Measures of Empire Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Regime, 1695-1807

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Bruce Masters

Power and society in Aleppo in the 18th and 19th centuriesIn: Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée, N°62, 1991. pp. 151-158.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Masters Bruce. Power and society in Aleppo in the 18th and 19th centuries. In: Revue du monde musulman et de la

Méditerranée, N°62, 1991. pp. 151-158.

doi : 10.3406/remmm.1991.1529

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http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/remmm.1991.1529

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/author/auteur_remmm_175



Bruce MASTERS

POWER AND SOCIETY IN ALEPPO

IN THE 18th AND 19th CENTURIES

The Muslim empires of Asia experienced upheavals and crises in the eighteenth century.Whether in Istanbul, Isfahan or Delhi, the established political elites found it increasingly

difficult to maintain hegemony over the peripheries of their realms as new centers of politicaland economic might emerged. That this process of political devolution occurred almostsimultaneously across Muslim Asia from Java into the Balkans and North Africa has beenascribed by world system theorists to the changing relationships of the formerly autonomousAsian "world empires" to the West. In their view, the end of these older polities was aninevitable result of Asia's incorporation into a "world system" dominated by the economies ofnorth western Europe. Unable to compete economically with capitalism, the Muslim states weredoomed to fail politically as well (Wallerstein, 1989 ; Kasaba, 1988).

Reversing the economic determinist explanation offered by the world system proponents,revisionist historians of European imperialism, led by Christopher Bayly, have offered an

interpretation of the eighteenth century that sees the Muslim empires as beset by a number ofinternal contradictions which abetted the rise of indigenous political challengers on theirperipheries. The struggle between the old and new orders created the opportunities for Europeanexpansion. In the absence of European intervention, new Muslim dynasties might have triumphedover the remnants of the old. This approach suggests that without the internal dynamics of thedisintegration of the Asian empires, the Europeans might have remained trading diasporas onAsia's fringes and not empire builders. In short, the divide between the tw o historical explanationslies in where their proponents place the respective motor of change, in Asia or in Europe. Bothviews agree, however, that the eighteenth century saw unique opportunities for new indigenousactors to emerge and to confront the older dynasties, both economically and politically.

In the lands controlled by the House of Osman, the period was marked by the rise of thederebeys, the growing strength of the "notables" (a cyân in the Arabic usage) in urban politics,

RE.M.M.M. 62, 1991/4



152 /Bruce Masters

and the emergence of dynasties which in many regional centers came close to holding provincialgovernorships as family fiefs. While the external circumstances that led to the success of thesecontending forces were the same throughout the empire, local conditions often determinedwhich nexus of leadership would become dominant, as no region could support the simultaneousemergence of all three types of political elites.

In addition to these local forces, the central government was not completely impotent and itsrepresentatives could, at times, wield considerable authority or, at the least, tip the balance toone faction or the other and so prevent the emergence of a single controlling political actor.Significantly, even such successful warlords as Ali Pasha of Ionnina, Bayraktar Mustafa Pashain Ruse, the Çapanoghlus in Yozgat, or Ahmed Cezzar Pasha in Acre sought to obtain officialrecognition from the Porte. This ability to maintain at least minimal fealty in the provincesdistinguishes the Ottomans from other Muslim empires in the eighteenth century. Employingthat residual sense of legitimacy derived from centuries of rule, they were able to achieve atemporary reversal in the process of decline. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Istanbulhad reestablished its authority over its Asian provinces even while it fought a losing battle toretain its dominion in Rumeli and North Africa.

A process of devolution was at work in Aleppo in the eighteenth century as well, but the crucialdifference between it and what was occurring in most other major Ottoman provincial centers wasthat no individual, dynasty, or party emerged to monopolize the political life of the city. Rather theperiod between 1760 and 1850 was marked by political turbulence as one group emergedmomentarily decisive, only to be brought down by agents of the central government acting inconcert with rival political factions. In Aleppo, the state managed to manipulate the political chaosof the city so as to deny the emergence of any effective, or long lived, challenge. The result was theemergence of two armed "populist" factions, the ashrâf and the janissaries, who periodicallybattled each other and the representatives of the state under conditions that often seemed to totterprecariously close to economic class warfare. While the city's underclass brawled in the streets forpolitical power, the city's civilian elite remained either impotent or aloof.

What has been obscured, however, by the attention of scholars to Aleppo's janissary-as/ira/rivalry in this period, was the dramatic growth in economic power of tw o classes from amongthe city's civilian elite : the Muslim notables and the minority merchants. In his ground-breakingstudy, Bodman characterized these tw o groups as having had negligible political influence in theyears between 1770 and 1826. This is undoubtedly true, but as Meri wether and Thieck haveshown for the a cyân families, their acquisition of economic power in that period laid thefoundations of their increased political role after the definitive restoration of central governmentcontrol in 1850. The same could be said for some of the minority merchant dynasties whichcame to prominence contemporaneously with the Muslim notables.

Both groups, often allied with one another, tied their fortunes to those of the centralgovernment rather than opposing it. As such, their survival through the end of the nineteenthcentury mirrored the resiliency of state authority in the city. The Ottoman state's ability toreassert its presence in Aleppo adds credence to those historians who look to Asia to understandthe dynamics of the historical processes of the eighteenth century. Despite the setbacks it

suffered, the Empire was still capable of acting to reverse the process of its own unravelling.Undoubtedly, Europe had a role in all of this, but it would seem that in the case of Aleppo, itsinfluence was only secondary to that of the central government.



Power and society in Aleppo in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries / 153

Aleppo as an ottoman provincial center

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Aleppo's political life in the Ottoman period was its

administrative separation from its historically more dominant rival, Damascus. There is some

ambiguity as to when this occurred, but it was a political fact when Sultan Siileyman visited thecity in 1531. The removal of northern Syria from its political dependency on Damascus byimperial fiat meant that the inhabitants of Aleppo were largely free to evolve their own powerrelationship with the capital, unencumbered by developments to the south. While continuing to belinked culturally to Damascus, Cairo, and the Holy Cities of the Hijaz, the city formed importanteconomic ties to southern Anatolia which outweighed those it enjoyed with southern Syria.

The wealth that Aleppo generated in the first century of Ottoman rule was an attractive prizefor aspirants to more global political ambitions. Ironically, given the relative fealty offered byAleppo's political elite to the central government in the eighteenth century, the city served as thelocus for two of the most formidable challenges the Ottoman state faced in the seventeenth

century. Although both the revolts were labeled by Ottoman chroniclers as Celâlî, the earlier ofthe two, that of Canpulatoghlu Ali Pasha, seems rather to have prefigured the rise of the a cyân inAnatolia and Rumeli in the late eighteenth century. As they would later do, Ali Pasha based hisstrength on tribal levies, seemingly had visions of regional autonomy, if not independence, andsought to involve the Europeans in his scheme (Rafeq, 1983).

The second revolt, that of Abaza Hasan Pasha which ended with his death in 1659, was one of adisgruntled Ottoman official and its venue in Aleppo had little to do with the city or its inhabitants.Both revolts indicate that the state was already experiencing the internal contradictions of its ownimperial system. That they resembled so closely the more damaging revolts of the late eighteenthand early nineteenth centuries seems to vindicate those who see the slow dissolution of the empire

as having been based in the domestic and structural weaknesses of the Ottoman state rather than inits shifting external relations. But whatever the ultimate historical cause of either rebellion, neitherhad any lasting effect on society in Aleppo, or the pursuit of power in the city.

Political control in Aleppo was vested in the first two centuries of Ottoman rule in the handsof the representatives of the state, the governor and his military entourage composed ofprofessionals sent out from the capital. Economic power lay in a much more complicatedlayering of social groups : Muslim merchants, members of the culamâ, political office holders,and the European trading communities. With the exception of the Europeans, the other groupsoften overlapped and intermarried so that the indigenous economic and religious elites were noteasily distinguished. By the middle of the eighteenth century, those patterns while maintaining

the facade of the older order, had changed.One of the most important of these changes for the balance of political power in the city was

that the military forces stationed in the province were increasingly of local origin. Thistransformation had come about gradually as the Empire suffered fiscal and military downturnsthat hindered the center from effectively exercising control over its periphery. For Aleppo,located as it was in close proximity to various tribal groups : bedouin, Kurds, and Turkmen, thismeant the loss of effective control by the governor over his province.

The breakdown in order in the countryside altered what the central government expected ofthe city's inhabitants in terms of their own defense. Thus in 1690, when a band of Sheyhlii

Kurds, reportedly consisting of 900 musketeers, threatened the city, the professional garrisonwas dispatched along with that of the city Marash to repel the tribesmen while the inhabitants ofAleppo were required only to provide financial support (AS 1, p. 22). Thirty-five years later,



154 /Bruce Masters

however, when the city's garrison was called to duty at the Iranian frontier, the city was orderedto provide 300 soldiers who could be used to defend the province from marauders (AS 2,p. 210). This pattern was to be repeated periodically in the city until the implementation of directconscription, first during the city's occupation by Ibrahim Pasha and later by Istanbul in 1850(AS 39, p. 145 ; AS 43, p. 21 ; AS 45, pp. 52-60).

This need for extra levies led to an increasing militarization of the province with theproliferation of bands of armed men whose services could be bought. In the city of Aleppo, thereduction in troops that the capital could provide led to the swelling of the ranks of thejanissaries with the enlistment of locals as well as rural migrants who had been drawn into thecity. The janissaries quickly emerged as one of the two activist political factions in the city in thelate eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The appearance of the other, the ashrâf,seemingly came as a response to the growth of janissary influence. While they were numeroussharifs mentioned in the local sources from the preceding century and the office of the naqîb al-ashrâfv/as prominent in representing local interests, the ashrâf had not functioned as a politicalparty or interest group prior to the eighteenth century.

Although the janissaries and ashrâf were not "the Guelphs and Ghibellines of Aleppo"(Barker, 1876, v.l, p. 80), the composition of each group's membership and their mechanism formobilization are far from clear. The geographical base of the janissaries was in the easternquarters of the city and many of those identified with the corps in the local court records hadKurdish or Turkish names which hint of tribal origins. Nonetheless, in an order from 1814listing those who had fled the city under charge of participating in the janissary revolt of theprevious year, persons coming from the eastern suburbs predominated, but almost all of thecity's quarters were represented and where it is possible to tell from family names, Arabicspeakers were seemingly in the clear majority (AS 35, pp . 94-97).

Similarly, while the power base of the ashrâf was inside the city's walls and they wereheavily represented in such established professions as weaving and dyeing, at least some of theirmembership were also recent migrants to the city (Thieck, 1985, p. 151). The dynamics of thestruggle were not purely locational, ethnic, nor a case of urban interests versus rural newcomers,although elements of all of those categories can be identified as contributing to the perpetuationof solidarity within the two blocks. Furthermore, while economic rivalries added to the hostilityvented in the streets as janissary pressure on the established guild structure was resented andresisted, their mutual antagonism and rivalry can not be explained away through a economicclass analysis as the two group's membership seems to have been drawn from roughlycomparable economic classes. The sharîf status claimed by many of the a cyân only rarely ledthem to perceive a commonality of interests with the ashrâf "of the street.

Rather than monolithic factions, both identities appear to have been relatively fluid and whileit is possible to generalize about the membership of each group, it must be remembered thatthere were many different degrees of clientage at work and that individual loyalties might shiftwith changes in the political climate. Similarly, it is dangerous to identify either group withnascent urban populism, although when contrasted with a cyân interests such an explanation istempting, as each sought largely to advance its own membership's status without regard to thegeneral welfare of the urban poor. That there was little, if any, proto-class consciousness at workwas indicated by the infrequency of cooperation between the two. The existence of these tw oarmed, querulous factions constituted a real test to the authority of both the state and of thea cyân, but it was a challenge that could only deliver disruption and not revolution.

An equally important, though less dramatic, evolution in the power structure in the cityduring the eighteenth century was the emergence of a dozen or more prominent a cyân families




as active participants in the city's economic and political life. From at least the beginning ofOttoman rule, and presumably earlier, local notable culamâ families had acted as representativesof the city's population and had enjoyed prestige and economic well being. This status hadsprang from their position as religious authorities and functionaries, and as administrators ofmany of the city religious endowments. Additionally, local Muslim families profited fromAleppo's location as a trade entrepot and had prospered. While both civilian groups could bewealthy as the estates registry for Mustafa Tahazâdah, the naqîb al-ashrâf, and the merchant,Ahmad al-Ghazzâl, from the late seventeenth century show (Sijill 33, pp. 129-131, 241-250),real economic power was vested in control of the revenues of Aleppo's agricultural hinterlands.Throughout the seventeenth century, those were largely in the hands Ottoman officials andsoldiers in the form of credit relationships with the villagers.

As the central government began to sell off its tax farms to life time tenants (malikâne) at theend of the seventeenth century, however, new opportunities for wealth in Aleppo appeared. Thefirst beneficiaries of the new fiscal system were Ottoman officials and their descendants whohad earlier lent money to the same villages which they then received as malikâne. By thebeginning of the eighteenth century, the process was well under way and much of the province'srevenue was increasingly diverted into the hands of the tax farmers. This, in turn, forced thegovernors to levy even more of the extraordinary taxes on the city's population, creatingeconomic and social hardships on almost everyone else.

The Ottomans and their descendants were not the only ones to profit from these changes inrevenue procurement. Local families, both of culamâ and merchant origins, began to invest thewealth they had accumulated in the acquisition of tax farms. By the middle of the century, thistransferral of much of the fiscal system of the province into local hands was consolidated withthe repeated appointment of Aleppines to the posts of mutesellim and muhassil of the province.Effective political power did not immediately accompany this increase in status, however.Rather, the a cyân like their poorer neighbors remained divided against themselves (Bodman,pp. 100-02). Rarely uniting out of class self interests, they could wield little political influenceand were so limited to acting as mediators between the warring factions, or between thosefactions and the government.

Divided and without their own military force, the only political opposition that could emergeat those times when the governor was either absent or oppressive were the armies of the street.As such, Aleppo did not experience the rise of a local political dynasty such as the ' Azms or theJalilis, or even of a single strongman such as Ahmed Cezzar Pasha. Ibrahim Pasha Katiraghasicontended for such power during his term (1799-1804) as Aleppo's first local governor since

ÇanpulatoghluAli

Pasha,but his reign was short-lived, in part due to his rapacity

astax-

collector (Marcus, 1989, pp. 90-93). His son succeeded him, but he too was undone by janissaryresistance. In the end, it was a scion of an Anatolian a cyân family, Çapanoghlu Celalettin Pasha,who temporarily crashed the janissaries in 1813 and restored Istanbul's authority in the city(Barker, v. 2, pp. 138-42).

Parallel to the growing importance of the Muslim a cyân, a number of Christian Arab familieswere able to take advantage of changing economic and political conditions and attainedeconomic, if not political, eminence in the eighteenth century. Their precipitous rise was all themore remarkable as western visitors to Aleppo in the previous century invariably described thelocal Christians as living in abject poverty. The initial boost to these families had come withtheir service as translators (dragomans) for the resident European merchants. Taking advantageof the protection offered their status by the capitulations, members of the Ghadbân, cÂ'ida,Hawwâ, Dallai, and Qassâb families, among others, were able to develop their own trading



156 /Bruce Masters

networks and built up commercial fortunes. This was frowned on by the European consuls andforbidden by the Porte, but as long as the European presence remained in Aleppo there was littlethat the Ottomans could effectively do to reign in the dragomans' commercial activities(Masters, 1988).

Using foreign connections, these families had set the pattern that the protégés of the nineteenthcentury in commercial centers such as Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad would emulate on their riseto commercial prominence. Ironically, by the end of the eighteenth century, foreign protection hadlargely evaporated from Aleppo as most European nations either reduced, or eliminated, theiroperations in the city as the region's transit trade declined. With the general downturn in the city'scommercial economy, members of some of the Christian Arab families who had earlier served theEuropean consuls as dragomans expanded their operations to the capital where they engaged intrade and acted as agents for prominent a cyân families back in Aleppo.

With their transfer to Istanbul, these individuals lost their patents as protégés. While initiallydamaging to their business operations, they were compensated for this in the first decade of thenineteenth century, when Sultan Mahmud created a category of imperial merchants (Avrupatiiccarlari) who were to be granted many of the same trading privileges as the Europeans (Bagi§,1983). With their embrace of the new system of commercial patents offered by the Porte, theAleppo Christian merchant families, like their Muslim a cyân compatriots and unlike Christianmerchants elsewhere in Syria, had obtained a vested interest in the maintenance of the Ottomanstate and its institutions.

By 1816, the Avrupa tiiccarlari were well established in Aleppo and in 1818, they felt secureenough to challenge janissary interference in the city's commercial life (AS 42, p. 28).Although, they achieved success both in the local courts and at the Porte, this did not mean thatcentralized authority had returned to Aleppo unchallenged, as the city wide revolt againstHiirshit Pasha in 1819 demonstrated. In the wake of the suppression of the uprising, the cityendured an uneasy decade as the central government seemed unable to capitalize on the severeblows it had dealt the street factions. It was obviously preoccupied elsewhere as the levy ofextraordinary taxes in 1824, 1825, 1826, 1828, and 1829, all ostensibly to finance the war in theBalkans, attest (AS 39, p. 93, 145 ; AS 43, p. 21 ; AS 45, pp. 4, 134-7).

The order abolishing the janissary corps in Istanbul was registered in Aleppo on 8 July 1826and soon afterwards, an order was received warning the governor to be on the look out forescaped janissaries who had retreated into the mountains of Anatolia and were reportedlyengaged in brigandage (AS 43, pp. 55-59, 102-05). There was, however, no purge of the corps inAleppo. Nonetheless, members of some of the guilds that had been infiltrated by the janissariessensed the change in political climate and, in 1827, forced the janissaries out of several of themonopolies they had enjoyed in the city's retail trade. They were supported in their legal actionsby prominent members of the a cyân, a sign of the growing shift in the political balance in the

city (AS 44, pp. 128-29).The janissaries had been bloodied, but not eliminated. Their rough style of factional politics

enjoyed a brief resurgence during the occupation of the city by the forces of Ibrahim Pasha whenmembers of the a cyân fled the city. Faced with hostility, or indifference, from the city'sprominent families, the occupation forces favored the janissary faction, appointing their leader,'Abdullah al-Bâbinsî, as miitesellim. This was the first time in Aleppo's turbulent history that ajanissary had been so favored. With the return of the Ottoman forces in 1841, however, 'AbdullahBey was stripped of his lucrative tax farms and his fellow janissaries were once again voiceless.

In the first decade of the Tanzimat, Aleppo became one of the test cities for Ottoman reformprojects as earlier it had been singled out for the implementation of the institution of the Avrupa




tiiccarlari. Both an early census and the imposition of the ferde were undertaken there beforeanywhere else in the Arab provinces. These innovations, in turn, sparked the riots of 1850 andAleppo served again as a precursor of trends that were to occur later elsewhere in Syria.

The events of 1850 mark the definitive end to the period of militant factionalism in Aleppo

and with it, the return of direct Ottoman control of the city. The storming of the city's easternsuburbs by the newly organized Arabistan Ordusu, destroyed the power of the street mobs andcity's poorer classes lost their ability to influence politics for the rest of the Ottoman period. Thesame could not be said for either the a cyân or , despite the trauma of the riots, the leadingChristian families. Significantly, while several prominent members of the a cyân families wereexiled for alleged complicity in the rising, Muhammad al-Jâbirî was the only non-Ottoman to siton the commission formed to assess the damages caused by the rioters and several of thoseexiled returned soon after and later held high government posts.

Their rehabilitation points to the last significant development in the city's political life in theOttoman period. The power structure of this reasserted central government control, as

envisioned by the Tanzimat reformers, was different from what it had been in the first twocenturies of Ottoman rule. While the governors continued to be Ottoman bureaucrats, theadministration of city government, courts, and even taxation were increasingly in the hands oflocal residents who were fast becoming an "aristocracy of service" (Khoury, 1987, 103). Asascertained from the provincial salnames, these included representatives of the Muslim a cyânfamilies and the Melkite Catholic merchant families who had begun their rise to politicaleminence in the city with their acquisition of economic power in the eighteenth century.

Neither group had remained static in terms of composition over the course of a century and ahalf. Some families faded from prominence and others emerged to take their place, but all hadbenefitted from cooperation with the state. Their recognition of the symbiotic relationship they

shared with the authorities in Istanbul undoubtedly helps to explain Aleppo's relativeindifference to the cause of Arabism until confronted with Amîr Faysal's state (Khoury,1978, 101-05).

What is far from clear, however, is the depth of loyalty of Aleppo's elites to the Ottoman state.In both the diaries of Yûsuf al-Halabî and Nacûm Bakhkhâsh, mention of a sultan's name isfollowed by the obligatory prayers for his long life and prosperity, but it is hard to infer anydegree of political commitment to the idea of the sultanate beyond that. Rather, it would seem thatas the leading families of Aleppo were unable to form a political base to challenge the Porte, theyacquiesced to its legitimacy. It served their interests and the alternative was rule by the streetmobs. The divisiveness of the local elites meant that state could, in turn, selectively co-opt their

individual members to enhance its own political objectives. While the Ottomans were on thedefensive throughout so much of their territories, Aleppo, thanks to a myriad of local conditionsand political currents, had been reclaimed for the empire by the end of the nineteenth century.

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AL-HALABÎ, Yûsuf Dimitrî cAbûd, Murtad fi tâ'rikh Halab wa Baghdad, edited as M.A. thesis,Damascus University, 1978, by Fawwâz Mahmûd Fawwâz.BAÔIS. (I. A.), 1983, Osmanli Ticaretinde Gayri Muslimler, Turhan Kitabevi, Istanbul, 15 0 p.



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BAKHKHASH (N.), 1985, 1987, Akhbâr Halab, éd . Yûsuf Qûshâqjî, Matbacat al-Ihsân, Aleppo, 2v .BARKER (J.), 1876, Syria and Egypt Under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey, edited by Edward Barker,

S. Tinsley, London, 2v.BAYLY (C. A.), 1989, The Imperial Meridian : Th e British Empire and the World, 1780-1830,

Longman Group, London, 295 p.BODMAN (H.), 1963, Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760-1826, University of North Carolina Press,

Chapel Hill, 16 0 p.KASABA (R.), 1988, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy : The Nineteenth Century, StateUniversity of New York Press, Albany, 191 p.

KHOURY (P.), 1987, Syria and the French Mandate, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 69 8 p.KHOURY (P.), 1990, "The Urban Notables Paradigm Revisited", Revue du Monde Musulman et de la

Méditerranée (55/56) : 217-228.MARCUS (A.), 1989, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity : Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century,

Columbia University Press, New York, 418 p.MASTERS (B.), 1988, The Origins of Western Dominance in the Middle East : Mercantilism and the

Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750, New York University Press, New York, 240 p.MASTERS (B.), 1990, "The 1850 Events in Aleppo" International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies

(22) : 3-20.MERIWETHER (M.), 1987, "Urban Notables and Rural Resources in Aleppo, 1770-1830" International

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THIECK (J.-P.), 1985, "Décentralisation ottomane et affirmation urbaine à Alep à la fin du XVIIIesiècle", in P. Y. Péchoux éd., Mouvements communautaires et espaces urbains au Machreq, CERMOC,Beyrouth: 117-168.

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Documents

Measures of Empire Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Regime, 1695-1807