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May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University [email protected] http://www.stanford.edu/~casado

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University [email protected]

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Page 1: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

The Protection Problem in EnterpriseNetworks

Martin CasadoPhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University

[email protected]://www.stanford.edu/~casado

Page 2: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Talk Focus

Negative affects of protection measures on edge networks

Motivated by anecdotes from real networks

Introduce Ethane

Page 3: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Network Examples

National Lab, Small-moderate size business, academic, hospital

Security sensitiveMore LAN than large routable network

Page 4: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Problems Areas

InflexibilityLoss of RedundancyFiltering woes

Page 5: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Problems

InflexibilityLoss of RedundancyFiltering Woes

Page 6: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Inflexibility

L2 Switch

Firewall + Router

• If one is compromised, can’t sniff traffic of others• Can’t enumerate how many hosts on network• Can only get “out” through proxy• Prevent rogue connections

Page 7: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Inflexibility

L2 Switch

Firewall + Router

• If one is compromised, can’t sniff traffic of others• Can’t enumerate how many hosts on network• Can only get “out” through proxy• Prevent rogue connections

Firewall rulesACCEPT 192.168.1.20

Page 8: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Inflexibility

L2 Switch

Firewall + Router

•Turn of ARP

•Static ARP cache

•Ca:fe:d0:d0 192.168.1.1

Firewall rulesACCEPT 192.168.1.20

•Turn of ARP

•Static ARP cache ca:fe:de:ad:be:ef 192.168.1.20

Page 9: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Inflexibility

Firewall + Router•Turn of ARP

•Static ARP cache ca:fe:de:ad:be:ef 192.168.1.20

•Turn of ARP

•Static ARP cache

•Ca:fe:d0:d0 192.168.1.1

Firewall rulesACCEPT 192.168.1.20

No DHCP

•Also insecure

•Might undermine firewall rules

•Might undermine static ARP cache

Page 10: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Inflexibility

L2 Switch

Firewall + Router•Turn of ARP

•Static ARP cache ca:fe:de:ad:be:ef 192.168.1.20

•Turn of ARP

•Static ARP cache

•Ca:fe:d0:d0 192.168.1.1

Firewall rulesACCEPT 192.168.1.20

No DHCP

•Might undermine firewall rules

•Might undermine static ARP cache

Port Security

• Tie MAC address to Port ca:fe:de:ad:be:ef 192.168.1.20

Page 11: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Inflexibility

Topology (ports, interfaces) and addresses sprinkled throughout configuration stateNo distributed maintenance like routing tablesDifficult to move machines Moving machines can be bad

Indirection points (e.g. ARP, DHCP) insecure(.. often removed)

MAC addresses everywhereChew up memoryNo aggregation

Page 12: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Problems

InflexibilityLoss of RedundancyFiltering Woes

Page 13: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Loss of Redundancy

Page 14: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Loss of Redundancy

Easier to reason about/verifyProxies are a catalyst

Distributed firewalls are not the solutionLack of good support for L5 routing

(does anyone have this turned on?)

Existing solutions exacerbate the problem“do everything” proxiesSingle bridge NACs

Page 15: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Problems

InflexibilityLoss of RedundancyFiltering Woes

Page 16: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Filtering Woes

Filtering done on the datapath todayGenerally limited filtering state

(so can have large forwarding tables)

Common problem is running out of ACLs

MAC addresses everywhere Chew up memory No aggregation

In some networks, forwarding tables + filters doesn’t make sense ..

Page 17: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Centrally declare network policyAuthenticated end-hostsCentral-arbiter grants permission to connect

on a per flow basisCentral-arbiter has fine grained control of

routes

Ethane: Towards a Solution

Page 18: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Publishmartin.friends.ambient-streamsallow tal, sundar, aditya

Authenticatehi, I’m tal, my password is

martin.friends.ambient-streamsFirst packet to

martin.friends.ambient-streams

Global Network Policy:(allow all martin using rtp)

Authenticatehi, I’m martin, my password is

Ethane

Page 19: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

FlexibilityDynamic bindings are secure

(movement is easy)

Security policy independent of topology

RedundancyMore switches != more configuration stateFine grained control of routes allows L5 routing

Permission checks done on connection setup(taken off data path)

Ethane: Properties

Page 20: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Thanks!

?

Page 21: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Isolation

Networks exist today with differing levels of sensitivityCasino FinancialMedicalGovernment/Military

Want reasonable IsolationNo DDoS from less secure to moreNo data exfiltration from more secure to lessNote, VLANs generally insufficient

This is not solely a governmentnetwork problem

Page 22: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Today’s Solution(really) heavyweight,

application proxy(cannonicalization + fuzzy timers)

OR …

Page 23: May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006 The Protection Problem in Enterprise Networks Martin Casado PhD Student in Computer Science, Stanford University casado@cs.stanford.edu

May, 2006 EdgeNet 2006

Isolation Cont …

Obviously suboptimalManagement Number of components (MTTF)Could use same components, separate queues,

TDM

Consolidation on the road-map for some very large networks