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Measuring the Outcomes of Anticommons in Land Development Tzuchin Lin, Fanghsin Huang Department of Land Economics National Chengchi University Taipei, TAIWAN European Real Estate Society 21 st Annual Conference Bucharest, Romania 25-28 June 2014

Measuring the Outcomes of Anticommons in Land Development

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European Real Estate Society 21 st Annual Conference Bucharest, Romania 25-28 June 2014. Measuring the Outcomes of Anticommons in Land Development. Tzuchin Lin, Fanghsin Huang Department of Land Economics National Chengchi University Taipei, TAIWAN. Outlines. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

Measuring the Outcomes of Anticommons in Land Development

Tzuchin Lin, Fanghsin HuangDepartment of Land Economics

National Chengchi UniversityTaipei, TAIWAN

European Real Estate Society 21st Annual ConferenceBucharest, Romania 25-28 June 2014

Page 2: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

2

- The Inert Housing (Land) Supply is Overlooked- Land Assembly likely Leads to The Anticommons

Tragedy- Wanhua District needs to be Revitalized- The Size of Developed Parcels is Larger than

Undeveloped Parcels- Land Parcels have been slowly but Persisently

Assembled- Wrestling between Urban Development and Property

Rights is Inevitable

Outlines

Page 3: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

32001Q1

2001Q3

2002Q1

2002Q3

2003Q1

2003Q3

2004Q1

2004Q3

2005Q1

2005Q3

2006Q1

2006Q3

2007Q1

2007Q3

2008Q1

2008Q3

2009Q1

2009Q3

2010Q1

2010Q3

2011Q1

2011Q3

2012Q1

2012Q30

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

900,000

1,000,000

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Housing Units

Price Index

Hou

sing

Uni

ts

Pric

e In

dex

The Inert Housing (Land) Supply is Overlooked

Page 4: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

4

Alonso: a demand-dominated thinking

The Revival of the Supply Side- Alan Evans (1983): The determination of the price of land,

Urban Studies- Max Neutze (1987): The supply of land for a particular use,

Urban Studies- David Adams (1991): Active and passive behavior in land

ownership, Urban Studies- Edward Glaeser (2009): The causes and consequences of

land use regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, Journal of Urban Economics

Land scarcity: attachment, speculation, regulations…, but, anything missing?

Page 5: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

5

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011270,000

271,000

272,000

273,000

274,000

275,000

276,000

277,000

278,000

279,000

280,000

400

405

410

415

420

425

430

435

440

445

450

455

Parcel Number

Average Size

Parc

el N

umbe

r

Ave

rage

Siz

e (m

2)

Number and Areas of Privately-owned Land Parcels – Taipei City

Page 6: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

6

Neihu

NangangShilin

Beitou

Wensh

anXinyi

Zhongshan

Songshan

Daan

Zhongz...

Wanhua

Datong5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

50,000

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1,000

1,100

1,200

1,300

Parcel NumberAverage SizePa

rcel

Num

ber

Ave

rage

Siz

e (m

2)

Number and Areas of Privately-owned Land Parcels – by Districts

Page 7: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Land Assembly likely Leads to The Anticommons Tragedy

Takatoshi Tabuchi (1996), Peter Colwell and Henry Munneke (1999), Tzuchin Lin and Alan Evans (2000)

Tota

l Pri

ce

Area

2V(A)

V(2A)

V(A)

2AA

Page 8: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Land assembly implicit in the convex size-price function- any owner whose parcel is needed for development is on a

position to negate the project by refusing to sell- potential gains through land assembly allure all owners to

think strategically so as to convert their parcels to be the last key piece

- high transaction costs of land assembly likely induce a bias toward fragmentation in ownership.

Page 9: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Anticommons

Heller (1998)- the danger of a property regime in which multiple owners

hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource- individual owners within this regime are prone to exercise

their rights of exclusion that will in turn lead to an inefficient and under-utilized use of resources

- a potential tragedy

Jieming Zhu (2012)- owners’ strategy of holding land out of market nicely

exemplifies the possible tragedy of the anticommon

Page 10: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Wanhua District needs to be Revitalized

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 130015

17

19

21

23

25

27

29

31

33

35

ShongsanDaanZhongzheng

WanhuaDatong

Zhongshan

Wenshan Nangang

Neihu

Shilin

BeitouXinyi

Plot Size(m2)

Housing Age

Page 11: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Page 12: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Plan Area: 39.5 hectaresDevelopable Area: 23 hectares

Page 13: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

another attempt to empirically test the tragedy of anticommons- if this tragedy is in place-- assembly of small parcels into a larger and developable one will be difficult

therefore,- size of developed parcels is larger than that of undeveloped parcels- developed parcels largely come from assembly of small parcels- this assembly activity is labourious, time-consuming and even socially wasteful 13

Page 14: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Article 193 of Regulation of Land Cadastre Surveying:The owner of abutting plots with similar land use can apply to have them merged into a single plot under sole ownership

The Size of Developed Parcels is Larger than Undeveloped Parcels

19701971

19721973

19741975

19761977

19781979

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

1988100

600

1,100

1,600

2,100

2,600

3,100

3,600

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

Plot NumberAverage Size

Plot

Num

ber

Ave

rage

Siz

e (m

2)

Page 15: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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1-1031-40

61-70

91-100

121-130

151-160

181-190

211-220

241-250

271-280

301-310

331-340

361-370

391-400

501-550

651-700

801-850

951-1000

1201-1300

1501-1600

1801-19000%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%

Year of 1988

Developed

Undeveloped

Plot Size(m2)

%

Page 16: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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19701971

19721973

19741975

19761977

19781979

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19880

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Developed Average SizeUndeveloped Average SizeDeveloped Plot NumberUndeveloped Plot Number

Plot

Num

ber

Ave

rage

Siz

e (m

2)

Page 17: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Land Parcels have been slowly but Persisently Assembled

Year Gini Year Gini Year Gini

1970 0.5978 1977 0.5664 1984 0.6006

1971 0.5980 1978 0.5653 1985 0.6063

1972 0.5972 1979 0.5672 1986 0.6153

1973 0.5993 1980 0.5712 1987 0.6195

1974 0.5974 1981 0.5783 1988 0.6277

1975 0.5964 1982 0.5800

1976 0.5989 1983 0.5970

Page 18: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

180% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1970197619771988Equality

Page 19: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Page 20: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Gini Coefficient- on a steady rise from 1977 onwards when cadastral re-surveying took place- a long-term increase in unevenness of size distribution among parcels- an increasing dispersion of parcel sizes suggests frequent activities of assembly and partition of land- developers might either purchase a larger plot, or buy contiguous smaller plots (land assembly)

Page 21: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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Below 100

101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 501-600 601-1000 1001-2000

Above 2000

Below 100

101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 501-600 601-1000 1001-2000

Above 2000

Par-tition Frequency

0.3114754098360

66

0.3522727272727

27

0.6578947368421

05

0.8636363636363

64

1.1666666666666

7

1.25 1.5882352941176

5

1.0833333333333

3

1.8

As-sembly Frequency

0.5081967213114

75

1.25 3.3947368421052

6

4.0454545454545

5

4.4166666666666

7

6.25 4.6470588235294

1

4.1666666666666

7

2.2

Frequency of As-sembly and Par-tition

0.82 1.60 4.05 4.91 5.58 7.50 6.24 5.25 4.00

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0.82

1.60

4.05

4.91

5.58

7.50

6.24

5.25

4.00Assembly FrequencyPartition FrequencyFrequency of As-sembly and Parti-tion

Plot Size(m2)

Frequency

- a total of 799 times of size change; including 627 times of land assembly and 172 times of land partition

- up to plots of 600 m2, the frequency of land assembly increases with plot size (scale of development project)

- the whole Wanhua train station areas will take 76 years to be fully developed

Page 22: Measuring the Outcomes of  Anticommons  in Land Development

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In Taipei, land supply is bound to be inelastic and parcel size to be slow in adjustment

This lengthy process of adjustments in parcel size has resulted in an inert response to the market, and possibly undesirable land uses

But- any coercive measure to force owners to sell his plot or merge it with others is fairly impractical, as recent cases have repeatedly demonstrated- sensible policies are therefore urgently called for

Wrestling between Urban Development and Property Rights is Inevitable

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Thank your for listening!

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5-storey building

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 90%

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100%

0

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149 149 149 149 148 148 148 149

Times

Shar

es Size