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Mck Mainports 2040 Final Report
Citation preview
Mainports 2040
Final report, June 2009
CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARYAny use of this material without specific permission of McKinsey & Company is strictly prohibitedThis material is partly based on information that has not been generated by McKinsey & Company, and has not been subject to our independent verification. While we believe this information to be reliable and adequately comprehensive, we do not represent that it is in all respects accurate or complete.
Input for exploration phase long-term vision Mainports
McKinsey & Company 1|
Legal Disclaimer
McKinsey & Company has been supporting the Dutch Ministry of Transport (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat or VenW) to help VenW gain insight in the environment in which Dutch mainports have to strategically position themselves.
To this end, this report presents (i) different scenarios and key issues for the mainports (ii) perspectives on the current position of the Dutch Mainports, and (iii) the main opportunities and threats for the Mainports.
The preliminary comments contained in this report are based in part on data generated during several discussions with executives of VenW and, and on publicly available information, but has not been subject to detailed verification by McKinsey & Company.
The scenarios outlined in this report should not be taken for most likely scenarios and the issues listed should be interpreted as possible actions for VenW independent consideration, not as constituting any policy or other recommendation for action. McKinsey & Company does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of the underlying assumptions in this report although we believe them to be adequate for the purpose of discussion. There is no implied warranty that these assumptions will come to pass.
In the event that this report or the information herein becomes available to a third party other than VenW, such party is hereby notified that this analysis was undertaken by McKinsey & Company for VenW and is being made available to the third party for information purposes only. The third party should conduct its own investigation and analysis of the matters set forth herein. McKinsey & Company makes no representations or warranties regarding the accuracy or completeness of the information in this report or any other written or oral communication transmitted or made available to the third party and expressly disclaims any and all liabilities based on such information or on omissions there from. Finally, this document is highly confidential. No part of it may be circulated, quoted or reproduced for distribution outside the VenW organization without prior written approval from McKinsey & Company
McKinsey & Company 2|
Key messages The two mainports create important direct and indirect value for the Dutch economy, even if they are of limited importance in
stimulating the growth of upcoming sectors like tourism and the creative industry
Economic interdependences between the mainports are limited and unlikely to be a key success factor for the individual mainports, thereby limiting the need for a joint strategy. There are, however, areas of mutual interest that warrant a coordinated approach
Schiphol could grow in volumes by a factor 1 to 7 towards 2040, mainly depending on developments after 2020 (developments until 2020 outlined in recent policy papers, such as the Luchtvaartnota). Growth beyond a level of 2.5-3x current volumes is likely to require major infrastructural works with relocation being the most extreme variant. Strategic choices need to be made on the basis of ambition level, no-regret moves that apply to all scenarios, and belief in the likelihood of specific scenarios. Questions that need to be addressed are, for instance:
What is the impact on The Dutch Economy, if Schiphol would become an airport with good European connections but limited direct intercontinental connections?
What is the economic impact (direct and indirect) if Schiphol would become one of the 3 primary European intercontinental mega-hubs, considering Schiphol would grow with a factor 5-7 of todays volume?
What are no-regret moves that are optimal in all scenarios, such as enlarging the catchment area through better hinterland connections and adaptive policy making to optimize flexibility around scenario-dependent moves?
A balanced choice needs to be made about which volumes of container cargo Rotterdam wants to attract and how these will be transported to the hinterland
Rotterdam could grow current throughput volume by a factor 1 to 2.5 until 2040, depending on which long-term CPB growth scenario will unfold. This growth would primarily be driven by container cargo
Port capacity plans seem sufficient to accommodate growth as liquid bulk, which consumes most port capacity, is expected to grow maximum with a factor 1.5x versus current throughput. However, this could require targeted policies to optimize the use of available space and assume no wild swing factor that would trigger a bigger volume increase, such as the rise of alternative fuels
Accommodating container volume growth would require large infrastructural investments to avoid major congestion issues in the hinterland, unless the modal split significantly changes thereby lowering the share of road traffic
There might be a need to set priorities between expanding capacity versus policies to make optimal use of current infrastructure. Questions that therefore need to be addressed are, for instance:
Which cargo flows have the highest value-add and least negative externalities in the Netherlands? What are the best policy instruments to primarily attract high value-add flows and enforce an optimal modal split?
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
McKinsey & Company 3|
Chapter 1: Role of the mainports in the economy
The Netherlands is a small, open economy heavily dependent on foreign trade. Having logistical hubs and a strong infrastructure is a prerequisite for sustaining this position in the future. In this chapter, we assert that the two mainports create significant value-add for the Dutch economy, even if they are of limited importance in stimulating the growth of upcoming sectors like tourism and the creative industry
Direct value-add is estimated at ~ 1% of GDP for Schiphol and ~ 2% of GDP for the Port of Rotterdam. Direct value add is defined as the GDP contribution of companies directly related to the mainports key transport and business functions
Indirect value-add is estimated at ~2% of GDP for Schiphol and ~1% of GDP for the Port of Rotterdam the GDP. One element of indirect value-add is the role of mainports in attracting business to the Netherlands
Both mainports play a role in attracting business functions that rely on strong transport connections Examples for Schiphol are European headquarters or training centers, for which easy transportation of people
is a key success factor
Examples for Rotterdam are European distribution centers, which depend on efficient, low-cost cargo transportation infrastructure
Both mainports are of limited importance for attracting companies and activities not directly involved in either mainports key functions
Sectors that merely use the mainports, only require a basic level of connectivity and will not choose the Netherlands as a location on the basis of its superior logistical hub function. Other factors, such as proximity to clients, availability and cost of talent, and the tax climate, are more important location decision criteria
The role of the Mainports in supporting the growth of upcoming sectors such as the creative sector and tourism seems limited
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
McKinsey & Company 4|
Chapter 2: Interdependence between the mainports
The existence of two major mainports in such close proximity is, within Europe, a feature unique to the Netherlands. The question remains whether the two mainports owe their position to the existence of the other. If so, how could this interdependence be exploited and stimulated for the benefit of the Netherlands? In this chapter, we assert that economic interdependences between the mainports are limited and unlikely to be a key success factor for the individual mainports, thereby limiting the need for a joint strategy. There are, however, areas of mutual interest that warrant a coordinated approach
Direct economic interdependence between Schiphol and Port of Rotterdam is limited Primary interdependence comes from companies that are linked to Port of Rotterdam for their cargo flows and
also use Schiphol to transport personnel and business relations. However, the spin-off effect on Schiphol is relatively small, contributing less than 1% of total business passengers
Secondary interdependence comes from companies that use both Rotterdam and Schiphol for cargo transportation. Even though these companies benefit from access to two nearby major logistical hubs, this is not a key location decision factor, as all competing ports have a major airport within hours by truck
Areas of mutual interest exist for which a coordinated approach could benefit both mainports and the overall economy:
Although hinterland routes for the mainports differ by nature, easing congestion on one could have a positive spill-over effect for the other e.g., dedicated rail freight routes would benefit Rotterdam directly, while it would ease congestion of the passenger rail network, benefiting Schiphol
Focused investments to improve the Dutch logistics talent pool, knowledge development and innovationcould help both mainports to maintain their competitive positions. Logistics knowledge build-up through research and innovation is likely to have a beneficiary spill-over effect of knowledge for both mainports
Government and related organizations involved in strategy and policy making for the mainports can learn from each other, which could result in better informed decisions at lower costs
* * *
As interdependence is limited, strategic choices for each mainport are discussed independent of the other
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
McKinsey & Company 5|
Chapter 3: Strategic choices for Schiphol (1/3)
Schiphol could grow in volumes by a factor 1 to 7 towards 2040, depending on which long-term growth and airport industry structure scenario will unfold. Growth beyond a level of 2.5-3x current volumes is likely to require major infrastructural works with relocation being the most extreme variant. Given the high level of uncertainty surrounding these scenarios, strategic choices need to be made on the basis of ambition level, no-regret moves that apply to all scenarios, and belief in the likelihood of specific scenarios
Schiphol could grow in volumes by a factor of 1-7 towards 2040, depending on scenarios for passenger volumes and airline and airport industry structure developments
Air passenger volume growth is the key factor for determining future capacity constraints. Potential cargo volume growth is less of a factor as belly capacity free-rides on passenger flight movements and demand growth and full-freighters make up for only 4% of today's Schiphol flight movements.
Air passenger volume growth will be driven by 5 demand factors towards 2040: real economic growth, degree of continued globalization, relative cost of flying, access to destinations, and availability of alternatives to flying. Depending on how the combination of these 5 demand drivers plays out, European air passenger volumes could grow by between 1 and 5% per annum, resulting in 1.4-5 times today's volumes by 2040
High growth scenario (up to 5 times today's volume): Continued economic globalization and a further reduction in real cost of flying results in high leisure and business demand growth, in line with pre-crisis estimates of ~5% p.a.
Moderate growth scenario (up to 2.7 times today's volume): Slowdown of economic globalization, combined with an increase of the real cost of flying, results in moderate leisure and business demand growth of ~3% p.a.
Low growth scenario (up to 1.4 times today's volume): A stop to further economic globalization, combined with a steep increase in the real cost of flying due to high fuel cost, results in low demand growth of ~1% p.a.
The European airport industry structure primarily depends on the degree of airline consolidation and airport capacity constraints. Depending on the development of these key factors, the following 3 scenarios could unfold:
Schiphol is no longer a major hub (1-3.5 times today's volume): EU airline sector has consolidated into 3 major players. Each carrier has concentrated its intercontinental hub activities in one mega-hub , facilitated by a step-change in airport capacity. Schiphol is not one of these 3 hubs and has become a large 2nd tier airport, with specialized intercontinental routes and a large European network
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
McKinsey & Company 6|
Chapter 3: Strategic choices for Schiphol (2/3)
Schiphol is still a major hub (1.4-5 times today's volume): EU airline sector has not consolidated much further. The current airport landscape is still in tact, and all airports have grown at the same pace as far as capacity constraints allowed them to. Schiphol has maintained its current position as one of the 5+ major European hubs
Schiphol is a mega-hub (1.9-7 times today's volume): EU airline sector has consolidated into 3 major players. Each carrier has concentrated its intercontinental hub activities in one mega-hub, facilitated by a step-change in airport capacity. Schiphol has become one of these mega-hubs, with daily connections to more than 100 intercontinental destinations. Paris has been degraded to a large 2nd tier airport
The scenario that unfolds will determine whether major infrastructural investments are necessary A growth factor up to ~2.5-3 times current volumes can possibly be accommodated at Schiphols current
location, assuming selective policies, technological advances and/or less restrictive noise and environmental regulation. Measures to handle this growth include:
Overflow to regional airports: Transfer non-hub dependent traffic, especially LCC and charters, to overflow airports such as Eindhoven and Lelystad
Optimize current use of infrastructure within safety limits and legal constraints, e.g., shorten take-off/landing intervals; redefine noise restrictions; optimize the slot allocation and queuing system; increase pax/plane
Replace feeder flights with high-speed rail: This would reduce the burden on capacity from feeder flights (e.g., Brussels, Copenhagen), although potential impact may be small given the limited number of nearby feeder flights
Expand infrastructure at current location: Extend Schiphol with extra runways at the current location A growth factor beyond 2.5-3 times current volumes is likely to require major infrastructural works,
relocation being the most extreme of these. Two options for relocation are a dual hub system and a full relocation:
For a dual hub, the connection time between the two terminals should ideally be less than 5-10 minutes; otherwise, the hub function will be undermined and transfer passengers will choose alternative routes
An airport at sea has been found to be technologically and environmentally possible. Being a first mover could make Schiphol the largest European intercontinental hub, transforming the Netherlands into Europe's logistical centre of gravity for passenger transportation. However, there are questions around the cost-benefit trade-off
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
McKinsey & Company 7|
Chapter 3: Strategic choices for Schiphol (3/3)
Given the high level of uncertainty surrounding these scenarios, strategic choices need to be made on the basis of ambition level, no-regret moves that apply to all scenarios, and belief in the likelihood of the various scenarios. As the lead time of these types of projects spans several decades, procedures should be started as soon as possible if the ambition for Schiphol is a growth factor beyond 2.5-3 times current volumes
Define the ambition level regarding the role Schiphol should ideally play within the different scenarios that could unfold. Questions that would need to be addressed are, for instance:
What is the impact on the Dutch economy, if Schiphol would become an airport with good European connections but limited direct intercontinental connections?
What is the economic impact (direct and indirect) if Schiphol would become one of the 3 primary European intercontinental mega-hubs, considering Schiphol would grow with a factor 5-7 of todays volume?
Define no-regret moves that are optimal in all scenarios, such as enlarging the catchment area through better hinterland connections, optimizing airside access, adapting policy making to optimize flexibility around scenario-dependent strategic moves
Define optimal actions per scenario, depending on the ambition level: Carrier / alliance strategy: Which carrier / alliance should be given priority? Could a multi-carrier strategy be
optimal in some scenarios? What should be done with non-alliance traffic on the hub?
Strategic moves: How should Schiphol expand in the long run? Should it be relocated now, in the future or never?
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
McKinsey & Company 8|
Rotterdam is the largest port of Europe due to its naturally favorable location: an easy-to-access deep sea port with a strong hinterland link over the river Rhine to the Ruhr area, combined with a relatively large port area. Rotterdam is by far the largest bulk port and the number one container port, but faces strong competition for the latter from Antwerp and Hamburg for the northern European hinterland. A balanced choice needs to be made about the volumes of container cargo that Rotterdam wants to attract and how these will be transported to the hinterland
Rotterdam could grow current throughput volume by 1-2.6 times until 2040, depending on which long-term growth scenario will unfold. Containers and new liquid bulks are likely to account for the majority of this growth.Trade growth up to 2040 will be driven by 7 key volume drivers: real economic growth, delta factor cost between developing and OECD countries, fragmentation of supply chains, degree of globalization, cost of energy, level of recycling and depletion of raw materials, and the rise of new (liquid) commodities. Three scenarios could unfold:
High growth scenario: Continued globalization, further specialization of supply chains and rise of cheap alternative energies and new liquid fuels drive growth of containers to ~6 times and bulk to 1.5 times today's volumes. It remains doubtful whether a container growth of ~6 times is realistic, as this would imply a tremendous growth in consumption of physical goods per capita
Medium growth scenario: Moderate economic growth, a continued difference in factor costs and expensive fuel drive growth of containers to ~3 times and bulk to 1.3 times today's volumes
Low growth scenario: Low economic growth, high transport and energy costs and a no further globalization limit growth of containers to ~1.5 times, while bulk volumes decline to 0.7 times today's volumes
The scenario that unfolds will determine whether optimized use of currently planned infrastructure is sufficient, or if a step-change in infrastructural investments is required to avoid major congestion
Container growth: In all volume growth scenarios, planned storage and terminal capacity seem to be sufficient, but hinterland road capacity constraints need to be resolved
The 2nd Maasvlakte provides enough room for storage and terminal capacity in all scenarios Both barge and rail have sufficient capacity to handle 3-7 times the current volume, given that the terminals in
the port can digest the volumes for loading and unloading of both modalities
Chapter 4: Strategic choices for Port of Rotterdam (1/2)EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
McKinsey & Company 9|
Current road capacity is constrained during rush hours. Measures to improve road congestion can help accommodate container growth of up to 5 times todays volumes:
- Divert all non-domestic trucked containers to other modalities
- Set up a dedicated barged freight corridor to the north of the Netherlands
- Construct intermodal barge and train hubs in the Dutch Hinterland
- Expand the road network around Rotterdam with, e.g., extra lanes on the A15, A20 and A59
- Increase rail capacity, e.g., by building a 2nd Betuwe route and other dedicated rail freight lines
Bulk growth: In a high growth scenario, planned terminal and hinterland capacity seem to be sufficient, but a step-change in infrastructure would be necessary to secure sufficient storage capacity
Barging and piping to the hinterland have enough capacity to accommodate even the high growth scenario For growth of up to 1.3 times current volumes, Rotterdam has little free space to accommodate potential liquid
bulk growth. Measures for freeing up capacity using current available space (incl. 2nd Maasvlakte) may include:
- Reducing strategic oil storage in the port by relocating storage to other locations, potentially abroad
- Relocating dry bulk storage (especially ores and coals for foreign countries) to locations outside the port
- Relocating liquid bulk storage capacity to the port of Amsterdam
Beyond 1.3 times current volumes, drastic measures seem necessary to accommodate growth. This might include constructing a 3rd Maasvlakte
In the face of these capacity constraints, The Netherlands needs to make a balanced choice between volume growth accommodation and policies to attract cargo flows that add most value to the Dutch economy. In order to make this decision, several questions need to be answered:
Which cargo flows have the highest value-add and least negative externalities in the Netherlands? What are the best policy instruments to primarily attract high value-add flows and enforce optimal modal split?
Chapter 4: Strategic choices for Port of Rotterdam (2/2)EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
McKinsey & Company 10|
Contents
Role of the Mainports for the economy
Interdependence between the Mainports?
Strategic choices Schiphol
Strategic choices Port of Rotterdam
Appendix - Beantwoording offerte vragen
McKinsey & Company 11|
Both mainports are of similar relevance to the Dutch economy
SOURCE: SEO, Economische Effecten Schiphol, 2006; Port statistics 2006; Havenmonitor 2006; CBS; McKinsey analysis
12
3
1
1
2
2
4
1
3
Distribution
Direct - other sectors1
Direct - aviation only
Total direct
Construction
Transport & communication
Other sectors
Total incl indirect effect
Professional services
17
5
12
0
1
4
7
2
2
3Transport modes3
Services for transport
Handing and storage
Direct value add - transport related
Industry4
Wholesale
Public and private services
Total direct value add -including business locationIndirect value add -economic multiplier effect5
Total including indirect effect
Estimate of value add Schiphol 2002, SEO (2006) estimatesNet value add (gross value add adjusted for depreciation)
Estimate of value add Port of Rotterdam2006, Port area Rotterdam RijnmondGross value add
1 Limited number of studies on value-add available, the numbers on this page are based on two recent reports from well known institutions2 Other Schiphol located but non-aviation activities, such as: distribution, other transport and financial services3 Includes the transport modes: road, rail, barge and pipeline4 Includes the sectors: foodstuff, petroleum, chemicals, metals, vehicles and electricity production5 Multiplier effect of 1.5 direct value add assumed6 Schiphol estimates are net value add and therefore compared with Dutch Nett Domestic Product in 2002, estimated at 396 bln by CBS;
Port of Rotterdam estimates are gross value add and therefore compared with Dutch Gross Domestic Product in 2006, estimated at 540 bln
Economic value add of mainports, billion1
~1%
% of Dutch economy6
~3% ~3%
~1%
~2%
McKinsey & Company 12|SOURCE: Rankings from World Bank Doing Business; McKinsey analysis
Many businesses interact with the mainports, but close proximityto a mainport is not necessarily a key location decision factor
which interact with the mainports in some way
which clearlyeconomically benefitfrom being close to one or both mainports
for which access to one of the mainports is a key success factor
Sectors
Business functions
Repair Centers Training centers European
Distribution
Training centers European HQ Production/Assem
blage
Shared Services Center
Call Center R&D Center Marketing and
Sales
Wholesale Maritime cluster Petroleum
Agriculture Energy Professional
services
High Tech Universities and
innovation Production Creative industry
NOT EXHAUSTIVE
Sectors and functions
McKinsey & Company 13|
The mainports play a role in attracting business functions requiring physical transportation of people or goods Very important
Not important
Important
Elements of investment climate
Corporate taxes
Availability & costs of skilled labor
Labor flexibility
Bureaucracy Languages spoken
Access to port
Living climate
Costs of doing business
Ease of access to key market
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
f
o
r
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
Repair Center
Shared Services Center
Call Center
R&D Center
Production/Assemblage
Training center
European distribution
Marketing and Sales
European HQ
Access to airport
BUSINESS FUNCTIONS
SOURCE: Rankings from World Bank Doing Business; Cushman & Wakefield; IMD; OECD; EIA; World Economic Forum; IMDB World competiveness; McKinsey analysis
McKinsey & Company 14|
No HQ
>5 HQs
1-5 HQsThe Netherlands have not attracted many Asian businesses Non-HQ significant facilities1 of 1802 Asian companies with internationalization potential3
Norway
Sweden
Finland
U.K.
Denmark
Germany Poland
Czech
France
Belgium
AustriaHungary
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Luxembourg
Corsica
Spain
Sardinia
Monaco
Switzerland Slovenia
Macedonia
Greece
BosniaCroatia
Italy
Malta
Serbia
Albania
Monte-negro
Romania
Other 9 facilities scattered across the Europe in 9 different countries
UK: 24
x 5Marketingx 5Productionx 3Financex 3Subsidiaryx 2HRx 2R&Dx 2Service Centerx 1Mediax 1Distribution
France: 2
x 1R&Dx 1Production
Belgium: 2
x 1Subsidiaryx 1Production
Italy: 2
x 2
ProductionSwitzerland: 2
x 1R&Dx 1Production
x 1R&Dx 1Service Centerx 1Subsidiary
Germany: 12
x 2Marketing
x 3R&D
x 1Subsidiary
x 6Production
Hungary: 3
x 1R&Dx 1Marketingx 1Subsidiary
Denmark: 2
x 2Service Center
Poland: 2
x 1Marketingx 1Production
Portugal
NL: 3
1 All the facilities excluding HQ, sales and branch offices2 Data not available for 29 of the 180 companies3 Companies shortlisted on the basis multiple criteria viz. size, internationalization potential etc.
SOURCE: Company websites and reports; McKinsey analysis
BUSINESS FUNCTIONS
McKinsey & Company 15|
For Asian companies transport and accessibility is less important then other location decision criteria
CEO Awareness of the country Personal recommendation Visa & work-permits Closeness to market Proof of concept Direct personal contacts with the country Image of the country Tax advantages International Talent pool Market size Part of EU Transport and accessibility
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
SOURCE: Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce
Key location factors for Asian companies
BUSINESS FUNCTIONSILLUSTRATIVE
McKinsey & Company 16|
The top 3 factors for location decision are access to market, availability and cost of qualified labor and tax climate
Cushman & Wakefield - European Cities monitor 2007
Ernst & Young - European Headquarters
Perception of EHQ location factors% of total weight
Essential factors for locating a business% of respondents (n=500), 2007
29Languages spoken
Climate of taxes/financial incentives 27
55
Client proximity 58
Qualified staff
52
Cost of staff 36
TransportInfrastructure
Quality of telecom
62
6
7
9
Transport/accessibility
15Quality & availability of labor
Corporate taxes
Centrality
Other 25
Airport proximity
23Client proximity
15
Ministry of Economics Affairs -Quickscan 2006
Key location factors
1 Headquarters Multilingual personnel Proximity to international airports Corporate tax rates
R&D Availability of qualified personnel International proximity
Distribution & logistics Corporate tax rates International proximity/centrality Quality of labor
Production & manufacturing Availability of skilled labor Real labor costs International centrality/proximity
2
3
4
Top 3 elements of investment climate: Market proximity Availability & cost of talent Tax climate
SOURCE: Ernst & Young (2005); Cushman & Wakefield (2008); Ministry of Economic Affairs (2006); Buck Consultants International (2006); McKinsey analysis
BUSINESS FUNCTIONS
McKinsey & Company 17|SOURCE: Berenschot 2008; Innovatieplatform; McKinsey analysis
Six industry clusters have been identified as key future growth areas in which The Netherlands should investEconomische sleutelgebieden
Distribution / Logistics Rotterdam Amsterdam Schiphol
High Tech Zuid-vleugel (maritime)
Eindhoven
Renewable energy Windparks Rotterdam / biofuels
Creative Industries Amsterdam-Utrecht Eindhoven
Chemicals Maastricht Eindhoven Arnhem Rotterdam
Food Wageningen Westland
Detailed further1
1 Creative industries and renewable energy are potential future high growth sectors for which the interdependence with the Mainports is least well known
SECTORSILLUSTRATIVE
McKinsey & Company 18|
Creative business services is the fastest growing segments within the broader creative industry
4.22.99.9
Employment growth for 2004-07Percent
(2.9)10.2
(11.4)6.0n/a
58.814.811.224.0
Creative industry
Arts
Media and publishing
Creative business services
SECTORS - CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
1 Based on data by CBS, measured in 2007 FTEs on SBI93 codes2 No Dutch employment data available
SOURCE: Broek, Wils and De Kleijn, 2008; Stam, Marlet and De Jong, 2008
Rarely driving economic innovation
Very high share of subsidies in total revenues
Nearly always innovative Small share of subsidies
in total revenues
Occasionally innovative Partially share of
subsidies in total revenues
Characteristics
30,32257,89436,317
Contribution in Dutch employment1
14,64114,08941,588
3,154n/a
13,29959,21333,739
9,011
Visual arts Performing arts Festivals, events
expositions etc.
Film Television & radio Literature & books Journalism Digital media
Design Architecture Advertising Fashion
Subsectors
McKinsey & Company 19|
The success and relative size of a regions creative industry is currently not correlated with intercontinental network quality
Creative employment of total employmentIndexed, Milan = 100
43
43
43
50
57
57
57
64
79
86
93
93
100Milan
Budapest
Helsinki
Barcelona
Dublin
Leipzig
Amsterdam
Munich
Sofia
Poznan
Birmingham
Riga
Toulouse
Number of long haul destinations1
3
2
7
0
0
38
68
1
15
9
19
4
46
SECTORS - CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
1 Long-haul defined as a flight lasting at least 6 hours. Schedule for 12 month period ending March 2009 analyzed
SOURCE: Florida, R. (2004), Europe in the Creative Age; Slideshare (2009) - Musterd, S. (2008), Creative Industries in Europees en regionaal perspectief, OAG; McKinsey analysis
McKinsey & Company 20|
Ethanol could make up for more than 5% of liquid bulk throughputand storage capacity for the Port of Rotterdam by 2020
Bioethanol
100% = 59,7 bln gallon
Trade flows of ethanol EU-27
Africa
NAEurope
Brazil
2,1 3,6
0,7
Ethanol demand worldwide, billion gallon, 2020
SOURCE: McKinsey land use and biomass model 2020
Assumptions ethanol Same subsidies as today Crude oil price 70 USD / bbl Tariffs - same as today
Brazil to NA: US$ 0.58/gallon Brazil to EU: US$ 0.91/gallon
Logistics - same as todayInland freights + maritime freights
Brazil to NA: US$ 0.16/gallon Brazil to EU: US$ 0.21/gallon
Breakdown of ethanol demand Percent 4.3 billion gallon
shipped to Europe equals ~16 mln m3
Currently Rotterdam is the biggest biofuel port in Europe
Assuming Rotterdam attracts 80% of the intercontinental traded biofuels, ~5% of all liquids in the port could be biofuels by 2020
89Local use 11 Traded ethanol
Energetic value of Bio-ethanol is 35 - 40% lower per liter than most oil based fuels
If bio-fuels volumes would grow significantly up to 2040, this could cause problems with storage capacity in the port
SECTORS - RENEWABLE ENERGY: ETHANOL
McKinsey & Company 21|
1 IEA estimates of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion and industrial processes in 2007. Does not include miscellaneous small CO2 emitters and non-CO2 emissions such as methane (e.g. forestry, farming, etc.)
2 Not including biomass, oil sands, paper mills, ammonia, ethanol, ethylene, hydrogen, and other industries3 Includes metal ores processing
Predominantly large, stationary sources
CCS could address almost half of European CO2 emissions from fuel combustion and industrial processes
CCS addressable emissions 100% = 2 GtCO2, 2007
Total emissions1100% = 4.2 GtCO2, 2007
Power: gas
Power: oil
Power: other
Cement
Iron & Steel3
Refineries
88
9
6
16
52Power: coal 1
53
47
100
2007
Not adressableby CCS
Addressable by CCS
SECTORS - RENEWABLE ENERGY: CCS
SOURCE: EEA GHG Emission Trends and Projections 2007; IEA World Energy Outlook 2007; McKinsey analysis
McKinsey & Company 22|
CCS expected to be economically viable as of 2020, if sufficient funding for pilot projects becomes available
Demonstrationphase (2015)
Early commercial
phase (2020+)
Mature commercial
phase (2030+)
/tonne CO2
Estimated cost of CCS
Carbon price forecast*
05
1015202530354045505560657075808590
Demonstration phase: Not economically viable in itself
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
g
a
p
SECTORS - RENEWABLE ENERGY: CCS
1 Carbon price for 2015 from 2008-15 estimates from Deutsche Bank, New Carbon Finance, Soc Gen, UBS, Point Carbon, assumed constant afterwards
SOURCE: Reuters; McKinsey analysis
Commercial phase: Cost of CCS likely to approach the range of the future carbon price
McKinsey & Company 23|
Price differential of ~4% will not make people choose for The Netherlands as tourist destination instead of a city with a 2nd tier airport
Schiphol position as a major intercontinental hub is unlikely to be a key vacation destination decision factor
SECTORS - TOURISM
Tourists visiting The Netherlands instead of another European citybecause of Schiphol as a large hub
Price argument: flying to Schiphol is cheaper
Convenience: it is easier to fly to The Netherlands
1,250Amsterdam
1,300Helsinki
1,299Oslo
Stockholm
1,345Milan
1,301+4%
Ticket price from Tokyo toRound trip via Schiphol,
1 Oslo and Stockholm are one stop connections via Schiphol, others are direct flights
SOURCE: Destination Holland, NBTC (Nov 2006); AF-KLM website; OAG, McKinsey analysis
Travel time from Tokyo toHours, Airport to Airport1
11,810,3
13,7
12,412,4
AmsterdamHelsinkiOsloStockholmMilan
+5%
Travel time differential on a intercontinental trip only ~1.5 hours on a 12 hour trip, thus also not likely to be a key final tourist destination decision factor
CASE EXAMPLE
McKinsey & Company 24|
Intercontinental tourists do not seem to visit The Netherlands to benefit from Schiphol as easy access point into Europe
SECTORS - TOURISM
3,546
639
55
279
2,573
346
159
135
100
139
Total
Other intercontinental
Japan
UK
Germany 628
Italy
Belgium 192
874
Spain
France
US
Total Europe
Other Europe
Scandinavia
Total tourism spend in The Netherlands by residents from2005, mln
Most popular combinations with a visit to The Netherlands2005, mln
USA Germany France Belgium UK Ireland
Japan Italy UK Belgium Germany France
Other intercontinental guests Germany France Belgium UK Italy
More then 70% of foreign tourism spending in The Netherlands comes from residents of European countries
Intercontinental guests(
McKinsey & Company 25|
Contents
Role of the Mainports for the economy
Interdependence between the Mainports?
Strategic choices Schiphol
Strategic choices Port of Rotterdam
Appendix - Beantwoording offerte vragen
McKinsey & Company 26|
Some sectors use both Schiphol and Rotterdam for transportation of cargo and/or people
Flow
Schiphol Rotterdam
Pax Perishables Express High value products
Dry bulk Liquid bulk Containerized products
Business clusters using one or both mainports1
SOURCE: KiM: Synergie tussen de Mainports?; McKinsey analysis
Agriculture2
Petroleum
High Tech
Wholesale
Maritime cluster3
High use of flow
Medium use of flow
no use of flow
Only High Tech and Wholesale have limited over-lap in Cargo flows
Many business clusters use Schiphol for pax and Rotterdam for cargo, suggesting economic spin-offs exist
Professional services
BASED ON KIM REPORT QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
1 Business clusters as defined by KiM that extensively use one or both of the mainports2 Export mostly flowers, import grain, fruit and vegetables3 Shipbuilding, offshore, and maritime construction
McKinsey & Company 27|
Some direct economic spin-off exists between the two mainports
SOURCE: Port of Rotterdam, Schiphol, Airport Emission Control; McKinsey analysis
Schiphol requires approximate 600 mln liters of kerosene each year
This kerosene is transported from the Port of Rotterdam to Schiphol by barge and pipeline
Schiphol demand for kerosene equals ~1.1% of the total annual oil products throughput , which equals ~0.3% of annual liquid bulkthroughput of the port of Rotterdam
Rotterdam benefits from the need for kerosene by Schiphol
Schiphol benefits from pax generated by Rotterdam
An estimated 130k-500k Pax are generated by companies directly linked to the Port of Rotterdam
Lets assume 80% of these Pax will fly through Schiphol
Even then, with a total annual business volume of ~17.5 million pax, this equals to 0.6-2 % of total Schiphol business passengers, less than 1% of Schiphol pax volume
McKinsey & Company 28|
Port of Rotterdam generates less then 1% of Schiphol business passengers
SOURCE: McKinsey analysis
Pax Generated by Port of Rotterdam for Schiphol
Pax Generated by employees of port related companies
Pax generated by customers visiting companies
Pax generated by consultants helping companies
Pax Generated by direct port related companies
Pax Generated by indirect port related companies
80.500 employees directly working the port Due to local nature of work, 5-10% is expected
to travel by air Average annual travel by air per person 2-10
60.400 employees indirectly working the port Due to service orientated nature of work, 10-20 % is expected to travel by air Average annual travel by air per person 2-10
Approx 2.500 companies connected to Port of Rotterdam
On average an estimated 20-50 customers visit these companies
Approx 2.500 companies Connected to Port of Rotterdam
On average 20-50 (technical) consultants flying in on a yearly basis
Total business related PAX generated by Port of Rotterdam and flying on Schiphol: 0.1-0.4 mln
Estimated maximum of 80% of total Pax generated to fly from Schiphol
Rotterdam Airport expected to accommodate at the remaining (i.e., minimum 20%)
% of Pax generated by Rotterdam that uses Schiphol
Total Pax generated by Rotterdam
BACK-UP
INDICATIVE
McKinsey & Company 29|
Having an airport close to a major port is not a unique feature within the western European port sector
SOURCE: McKinsey analysis
Port
Airport
All large NW European ports have a International air passenger hubwithin hours of driving distance
All ports have International air cargo hubs within hours of driving distance
All ports have small local airports,convenient for flying e.g. technical staff in and out
Most large ports have a major airports nearby which makes the proximity of Schiphol to Rotterdam not unique
ILLUSTRATIVE
McKinsey & Company 30|SOURCE: Press search; McKinsey analysis
Despite not having an international airport, Hamburg has been able to attract Chinese business through creation of a Chinese community
Hamburg has a welcoming attitude towards Chinese people Chinese healthcare practitioners are supported There is a large number of Chinese organizations
There are good distribution facilities
All official documents and websites are translated into Chinese The country leads in education of Chinese medicine There are Chinese sector associations (e.g., law, IT,
food, culture) Port of Hamburg is the largest Chinese distribution
centre of Europe
Relationships Business Research Politics
Sector conferences of Chinese and German businesses Most active student exchange program between
Europe and China Shanghai is twin city of Hamburg Ex-chancellors and the Chinese prime minister are
involved in establishing relationships between politicians
Culture There are cultural events for the Chinese
community in Hamburg There are large cultural events to educate
Hamburg about the Chinese culture
Many Chinese cultural associations 3-day city event that involves high-profile Chinese
and German politicians / CEOs
Examples
Hamburg is Chinas leading investment hub 400 Chinese companies in Hamburg Port of Hamburg is the most important trading partner of
China, processing 25% of the Chinese export to Europe Chinese expats consider Germany the most attractive
country to settle after the US
Pillars of the Chinese-German community CASE EXAMPLE
McKinsey & Company 31|
Although there is limited direct economic interdependence between the mainports, there are areas of mutual interest
Impact on Mainports Advantages of combined approach
Hinterland connections1
Solid hinterland connections will help secure and extent Schiphol O&Dcatchment area
Low congestion on hinterland connections is necessary for Rotterdam to continue its growth, especially in containers
Although hinterland routes for both main-ports differ by nature, easing congestion on one, could have a positive spill-over effect for the other e.g., dedicated rail freight routes would benefit Rotterdam directly, while it would decongest the passenger rail network, benefitting Schiphol
Talent pool, knowledge and innovation
Competitive position of Schiphol as a hub highly depends on quality and service of its labor force
Rotterdam's competitive position is partly due to its relatively high skilled labor force and resulting high quality of service
Focus on education of labor force in logistics could benefit both mainports in maintaining their competitive positions
Logistical knowledge build-up trough research and innovation is likely have a beneficiary spill-over effect of knowledge for both mainports
Strategy and policy making
Mainports benefit from sound policies and regulations
Government and related organizations involved in strategy and policymaking for both mainports can learn from each other, which can result in better informed decisions at lower costs
SOURCE: Expert interviews; DGLM interviews; McKinsey analysis
1 In practice, both mainports are also competing for funds, as public funds to invest in infrastructure are limited2 Quantitative ambition commission van Laarhoven (Innovation program logistics and supply chains): increase value add from ~ 3-10 bln by 2020
McKinsey & Company 32|
Contents
Role of the Mainports for the economy
Interdependence between the Mainports?
Strategic choices Schiphol
Strategic choices Port of Rotterdam
Appendix - Beantwoording offerte vragen
McKinsey & Company 33|
"Third league"(examples)
Schiphol currently in first league of European intercontinental airports
Number of long-haul destinations1
Weekly long-haul seat capacity offered, outbound seats 000
"First league"
"Second league"
New York Hong Kong Tokyo
Average daily frequency of flights2 by destination
45666699
111215151719212730353841414144
68
6885
9798CDG
FRALHRAMS
LGWMXPMADFCOMANMUCBRUZRHDUSORYHELLISDUBVIECPHARN
ATHBCNGVAPRGLYS
WAWBUD
MRS
35234689
13181723232034
1941
3248
3551
9628
61
234215
408153
0
11.86.7
26.06.8
2.03.64.66.5
4.01.9
4.94.8
1.52.5
0.91.9
4.80.91.82.2
2.23.32.4
0.90.4
1.41.0 0
0000000
00000
00
0
0
000
3.22.4
10.22.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
00000000
0
00
00
0
0
0
0
4.93.04.7
2.0
1.0
1.4
1.0
1.0
0.6
0.80.9
Three "leagues" of airports can be identified in long-haul offering
Schipholcurrently in top league
SOURCE: Back Aviation Solutions OAG database; McKinsey analysis
1 Flights lasting more than 6 hours included2 Weekly number of connections divided by seven
12 month period ending March 2009
McKinsey & Company 34|
Small home market is a potential threat for Schiphol attractiveness as a hub location, however relatively good score on other key factors
SOURCE: Expert interviews; McKinsey analysis
(Intercontinental) hub key success factors
Schiphol Frankfurt London (LHR) Paris
Evaluation of major EU hubs vs key success factors
Schiphol and Frankfurt are well positioned to serve as major EU hub and have strong infrastructure, small home market is primary weakness
London, although it has a strong home market, suffers from bad weather, sub-optimal geographical location and congested infrastructure
Paris has a strong home market, good location, good weather, but is a question mark due to its bad infrastructure
Large home market, .i.e. high O&D volume
Strong infrastructure and sufficient expansion options1
Favorable location (center of, e.g., continent)
Other (e.g., weather, quality,)
EXPERT OPINION
~
~
~ ~~
1 Includes hinterland connectivity (landzijdige bereikbaarheid), Airport infrastructure as well as airside connectivity (luchtzijdige bereikbaarheid)
McKinsey & Company 35|
Within the top-league, Schiphol has least long-haul destinations and is relatively dependent on transfer passengers
1 Number of annual flights divided by 3652 Flights lasting more than 6 hours included
SOURCE: OAG; UK CAA; McKinsey analysis
Passenger compositionMillion, 2007
45
59
65
68
87
35 68LHR
32 57CDG
AMS 41 46
13 35LGW
O&DTransfer100% =
55FRA 53
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
AMS CDGFRA
LHR
Long-haul destinations2Number
Frequency1Daily average
Airport breadth and depth12 month period ending March 2009
1st league2nd league3th league
McKinsey & Company 36|
Schiphol physically has most room for infrastructure expansionHectare of available land for expansion within a 20x20 km area around the airport
SOURCE: Internationale benchmark capaciteit luchthavens, Kennisinstituut voor Mobiliteitsbeleid; McKinsey analysis
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
DubaiAmsterdamMadridLondon StanstedParis CDGRomeFrankfurtLondon GatwickMunchenHelsinkiBarcelonaLondon LHRBrusselsMilan MalpensaCopenhagenViennaWeezeKolnLiegeIstanbulLuxemburgZurichParis - CharleroiDusseldorfManchester
Capacity for runways
Capacity for businesses
Within Europe, Schiphol has most room for business expansion
Schiphol also has most room forrunway expansion1
However, actual expansion potential dependent on restrictive policies, such as noise restrictions
1 Not taking the effect of noise and other restrictions on actual capacity into account
McKinsey & Company 37|
Schiphol is relatively constrained in its airside access, but easily accessible by land
90
97
97
89
23
10
11
77% 705Paris (CDG)
539Frankfurt
3 489London (LHR)
3 450Schiphol
291London (LGW)
Available slots
Used slots100% =
Together with Heathrow, Schiphol is very constrained on the airside access of the airportUsage of landing and take-off slots within legal constrains, 2007
SOURCE: Internationale benchmark capaciteit luchthavens, KiM; Airport capacity profiles, IATA; McKinsey analysis
Schiphol is 2nd best airport with regard to ease of access by land after FrankfurtGround access, 2003
30
10
16
29
10
4
4
4
4
4-6
15,970
36,500
18,220
29,900
27,000
Journey time to city centre by trainminutes
Frequency of train connectionPer hour
# of parking spaces
#1 #1 #2
McKinsey & Company 38|
Schiphol profits from being in a highly accessible location for trans-porting air cargo in to Europe, with fierce competition however
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.7
0.9
1.3
1.6
2.1
2.1
2 Frankfurt
3 Schiphol
4 London (LHR)
5 Luxembourg
6 Brussels
7 Cologne
8 Liege
9 Milan (MXP)
10 Copenhagen
1 Paris (CDG)
European Trucking Accessibility MapBased on time travel matrix1
Low accessibility High accessibility
21
34
56 7
9
10
8
Top 10 European Airfreight AirportsMillion metric tons, 2007
1 The travel time matrix and resulting accessibility indicator for trucks, i.e. for good transport, can be interpreted from the perspective of producers on (potential) markets as the answer to the question which location has the highest market potential
2 Top ten share of total volume transported is 64%
SOURCE: ACI; IRPUD; McKinsey analysis
McKinsey & Company 39|
While Schiphol is a large cargo airport, relatively air cargo is less important than passenger for understanding future capacity constraints
Amsterdams position as a major cargo airport seems secure due to its size Air cargo throughput, 2007 1000x tons
but Liege took off during that last 10 yearsFreight activity, 1000x tons
SOURCE: Sowaer website; ACI; Helder Kiezen, keuzes helder maken; McKinsey analysis
2,074Frankfurt / Main2,053Paris De Gaulle
1,610Schiphol1,314London Heathrow
856Luxembourg738Brussels705Cologne / Bonn
490Liege471Milan Malpensa
396Copenhagen333Istanbul322Madrid275East Midlands265Zurich251Munich207London Stansted192Vienna171London Gatwick166Manchester134Milan Orio al Serio
490406
32638237432727327020816435810
1994 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 0605 07
As full freighters account for only 4% of all Schiphol flight movements, the remainder of this chapter focuses on passenger demand
20 76Schiphol
Major carriersFull
FreighterLCC
100%4
Pax flights are significantly larger in volume to than full freightPercent of total number of flight movements, 2006
McKinsey & Company 40|
There are 5 key drivers of air passenger volume growth towards 2040
SOURCE: Expert interviews; McKinsey analysis
High
Low
1 Visits to Friends and Relatives
1
2
3
4
5
Access to destinations
Alternatives to flying
Real economic growth
Continued globalization
Cost of flying
Description of trend Change in trend? Impact of driver
Real GDP growth is the key driver of air travel demand: more business means more travel and more GDP per capita means more leisure demand
Future economic growth uncertain, but will still be a key driver of air travel demand growth, question is at what multiplier?
Globalization increases the need for business travel to meet with overseas business relationships
Global social networks and VFR1 trips increase
Decreasing cost of flying (in real terms) has been a key driver of traffic growth, especially leisure demand
Increased offering of number of destinations and frequency
Trip time decreased
There is a physical limit to improvement of access and marginal utility of increasing frequency declines
Land travel: train, car Communication: video conferencing, virtual
meetings
High speed rail will play an important role on intra EU traffic
Virtual meetings impact on business travel is a question mark
Past Future
Key question mark is cost of (alternative) fuels and climate taxes
Globalization may continue, but may also flatten out as a response to current economic crisis
McKinsey & Company 41|
Economic growth has been the key driver of global passenger volumes
SOURCE: Worldbank World Development Indicators; ICAO; McKinsey analysis
y = 2.0562x - 0.0166R2 = 0.536
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
-3.00% -2.00% -1.00% 0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00%
Year on year change in global airline passengers carried, %
Year on year change in global real GDP%
1974, 75 stock crash, oil
1973 stock crash, oil
2004 recovery
1991, Gulf War
2002 (post-9/11)
1982, recession
Expectation given GDP change, 2009
Historically, there is a reasonably high correlation (R of 0.70) between changes in real GDP and passenger numbers
However, duringshocks to the economic system this relationship is broken
Observed YTD, 2009
Economic shocks
Normal GDP-air travel growth correlation
1BACK-UPCorrelation between yoy change in real GDP and global passenger numbers, 1971-2007
McKinsey & Company 42|
Globalization is an important underlying driver of air passenger volume2
Air travel to do business
International labour movement
Evidence
12111198
6665
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
+10%
Number of seats (mln seats per annum both ways combined) offered on flights between China,HK and EU increased by 10% p.a.
Number of offered seats on Emirates flights from Dubai to India increased from 306 thousand in 2000 to 1.8 million in 2008
At the same time, the number of destinations in India served by Emirates increased from 4 to 10
SOURCE: SOURCE: Innovata schedules via APGdat, OECD; McKinsey analysis
1 Austria, Czech Rep, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland. Portugal, Switzerland, UK taken as sample for Europe
ILLUSTRATIVE
Explanation
Increasing business links between China and Europe
Value of FDI of European countries in China increased with an ~18% CAGRbetween 2000 and 2005*
Airline capacity offered between China and Europe also increased substantially
A high number of Indian people are currently employed in Dubai working eg in the hospitality industry and in construction
This has also led to substantial increase in air flows between Dubai and India
McKinsey & Company 43|
Cost of flying decreased significantly
1 yield = passenger revenue / revenue pax km2 Association of European Airlines members only, system wide traffic
SOURCE: AEA; McKinsey analysis
Passenger yield1 European carriers2, constant, USD cents / RPK
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 200710,0
10,5
11,0
11,5
12,0
12,5
13,0
13,5
14,0
14,5
15,0
15,5
16,0
16,5
17,0
17,5
-26%
3
McKinsey & Company 44|
Leisure demand is most sensitive to price changes
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0
Elasticity
More Less
Rationale
Paid for by company; no substitutes
One part of trip spend but no need to travel
Paid for but has someland substitutes
One part of trip spend but no need to travel
Paid for but has many land substitutes
Opportunistic price-driven booking
3 SYNTHESIS OF 21PREVIOUS STUDIES
SOURCE: Air travel demand elasticities - Concepts, issues and measurement, Gillen, Morrison & Rietveld (2002)
Numberof studies
2
6
2
2
3
3
Market segment
Long-haul inter-national business
Long-haul inter-national leisure
Long-haul domestic business
Long-haul domestic leisure
Short-haul business
Short-haul leisure
Number ofestimates
16
49
26
6
16
16
McKinsey & Company 45|
At consistent high fuel prices airlines may change their behavior, reducing frequencies in order to increase load factor
60 55 5148
26
14
100 100
11050
21
202224
27
100
140
100
Fixed cost1
32
Other variable cost2
80
Fuel cost
Percentage of total operating costs for an average stage-length
Price of jet fuel $/bbl
As fuel costs increase, airlines may change their behavior
In a fixed cost environment, airlines were prepared to discount seats heavily to contribute to their fixed cost base
With variable costs above 50%, airlines may be prepared to reduce frequencies and only fly when the aircraft has adequate yield
The industry break-even oil price is around ~$95/bbl, at which point variable costs are ~45% of revenue
3
1 i.e., in the near term, cost is not affected by the load factor or the number of frequencies flown2 Most variable cost (including fuel) varies mainly according to the number of frequencies flown rather than the load factor
SOURCE: Airline industry fuel model; annual reports; Airline Business; press searches; McKinsey analysis
McKinsey & Company 46|
Ease of access to far-away destinations increased over time
SOURCE: OAG; press articles; McKinsey analysis
4 CASE EXAMPLE
Kangaroo route in 1947 55 hours needed to fly the route, excluding
stopovers 6 stopovers, including two overnighters: London-
Tripoli-Cairo-Karachi-Calcutta-Singapore-Darwin-Sydney
Lockheed Constellation flying the route, carrying 29 passengers
Average Australian needed to work 130 weeks to buy a return ticket
Kangaroo route now 21.8 hours needed to fly the route One stopover (e.g., in Bangkok, Singapore, Hong
Kong) B747-400, B777, A380 flying the route* carrying
between 224-525 passengers Average Australian needs to work 2 weeks to buy
a return ticket
McKinsey & Company 47|
High speed rail is a substitute for short-haul flights
SOURCE: UK CAA; Press Research; McKinsey analysis
5
Market share on Paris-London Route Market share on Brussels-London Route
64 69 71 72
36 31 29 28
100
2003
100
2004
100
2005
100
2006
56 6165
52 4439 35
48
100
2003
100
2004
100
2005
100
2006
Airplane
EurostarMarket shares, percent
McKinsey & Company 48|
Long-term scenarios are formulated as combinations of these 5 factors
SOURCE: Expert interviews; Workshop discussions; McKinsey analysis
Description of scenario and impact on air travel demand
High growth
Moderate growth
Low growth
Global scenario
Acce
ss to
desti
natio
nsAl
terna
tives
to fly
ing
~ ?
?
Glob
al rea
l
econ
omic
grow
thCo
ntinu
ed
globa
lizati
onCo
st of
flying
~
1 2 3 4 5
~5%
~3%
~1%
PositiveNegative
... Growth CAGR, %
Economic scenario Continued economic globalization
resulting in high economic growth and further supply chain specialization
Further reduction in real cost of flying, driven by technological advances and plenty available alter-native energy at reasonable cost
Stable economic globalization resulting in moderate economic growth and stable supply chain specialization
Real cost of flying flattens out, driven by and high cost of fuel and limited technological advances
De-globalization resulting in low economic growth and reversed supply chain specialization
Real cost of flying flattens out, driven by and high cost of fuel and limited technological advances
Impact on air travel demand High leisure demand
growth due to low ticket and global social and business networks
High business demand growth due to high econo-mic growth and continued economic globalization
Moderate leisure demand growth
Moderate business demand growth
Low leisure and inter-continental business demand growth
Moderate intra-Europe business demand growth
McKinsey & Company 49|
2.03.0
4.03.5
1.5
1.0
1.01.5
Volume growth under these scenarios could vary from 1-5% p.a.
SOURCE: Boeing; workshop discussions; expert interviews; McKinsey analysis
2007 volumesRPK, trillionFrom EU to
2040 volumesRPK, trillion
Growth assumptionCAGR, %
0.6EU0.4NA0.4ASIA0.4ROW1.8Total
Scenario summary description + =
2.01.9
2.42.08.2
1.21.1
1.41.24.9
1.00.60.50.62.8
Continued economic globalization Further reduction in real cost of
flying High leisure demand growth High business demand growth
3.5
4.7
5.75.0
>4x
~3x
McKinsey & Company 50|
Pre-crisis market forecasts support the high growth scenario of 5% growth per annum
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14 Boeing
Airbus
AirlineMonitor
5.0
4.6
4.8
CAGR07-27Global passenger growth
Actuals
SOURCE: Boeing, Airbus, Global Insight; McKinsey analysis
Market forecasters see continued strong growth in global pax
The Boeing detailed growth rate forecasts for EU traffic are used as proxy for the High Growth Scenario
European passenger growth1
3.5
5.0
5.7
0
1
2
3
4
5
EU-ASIA
EU-RoW
EU-NA
EU-EU
4.7
1 Based on Boeing detailed traffic outlook per region
2000 20272007
2000 20272007
RPK, trillions, 2000-2027
BACK-UP
McKinsey & Company 51|
Airline consolidation and airport capacity constraints are key determinants of what the EU airport industry will look like in 2040
SOURCE: DGLM interviews; Expert interviews; McKinsey analysis
High
LowDescription of trend Impact on EU airport sector Importance
Carrier consolidation
Airlines are consolidating to increase scale economies
In a low growth scenario with airport overcapacity, airlines with multiple hubs in close proximity might rationalize the hub function
Competing non-EU hubs/carriers
Large ME carriers (e.g. Emirates) with a favorable geographic hub location compete for traffic
EU hubs maybe bypassed on increasing number of routes when these carriers get equipment that can economically make these alternative connections
Specialized airplanes
Larger equipment (A380) for trunk routes and specialize smaller equipment for long-haul direct connections make more combinations possible
Large economic equipment increases shift towards mega hub consolidation
Specialized long-haul equipment enables carriers to bypass large hubs
Rise of LCC
The market has seen an inflow of LCC and point-to-point players, flying directly between peripheral cities and even creating completely new routes
Pure LCCs do not compete with mainline carriers for traffic on key routes between large cities
EXPERT OPINIONS
Airport capacity constraints
Currently all major European airports are facing serious capacity constraints
In a high growth scenario without a step change in capacity by 1 or more of the 1sttier EU airports, growth will defer to 2nd tier airports and hub consolidation will not occur
1 depending on degree of airline consolidation, which is a driving factor
McKinsey & Company 52|
Key question is to what extend hubs will consolidate into mega hubsand what the role of Schiphol could be under such a scenario
SOURCE: Expert interviews; DGLM interviews; workshop discussions; McKinsey analysis
EU airline sector has consolidated into 3 major players Each carrier has concentrated its intercontinental hub activities into one mega
hub, facilitated by a step-change in capacity by these airports Schiphol has become a large mega hub with daily connections to more then
100 intercontinental destinations
Schiphol still a hub >5 large EU hubs
Schiphol grows into a mega hub 3 large EU hubs
EU airline sector has not consolidated much further OR airline consolidation has not resulted in hub consolidation due to airport capacity constraints
Current airport landscape still in tact, all airports have grown at the same pace as far as capacity constraints allowed them to.
Schiphol has maintained its current position as one of the 5+ major European hubs.
EU airline sector has consolidated into 3 major players Each carrier has concentrated its intercontinental hub activities into one large
mega hub, facilitated by a step-change in capacity by these airports Schiphol is not one of these 3 hubs, and has become a large 2nd tier airport,
with specialized intercontinental routes and a large European network
Scenario name Scenario need to believes
A
B
C
Schiphol not a hubanymore3 large EU hubs
S
i
z
e
o
f
S
c
h
i
p
h
o
l
McKinsey & Company 53|
2.7x 2.7x
Schiphol passenger volume could be 1-7x current volumes by 2040Schiphol 2040 passenger volume growth scenarios, indexed, volumes 2007 = 1
SOURCE: Workshop discussion; McKinsey analysis
Schiphol still a hub 5 large EU hubs1
Schiphol growsinto a mega hub 3 large EU hubs1
A B CSchiphol not a hub anymore3 large EU hubs1
High growth ~5%
Moderate growth
3.5x
Low growth ~1%
2.8x1.4x
Transfer
O&D
5.0x 5.0x
10.0x
5.0x
5.3x2.7x
1.4x 1.4x
0.7x2.7x
0.3x 1.4x
1.3x
5.0x
Assumptions: Today ~40% of passenger
volumes is transfer
If Schiphol not a hub, it looses 75% of transfer passengers
If Schiphol becomes a mega hub, transfer volume doubles, as Schiphol takes over transfer passengers from other hubs. This is on top of autonomous market volume growth
ESTIMATES
1.9x
1.0x
5.0x
2.7x
1.4x
7.0x
3.7x
1.9x
~3%
Total
Can growth be accommodated at current location?
Yes
Uncertain
No
McKinsey & Company 54|
Beyond 2.5-3x volume growth, relocation of Schiphol might be necessary
SOURCE: workshop discussions; McKinsey analysis
Replace short-haul traffic by train
Overflow to regional airports
Physical runwayoptimization at current location
Optimize use of current infrastructure
Reduces burden on capacity from feeder flights (e.g., Antwerp, Brussels, Copenhagen, )
Extent Schiphol with extra runways at current location in order to increase capacity within noise / environmental boundaries
Transfer non-hub dependent traffic, especially LCC and charters, to overflow airports such as Eindhoven and Lelystad
E.g. shorter takeoff/landing intervals; optimize slot allocation and queuing system; reconsider noise restrictions; more pax/plane
Rationale
1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 8x
Expand at alternative location or relocate
Build new airports or expansion within 5-10 minutes by super fast train to current Schiphol (e.g., Singapore)
x1.2
X1.5-2
?
x1.1
Capacity increase multiplier
x
>8x
Volume growth factor Schiphol 2040 vs 2007
Low GrowthSchiphol not a hub
Moderate growth, Schiphol still a hub
High GrowthSchiphol a mega hub
7x
High growth, Schiphol still a hub
Actions
INDICATIVEESTIMATES
McKinsey & Company 55|
Schiphol could increase capacity by outplacing non-hub traffic
SOURCE: Lange Termijnverkennning Schiphol; Helder Kiezen, keuzes helder maken; McKinsey analysis
8 412 24Schiphol
17Paris (CDG)
7Frankfurt
1London (LHR)
Full Freighter
LCC- leisure & Charter
LCC -business motive
Currently, 24% of Schiphol flight movements do not contribute to the hub function
By moving charters and LCC with leisure motive to regional airports, Schiphol can free-up 8% of current capacity
If LCCs with a business motives also would be moved, Schiphol could free-up 20% of current capacity, creating room to increasehub related capacity by 25%
Percent of total number of flight movements, 2006
McKinsey & Company 56|
Schiphol could potentially double its capacity at current location
SOURCE: Lange termijnverkenning Schiphol; Jaarverslag Schiphol Group 2008; IATA; OAG; ACI; McKinsey analysis
INDICATIVEESTIMATES
~ 2x current traffic of 50 mln pax per annum
47Current operations
13Headroom capacity within current constraints
60Current foreseen maximum
10Technological advances -planes make less noise
10Technological advances -larger planes
80Capacity after technological advances
10Policy - stimulate use of larger planes
0-10Policy - enforce use of quiet planes
?Policy -less restrictive regulation
~100Capacity after policy measures
Impact of measures on passenger capacity Million
Schiphol Airport passenger capacity, million pax per year
Assumptions / rationale
2008 total pax handled 47 million
Current terminal capacity 60 million pax
New aircraft are 50% quieter than aircraft 10 years ago; IATA expects a 50% reduction in noise by 2020
Average aircraft size at LHR is currently 28% more than at AMS (195 seats versus 152 seats)
Use landing charges to incentivize use of quieter planes
Relaxation of regulation to increase competitiveness
Trend towards larger equipment, especially for truck routes (e.g. A380)
McKinsey & Company 57|
Substitution of feeder flights by HSL is estimated to have a small impact, unless all short-haul flights would be substituted
SOURCE: Lange Termijnverkennning Schiphol; McKinsey analysis
300
800
3,100
Total
Other1
Frankfurt
Brussels
London
5,800
15,000-21000
5,000-11,000
Paris
Feeder flights on destinations within 500-800 km can be partly substituted by High Speed RailNumber of flight movements that can be substituted
60
Assumed substitution %
Current total number of flight movements
of ~450.0001 Other European spokes within 500-800 km from Schiphol, such as Munich, Zurich, Lyon, Geneva, Copenhagen2 Assuming 100% substitution for Paris, London, Brussels, Frankfurt and the lower range of other (assuming 10% substitution for original estimate)
49
7
11
~3
Estimated effect of substitution 100.0002flight movements or 17% of capacity
This excludes the extra traffic that will be attracted as the effective catchment area is being enlarged
na
McKinsey & Company 58|
Contents
Role of the Mainports for the economy
Interdependence between the Mainports?
Strategic choices Schiphol
Strategic choices Port of Rotterdam
Appendix - Beantwoording offerte vragen
McKinsey & Company 59|
The port of Rotterdam is the largest European port, especially in the dry and liquid bulk segments
SOURCE: Port of Rotterdam (Port Statistics); McKinsey analysis
Total throughput 2006-07, Mln tons
0 100 200 300 400 500
2003
Rotterdam
Antwerpen
Hamburg
Amsterdam
Le Havre
Bremen
Duinkerken
Wilhemshaven
Zeebrugge
Gent
2007
Total dry bulk throughput 2007, Mln tons
1722
28105
512725
91
3641
14246271540
187
129
PoR
119
Antw
99
Hamb
10
Adam
28
Le H
58
Bre
16
Dnk
0
Wilh Z.bru
34
Containers
Other general
Gent
5
Total liquid bulk throughput 2007, Mln tons
Total container and general cargo throughput 2007, Mln tons
Rotterdam is the biggest port of Europe especially in bulk, while it has similar container volumes compared to its main competitors
24%
49%
26%
Market share Rotterdam
Delta 2003-07
28%
32%
34%
10%
42%
14%
8%
38%
-5%
49%
McKinsey & Company 60|
Historically, Rotterdam has benefited from strong global trade growth, driven by underlying global trade flow drivers
SOURCE: McKinsey global trade flows
Catch-up effect in 90s and 00s (opening of E. Europe/China)
ESTIMATES
Growth in global con-sumption/production
0.1 - 0.2Productivitygains
0.3-0.5 0.5 - 0.7
Labor cost arbitrage
~0.2
0.5-0.7
0.7 -0.9
Increasing specialization
0.3-0.51.7 - 2.1
2.0-2.6
Total multiple(trade on GDP)
~0.2
0.7 - 0.8
Long-term drivers of trade growth, 1980-2008
Sectors with high transport intensity (agriculture, construction) grow slower than GDP
Service industries grow faster than GDP
Substantial global labor cost differentials remain
Real transport cost at historical lows
Economies of scale drive consolidation in manufacturing
Multi-national manufacturers operate trade-intensive net-works and technology clusters become global factories
Long-term trade to GDP growth expectedat around 2
Catch up effect of 90s/00s fading
Impact on global trade
Physical output outpaces real value added
Factor as multiple of global GDP
0
9,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
Global trade growth, 87-08, mln tonnes
1987 2008
2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 20070
340
360
320
420
400
380
Rotterdam total volumes, 00-07, mln tonnes
McKinsey & Company 61|
Key global trends likely to drive cargo volume growth towards 2040
Globalization
New (liquid) commodities
Increase of global business resulting in more global trade
Emergence of different trade patterns driven by shifting economical powers and new rising economies (e.g., Africa)
Description of drivers
Rise of alternative liquid fuels driven by renewable energy revolution (e.g., biofuels, H2, other types of energy carrying liquids, LNG)
3Tick mark explanation
2Increased globalization
Decreased globalization
Low cost energy
Rise of alternative energy will result in low energy cost, both due to abundance of energy as low environmental taxes as renewables impose less burden on the environment
Rise of cheap new energy
Continued dependence on expensive fossil fuels
Depletion / Recycling
Depletion of easy to quarry raw materials could result is shift to harder to quarry raw materials in the rest of the world accompanied by changing trade flows
Possible rise of new commodities due to increased recycling with likely shifting trade patterns
Depletion and increased recycling
Little recycling possible depletion
Plenty new commodities
Continued dependence on current liquids
SOURCE: Expert interviews; workshops; McKinsey analysis
McKinsey & Company 62|
Future scenarios are formulated as combinations of these key drivers
SOURCE: Expert interviews; team analysis
Impact on global trade volumes
High growth
Low growth
Econ
omic
grow
th
Glob
aliza
tion
Low
cost
energ
y
High economical growth, while global trade volume outgrows GDP growth driven by increased globalization, specialization of supply chains, and cheap alternative energy
Gap between OECD and emerging countries becomes significantly smaller (e.g. factor costs, GDP per capita and consumption)
Medium growth
Moderate global economic growth due to climate taxes and expensive energy cost
Continuation of gap between emerging countries and OECD
Majority of production remains in Asia as difference in factor cost continues to exist
Low economic growth due to expensive energy and multiple international conflicts which has lead to de-globalization (regionalization)
High transport costs and international conflicts and crisis lead to emergence of regional trade areasalong continental split (i.e. EU, Asia, North Africa)
~
Global scenario1
1 See appendix for detailed description of scenarios and megatrends
Megatrends1:
Glob
al su
pply
chain
s
Delta
facto
r cos
ts
~
~
Recy
cling
/ dep
letion
New
comm
oditie
s
?
?
~5%
~3%
~1%
PositiveNegativeGrowth CAGR, %
McKinsey & Company 63|
CPB WLO scenarios are used to quantify these scenarios
SOURCE: Welvaart en Leefomgeving: scenario descriptions
Global Economy
CPB WLO scenarios Link to scenarios in this report
Similar to High Growth scenario Globalized open economy High global economic growth Low environmental burden on economy
Regional Communities
Similar to Low growth scenario Regional trade areas Low economic growth Environmental policies potentially
harming growth of economy
Transatlantic Market
Similar to Moderate growth scenario Current level of globalization remains Medium economic growth Difference in factor cost remain
between OECD and developing countries
Story behind CPB WLO scenario
Little governmental intervention in the European Union
Liberalization of global trade EU expands with Turkey, Ukraine
and other small countries Increased labor mobility
EU member states focus primarily on national interests
EU redirects its attention to the US Global free trade agreements fail Increased flexibility of the labor
market
Little modernization of welfare states World fragmented in couple of Trade-
blocks Welfare split in old EU members
and new EU members No free global trade
McKinsey & Company 64|
CPB scenarios estimate overall growth between -0.5% and 2.5% p.a.
SOURCE: CPB, Aanpassing WLO scenarios voor containervervoer, McKinsey analysis
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
Regional Communities
Strong Europe
Transatlantic Market
Global Economy
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Regional Communities
Strong EuropeTransatlantic Market
Global Economy
Total volume Dutch ports (including container)
Total container volume Dutch ports
1984 2005 2020 2040
Total volume is expected to grow at maximum 2-3%, and is even expected to shrink in RC scenario
Primary driver behind this growth arecontainer volumes
2.5
CAGR, 2005-40, %
-0.5
5.2
1.3
1.4
3.3
Mln ton
McKinsey & Company 65|
Overall throughput growth is primarily driven by container segment
SOURCE: CPB, Aanpassing WLO scenarios voor containervervoer, McKinsey analysis
High Growth
Medium Growth
Low Growth
Global scenario
Scenario summary description
Volume 2040, mln tonnes Size vs 07
CPB scenario
542Container
426Bulk
968Total
High economical growth, while global trade volume outgrows GDP growth driven by increased globalization, specialization of supply chains, and cheap alternative energy
Gap between OECD and emerging countries becomes significantly smaller (e.g. factor costs, GDP per capita and consumption)
287Container
362Bulk
649Total
Moderate global economic growth due to climate taxes and expensive energy cost
Continuation of gap between emerging countries and OECD
Majority of production remains in Asia as difference in factor cost continues to exist
144Container
191Bulk
335Total
Low economic growth due to expensive energy and multiple international conflicts which has lead to de-globalization (regionalization)
High transport costs and international conflicts and crisis lead to emergence of regional trade areas along continental split (i.e. EU, Asia, North Africa)
A
B
C
5.9
1.5
2.6
3.1
1.3
1.8
1.6
0.7
0.9
McKinsey & Company 66|
The high growth CPB scenario would require a combination of verypositive developments to materialize
542
287
14492
2005 Low Growth
Medium Growth
High Growth
The high growth CBP scenario
SOURCE: CPB, Aanpassing WLO scenarios voor containervervoer, McKinsey analysis
implies one has to believe that
Consumption per capita of containerized goods in Western Europe increases by a factor 6x, and/or
the ~10% containers with non-Western Europe final destination grows by a 2 digit factor, and/or
global supply chains specialize further to such an extent that goods are shipped back-and-forward multiple times more than today
10.50.30.2Implied containers per capita
Mln ton
~90% of Rotterdam container throughput has a Western-European final destination
McKinsey & Company 67|
Especially the moderate and high growth scenarios could create serious congestion problems
Terminal transshipment capacity
Terminal space / storage capacity
Hinterland connections
SOURCE: McKinsey analysis
Explanation
Liquid Bulk Little room for expansion of current storage capacity on terminals
Sufficient spare capacity for pipelines to hinterland
Container Terminal storage space reached its limits early 2007, but 2nd Maasvlakte likely to provide sufficient storage
Hinterland connections (especially road) currently congested, likely to become worse
~
Dry Bulk Storage capacity likely to be sufficient Hinterland connections mainly by rail
and barge, no major bottleneck expected
~
No bottleneck
Bottleneck
Detailed further
ILLUSTRATIVE
McKinsey & Company 68|
Different actions can help to accommodate container volume growth
SOURCE: Team analysis
Expansion ofhinterland road network
Transport more containers by rail or barge
Expansion of rail network capacity
Intermodal hubbing in Hinterland
Enlargement of Ring-Rotterdam from 2-3 lanes to 4-5 lanes and A15 & A59 from 2 lanes to 4 lanes
Build 2nd Noord-oeverconnection
Prepare roads with possible capacity increase
Build 2nd Betuweroute to accommodate growth
Build an new dedicated rail-route to Antwerp
Expand requirements set for certain modal split for all new-build capacity on 2ndMaasvlakte to rest of port
Construct Inland hubs and divert all transfer containers to this hub
Examples of actions
1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x 7x
Volume growth factor of Port of Rotterdam
Low Growth Medium Growth High Growth
+ ~1
+ ~1
+ ~1
Dedicated freight corridor to North of NL
Set-up a barge corridor to divert all cargo currently trucked to the north
+~0.3
+~0.5
CONTAINER HINTERLAND CONGESTION
Additional capacity from measure
+
ROUGH ESTIMATES
McKinsey & Company 69|
Rotterdam has the most containerized transfer traffic in the Hamburg -Le Havre rangeDestin