

work

toward

peace

in

the

Balkans

after

Joannitsa

had been

crowned,

there is

no

evidence

to

show

serious

papal

in-

terest

in this conflict once the

coronationhad

taken

place.

King

Imre's

fears

would

seem

to

have been

justified.

When

in

1205

Innocentchose to

coerce

Joan-

nitsa

to

make

peace,

he

was

chiefly

motivated

by

the

danger

the

Bulgarians

posed

to the Latinsat

Constantinople.

And even then he did not resortto ecclesiastical

sanctions

of

the

type

used

against

Venice,

but

to

the

physical

threat of

a

non-

existent

army.

Modem

historians

commonly

cite

the

beginning

of

the

thirteenth

century

as

the

"apogee"

or "zenith"

of the medieval

papacy

and

point

to

Innocent III

as

one

of

its

most talented

and successful statesmen.

This

estimate

rests

upon

the

impressive

range

of his activitiesand the

legal

and

intellectual

brilliance

of

his

correspondence.

nnocent'seffectiveness

as a

diplomat,

however,

ought

also to

be

judged

by

the

degree

to whichhe was able

to

shape

or

modify

the

outcomeof

the

disputes

in which he intervened. Employingthis standard n the present case,

we

are

led

to the conclusion

hat Innocent's

diplomatic

reputation

s in

need

of

more

moderate

appraisal.

81.

Ganshof,

p.

135 et

passim.

82.

For

an

instance

where

Innocent

acted

on

the

basis

of

information

deliberately

mis-

represented

to

him

by

one of the

parties

to

a

dispute,

see John

0.

Moore,

"Count

Baldwin

IX

of

Flanders,

Philip

Augustus,

and the

Papal

Power,"

Speculum

37

(1962), pp.

79-89.

83.

In

Hungary

the

Zara

incident still

rankled,

as

Imre's

complaint

testified.

Innocent

in

Beg. VII,

127,

defended

his

handling

of the affair

by

observing

that both

the Vene-

tians

and

the

Crusaders

had been

anathematized

for

taking

the

city,

although

he

seems to gloss

over

the

subsequent

absolution

of the

Crusaders. He had also refused

to

consecrate

the

Venetian

patriarch-elect

of Grado. He

directed

that a

new

archi-

episcopal

election

for

Zara

take

place

under

Hungarian

auspices

and

that this

Documents

Sweeney, James Ross. Innocent III, Hungary and the Bulgarian Coronation - A Study in Medieval Papal Diplomacy