Mediation in the Arab-Palestinian Conflict:

What Role Can the EU play?Dr. Martin Beck

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Amman, Jordan

Content

• 1.Theory:• 1.1 Basic Assumptions • 1.2 Structure of the Isr.-Pal. Conflict• 1.3 EU Mediation: Leverage Points?• 1.4 EU Mediation: Success Conditions• 2. Empirical-Historical Analysis: • 2.1 Before 1967: No chance, no will• 2.2 1970/80s: Declaratory policy of a „Civilian Power“• 2.3 1990s: Limited success• 2.4 Since 2000: Even more limited success

1. Basic Assumptions

• No „veil of uncertainty“ (Oran Young) anymore in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

• No „zones of agreement“ etc. to be discovered anymore in the Israeli-Palestinian case

• No succesful mediation without power capabilities (in the Israeli-Palestinian case):

• Thus, finding leverage points is crucial. To find them, we first need to identify the structure of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

1.1 Until 1967: Deadlock Situation

Arabs

Israel

C D

C

Bi-National State, Partition of Israel

2:2

Arab Rule over Israel

1:4

D

Arab Recognition of Israel

4:1

Israeli Rule over Israel Non-Recognized by the Arabs

3:3

M, N, P

1.2 Since 1967: Dilemma Situation

PLO

Israel

C D

C

Limited Palestinian Sovereignty over EJ, W, G

3:3

P

Unconditional Israeli Withdrawal from EJ, W, G

1:4

P

D

Palestinian Waiver of Sovereignty

4:1

P

Prolonged Occupation

2:2

M, N

1.2 Leverage Points for EU Mediation

• Palestine - 1967-1993: limited (diplomatic recognition)- after 1993: strong (conditioning political rents)

• Israel- Since 1967: very limited (partly due to US support of Israel)

1.3 Success Conditions for EU Mediation

• Palestine:- 1967-1993: Low- Since 1993: High (PLO: Rents!)

• Israel- Since 1967: Very low (certain degree of sensitivity but very low degree of vulnerability)

• Overall (in terms of the conflict as a whole)- 1967-1993: Low- Since 1993: Significant only if US puts pressure on Israel

2.1 Before 1967: No Chance, no Will

• Deadlock Situation: No scope for mediation

• European actors were rather escalating than moderating the conflict:

- Suez War 1956

- 1960s: strong French military support towards Israel

2.2 1970/80s: Declaratory Policy of a „Civilian Power“

• Declaration of Venice:- the Palestinian issue more than a „refugee problem“- PLO „will have to be associated with the negotiations“- „the Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position (…) to exercise fully its right to self-dermination.“

2.2 1970/80s: Declaratory Policy of a „Civilian Power“

• The declaratory approach has often been critisized as weak

• However, taken context conditions for granted, not much more could have been achieved.

• Succesful insofar as the European position—the recognition of the Palestinians as a people and the PLO as its legitimate representative—shaped world politics.

2.3 1990s: Policy of Conditionality with Limited Impact

• Impact: Western including European rent donations were the most important single factor causing the Oslo agreements

• However, two major problems of Oslo:

- Asymmetry in benefits for Israel and the PLO

- Exclusion of the societal level

2.3 Since 2000: Policy of Con- ditionality with Even Less Impact

• Limited Impact: PLO/Fatah (but Hamas!)

• Administration rather than regulation of the conflict

• Direct Negotiations will come in 2010 (most probably still in August)

• Yet, chances of a durable conflict regulation are very low.

3. Conclusion

• General conditions for EU mediation are rather difficult:

- Complicated (Graduated) Dilemma Situation

- No leverage point in the case of Israel

- No leverage point in the case of Hamas• Therefore, EU success in mediation has been

limited.• Yet, sometimes its impact is better than its

reputation (declaratory policy of the 1970/80s)