Mayer & Schouten - Energy Security and Climate Security Under Conditions of the Anthropocene

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Contents

List of Tables vii

List of Figures viii

Series Preface ix

Acknowledgements xii

Notes on Contributors xiii

List of Abbreviations xv

Introduction: Challenges to Energy Security in the Era of ClimateChange 1

Jonathan Symons

Part I Conceptualising Energy Security in the Era ofClimate Change

1 Energy Security and Climate Security under Conditions of theAnthropocene 13Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten

2 Unmasking the Invisible Giant: Energy Efficiency in thePolitics of Climate and Energy 36Mark Lister

3 National Energy Security in a World Where Use of FossilFuels Is Constrained 54Hugh Saddler

4 Can Energy Security and Effective Climate Change Policies BeCompatible? 72Mark Diesendorf

Part II Climate Change and Energy Policy Formulationin Asia-Pacific

5 Energy and Environmental Challenges in China 91Xu Yi-chong

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vi Contents

6 Energy Security and Climate Change Challenges: IndiasDilemma and Policy Responses 111Tulsi C. Bisht

7 Conflicting Policies: Energy Security and Climate ChangePolicies in Japan 126Akihiro Sawa

8 Russias Energy Security and Emissions Trends: Synergies andContradictions 143Anna Korppoo and Thomas Spencer

9 Energy Security in Indonesia 161Budy P. Resosudarmo, Ariana Alisjahbana & Ditya Agung

Nurdianto

10 Energy Governance and Climate Change: Central AsiasUneasy Nexus 180Luca Anceschi

11 More Fossil Fuels and Less Carbon Emissions: Australias PolicyParadox 198Leigh Glover

Part III Multilateral Energy Governance in the Era ofClimate Change

12 Energy Security and Climate Change Tensions and Synergies 217Peter Christoff

13 Rethinking Energy Security in a Time of Transition 240Jim Falk

14 Energy Governance in the Era of Climate Change 255Joseph A. Camilleri

15 Interconnections between Climate and Energy Governance 275Jonathan Symons

Index 292

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1Energy Security and ClimateSecurity under Conditions of theAnthropoceneMaximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten

All members of the international community face a shareddilemma. To ensure well being for a growing population with unful-filled needs and rising expectation we must grow our economies.Should we fail, we increase the risk of conflict and insecurity.To grow our economies we must continue to use more energy. Muchof that energy will be in the form of fossil fuels. But if we use morefossil fuels we will accelerate climate change, which itself presentsrisks to the very security we are trying to build.

(United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, 2007)

Introduction

This chapter sets out to revisit energy security and climate security in lightof the Anthropocene. We draw on the notion of the Anthropocene in orderto ask what it means for conceptions of security that the environment hasbecome an effect of human agency. The passage quoted above, which is astatement of the British Government in the 2007 United Nation SecurityCouncil debate on climate change and security, provides an ideal startingpoint for our considerations. The dilemma that stems from the costly down-sides of the prolonged pursuit of energy security could not be expressedmore plainly: the term security appears inappropriate in energy securityas pursuing it threatens its very aim.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has called atten-tion to aspects of the same endemic danger, such as the challenge green-house gas emissions from consumption of natural resources present to theenvironment. But the challenge looms larger. Jane Lubchenco (1998, p. 491),for one, lucidly points out that:

As the magnitude of human impacts on the ecological systems of theplanet becomes apparent, there is increased realization of the intimate

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14 Energy and Climate Security and the Anthropocene

connections between these systems and human health, the economy,social justice, and national security.

Another manifestation of the same dilemma is that the 2010 Gulf Coast oilspill, which President Barack Obama called the worst environmental disasterAmerica has ever faced (The White House, 2010), resulted directly from thatnations hunger for affordable mineral resources. We therefore ask: how is itpossible that the security of nations depends on oil consumption on the onehand (Litfin, 2003), while the US President speaks of waging a battle againstan oil spill that is assaulting our shores and our citizens on the other? Or,in more general terms, why has energy security policy caused widespreadinsecurities?

Tackling this dilemma in an insightful way, Simon Dalby (2009) has hailedthe notion of the Anthropocene as a new paradigm for global politics. TheAnthropocene, a term imported from earth sciences, refers to a new geo-logical period in which human actions have such an impact that we needto fundamentally rethink our relationship to the environment (Crutzen andStroemer, 2000). Taking the work surrounding this notion as a starting point,this chapter offers a contribution to the unfolding debate on energy securityin an era of climate change, in which the meaning and importance of thenotion of the environment for contemporary security analysis has been ofcentral concern (Krause, 2003).

Accepting that the Anthropocene is not only a geological era, but is also aconcept that carries an urgent normative connotation, we here explore twoof its implications for our understanding of energy security. Firstly, rethink-ing energy security in light of the Anthropocene means we cannot leavethe externalities of its pursuit out of the picture. Attempts to rethink energysecurity for the twenty-first century that do not live up to this criterion areinadequate. Daniel Yergin (2006, p. 69), for instance, proposed a broadeningof energy security so that it does not stand by itself but is lodged in the largerrelations amongst nations and how they interact with one another. Thiswidening does not reach far enough. Nor can the inclusion of externalitiesbe accomplished by simply adding the goal of limiting greenhouse gas emis-sions to the traditional agenda of adequate, reliable, and affordable energyresources (Verrastro and Sarah Ladislaw, 2007, p 103; Bradshaw, 2009).

If these were viable solutions, we might ask why so little progress hasbeen achieved in tackling the double challenge of energy security and cli-mate change (Deutch, Lauvergeon, and Prawiraatmadja, 2007, p. 2). An arrayof econometric studies point to the intricate linkages, trade-offs and possi-ble synergies between the pursuit of energy security and climate mitigationpolicies (cf. Turton and Barreto, 2006; Lefvre, 2007; Brown and Hunting-ton, 2008). Realising that fundamental insecurity persists despite successfulattainment of energy security leads us to reconsider the premises uponwhich thinking about security is based. The first implication then is that

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Maximilian Mayer and Peer Schouten 15

under the Anthropocene, the factuality of the modern separation betweenmankind and nature is breaking down to uncover a contested web ofrelations, not reflected in the confident ontology underpinning energysecurity.

Second and related, we need to take one step beyond discursive under-standings of (energy) security. To conceptualise security as discourse and,subsequently, energy security as a discursive political agenda, is to adopt thelanguage of radical constructivism and to treat energy and climate secu-rity as merely socially constructed. This comfortably removes from sightthe many externalities of their pursuit. Instead, an adequate conception ofenergy security needs to incorporate the material processes by which weattain that security, and to conceptualise climate concerns as a reality atthe intersection of its physical and social history (Byrne and Glover, 2005,p. 6). The second implication of taking the Anthropocene seriously is thatwe must methodically treat security not as merely socially constructed butrather as also built up from and threatened by the very material ele-ments that are mobilised and assembled in its pursuit. Taken together, thesetwo implications mark a shift in the way in which the relationship betweennature and human society conditions our understanding of security.

Outline of the chapter

In the following section, we first show how different scholars in debatessurrounding security and the environment agree that our notion of securityneeds to be rethought, as existing conceptualisations, based on a traditionalmeaning of national security, have proven of limited use in responding toenvironmental concerns,1 to subsequently lay out what it would mean torethink security in light of the Anthropocene.

The third section explores ways to incorporate energy securitys external-ities into the analysis. It does so by building on insights from the abovetheoretical debate while adding a conceptual twist. From an actor-networktheory inspired perspective, we argue that rethinking energy security inlight of the Anthropocene requires first rethinking the relationship betweenpolitical discourses on security and nature. We propose that taking theAnthropocene condition seriously requires us to move beyond the discursiveturn to consider energy security as an assemblage, constituted by and depen-dent on both social and material elements, and which in turn directlyimpacts upon both rather than being a social construct divorced fromnature. The section continues to analyse energy security and those agendasconcerned with its externalities environmental and climate security asdifferent ways of assembling the same elements from the biosphere. Show-ing how these agendas constitute agencies by pushing and pulling the sameelements reveals the interwovenness of, and feedback loops between, socialand natural elements that are hidden by discursive representations of theseagendas. Through examples, it shows how alternate renderings of climate

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security have tended to assemble the climate as a security issue in ways verysimilar to energy security agendas.

In the conclusion to this chapter, we argue that by considering these alter-nate agendas as political agencies working on the same elements in differentways, it becomes possible to pin down the shortcomings of energy security.We identify a series of focal points that must be addressed if the debate is tomove further, and argue that the principles of inclusiveness and symmetrywould enable us to unsettle our narrow understanding of security and createspace for a broader range of concerns.

Conceptualising Security in the Anthropocene Era

Within critical security studies, security is understood as an essentially con-tested concept. This entails recognition that invoking security involvesspecific actors uttering speech acts that reveal conflicting interests, and sub-sequently, that security cannot be feasibly reduced to any single perspective.Security has thus come to be understood as a way of speaking about politicalissues; securitisation refers to the discursive process by which an issue is ele-vated from normal politics and constituted as a priority issue that warrantsextraordinary policies (Wver, 1995; Huysmans, 2006). In this understand-ing, security is more socially constructed than objectively determined(Barnett, 2001b, p. 2). Whereas this approach accounts for the contested andshifting nature of security, it also delinks discursive security from an objec-tively determined realm to which nature belongs. Recognising security ascontested and partial reveals that any such agenda involves a contentiousarticulation of the relation between nature and security; an articulationdeveloped by someone, for someone and for some purpose (Buzan, Wver,and Wilde, 1998; Stern, 2005). Asking who this agenda serves, instead ofaccepting energy security as a universally shared goal, denaturalises the linkbetween energy consumption and security.

Energy security: Securitising national consumption

Energy security is commonly understood as a political agenda concernedwith governance of energy production and consumption in service ofnational economies. Securitising an issue like energy provision takes it out ofthe domain of normal politics and constitutes it as an exceptional concern.Importantly, the elevation of one particular kind of concern as a securityissue reduces the broader environment to a slim object of political disagree-ment and silences it as a concern. Consequently, the imposed relationshipbetween nature and security is quintessentially biased towards concernsstemming from a national interest, conflicting not only with other nationalinterests but also with security conceptions foregrounding subnational orglobal interests (cf. Lubeck, Watts and Lipschutz, 2007). Firmly rooted in therealist framework that perceives the world beyond ones national borders

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as anarchic and relations with other states as antagonistic, energy securityhas been concerned with national referent objects with pre-given inter-ests. These interests have been taken as preservation of a fixed supply ofnatural resources to feed a national economy in a manner that leaves ecol-ogy unproblematised. With energy security successfully securitised, only avery limited aspect of the relation between human agency and the naturalenvironment receives political (and analytical) attention.

Environmental and climate security: Broadening the scope

This narrow understanding of energy security while still in broad use has come under heavy scrutiny, as is reflected in the broad debate aboutenvironmental security. Ironically, energy securitys continued and effectivepurchase has given rise to even bigger threats to national security such asabrupt climate shifts (Barnett, 2001a; Dalby, 2002; Liotta, 2005).

Subsequently, these externalities also became securitised (Floyd, 2008;Trombetta, 2008). Since the mid-1990s, climate concerns have increasinglyappeared in national security strategies, framed as threats to national well-being (Dalby, 2009). Recent efforts by various international institutions toseparate out climate change into different measurable security issues (Brauchand Zundel, 2008; Brauch, 2009) can also be seen as applications of the sameprinciple, in which the relationship between mankind and the environmentis fixed again by securitisation. Environmental security becomes constructedin terms of technological and modernist managerial assertions of controlwithin a geopolitical imaginary of states and territorial entities (Dalby, 2002,p. 146). Again, successful securitisations of particular aspects of the relation-ship between human agency and the natural environment constitute thelatter as a limited, stable and apprehensible object in service of or threat-ening the former. In this process, the reverse dynamic by which humanagency affects the natural environment is by and large discarded.

Alternate securitisations such as environmental or climate security, despitesome differences (Brzoska, 2009), are based on, and ultimately lead to, thesame kind of reductionism as the energy security agenda. This reductionismis made evident by the lack of clear evidence for a straightforward path-way between environmental change and conflict, for linkage between fossilresources and interstate wars, or between climate change and societal col-lapse, despite almost 30 years of research (Mcab and Bailey, 2007; Dalby,2009). We thus witness the same principle at work both in energy securityand in alternate securitisations that challenge it by incorporating more mat-ters of concern. Both energy security and climate security are thus contestedsecuritisations, each with a limited and conflicting scope of matters of con-cern. To explore why Anthropogenic insecurity persists despite the effortsmobilised and concerns addressed by these agendas, we need to uncoverwhat these dominant securitisations of energy and climate change share.

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Nature black-boxed

The different agendas energy security, environmental security and cli-mate security all present us with a reductionist account of the naturalenvironment and how it is related to human agency. All three agendas arepremised upon a modern, anthropocentric, ontological separation of natureand society, in which nature is a black box, a mechanical, factual entitythat requires mastery.2 Society, instead, is more fluid and determines whatcounts as a matter of concern that requires us to act upon nature in a cer-tain way. Indeed, it is the concern of a social subject that drives the shiftingsecuritisations of natural objects. Energy security reduces nature to a factualamount of barrels of oil per day, which is of importance to the demands setby a human referent object. While climate security broadens the concern tothe social repercussions of this process, it is premised upon the same under-standing and foregrounds the same social concerns. The content of bothsecuritisations is social and disembedded from nature, which merely formsa passive context to be acted upon.

The Anthropocene: Unleashing mankind as a natural force

The anthropocentric understanding underpinning the aforementioned secu-ritisations is challenged by insights from climate scientists; foregroundingthe notion of the Anthropocene, they emphasise not human control over,but human influence on the environment (Hulme, 2010). Recognising thecentral role of humankind in geology and ecology since the IndustrialRevolution, Nobel laureate Paul J. Crutzen proposed to call the period char-acterised by that influence the Anthropocene. Crutzen and others havesubsequently advocated a re-embedding of mankind in the environment asthe point of departure for feasible social science (Clark and Munn, 1986;Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; cf. Marsh 1874). They advocate a shift infocus from concerns such as building pipelines, ever-deeper offshore drilling,the calculation of arable land for food production and incentivising othernations to reduce emissions, to shifting climate patterns, rapidly decreas-ing water resources and the use of the atmosphere as a gigantic emissionsdump. In other words, when global economic and consumption dynamicsare considered an agency working upon nature, security becomes linked todifferent matters of concern.

But ultimately, the challenge goes further: it requires the reinterpretationof what security means in light of a different interpretation of moder-nity (cf. Litfin, 2003). Starting with the Industrial Revolution, mankind hasgained unprecedented control over nature. Nature became, in the under-standing of the Enlightenment, a force that can be understood, controlledand domesticated in a mechanistic way, to serve shifting social interestsover time (Bauman, 1995).3 Nature was made to behave like a classical eco-nomic commodity and reduced to a passive factor of production land.

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Because nature appeared to react in a predictable way to our interventions,economics, politics and social theory became divorced from environmentalconsiderations (Barry, 1999; Steffen, 2004).

Yet with increased control came unprecedented influence we, indeed,now live on a human-dominated planet (Lubchenco, 1998, p. 491). Iron-ically, due to human agency, nature has come to constitute a severe threatto livelihoods and whole nations, as illustrated by the small island statesthat are already beginning to move their citizens to secure lands. Further-more, it is recognised that global and local feedback loops between natureand human interventions therein, as well as non-linear irreversible dynam-ics, could lead to unforeseen disasters eventually destabilising the globalecosystem (Hansen, 2005; Solomon and Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-mate Change, 2007). As humans are rapidly changing global ecologicalsystems often with unpredictable and threatening results the mod-ernist understanding that a clear and easily defined difference exists betweenobjective factors and dynamics of nature and the contingent processes ofsociety is giving way to numerous continuing border conflicts (Beck, 2002;Tsing, 2005). Adopting these premises, a different picture arises, consisting ofintricate interwovenness, perpetual feedback loops and the essential embed-dedness of the human enterprise in nature. Social scientists have gone asfar as proclaiming the death of nature in a naturalistic sense, that is, asan adversary to the social, and replacing it with an ontology of nature as asocial phenomenon (Jokinen, 1997). In the following section, we explorewhat it means for our conception of security in the cases of securitisationsof energy, the environment and the climate, to merge the ontology of thesocial and the natural into one.

Energy Security, Environmental Security and Climate Securityas Assemblages

This section draws upon insights from science and technology studies ingeneral and actor-network theory in particular to provide an analysis ofhow energy, environmental and climate security can be understood as dis-tinct assemblages that enrol essentially the same elements but to differenteffects.4 Securitisations of nature are understood not as social constructions,but rather as associations both of social and material elements, involvingpolitical and economic practices, material flows, infrastructure and ecolog-ical environments as well as human resistance and narratives of nationalsecurity.5

Security assemblages that perform and shape the world are here definedconceptually as networks of elements linked by actors or programmaticagencies.6 This stance entails methodically moving beyond the discursivefocus of securitisation. Rather than solely constituting security discoursesabout some aspect of nature, actors involve these aspects of nature by actively

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transforming them to fit a particular agenda (Rose and Miller, 1992; Latour,1993). As such, the contested discourses of energy, environmental and cli-mate security are hybrid agencies consisting of a complex blending of socialand biophysical factors (Forsyth, 2001, p. 150) working upon nature indefinite and finite ways (Latour, 2004, 2005). In order to act upon suchvast assemblages, all elements have to be translated into a language thatpermits intervention, by separating out what matters into economically orpolitically apprehensible concerns. The notion of translation is pivotal foractor-network theory. It refers to all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations,acts of persuasion and violence thanks to which an actor or force takes, orcauses to be conferred on itself, authority to speak or act on behalf of anotheractor or force (Callon and Latour, 1992, p. 279). The notion thus literallycaptures the transformation of elements through the associations made byactors in a securitisation.

In line with the rich body of work surrounding such thinkers as Arne Naessand more recently Bruno Latour, who have each in their own way argued fora notion of the social that incorporates both nature and mankind as mat-ters of concern (Callon, 1986; Mol, 1998; Barry, 2001; Barad, 2003; Jasanoff,2005; Asdal, 2008; Bingham and Hinchliffe, 2008; Morin, 2009; Gammon,2010), we here summarise our analytical lens as based on the two criteriaof inclusiveness and symmetry. Inclusiveness refers to the scope and breadthof a notion of security in terms of the elements assembled as endogenousmatters of concern rather than as exogenous matters of fact.7 Secondly, sym-metry is a criterion that implies equal inclusion of both social and naturalagencies and concerns. Thus, neither a notion of security focusing primarilyon human concerns (as does energy security), nor privileging environmentalconcerns (as do radical variants of deep ecology) will suffice. Directing ourattention instead to the hybrid agencies that assemble heterogeneous ele-ments, hopefully avoids the bias that inevitably results in one-sided researchendeavours and destructive or infeasible policy agendas, which have helpedto bring about the Anthropocene era in the first place.

Assembling energy security

Energy security is commonly understood as simply the availability of suffi-cient supplies at affordable prices, that is, a variable of national economicgrowth to be secured through markets, political and, if necessary, militaryaction. By extension, political and scholarly concern with energy security ispremised on threats to the smooth functioning of national economies aris-ing from sharp increases in prices, instability in oil-producing countries orgeopolitical tensions. As such, hydrocarbon resources in general, and oil andgas reserves in particular,8 are deemed the lifeblood of civilization; for thisreason, they are a central preoccupation of national security agendas (Zweigand Bi, 2005; Amineh and Houweling, 2007; Marquina Barrio, 2008; Moranand Russell, 2009).

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While specific national energy security strategies may diverge as exportand import countries follow diverging interests and strategic policies appearto compete with market-based approaches, their similarities by far outweightheir differences. The basic assumptions have remained constant over time.The standard contemporary understanding of energy security has not devi-ated from the canonical definition offered by the US Department of Energyin 1985 (as cited in Hirsch, 1987, p. 1472):

Energy security means that adequate supplies of energy at reasonable costare physically available to US consumers from both domestic and for-eign sources. It means that the nation is less vulnerable to disruptions inenergy supply and that it is better prepared to handle them if they shouldoccur.

Ever since Winston Churchill made oil dependence a core concern of Britishstrategy, energy policies have shared an emphasis on securing sustainednational energy consumption patterns and a supply-side focus. The corematter of concern is thus the question whether there will be sufficientresources to meet the worlds energy requirements in the decades ahead (Yer-gin, 2006, p. 70). Politicians commonly invoke the national rationale forthe inevitable primacy of exploring new oil reserves, as President Obamas(2010) assertion illustrates:

But the bottom line is this: given our energy needs, in order to sustain eco-nomic growth, produce jobs, and keep our businesses competitive, weregoing to need to harness traditional sources of fuel even as we ramp upproduction of new sources of renewable, homegrown energy.

The security community as well as energy companies present energy secu-rity to their audience neatly cleaned up and seemingly consisting of onlymarket efficiency and strategic concerns while in fact it is made up just asmuch of material and other multifarious elements. It incorporates naturalelements like the resource endowments of national territories and techni-cal infrastructure like pipelines or oil tankers as much as it does socialor discursive ones: a successful securitisation of nature that foregroundssecure access to energy (rather than for instance environmental concerns),needs to assemble social actors consisting of oil companies, US legislators,refineries and platforms, deep sea drilling technologies, but also geother-mal tendencies, global consumption habits and the downsides of alternativetechnologies.

Numerous studies illustrate the multifaceted and continuous assemblingefforts of different agencies that the pursuit of energy security requires tokeep the globe-spanning energy security assemblage in place. US and Chi-nese oil companies work hand in hand with their respective governments,

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and, in the case of the United States, with the armed forces, in orderto explore and extract crude oil (Klare, 2004; Mitchell, 2007). Oil com-panies, however, also must persistently organise the coupled processes offinancial accumulation and crude oil extraction to stabilise the world oilmarket. The specific materiality of crude oil shapes not only the territo-rialisation of global productions networks but also the internal politicalstructures of rentier states (Bridge, 2008; Labban, 2008). At a local level, thesame assemblage requires production, distribution and regulation regimesacross the globe, which involve multiple disparate issues to be enrolled andkept in place. Moreover, the car assemblage has restructured entire land-scapes, has significantly changed urban planning and architecture as well ascommon patterns of leisure and work life. Car and oil companies, whichare integral parts of the energy security assemblage, are also among theeconomically most powerful global enterprises (Merriman (2009), see alsoUrry, 2007).

It is equally important for our purpose to note what energy security doesnot incorporate as a matter of concern, namely, corrupt regimes financedby fossil revenues and plutocratic dictatorships and corruption in theglobal petroleum sector at large (McPherson and MacSearraigh, 2007), theresource curse (Collier, 2007), biodiversity surrounding coal mines anddrilling platforms, the military as a major environmental polluter (Deudney,1999; McNeil, 2009) and the consequences of energy consumption on theenvironment all elements impacted by the pursuit of energy security. Dis-tribution conflicts over oil revenues sustain civil wars, and can even threatenthe subsistence of states where resource revenues reignite conflict along eth-nic fault lines, sustaining the fragmentation of already weak states (Kaldor,Karl and Said, 2007; Watts, 2009).

Another example of how such externalities are actively silenced out ofthe energy security assemblage by the conscious efforts of agencies is thatin the United States, the Global Climate Coalition organised by the fossilindustries successfully undermined a widening of public and scientific con-cerns on the greenhouse effect throughout the 1990s (Levy and Egan, 1998,p. 343; Antilla, 2005). Similarly, influential international relation scholars,by invoking a supposedly established hierarchy of security issues, activelysilence environmental concerns (Lacey, 2005). Through these seeminglydisparate assembling agencies, energy security, with its restricted scope ofconcern, has largely managed to hold these elements stable as passive mat-ters of fact that react as expected to interventions stemming from our energydesires and present no cause for concern. By translating all elements intothe economic terms of supply and demand, the energy security assem-blage produces a parsimonious social matter of concern. At the same time,this translation process silences and hides many elements and concernsthat respond differently to petro-politics (cf. aliskan and Callon, 2010).While these social and material effects are very much linked into thenetwork of elements constituting the energy security assemblage, they are

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not represented as matters of concern and as such remain largely invisibleborder conflicts.

Assembling environmental security

Environmental security is qualitatively different from energy security in sofar as it does not represent a single parsimonious global assemblage. Instead,it points to the competition between interest groups that are differentlyaffected by energy production processes such as mining, drilling or energy-related development projects (Peluso and Watts, 2001). The many cases ofenvironmental securitisations thus present us with a more diffuse and con-fused array of matters of concern, ranging from local and transnationalcompeting interest groups to wildlife diversity and the preservation of theGold Coast of California. They dissolve the rational language of resourcesupply and demand into a wide array of affected contradicting interests ofhumans, animals and whole ecosystems. By giving these actors a voice, envi-ronmental securitisations are assemblages revolving around different mattersof concern.

The US reactions to the huge underwater oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico inMay 2010 perfectly illustrate how energy and environmental security are atonce linked and at odds. First, a draft climate bill which was to encourageoil drilling in US territory was hastily revised to take the opposing posi-tion (Broder, 2010b). Second, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger halted oilexploration projects along the Californian Coast stating his most pressingconcerns on television:

All of you have seen when you turn on the television the devastation inthe Gulf. And Im sure that they also were assured that it is safe to drill.I see on TV the birds drenched in oil, the fishermen out of work, themassive oil spill, oil slick destroying our precious ecosystem. It will nothappen here in California. (Rothfeld, 2010)

The sort of environmental security Schwarzenegger evokes here concernsoil, but it assembles it differently and draws in more elements than energysecurity does including for instance birds, fisherman and the ecosystem.Instead of aggregate national concerns, it brings to the fore many of the con-sequences of oil production that are otherwise silenced. As such, it exposesmatters of fact that are silenced by the energy security agenda and makesthem matters of concern. Whereas the environmental security agenda isoften treated as a separate concern from the energy security agenda, thisexample shows how environmental security is literally attached to the sameassemblage of drilling platforms and submarine ecologies as energy security an assemblage that is differently enrolled by invoking environmental con-cerns. To put it differently, the oilrig off the Gulf Coast, which had previouslybeen a smooth-functioning technical element in an energy security assem-blage, was revealed to be an unstable network of elements that could not

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simply be transposed to the Californian coast without possibly unacceptableenvironmental costs.

Where environmental securitisations gain in inclusiveness and symmetryvis--vis energy securitisations of related assemblages of elements, they pointto much less straightforward policy agendas. The notion of security under-pinning environmental security is much less wedded to the policy-readystate centrism underpinning energy security. For instance, an environmen-tal securitisation of the Arctic region extends the perspective from that ofa single state to that of a hybrid referent object (consisting of biodiver-sity, indigenous people and mankind through potentially rising sea levels)threatened by crude oil production, industrial pollution and rising localtemperatures (Martello, 2008; Kristoffersen and Young, 2010).

Assembling climate security

Climate security involves new programmatic agencies and further extendsthe range of concerns assembled to include beyond local and regionaltransformation and pollution of livelihoods long-term increases in aver-age temperatures, the global interconnectedness of feedback loops and allkinds of linkages between disparate components of the biosphere (e.g. Over-peck and Cole, 2006; Lenton et al., 2008). Since only climate and earthsciences can detect and visualise the complex and increasingly non-lineardynamics of fragile global ecosystems that eventually need to be actedupon (Demeritt, 2001; Hulme, 2009; see also Taylor and Buttel, 1992), thescientific community represents a central agency assembling climate secu-rity (Mayer, forthcoming). The assembled elements are translated into thealarming language of abruptness and tipping points in ecological regimes(Risbey, 2008; see also Cox, 2002; Pearce, 2006; Fagan, 2008), as for instancehere by US presidential science adviser John Holdren: Climate scientistsworry about tipping points thresholds beyond which a small additionalincrease in average temperature or some associated climate variable resultsin major changes to the affected system (ScienceDaily, 2010).

Furthermore, competing climate security assemblages refer to differentreferent objects that have to be secured accordingly. For instance, whereasclimate scientists warn against very rapid changes in regional and local eco-logical systems with huge global environmental repercussions, think-tanksand strategists assemble the climate flickers as amplifying local conflictsover resources and societal instability and leading to interstate rivalriesand, ultimately, anarchy (Schwartz and Randall, 2003; Borgerson, 2008;cf. Maas and Tnzler, 2009). Climate security assembled in the latter wayechoes the environmental determinism of the 1990s and directly circlesback to the logic of energy security (cf.: Judkins, Smith, and Keys, 2008;Dalby, 2009). For example, a group of former US generals recently concludedthat since climate change amplifies the problem of unstable governments itdemands military stabilisation operations worldwide. The generals invoke

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the US resource supply as threatened: Political instability also makes accessto African trade and resources, on which the US is reliant for both militaryand civilian uses, a riskier proposition (CNA, 2007, p. 20).

In the Arctic, where rapid temperature increase has surpassed even recentscientific predictions (Leichenko and OBrien, 2008, pp. 91103), state agen-cies have started to react to rapid physical changes and enrolled them asthreats to sovereignty and economic interests. Studies show that the sea iceover the North Pole might vanish completely within the next 30 years (Hol-land, Bitz, and Tremblay, 2006; Wang and Overland, 2009), which in turnrenders existing assemblages of state practices unstable. Climate change isthus forcing the state system to confront its accepted suppositions aboutthe relationship amongst land, state, territory, and nation (Gerhardt et al.,2010, p. 999).

The rapid sea ice melting is enabling gas and oil exploration and openingup the Northwest Passage as a major new shipping route for world trade.Reacting to the exposure of multiple undetermined border demarcations,the Canadian government is rapidly extending its military presence at theAmerican continents northern rim in order to control the Northwest Passageand to assert its sovereignty claims (Byers, 2009). When Canadas ForeignAffairs Minister Lawrence Cannon labels his country an Arctic superpower,he is mainly referring to the abundant fossil reserves in the Arctic that wouldmake Canada another Energy Superpower (Boswell, 2009).

On the opposite side of the Arctic ocean, Russias government tries tosecure territorial claims and the interests of its national oil companiesstretching over the whole North Pole by re-establishing its strategic bearbombers patrol flights and large-scale military drills (Zysk, 2010). Duringone of Premier Vladimir V. Putins nature adventures to Franz Josef Landthat received considerable attention in the Russian mass media, the Pre-mier enrolled the polar bear, also figuring as national personification, asan element of the climate security assemblage. Emphasising at once Rus-sias profound strategic interests in the Region, the dire consequences of iceshield reduction and sea ice melting for the animals living conditions, thebear, he declared, is the real master of the Arctic (Harding, 2010). In August2007, Russian scientists, claiming the North Pole belongs to Russia, placed atitanium Russian flag on the North Pole seafloor.

Although nationalist rhetoric abounds, Denmark, Russia and Canada com-mitted in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration to solve their territorial disputeswithin the framework of international law. These nations are now fundinghuge scientific research projects to map the Arctics continental shelves inpreparation for 2013, when the United Nations (UN) seabed commission willfinally determine which country owns the Arctic according to InternationalLaw. As such, geologists and lawyers, who shall determine which nationsown the exclusive rights of exploiting the large gas and oil reserves underthe Arctic seabed (Byers, 2009; Gerhardt et al., 2010), are drawn into climate

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security assemblages too. Meanwhile, Chinese scholars, seeing huge poten-tial in the opening up of new trade routes, proclaim their nations rightsin the Arctic region. The Chinese state connects itself with the rapid ecolog-ical changes in the Far North not only through research teams that makeinroads into the region, but also via a formidable flotilla of new icebreakers(Jakobson, 2010; McLeary, 2010).

Other assembling agencies are also active. In contrast to these competi-tive regional postures, the diplomatic context of the ongoing internationalclimate negotiations does not primarily enrol climate change as a threatto national sovereignty, territory and petro-politics. The 2009 CopenhagenAccord that has been signed by all major world powers, has set a 2-degreebenchmark for stabilisation of the global average temperature (Broder,2010a). Here, the stability of the earth system is assembled as the mainmatter of concern, and ecological change in the Arctic is not enrolled as asovereignty issue, but as chemical dynamic (methane emissions) that pushesthe whole earth system over a threshold (Sample, 2005).

Importantly, as the above examples show, environmental security andclimate concerns push and pull the same elements that make up energysecurity assemblages, albeit in different directions. As discussed above, anoilrig off the Louisiana coast, while constructed as an element in securingenergy supplies, can also be mobilised as part of an environmental securityassemblage; and climate concerns can be mobilised to fortify the militari-sation of an energy security agenda. Whereas climate security foregroundshuman and natural concerns more or less on an equal level and includesmore elements than either energy or environmental security assemblagesdo, it has proven more difficult to assemble the political agencies necessaryto implement the agenda of climate mitigation. By symmetrically includingthe technical and natural elements and the social concerns assembled underthe headers of the various agendas in our discussion, it becomes evident howeach agenda links them differently and to what effect. Beyond mere securiti-sations, these distinct renderings actively transform the assembled elementsto different, and competing, effects. What is also revealed is that the com-peting assembling efforts of energy, environment and climate securitisationsare often blurred; overlapping ambiguities are enrolled in varying ways, butthe strategic agencies of those spearheading an energy security assemblagealways appear dominant.

Conclusions

This chapter started with a central dilemma of current world politics: weurgently need to balance the pursuit of energy security with broader socialand ecological concerns. While various studies made important inroads ininvestigating the conditions enabling such a multidimensional balancingact, this chapter has argued that a tenacious issue remains that existing

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conceptions of security do not accommodate broader environmental con-cerns. By revisiting the underpinnings of energy security in light of theproblmatique of the Anthropocene, we argue that it is only by consideringboth the consumption of hydrocarbon resources and the consequences oftheir extraction and usage as endogenous matters of concern that redefini-tions of energy security will enjoy any success in unsettling unsustainableand treacherous patterns.

The main theoretical contribution of this chapter lies in conceptualisingagendas pursuing energy, environmental and climate security not as socialconstructs but rather as assemblages. Progressive variants of security stud-ies, including those critical of the traditional energy security agenda, havetended to treat security as part of the discursive realm, either as a discourseor as a securitisation, divorced from both technical problems and physi-cal reality, thus requiring a different conceptual toolbox. In doing so, theyrun counter to the central tenet of the Anthropocene that modern humanagency is currently the biggest natural force.

Drawing on insights from actor-network theory, this chapter entails threemain points. Firstly, in conceptualising security as assemblages embedded inand linked to the very natural objects they concern, it becomes apparenthow competing programmatic efforts working upon nature in fact consti-tute it as an object amenable to intervention. They are not mere discursivenarratives by politically organised groups of humans about nature, but rathertransformations of nature. As an effect, as Dalby (2002, p. 194) puts it, wehave learnt to represent nature as an unproblematic object, knowable viaclassification and experiment, and above all infinitely manipulable in theservice of human purpose.

Secondly, actor-network theory allows us to narrate the effects of com-peting discourses in a distinct way. The concurrent existence of competingdefinitions of the relationship between nature and security (that assemblefrom the same heterogeneous variety of elements but differently) pointsto the jostling inherent in politics in an inherently unstable world (Cal-lon and Latour, 1992). A move in one node of these vast and complexassemblages reverberates all over because of the different feedback loopsand interdependencies between elements: one human intervention medi-ated by technology impacts on the environment, which in turn responds,leading to constrained human acts that modify the assemblages as awhole. By bringing the effects of these assembling efforts into the pic-ture as matters of concern, the condition of the Anthropocene becomesapparent. Rather than critically lamenting capitalist social constructs orabstract but dangerous dominant discourses, we have shown how assem-blages of energy, environmental or climate security only persist because ofthe active assembling efforts of actors and programmatic agencies. High-lighting these efforts is an essential part of actor-network theory and hasthe advantage of revealing concretely the specific political agencies that,

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geared at sustaining energy security, impact on nature in complex andvaried ways.

Finally, through the notions of inclusiveness and symmetry, our approachuncovers the paradoxes of energy security by bringing the material back intoanalysis of energy security. Inclusiveness brings to the fore the externalitiessilenced by energy security, and symmetry shows that material and naturalelements are as much a part of securitisations of energy as are discursive ele-ments. We were thus able to shed a different light on the question of howit is possible that we might successfully attain energy security (e.g. success-fully securitise the environment in a particular way) and yet deepen globalinsecurities.

Energy security is the most powerful amongst the securitisations of naturewe discussed. It forms an assemblage that holds stable uncountable associa-tions between huge material and financial flows, and enrols a wide array ofactors and agencies. Neither environmental nor climate security, which aremostly small and regional or locally based assemblages, reach the parsimonyand global scale of energy security. Under its header, the use of fossil fuels,national political legitimacy and the structure of the international systemhave become deeply intertwined. By analysing how the agencies upholdingenergy security assemblages neatly separate out the relevant concerns con-cerns in a language consisting of market efficiency and strategic tools, as wellas how material linkages to such externalities as pollution, climate changeand other environmental concerns become silenced, it becomes possible toassess the success of energy security. Energy security, with its restricted scopeof concern, is anchored in an anthropocentric myth of limited social con-cerns prevailing over an extensive natural context that can be filled anddrilled with the proper technology.

The downside of this immense power is, ironically, the paradox of theAnthropocene: whereas human impact on ecological systems is growingquickly, it is at the same time hard to see how society has increased itscontrol over nature, when in fact converging lines and fragile complexinterdependencies are laid bare by climate change. If the multiple forms ofinterwovenness of environment (encompassing the climate) and humanswere assembled as sharing the status of matter of concern against whichto measure interventions, energy security agendas would be less parsimo-nious, but energy consumption would possibly be better attuned to itsconsequences for the biosphere.

One of the main difficulties remaining is formulating policy or creatingprocesses and institutions for the pursuit of balanced energy and climatesecurity under conditions of the Anthropocene, that is, when nature isno longer naturalistic, and security no longer a socio-political construct.Answering this question is beyond the scope of this chapter. Yet, it becomesclear that conceptually, nature cannot be held constant as a matter of fact

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to be acted upon by humans according to their shifting social concerns.Instead of this anthropocentric worldview, the reality of (often differently)assembled referent objects including those actors that are habituallysilenced as pure facts or others that we usually isolate from their surround-ing (ecological) systems should form the starting point when formulatingsecurity matters of concern. It is only by acknowledging this condition, forinstance through the methodology of inclusiveness and symmetry, that onecould begin to conceive of a notion of security that will not ultimately renderus more insecure.

Notes

1. Susan Strange (1999) already stressed the systematic failure of the internationalsystem to limit environmental pollution. Simon Dalby (2002, p. xxiii) asserts that[the] limitations of international relations thinking are especially acute when mat-ters of global environmental politics and environmental security are concerned.Anthony Giddens (2009) links the political economy of energy security to cli-mate politics, and calls for radical changes in human interaction with nature toavoid disastrous climate change. Still others point to the intersection of energysecurity, climate change, food and water scarcity that places huge pressure on theinternational security (WBGU, 2007; Lee, 2009).

2. This argument has often been voiced as a (postmodern) analysis or critique againstmodern social sciences, cf. Latour (1993, 2004, 2005) and Beck (1995).

3. Also see aliskan and Callon (2009); Hall and Klitgaard (2006); Latour (1993);Polanyi (2001), for criticisms of the disembedding of different aspects of societyand the complicity of different social sciences herein.

4. This section draws heavily on the work of actor-network theory (ANT) (Callon andLaw, 1982, 1997; Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 2005; Law and Callon, 1988; Callonand Latour, 1992; Law, 1991, 1992, 2008; DeLanda, 2006; Law and Mol, 2008). Fora more in-depth discussion and empirical applications of ANT within internationalsecurity studies, see Schouten (2010, 2011).

5. Securitisation theory explicitly bases itself on a linguistic approach called speechact theory deriving from the work of Searle (1965) and Austin (1962).

6. While the term assemblage is a core ANT term referring both to a network ofheterogeneous actors (be they material, human, discursive or natural) and any dis-cursive representation of such a network (Latour, 2005), the term has also beengaining purchase in security studies to refer to networks of security actors cross-cutting public/private, formal/informal and local/global divides. See Abrahamsenand Williams (2009, 2011) and Schouten (2010) for a discussion of assemblagesthat links both approaches.

7. As with much of the discussion in this section, this distinction between mattersof concern and matters of fact derives from Latour (2005); any actant or elementcan be assembled as a black box, that is, a stable building block, or as a capriciousconcern.

8. Due to the relative abundance and equal distribution, its material characteristics,and the lack of a global market coal (and biomass) is rarely a concern of energysecurity.

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Quarterly, 57: 10411.

PROOF

September 7, 2011 8:26 MAC/CESHI Page-292 9780230_279872_18_ind01

Index

actor-network theory, 16, 19, 278adaptation, see climate changealternative energy, see renewable energyAmu-Darya, 183Anthropocene, 1415, 18, 28, 242anthropocentrism, 3, 18, 20, 27, 28AOSIS (Association of Small Island

States), 225, 234Aral Sea, 191Arctic, 246

territorial disputes, 25ASEAN, 161, 166, 171Ashgabat, 181, 191Asian Development Bank, 189Asian Financial Crisis, 162, 164Asia-Pacific region

definition of, 3Astana, 181, 191Australia

Australian Alliance to Save Energy, 50Australian Greens Party, 207Australian Labor Party, 204, 205, 208,

232Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme,

657, 207, 210, 211Council of Australia Governments,

205emissions targets, 204, 206, 235energy efficiency, 404, 202energy security, 638, 2023energy trade of, 221, 232Energy White Paper, 44, 46, 59, 201Liberal Party/National Party coalition,

204, 205, 207Ministerial Council on Energy, 65National Electricity Market, 634National Emissions Trading Taskforce,

206National Energy Security Assessment,

198National Greenhouse Response

Strategy, 206New South Wales GHG Abatement

System, 206

politics of emissions pricing, 5Prime Ministerial Task Group on

Emissions Trading, 206Renewable Energy Target, 65, 67role in climate negotiations, 199,

2034, 205, 208, 2323separation of energy security and

climate policy, 65, 203supply-side bias, 446, 199201

Azerbaijan, 191, 192

Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, 181, 189Bali Action Plan, 119, 263, 264Bali Conference, 204, 264, 269BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India,

China), 119, 225behavioural economics, 469Beijing, 92, 97, 104, 105, 107, 109Beluga sturgeon, 193Berdymukhammedov, Gurbanguly M.,

184biomass, 29n8, 42, 77, 78, 79, 92, 97,

100, 113, 114, 115, 122, 135, 169,171, 172, 289

Bishkek, 181Black Sea, 150Blair, Tony, 207Bosnia and Herzegovina, 145Bovanenko gas field, 145Brazil

emissions targets, 235Bush Administration (George H.W.), 262Bush Administration (George W.), 228

California, 9, 23, 24, 43, 78Canada, 8, 22, 133, 134, 205, 220, 223,

230, 232, 235, 237emissions targets, 235security interests, 25

carbon credits (international), 6, 1389and Australia, 66, 69and Japan, 139, 140

292

PROOF


Index 293

carbon dioxide (CO2)atmospheric concentrations, 734,

244, 2802, 285carbon capture and storage, x, 39,

768, 801, 86, 202, 210, 263climate change and, 2, 261deforestation and, 162, 1634,

173, 175energy production and, 38, 7484, 99,

11819, 131, 149, 152, 264,276, 282

ocean acidification and, 281pricing of, 5, 46, 263, 287, 289

Carter Doctrine, 227Caspian Environmental Programme, 193Caspian Sea, 4, 191, 1923, 194Central Asia, 8, 150, 151, 18095, 229Central Asia Power System, 1934Centre for Science and Environment

(CSE), 118China

Assets Supervision and AdministrationCommission, 106

Clean Development Mechanism, 287Communist Party, 105domestic determinants of climate

policies, 957, 22930emissions targets, 99, 235energy efficiency, 93, 96, 97, 99, 101,

102, 1045, 229, 230energy security, 92, 957, 1002, 107,

108Five Year Plans, 93, 229Medium- to Long-term Energy

Conservation Plan, 93Medium and Long-term Energy

Development Plan (20042020),93

Ministry of Environmental Protection(MEP), 104, 106, 107

Ministry of Finance, 106, 107Ministry of Land and Resources, 106Ministry of Water Resources, 106National Development and Reform

Commission (NDRC), 101, 106,107

National Energy Administration, 106,107

National Environmental ProtectionAdministration, 106

National Peoples Congress, 106role in climate negotiations, 2245,

227, 229, 2378, 284State Administration of Coal Safety,

106state capacity, 6, 284State Council, 99, 1067State Council National Energy Leading

Group, 106State Energy Commission, 106State Grid Corporation, 101

Churchill, Winston, 21Clean Development Mechanism, 116,

119, 139, 224, 277, 282, 287clean fossil fuels, see carbon capture and

storageclimate change

adaptation, ix, 120, 173, 192, 248,2834

as collective action problem, 283developing world mitigation and

adaptation funding, 116, 119,139, 224, 265, 276, 2867

framing of, 51impacts of, 72, 2434, 281

ice coverage, 258sea level, 258temperature, 258

and justice, 9, 14, 91, 120, 248, 269,276, 288

mitigation, emissions abatement, 5,389, 41, 276, 282

see also climate securityclimate debt, 276climate negotiations, see UN Climate

Negotiationsclimate policy, linkages to energy

security, 14, 68, 1523, 268, 275climate security, 78, 246, 834,

21819, 2434ClimateWorks Australia, 41coal, x, 2, 7, 22n8, 38, 44, 49, 55, 56, 57,

77, 84, 227, 255, 256, 289in Australia, 634, 67, 68n4, 199201,

224, 232in Central Asia, 183, 184, 185in China, 967, 101in India, 113, 115, 116in Indonesia, 16870, 173in Japan, 1345, 137

PROOF


294 Index

coal continuedpeak coal, 73in Russia, 149, 154, 157in the UK, 59in the United States, 256

Cold War, 128Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS), 150, 184Copenhagen Accord, 26, 130, 131, 211,

265, 266, 282Copenhagen COP, see UN climate

negotiations, UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change1992 (UNFCCC)

Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, 265,272, 276

Croatia, 145Crutzen, Paul J., 18, 242

Dalby, Simon, 14, 27Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Gulf of

Mexico 2010), 14, 23, 223Dushanbe, 181

economic globalisation, 7, 133, 219, 277,280

electricitydistributed generation, 41, 43, 50, 82,

252fair and secure access to, 289

in Central Asia, 181in China, 923, 101in India, 11314, 121in Indonesia, 170, 171, 172, 176,

177in Japan, 126, 132in Russia, 154

network infrastructure, 42, 43, 60, 91,93, 108, 151, 162, 2556

energy companiesE.ON, 154Gazprom, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 155RAO UES, 146Rosneft, 147RWE, 154

energy efficiency (end use), x, 67,3651, 68

administrative barriers, 47of building sector, 40electric productivity, 3940

and IEA, 567social acceptability, 467split incentives, 47see also country entries

energy market liberalisation, 55, 57, 151,2778

in Australia, 648in China, 22930in Indonesia, 164in Russia, 1467, 154, 1567in the United Kingdom, 59, 63

energy security, definition of, 1, 3, 13,1617, 21, 545, 74, 80, 91,2412, 275

and climate negotiations, 21738and climate security, 745, 21819,

2434and demand, 3651differences developed/developing

countries, 91and energy vulnerability, 218and Great Powers competition, 229,

278and sustainability, 252and water scarcity, 181, 242

energy state, typologyenergy-exporting states, 144, 2202,

226, 2301energy-importing states, 8, 219,

2212, 226energy independent states, 219,

2212, 226energy technology

and history, 2557and politics, 824

environmental externalities, 2, 3, 289see also carbon, social costs

European Union, 8, 118, 130, 144,151, 153, 181, 262, 264, 265,270n2, 277

emissions targets, 235Energy Charter Treaty, 151

fast neutron reactor, see nuclearenergy

feedback loops, 15, 19, 27, 281Ferguson, Martin, 198, 199550ppm scenario, 263, 264, 280, 281450ppm scenario, 38, 263, 264, 266,

280, 282

PROOF


Index 295

France, 128, 219, 221, 234emissions targets, 235

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, 12,1267

G-20, 266Pittsburgh summit, 173

G77 in climate negotiations, 225, 230G8 Hokkaido Toyako summit, 129G8 LAquila summit, 130Gandhi, Indira, 117Garnaut, Ross, 207, 248, 280gas, natural, 8, 72, 74, 230, 231, 232, 256

in Australia, 199200in China, 92, 96, 106in India, 11314, 123n1in Indonesia, 163, 168, 169, 170, 171,

172n1in Japan, 126, 133, 137, 138peak supply, 73, 223in Russia, 143, 145, 1467, 148, 149,

1501, 155, 156, 157in Turkmenistan, 180, 1845in Uzbekistan, 182, 185, 189see also LNG

generation IV nuclear reactor, see nuclearenergy

Geneva Declaration, 261geoengineering, 281geothermal energy, see renewable energyGermany, 148, 221, 231, 234, 245

emissions targets, 235Gillard, Julia, 205, 207Gleneagles Plan of Action on Climate

Change, Clean Energy andSustainable Development, 57

Global Climate Coalition, 22, see also oilindustry

global energy governance, 2, 245,25573, 276, 282, 28690

Global Environment Facility (GEF), 263global financial crisis, 62, 72, 93, 104,

207, 223, 268greenhouse gases, 72, 240

and agriculture, 72, 245emissions pricing, 5, 46, 263, 287, 289emissions targets, 2246, 2318,

2614, 267in the European Union, 273, 280,

286

and emissions tradingin Australia, 66globally, 224, 277in the United Kingdom, 63

social cost of emissions, 2, 289see also carbon dioxide, country

entries, climate change

Hawke, Bob, 204, 205Holocene, 242Howard, John, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,

232Hu, Jintao, 100hydro electricity, see renewable energy

Ilulissat Declaration, 25India

emissions targets, 119, 235energy efficiency, 116, 120, 122energy security, 11416energy trade of, 113, 114, 116Integrated Energy Policy (IEP), 111,

112, 11416, 1212Jammu and Kashmir (state), 246National Action Plan on Climate

Change (NAPCC), 111, 112,11721, 122, 123

National solar mission, 120, 122opposition to binding emissions

limits, 9, 119Planning Commission, 11213role in climate negotiations, 11819Rural Electrification Scheme, 121Srinagar Statement, 246

Indonesiaemissions targets, 176, 235energy efficiency, 161, 166, 172, 175energy security, 1702energy subsidies, 5, 162, 163, 170energy trade, 168, 169, 173, 222forestry, 5, 162, 1634, 175Law No. 17/2007 on the Long-term

National Development Plan(2005 2025), 170

Law No. 30/2007 on Energy, 161, 162,170

Law No. 5/2010 on the Medium-termNational Development Plan(20102014), 170

PROOF


296 Index

Indonesia continuedMinistry of Energy and Mineral

Resources, 161, 172National Electricity Company, 170Presidential Decree no 5/2006 on

National Energy Policy, 168, 170role in climate negotiations, 1734

Inel, 154Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change, 13, 37, 256, 259, 262, 270,271

First Assessment Report, 259, 285Fourth Assessment Report, 38, 117,

224, 244, 259, 280Second Assessment Report, 261

International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA), 95, 100, 250

International Energy Agency (IEA), 2, 54,57, 60, 65, 68, 77, 153, 193

and developing countries, 100and energy security, 60, 152, 270, 279establishment of, 7, 556projections of global GHG, 151shared goals, 56, 578World Energy Outlook, 378, 578, 263

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 118,231, 278

Iran, 78, 144n1, 193, 221, 229, 242emissions targets, 236

Italy, 145, 221, 231, 234emissions targets, 235

Jakarta, 163, 164Japan

Agency for Natural Resources andEnergy under the Ministry ofEconomy, Trade and Industry, 128

Basic Act on Energy Policy, 129Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 131,

140emissions reductions, 6, 1301, 137,

138, 140n2emissions targets, 129, 1301, 135,

138, 235energy efficiency, 129, 130, 137, 139,

140energy trade of, 127, 1289, 131, 134,

135Hatoyama, Yukio, 131, 138

Liberal Democratic Party of Japan(LDP), 131, 132

Long-term Energy Supply andDemand Outlook, 129

New Growth Strategy, 130role in climate negotiations, 12930

Java-Bali, 1634Joint Implementation, 156, 224JUSCANNZ-plus group, 237

Kalimantan, 163Karimov, Islam, 182Kazakhstan, 8, 181, 247

emissions structure, 1889energy legislation, 186, 192flaring, 191hydrocarbon reserves, 180, 182,

183, 184Keating, Paul, 204Kyoto Protocol, 8, 119, 139, 140, 206,

209, 2245, 231, 245, 2603, 285and Australia, 205, 232entry into force, 260, 261and Japan, 12930, 131and Russia, 143

Kyrgyzstanelectricity, 184emission structure, 1823, 1878energy insecurity, 181, 185hydropower capacity, 180, 186water issues, 193

LNG, 64, 126, 128, 132, 133LPG, 45, 156, 200Lubchenco, Jane, 13

Major Economies Forum on Energy andClimate (MEF), 266

Malaysia, 163, 189Manua Loa Observatory, 285market failure, 4, 5, 6, 489, 50, 201,

210, 288Medvedev, Dmitri A., 148Mexico

emissions targets, 236Middle East, 78, 282

gas, 133instability, 1278, 133, 223, 233and Japan, 127, 128oil, 1, 229

PROOF


Index 297

minilaterialism, 266, 270MRV (Measurable Reportable Verifiable

Commitments), 138, 140, 224, 230,286

Nabucco pipeline, 148, 151nature-society relationship, 1819neo-liberal economic policies, 54, 209New South Wales, 43, 68, 206

NSW Owen Inquiry, 43New Zealand, 205, 237, 247Non-Proliferation Treaty, 115Nord Stream, 231northwest passage, 25Norway

climate leadership, 237nuclear energy, conventional, 73, 75, 81

associated CO2 emissions, 75in China, 92, 93, 100expectations, 250generation III, 75, 81generation IV, 76in India, 113, 114, 115, 121in Japan, 128, 129, 130, 1324, 135,

137, 138and nuclear proliferation, 76popular opposition, 251risks, 84waste, 75, 76

Obama Administration, 14, 21, 228, 284Office of Gas and Electricity Markets

(UK), 623oil industry, 147, 188Olkiluoto nuclear reactor, 75Organisation for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD), 55, 250countries, 94, 118, 148, 279and IEA, 94, 118, 279, 282

Organization of the Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC), 2, 147, 164, 168,203, 211, 219, 230, 270, 278

Papua, 163Papua New Guinea, 163petroleum, 7, 20, 215, 724, 78, 91

in Australia, 56, 64, 200, 211, 218in Central Asia, 182in China, 2, 6, 912elasticity of demand, 223

in India, 113, 116in Indonesia, 161, 162, 163, 16870,

171, 172in Japan, 1278, 133, 134,

Documents

Mayer & Schouten - Energy Security and Climate Security Under Conditions of the Anthropocene