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MASTERINGTACTICS

MASTERING TACTICS

A Tactical Decision Game Workbook

JOHN F. SCHMITT

Marine Corps AssociationQuanfico, Virginia

II,

CreditsMaj John F. Schmitt authored, coauthored, or inspired all game scenarios used in this workbook and wrote

game discussions. SSgt Henry S Johnson collaborated with Scenarios #1 and #12; Maj Bruce I. Gudmundsson, with Snahos #3 and #5; and Cot John E. Greenwood developed #11 as a direct follow-on to #10 “to insert a word of caution ab’the difficulty of identifying gaps”

Many people contribuLed to the preparation of this malerial for printing: Bonnie J. Martin did the typesettiAnne H. Wood, much of the proofreading; Robert R Fleischauer, the layout; and Richard H. Westbmok, the final prepadon on the maps.

Marine Corps Associationwww. mca-marine s , org

866-622-1775

Copyright © 1994 by Marine Corps Association.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means, electronicmechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, withopermission in writing from the publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to the Editor, Marine Corps Gazer1P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataMastering tactics: a tactical decision game workbookJohn F. Schmitt

p. cm.Includes sketch maps, appendixes, and indexISBN 0—940328—14—31. Infantry Tactics. 2. Maneuver Warfare Doctrine. 3. Decisionmaking in

Printed and bound in the United States of America

Ground Combat.

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r

ISBN

Iv

This book is dedicatedto the tacticians at thetip of the spear—to the

Marine NCOs and officerswho lead our combat unitsin the Fleet Marine Force.

Contents

Foreword by MajGen Paul K. Van Riper. USMC ix

Preface xi

ARTICLESAre You the Next Napoleon? 2Observations on Decisionmaking in Battle 6

SCENARIOS & DISCUSSIONSI Ambush at Dusk 10. 42

# 2 Platoon Ambush 1145#3 Atiack on Narrow Pass 14.48#4 AtLack on Narrow Pass Continued 16.51#5 Film at Eleven 18.53#6 Hole in the Trowzer Pocket 20.56#7 Securing Cam-Pljuna 22,59#8 Raid on Gazebo Ridge 24.61#9 Enemy Over the Bridge 26.64

#10 Gap at the Bridge 28. 68#11 Enemy Over the Bridge Continued 30. 71#12 Battle oCthe Garagiola River 32.74#13 Battle of the Garagiola River Revisited 34.78#14 Battle of Dadmamian Swamp 36.81#15 Battle of Mount Giddy 38.84

APP EN D LX ESA. Glossary olTactical Terms 90B. Glossary of Map Symbols 93C. Combat Orders 95D. U.S. Marine Infantry Battalion Organization

and Weapons 96E. Typical Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Organization 103

Solutions to Symbol Quiz 104

Index 105

About the Author 107

vii

ForewordI first met John Schmitt in February 1988 at Quantico, Virginia, during a conference

on Marine Corps doctrine. Though he was then a captain and one of the youngest andmost junior Marines attending the meeting. he displayed considerable knowledge andunusual insight throughout the discussions. I later learned that his exceptional tactical wisdom was the result of a number of years of intense and dedicated study, whichhe had successfully synthesized with his own experiences as an infantry and lightarmored infantry commander in the 2d Marine Division.

When I returned to Quantico as the director of the Command and Staff College thefollowing summer, my association with Capt Schmitt was renewed. We soon foundourselves engaged with others in long conversations on military matters. He was always able to hold his own in these talks and frequently brought new approaches to theunderstanding of complex issues. It seemed natural, therefore, to turn to him for assistance when I was looking for a better way to prepare instructors to explain the relationships between tactics and operations, and operations and strategy. His answer wasto develop a three-level decision game that instructors could practice on and then usewith students in the classroom.

Not surprisingly, there was among the dozen experienced colonels and lieutenantcolonels some skepticism that a young captain could teach them much about tacticsor operations, let alone strategy. Any doubt faded shortly after John described the historical origins of the concept of “levels of war” and launched into the game. Interestrose and understanding came quickly through his simple device. John refined thegame into a powerful instructional tool, variations of which are still in use inQuantico’s schools.

When the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen A. M. Gray. announced that hewanted to have a capstone manual written on warfighting, Capt Schmitt was detailedto the project. His knowledge of tactical doctrine and his superb intellect and writingskills soon became so evident that he was assigned as the primary author and beganworking in close association with Gen Gray. That the Commandant, a four-star general, was collaborating with a Marine captain on the Corps’ fundamental doctrinalpublication surprised many a traditionalist. The book they produced, Fleet MarineForce Manual I (FMFM I). Warfighting, alleviated any concern, for it was rapidly andwidely acknowledged inside and outside the Corps for the clarity and understandingit brought to a complicated subject.

Promulgation of FMFM 1 proved to be a watershed event for professional militaryeducation within the Marine Corps. The manual was soon in demand by officers andnoncommissioned officers alike. Though the material was complex Capt Schmitt’swriting style make it easy to read and grasp. Capt Schmitt soon followed up with asimilar and equally successful work on campaigning. The value of his unique approach to presenting doctrinal ideas in short simple prose was further evidenced bythe decision of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992 to use the same techniques and format in Joint Pub I, Joint Warfare of the US. Armed Forces.

Throughout his research and writing efforts Capt Schmitt continued to create “decision games” as a means to learn and to enhance his understanding of military concepts. He seemed to always have a new battlefield situation available to challenge as-

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sociates. Some were historical battles disguised in modern settings and others wereoriginal. My favorite was a game which merely inverted the situation British GenAllenby faced in his 1918 campaign through Palestine. This game had the added advantage that after a player’s solution was analyzed a “mirror” comparison could bemade with Gen Mlenby’s actual operation. I am pleased he included an updated version of this game in his book.

It was not long before the value of Maj Schmitt’s informal sessions was recognized.In April 1990 the Marine Corps Gazette began to publish a series of tactical decisiongames, and the games became a formal part of the scheduled elective courses at theMarine Corps University. By then the games were most frequently referred to as4T—D—Gs.” Their educational value was obvious, and commanders throughout theMarine Corps started including them in training programs for unit leaders. The inherent value in playing such games was clearly understood.

Military leaders are members of a profession that does not routinely practice itsskills. Only constant war, a condition too abhorrent to even contemplate. would allowsuch practice. Thus, the honing and developing of military skills must be achieved inother ways. Field exercises, manual and computer-aided wargames. reading. andmore recently simulators provide vicarious experience. Tactical decision games perform the same Function, but at less cost in terms of time and resources. Their ease ofuse allows them to be employed in those odd minutes that are too often wasted. By design they are equally effective for corporals and generals. Used correctly they can reinforce other methods of education and training. Most importantly, they enable leadersand future leaders to gain experience that otherwise could not be gained. Only thosewho have challenged themselves with countless tactical situations in peacetime, onlythose who have refined their ability to make decisions and communicate clearly withsubordinates, are prepared to command in war.

Maj John F Schmitt and the Marine Corps Association have made an importantcontribution to professional military education with the publication of this workbook.I predict it will be in great demand with Marine leaders around the world and thatthat demand will soon make this edition the first volume of a multivolume set. WhenMarines next go ashore in defense of our Nation’s interest those leaders who haveworked their way through the 15 decision games will be far better prepared for theunknowns of combat.

Paul K Van RiperMajor General. U.S. Marine Corps

April 1994Washington, DC

Preface

This book contains 15 tactical decision games. designed to improve tactical skill

and decisionmaking ability. Most of the scenarios have appeared previousl) in the

iarhw Corps Gazette between 1990—1993: several have never been published before.

The introducion article, ‘WAre You the Next Napoleon?” describes the intent behind

the games and olkrs suggestions on how to get the most out of them. The second in

troductory article. “Observations on Decisionmaking in Battle.” analyzes the problems

of tactical decisionmaking in greater detail. The scenarios themselves range in scope

from the rifle squad to the Marine expeditionary brigade. with the majority being

designed at the company and battalion levels. The level at which the scenarios are de

signed is not the significant thing. however. The objective here is to exercise decision-

making skill and to illustrate key tactical principles, both of which are generally

independent of the level of command. Moreover, the reader will find that one of the

prevailing themes of this book is that the effective functioning of military organiza

tions depends on shared understanding by all commanders up and down the chain. It

is important for colonels to appreciate the problems of squad leaders and for sergeants to

appreciate the problems of regimental commanders. The scenarios are designed to be

done sequentially: the “Discussions” that apply to each scenario are progressive, be

coming generally more advanced and each building on the previous ones.

The discussions should in no way be construed as the only “right” answer. Nor

should the different options discussed be construed as meant to be conclusive or exhaus

tive. They are intended instead as food for thought—to identify key considerations and

possibilities. I have tried to make frequent use of insightful solutions submitted by readers

to the original problems as they appeared in the MCG. Where appropriate, I have used

scenarios to illustrate important tactical concepts. But this book is not a systematic

analysis or presentation of tactical theory. Tactics are very much a practical disci

pline, and thus the focus is on the practical application of these concepts to solving

likely battlefield problems.

The appendixes at the end of the book provide practical information useful in prepar

ing orders and overlays.

Except where I have cited Marine Corns doctrine, the opinions expressed are my own

and should not be construed as reflecting the views of the U.S. Marine Corps. Some

readers may find certain of the discussions controversial and may disagree with cer

tain of my tactical assessments. If that is the case, so much the better. Another theme

central to this book is that, in the words of Gen George S. Patton. Jr.. “There is no ap

proved solution to any tactical situation.” If after careful consideration you disagree

with any of the ideas contained in these pages. I will consider this work a success. The

ultimate object is to generate serious interest and study in the field of tactics.I owe thanks to SSgt Henry E. Johnson, USMC, and 2dLt Christopher A. Mikucki.

USA. for reading and commenting on the manuscript: to Capt John D. Kuntz. USMCKfor his contribution to “Are You the Next Napoleon?”: and especially to Col John E.Greenwood, USMC(Ret), who edited the manuscript and withoul whose suppon and vision this book would not hac been possible,

Each monthly issue of the Marine Corps Gazette includes a new TDG as well as solu

tions that readers have submitted to previous TDGs. To subscribe call 1—800—336—0291.

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Articles

Nine-tenths of tactics are ceain and taught in books: butthe irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pooi, andthat is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it isas natural as a reflex.

—T.E. Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”)

Are You The Next Napoleon?

.4 general should sm w luniseifnuun’ unwc a dat: ff the ho.cnle cJrnw were to make usappearance in from. on mu right, or mi mu left. ii’hat should 1 (/0?

—ivapoleun

In war there is no substitute for experience, no substitute for theintuitive skill that comes from repeated practice. Tactical decisiongames are a practice field for the tactical leader This article explainswhy and how

Think of the Great Captains of military history—Alexander. Hannibal. Frederick the Great. Napoleon. Genghis Khan. We hold these men in high regard because we recognize them as military geniuses.as true maslers of the art of war whose mastery of theart form clearly eclipses the mass of the merely competent. Clearly, the art of war places high demandson the intellect of military commanders, and any professional continually strives toward mastery.

The “Myster of Mastery”But how are such masters made? Are they born

geniuses or the product of training? Napoleon’squote makes it clear that he believed intellectualpreparation was an essential factor. While naturalabilities are certainly a contributing factor, psychological studies show that Napoleon was right. The pioneering work to uncover the “mystery of mastery”was done by cognitive psychologists in the 1960s andl970s. using chess players as the subject. Accordingto Robert J. Trotter in “The Mystery of Masten.” Psichologv Todat’. July 1986:

Ii had been assumed that the ability to think manymoves ahead and consider the implications of eachmoe was shai separated the expert from the novicechess plaer. But in the mid 1960s. psychologistAdriaan (IC Groot showed thai neither experts nornovices think more than a t’ew moves ahead.

Instead:findings suugest ihat a chess master is someone

who. after years of experience, can recognize as manyas t(XUXX) meaningful board positions and make thebest response to each. So instead of being a deepthinker who can see many movesahead. the masterchess piaxer is now seen as someone with a superiorability to lake in large chunks of information, recognise problem situations and respond appropriately.This explains how a chess master is able to defeat dozens of weaker players in simultaneous play. For themost part, the master relies on pattern-recognitionabilities, or so-called ‘chess intuition,” to generate potential ly good moves.

According to Robert Glaser and Michelene Chi ofthe University of Pittsburgh’s Learning Research

and Development Center in the same Pt’chologv Th’dat’ article:

Ttie most important principle of skill performance isthai skill depends on the knowledee base. In general,the more practice one has had in some domain, thebetter the performance, and from all indications, thisincrease in expertise is due to improvements in theknowledge base.

The same principle applies to tactics—which haveobvious similarities to chess—and to tacticians. Andthat is where tactical decision games come in,

Tactical decision games (TDGs) are a simple. fun,and effective way to improve your decisionmakingability and tactical acumen—to improve your masterv of the art of war. Like most skills, you can improve tactical decisionmaking ability through practice. The idea behind TDGs is to put you in the roleala commander facing a tactical problem. give you alimited a mount of time and information, and requireyou to develop a plan to solve the problem. By repeaiedly working through problems like these you

- . . the art of war places high demandson the intellect of military commanders, andany professional continually strives towardmastery’.

will learn not only to make better decisions, hut youwill aLso learn to make decisions better—that is,more quickly and efficiently. You will learn to lookat a situation and instantly take in its essential features, to cut right to the heart of the problem.

Coup D’oeilIn short you will develop the skill

Great called coup doed (pronouncedCoup doer] means literally “strike ofFrederick described it as:

Frederick the“koo dwee”).

the eye.” and

the talent which great men have of conceiving in amoment all the advantages of the terrain and the use

they can make of it with their army. . . The clevergeneral perceives the advantages of the terrain instant

ly: he gains advantage from the slightest hillock from

a tiny marsh: he advances or withdraws a wing to gainsuperiority: lie strengthens either his right or his left.moves ahead or to the rear, and profits from themerest bagatelles. . Whoever has the best coupd’oci( will perceive at first glance the weak spot of theenemy and attack him there. . . . The judgment that

is exercised about the capacity of the enemy at thecommencement of a battle is also called coup dod!.This latter is the result only of experience.

Just as the chess master immediately sees patterns

and opportunities on a chess board where others seea disarray of pieces. the tactician gifted with coupd’oeil sees patterns and opportunites on the battlefield where olhers see chaos and confusion. Whileno two battlefield situations will ever be identical,the master tactician can recognize patterns on thetactical “chess board.”

Improved Tactics

Not only will you improve your ability to make decisions quickly and cilectively through TDGs, butyour appreciation and masteiw of tactics will improve also. An understanding of tactical theory’ is animportant foundation for tactical mastery’. but theorywill only take you so far. Frankly. the basic conceptsbehind good tactics are not all that complex, nor arethey particularly hard for the average Marine to

A plan does not have to be morecomplex to exhibit a greater understandingof tactical principles, greater flexibility, agreater appreciation for the use of terrain, agreater sense of liming, or a greater range ofoptions. ,,

comprehend. The difficult thing is in applying thoseconcepts to specific tactical situations—that is wheretrue genius and the development of coup d’oell comein.

As coup dbei! improves you begin to make sense ofsituations that made no sense before, you begin tosee patterns, and in those patterns you spot opportunities and options that previously did not exist foryou. As you become more experienced you becomemore comfortable with a variety of different situations. You have the opportunity to experiment withdifferent tactical ideas without having to worry aboutpaying the price in terms of casualties. Your tacticsbecome more ambitious. Where before an enemymovement appeared threatening. now you see it asan opportunity to strike him in the flank. Your tactics become more advanced. Where before your tactics involved simply trying to attack your enemy. now

you think of ways to get him to expose himself first.By “more advanced” I do not necessarily mean morecomplex. A plan does not have to be more complexto exhibit a greater understanding of tactical principles. greater flexibility, a greater appreciation for theuse of terrain, a greater sense of timing, or a greaterrange of options. Often the simplest plans are themost inspired precisely because they are the mosteconomical.

A valuable fringe benefit of TDGs is that you become more familiar with weapons capabilities andemployment techniques, the use of control measuresand map symbols. and other technical details.

Tactical Decision Games GroupI say all of this out of personal experience. I was

part of a group of Marines and civilians that met atthe Marine Corps University late every Thursday afternoon for a couple of years to play and developTDGs. The makeup of the group ranged from corporals to brigadier generals. from clerks and driversto the editor of the Marine Corps Gazette, a MarineCorps University librarian, and Command and StaffCollege instructors in operational art Some members came and went, but a devoted cadre remained.Those of us who participated regularly unanimouslyagreed that our tactical skills had improved significantly as the result of the TDGs. Not only could wereach tactical decisions—that is, formulate plans—more quickly and efficiently, but we found we couldcommunicate those plans more clearly and conciselyto the group and in general the standard of our tactical plans was higher. Each of the members benefitedfrom seeing how others handled the same tacticalproblems and from being critiqued by the others—and in the atmosphere of professional fraternity thegroup consciously refused to “sugar coat” the critiques. The TDGs generated serious discussions on tactical concepts and created a heightened interest in tactics in general. While we may not have developed anynew Napoleons. all who participated felt much moreconfident of their abilities as a result of the experience.

How the Games WorkPlaying a tactical decision game is very’ simple.

Putting yourself in the role of the commander, youread (or have described to you) the situation: withinan established time limit you decide what plan toadopt and communicate that plan in the form of theorders you would issue to your unit if the situationwere “for real.” You provide an overlay of your plan.Then—and this is an important part of the process—you arplaitz the plan as a means of analyzing why youdid what you did: What options did you have? Whatfactors or considerations were foremost in yourmind? On what tactical principles or concepts wasyour plan based? What assumptions did you makeabout the situation?

Drawing an overlay of your plan is an importantpart of the process. It is much easier to be vague inwords, hiding the fact that you haven’t thought theproblem all the way through, than in a diagram. Diagrams are precise. In order to be able to draw a diagram of your concept you must have thought the

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concept through clearly: the overlay is a good way toensure this. But by the same token, it is equally imponant to develop a verbal order as well (whetherwritten or oral), because words are the primarymeans by which we communicate our plans. and weshould practice using the same tools we will use incombat.

One advantage of TDGs is thai just as in “reallife.” there are no absolute right or wrong answers—no “schoolbook solutions.” Tactics are concernedonly with what works. There are countless ways tosolve any tactical problem. However, some plans reflect a truer understanding of tactical principles thanothers. The whole objective ofTDGs is to arrive at atruer understanding that eventually results in inasten’.

Nortnally the scenario is fairly simple and the information about it is far from complete. requiring usto make certain assumptions as the basis thr decision—just as in combat. Unlike board games or theircomputer versions. TDGs have ver few rules or mechanics to learn. In fact, there are really only two“rules.’ They are (I) the imposed time I im it and (2)the requirement to give the solution in the Form of acombat order. Both are worth discussing briefly.

There are Iwo reasons for the ime limit. First, it introduces a certain amount of friction, in the form ofstress. to the decision process. 1 he idea is to give theplayer less time and information than he thinks heneeds 10 formulate a good plan and vet require himto come up with one anyway. This is the reality ofwar and precisely one of the abilities that makes for asuccessful com mander. Second, the game imposes atime limit because combat is time competitive. Speedrelative to your opponent is essential, Not only mustyou make good decisions, hut you must make themquickly. If not, your decisions, no matter how sound.will be irrelevant because you will he too late. For amore detailed discussion of the efkcts of time ondecision making. see the article “Observations onDecisioninaking in Battle” that follows.

The reasons fir requiring the solution in the formof a combat order are also two—ibId. First com mu n—ications skills improve with practice. The means thatcomma inlers use to com mu nicate insi rttclions tosubordinates is through combat orders. either [tilloperation. orders or fragmentan orders. The abilityto communicate clearly a plan involving the participation of hundreds or thousands of men and piecesof equipment in an atmosphere of fog and friction isno mean skill A brilliant plan muddled in the issti—inc is a had plan. l:tictie communication meansnot only clarit. hut also orcelulness and. clue to theiced ir speed. cc ineiseness, It is no coincide ice thaIso tnan\ o( the great itilitan leaders sere also iii—spiring commu nieators. Second. tactics deiiia od action. not an academic discussion of the merits of thisor that scheme’. Decision, not debate. “The essentialthing is action.” wrote Hans von Seeki. once chief ofstaff of the German army. “Action has three slages:the decision born of thought. the order or preparation for execution, and the execution usd1’.” Thethird. and really meaningful, stage—execution—cannot happen without the first two stages. The TDGsprinted here and in the Gazette ask players to submitexplanations of their plans, but only fler they have

issued their orders. So the rule is: “Orders first, thendiscussion.”

Solitaire PlayThere are a couple of ways to play the games. Thc

first is solitaire play, working the scenarios just likeyou would solve a brain teaser or crossword puzzle.This is the form the TDGs lake in these pages. Thetime commitment is usually no more than 15 minutes to a half hour. This meihod exercises thedecisionmaking process hut lacks certain advan—lages of the second method.

Group PlayThe second method is to play the game in an in

teractive group, with one player (usually the senioror most experienced member) acting as moderator.‘[lie moderator describes the scenario to the players, a nswers questions (some. hut not all) about thesituation, enlorces the ti me Ii in it, selects d hierentplayers to brief their phi ns to the group, and moderates the critique of each p1 an. ‘I’he moderator playsdevil’s advocate, introducing ‘‘What its” and asking

The ability to communicate clearly aplan involving the participation of hundredsor thousands of men and pieces of equipmentin an atmosphere of fog and friction is nomean skill. A brilliant plan muddled in the issuing is a bad plan.

“Why did you do that?” The advantages of groupplay are:

• A built—in sense of pressure and competition.Players’ abilities are on display for others to see.• I ni mcdi ate tëedbae k. Each p Liver gets a eritiq Lieof Ins plan from the moderator and other players.• Practice giving orders. Etch player must actually issue his order to the grou p.• See other solutions. Plaers can see how othersapproached the same problem. gn iii ng insightsthat i lies can add to tli ci r own repefloi re.• Teamwork. Especially within operating units.these roup sessions can help develop intuiti eu tide rsta nd i ng among mem hers.• Generates discussion in tactics. As happened inthe Qua ntico group. the TDG5 become a catalystor sharing tactical ideas, 01’ Scenario #9. “The

Enemy Over the Bridge.” A!CG. Jun90. Cpl J. R.Murph wrote:

I liase shown your article to three other Marines.and hase been inwlved in three heated conversation s regarding the scena rio and hat course of ac—tom the frac order should initiate. This simple ioolthat you ye published has the demonstrated abilityto really turn on sonic minds.

This method is ideally suited to omeers’ or NUOs’calls or professional development sessions withinunits. (In Ihet. Scenario #7, “Securing CamPljuna.” was specifically developed for the 2d Bat-

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talion, 2d Marines PME program.) The groupmethod works best using an overhead projector soplayers can project an overlay of their plan for theirbriefing.

Two-Sided or “Double-Blind” PlayA third. more involved, method is two-sided play.

Two-sided play involves a controller and two opposing learns. The teams solve the same problem.but from opposing sides. The controller comparesthe two solutions and makes judgments about theresult; Blue’s tanks platoon is ambushed by TOWsat the clearing: Red’s LAI company has reached thebridge with no enemy contact: a Blue rifle companyhas broken through Red lines in the woods withmoderate casualties. The controller then separatelypresents each team with the updated situation—i.e..a new problem to solve. Each team “sees” onlythose enemy forces it has been able to locate by itsown means. Now, instead of allowing the teams to

In reality units get lost, orders get mis

understood, subordinates make bad decisions,

important intelligence reports get misplaced,

communications break down, and nothing

happens as fast as it should.

develop deliberate plans. the controller requirescommanders to issue fragmentary orders “on thespot”; “Alpha Company, attack north to seize thebridge in order to deny its use to the enemy.” Thecontroller then compares the new fragmentary orders, generates another updated situation, and thegame continues. After four or five turns the teamshave fought out an engagement.

This version rnore resembles a conventional wargame than the others and takes up to a couple ofhours to play. But rather than relying on movementratings, casualty tables, and dice rolls like a boardgame. the two-sided TUG relies on the judgment ofthe controller for its results. The actual results arenot as important as the fact that they create newtactical problems for the players to solve. This version works best if each team includes several players, a senior commander, and several subordinatesto lead the different units.

FrictionClausewitz wrote that “friction is the only con

cept that more or less corresponds to the factorsthat distinguish real war from war on paper.”TDGs are, quite literally, war on paper and so arenot subject to the countless difficulties that distinguish real war. In reality units get lost, orders getmisunderstood, subordinates make bad decisions.important intelligence reports get misplaced,communications break down, and nothing happens as fast as it should. A plan that seems simplein conception can be extremely difficult in execunon. A plan brilliant in conception that is impossi

ble to execute given the circumstances is not brilliant at all, but foolish. Commanders’ responsibilities do not stop when they issue their orders, ofcourse: they must also supervise the execution oftheir plans. But TDGs stop short of execution. Youshould keep this in mind when playing TDGs so asnot to get the impression this whole business ismuch easier than it really is. In the group version.the moderator should serve as a “reality check” byquestioning the feasibility of the various plans; “Doyou really expect to make a 12-mile forced marchthrough the woods at night?

Solve the Prohlem, Don’t Critique ItIn order to keep the scenarios from getting too

complicated and unwieldly, the situation descriptions are intentionally short and simple. This alsoadds an element of the uncertainty that is presentin any tactical situation. In any situation, a commander could identify countless pieces of information he wishes he had, as well as countlessinconsistencies in the information he does have.Since this is so. he must make certain assumptions.Dealing with uncertainty is one of the fundamentalchallenges of tactical decisionmaking. It is easy andtempting to pick apart a simplified scenario andcall it unrealistic, inconsistent or impossible. Butthat is simply avoiding the challenge. The fact is.war is Cull of unrealistic, inconsistent and apparently impossible happenings. It is important to takethe scenarios on their own terms.

One captain’s response to Scenario #1, “AmbushAt Dusk,” MCG. Nov91, was not to offer a solutionbut to question how the unit in question got intothe situation it did—probably a reasonable criticism. But in fact, the scenario was based on an actual incident in Vietnam. and a more detailed account could have explained more fully why the unitwas where it was. More important, whether or notthe unit should ever have gotten into that predicament in the first place, it did and Marines had tofind a way out.

The person whose first response to a problemscenario is to complain. “This would never happen.”is probably the same person who has trouble dealing with unexpected situations. As with any problem, the best advice is to solve it first and then figureout how it could have happened.

In ClosingExperience is the great teacher. Unfortunately.

ours is a field in which experience can cost dearly.As Field Marshal Sir William Slim wrote of takingover British forces in Burma in 1942; ‘Experiencetaught a good deal, hut with the Japanese as instructors it was an expensive way of learning.” Weare professionally obligated to do whatever we canto gain whatever experience we can without payingfull price. That is precisely why we study past campaigns, and precisely why we should play tacticaldecision games.

Now, it’s time for your first mission, Good luck!

us MC

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Observations on Decisionmakingin Battle

This article first appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette in March 198& Itis included here because it has exactly the same intent as TDGs—to improve tactical decisionmaking ability This article goes a long way towardexplaining certain of the design features of TDGs, such as the strict anddemanding time limit and the intentional lack of scenario information

Decisionmaking is the essence of command inbattle. By this I do not mean to diminish the importance of execution. For in battle the final accountingis based on results, not intentions, and even the bestdecision executed poorly is a sure nicans for defeat.Nor do I mean to exclude the other numerous challenges and responsibilities of command. But the responsibility for making decisions is the domain ofthe commander and no one else. While the commander may solicit advice and suggestions from anyof his subordinates, the decision on a specific courseof action is his alone.

All militan’ operations are based on decisions.Command and staff actions are merely implementsfor reaching and executing decisions. Victory is a reflection of sound decisions skillfully executed.

War being a conflict hetten opposing wills. hattlefield decisions are not made in a vacuum. VThilethe commander is trying to impose his will upon theenemy, the enemy is trying to do the same 10 him. Asa result decisionmaking becomes a competitiveprocess with the goal being to make and executethose decisions more quickly than the enemy. Clear13c the combatant who establishes a tempo that isfaster than his opponent’s gains a significant advantage. He retains the initiative. The focus of this’’trticleis to look at the factors that give the commander thisadvantage—at the factors that enable him to makesound and timely tactical decisions.

same time, commanders are expected to demonstratean understanding of enemy doctrine, tactics, andtechniques; a knowledge of the characteristics andrelative capabilities of weapons and equipment: and akeen appreciation for time-distance factors. Whilethese are all useful tools, they are not a scientificequation for success and must not dictate tactical decisions. They provide a foundation for applying experience and judgment, hut they cannot negate theartistic element that is the heart of decisionmakinu.To seek cover behind them is to deny the moral responsibility of command.

The second observation is thai as discussed in thequotation above. decisionmaking is a process requiring two distinct skills. The commander must be amaster of both. Firsi lie must have the intuitive skillto recognize the esscnce of a given problem. Second.

“First, the commander must have themoral courage to make tough decisions inthe face of uncertainty—and to accept fullresponsibility for those decisions—whenthe natural inclination is to put off the decision pending complete information.

ObservationsThe first observation is that decisionmaking as a

skill fits in the realm of the art of war rather than thescience. The 1962 edition of the U.S. Army’s FM fiX?—5. Operations, stated that;

Although arrived at through an analytical and orderly process. the commander’s decision is not merelya mathematical computation. It isan intuitive andcreative act based on consideration of all the factorsinvolved. Its soundness is a reflection of the corninander’s protëssionat competence, experience. intellieence. perception. boldness, .‘itd strength of character.

Our institution has developed command and staffactions to help standardize and formalize the procedures lór reaching and implementing decisions: estimates of the situation, estimates of supportability.and con rses of action are a few exa nples. At the

lie must have the creative ability to devise a practicalsolution to it.

The third observation is that the lower the echelonof command, the simpler, faster, and more direct isthe decision process. A small-unit leader’s decisionsare based on a relatively few factors that he usuallyobserves firsthand. At successively higher echelonsof command, circumstances become more numerousand complex. and the commander is further removed from events by time and distance.

There are various factors that weigh on the art ofdecisionmaking. By these I do not mean the commonly understood factors that affect the decision itself—the mission, friendly and enemy capabilities, terrain.and weather—hut those that affect the decision process.Among others, these include cenainfl infonnation.thne, and risk.

At Pt. A. info isscarce and decisioneffectiveness is lowhut improving dramatically.

At Vt. B. info is morecomplete and decision effectiveness ishigh but increasingslowly.

At Pt. A. info isscarce, (he commander must make manyassumptions, and thetime needed to makea decision is long.

At Pt. B. info is morecomplete and timeneeded to make a decision is short

At Pt. C, commanderhas more informationthan he can consider

c at once, causing delays in the timeneeded to reach thedecision.

CertaintyIn Command in War, historian Martin Van

Creveld describes command as:

An endless quest for certainty—about the state andintentions of the enemy’s forces: certainty about themanifold factors that together constitute the environmeni in which the war is to be fought. from the weather and the terrain to radioactivity and the presence ofchemical warfare agents: and last but definitely notleast certainty about the state, intentions, and activitiesof one’s own forces.

The more the commander knows of these factors, themore specific he can make his plan.

While the desire for certainty is a natural humantrait the very nature of battle makes absolute certainty an impossibility. The commander must notbecome enslaved to its pursuit Referred to as the“fog of war.” uncertainty pervades the battlefield.The commander must accept a degree of uncertainty.which he compensates for by developing flexibleplans. planning for contingencies. developing standing operating procedures (SOPs), developing initiative in his subordinates, issuing mission-type orders.and making his intent clearly underslood.

The moral courage to make decisions in the face ofuncertainty is an essential trait in a commander.

InformationThe second factor is information. Certainty is

largely a function of information. In general, themore information a commander has at his disposal,the.more effective his decisions. The commander attempts to reduce uncertainty by seeking informationabout the enemy, the environment, and his own situation as well. However, in the heat of battle, perhapsthe only certainW is that available information will always be incomplete, will usually be inaccurate, andwill sometimes even be contradictory.

Early in the decision process. when information is

scarce, the effectiveness of a decision increases dramatically as information increases. However, atsome point in the process. when basic informationhas been obtained and the effort concentrates on details. the commander reaches a point of diminishingreturns—when the potential effectiveness of his decision does not improve in proportion to the informationobtained or the time and effort needed to obtain it See

Second, the commander must have themoral courage to make bold decisionsand accept the necessary degree of riskwhen the natural inclination is to choosea less ambitious task.

Figure 1. The commander who delays his decision beyond this point risks surrendering the initiative.

TimeTime is an essential consideration in the decision-

making process. The 1954 edition of FM 100-5 statedthat ‘timeliness of decision is the essence of commandaction.” Timely decisions require rapid thinking, withconsideration often limited to essential factors,

The commander should spare no effort to streamline his information-gathering and decisionmakingprocedures to promote rapid decisionmaking. Towardthis end, he can decentralize decisionmaking by promoting initiative among his subordinates. This ispossible through the use of mission-type orders andthe clear expression of intent but requires qualifiedsubordinates. The commander can also locate himself closer to the critical events that will influence the

B4

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Information

B

The Effect of Information onthe Potential Effectiveness of a Decision.

Figure 1

Information

The Effect of Information onthe Time Needed to Reach a Decision.

Figure 2

7

situation so that he can observe them directly and

circumvent the delays and inaccuracies that result

from passing information up the ?hain of command.

As the amount of information increases to a point.

the time necessary to make an effective decision de

creases. Beyond this point, however, additional in

formation has the opposite effect: it only serves to

cloud the situation, causing the commander to re

quire longer to reach the same effective decision that

he could have reached sooner with less information.The commander has more information than he can

“ Third, the commander must have anintuitive understanding of when he hasreached the point at which additional information only serves to delay the decisionor when additional certainty will not jusfil5ithe time and effort spent gaining it.

digest quickly, and he has difficulty lbcusing on keyfactors. See Figure 2. Consequentl. the commandermust he carful io limit the amount of informationhe considers to those essential elements that allowhim to make his decision quickly and with reasonable certainty. He must be able to identify and focuson the central circumstances influencing a given decision. and elsewhere he must exercise economy ofthought, Focus ofefibri applies to decisionmaking aswell as combat power.

RiskA commander’s decision invariably involves the

estimation and acceptance of risk, Risk is inherent inwar and is involved in every mission. Part of risk isthe unconirollable element of chance. Risk is also related to gain: normal lv. greater pole nti a I gain requires greater risk. Further, risk is equally commonIn hot h action and inaction.

The practice of concentrating combat power at thefocus of ellort and economizing elsewhere by its nature requires risk. Willingness to accept risk is another element of the moral courage of command,

Ft is human nature to try to minimize risk bychoosing a less ambitious course. But Napoleon advised that “in audacity and obstinacy will he lbundsafety.” I do not propose recklessness, hut I suggestthat more decisions sufter from attempting too littlethan from attempting too much. Field MarshalErwin Rommel wrote:

Bold decisions give the besl promise of success. Butone must differentiate between stralegical or tacticalboldness and a military gamble. A hold operation isone in which success is not a certainty but which inthe case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces inhand to cope with whatever situation may arise. Agamble. on the oilier hand. nan operation which canlead either to victory or to the complete destruction of(Inc’s lbrce.

Although the commander avoids unnecessaryrisks, the accomplishment of the mission is the most

important consideration. The commander mustevaluate each possible course of action in terms ofrelative risk. If the degree of risk is unacceptable. hemust seek another solution.

The DecisionThe complex interaction of these basic factors

poses the commander with a dilemma. His task is toselect a course of action with reasonable certainty ofsuccess and an acceptable degree of risk and to reachhis decision more quickly than his foe. As stated atthe outset there is no formula for this process: it is acomplex and often subconscious act. It is also a skillwhich improves with practice: thus the use of TDGs.An improved understanding of the factors that workon the commander’s ability to make tactical decisions will help him to make those decisions more effeclively. Below. I have summarized the lessons as Isee them. Keep them in mind when playing theTDGs.

First, the commander must have the moral courage to make tough decisions in the face of uncertainty—and to accept full responsibility for those decisions—when the natural inclination is to put oft thedecision pending complete information. To delay action in an emergency because of incomplete information shows a lack of energetic leadership andcourage.

Second. the commander must have the moralcourage to make hold decisions and accept the nec

• • . in the heat of baftle, perhaps theonly certainty is that available informationwill always be incomplete, will usually beinaccurate, and will sometimes even becontradictory. ,,

essan’ degree of risk when the natural inclination isto choose a less ambitious tack.

Third. the commander must have an intuitive understanding of when he has reached the point atwhich additional information only serves to delaythe decision or when additional certainty will notjustify the time and effort spent gaining it. On onehand, the commander should not make rash decisions based on insufficient information. Gen A.AVandegrift warned: “Never allow’ yourself to he undulyrushed or stampeded. There is usually ample timefor considered judgment even during battle.” But, onthe other hand, the commander must not squanderopportunities while trying to gain more complete information.

And finally, since all decisions in battle must hemade in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem. Therefore, the commander shouldnot agonize over one. He should arrive at a reasonable decision quickly and execute it swiftly andaggressively. To quote Gen George S. Patton. Jr.: “Agood plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week.” usMc

Scenarios

The problem is to grasp, in innumerable special cases, theactual situation which is covered by the mists of uncertainty, toappraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements,to reach a decision quickly, and then to carry it out forcefullyand relentlessly.

—Helmuth von Moltke

9

Scenario #1

SITUATJONYou are the squad leader of 1st

Squad. 1st Platoon. Company C. 1stBattalion. 9th Marines. You are lighting in a tropical area against guerrillaForces armed with small arms. lightmach ineguns. and sometimes mortarsand rocket-propelled grenades. Recently. Company C has been conducting patrols in a populated region tocounter increased insurgent activity.Today, your platoon with a machine-gun squad attached is running a securitypatrol along a designated route. You areto attack and destroy any enemy forcesyou locate. Dusk is approaching within the hour. Your squad is the point of

the platoon patrol column, some 200yards forward of the platoon’s mainbody, advancing north through a ricepaddy. paralleling a 2-loot-high diketo your right. You have learned fromexperience not to walk on the dikes ortrails because they are Frequently booby-trapped: although uncomfortable. therice paddies are generally the safestplaces to move. To your west is a village. East of the dike is another ricepaddy and another small village.

As your squad crosses a trail at thenorthern edge of the paddy. one of

your Marines trips a booby trap. suffering a severe leg wound. Suddenly.the enemy opens lire with automatic

weapons From the village to the wesL.and the platoon commander is hit.The steady volume of lire from the village has 2d and 3d squads pinneddown in the rice paddy. After tendingto the lieutenant, the corpsman courageously makes his way forward underflre to your position. followed shortlyby one machinegun team. The corpsman tells you the lieutenant is in a hadway. You wish you had a radio, but theplatoon’s radioman is pinned downnear the lieutenanL The enemy lireagainst your position is sporadic: thetwo squads in the paddy are returninglire but appear unable to move. Youestimate that the sun will disappearwithin a half hour. You have nocommunications with your platoonsergeant. What do you do?

REQUIREMENTIn a time limit of live minutes. draft

the frag order you would issue to yourteam leaders and describe any additional actions you would take. Includean overlay sketch and provide a briefexplanation of the rationale behindyour action.

Ambush at Dusk

ifj

For discus5lon, see pp. 42-44.Game appeared In Madne Crnps Gazette. Nov91; solutions, Jan92

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Scenario #1

Scenario #2

Platoon Ambush

SITUATIONYou are the second squad leader of

1st Phttoon. Company A. 1st Battal

ion. 1st Marines. You have been light

ing enemy nlanttv Ibrces in wooded.

rolling te rrai ii. Your pl a (0011 cc) m—

ma nder tel Is von I hat the pl a loon Ii as

been ci en the miss ion to conduct a

pat ml beli i id e tie my hues to establish

an ambush along a main supply route

frequently used by enemy supply coti—

voys to move supplies I rwaid (west)

from l)e pot. s Ii ic Ii is ben ted about 5

kilometers east of the ambush site.

The convoys usually con Si SI ol a

macli inegun jeep in front lol lowed by

a haljdo,en or Sc) covered trucks.

There isa strong enemy garrisoli ol

iiiotc rued forces at Depot. [he Heu —

tenant plans to set in an L—shaped am—

b u 51) Vi Ill tWO SQ LI ads a lid Iwo a I—

tached maeliinegun squads at a bend

in the road just east o I l3eave r 1) am

Run. ‘‘It’ll be like shooting lish in a

barrel.” lie says. He plans to blow the

log bridge to the nest, detonating it

when lie springs the ambush. Your

squad. ith one 60mm mortar learn at

tach ed. will Ii rotect the other han k of

the a nib ush from a 05 i tW ii on the

high grou n rI to the east of the ambush

site. You will be Ii nked 10 the ambush

by handli tie. In his patrol order under

“[asks.” the lieutenant gives wit the

following instructions:

When we get to the 01W lotijecIverallying pointi. you will niove out first

to your position to provide security for

the rest of the platoon while it sets in

the ambush. ‘I lie platoon will move

out 30 mm Ltles Itter. You’ll take a

phone and LCpI L ooley lube plaucHin

runner! i ith you. He’ll run the ‘Vi re

trom ‘OL1 position back to the .t1fl

bush site. Find a position that givesyou a izood view of ihe rout! toward

Depot so yoti can ptu ide earls warn

ing and inlormation ot tile convoysapproach. When ‘.ou gel Ii position.stay concealed and stay pot. Once theambush is sprung you will isolate theobjective area by engaging lily enem

forces tr ing to gel in or out. You illpro’ ide protection fbr the platoon asit ‘ithdra”s to the OH’. Its especiallimportant that \oLl delay an reactlbrces coil] ing from the l)cpot garri

son. A green—star cluster is the signal

that you can withdraw back 10 the

01W Surprise is essential. sc’ it’s im—

peratiie. under all circumstances. thatyou sta concealed and not open lire

until the ambush has been sprung. got

Be lb re dejia rti ng on t lie patrol youdraw one AT4 per lire team. In addi—tin ii. each of your sq Clad ii e inbe rs is

cain i ng one 60iii lii 110 nt round.Everything goes as planned to the

OR P. From the OR P you iii inc out to

your position. En route you cross a

narrow animal track not on your map.You reach your destination a iid find agood pos lit) n from which vu ti ca ii

cover the Depot Road. You set in (liemortar to cover the road to t lie east bydirect lay. You hook u p the ha tid Ii ne.hut the connection is had: neither party can understand what the other issaying. Meanwhile, something attractsyour attention to the southeast. Movemetit of sonic kind? you send 1st Fire

Tea ii to cli cc k it out. a tid return to su—pen isi lie the delnsive preparations.

Filleen minutes later. 1st Fite Teamre Lu rn 5. out of Ii reat Ii -

‘‘WIi at Ii a e you got. C pl r me rTyou ask.

Au enemy loot patrol. 20—25 mcli.

mo\ i ng ccl through t lie n oods about20) yards south, auto weapons andI igli t mach iii egu n s lie replies.

Did they see you?’liell no. he says ith a grin. ‘Whoj

do ou think voure talkitig to!Thu tn to get through to the platoon

on the landhine. but the connection is

very bad.“Roger. I copy th at the convoys on

the way.’ comes the repl. “We’reready ibr em. Re me m lie r, do ii ‘t eti—gage until after the ambush goes.”

‘Negative’ you say. As you try to repeat your message. UpI 1 u mci taps

you on the a nil and poi tiLs down theroad to the east. The convoy approachesa moti nd a bend. about 301 )—40() yardsawayr. two machunegu n jeeps ho] owedh at least seven trucks, and niorecoming into view. moving about 15—25miles per hour.

lt a couple of iii mites. dii ngs aregoi hg to get interesting.

What do you do?

REQUIREMENTIn a time limit of 5 minutes. de

scribe your actions and issue the Iragorder you will give to your suhordl’nates. Make sure to nclude the intent

of your plan. Provide a sketch of youractions and an explanation.

I!

LI

hP-StdclDOSUO1SSfl2S!p10J

SITUATIONYou are the commander of 1st Pla

toon. Company I. 3d Battalion. 6thMarines. 6th Marines have been attacking north with the intention of destroying enemy forces in SanctuaryPlain and have already landed ahelicopterhorne company in the plainnear Sanctuary City. The helicopterborne force has become besieged.and 3/6 has the mission of launching arelief attack into the plain to reinforcethe helicopterborne force and continue the offensive. Implied in this mission is forcing passage onto the plain.The terrain south of Sanctuary Ridgeis generally rugged and undevelopedwith thick vegetation and severe relief.The enemy you have been fighting isprimarily infantry with small numbersof tanks. It is 2015: there is a fullmoon.

Your platoon—reinforced with twomachinegun squads from weaponsplatoon and two Dragon teams (withnight trackers) from weapons company—advances along the battalion’sleft flank with instructions to guardthat flank. Moving parallel to a narrow foot trail—but not on it—youcross a dry. rocky gully about 3 to 4feet deep and 20 meters wide withoutmaking contact But as you approachCheckpoint 37 your point squad makescontact with what appears to be a us

tening post that immediately fleesnorthwest toward the Western NarrowPass. Moments later a major firefightbreaks out in the thick woods to youreast From radio transmissions it isclear that the main body of the battalion has been halted by a significantenemy force and is taking casualties.Your best guess is that the engagementis taking place near the NarrowBridge. From your position you cansee several enemy machineguns onthe ridge to your northeast opening upin support of the firefight. On the conduct of fire net you hear the battaliondirecting supporting arms onto the enemy position at the bridge. Transmissions on the tactical net are somewhatunclear, but it appears the battalion isattempting a right flanking movementagainst the enemy position. Except forthe listening post that fled, there is nosign of enemy activity in your area.What do you do?

REQUIREMENTWithin a 10-minute time limit pre

pare any frag orders you would issueto your squad leaders and attachments, including your intent. Includeany plans for the use of supportingarms, an overlay of your scheme, andany communications you would makewith higher headquarters.

Acting with initiative does not mean being a “loose cannon.” It’s important to coordinate up and down the chain and laterally. What reports will you make to higher headquarters?

I Scenario #3

Attack on Narrow Pass

14

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Scenario # 3 a iôo 250 500 who

For dlscussslon, see pp. 48-50.Game appeared In Madne Corps Gazette, Mar91; solulions, May91.

5

This scenario is the continuation ofScenario #3 and is based on a cornmon solution (hr that problem submitted by several Marine corps Gazettereaders.

SITUATIONBased on the situation in Scenario

#3. you contemplate moving into aposition to assist battalion. hut you decide that your orders to guard theflank are explicit and that you hadbest stay put. You set your three riflesquads in a blocking position in thetrees along the east-west road nearCheckpoint 37. preparing to repel anyenemy approaching from the wesLYou decide to try to suppress the western enemy gun position with an attached machinegun squad. and you letbattalion know that you can adjustsupporting arms on the eastern enemygun position. You also cant resistsending your platoon sergeant duenorth with a small reconnaissance patrol to check out the situation alongthe ridge.

The enemy machineguns fall silentas you suppress with supporting armsand your own maehineguns. Battalionhas successfully outflanked the enemyand is advancing north again. Atabout 2130 your platoon engages anenemy patrol of about squad size approaching from the northwest: the enemy patrol withdraws hurriedly whence itcame. Checking the scene of the fire-fight, you recover two enemy corpses.Artillery impacts several hundred me-

ters west of your position. That wasabout a half hour ago: you have hadno enemy activity since then. Yourplatoon sergeant returns to reporl thathe reached the ridge and reconnoitered a couple hundred meterseach direction. The only contact hemade was an enemy LP which fledwest. He also reports the sound of enemy armor—a platoon or company attilost, he estimales—revving up northof the ridge.

Suddenly, battalion comes underheavy fire as it nears Narrow Pass.The enemy machineguns that you engaged open up on the battalion again.this time from either flank. It is apparent that the enemy has a sizable forceat the pass. From the radio traffic youdiscern that battalion has been hithard: Iwo companies are unable to advance and are taking casualties. Anxious to help, you contact battalion tooffer your services. “Just wait out.’ theS—3 snaps agitatedly. “We’ve got otherthings to worry about now.” The timeis now 2200. What do you do?

REQUIREMENTWithin a 5-minute lime limit, pre

pare the [rag order (if any) you wouldissue to your squad leaders and attachments. including the intent ofyour plan. Include any plans [or theuse of supporting arms. an overlay ofany scheme of maneuver, and any further communications you would makewith battalion. Then give a brief explanation of your rationale.

Attack on Narrow

-1 Scenario #4

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Scenario #5

‘Film at ElevenI

SITUATION

You are the commanding officer ofCompany F, 2d battalion. 3d Marines.fighting in an arid desert environmentchat offers exceptional mobility forwheeled and tracked vehicles. You aresupported by a platoon of assault amphibious vehicles (AAV5). enough tomount your entire company. After in—tense ighting at the front for severalweeks, the battalion commander hasassigned your company to rear dutyproiding security fbr a mobile combatseRice support detachment (MCSSD).As the ground combat element (GCE)advances north, the MCSSD plans tomove in that direction and establish aforward supply point at Oasis, some 25kilometers north hut still another 25kilometers south of the front. Whilethe front is generally to the north.there is no clear delineation betweenfriendly and enemy territory: as a result. you long ago learned the importance of all—round security, Irregularenemy Ibrces mounted on small trucksand equipped with heavy machine—guns are known to operate in the area.

Oasis is the only source of water inthe region. The local population livesin adobe dwellings, which will notnormally withstand anything largerthan small arms. The only masonrystructures are the two-story commu ni—

ty center and the pump house. In thecenter of town is a large plaza. Surrounding the buildings are irrigatedfields of “short” crops that meet theneeds of the local people. The localpopulation is of the same eth nic groupas the enemy, although their aciualsupport Ihr the enemy is sometimesless than enthusiastic.

The time is 1400. The MCSSD commander tells you he wants to occupyOasis by 1200 tomorrow, and he expects you to have the settlement completely secured by that time. From experience you know that each oasistown has a small militia Ihrce consistingof the adult males of the settlementequipped with small arms. rocket-pmpelled grenades (RPG5). machineguns.and possibly light mortars. The fighting skills of these units vary greatly,Some are looking l’or any excuse to laydown their arms: ma nv fire off a fewrounds to satisfy their sense of honorhelhre surrendering: only a few lighttenaciously. However, there seems tohe no way of anticipating how theforces will act from one settlement tothe next. In the case of Oasis, the S—2Cs Li mates die m i Ii U a to he hetwe n 100—150 strong. He can tell you nothingmore than that.

As you are grumbling about the Ii n—cage of the S—2. the MCSSD commander comes up to you and says: ‘One

more thing: there’s a cable TV new’team covering our operation that’looking for a little action. I’ve bItthem they can accompany you as yolsecure the Oasis. Cooperate with themhut keep them out of trouhle.”’fhtnews team comes equipped with it’own recognizable camera van. Yoiare introduced to the correspondentwhose smug. mustachioed lace yolrecognize. He says: “Lets get something straight. Captain. The public haa right to know what’s going on oveihere. I want to he right where the ac•tion is. If you tiw to keep me from do’ing my job. it could he emharrassin&for you.”

REQUIREMENTYou do not feel particularly friendly

towa RI the news team, hut you haveother thinus to worn about. How willyou approach the problem of securingOasis? You’re glad that for once vouvegot a little time to plan you r operation.so take 20 minutes. Write the orderyou will issue to your rifle platoonsand weapons sections and your instructions for the camera crew. In-ci ude a statement of your intent a focus of eflhrts. any plans for supportinrfires, and an overlay- of your plan.Then provide an explanation of therationale for your plan.

Does the enemy have a critical vulnerability you can exploit?

I

ix

For discussion see pp. 53-55.Game appeared In Marine Corps Gazette, Jun90; so4ullons, Aug90

I’)

Scenario #6

ii:1 Hole in the

Trowzer Pocket

SITUATIONYou are t lie commander of Corn pa—

ny K, 3d Battalion, 24th Marines.lighting in roiling, wooded terrainagainst enemy foot infantiw lorces.Regiment Ii as been attacking generally south (or over 2 weeks. A sizable en—cnn owe has managed to hold out.creating a salient in the vicinity of thetown of lrowzer. You are called to thebattalion command post or instructions. where you learn that regimentphi ns to destroy the enemy pocket byan encircling attack. The battalioncorn m a nde r gi •es you the f II owingwarn flu order on Ihe regimental plan:

[lie main enemy lorce is holed up inlnn/er to Oie south. Regiment intends io tim e one conipanvaniuntleach of the enemy lan ks under coverotdirkncss to occupy a hlockiniz posi—lion on the lo’ ridge south ot Iro’s—zer.At (14(8). the other tour cutflpittiieslotte battalion is in reserve] will attacksouth tltrottuh lrowzer to crush theenetn against the BP.A classic ham—ncr—and—anvil operation.

Kilo. you will be part of the am il.(_onhlnencitw at 2100. you will infil—Irate by Route Red around the easternlank of the enetnv to establish a HPin the vicittit’, of Hills XX and 82. on—tilted north. Your left houndan is1nn icr Road exclu sive. Coordi ni teoil ‘.our left with lox/2/24. ‘ho will hethe uttter half of the anvil in the vicinity of Hilt St. [ox witi be coming in

tram the vest, Make face—to—face coil—tact it tile I nsea ii U reek B ridge. Astite senior cutlltlia tider. the Fox CO isin o\eratt cc,,ntiiatid at the BR Corn—meucing 03(8). destroy etiemy torces in‘,titlr sector trying to escape south Ott,ol tlte pocket. The detailed plan illtoltuw.

Using the ‘Half Rule.” you brief youplatoon corn ma nde rsa nd gi \t themample time to prepare. After the operations order arrives, you make minoradjustments to your plan and moveout. ou are able to move yott r ct) m pa—ny undetected around the e nemysflank and arrive in position by 0130.Using the established brevity code.you en nt act I—ox Company by radio tolet them know you are in position.‘Roger that, same here. comes the reply. Alter giving your executi’.e otlicerand artillery f rward observer guidance to supervise the defensive lire—planning, you move to the bridge tocoordinate with Fox. arriving at (1200.You wait 15 minutes hut the Fox commander does not show up. You contact him again by radio and he replies:‘Rouer. Fm in position waiting bryou.” To the west you can see and hearFox moving around in the icinit\ ofHill XL “Prett poor noise and lightd isci p11 neT you think to vo u rsel F. Thti

decide 10 walk up to Hill NI to ii nil thecornpatw corn mander. but as you approach you decide the situation doesn’t

look right. The activity is not Fox atall; it is enetiiy inlatitry lbrces movingsouth in a steady out of the pocket.Fox Corn pa n is nowhere to he Iou ocT.\btt’re lucky to escape back towardyour cotii pa in vi th out hei rig detected.

You are positive of your location.You call up Fox agai ti, but the corn—matider itisists that lie also is iti thecorrect locatioti on Hill SI. He reportsno sign oF etie my activi t it is now0245. I lie enemy is by tiow movingsouth in increasing tittmbets just vestof Hill Xl; it is clear to you that this ispart of an organ ized vi th d rawa I. Youexplain the problem to battalion, whichrelays to regitiient. But since h-oxCotiipanv insists it is in the right position, about all regiment can say is:“Straighteti it out. The attack goes onas scheduled.”

About ili is t tue. your 1st P1 a toon reports a ii a rti I len u iii t lie ad i ng sott thon t he road fro nu Trowze r. approaching the brtdge. What do you do.’

REQUIREMENTIn a tithe limit of 5 tiiituutes. give the

orders ott would pass to your subor—din ates. to include the in Leti t of you

lila o and your lbcus of ellons. Providea sketch of your plan. any guidancebr supporting a mis. and a brief expla—tiation of your plati.

Remember to keep iti mind the intent of your higher comrnanderstj

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Scenario #7

Securing Cam-Pijuna

SITUATIONYou are the commander of Compa

ny F, 2d Battalion. 2d Marines, conducting peacekeeping operations in alb rd Wo rid count n torn by ethniccivil war. The terrain is mountainous.rugged. a id thickly vegetated. Mostroads are vol nerable to ambush fromthe nea div Iii gli ground. Veli ides arerestricted to roads; loot forces canmove a nyw here (though slowly andsometimes wi ili difficulty) except thesteepest terrai it Your region is controlled by a action known as the EarlyRe ti ri sts. who are opposed to the ma—jo ri iv local population and who areprone to iii istrea t the locals and to harass peacekeeping lorces. The mountaincity of Cam— U u na some 10—12 kilometers to your north west is strategical

ly. important because it isa gateway tothe nio on ta limos interior and controlsthe mai ii roads to the cities of Pend—jelan and Bensjkula, All three citiesli;tve been cut off Fr a couple wceksand are in need of food and medicalsupplies. Cam- Pljuna is importantalso because it is OflC of the few placeswith enough open Ilatland for a largehelicopter landing zone, through whichrelief supplies can he introduced intothe interior. Cam—Pljuna is accessibleto vehicles only by way of the narrowswitchl,ack road 1mm the southeast.

The battalion commander calls youto the coin ma id post to tell you thatbattalion will undertake operations intended to relieve the cities under control of the Early Retirists. As the firstphase of this campaign, he gives yourco mji any the following iii iss ion:

In the next 48 hours, capture ant secure the town of Cam—Pljuna in orderto facilitate immediate relief operations by helicopter and/or ehicle andto facilitate subsequcnt operations torelieve Pendjetan and tlensjkula. Youare the battalion’s main effort.

[he S—2 tel Is you that Ca iii— Plj u ii anormally Ii as a population of severalthousand, b tft it is u nd ear how tn anyhave fled the city in recent weeks. ‘[helocal population is not expected tocause trouble but cannot he countedon for much assistance either. Thepermanent garrison of Early Retiristforces at Cam—Pijuna is estimated between 50—75. Their training and monile are estimated at poor—to—average.They are equipped with small arms.light machineguns and mortars. Theirnight—vision capability is limited. Amotorized mach inegun unit of four orlive vehicles based at Petidjetan regularly patrols the route Pendjetan—Cam-Pljuna—Bensjkula. Any enemyrcinihrcemeims will conic fwtii Pendjetan. A flyover within the last 24

hours located antiair positions (twin—barrelled 23mm AA guns) on Hills 425and 307. a tiiortar position on the western edge of town and prepared defenses (which may not all he permanently occupied) east and south oftown. The Early Retirists regularly locate their positions among the localdwellings.

The battalion commander gives youthis additional guidance:

• Mini in ize collateral damage to locals, their homes. atid crops.• It is not necessary to clear theCam-Pljuna Road: follow-on forceswill be responsible for their ownroute security.• If you can secure the landing zone(LZ), battalion can reinforce with onecompatiy by helicopter within 3 hours.• Any weapons company assets yourequire are available.

REQUIREMENTIn a time limit of 30 minutes, devel

op the plan you ould use to accomplish your mission. Remember to include your intent. lbcus of efforts, anyplans for the use of supporting arms.and any coordinating instructions.Decide what weapons company assetsyou need. Then provide a sketch andgive a brief explanation of your plan.

What weapons company assets do you need, and why?

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Scenario #8

Raid on Gazebo Ridge

SiTUATIONIi is predawn. after a typically chaot

ic and bloody desert baltIc during Operation HOLY WARRIOR. You are thefirst sergeant of Company A. 2d LightArmored I nfantn Bawd ion. The corn—

pany’s last remai iii ng commissionedolhcer was killed in I he ape ni ng mo—cents of yesterdays battle: since thenou have commanded the company.

As of this morning. All a Corn pa nyconsists of six light armored vehicleswith 25mm cliai n guns (LAV—25s)each cartwing only two or three scouts:twci assault gun varia nts I LAV—AGs):Iwo -l OW Va ri a ii ts ( LAV—ATs I: antI anair—clelense ariant with Stinger and a25mm gun tL7\VAD). the 25mmcli a in gui o ii the L.AV—25 Ii res Ii ighexplosive (I-IL) and armor piercing(A I’) iou ntis vi Ii a max i ci U Hi dice—the range in sour practical experience) of a hou 1.500 mc te is. i’h e105mm LAV—AG has an eliective

range of about 2.500 meters. ‘the bat—utlion has been in inlense combat for5 days running, and you are hopingdr a day off to pull ma in Icti ance. No

such luck: as your gunner heats up thecohee, a messenger arrives with instructio ns to report to the hal tal ioncoin ni and post i ni mcdi a (ci y.

\ou arrive at the co ci ii and vehiclein the dark: the battalion commander.a captain who began the campiligli asyou r company corn ma nder, sa s witha s cii Ic. “G cod morning, skipper.”\hu don’t like the w a he is grinningat ow something must lie ui. Luckylie Ii Ut ou through all those tacticaldecision games. you niuse. lie getsdown to business:

We’re here. Puinting on the map witha pencil.l The Indigenous Division ishere, lAnoiher jab sonic 25 miles totIle east.l The enemy is here on

Gaiet,c, ridge, in between. giving theIndigenous boys a heating. Our diviSian has orders to relieve lie pressureon the Indigenous Division. Unldr—iunatelv. fuel is low. Division hasenough hr a limited operatitni. s tuchnaturalt will he us. We will make araid directly mb the enenn rear whilethe rest ol the division pulls back forreplenishment. First sergeant yourboys will he on the right: I can givevo ii a sec iio ii of two OW Ci di ra s indi icc! support. 13 ravo on the left:Cia rI iea nd Delta arc reserves, on theright and left respectively. Initial mainelh,rb is Al [a. \Wl I Ii ave one ha tbery ofsd lpropel led arty in di reel support.

I can’t give you an) instructionsabout w hal to do until we meet the en—cnn. I in doubt, raise as mncli havocas ou can—inindlil of the fuel sittia—non—hut do not get cotnmitied to aset baitle. lIthe enemy striks back innice, pull hack: use oti r superior

speed to h rca k contact, lb t it’s i inper—at i \ e t ft at ou act hid dl) to take somepressure off our friends in the east. Wemove out in one hour. Any qtieslions?

You arrange vi th the Cob ras to Ii over out of sight to your rear on til calledand organize your three as shown onthe sketch. Uncertain as to what youwill encounter, you rem hid veluclecom ii a nde is of the co iii pa ny’s ‘Do asI do: IhI low die leade r” s ta cdi ng ope r—ating procedure.

In the approaching dawn. vnu ap—proacli the rear of the encniy posi—don—a low, crescent—shaped escarp—meni—apparently u nnoticed. You areless than 4 miles awa. In the distanceto your left ou can see the veli ides ofBravo Company advancing in dis—PC rsed forni atm n towa rd I lie e cc mypositions Ia rthier north. You see an enemy tank detach itself from a smallcluster on the extreme left of the ene—

my position and move directly acrossyour front to the other hank. Th roughyour binoculars you see the enemytank commander look over at you, apparently without recognition, and wave.You return the greeting.

You tn to raise battalion on the radio. hul comm is dead. The CharlieCompany comniander tells you liewill relay messages to battalion.

You see an artillery batten positionin the hollow of the crescent poundingaway at (lie friendly threes to the east.You see trucks and clusters of troopsgoing disinterestedly about their morn—i ng clinics. You see cluswrs of five orsix tanks on either flank of the posi—ti on. the crews milling about d is—mounied. and field guns lining the es—carp ci ciii. al so firing to the east ..At thecenter of (lie crescent. aniong a cluswrof smaller vehicles, you spot an enor—mou 5. tw’o—ston’ com nia nd veli id e.which you recognize as a capturedU.S. model. Ani azi ngly. the ccc niyseems unaware oL or at leasi unconcerned about, your approach.

You are now nearly within thehorns of the crescent. The cluster ofenemy tanks on the far left starts toshow signs of life: one by one you seethe diesel signatures of the enginesrevving up. There is a sudden flurry ofactivity around the tanks, You sense itis the ni n me ot of truth.

REQUIREMENTIn a time limit of 5 niinutes, de

scribe the action you will take in theform of the fragmentan order you willissue to your subordinates. Make sureto describe your intent and designateyour lheus of eflbrts. Include an overlay and a brief explanation of yourplan.

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Scenario #9

Enemy Overthe Bridge

SITUATIONYou are the corn manding officer of’

2d Battalion. 6th Marines. Your battalion consists of two rule companieson loot, one rifle company on trucks, aweapons company. a lank company (minus), and a TOW section on HMMWVs.The Dragons and heavy mach inegu nsof your tapons company have beenattached out to the rifle companies.

Friendly Ihrces hold the bridge andthe river] inc. (You understand the river to be unfordahie.) Reconnaissanceelements are operating nonh of theriver. Tomorrow morning the divisionbegins a major oflensive north acrossthe river, with the division’s locus otefforts in 6th Marines’ zone. Your battalion will spea rliead the regiment’sattack, and as such will he the initialregimental focus of eflbrt.

You are to occupy the assembly areashown on the map west of Hamlet inpreparation for the morning attackacross the river commencing at 0400.You are moving north toward the as—senibly area as shown. At 2000, yoursurveillance and target acquisition(STA) platoon, which is fonvard reconnoitering the route. reports enemy

infantry occupying ynir assembly areain stre ngtli and continuing to reinforce. The size of these enemy units isunknown but esti ni a ted to he at least acompany. Further, the STA platooncommander reports he has just met areconnaissance team that was operat—i ng north of the river hut has beenforced south across the river underlire. The reconnaissance learn leaderreports there is no sign of friendlylbrces holding the riverline or thebridge and that enemy infantrv unitswith some light vehicles have beenmoving across the bridge for at least30 miii u tes. Th is is all the in form at ionthe ST4 and reconnaissance Marinescan tell you.

As the battalion co iii in an der, vli atwill you do?

REQUIREMENTWith in a 5—minute time limit give

your solution in the Form of the l’rag—mentarv order you would issue to yoursubordinates—to include the intentbehind your plan. your lbcus ofelThrtsand any use of supporting arms—andsupport it with an overlay sketch.Then give a brief explanation of thereasons behind sour decision.

Ask yourselC “iat is the cdtical element in this siwationT’

26

I 5] h p I

Scenario #10

Gap at the Bridge

Knowing your enemy means understanding his capabilities and generalintentions. But it also means seeingthings the way he sees them, thinkingthe way he thinks, with the aim of an—licipating his actions and therebygaining the upper hand. This situationis the same as in Scenario #9 with onevery significant dilibrence: This timeyou are the enemy.

SITUATIONYou are the commanding oliicer of

1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Your battalion consists of one reinforced rulecompany on trucks, two reinforced rilIe companies on foot, a tank platoonand an antitank (TOW) section onHMMWVs. The Dragons and heavymachineguns of your weapons company are attached out to the coin-panics. The division is temporarilyhalted. hut the division commanderplans to resume the offensive towardthe south as soon as logistics can bebrought forward. You have been operating north of the river against enemyreconnaissance and security elements.The enemy holds the riverline and thebridge in strength. (You understandthe river to he unfordable.) Intelligence indicates that the enemy isplanning an imminent offensive north

across the river—sooner than your division can be ready to attack instrength. Your mission, which givesyou broad latitude in the manner ofexecution, it to take whatever actionsyou can to forestall or disrupt the enemy attack in your sector.

A patrol by one of your companiesdiscovers that the enemy forces thatwere holding the bridge have withdrawn. The aggressive company commander has already begun to infiltratehis company across the bridge. Youdecide to exploit the situation bygetting your entire battalion south ofthe river with an eye toward mountinga spoiling attack. In the process. one ofyour companies has an engagementnear the bridge with an enemy scoutcar, which flees west along the riverroad. You contact regiment and explain the actions you have set in motion. The colonel tells you he will reinforce with all the forces he can muster:infantry and tanks will begin to arrivein 2 to 3 hours. He designates yourbattalion as the main effort. You havethe priority of fires for all supportingarms, he tells you.

The time is about 2000; darkness isdescending quickly. Elements of yoursurveillance and target acquisition

(STh) platoon report that Hshows no signs of enemy activityour leading company moves mt

triangular wood west of HamleL anSTA team located on the high grsouihwesi of the wood reports ancolumn approaching from theheaded toward your position. lhteam sends the following report:

Enemy force. estimate at least Iion strength. moving north on Froad, at the intersection sciu itt

pass: covered trucks, jeeps. inon foot: I can hear tanks inlance but do not have a visual.

Simultaneously. a short firbreaks out with what appears toenemy patrol moving mb the tHatwood Prom the south. \‘oti sosfmay he the advance guard of(hetcolumn. As the battalion commwhat do you opt to do?

REQUIREMENTWithin a 5-minute time limi

your solution in the form of thorder you would issue to your sonates and support it with an 0

sketch. Then write a brief explalof your actions, giving the key c’erations and assumptions thatyour decision.

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How lI kno\4ng how you reacted to “Enemy Over the Bddge

(Scenario #9) influence your actions now that the combat boot is on

the other foot?

- _______________________

15

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Scenario #11

Enemy Over theBridge, Continued:A Thwarted Plan

This situation is the continuation ofScenario #9, “Enemy Over the Bridge.”The actions described here are basedon a solution to that problem submitted by Maj Claes Henrikson of theSwedish Army.

SITUATIONYou are the executive officer of the

2d Battalion, 6th Marines, consistingof a reinforced rifle company ontrucks, two reinforced rifle companieson foot, a tank company (minus), and anantitank (TOW) section on HMMWVs.As the lead element in a major division offensive, your battalion wasmoving to an assembly area in preparation for an attack north across theriver at 0400 tomorrow morning. Although the assembly area, bridge, andriverbank were supposed to he infriendly hands. at 20(X) your battaliondiscovered this was not the case. Anenemy force of at least company sizehas seized the bridge and occupiedyour assembly area.

Recognizing the importance of thebridge and the need to move at once ifthe division attack is to proceed asscheduled, the battalion commanderdirected the mobile force of CompanyE (in trucks), supported by CompanyA (tanks) and the TOW section to attack the bridge by East Farm Roadwithin one hour. As this was the maineffort, he accompanied the force withhis mobile command group. Companies F and G were directed to attackimmediatel to the northwest acrossEast Hill toward Hamlet, the originalassembly area and West Farm. The intent of this attack was to gain controlof the main roads leading south, pro-

teet the deployment and advance ofthe main effort and divert the enemy’sattention from the bridge.

As executive officer, you moved behind Company F and were coordinating the attack of the two companies inthe south. Briefing and preparationfor the attack by both mobile and footelements took longer than expected astroops were tired and had been looking forward to resupply and rest in theassembly area. At 2130 Company Greported that elements on East Hillheard loud explosions and an intensefirefight to the northeast. It seemedclear that the mobile force had contacted the enemy, but neither you norCompany G on East Hill were able toraise anyone with the mobile force onany radio net. Periodic small armscouhi be heard for several minutes.then artillery began impacting in thevicinity of East Farm. At approximately the same time. Company F reportedcontact with the enemy south of theoriginal assembly area. At about 2145.you receive a garbled. panicky reportfrom a radio operator on the conductof fire net. The mobile force has beenambushed with heavy casualties. It isstopped on the road, disorganized.and now under artillery fire. As thebattalion executive officer, what doyou do?

REQUIREMENTWithin a 10-minute time limit re

spond by developing the instructionsor frag order you would issue and thereports you would make. Explain therationale supporting your decisionsand provide a sketch map depictingyour decisions.

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SITUATIONYou are the commander of 3d Bat

talion. 4th Marines consisting of Corn—panics I and K on assault amphibiousvehicles (AAVs) near the GaraL’iola River. Company L on trucks at Androida,a light armored reconnaissance (LAR)company west of the river, and a lankcompany in reserve east of Androida.The TOV section is moving withCompany L. For the last 2 weeks youhave been lacing superior enemy mechanized C rces and have been forced toCall hack from west to east slowlywearing down the enemy while conserving your own combat power. Youhave learned thai the enemy force opposing you is a mechanized regimeniconsisting of a tank battalion and twomechanized infantry battalions, Enemy ladies emphasize attacking aggressively upon contact and maintainingthe momentum. The enemy will generally try to overrun resistance withtanks and prefers to dismount infantryonly when necessary for close combat.

Poor visibility due to heavy foglately has obscured the enemy situation since the last engagement. afterwhich you lost contact with ihe enemy.While your battalion is halted alongthe river, your LAR company moveswest to reestablish contact,

Sleep banks make it infeasible for

your AAVs to swim the river. Yourmission is to dekai any enemy forcesin your zone or. liiling that, at a minimum to delay and disrupt the enemyadvance.

As your LAR company passes westward through Tragedia. it reports asizable eneniy mechanized three tothe west approaching Checkpoint 6&The LAR company estimates an enemy regi nient with a tank battalion inthe lead. At this stage the LAR commander does nol believe he has beendetected by the enemy. Your artilleryliaison officer assures you he can getmassed fire support. Your air officersays he can get you “a couple of sortiesof FA—l8s.”

At this rate, enemy tanks will heapproaching Tragedia or Garagiola inabout 30 minutes. What are your orders. Colonel?

REQUIREMENTTime is critical, but since you have

already been considering the possibility of a battle along the Garagiola for acouple of days now. you don’t feelrushed. So go ahead and lake 12 minutes to develop the orders you wouldpass to your subordinates. Make sureto include any guidance for supporting arms and a sketch of your plan.Then provide a brief explanation.

Scenario #12

Battle of theGaragiola River

I,.

Does your frag order indude a mission statement? a statement of intent? a concept of operations? tasks for subordinate units? a designatedmain effort?

IIaaii

The situation for this game is thesame as Scenario #12. only it is seenthis time from the enemy’s point ofview. As with Scenarios #9 and #10,the purpose is to illustrate the importance of tning to understand an enemy by seeintz the situation through hisbin oc u Irs.

SJTUATJONYou are the commander of 2d Bat

talion. 9th Marines advancing generally east along the lakeshore as part ofthe regiment. Your battalion includesCompanies E and F on assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs). CompanyG on trucks, and an antitank (TOW)section on HMMWVs, The Dragonsand heavy machineguns from yourWeapons Company are attached tothe companies. For the last II) days theregiment has been advancing againstan enemy tank-mechanized force ofbattalion strength. The enemy hasbeen waging an effective and cleverdelaying action, fighting tenaciouslyfrom delaying positions, making eflèctive use of terrain and supportingarms. but disenagin and fallingback before the regiment can bringabout a decisive engagement, At thelast engagement, the enemy managed

to give the lead battalion a bloody

nose before breaking contact. Thick

fog since then has obscured the enemy

situation. Frustrated over the slow

rate of advance and inability to force

the enemy into battle, the regimental

commander moves your battalion intothe lead and attaches a tank company

His instructions to you are:

Attack aggressively, force a crossing ofthe Garagiota River as quickly as possible to facilitate the continuation ofthe advance, and crush the enemyforce opposing us once and for all. Mygoal is to quickly create a securebridgehead and an open road to theeast. The 1st and Tank Battalions, inresent, wilt he ready to reinforce andexploit your success.

Intelligence indicates that the ene

my has fallen back through Tragediaand Garagiola and is preparing posi

tions along the Garagiola River. which

has steep banks that make it impassableto any vehicles. Additionally. enemytanks have been spotted near Androida,As your leading mechanized company

approaches Checkpoint 68. you receive a report of enemy armored re

connaissance (with antitank missiles)

at Tragedia. Within the next half hour

your battalion will he engaged. What areyour orders. Colonel?

REQUREMENTAlthough time is shorL you have

been thinking about how to get acrossthe Garagiola River for sonic time, soyou already have sonic ideas. Take IDminutes to finish up the orders youwould pass to your subordinates. Makesure to include your intent, focus of efforts, and any guidance for the use ofsupporting arms. Provide a sketch anda brief explanation of your plan.

Sccuario #13

Battle of the GaragiolaRiver Revisited

34

For discussion, see pp. 78-80.Game appeared in the Marine Coips Gazette, Dec92; solutions, Feb93.

35

near Furhurg. While the first enemy

regiment occupies Gumbyville. 3d Battalion reports that another enemy infan

try regiment is marching on Furhurgfrom the southwest: 3d Battalion’s security elements are beginning to lullback under pressure. It is exactly thesituation you have been contemplating for the last 48 hours, so wu havesome pretty good ideas what to do.What are your orders. Colonel?

REQUIREMENTSince you have been planning for

this contingency for some time, itshould not take you long to issue yourorders. So take 10 minutes. Give theorders you would pass to your subordinate units. Describe your intent anddesignate a focus of effort. Provide asketch of your plan. any guidance forsupporting arms and a brief explanation of your rationale.

Can you identify the historical case that this scenario is based on’j

Scenario #14

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Battle of theDadmamian Swamp

SITUATIONYou are the commanding officer of

the 4th Marines, which consists of twobattalions on trucks, one battalion onassault amphibious vehicles (AAVs). atank battalion, and a reinforced lightarmored infantry (LAI) company. Youare west of the river with the missionof holding a bridgehead until reinforcements can arrive from the east inabout 72 hours.

An enemy unit, which consists of infantry reinforced with limited numbers of tanks, is advancing generallyfrom the west. An enemy regiment battered your 1st Battalion 24 hours agoin an engagement west of Gumbyville.Following that action, 1st Battalionwithdrew east across the DadmamianCreek. You now hold the bridgesacross the creek with 2d Battalion andthe LAI company The tank battalionis in reserve near Sphericberg. Your 3dBattalion protects the southern flank

3(1

Scenario #14For discussion, see pp. 81-63.Game appeared In the Maine Coips Gazette, Mar93; solutions, May93.

37

Scenario #15

Battle ofMount Giddy

This scenario is a little differentfrom previous ones Icr a couple ofreasons. l:irsi. ii is of a broader scopethai previous scenarios: you mighteven argue that ii verges cii being anoperanoiul decision game instead of aU rely tactical one Seco ntl. it is a M a—rine air—ground task orce (MAGTF)problem—desined lbr a Marine cx—ped ii io na iy b riga (IC (ML B) co ni man—der—in n hicli the requirement is orthe broad integration of ground. air,anti logistics elements rather than justthe tactical control of subordinateunits on the ground.

SITUATION\ou a Fe a ML 13 CC) mm a nLI er 15gb t—

intl in a coastal desert ihat itIThis excellent mobiliv and freedom for media—nized a lid motori/ed li>rees save brthe ridgelines. litch tend to canalize‘cli ide mo enie n t. 1 he theater st rate—g\ calls Icr the Joini [ask Force(lIT I—of nh ich t lie NI I B is a part—to mount a major hind oliensive toward the north out of the Damoose re—giun. [he ME Ks iii ission is to protectthe ii F\ southern hank. i.e., its rear.as the ill attacks noril’. Yoti are au—thorized to trade space Icr lime aslong js ti deny t lie e tie on theDa ii oose— 13 rut Ii tie. B rut being a keyport a tid at rfie I d and I )a moose beinga key l( gist cs node.

ui NI IL 13 Ct) fli 0 an d dc nieti t (CE)and brigade service support groupBSSG ) are located at I)amoose. Your

aviation combat element (ACE) is located at Brute. The air siluation is one

of relative pa riIy the enemy beingstronger in air defense assets, whileyou are stronger in offensive air assets.Your ground combat element (GC E)consists of a mu 10 ri zed infantry battalion (minus) in the vicinity of MountGiddy. one battalion on assault am—phi bious ehi ides twa r Goosel ub, a noth—er along (lie rail road west of lied Lake.a reinlbrced light armored infantrycc m pa in gun rd i ng the right ha n ktwa r 13e rra. a tid t ta ii k Ii atta I ion (iii i—nus) in reserve near Nevertheless. Thee lie my Ii as ti pe rio ri Lv (IC roughly twoto one in ground lorces.

You plan it) conduct a delaying ac—ti on. trading space lb r lime. \ )U in—tend to fall back only under pressure.niaking the enemy pay 11w even inchof terrai ii but avoiding decisive engagement. Since yours is a subsidianmission. von do 101 intend to force adcci s ion but ra the r Ic ores tall one.I lie JTF ollensive has been untierwavfor nea rh a week and to t Ii is poi in theene my oti vu ti r Ira nt h as Ii laved fl IC)your hands by remaining relatively inactive. p rohi tig Li ut tiC It t Ii rca (ciii ngyou r lb rwa RI del e is i ye posit tons. Hehas irregular lorces equipped i (Iilight vehicles operatin out of the barren desert to (lie nest who periodicallytn to cti t t lie I) a moose rail road, annportant line oh communication. In

telligence has been reporting a buildupof enemy a rino red and in ccli an izedforces anti supplies south of Gooselubover the last 45 liou rs. The (3—2 anticipates the enemy will mount an of [en—

sh’e in that sector within the next 72hours.

As it turns out, however, the enemybuildup in the south is actually a wellexecuted deception. Instead of strikingGooselub. the enemy attacks in strengthat Mount (3 iddy supported by niassedohlensive air power. The GCE cornma nder also reports that the LAI com—pa ny and mechanized battalion (inthe right Hank are under attack butholding their own, as is the battalionat (3 oosel ub. But lie re1io rts t Ii at lieca ii tic t make co ii tact vi th the motor—ized lialtalion at Mount Giddy, whichapparently has been overrun. Within12 hours scattered situation reports in—dica Ic I Ii a I enemy mccli a ii ized andarmored lorces have reached Never—Iheless. where they are being engagedby elements of the resent lank battalion. an ri are hegi in ng to bypassHuhi\ headed north along the littoralplain.

By all accoutits a niajor oliensivehas pe net ra ted vu ti r Ic it front and ispouring unchecked into your rear. AsWe MLII commander, what ill youdo?

REQUIREMENTDevelop a NI EB plan that includes

a general concepl of operations (within tent) and b ron d ni is sio ns br yourc;CE. ACE, and combat service suppt elements ts appropriate. (Leave itto you r sta if to vu rk (in t the details.)[lie ii provide a brief expl a natio ii ofour plan.

IIaS

Discussions

NoaHy, there is no ideal solution to military problems;every course has its advantages and disadvantages. One must selectthat which seems best from the most varied aspects and then pursueit resolutely and accept the consequences. Any compromise is bad.

—Held Marshal Erwin Rommel

4!

I)iscussian of Scenario #1

Ambush at Dusk‘it is even better to act quickly and err than to hesitate until

the time of action is past.”—Carl von Clausewitz

“Catch the enemy by the nose with fire and kick him in thefire emplaced through movement.”

—Gen George S. Patton

pants with

Initiatiw and SpeedTile first scenario is pretty straight—

to rwa rd—wli ic Ii by no ni cans makes iteasy. The platoon is caught in an ambush. Our squad is the only element ofthe platoon that s 1101 pi I ned down,Ii u t we Ii ave no coin mu n ica lions withthe platoon commander (who hasbeen lilt) or the platoon sergea nt. Wehave basically %ti options: We ca ii Iwait br instructions, which includeswing to rees Ut hI is Ii corn in u n ica tin ns

wi thi the platoon Il eadq u a rters andasking s hat to do. or (2) act on ourOwn initiative.

While there may be no approved soI u tin n to any tactical problem, somep roble us den, and to be solved, ai dfast. [Il at’s tll e case wi I h ‘Am bus l a IDusk.” I Cs no I a dela taMe poi Ilwhether we (as the squaLl leader)sll ou Id act or not. We inns: act, and wemust act nii,netha&’it’, We cannot delayaction because of a single casualty Ina situation like this in which Marinesare under lire, seconds count, and ifse do not act promptly there will certainlv be more casualties. Thus we introduce the essential element of speedas a fundamental of lactics—titwelinessof decision, tenlpo of operations, and ye—loci ty of movement. \Ve’l I see it Ii mea ndtiole again ill the killming scenarios.

Everone who responded to “Ambush at Dusk” when it appeared in theMCCI agreed on the need or promptacti ii tl. We m us I not wait I or ill st ru c—lions to reach us irom the platoonlieadqua rters and t is certainly riotadvisable to go back into the killingloll c—to stm rre title r the only ‘reedoillof action the platoon has—to ask orinstructions. This is a clear—cut example of a case in which a leader mustact witllout nstructions from above.The p1 atoo n coin in a nde r, platoon sergeant, arid the rest of the platoon

trapped in the killing zone have even’right to expect the squad leader to takedecisive action,

So, looking at tile bigger picture. weask ourself:

I) “What can I do to help the platoon as quickly as possible?(2) WhaI can I do to further the accoulpl ish ment of the platoon mission’!(3) Can we do both at once!

A Sample FragOThe flillowing is provided not as

the ‘Wright” answer hut as an example

The idea behind the cheng/cli I or fix-and-flank is to prevent our enemy from reactingeffectively to us by fixing his attention in one direction.

of a fragmentan order for one poss’—ble sol utiotl:

F ire team leaders. we’re gui ne lo moveon the double to that linger [pointingto the westi and attack the village byire tron the north iii order to relieve

the platoon and kill the enemy. Guns.you I ;ly down a base ot lire from hereui hI ‘ye get to the linger. 1 hen. vetlay ttown a base of tire hile youdoubleiime up to join us. Smnittv jtliewon tided Marines tire tea in leader].leave one man tsith the casualty untilthe mnedevac bird gets here. Get yourtire teams and hittow me: I’ll explainthe rest on the move.

j\Vhile moving: Once e get to therise and opeti tire. one ut ns o thingswill happen. Either the platoon will ‘cat,le to nove, and welt he the base oftire for their attack, or we’ll have toin a he t he attack on rsel yes with on

macli inegun team providing the baseof tire and the squad enveloping righta id swinging in from the norttm, Agreen-star cluster will shift the base oftire jas per the platoon’s standing opcrating procedu re].’

Linportantly, the squad leader has realized the gravity of tile situation anddecided that an i tnmediate, simple.and decisive response is the only answer. In order to save time, he’s evengone so far as to issue part of his orderon the move.

Saving the PlatoonThe immediate problem is trying to

save the platoon. How can we best dothis? Several readers suggested sending all or part of the squad back intothe killing zone to help evacuatewounded and increase the platoon’sfirepower. While it’s understandableto want to go directly to tile aid of ourcomrades, in this case it’s not a wiseidea. First. if it were possible to evacuate wounded t’ron, (he paddy. there arestill plenty of able-bodied Marinesnearby to do it. Second. our squad isthe o nlv dc merit of tll e platoon thathas freedom of action. It’s the onlymea ns. short of generating lire superiority Irom paddy. by which the platoon can seize the ittitiative hack fromthe ene my, The km is not to surrenderfreedom o/ar’Um: hi’ getting p11111Cc’ (/01111im’ith the rest o/ rite platoon.

Most readers recognized that thebest way we can help the situation isby rd levi ng the pressure on the platoon—i.e.. by stri king at the enemyforce that has the platoon pinneddown. The ti nger to the west ot’fers acertaill amount of cover if our squadnloves west and also provides a posi—tb n fronl which the sqttad can et’fee—tively engage [he village from thenorth. By putting etkctive suppressing

42

fire on the village, we take pressure oIlthe platoon—maybe to the point wherethe platoon regains its freedom ofmovement and can get out of the ricepaddy or can even go into the attack.

ccompIishing the MissionSome MCG readers suggested we

should be happy with preserving theplatoon and should not try to engagethe enemy any more than was necessary to allow the platoon to disengage.On the contrary, I suggest that although the platoon’s predicament isour first concern, it should not he ouronly concern. We should also bethinking about ways to force the enemy into a decisive engagement. AsMaj Steven A. Hummer wrote in hissolution to this problem. “Our mi.ssionis to locate and destroy the enemy andnow is our opportunity.” The fact isthat the two ohjectives are not mutual

ly exclusive: we can attempt to accomplish both at once. It is generally difficult to get a guerrilla enemy to standand fight. Here we have located a fairly significant enemy force and have achance to destroy it.Although the platoon’s situation is not good and theenemy clearly has the initiative, withtimely and aggressive action we canturn the tables. In order to do that weneed to launch a rapid and aggressiveattack. If we generate lire superiorityhut do not attack, the enemy will likelywithdraw. Likewise, the enemy willlikely withdraw after dark, when theeffectiveness of his fires has decreased.Either way. we have lost contact. Notgood.

Complementary Forces: the Cheng andCh’i

Not only does this problem demandoffensive action, hut the situation offers a tailor-made opportunity for attack. We don’t have to think in termsof making the attack all by ourselves.The platoon returning fire from therice paddy is a ready-made base of firefor a squad envelopment from thenorth. Similarly, by taking the enemyunder fire from the north, we may relieve pressure on the platoon enoughfor the platoon to go into the attack.

This situation provides an excellentexample ofa concept of such basic importance in tactics that we can call it atactical fundamental: the use of complementary forces, sometimes variously called the cheng and ch’i or fix-and-flank, We’ll see the concept time andagain in infinite variations, from the

is due to operations of the c/ilIextraordinaryl and the chetig Lnormallforces Generally. in battle, use thenormal force to engage use the extraordinary to win. , . . In battle thereare only the normal and extraordinary t&ces, hut their combinationsare limitless . . For these two forcesare mutually reproductive: their interaction as endless as that of interlocked rings.

Marine BGen Samuel B. Griffith, SunTzu’s translator, explains:

The concept expressed chcng, “normal” (or “direct”) and c/i I. “extraordinary” (or indirect”) is of basic itnportance. The normal (cheng) force fixes

or distracts the enemy: the extraordinan’ (c/i ‘i) forces act when and s heretheir blows are not anticipated. Shouldthe encmy perceive and respond to ac/il maneuver in such a man ncr is to

neutralize it, the maneuver would aulomatically become chcn’.

Morn recently. the lamed British military historian and theorist H. H. LiddellHart wrote that:

In war the power to use two lists is aninestimable asset. To fint with onefist and strike with the other yields anadvantage, but still greater advantage

lies in being able to interchangethem—to convert the feint into thereal blow as the opponent uncovershimself.

And in the quote at the very beginningof this discussion. Gen George Pattonexpresses the same thought in his ownparticularly eloquent way.

The idea behind the eheng/chl orfix-and-flank is to prevent our enemyfrom reacting eflectively to us by fixing his attention in one direction

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simple base of fire and enveloping attack in this scenario to the complementaty employment of the groundand aviation combat elements of aMarine expeditionary brigade in Scenario #15. The ancient Chinese warrior-philosopher Sun Tzu wrote thatvicton’:

43

while we strike from another. In otherwords, we eliminate his freedom of action. Without our cheng to occupy orhinder his efforts, the enemy can shiftto meet our thY with his lull strength.But by using complementary Forces weForce our enemy to disperse his effortsin different directions, while our efforts. although coming from differentdirections, have a converging effect.

The concept of complementary forcesapplies to the defense as much as tothe offense. In the defense we strive toestablish positions that are ,nittita’supporting, so that in order for the enemy to attack one he must first exposehimself to the fires of another. Theconcept applies as well to the complementary use of weapons systems. inwhich context we call it conthined(inns. The complementary use of dii—lërent weapons systems creates a dilemma for our enemy—in order toavoid the elkcts of one weapon hemust expose himself to another, Within a lire team, for example. we use thesquad automatic weapon (SAW) to pinan enemy down, which makes him vul—nerahle to the M203 grenade launcher.If he tries to move to avoid the effectsof the M203, we cut him down with theSAW.

Coordination and CommunicationsPart of our problem in this scenario

is that we can’t communicate directlywith higher headquarters. We do nothave direct access to supporting armsor medical evacuation (medevac) forour wounded Marine. How do we coordinate our actions with the platoonand get the support we need?

First, we keep our plan as simple aspossible to mini mite the amount ofcoordination necessary. Our decisivecourse of action should be evident tothe rest of the platoon. Given a simpleplan, the distances involved and thenature of the terrain, even without di—mct communications hetween the squadand the platoon, coordination should

not he too difficult. As Capt James R.Sinnott pointed out, any number ofsimple methods exist to signal the platoon to cease or shift its fires (whichshould he covered in unit standing operating procedures)—e.g. hand-thrownsmoke grenades. pop-up pyrotechnics.or even M203 smoke rounds. As forsupporting arms and the medevac. wehave to count on the platoon to takecare of those.

Immediate Action DrillsPerhaps the most important ele

ment in coordination in a situationsuch as this is the mutual understanding and trust that must exist amongthe different individuals and elementsin the platoon. As discussed earlier.this is a situation that calls for immediate action. Appropriately enough.immediate action drills are designedspecilically for just such situations. Awell-trained platoon will have practiced “plays” for dealing promptly andeikctively with likely situations. A typical counterambush drill for a ihr ambush (such as this) calls for the elementstrapped in the killing zone to immediately seek cover and return fire.while elements not in the killing zoneimmediately maneuver against the en—emy. using the trapped elements astheir base of lire. As the name indicates, immediate action drills providean immediate response to crisis situations. saving the critical moments

needed to make a decision and issueorders. Equally important. with established immediate action drills everyone in the unit knows what to expectfrom the other elements, making iteasier to coordinate efforts, even without direct communications. I mine—diate action drills should he practicedto the point that they become secondnature for the unit

As squad leader in this situation weknow that the platoon expects us tomaneuver against the enemy from thenorth; we know that the platoon will he

supporting us by fire (and will he requesting supporting arms), and will heready to shift those lires as appropriate.

As Sgt M. R. Hetzler succinctlywrote of this scenario when it appeared in the MCG:

If anything, this problem should showthe player the importance of minediate action (IA) drills .., There isno time to think, only to act whenyour buddies are under lire. If you’refollowing the prescribed drill, everyone should know what’s going on.Speed. simplicth’. and aggrcssil’cncss arethe keys to IA drills, and this situationclearly shows how they can he used toreact to a situation and save the lives ofyour men while destroying the enemy.

If the platoon commander has trainedhis Marines properly. “Ambush atDusk” will not pose a problem for oursquad leader fhr he will know just whatto do and just what to expect from theplatoon.

Historical NoteThis scenario was based on an actu

al situation faced by 1st Platoon,Company D. 1st battalion, 9th Marines near Da Nang in the summer of1966. as described in Francis J. West’s“Mines and Men,” Small Unit Actionsin Viernani: Sumnie,’ 1966. The boobytrap was intented to halt a Marine patrol in the open—which it did. TheViet Cong ambush was actually designed specifically to get the key members of the patrol. The enemy did notopen fire as soon as the booby trapwent oIL hut waited until the platooncommander, platoon sergeant and corpsman came forward to investigate—asthey invariably did. Fortunately, theenemy snipers missed their marks, hutthe various elements of the patrol wereseparated and unable to communicate. Squad and fire team leaders hadto act on their own initiative, andthrough aggressive action were able tomount a hasty attack and overcomethe resistance. The Viet Cong fledfrom the village.

*** * *

44

l)iscussion of Scenario #2

Platoon Ambush‘in all operations a moment arrives when brave decisions

have to be made if an enterprise is to be carried through.”—Adm Sir Roger Keyes

“He wins who fires first and can deliver the heaviest fire.”—Erwin Rommel

Seeing the “Bigger Picture”“Platoon Ambush” is a cough prob

1cm. As with “Ambush at Dusk.” thisscenario places a squad leader in a sttualion in which, on his own initiative.lie must make decisions and lake actions that impact at a higher level. Theplatoon laces a dilemma: a presumably favorable occurrence in the approach of the convoy as expected anda very threatening occurrence in theunanticipated appearance of the enemy patrol. Our hypothetical squadleader is the most senior member ofthe platoon who sees the dilemma.Unf&tunately. due to technical problems. Ii is landline communicationswith the platoon commander aren’tworking. He is thrust into the positionof having to make decisions at the plaloon level. A lot of the responsibilityfor the success or survival of the platoon in the next few minutes will reston his shoulders.

In order to act properly in this situation. we (as the squad leader) mustthink not just at the squad level, but atthe plaloon level. We must look at Ihebigger picture” and consider the efThcts

of our decisions on the larger outcome.This concept applies at all levels

and is important enough that we cancall it a tactical fundamental. Our un

derstanding of the “bigger pictureshould provide a frame of referenceor all our decisions. Furthermore, as

a general rule, we should think at least“two levels up” and not just one. Inother words, a platoon commanderwould consider the battalion situationin making his decisions. Likewise, asquad leader would normally considerthe company situation. (In this particular case the platoon is acting independently.) In making his tactical decisions the commander at any levelasks himselL ‘What can I do at my levelto help the higher situation or further theaccomplishment of the higher mission?”

In this scenario the platoon commander’s orders did not specificallycover what to do in the event of an en-cnn force coming in from behind theplatoon: the platoon commander anticipated forces coming down the roadfrom Depot hut not through the woods.We could argue that dealing with anyunexpected enemy movement from theeast falls under our squad’s generalmission of flank security. But even ifthis were not the case—if dealing withthe enemy patrol were clearly not partof our squad’s assigned mission—weshould realize we must act anyway fora couple of reasons. First this enemydevelopment was not anticipated by

the platoon commander’s order andtheret’ore is not covered by the plan.Second, it poses a signiticant threat tothe saflty of the platoon and the accomplishment of the platoons mission. Therel’ore. we have to do sonicthing about it.

Critical Vulnerability—OursAnother way to look at this is in

terms of critical vulnerability—in thiscase not the enemy’s vulnerability, butour own. In this situation, are we critically vulnerable? Definitely. There isthe potential ‘or real trouble here. Ofthe two enemy forces—the convoy orthe patrol—which is more likely tothreaten us critically? Clearly, the paIrol for it is moving toward the plaloon’s flank or rear and is in a positionpossibly to destroy the platoon or cutit oil from its route of escape.

A New Situation Can Make OrdersObsolete

The one thing the platoon commander’s orders were explicit about is thatwe were not to open fire until the aimhush had been sprung. But those instructions clearly were based on conditions and assumptions that no longerexist and are no longer appropriategiven the new developments in the sit-

45

uation: we shouldn’t feel restrained bythem. Instead. we have to use our bestjudgment to take whatever initiativewill best support the platoon given thenew situation.

“What’s the Enemy Up To?”In any tactical situation we should

ask ourselves. What exactly is the enemy up to?” We can’t ignore the possibility that the enemy is aware of theplatoon’s presence. in which case thepatrol is coining after us with a purpose. But even if they’re not aware ofour ambush and are merely a securitypatrol. things don’t look good for theambush. Thinking themselves safe intheir own rear area, the patrol mayvery likely follow the animal trail thatwe crossed, and although we don’tknow exactly where the trail leads, itappears to lead into the rearof the plaloon. Not good. IF ihe patrol doesn’tFollow the trail but heads due west itwill likely strike the objective rallyingpoint (ORP), which probably containsthe platoon sergeant and at most onefire team for security. Also not good. Ifits a security patrol, protecting the enemy’s rear area, it will likely check outthe bridge on its route and will likelyrun directly into the flank of the am—hush Force on the way. Again, notgood. In short, it seems extremelyunlikely that the patrol ‘ ill paut rough the area without coming uponsome part of our platoon. And even ifthe patrol does not discover our presence beforehand, it will he in a positionto strike our platoon once the ambush issprung—a vulnerable time.

Compl eating things is the approachof the convoy, which will likely—hut notdefinitely—arrive before the enemypatrol does. (A lot depends on the relative speeds of the convoy and patrol.)If we do nothing, the platoon will a in—hush the convoy as planned. thus giving itself away to the enemy patrol.Conversely, if we strike the patrol. wemay give ourselves away to the convoy. The convoy is bigger than usual—eight vehicles already with more cominginto view. A lucrative target. certainly—but how much is too much for a platoonambush to bite oft? When planning anambush, it’s not a had idea to have decided in advance how big a target istoo big. If the target is bigger than youcan handle, you let it go. Although theconvoy is not a combat unit, it is ledby a couple of maehinegun vehiclesand presumably includes other weapons, and can definitely do some damage.especially in conjunction with an attackby the patrol from another direction.

So What Do We Do?Having considered all this. what are

our options?

Option 1: Ignore parrot continueoriginal mLvsion. Doing nothing is always an option. right? In this case, definitely not. There is a definite problemhere that needs to he dealt with. Wecannot ignore the patrol. It clearlyposes too great a threat to the platoonand the accomplishment of the mission. At the absolute minimum, wehave to warn the platoon commanderof the new development.

• Option 2: Report to platoon, ask forutsinienons. Assuming that we can’t getthe landline working, we can send arunner back to the platoon: he couldprobably beat the convoy to the ambush site. You niight argue that the decision of what to do in this case is notthe squad leader’s to make. Instead.you might argue, we should inform the

In making his tactical decisions the commander at any levelasks himself, ‘What can I do atmy level to help the higher situation or ftirther the accomplishment of the higher mission?’

platoon commander of the unforeseensituation, hut leave it up to him whatto do. Unfortunately. there isn’t timefor that. By the time the platoon corn—mander were to get the information byrunner, make his decision, and sendinstructions hack to our squad by runner. it will almost certainly be too late.Furthermore. I suggest that the platoon commander isn’t even the bestperson to make the decision. His entire knowledge of the situation isbased on the sketchy and hurried information he will have gotten from themessenger. He understands none ofthe subtleties of the situation, such asthe relative positions of the two enemyforces, their relative speeds. or the degree of threat each actually poses. Wecan’t possibly communicate ellectivelyto him all the intuitive factors thatwent into our estimate of the situationbased on first-hand observation. Thebottom line is that the squad leader(who, remember, is thinking like a platoon commander) understands the situation better than anyone else.

Consequently, we reach the conclusion that we must deal with the enemy

patrol. It poses too much of a threat tothe platoon and the accomplishmentof the mission.

. Option 3: Deploy against patrol, hutdon’t strike immediareW You might argue that another option is to he prepared to strike the patrol hut to wait asalong as possible before initiating action so to give the platoon commandermore time to decide what he wants todo. You might argue that by holdingoff on striking the enemy we leaveopen to the platoon commander thechoice of surprising the convoy orletting it pass through the killing zone,but that once our firelight begins inthe woods, the convoy will he tippedoff that something’s up. You mightalso argue that by waiting wt give theplatoon commander time to deployagainst the patrol. if he so chooses.However, in this situation I think wait.ing is a mistake. The longer we wait.the closer we allow both enemy forcesto converge on us and the more likelyit becomes that we will have to dealwith both at once—the worst possiblescenario. And the longer we wait asthe patrol moves west, the greater riskwe run of the platoon being cut oilfrom the ORP. Once the enemy patrolgains the nearby ridge which runssouthwest between our squad and theORR the platoon is in trouble. Thepatrol is just about to become a majorthreat to the platoon, and we can’t alford to wait. We must deal with thissituation at once.

• Option 4: Stoke the patrol, let theplatoon u’orfl’ about the coni’Ol: Ourfourth option is thus to strike the enemy patrol. by attack or ambush (sending information to that elket to theplatoon commander). We can leave itup to the platoon commander whetherhe thinks the platoon is able io lightboth the patrol and convoy at once. (Ithink it is highly riskvi Of all the elements in the platoon, our squad is theone best disposed to deal with the pa’trol: in fact, it is the only element in aposition to deal with the patrol advantageously. The rest of the platoon.meanwhile, is already deployed todeal with the convoy, If we choose thisoption. we have to realize that by beginning an engagement with the patrol in the woods, we may sacrifice theelement of surprise with regard to theconvoy, and we are no longer in a position to protect the ambush siteagainst reinforcements by road fromthe direction of Depot.

• Option 5: Strike tile patrol, abort theambush. We might reach the condo

46

sion. based on our knowledge of thesituation, that it is too ambitious andrisky for the platoon to try to springthe original ambush while also striking the patrol. So we can send the messenger to the platoon commander withthe recommendation of foregoing theconvoy and going after the patrol instead. Thus the patrol becomes thenew target. Being a platoon-level decision. this certainly would be a gutsydecision for a squad leader to make.but a better one than Option 4. because it leaves less to chance. So whatdo we do about the convoy approaching down the road? That’s a closejudgment call that depends on time-distance factors. If the convoy is movintz fast enough to get through the killing zone before well strike the patrol(but assuming that our messenger willarrive in time to warn the platooncommander not to spring the ambush). we might just let the convoypass through. That way we have oneless problem to worry about. (The plawon can blow the bridge to preventthe machinegun jeeps from comingback.) Rut if thafs not the case—il itappears that the patrol will make contact first or the convoy and patrol willconverge on the ambush site about thesame time—we might think aboutquickly dropping a few mortar roundson the mad in order to disrupt and delaythe approaching convoc We shouldhave already laid the mortar on theroad and should he able to fire immedialely while the rest of the squad de

ploys against the patrol. A few explosions on the road some distance awaywill not necessarily alert the patrol tothe possibility of the direct threat to itself. We should probably plan to withdraw the mortar at some point to therelative safely of the platoon position.

Option 6: .4mhush the coni’ov,flx tilepatrol. There is another way besidesstriking directly at the patrol to prevent it from threatening the platoon.That is h instead of our going afterthe parol. gelting the patrol to conic tous. We can ambush the convoy ourselves. before it can converge with thepatrol and become a real problem, using primarily our mortar, AT4s. andM203s. This is another gutsy call bythe squad leader because it is in directviolation of the platoon commander’sexplicit instructions, An enemy security patrol would he compelled to turnnorth to investigate. But they wouldnot know that we’re already aware oftheir presence and are waiting forthem. Alter ambushing the convoy(making sure that we get the machine-gun jeeps). we quickly shift to face thepatrol. Our object is nol necessarily todestroy it but rather to keep it fixed onus while the platoon (which the patrolpresumably is not aware of) strikes itfrom the west—another example offix-and-flank. Like the others, this option is not without risk, If e fail tosmash the head of the convoy, wecould be between a rock and a hardplace.

ObservationsFor such a simple problem there are

a lot of difficult factors for our hypothetical squad leader to consider. Unlike “Ambush at Dusk.’ in which onegeneral course ol’ action presented itselL this problem has several drastically different solutions, any of whichmight work. You might argue that anycommander would be hard-pressed inthe time available to consciously consider all the factors we’ve discussed,And you’d he right. There simply isn’tenough time to deliberate on all thevarious factors and considerations thatweigh on the squad leader’s decision.That’s exactly the point of doing problems like this one. Through practice wedevelop the ability to deal with suchconsiderations instinctively and instantly rather than through reasoneddeliberation. We internalize the process. so that it occurs automaticallyand smoothly without our even beingaware of it taking place.

What’s the bottom line in “PlatoonAmbush”? That the squad leader mustcontinuously think beyond his ownlevel and be prepared to act on hisown initiative in the best interests of

the larger mission—even if it meansmaking decisions usually resened forthe platoon commander. As long asyou realized that you have to do something about the enemy patrol whichthreatens to hit our platoon in theflank, you’re on the right track.

USMC

* * * * *

47

Discussion of Scenario #3

Attack on Narrow Pass“Undeniably, in a mountainous area a small

favorable position acquires exceptional strength”—Carl von

post in a

Clausewitz

‘4Battles are won by fire and movement. The purpose of themovement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place toplace on the enemy. This is from the rear or flank”

—Gen George S. Patton

Thinking Two Uevels Up—AgainThis scenario generated a lot of con

troversy when it first appeared in theMCG in March 1991. Although we discussed the importance of thinking atleast two levels up in the previoustWO scenarios, it’s a point of such sig—nificance that it’s worth making again.The basic problem in ‘Anack on Narrow Pass” is how the platoon commander can best l’uriher the accomplish meni of the battalion’s mission,Some readers ‘cli verv strongly thatthe best way the platoon commandercould support the battalion was toguard its (lank—as explicitly ordered—and nothing more. Others completelyignored the flank guard mission andmoved oil to strike the enemy in theflank, either at the bridge or at thepass. to take pressure oil the battalion.

This scenario exhibits other similarities to the previous ones. As in “Platoon Ambush.” while separated fromthe main body with the mission ofprotecting its (lank, we discover athreat to the main body. but not fromour area of responsibility. As in “Ambush at Dusk.” the main body is heavily engaged, while our unit enjoys freedom of action and is potentially in aposition to directly help the main

48

body. If nothing else, this illustratesthe point that while diflèrent situations may exhibit similarities, no twosituations are the same. We must solveeach problem on its own merits, notaccording to the way we solved a similar problem. Our solution to “Ambushat Dusk.” for example. may not he appropriate in the “Attack on NarrowPass.”

What’s the Enemy Up To?As always, we should tn to get a

handle on the enemy’s intentions. Weknow that the enemy has a fairlystrong position at Narrow Pass. butthis doesn’t necessarily mean a largeforce. As Clausewitz’ quote indicates.the proper use of difficult terrain canconfer exceptional combat power toeven a relatively small force. The enemy has seen lit to place an outpostsouth of the dry gully to add depth tohis defense. The fact that the enemy isable to use his heavy machineguns tofire over the heads of his outpost atnight indicates that this is no hasty position, but has been carefully prepared. Without question. this will beone tough nut to crack. In fact if we’regoing to take Narrow Pass. the way todo it is not frontally but from the

flanks, attacking along the spine of thehigh ground to negate the strength ofthe enemy positions.

What about Western Narrow Pass?The patrol we ran into fled in that direction. The enemy almost certainlyhas forces positioned there. The question is how many! Our platoon has already reached the east-west road andthe only enemy we have met are thelistening post (LP) we chased off. Myguess is that Western Narrow Pass isnot as heavily defended—although wedon’t know for certain.

What about the ridgeline betweenthe passes? Our vehicles may not heable to cross, but as Napoleon said,our infantry can go anywhere two mencan set foot. To this point our platoonhas seen no sign of enemy (brcesalong the ridge. hut again we simplydon’t know for sure. There are possibilities here worth exploring.

And what about the enemy’s tanks,which we havent heard from yet? If Iwere the enemy in this situation Iwould prefer to hold my tanks in reserve north of the ridge on the WesternNarrow Pass road midway betweenthe two passes. As the enemy approached one pass or the other my concept would be to drive south through the

4

0ther pass and strike the enemy flunkvia the east-west road south of thehdee.

What Are Our Options?So where does this leave us?

Option 1: Guard the flank, let thebattalion COnInlandL’r worn’ about thebattalion. As LtCol S. A. Clay wrote;

The great temptation in this situationis to display excessive initiative aL theexpense of carrying out very clear-cut.specific orders The battalion cornmander instructed the platoon leaderto guard the battalion’s left flank.There was nothing iffy. conditional, orprovisional about the mission: “Guardthe left flank” The battalion commander clearly has the right to expectthat his left flank will be screened andprotected; at ihe very least he will bealerted if a significant threat emeruesfrom the west along the road the rockyuullv. or any of the adjacent terrain.

Unlike Atnbush at Dusk” or “Platoon Ambush.” you might argue thatin this situation the main body is notin obviously dire straiLs: the battalionis heavily engaged, true. hut who’s tosay it won’t fight its way through without our help? Moreover, in this situation we do have communications withhigher headquarters. As a result, do wehave less of an excuse for acting onour own initiative? Given the apparently unimaginative tactics of the battalion, you might infer that our battalion commander will probably not hetoo tolerant of subordinates who demonstrate too much independence. Because we’re concerned about battalion’s success. at a minimum we mayoffer to direct supporting arms againstthe enemy machinegun positions. (Wemight even go so far as to direct one ofour machineguns at the western enemy gun position. betraying our ownpresence in the process.)

Option 2: Attack the enemy izearNarrow Bridge. As with going directlyto the platoon’s aid in “Ambush atDusk,” supporting battalion by thisoption is not a good idea, As Maj DirkJ. Vangeison wrote. “It ould be foolhardy to rush directly to the aid of thebattalion under confusing ciitumstances, darkness, and with such a smallforce. This is especially true sincebattalion seems to he conducting anattack around the enemy’s east flank—i.e., toward us. Attacking east, wewould put ourselves directly in the lineof friendly fires. Moreover, this optionwould put us under the fire of thesame machineguns that are engaging

the battalion. As we’ve said before. thiswould mean surrendering freedom ofaction. If w&re intent on helping battalion out of its predicament. there aremore far-reaching ways to do it. Forexample:

• Option 3: Launch a flank attackagainst the Lqienn’ holding the pass. Youmight argue that. looking at the biggerpicture. we know we must do every-thing we can to facilitate battalion’sgetting through Narrow Pass. and thatthe best way to do this is to attack theenemy holding the pass in the flank.You might argue convincingly that theactual problem to the battalion’s frontmakes a possible threat to the flank ofless immediate concern. (1 would argue, however, that an enemy counterattack with tanks east via WesternNarrow Pass is a likely enemy response and cannot simply be ignored.)In opposition you might argue that

Simply put, the ideais to avoid enemy surfaces andexploit enemy gaps. . . we tryto avoid the enemy where andwhen he is strong and strike himwhere and when he is weak orvulnerable.

our platoon is not a big enough forceto overtake an enemy lorce that hasmanaged to stop the battalion. But theAmerican niilitan historian S.L..A.Marshall wrote:

For the infantry soldier the great lesson of minor tactics in our time . . . isthe overpowering effect of relativelysmall amounts of fire when deliveredfrom the right ground at the righthour. . [flhe salient characteristicof most of our great victories (and afew of our defeats) was that they pivoted on the tire action of a few men.

As we’ve already discussed, if anybodyis going to take Narrow Pass, it’s probably going to he from the flank as opposed to frontally.

Option 4: Protectflank while also de—tvloping other option.v Perhaps you’vereached the conclusion that you can’tignore your orders to guard the flank—that, in fact an enemy counterattackfrom the west is a distinct possibility.But at the same time you realize thatbattalion isn’t going to get throughNarrow Pass using its current ap

proach. Perhaps you know that yourbattalion commander is going to startconsidering other routes across Sanctuarv Ridge and expects his subordinates to use initiative to developopportunities. So you might establisha blocking position. with your Dragons arid machinegu ns and most of theplatoon, on the spur east of \VesternNarrow Pass and at the same timesend a patrol up the spur to the crest ofthe ridge to ascertain enemy dispositions. We don’t know if the ridge orWestern Narrow Pass will offer a wayfor battalion to get into SanctuaryPlain: the only thing we know for certain is that Narrow Pass won’t. From acentral position on the ridge, we are ina good position to liatik either of thepasses. or move against the enemymachinegun positions from the rear. Ifwe push out west along the ridge, weare also in a position to continue toprotect the battalion’s left flank byclosing down Westerti Narrow Pass.

What About Battalion?Unlike the previous scenarios, in

this situation our commander doeshave communication with higher headquarters. No matter what decisioti theplatoon com mander makes, it’s important that he contact battalion to report the situation as he sees it from hisvantage point and to suggest any possible options ‘or battalion.

It’s perhaps a little unfair to put aplatoon commander in the position ofhaving to make all these decisionsabout how the battalion ought to act—although it could happen. Hopefull.our platoon commander is not theonly person thinking at the battalionlevel; hopefully the battalion coinmander has got a few ideas himsell’.Hopefully. our platoon commander isnot the only person in the battalionwho realizes that we probably ought toat least start looking at sonic other options for getting across SanctuaryRidge. That decision ought to belongto the battalion commander, and thisscenario could just as easily have beendesigned as a battalion problem. If ourbattalion commander is intent onforcing his way frontally through Narrow Pass no matter what, there may henothing our platoon can do to preventdisaster. But the battalion commandercertainly ought to be considering otherplans and ought to he open to suggestions from his subordinates. The question is: What will it take for the battalioncommander to shift his axis of advanceaway t’rom the Narrow Pass?

4’)

Surfaces and GapsThis brings us to another fairly sim

ple hut extremely important concept:surfaces and gaps. This is not a newconcept: it has been around for ages invarious guises. Says Col Michael D.

Wyly, one of our leading tacticalthinkers:

It is unimportant whether you refer tothis concept as surfaces and gaps orsoft-spot tactics or simply the idea ofpitting your strength against the enemy’s weakness, call it what you will.

The great Sun Tzu used an analogy

t’rom nature:

Now any army maybe likened to water. ‘or just as flowing water avoids theheight and hastens to the lowlands, soan army avoids strength and strikesweakness. And as waler shapes itsflow in accordance with the ground,so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy. And as water has no constantform, there are in war no constantconditions. Thus, one able to gain thevictory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situationmay he said lobe divine.

Taking his cue from Sun Tzu. LiddellHart developed the “expanding tor

rent” theory:

liwe watch a torrent hearing down oneach successive bank oF earth anddam in its path. e see that it firstheats against the obstacle Feeling itand testing it at all points. Eventuallyit finds a small crack at some point.Through this crack pour the firstdriplets of water and rush straight on.‘rhe pent up water on each side isdrawn towards the breach, It swirlsthrough and around the flanks oF thebreach, wearing away the earth oneach side and so widening the gap. Simultaneously the water behind pours

straight through the breach

Simply put, the idea captured in thesequotes is to avoid enemy surfaces andexploit enemy gaps. Or in other words.we try to avoid the enemy where andwhen he is strong and strike himwhere and when he is weak or vulnerable. Gaps may be actual physicalgaps in the enemy’s dispositions. orthey may be any exploitable weakness—spacial. technological, moral,etc. Likewise, a surface may he an actual strongpoint, or it may be any ene

my capability In our scenario. Narrow Pass clearly is a surface. Theremay he gaps elsewhere—we won’tknow until we take action to lind out,

In the words of FMFM I, Waighthig:

Due to the fluid nature of war, gapsvill rarely he permanent and will usualty he fleeting. To exploit them demands flexibility and speed. We mustactively seek our gaps by continuousand aegressive reconnaissance.

In Option 4. our platoon commanderis actively seeking out gaps, as FMFM1 instructs, by sending a patrol northto the ridge. We know that the enemyis aware of our platoon’s presence because we chased oft’ one of his LPs. Ifthe ridgeline or Western Narrow Pussisn’t defended in strength. we can betthat the enemy is sending reinforcements in a hurn lfwe don’t act quickly we are going to find that our possible gap has turned into a surface.FMFM 1 continues:

Once we locate [gapsj. we must exploitthem by funneling our forces throughrapidly. For example, if our locus ofeffort has struck a surface but anotherunit has located a gap. we shift the focus of effort to the second unit andredirect our combat power in supportof it. In this manner we “pull” combat

power through gaps from the Frontrather than ‘pushing’ it through fromthe rear.

I suggest that in our battalion, the platoon commander should know thatthe battalion commander expects himto actively probe for gaps routinelyand that the battalion commander, realizing he has struck a surface in thissituation, should he ready to redirecthis companies behind our platoon. Asfor the original flank guard mission,our battalion commander, realizingthat our platoon is in the best positionto find a gap. should consider assigning another unit to protect the flankand should cut our platoon commander loose to develop the situation.

The Bottom LineOne main reason this scenario caused

such disagreement among readers is thatthe situation was so uncertain and allowed for widely differing assumptions and interpretations. One of themain points of this book is the importance of decisiveness in the Ilice of incomplete information. However, a certain amount of information is essential to making a sound decision.Indecisiveness leads to disaster, hutgoing off halttbaked can be just as disastrous, There is a lot more about thissituation that we ought to know helbrewe commit ourselves.. What is the situation at Western Narrow Pass? Doesthe enemy hold the ridge in strength?What is the actual threat to the leftflank? A good commander has toknow when he has enough information to make an informed decisionand when he needs to develop the situation to gain more information. Moreabout this later

uSMC

* * * * *

5t)

Discussion of Scenario #4

Attack on NarrowPassE Continued

From Bad To Worse“Gallant fe/lows, these soldiers; they a/ways go for the

thickest place in the fence.”—Adm Sir John de Robeck

“Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the sameform) after it has once failed. A mere reinforcement of weightis not sufficient change, for it is probable that the enemy willhave strengthened himself in the process.

—B. H. Liddell Hart

What’s Different?Based on the controversial, strongly

divided response to “Attack on Narrow Pass” when it appeared in theMCG. this follow-on scenario was developed in order to see what sort ofdevelopments in the situation it wouldtake to get the hardline “flank guardcr5” to change their minds.

What has changed from Scenario#3 to Scenario #4 that might (ormight not) lead us to change our plan?In the Former scenario, battalion hadmade contact with a sizable enemyforce—had hit a surface—hut was notnecessarily in dire straits. Meanwhile,it seemed that the situation in our areamight oiler sonic opportunities (in theform of gaps). although we didn’t yetknow for certain. In the latter, it’s becoming increasingly dear (to us atleast) that battalion is going for the“thickest place in the fence”—as Admde Robeck had observed of the Britishforces making repeated fruitless frontalassaults against strong Turkish positions at Gallipoli in 1915. Meanwhile.we have reconnoitered Sanctuary Ridgeto our north and have made contactwith nothing more than an enemy listening post (LP). Additionally. we spotsome motorized/mechanized activitynorth of the ridge. In short, the situa

tion has become much clearer on bothfronts. Battalion has hit a hard spotand is in trouble while opposite us theenemy is weak.

What Do We Do?Our options are roughly the same as

before. with the exception that “pulling” the battalion across the ridge westof Narrow Pass is probably no longerviable (as we’ll discuss).

Even if we decide to interprel ourmission narrowly and maintai ii ablocking position to protect the battalion’s left flank, 2dLts Brian J. Donovan and Thomas C. King suggest thatwe shouldn’t do it in the immediate vicinity of Checkpoint 37. The enemyhas already located us there twice. Anartillery mission has landed a shortdistance away. We’re just lucky heisn’t more proficient with his supporting arms. (Or maybe he’s too busy firing at the lucrative target our battalionpresents and can’t spare the fire missions.) The key concept here is obvious: if you can be located, you can hetargeted. At a minimum we ought tomove. The spur north of Checkpoint37 looks like a suitable position fromwhich we can control the east-westroad. (More on this later.) Of course, ifwe’re willing to move up onto the

ridge, why not keep going . . .

What About (he Flank Guard Mission?At this stage. the way things have

developed. I would argue that a possible threat to the battalion’s left flank isof less consequence than a yen realand significant th real to its t’ront. Howmuch worse can things get? However.I think we have gotten lucky on thiscount. I think that there is. in facL areal threat to the battalion’s flank. It isthe group of vehicles assembling (somewhat belatedly, in my opinion) northof the ridge. Again (and always) tryingto figure out the enemy’s plans. I thinkthe enemy intends to move his mobileforces south via Western Narrow Passand strike east against the battalion.It’s the most logical enemy countermove. So. how have we gottenlucky! From the ridgeline we can protect the battalion by blocking the enemy move (befâre the enemy mobileforce reaches Western Narrow Pass)just as effectively as we can fromCheckpoint 37. But we have to actfasr:the enemy appears to be getting readyto move.

Key TerrainThis situation leads us to another

key thought: the importance of terrain.

‘I.-,

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iërrai is ni priman significance tothe tactician: a huge pan of taclics. infact, is based cii being able to :read’’terrain. But it’s essential to Pont outthat terrain is not significant hr itsow ii sake. Ihe Ii ijth ground north ofCheckpoint 37 on Sanctuary Ridge isii ot i m p0 rta lit 5 ni ply beca use it’s Ii ighground. Thmmi tc inipoiloin on/i to thedcgree that ii con/en an cn/ranrage toc/meter vntro/c it. lerrai n is sonic—thing to be cited, not simply somethingto he gained.

The Ii igh ground to the north —

Sanctuan Ridge—i.c key terrain. though.Why? For several reasons. First, bycontrolling the undeibnded ridge weIi old open a gap I Ii rough nh ie Ii ha tta I —

ion might pour like an Thxpandingtorrent.’ Second. being on the ridgeputs us in posi [ion to make a moveagainst t lie flank of t lie ene iii positions at cit lie r pass. :\nd third. (remthe ridge we can engage enemy forcesmoving east—west on either side of theridge. We can thus move our entireplatoon to the u tide l tided ridge a ii dbe in position to make a move againstthe enemy positions at Narrow Passfrom t lie Hank while still providinuprotection hr the battalions flank.

We should point out that while theposition on the ridue offers fat moreoptions. it is not without risks. We riskbeing cut oil ii the enemy is able tobreak I Ii rough on the east—west roadsouth of the ridge. Mo t’eo ye r. if t hebattalion decides to break contact and

ii hack, we’re hung out to dn.

Multiple Optionsfli is discussion in turn leads us to

vet another valuable concept. LiddellHart suggested that, whenever possible.we should take a line of operationw Inch offers alternative objectives.Not only do we c rca t C more optionsa ti d opport u nit ies or ott rse I yes, wemake it much Ii aider br the ene m\ toant ici pate our next no’ e and to tie—lbnd against it. As just discussed, theposition on Sa nctu an Ridge at onceoilers ii u in erou s optic >ns. both olien—sive and detensive. Bi conipa rison. apos i tic) n in t lie vicinity of C heckpoi ii37. only several hundred meters awa’..Ii mi ts our cc u rses of action to ii a sic—all one—establishing a blocking p0—sition on the left flatik.

More on Surfaces and GapsTo conti tiue our discussion of sur

faces and gaps. what was a hunch inthe last scenario is more certain now—that Narrow Pass represents a definite

enemy st ro ngpoi nt. while lu rt her westalong the ridge represents a soft spot.Ideally. by now the battalion shouldhave shified its axis of advance flirt icrwest—either di rough Western NarrowPass or over the ridge itself—to cxploi t the opportunity developed h our1ilttooti.

In order for this process to work several conditions must exist. FirsL unitsand corn tnanders must h ave the flexibility to adjust quickly to fleetingopportu nities. to act like water ‘hast—

...whenever possible, weshould take a line of operationwhich offers alternative objecfives. Not only do we createmore options and opportunitiesfor ourselves, we make it muchharder for the enemy to anticipate our next move. - -

ciii ii g to the lowl a ii ds.” Seco rid. s u ho r—ditiate leaders must have the initiativeto probe for and create opportunities:they must keep their seniors appraisedoh’ developments: and they must stayfoe used on the in ission and intent oftheir Ii igli er coin ma tide rs— in ot liewords, they can no I turn in to “loosecan tions. “They must act with i nitia—live. >es. hut always with regard to thelarger situation. Third. senior cotn—manders must be receptive to theopportunities developed Lw tliei r subordinates: moreover. the> must en—cou rage thieir subordinates to act ivi tliboldness and initiative to develop tImesituation anti ni us t support them whenthey do And finally, seniors must explain thetr intent clearly so that theirsubordinates have a sound basis flirtheir actions.

in this situation. I suggest that ‘‘pulling” battalion across the odge is proba—hlv no longer art option. Battalion isengaged iii close cotnbat a tid proba Lilycannot effectively disenjiage and niovelaterally across the enemy’s front atshort range. So while lindinu a gapelse Ii crc in igh t have been an optionearlier, at this stage it seems that theonly viable course is to help battalionfight its way through where it is. Lackof adaptability. flexibility, and quickness have constrained us to fighting apttclied battle at Narrow Pass.

Screen Versus GuardThere is possibly another way to deal

with the dilem ma over securi ng the hattal ion’s fl a ii k and helping hat tal ion outof Ls iii mediate pred came it. lb at isto cli a nge the in ssio ii from Ha ti k guardto flank screen. Guard and screen aretwo securit> missions that (liner in thea niou in of protectioti they proi ide. Aguard force has a mission to providephysical protectioti to the ni a in bodyagainst the effi1cts of enemy direct lire.A guard lights in the conduct of its mission, using otknsive. defCnsive, or delaying action. A screen. on the otherhand. provides the mai ii body wit Ii ear—l warning of enemy action hut doesnot provide physical protection. A ‘

screen reports infOrmation and niay direct supporting arnis. hut lights only inselfpresenation.

A third classification of’ security mission is cover. Covering lhrces are self-contained tactical units operating independently from the main force for thepurpose of intercepting, engaging. dehaving. disorganizinu. and deceivittgtIme enemy hethre he can attack themain force. Covering forces generallyopera Ic beyond a rti I len range f’ro m thetnain body (and are thus beyond thescope and scale of this scenario).

In di is seen a no. an option ni igh t heto sereeti the Ic hi flank ivi th a nii iii malforce—maybe a lire team and thel)ragons (since thus is tIme likely avenueof approach of enemy tanks)—and usethe rest of our fOrce to relieve the pressure on the battalion. As discussedearlier, we can screen just as efkctively(or even better) from atop SatictuanRidge as from Checkpoint 37.

Of course. the decision to changethe platoomis iii i ssio n from guard toscreen rests nortiiahly with the highercoinniander who assigned the missionin thi e first place. although in a dire Sit—u a tion die p1 a too ii com ma nder ni a’yen well find hi in self’ in the positionof having to make that call himself, Iintroduce the discttssion of screen versus guard siniph to suggest anotherpossi lie way to deal ‘vi thi the di Ic in mawe face.

Tlte Bottom LineSt), the question is, Has the situation

changed enough—has it become desperate enough—for you to abandonyour original orders as no longer applicable and to take matters into your ownhands? Regardless of how you eventually answer, you’re breed to analyzethe larger situation, your role in it. andwhat actions you can and ought totake—and that’s the ultimate object ofthe scenario. usMC

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9iscussion of Scenario #5

‘Film at Eleven I

“Should one ask: ‘How do / cope with a well-ordered enemyhost about to attack me?’ I reply: ‘Seize something hecherishes, and he will conform to your desires.’”

—Sun Tzu

“For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles isnot the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting isthe acme of skill.”

—Sun Tzu

Acting With DiscretionGiven the relative strengths in this

situation, there is little doubt we willseize Oasis one way or the other. Thegoal is to minimize the cost to all concerned. Obviously, we want to minimize our own casualties. hut it’s equally important to minimize casualtiesamong the locals. In a response to thisscenario when it appeared in theMCG. Maj H. Heath Fox II gave thisconcise analysis:

A key to this situation. especially sincewere seizing the town for occupation

by the MCSSD IMohile Combat Service Support Detachmentj. is not making more enemies than we alreadyhave—particularly ones who are not

easily idenliftahie. Care must he exercised when dealing with a mixed comhatant/noncomhatani populace. Anyimprudence on our part will lead tounnecessary civilian casualties, createfurther animosities toward us amongthe civilian population, and is sure tohe reported in a negative context bythe TV news crew. Minitnizing civilian casualties and collateral damageis in our own best interests.

Since the MCSSD is going to he operating out of Oasis, it will simplify thesecurity situation if we gain the cooperation, if not the actual support ofthe locals. We should try to spare not

only the lives hut also the dwellingsand crops of the inhabitants.

Our plan should lirst include thepossibility of seizing Oasis without afight. In fact. we should make even effort to induce the militia to surrenderwithout fighting. Certainly. preparaton fires are out of the question: unprovoked firing, in addition to making

We should also stipulategeneral rules of engagement,such as what sort of response toaggression is acceptable andwhat sort is not. Even after being fired upon, we don’t want toreturn fire indiscriminately.

for poor publicity. may convince thelocals they have no choice hut to fightin self-defense. We should fire only after being fired upon. But to preventMarines from being passive targets. weshould have a simple and immediatesignal for transitioning from nonfiringto firing mode. We should stipulate whohas the authority to give this signal.

We should also stipulate generalrules of engagement such as what sort

of response to aggression is acceptableand what sort is not. Even after beingfired upon. we don’t want to return lireindiscriminately. Since we have thetime. we should make sure this is veryclear throughout the unit. The bottomline is that we want to minimize collateral damage. while at the same timetiii ni mizi ng the risk of our Marines.

Center of Graity/Critical VulnerabilityWe have already discussed the impor

tance of pitting our strength against theenemy’s weakness, of striking herethe enemy is vulnerable. Rut thaisonly part of the equation. An enemymay he vulnerable in a particular areaprecisely because that area is unimportant to him and so he hasn’t bothered 10 prolect it. In such a case, eventhough we would be attacking wherethe enemy is weak, we would gain littlefor our efforts. We must also commitour strength where and when it will dothe most good. In other words, wewant to attack the enemy at some critical point or center of gravity. We wantto go after the one thing—the unit capability. place. whatever—that contributesmost to the enemy’s ability or will toresist, the one thing that if lost willcontribute most directly to the enemy’sdownfall. But we want to make sure to

53

dolt in a way that exploits the enetnvsvulnerahilities. There’s a definite ruthlessness about attacking critical enemy vulnerahilities. a sense of “goingfor the jugular.” Bruce I. Gudmundssondescribes it very clearly in TacticalNotebook (Mar93):

Nature provides a useful example of acritical vulnerability in the form of thejugular vein and carotid arteries. Carrying, as they do. the blood to andfrom the brain, these vessels are critical to life. Located on the outside ofthe neck and throat, moreover, theyare poorly protected. The knife aimedtowards them will run into very littleresistance from muscle and nonefrom bone.

What is the center of gravity of Oa

station, a community symbol. WroteMaj Fox:

By seizing the pump station. we’ll conirol the only local fresh water supply,and the source of irrigation for the local food supply. The pump station/water supply . . . is the center ofravity in this situation. By seizing thecommunity center, we’ll control themain building. and a key defensibleposition in the town. Controlling thesetwo key terrain features gives us effective control of Oasis. By executing avigorous effort to seize the two buildings quickly, I hope to discourage militia resistance against us.

Whatever plan we eventually develop.it should probably call for the earlyseizure of the pump station and community center as a means for controlling Oasis and its population.

easy. Time is a commodity shared byboth sides, and the object is to makehetter use of that tinie than our opponent by getting better prepared. Moreover, once we’re into the conductphase and have made contact with theenemy, speed of action becomes essential again.

OptionsThere are a couple of fundamental

ly different approaches to solving thisproblem.

Option I: Surprise night attack. Theobject of this option would be to disarm the enemy before he could makeany organized resistance. It wouldprobably mean a dismounted attack.since the noise of our vehicles would

We want to go after the onething—the unit, capability, place,whatever—that contributes mostto the enemy’s ability or i4lI toresist, the one thing that if lostwill contribute most directly tothe enemy’s downfall.

sis? Some readers suggested the community center. Other readers recognized. however, that the true center ofgravit —the one thing the locals cannot Ii ye vi Lh out—is the pu iii p sta Lion.Not only is the Ilu m p station the literalliflline of this desert community. hut itis probably the symbolic one as well.Seize the pump station and any md

nation to continue to resist is gone. Be—i ng on the outskirts of the town, thepuiw station is vulnerable to attack.As StMaj P. J. Pollionc wrote in response to this scenario:

The pump station is the pri ne objective. Si nec we dont know how the militia will react, control of the water willservc as a catalyst for the enemy tosurrender. Attacking from the westand north is the only feasible way tomaneuver without destroying the cropfields. Since the locals depend onthese fields for food. iL becomes important to save them and thus tn towin local supporL

The community center. a two-storymasonry building that provides thebest observation and cover in Oasis. isnext in order of importance. The community center is probably also the nilitia headquarters and, like the pump

PreparationOf the first five scenarios, this is the

first in which time is not a critical factor. the first in which we’ve actuallygot time to catch our breath and thinkabout our plan. That in itself is a pretty clear indication of the importanceof tempo. As the Duke of Wellingtonsaid. ‘ln milita operations. time iseverything.” The previous scenariosrequired us to conduct hash’ operations. which relied for success on theenemy’s lack of preparedness and onour ability to improvise and act quickly. In this scenario, however, it’s to ouradvantage to conduct a deliberate operation. Deliberate operations rely forsuccess on our own level of preparedness. The problem with deliberate operations is that while we are taking thetime to prepare. usually so is the enemy. Not so with ‘Film at Eleven.’” astatic situation in which we have noreason to think that the enemy’sdefenses will get any stronger over thenext 22 hours. When time is on ourside, we should use iL The luxury of a22-hour window in which to accomplish our mtssion in this case allowsus lo pick the optimal time of attack,to consider our options deliberately, todevelop a more detailed order reflecting a more coordinated plan. and toconduct a rehearsal. This last point isperhaps most imponanL When we’vegot the time. there is usually no betterway to spend it than in a rehearsal.which allows us to iron out snags.smooth out coordination, and give ourpeople some idea of what to expect.,

Just because we have a certatnamount of time to prepare an operation doesn’t mean we should take it

When we’ve got the time,there is usually no better way tospend it than in a rehearsal,which allows us to iron outsnags, smooth out coordination,and give our people some ideaof what to expect.

compromise the element of surprise.However, even moving by foot it willhe difficult to achieve surprise in opendesert terrain.

• Option 2: Show of fbrce to inthni—date. This option is as much psychological as it is tactical, playing to thelocals’ natural disinclination for fighting by convincing them it is not a svisething to do. The aim of this optionwould he to appear so ovenvhelmingthat the locals wouldn’t even think ofresisting. We would want to appear sopowerful that they would realize thatresistance was suicidal. In this case.we would probably want to make ourmove during broad daylight so thetownspeople could see us: we wouldstay on our vehicles, making as muchnoise and kicking up as much dust aspossible. Perhaps having one platoonhalt conspicuously outside of Oasiswith its weapons leveled at the town.we would drive into Oasis like weowned the place. Putting the cameravan right up near the front would helpto psychologically disarm the locals.reinforcing the point that we know wehave little to fear. The danger with thisoption is that we have surrenderedmost tactical advantages for the sake

54

of psychological effect: if our psychological gambit does not work, we mayhave a light on our hands.

O,nion 3: Cordon and iiegotiate Wecould surround Oasis, open commullications. and appeal to reason.This way we would give the Oasians aclear opportunity to surrender peacefjlly and in the process would appearas nonthreatening a possible. TheproNe n with this option is that wewould he putting the Oasians in a posinon to negotiate. A negotiated settlemerit could he a lengthy process. Andif negotiations fail, we have lost any ofthe tactical or psychological advantages of the previous options.

What Do We Do Once We CaptureOasis?

No malter what plan we use, oncewe seize the town we have to act quick-

ly to consolidate our position. Weshould meet immediately with the local leadership. We should tell the localleaders that we hold them responsiblefor the cooperation and good behaviorof the citizens. We should make itclear that in return for the citizens’ cooperation and good behavior, we willharm nobody. will cause as little disruption to the daily routine as possible, and will provide what medical assistance we can. We should make itknown that we have taken over responsibility for the protection of thevillage, that the local militia is at thismoment disbanded, and that the leaders have 30 minutes in which to collectand turn in all weapons.

Dealing With the News TeamThe problem of dealing with the

news team is an interesting one. In thisage ol’ electronic media. images and

information are powerful weapons,particularly as they aflbct a nation’sresolve. We must use them to our advantage. The presence of’ the newsteam in this scenario does not createthe need to act with discretion, hut itcertainly emphasizes it. If there is tobe bloodshed at Oasis, we want it to heclear that it is not the result ol’ American misconduct.

The Bottom LineThis scenario di irs from the pre

vious ones in that restraint and discretion are key considerations. In an ageof low—intensity conflict, in which agrayish sort of’ pseudo-war blurs thedistinction hetwecti war and peace.questions about restraints on the useof force are extremely important andsometimes extremely difficult.

usMC

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55

Discussion of Scenario #6

Hole in the Trowzer Pocket

“Countless minor incidents—the kind you never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, sothat one always falls far short of the intended goat”

—Carl von Clausewitz

“I suppose dozens of operation orders have gone out in myname, but I never, throughout the war, actually wrote one myself I always had someone who could do that better than Icould. One part of the order I did, however, draft myself—theintention. It is usually the shortest of all paragraphs, but it is always the most important, because it states—or it should—justwhat the commander intends to achieve. It is the one overriding expression of will by which everything in the order and eveiy action by every commander and soldier in the army must bedominated It should, therefore, be worded by the commanderhimself”

—Reid Marshal Sir William Slim

FrictionThis scenario was inspired by actual

experience. During a field exercise, myforce and another were supposed tolink up on what we thought would hean easily identifiable piece of terrain.As expected, both forces had no trouble whatsoever locating the iinkuppoint Each commander was sure ofhis location. The only problem wasthat we had each gone to a dilierent terrain feature. Needless to say. the linkupdid not go smoothly as planned.

The first lesson of “Hole in theTrowzer Pocket” is thus that thingswill go wrong. People will go to thewrong piece of high ground. Theseemingly simple things will becomedifficult As Murphy said, what can gowrong, will. In addition to the problems posed by the enemy, it is the natural order of things to have to dealwith the “countless minor incidents”that Clausewitz went on to call “Friction.” Friction is one of the defining

features of combat- We will nevereliminate it. The first requirementthen, before we can hope to accomplish anything else, is to he able todeal with friction.

Mission TacticsWe have talked at length about the

subordinate’s need to “think big” antito act in the best interests of the highermission. This places a lot of responsibility on the shoulders of subordinates. If we’re going to burden peoplewith responsibility (as we should), wemust also give them the correspondingauthority to act. We can best accomplish this through the use of missiontactics. According to FMFM 1:

Mission tactics are just as the nameimplies: the tactic of assigning a subordinate a mission without specifyinghow the mission must be accomplished.We leave the manner of accomplishingthe mission to the subordinate, thefthyallowing him the freedom—and es

tablishinu the duty—in take whateversteps he deems necessan’ based on thesituation, The senior prescribes themethod of execution only to the degree that is essential for coordination.It is this freedom for initiative thatpermits the hiQh tempo of operationsthat we dti’. Uninhibited by restric

lions from above, the subordinate canadapt his actions to the changing situation. He informs his commander whathe has done. hut he does not wait forpermission.

What we’re talking about here is decentralizing decisionmaking authority. This decentralization allows us tocontinue to act appropriately and operate effectively in the face of failedcommunications, as we saw in “Ambush at Dusk” and “Platoon Ambush”; when the situation has drastically changed. as at “Narrow Pass”: orwhen friction threatens to unravel ourbest laid plans, as in this scenario.Moreover, decentralization allows usto act quickly. (As we saw in “Platoon

5t’

srnhush.” the souad leader didn’t ordinate we should give both the task the contrary do not absolve us fromtime to send a runner to the pla

toon commander with a situation report and wait for the runner to returnwith instructions. He had to act)

Contrary to popular belief, this is0ot a radical, untried concept. but onethat has been proved in combat. Slim,who inflicted the greatest defeat onJapanese ground forces of any Alliedcomtnander in World War II. de—scrihed his lessons learned in Burma:

Commanders at all levels had to actmore on their own: they were givengreater latitude to work out their ownplans to achieve what they knew wasthe Army commander’s intention. Intime they developed to a marked degree a flexibilily ol mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them toact swiftly to take advantage of suddeninformation or changing circumstanceswithout reference to their superiors. - . . This acling without orders.in anticipation ol orders, or withoutwaiting for approval. yel always within the overall intention, must becomesecond nature in any form of warfarewhere formations do not fight closelyen cadre, and must go down to thesmallest units. It requires in the highercommand a corresponding flexibilityof mind, confidence in subordinates.and the power to make intentionsclear right through the force.

Slim makes it clear that we cannothave decentralized initiative without

things will go wrotig.Ptople will go to the wrong pieceof high ground. The seem

ingly simple things will become

difficult.

some means of providing focus to thevarious efforts. As FMFM I says: “Todo so would be to dissipate our strength.We seek unity lofeffoni, not through imposed control, hut through harnioniousinitiative and lateral coordination.”

It is essential that the senior commander provide his subordinates withthe guidance and frame of referencethaI allow them to exercise initiativemore confidently and effectively.

Commander’s IntentThere are several tools with which

the commander can do this. The first,and perhaps most important as Slim’squotes indicate, is the commander’sintent. In assigning a mission to a sub-

to be accomplished and the intent behind the task. The task describes inquantitative terms the who, what, where,and when of the mission. The intenton the other hand, describes the whybehind the mission and, in qualitativeterms, the end resuk we expect. Between the task and intent, FMFM Isays:

the intent is predominant. Whilea situation may change. making thetask obsolete, the intent is more permanent and continues to guide ouractions. Understanding our commander’s intent allows us to exercise initiative in harmony with the commander’s desires.

The commander’s intent describeshis vision of the outcome of the actionin terms that relate to the enemy andthe battlefield. The intent is not merelya restatement of the mission or theconcept of operations. It should notspecify how to accomplish the mission(“Bypass enemy resistance: avoid gelting bogged down ) or simplyspecify the intensity of the action (“Altack aggressively ).

In this scenario, for example. our assigned task is to establish a blockingposition in the vicinity of Hills S’S and82 and, commencing at 0300. to engage and destroy enemy forces tningto escape south out of the pocket inour sector. We know that the overallintent of the operation is to encircleand destroy the enemy force holed upin Trowzer. The final result expectedout of the blocking position is to prevent the southward escape of the enemy. As the scenario unfolds we haveno trouble with fulfilling our assignedtask. We establish our blocking position with no problem. Unfortunately’.it becomes clear to us that although ssehave performed our assigned task. ourcommander’s intent is not being satisifed. The enemy is escaping in sizable numbers out of the pocket. (Itdoesn’t matter that it’s not our fault.We’re not interested in who’s to blame:we’re interested in accomplishing themission.) So where does this leave us?

OptionsOption I: Execute assigned task. In

other words, do nothing for the present. First, the time to engage the enemy as stipulated in the order has notarrived. Second, there is no enemy inour sector (the artillery unit on theroad being in Fox Company’s sector).We certainly can’t be criticized for following orders, right? Wrong. Orders to

doing the right thing. lfwe act, we maymake a mistake, but not to act is inexcusable. As Winston Churchill said:“Errors toward the enemy must belightly judged.” By now it should beclear that even though we are executing our assigned tasks, our commander’s intent requires us to do more. Sowhat’s next?

• Option 2: Eigage the anhllen’ unit.At a minitnum we can engage the artillery unit a valuable target, Puristswill argue that the artillery unit is inFox’s sector and that doctrine prohibits us from firing across boundaries,Boundaries are control measures established between adjacent units for

The task describes in quanthadve terms the who, what,where, and when of the mission.The intent, on the other band,describes the why behind themission and, in qualitative terms,the end result we expect. ,,

the purpose of coordination. They ensure a unit the freedom to operatewithin its own zone or sector withoutinterference from outside, and they restrict a unit from interfering in anotherunit’s zone or sector You might arguethat instead of violating the boundarywe can request that higher headquarters shift it west so that the artilleryunit is in our sector. Three problemswith this. First it’ll never happen intime to get the artillery unit. Second.since Fox insists it’s in the right place.regiment has no reason to shift theboundary: regiment has already toldus to work it out between ourselves.And third, the more ef’l’ective way 10

deal with such coordination problemsis lalerally—i.e.. directly with the adjacent unit—rather than vertically throughthe chain of command. So then youmight argue (quite correctly) that themore appropriate response is to contact Fox Company directly and request permission to fire across theboundary.

Since the Fox Company commander is convinced that he’s in the rightplace and that we’re the ones who arelost he’s not likely to give us permission to start firing indiscriminatelyinto his sector. What do we do when

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he denies our request? Just as an assiened iask should not prevent usfrn1 doing what’s required, neithershould we let a control measure get inthe way of’ the right tactical decision.Control measures aren’t laws. Goodtactics take precedence over properuse of control measures. Moreover. Iwould argue that boundaries are meantto exist between adjacent units. hut inthis case there is no adjacent unit. Foxisn’t there. The boundary is not appropriate to the current tactical situation.“Fine.” the purist might say. “if youtake it upon yourself to ignore aboundary imposed by higher headquarters, you must he fully responsiblelór your actions” Quite true; hut bynow we should he quite used to takingfull responsihilit For our actions.

Option 3: Direct .cuppofling armswest of Hill 81. I don’t mean to implythat we should simply ignore boundariesand lire across them indiscriminaiely.Asalready discussed, boundaries exist forgood reason. Among oiher things. theyare designed to protect us from Iliendly lire. In the first place, in this case wewould he calling for fire exactly whereFox Company thinks it’s located, andthe tire support coordination centerassigned responsibility for coordinating supporting arms for this operationwould certainly disapprove the liremission. We could lire the missionwith our own mortars. Moreover, wecould get Fox to give us a hearing tothe sound of the impact as a means oftrying to deiermine Fox’s location.The problem is that we dorit know exactly where Fox is. we’re no longer in a

position to effectively control the liremission. and we certainly don’t wantto risk friendly casualties. This optionis less defensible than engaging the artillery on the road by direct lire.

Option 4: Attack nest toward Hill 81.The rationale here would he to assumeFox’s mission as well as our own in order to prevent the enemy’s escape. Ahold move certainly: hut in the dark.without any preparations, with enemyunits moving down the road posing adeli nite threat to our right flank, without knowing where Fox is, and withoutthe ability to coordinate eliectivelywith Fox as a result this is a risky proposition. There is a definite potential forseveral things to go wrong not least ofwhich is an intramural firelight.

• Option 5: Shift .coutl,nesr to Hill 87.Based on the terrain, it seems quitepossible that Fox Company has mistaken Hill 85 for Hill SI. (They’re onlya kilometer apart.) By shifting 3d Platoon (and possibly even 2d) to Hill 87we might he able to reconstitute theblocking position on Hills 85—87—68vice Hills 81—88—82 as originally ordered, satisfying the regimental commander’s original intent. Even if Foxis not on Hill 85. Hill 87 is some SODmeters west and south of Hill 88 (hutstill in our sector). From Hill 87 wewould therefore he in a much betterposition to tn to bottle up the enemyforces that are crossing the ridge westof’ Hill 81.

particular format that aintent must take. In ad-

dition to being one of the most important parts of an order to issue, the intent is also one of the most dillicult toprepare because it requires the commander to express a qualitative visionof how he wants the operation to turnout. A couple of possible techniquesfor expressing intent are:

• To follow each task assigned to asubordinate with an “ ... in orderto statement. For example:“Establish a blocking position in thevicinity of Hills $8 and 82 in order toprevent enemy forces from escapingsouth.”• As Capt Michael L. Ettore suggestsin “Commander’s Intent Defined.”(MCG, Apr93). to begin the intentstatement with “The final result desired is For example: “The IInal result desired is to prevent enemyforces from escaping south.”The statement of intent should he

clear and forceful. As Capt Ettorepoints out, a concise intent statementis easier to transmit by radio or messenger and is more easily rememberedunder conditions of extreme stress.Hut don’t sacrifice clarity for brevity.

The commander’s intent is differentfrom any other pan of the order, andthere is a definite skill to expressing itwell. As you do the remaining scenarios in this workbook, focus on issuing agood commander’s intent, and alterwards analyze it to determine if itserves its bottom-line purpose of giving your subordinates the ability to deviate from the plan and still supportyour desires.

USjMC

More on IntentThere is no

commander’s

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5H

Discussion of Scenario #7

Securing Cam-Pijuna

‘Weigh the situation, then move. He who knows the art ofthe direct and the indirect approach will be victorious. Such isthe art of maneuvering.”

“Originality is the most vital of all military virtues.”

—Sun Tzu

—B. H. Liddell-Hart

Mission Tactics IIThis mission is a straightforward

one, in which our battalion commander has given us broad latitude in themanner of execution. The only condition he has imposed is the deadline,and even that is not particularly constraining. Moreover, to guide us in ouractions he has explained the intent behind the operation and how the operation fits into the scheme of the largerupcoming campaign. He has furthermore made us the battalion’s main effort. offering us any weapons company assets we might need and ensuringtimely reinforcements by helicopter.All in all, we have the opportunity toweigh the situation thoroughly andthe freedom to construct an originalplan that we’re happy with.

Looking for Patterns‘Securing Cam-Pljuna” shares sev

eral similarities with “ ‘Film at Eleven’Both involve a straightforward mission to seize a specific location for future use. In both eases time is not aparticularly significant consideration:we have a reasonable amount of timeto accomplish the mission. Both involve operations in populated areas,with the consequent need to exerciserestraint so to limit collateral damage.

In both cases t4 enemy force is notparticularly large. The problem willnot he seizing the objective; it will heminimizing damage to ourselves andthe locals. One key area in which thescenarios dilTer. however, is that atCam-Pljuna we can expect the enemyto resist. At Oasis the situation with regard to the enemy was much more ambiguous. and that always complicatesthings. Knowing that we can expect theenemy at Cam-Pljuna to fight may notmake accomplishing the mission anyeasier, hut it certainly makes the situation less ambiguous.

Uncertainty—A Fact of LifeAs at Oasis, we don’t know much

about the enemy situation. We knowwhere his mortar and antiaircraft gunemplacements are, and we know thedefensive positions he has prepared.But we don’t know the actual dispositions of the main enemy forces. Nordo we know the current location of themobile machinegun units, which mayor may not be present when we makeour attack. And of course, we don’tknow with any certainty—and neverwill—the enemy’s exact intentions.Even in this age of high-tech sensors,there will always he much about theenemy situation that will remain un

certain. The predominant feature oftactical decisionmaking is the pen’a—sive uncertainty that surrounds everydecision. Information will always beincomplete, will often he confusing.and will sometimes even be contradictory. If we wait for certainty beforemaking a decision, we’ll never act. Therequirement is to recognize uncertainty as a fact of life and to learn to dealwith it.

FlexibilityBecause the enemy situation is un

certain, our plan has to be flexibleto allow us to adapt to a variety of circumstances and developments. Ourinitial operation order should not tryto cover the entire operation all theway through to conclusion, becausethere’s still too much about the situation that we don’t know. Our initialorder can probably cover the approach march in detail, but specificactions after that will probably depend on how the situation develops.About the best we can do at this pointis to prepare our company for futureactions by issuing warning orderswhich describe our broad intent, likelyanticipated tasks, and possible contingencies. For the- units whose missionswe know with reasonable cedainty—tak

5’)

ing out the antiair or mortar positionsor blocking the Pandjeton road, forexample—we can he more specific.Hut by and large, the detailed plan foractions in the objective area will haveto come later. throutzh the issuance of’improvised fragmentarv orders, as thesituation develops and becomes clearer.This is when having good immediateaction drills and standing operatingprocedures and a cohesive team withtrustworthy subordinate leaders willpay dividends. In general. the less certain a situation is. the fewer forcesshould he committed initially to specHic Iasks. and the more should heheld back ready lo commit as the situation develops.

The Importance of ReconnaissanceGen George S. Patton said. “You

can never have too much reconnaissance.” and this scenario is a perfectexample of that adage. Our succcss atCam-Pljuna will depend in large measure on our ability to generate information ourselves about the enemy sit—tuition through reconnaissance.

Exactly what information do wewant to generate? There are a relative

ly. few essential elements of inlorma—tion that will go a long way towardclearing up our picture of the situationat Cam-Pljuna. Everyone in thc company should know these questionsand should he instructed to keep theireyes open for the answers:

• Where are the main Early Retiristforces?• Are the mobile machinegun unitsin or near Cam—Pljuna?• Are the antiair and mortar unitsstill where last reported?

Equally important, anyone who seesthe answers to these questions mustknow to pass that information on, bothup and down the chain of command.

Reconnaissance is not a specializedmission reserved for special units. Itshould bean on-going activity in evencombat unit. As we discussed in thesection on “Surfaces and Gaps.” weshould he continuously and activelyprobing down to the lowest levels lbr enemy vulnerahilities that we can exploit.

Exploiting Critical VulnerabilitiesAre there any critical vulnerahilities

in the enemy dispositions as we currently know them, any weak spots wecan exploit to gain leverage? The enemydefensive preparations am oriented tothe south and east—i.e., directly toward us. There is only one defensiveposition northwest of the town, Impor

tantly. the enemy has no defensive positions to the northeast.

Meanwhile, the critical points inthis scenario—at least the ones weknow with any certainty—are to thewest of town: the antiair and mortarpositions and the landing zone (LZ).Likewise, enemy reinforcements willconic from the west via the Pendjetanroad,

The antiair positions are critical tothis scenario because they commandthe LZ. (We can’t take them out withsupporting arms because of their proximity to local residences,) If we takeout the antiair positions, we can beginto land helicopters. This is importantbecause it facilitates immediate reliefoperations as per our orders, and it allows for the early introduction of reinIhrcemenis. The early introduction ofreinforcements strengthens our handno matter how the situation develops.

Information will always beincomplete. Will often be confusing, and Will sometimes evenbe contradicton’. If we wait forcertaint before making a decision, we’ll never aeC The requirement is to recognize uncertaintyasafactoflife. - . .

especially since at the same time wecould he blocking off’ enemy reinforcements via the Pendjetan road.

Thus, a basic concept for our planmight call for an approach via the apparent gap northeast of town to capture the antiair and mortar positionsand the LZ.

Possibilities—Infiltration AttackAn infantn force infiltrating through

the woods could cross the Bensjkularoad northeast of Cam-Pljuna andmove in a counterclockwise directionaround the north and west sides oftown, putting itself in position to attack the antiair and mortar positions.secure the LZ. and block the Pendjetan road. Moving around to thenorth vice the south, in addition to exploiting natural vulnerabilities in theenemy disposition, has the advantage—being on the slopes above thetown—of offering better obsen’attonof the objective area, which may hevery valuable as we continue to devel

op our plans.Because we’ve got time, the three

can move carefully to avoid detection.By moving at night we can take advantage of the enemy’s poor night-visioncapability. Attack elements could moveinto position to launch simultaneoussurprise attacks against the key knownpositions. We could hold other dcments (one or even two platoons) inreserve to deal with the developing situation. We might make arrangementswith battalion for a conspicuous feintup the Cam-Pljuna road—vehiclesmaking a slow, plodding and noisyadvance—to keep the enemy’s attention fixed to the southeasL The idealsituation would be to he able to keepthe enemy oriented southeast, occupying primarily the three positions aroundHill 290: this could allow us to take thecity proper from behind with minimaldamage to the locals as well as to attack the enemy positions themselvesfrom the rear.

What Weapons Company Assets DoWe Want?

Assuming that we will not he moving with vehicles up the Cam-Pljunaroad, our decision of what extra weapons to bring will he guided primarilyby what we can reasonably man-packover forested mountain terrain. Buteven within that restriction there isstill plenty of room for differences. Alot depends on our concept of operations. Is our plan based primarily onspeed and surprise or on superior firepower? I would argue that for the sakeof’ mobility’ we want to travel light andcarry the minimum gear necessary.Perhaps we can arrange to have certain heavier weapons brought in byhelicopter in the initial wave of reinforcements.

We can probably do without mortars, relying instead on artillery. Thereis no significant armor threat, hut atleast sonic bunker-busting capabilitywould help. We also want the capability to stop the mobile machincgununit or enemy reinforcements by vehicle. Perhaps a few Dragon teams atmost. Machineguns could he very valuable. both as part of a roadblock andbecause the terrain oIlers numerousopportunities for massing machinegunsin a base of lire. Would the increasedfirepower of heavy machineguns heworth the loss of mobility they wouldcause? Or might we be better served byrequesting reinforcement with anothersection of M60s from another linecompany? usj

64)

Discussion of Scenario ItS

Raid on Gazebo Ridge“Speed is the essence of war Thke advantage of the ene

my’s unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strikehim where he has taken no precautions.”

—Sun Tzu

‘The principles on which / planned all operations were:• The ultimate intention must be an offensive one.• The main idea on which the plan was based must besimple.• That idea must be held in view throughout and eve,ything else must give way to it.• The plan must have an element of surprise.”

—Field Marshal Sir William Slim

SSS&BThis is a situation ripe with both

danger and opportunity. We havecaught the enemy unprepared andhave a chance to wreak havoc. But weare also entering a lishhowl lined withwith enemy guns and enemy tanks onboth Ilanks that can make life miserable for us. We are badly outnumbered. Success and survival depend onacting quickly and aggressively beforethe enemy can get his hearings. Nearlya)) of the MCG readers who submittedsolutions to this scenario when it Ii rstappeared in Sep90 recognized that thekeys to success at Gazebo Ridge werespeed, smiphern’ suiprice and boldness:Hit ftmt hit hard, and get out quick.

SpeedIn nearly all of the previous scenari

os—the possible exceptions being Filmat Eleven’ and Seizing Cam-Pijuna”—speed has been an important ingrediem. Even in those two scenarios, inhich we seemed to have plenty oflime to develop our plan. once we putthe plan into action and came intoconlact with the enemy. speed of execution became important. In fact, of

all the concepts we have discussed tothis point, there is none more important than speed—the ability to thinkfast, decide fist, act last, move fist. Actually. it’s not so much absolute speedthat matters. hut speed relative to ourenemy. .s militarv theorist Col JohnBoyd. USAF(Rel). is fond of sayintz, itdoesnt matter if we’re slow, as long asthe enemy is slower.

Back in the late R)s and early 1970s.BGen F. P. Henderson, USMC(Ret).and other Marines were talking andwriting about a sequence of essentialcombat actions referred to as SEDA(Sense-Evaluate-Decide-Act). Boyd popularized this theory using the term“OODA loop” (Observation-Orientation—Decision—Action) to describe thefundamental time-competitive natureof contlict. The theory applies to anydirect conflict, whether the antagonists are individual boxers, soccerteams, military units in combat orbusinesses in a competitive market. Itdelines the cycle by which we makedecisions in a competitive situation.Facing a competitive situation, we firstsense the situation. We then evaluate it

by making estimates. assumptions. analyses. and judgments. Based on thatevaluation, we make our decision—i.e., we come up with a plan. Then weput the plan in to ac tin ii. Having acted.we have changed the situation, and sothe cycle begins again. To he fisterthrough the cycle once gives us the advantage of being able to seize the initi—ative. dictate the terms nt action, andforce the enemy to react to us. But theside which can consistently and ellec—tively transition through the SEDA cycle or OODA loop faster—the sidewhich maintains a higher tempo—gains an ever-increasing advantagewith each cycle. The slower antagonistfalls Eu rther and further behind in hisreactions and becomes increasinglyunable to cope with the deiednratingsituation. With each cycle his actionsbecome less relevant to what’s actually’happening, and he becomes increas—i ngly ineffective.

Its precisely because of the importance of speed that the TDGs generally have such a rigorous time limiL It’snot just the ability to move fast—although that certainly is part of it—but

6t

the ability to think fast and decide fastAs a rule we want to do everything

we can to improve our own speed: decentralize decisionmaking authority,minimize restrictive control measures,simplify our plans, make maximumuse of immediate action drills andstanding operating procedures. andstreamline our decisionmaking andstall planning procedures. Likewise.since combat is time—competitive, wewant to dn everything we can to slowour enemy down.

As this scenario demonstrates, speedalso has a protective element. It makesit harder to catch us, harder to hit us.and harder to fend oil our thrusts.

SimplicityAt Gazebo Ridge there is no time

for detailed coordination or instructions: this will have to he a hasty andimprovised attack with our suhordinates acting on their understanding ofthe commanders intent and the devel—opi ng situation. If this turns into aconfused and chaotic melee, line: thatserves our purpose of distracting theenemy. The bottom line is. the simplerthe better.

How do we get simplicity? First wedevelop a plan that has few “movingparts—i.e.. few different tasks or components. The more moving parts aplan has. the more elaborate it becomes. Fewer moving parts lessens theneed for coordination, detailed instructions. control measures. etc. Inour particular case it shouldn’t hehard to keep it simple, since we haveso few assets to work with. Thesimplest plan would he to keep ourcompany together as a single unit andhave the different weapons systemsengage appropriate targets as we pass.Since we have only two sections ofLAV—25s (the backbone of our unit)we certainly don’t want to have anymore than two main thrusts to our attack—in this situation, any more thantwo thrusts will start to get difficult tocontrol.

LtCol Kenneth W. Estes suggestedtask organizing into two platoons eachwith three LAV—25s, an LAy—AG, andan LAV—AT—”That way I commandtwo platoons of equal weight not fourdifferent sections.” In this case, thereis something to be said for a two-pronged attack vice a single thrust. Itwould likely cause more confusionand disruption, which is our ultimateobjective. Moreover, as we’ve discussed before, the use of separate hutcomplementary forces compels the en-

emy to split his efforts.The second way we maintain sim

plicity is to minimize the amount ofdirect coordination and positive control necessary to make the plan work.In this scenario, even if we come upwith a two-pronged plan. we want tomake sure that each element can execute its part of the plan independently.without having to coordinate with andworry about interference from theother element. The two forces can stillcomplement each other. hut in an indirect way. In other words, the planfits together loosely.” What we absolutely don’t want is a plan in which allthe elements are precisely synchronized and there is little tolerance forfriction or anything going wrong. Anexample of this is a plan in which A

- - . the side which canconsistently and effectively transilion through the SEDA cycle orOODA loop faster—the sidewhich maintains a higher tempo—gains an ever-increasing advantage with each cycle.

happens after B takes place. hut Bcan’t happen until C occurs’S, C has tohappen simultaneously with D. etc. Ifany one part of the plan is disrupted.the whole plan begins to fall apart. (Ingeneral. plans with a lot ol’ “on-order”tasks, in which the commander directseach action, are good examples of operations with little tolerance for thenatural friction of war.) To make ananalogy, it’s kind of like the differencebetween the music of a jazzhall bandand an orchestra. In the orchestra,each instrument must respond to thepositive control of the conductor andhe precisely synchronized with theothers: the music is, as the name indicates, orchestrated. The jazzhall band’smusic, on the other hand. is “looser,”with room for improvisation and creativity. The bottom line is that we wantto he more like a jazzhall band andless like an orchestra. We want ourplans to fit together “loosely.” so theydo not have to be carefully orchestrated: so they are not as easily dismpted by fog. friction, and enemy action: and so we have room to improvise and show initiative as the situation warrants.

SurpriseWe are vastly outnumbered and

outgunned in this scenario. The onlyreason we can even think of attackingis that we seem to have the element ofsurprise. A multiplier of combat power,surprise is a concept of such importanceas to rate as a tactical fundamental.

Clausewitz observed that the desirefor surprise is “more or less basic to alloperations. for without it superiority atthe decisive point is hardly conceivable.” Hut beyond being a necessaryprecondition for local superiority, surprise is a Fundamental in its own rightbecause of its psychological effect. AsFMFM I says. “Surprise can decisivelyaffect the outcome of combat far beyond the physical means at hand.”

It is interesting that we should usethe “Raid on Gazebo Ridge” to introduce the concept of surprise becausewe typically think of surprise as theproduct of some devious and roundabout scheme—anything hut drivingstraight at the enemy in growing daylight by the most direct route. But infact, this scenario illustrates the important point that although we oftentalk about “taking the enemy by surprise,” surprise is not so much something the surpriser does. Rather it is astate of shock on the part of the surprised as the result of some unexpected event that leaves him temporarily unable to respond effectively. Wemay take certain actions intended tosurprise the enemy, but success in theend depends ultimately on the enemy’s susceptibility to being surprised.Typically, for example. we seek to surprise the enemy by striking his flanks,but if the enemy expects a flank attackthe surprise will he on us. In otherwords, surprise comes down to avpecrat/otis. The first requirement, then, inachieving surprise is to he able to anticipate the enemy’s expectations. Wetry to look at the situation from the enemy’s point of view. figure out his expectations. and then do the thing heleast expects. As we’ve already done inprevious scenarios, we ask: “What’sthe enemy up to?”

While surprise can be decisive, because it is not completely under ourcontrol, we should not count on italone for the margin of success. Forsurprise to work it’s not necessary totake the enemy unawares. It’s only important that he become aware too lateto react As a result surprise is a product of speed and secrecy—secrecy sothat the enemy does not become awareuntil too late. and speed so that once

62

he does become aware he doesn’t havethe time to react effectively.

BoldnessBoldness also is a key [actor in the

Raid on Gazebo Ridge.” Much likesurprise, boldness is a true force multiplier. As Clausewitz observed:

Indeed in what held ol human activilyis boldness more at home than inwar? . . . It must he granted a certainposr over and above successful calculation involving space. time. andmagnitude of forces, for where it is superior. it will take advantage of its opponent’s weakness. In other words. iiis a genuinely creative force.

Boldness can contribute to surpriseand add shock effect to our actions.

A Sample FragOThe follosing Iragmentan order.

submitted by LtCoI Estes. is not meantas the only ‘right” answer. but as anexcellent example of a clear and crispordcr for a quick. simple. and boldplan:

Action right front: left platoon attackenemy artillery: right platoon attackenemy command post: no decisive engagemen L: withdraw to south and westtitrouch their lou train: watch out forthe tanks to the south: make smoke:NOW. Cobras. attack tanks on ourleft, cover our withdrawal. FO. tn 10get immediate smoke and 1CM fire onthe northern tan ks”

ask the Company B commanderto take on that tank unit (on the northern part of the escarpment) as mutualsupport then call the Company C

commander to relay a sitrep to the battalion commander, asking that Company C support me by lire and maneuver.]

Notice Ihat in this solution, ourcompany commander asks CompanyB to the north to engage the enemytank position on the northern end ofthe position and also asks the CompanyC commander to support our cornpuny. Because his company has beendesignated the main effort, our company commander knows that the jobof the other companies is to support

us. and so. in a pinch, without referring to the battalion commander, hecan seek their support, and they areobligated 10 respond.

Historical BackgroundThis scenario is based on an actual

action from Robert Crisp’s excellentmemoir of the North African campaign of World War II. Braze,? ChaHot.c(New York: Bantam Books. 19Th).During Operation CRUSADER. CaptCrisp commanded an understrengthtank squadron as part ola raid againstthe rear of a German position pwssuring an Indian division south of Gazala.Crisp’s squadron was equipped withStuans, a light U.S. tank thai wasoutgunned by. hut faster than, theGerman Marks.

As he approached the rear of theGerman position in the daylight, apparently unrecognized by the Germans. Crisp lost communications withhigher headquarters.

[As] I was not in touch with Ihead—

quartersi. I proposed to act on my owninitiative. The plan I had in mind wasto make a charge in line abreast.straight towards the middle of the rearof the German position. When wereached it we would swing north inline ahead. and run along the wholelength of the encmy lines blazingaway with exenthing we had before‘heeling out and away at full speed. Itwas the son of recklessness that was.in fact, pretty safe in execution. By thetime the Jerries had woken up to whatwas happening we would he in themiddle of them, every gun firing andevery tank going flat out. None oftheir weapons would he ready for us:they were all directed towards the eastand the Indian division. They wouldnot he able to engage us while we wereright in their own position. By thetime w swung out again there wouldhe so much consternation and confusion. and we would he going so fasLthat I had even prospect of gettingaway with it scot-free—without losinga single tank I was about tosummon troop commanders to a quickconference back at my tank (it wouldhave to he darn quick) when one ofthem came on the air to report fourenemy tanks moving out from the leftand coming across his front.

Crisp was seriously sounded in theensuing firefight while tn’ing to rescuethe crew of a disabled tank. intercepted ssireless message l’rom the headquarters of the Afrika Corps revealedthat the Germans were evacuating theGazala position. lucky in their opinion to have escaped a “steel trap.”

USjMC

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63

Discussion of Scenario #9

Enemy Over the Bridge‘To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits

of the victor,’ is the secret of successful war.”—Stonewall Jackson

‘The measure may be thought bold, but I am of opinion theboldest are the safest.”

—Adm Lord Nelson

Looking at the “Big Picture”—AgainSince “Enemy Over the Bridge” was

the very first TDG to appear in theMCG (Apr90). it is appropriate thatthis scenario returns us to the first ofthe tactical first principles discussedin this book—the importance of considering the larger situation. In this situation, there is no way our battalioncommander can make the right choiceunless he considers the division situation. The key question is, What can Ido to further the accomplishment ofthe division mission?

Speed—AgainAnd it is also significant that we see

yet again that all-important concept ofspeed, which is critical to every tacticalsituation. This scenario amounts to ameeting engagement, an unexpectedmeeting between two forces not fullydeployed for combaL In any meetingengagement it is important to beat theenemy to the punch, to act quickly andaggressively to seize the initiative andgain the critical advantage. No matterwhat your solution to this problemmay he, it should reflect a definitesense of urgency in acting more quickly than the enemy.

Friction and UncertaintyPerhaps better than any of the

others, this scenario also illustrates theimportant related concepts of frictionand uncertainty. On the surface, thisought to be an easy situation for us.We’re making a simple administrativemove into an assembly area in ourown supposedly secure rear area. It’snot even a tactical situation. Friendlyforces hold the bridge and riverline

with security forces operating fartherforward. But we discover nothing is asit should be. There are, in fact nofriendly forces at the bridge or alongthe river. A sizable enemy force occupies our assembly area. We don’tknow exactly how big the enemy forceis. We don’t know what other areas, if

In any meeting engagementit is important to beat the enemy

to the punch, to act quickly andaggressively to seize the initiativeand gain the critical advantage.

No matter what your solution tothis problem may be, it should reflect a definite sense of urgencyin acting more quickly than theenemy.

any, the enemy has occupied. Wedon’t know the enemy’s intentions. Wehave no idea what happened to thefriendly forces that were supposed tobe forward of us. About all we doknow is that the situation is not goodand is nothing like we expected. Consequently, the instructions we’ve received are no longer appropriate. Thebottom line is that we have to use our initiative to retrieve the situation.

What’s the Enemy Up To?As we’ve discussed, we don’t know

what the enemy’s up to. But we canwork through some possibilities. Onone extreme, this action may he thebeginning of a major enemy offensive,in which case we can expect substan

tial enemy forces to begin pouringacross the bridge soon. If that’s thecase, the enemy has beaten our division to the punch. and we need to tryto contain the problem. On the otherextreme, this may be nothing morethan a local spoiling attack, in whichcase the enemy has succeeded in seizing the initiative and threatening tohamstring our offensive. If that’s thecase, we need to regain the initiativeand get the division offensive back ontrack.

What’s Critical?What’s critical in this situation?

Thinking strictly at the battalion level,we might answer, “The enemy forceoccupying our assembly area. We weretold to occupy that piece of terrain,and the enemy is preventing us fromdoing it.” But how important is thattriangular piece of woods? Not very; ithas no inherent tactical value and, infact, is hemmed in by the two hillmasses to the south. Occupying the assigned assembly area is no longer appropriate since the situation has changeddramatically An assembly area ismerely a control measure designed tofacilitate future preparations. As we’vealready discussed, we shouldn’t letcontrol measures get in the way ofgood tactics. And how much of athreat does the enemy force reallypose in its current position? Can thedivision still use the bridge? Yes: aslong as we can contain the enemy thedivision can still reach the bridge viathe East Farm road. The hills south ofthe assembly area are important because if the enemy can control themhe can begin to solidify his bridge-

head. and if we can control them we cancontain the enemy. As Maj Leonard A.Blasiol observed, the east hill is moreimportant of the two because it “controls both of the roads available to thedivision for its advance to the river.”

Looking at the larger situation, werealize that the situation at the bridgeis much more significant. If the division attack is going to go off as scheduled, we have to have the bridge. Evenif the attack will have to be delayed,the situation will get worse as long asthe enemy holds the bridge. The enemy continues to funnel forces acrossthe bridge, so every passing minutemeans more enemy forces south of theriver that we have to deal with. Wedon’t want the division to have tolaunch its attack just to regain thebridge. And there is always the chancethat the enemy will prepare the bridgefor demolition. The bottom line is thatalthough the enemy in the assemblyarea may be the immediate problem,the more critical problem is the bridge.To keep a potentially bad situation fromgetting worse and to facilitate the division’s offensive, we must secure thebridge. In his solution to “Enemy Overthe Bridge” when it first appeared inthe MCG. Mr. Stephen V. Cole captoted it most succinctly: “The key pointis the bridge. The situation will continueto deteriorate as long as the bridge is inenemy hands. Therefore, capture of thebridge is the highest priority .

What’s Vulnerable?All we know of the enemy disposi

Lion is that he occupies the assemblyarea in strength and continues tomove south across the bridge. So to attack into the assembly area is to attackdirectly into the known strength of theenemy. The enemy’s lines of operationrun north-south from the bridge to theassembly area, so he is vulnerable to aflanking attack that threatens to severthat line from the east or west. Mostthreatening is an attack at the bridge—the key link in the enemy’s lines of operation. The East Farm road seems tooffer the most covered and concealedroute for doing this.

The Critical VulnerabilityThe bridge holds the key to this

whole situation. It clearly is the mostcritical point on the battlefield, bothfor us and for the enemy. If werecapture the bridge we restore the division’s attack plans for the morning,and we make the enemy’s position

south of the river desperate.

Focus of Efforts/Main EffortIt’s not enough merely to identify

the enemy’s critical vWnerability. Thereis a corresponding concept involvingthe focus of friendly effort* that ranksas a true tactical fundamental. Havingidentified a critical enemy vulnerability.we must go after it ruthlessly and with allthe strength we can muster. We must

It’s not enough merely toidentify the enemy’s critical vulnerability. There is a corresponding concept involving the focusof friendly effort that ranks as atrue tactical flmdamental. Havingidentified a critical enemy vulnerability, we must go after itruthlessly and 4iith all the strengthwe can muster.

concentrate our efforts against it. FMFMI discusses the concept this way:

Of all the efforts going on within ourcommand, we recognize the focus ofeffort as the most critical to success.All other efforts must support it. Ineffect, we have decided: This is how Iwill achieve a decision; eventlung else isseamdon’.

We cannot take lightly the decisionof where and when to focus our effort.Since the focus of effort represents ourbid for victory, we must direct it at thatobject which will cause the most decisive damage to the enemy and whichholds the best opportunity of success.It involves a physical and moral commitment although not an irretrievableone. It forces us to concentrate decisive combat power just as it forces usto accept risk. Thus, we focus our effort against critical enemy vulnerability.exercising strict economy elsewhere.

In this situation we have realizedthat capturing the bridge is the crucialact. Everything else is secondary. Whocontrols the bridge controls the situation; everything else will fall intoplace. Therefore, we should ruthlesslyconcentrate all our efforts and assetstoward that essential task ensuringoverwhelming local superiority. More

Whiie FMFM I rclers to the focus of efforits) orpoint of main cifort. Docirinc Division atQuaniico now prefers (he lerm main effort.”The concept, however, remains unchanged.

over, we judge any other secondary effort on how it supports the main effort.FMFM I explains:

Like the commander’s intent, the focus of effort becomes a harmonizingforce. Faced with a decision, we askourselves: “How can I best support thefocus of effort?”

For example, we have already decided that we can’t simply ignore theenemy in the assembly area; we mustcontain the enemy force there. So wecan definitely justify allocating forcesto deal with the enemy in the assemblyarea, but we want to allocate no moreforces than necessary. So how do wedistribute our forces between the bridgeand the assembly area?

Because time is critical we definitelywant to commit our most mobileunits—the motorized infantry and tankcompanies and the TOWs—to thebridge. Several MCG readers suggestedsending the whole battalion to thebridge and fixing the enemy with supporting arms. That certainly demonstrates a willingness to concentrateruthlessly at the critical spot and to accept risk elsewhere. Other readers, onthe other hand, saw merit in occupying the enemy’s attention to the southby a ground attack on the assemblyarea. (But, importantly. the object wasnot to attack for the sake of capturingthe assembly area, hut to support themain effort at the bridge.) Many readers committed only the motorized andtank units to the bridge and used thefoot-mobile companies in the assembly area—essentially splitting theirforces evenly between the two tasks—precisely because of the critical timefactor. The foot-mobile companieswould not be able to keep up with theother elements on the road to participate in the attack at the bridge in thefirst place. As Maj Blasiol explainedin his solution:

My vehicular-mobile units will takeadvantage of the high-speed avenue ofapproach leading around the enemy’seast flank My foot-mobile unitswill operate in the ierrain best suitedfor them: the forest and high ground.

Differences in MobilityThis issue illustrates an interesting

point—the differing degrees of mobility among the elements of our force.The motorized and tank elementshave far superior mobility on theroads and open areas compared to thefoot infantry, which has superior mobility in the woods and other restrictedareas. Even within the so-called “mo

65

bile” elements, the lank and truckmounted elements can travel differentspeeds on different surfaces. Moreover. tactical mobility is not merely amatter of the speed at which a unit cantravel over a given surface. For example. the armor protection of our tanksgives them mobility in the face of certain types of enemy fire that unarmored units lack.

Differences in mobility can be botha drawback and an advantage. Theycan be an advantage in that they giveus the flexibility to move in a broadvariety of terrain and conditions. Theycan be a problem. as in this scenario,when they prevent us from being ableto concentrate all our forces as wemight desire. In general, a unit assigneda single nick ought to have roughly uniform mobility.

The RcseneThere is another issue affecting both

the questions of the distribution offorces and of mobility that we havcnot yet discussed—the resent. The reserve is a part of the force held underthe control of the commander as a maneuvering force to influence future ac

- . . the reserve providesflexiblity in the face of uncertain conditions. In general, the

I

Discussion #9

Distance - KilometersI I I0 1 2 3

more uncertain the situation,the greater the need for areserve and the larger it shouldbe.

tion. The resent is the means bywhich the commander deals withunforeseen problems and exploits unexpected opportunities. In other words.the reserve provides flexibility in theface of uncertain conditions. In general. the more uncertain the situation.the greater the need for a reserve andthe larger it should be. Given the uncertainty of this particular situation, areserve is a good idea. The reserveshould have the capability to deal witha variety of situations, and it shouldhave the mobility to get quickly towhere it’s needed. Since we’re going tocommit our reserve at a critical stagein the battle, we want it to be strong.and we want it to be fast.

This is especially true in our scenario in which the two main actions are4 or 5 kilometers apart. The problem is

that if we commit our “mobile” unitsto the bridge and one foot infantrycompany to the assembly area, thisleaves us with a foot-mobile unit as ourreserve. A coot-mobile reserve wouldlikely lack the mobility to react quicklyto the critical spat on the battlefield.

There are a couple of things we cando to deal with this problem. The firstsolution is the careful positioning ofthe reserve so that it is within reachwhen we need it. In general we shouldposition our reserve in a central location, which does not necessarily meanin the middle but in a location whereit can access any critical spot on thebattlefield. However, if we anticipatecommitting our reserve in a specificarea we may want to hedge our bets bymoving it closer to that area. In thisscenario, for example, a reserve located at East Farm—even though apparently far to the east—is within easystriking distance of the key location.the bridge. but can also strike southand west quickly by road. Moreover.

positioning our reserve at East Farmprotects our route to the bridge viaEast Farm road.

The second solution, specific to thissituation, is to shift our trucks to improve the mobility of our resent company. Once Company E reaches thebridge, it no longer has need for itstrucks; its mission requires it to holdits position. We can detach the trucksand reassign them to our reserve riflecompany. which can already havestarted to march toward East Farm.

A Sample FragOThe following is an example of a

fragmentary order based on the previousdiscussion. It is not meant as the “righianswer, but as food for thought.

The battalion attacks immediatelyto seize the bridge in order to cut offthe flow of enemy forces south and tosecure a bridgehead for the divisionsattack at 041)0 tomorrow, I intend tocontrol a bridgehead north of the riverand to contain the enemy forces southof the river.

I

E FflAIJ(7SJ

66

Echo Ion trucksj. with TOWs attached and reinforced by Tanks, attacksas rapidly as possible by way of EastlThrm road to secure the bridgeheadand sever the enemy movement south.You are main effort. When you get tothe bridge, send the trucks back forGoIL who’ll he marchinu up the EastFarm road,

Tanks. reinforce Echo: he prepared10 continue the attack north or to attack south to destroy the enemy southof the river.

Fox probes north in order to determine the size of the enemy force andcontain it in the assembly area. Control the east hill in order to ensure ourcontinued use of East Farm road.Must important, keep the enemy lbrcelixed where it is so it can’t interfere

taking.

or to attack west toward Hamlet lodestroy the enemy. You’ll pickup Echo’strucks en route back from the bridge.

Ill he with Echo and Tanks.

A Final Thought—Keep HigherHeadquarters Informed

Actinu with initiative does not giveus license to leave others—adjacentunits or higher headquarters—in thedark. As Maj Francis X. Bergmeisterpointed out in his solution, while we

—_ certainly should not wait for instructions in this situation, there’s no reason that we can’t advise regiment of thenew situation and the action we’re taking. The sooner we do. the sooner regiment can support us. uSMC

Acting with initiative doesnot give us license to leaveothers—adjacent units or higherheadquarters—in the dark. . . -

there’s no reason that we can’tadvise regiment of the newsituation and the action we’re

with advance of Regiment.Golf is in reserve. ‘rake up position

near the East Farm from iiich youcan protect East Farm road: he prepared to reinibrce Echo at the bridge

*** **

67

Discussion of Scenario #10

Gap at the Bridge

“Nothing is more worthy of the attention of a good general

than the endeavor to penetrate the designs of the enemy.”—Niccolo Machiavelli

‘Therefore / say: ‘Know the enemy and knowhundred battles you will never be in danger.’”

yourself; in a

—Sun Tzu

Know Your EnemyDid the fact that you, played this

game from the other side in the previous scenario—and probably optedfor an attack by the East Farm road—influence your plan now that you areon the other side of the fence? Itshould. The foreknowledge you gainedfrom having already seen this problemthrough the enemy’s eyes did not solve

the problem for you hut it certainlyshould have given you sonic valuableinsights. It is not enough to understand an enemy’s capabilities anddoctrine. We also have to tn to get inside our enemy’s head, to try to see thesituation and the terrain from hispoint of view, with the intent of anticipating his actions. If we can anticipateour enemy’s actions, then s’ can hewuitinu in ambush for him, and we

can make him pay.While it’s always helpful to try to

ligure out what our enemy is up to. we

should not delude ouielves into thinking that we know exactly what he’s going to do and exclude all other possibilities. IC we fall into that dangeroustrap we’re likely to get surprised ourselves. We should not only considerwhat we think the enemy will do. hutwhat he might do and what he can do.As Helmuth von Moltke said. “Youwill usually rind that the enemy has

three courses open to him, and of

these he will adopt the l’ourth.” Whileit is dangerous and reckless to gamblethat we have ligured out with certitudewhat the enemy will do. it helps immensely to locus on him and consider

the options available to him. Onething we can never go wrong by ask’

ing: “What is the enem up to’.”

ExploitationThis scenario illustrates the concept

of surfaces and gaps at work. The hat

We also have to try to getinside our enemy’s head, to try

to see the situation and the ter

rain from his point of view, withthe intent of anticipating his

actions.

talion advance south across the river(to he reinforced by regiment) isn’t theresult of some plan devised at higherheadquarters. hut rather of the initiative of an agressive patrol leader andthe readiness of each successive cornmander to quickly and decisively exploit the situation. The actions of thatpatrol leader could turn out to be criti

cal to the dn’ss’jon .s u peom i ng o Hen—sive. This is a clear example of a smallunit “pulling” a larger unit through agap.

This approach requires a ruthlesslyexploitive mindset. Given an inch. we

should he looking to take a yard. Wmust be constantly looking ‘or opportu n i ties and then jumping on themwhen we md them, And like the boxerho has stunned his opponent, oncewe get the enemy on the ropes. wewant to redouble our efforts to go frthe knockout blow. In general. the bestway to exploit success is not to slopand consolidate what we have but tokeep pushing.

The Bigger PictureThe key to success in this scenario is

to deny the enemy a bridgehead northof the river at all costs until regimentcan send reinforcements. Without ahridgehead the enemy can’t effectivelylaunch his offensive in this zone.Moreover, realizing that the divisioncommander intends to go on the ol’fensive soon, we know that a friendlybridgehead south of the river would he

a huge advantage. If all else fails, wemust deny the bridge to the enemyRut our more ambitious object shouldbe to retain a consolidated bridgeheadsouth of the river from which division

can launch its upcoming offensive. AsCapt Robert M. Sellers pointed out inIns solution to tins problem. there areother reasons for not simply “hunkering” down to defend the bridge. First,we don’t want to surrender the initiative to the enemy. Second. the soonerand farther south we meet the enemy.the more room (and. consequently.more time) we have to work with—inother words, the more delay we canimpose on the enemy. And third. our

While it’s always helpful totry’ to figure out what our enemyis up to, we should not deludeourselves into thinking that we

know exactly what he’sto do and exclude allpossibilities.

Company A on foot, is already too lhrsouth to withdraw to the bridge in timeagainst a motorized enemy.

Speed, Speed, SpeedAs we saw clearly in the previous

scenario (and in practically every scenario before that). speed is a criticalfactor. The side that acts faster willhave the upper hand. It is every hit astrue as it was 2.500 years ago when Euripides wrote it: The god of war hatesthose who hesitate.”

FirepowerAlso critical to this situation is the

timely and eliective use of firepower.In his solution to the problem. Mr.Carl F. Kusch went so far as to designate his battalion tire support coordinator as the maiti effort:

For this initial phase. the POME[pci ta of ma in elfoni ‘viii he the firesupport coordinator! Our supportingarms assets are the only weapons withwhich we can thmwjlately strike theenemy and give us time to get into posi tion for the next phase of this battle.Therefore, it is imperati e that you(the FSC) bring all araththk lire support assets to bear on the enemy in thevicinity of TRP [target rekrence pointl#1 Ithe road frk south of the hillsl.

For the same reason, several readerssuggested that the STA team, the onlyfriendly unit that can initially observethe enemy main body and thereforethe unit which would he controllingthe initial lire missions, should he designated initially as the main effort.

Either way, the point is that hittingthe enemy quickly with massed firepower is imperalive iti this situation.We should take the regimental commander up on his offer of massed liresupport. As Mr. Kusch pointed out itis the one unit we have with which wecan immediately engage the enemy.The object would not he to completelydestroy, or even halt, the enemy colunin. hut to delay and disrupt it so thatwe can gain the initiative. Field Marshal Envi n Rom mel remarked that:

I have found again and again that inencounter actions [i.e.. meeting engagementsl. the day goes to the sidethat is the first to plaster its opponentwith tire. 1 he man who lies tow andaits developments usualiy comes offsecond best.

Key ThrrainThere are several key locations to

this situation, First is the bridge, theimportance of which is self-explanatory. If all else fails. we need to hold thebridge at all costs and may want todedicate one company to that mission.Company C is just arriving at thebridge and, being foot mobile, lacksthe mobility to he employed almostanywhere else.

As we saw in “Enemy Over theBridge.” the hills south and southwestof Hamlet are important because theyprovide a natural bridgehead defenseand command all movement towardthe bridge. Moreover, by controllingthose hills we would he providing anexcellent olThnsive bridgehead l’romwhich to launch the upcoming division offensive.

From the attacker’s perspective in‘Enemy Over the Bridge.” Hamlet wasnot particularly important. but it is tous in this scenario. Centrally located.Hamlet is like the huh of’ a wheel withspokes radiating outward: from therewe can strike quickly in any directionon interior lines. The enemy. on theother hand, must move on exteriorlines—i.e.. around the rim of’ thewheel. No matter which way he moves.even if he moves first, we can intercepthi m.

If “Enemy Over the Bridge” is anyindication, the enemy will probably gofor the bridge via the East Farm road.So the East Farm area becomes key.We could quickly move our mobileforces to East Farm to block this likelyenemy move. But if the enemy doesnot go this way, our main strikingforce is then out of position. While weexpect the enemy to use the East Farm

road, we shouldn’t gamble all ourhopes on that eventuality.

By controlling the high ground andHamlet we maintain the flexibility todeal with whatever course the enemytakes. lfhe tries to drive straight up themiddle, line: he must drive through ourentire battalion arrayed in depth. Thatwill be a costly anti time—consumingoperation. which thus plays into ourhands. If he drives east we use our interior lines to strike him in the flank atEast Farm on terrain suitable ‘or ourtanks and TOWs. If he swings west.fine: our mobile forces can strike justas easily’ toward West Farm. And if theenemy’ somehow manages to get by usto east or west, we can still cut him offat the bridge by driving due northfrom Hamlet.

Differing Mobility & CapabilityAs with “Enem Over the Bridge.”

we have a force consisting of unitswith different capabilities and degreesof mobility. The trick is to put theseunits to best use. Our foot—mobile in—fanny are best used in the woods andfor positional missions, such as holding key locations. We’ve already discussed using Cotiipany C to hold thebridge. Likewise. we can use CompanyA. our southernmost company, to engage the etiemy as fttr south as possible. This adds depth and definition tothe hattlefeld. By developing the situation aggressively. Compatiy A may

he able to force the enemy to committo a particular course of action,

We should tn to use our motorizedand tank units in a way that exploitstheir mobility over the road networkradiating out of Hamlet. Because thesituation is fairly vague and uncertainat this point. we ‘night do well to putall our motorized and tart k u nits into alarge, central reserve at Hamlet. readyto strike the decisive blow in any direction. We should consider keepingour reserve company commander withus so that the person who will he re

goingother,,

once we get the enemyon the ropes, we want to redoubleour efforts to go for the knockoutblow In general, the best way toexploit success is not to stop andconsolidate what we have but tokeep pushing. ,,

6’)

sponsible for striking the key blow cangain the same appreciation for the situation that we have and so that we canmake certain he knows what we expectof him.

The concept then, would call lor amobile deknse. with our loot infantryproviding depth and definition to thebattlefield in the form of the blockingpositions around which our mobile reserve would maneuver.

Gaining and Maintaining the InitiativeIn this context, initiative does not

mean the willingness to act on one’sown aulhoHn’. hut rather the adva n—tage of having the upper hand in battle, The two meanings, however, areobviously related for we use individualinitiative to seize battlefield initiative.Field Marshal Slim said: “In war it isall—important to gain and retain theinitiative, to make the enemy conformto the action, to dance to your tune.”We typically think of gaining the initiative by ollensive action, by strikingIirst and not letting up. Gen HollandM. Smith wrote:

Since I first joined die Marines. I ia yeadvocated aecressiveness in the FeIdand constant oflensive action H itquickly. liii hard, a rid keep right onIn iii no. Give the enem no rest. no up—portunit to consolidate his kirces andhit hack at you. This is the shortestroad to ictory.

And, in fact, this is probably themost common and direct way of seizing the initiative. But it is not the onlyway. Generally, by letting the enemymake the Ii rst move, we risk lettinghim gain the initiative—hut not always. If we can anticipate our enemy’s

move and he ready for it, we can oftenhurt the enemy worse than if we hailstruck the first blow: we then act likethe counterpunching boxer who letshis opponent expose himself by throwing a punch. More than a fev of theGreat Captains were great counter-punchers. For example. Hannibal’smasterpieces at the Trehia. Lake Trasimene, and Cannae were all based onletting the Romans strike first andthen crushing their flank when they

did. (See the discussion for Scenario#12.) Although the enemy had initialfreedom of action. Hannibal retainedthe initiative because he could anticipate the enemy’s moves.

In this situation, we can move Ii rstto block the likely enemy move at EastFarm. in which case we would at bestblunt his attack frontally hut wouldnot likely destroy the enemy force. Or,from our interior position at Hamlet.we can let the enemy make the Ii rstmove on East Farm and crush him inthe ilank shen he does. We mightwant to put a small holding force atEast Farm. not to block the enemymove hut to control it, to act as a trigger mechanism for our flank attackand “grab him by the nose,” as Pattonwould say. while we “kick him in thepants.” It is a variation of the fix-and-flank in which, instead of our havingto move around the enemy to get at hisflank, we let him move past us to accomplish the same end.

We don’t have to gamble evervthingon the enemy taking the East Farmroad either. We can do the same thingat West Farm if the enemy goes west.By letting the enemy move first because we are ready for him, we get himto expose himselL and we can createthe opportunity for a decisive victory.

us MC

If we can anticipate our enemy’s move and be ready for it,we can often hurt the enemyworse than if we had struck thefirst blow; we then act like thecounterpunching boxer who letshis opponent expose himself bythrowing a punch.

* * * * *

70

Discussion of Scenario #11

Enemy Over theBridge,A

Continued:Thwarted Plan

“However absorbed a commander may be in the elaborationof his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessaiy to take the enemy into account”

—Winston Churchill

“Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but a/most invariably because the leader has decidedin his own mind that the position cannot be held.”

—Gen A A Vandegrift

Opposing WillsPerhaps the most important thing

this scenario does is illustrate the (undamental nature of war as a conllicthet•ten hostile, independent wills.The enemy is not an inanimate objecthut an independent and animate forcethat acts and reacts. His commandersmay he clever and bold: his troopsmay he aggressive and well trained: hemay recognize every hit as much as wedo the importance of principles likeinitiative, speed. surprise, and main effort. (Because they depict a situationfrozen in time. TDGs don’t usuallycapture this idea of an animate, activeenemy very well.)

We should not expect the enemy tosit still while we execute our plans—todie meekly in place like aggressors ina scripted field exercise. The enemywill have an object and intent of hisown, and we must expect that while weare tRing to impose our will on him.he is trying to do the same with us,

It’s precisely for this reason thatthings will rarely go as planned. Despite the lhct that our battalion corn-

mander in this scenario has made the“right” decision and come up with areasonable plan. the battle is goingbadly. It’s possible to do everythingright and still take a heating. We mustrecognize this, accept it as part of thenature of war, and have the perseverance to keep going.

PerseveranceThis book is primarily ahout light

ing smarter and about outsmartingand outfoxing the enemy. Fightingsmarter means lighting more economically—i.e.. accomplishing the missionat the minimum cost in lives andequipment lost. But there’s much morethan this to success. Since combat is aclash of hostile wills, willpower is anessential element. Perseverance, tenacity. steadfastness, resoluteness, andfighting spirit are at least as importantas superior intelligence. When all elseis said and done, as Gen VandegritIsquote shows, it sometimes comes downto who’s tougher and willing to persevere, Maj Leonard A. Blasiol’s solution to this problem when it first ap

peared provides a good example niperseverance in the face of a deteriorating situation:

This is a fluid. uncertain situation.and the upper hand will go to thecommander who acts with the mostdaring and resolution. . , , Our boldplan will ensure that we keep the enemy reacting to us, rather than theother way around. As long as we canretain the iniliative south of the river.the division can attack as scheduled.and the 2d Battalion. 6th Marines willhave accomplished its mission.

What’s the Enemy Up To?Since the original scenario described

in “Enemy Over the Bridize.” has theenemy situation gotten any clearer?We now know that the enemy has apretty sizable force south of the river—certainly larger than we were earlierled to believe. In addition to the estimated company in the assemhly area,the enemy also has a large enoughforce at East farm to smash half ourbattalion or at least to stop it andcause extensive confusion with hisnight ambush. Moreover, the enemy

7t

has been south of the river longenough to prepare the ambush at EastFarm. More and more. this has the appearance of a serious enemy initiativerather than just a probe. We don’t actually know the situation on the westside, hut it’s reasonable to figure that ifthe enemy has sent out a Force to protect one flank, he has likely done thesame for the other. We cant ignore thedistinct possibility that this situationrepresents a serious effort by the enemy to establish a bridgehead south of

We should not expect theenemy to sit still while we execute our plans—to die meekly inplace . - ,,

the river. which would, of course, seriously disrupt our division’s plans.

OptionsSo where does this leave us?

Option I: Thinker dotin and holdwhat were got. As Mr. C. Craig Smithexplained in his solution:

We have already sent in our Sundaypunch. and the pu nehee has to ruedout to be all ogre. Now our primaryuhjeetive is damage control until BigBrother comes to the rescue.

The regiment will he moving up in amatter of hours. Moving forward before that Lime ‘sill do us more harmthan good. We would not only hewalking into a fire sack. e would heleaving tile roads to the south uncovered.

At night in an unreconnoiteredarea, with tired troops and possiblyheavy casualties, it is best to pull backto the strongest available defensivepositions. reinforce, and move up lateras part of a regimental counterattack.

According to this option, we’ve already taken too much of a heating tocontemplate further offensive action.We should cut our losses rather thanrisk losing everything by further initiatives. We surrender the initiative to theenemy and hope that reinforcementsarrive in time. By holding the two hillswe can prevent the enemy from consolidating his bridgehead or breakingout to the south. We also secure terrainthat division can use to launch an attack to recapture the bridge. As forCompanies E and A, at this stage thereis little we can do.

Option 2: Rescue the mobile fOrce at

East Farm. We certainly don’t want tosend our remaining combat power directly into the ambush that has hammered the rest of battalion. If we areintent on going to go to the rescue ofthe mobile force we should considertrying to take the enemy ambush in(lank—perhaps with Company G crossing the Hamlet-East Farm road andapproaching the ambush site throughthe woods from the west. There areseveral problems here, though. First amove like this would be very vulnerable to an enemy stroke from the direction of Hamlet. Second. being foot-mobile, would we arrive in time to doany good? And third, trying to findwhat’s left of the mobile force in thedark would he a coordination nightmare fraught with dangers.

But more important. regardless ofthe difficulties, is going to East Farmthe right thing to do? It’s natural to wantto go to the aid of our comrades, hut arethere morn important things we shouldhe doing with our remaining combatpower? Mr. Carl F. Kuseh thought so.as he explained in his solution:

That portion of our battalion that was“engaged with the enem in the vicirlit of the East Farm was the bulkof tile battalion (especiall in terms ofcombat power) and was therefore asizable force in its own right Any enemy unit that could have tied up ourforces there would have been no merepassing recon patrol. There would heabsolutely nothing whatsoever that theremainder of the battalion could dodircddt’ to help our comrades out oftheir am. As hard as it niay havebeen, the cold reality of the situationwas that it would he the wrong decision to ‘speed” off toward the EastFarm. attempting to reinforce our beleaguered forces in that area.

As a rule, we should look to reinforcesuccess and not failure. Even if we’reable to rescue part of the mobile force.resuming the attack along the originalaxis is not a good option. In generalit’s not a good idea to resume an attackin a direction that’s already failed.even with more forces: it’s usually better to try a different approach.

Most readers recognized that goingto East Farm was not a good idea.First, at this stage there is little wecould accomplish. Second. and moreimportant we would be playing directly into the enemy’s hands: he will havedistracted our efforts completely awayfrom the bridge, the truly critical pointfor both sides in this situaition.

• Option 3: Seize Hamlet. This was

the original mission of the two companies under our control (as battalionexecutive officer). The object of our attack was clearly a supporting one—toprotect the main attack’s left flank as itmoved toward East Farm and to distract the enemy. To continue to attackHamlet when the main attack thatwe’re supporting has failed would he ameaningless mistake. But several readers suggested attacking Hamlet anyway, although for different reasonsand always in conjunction with theirown attack on the bridge. In that thisdecision was not the result of blindlyfollowing orders and reflected an appreciation of the larger developing situation and the battalion commander’sintent there may be sonic merit in it.

As we saw in the last scenario. Hamlet is more important to the enemythan to us. Perhaps Hamlet is worthtaking precisely because it is so valuableto the enemy. By controlling Hamletwe would deny the enemy the use ofinterior lines that gives him such flexibility. By striking Hamlet we wouldnot be directly improving our own position so much as weakening the enemy’s—trying to lessen the initiativeand freedom of action that so clearlybelongs to him. And because Hamletis valuable to the enemy. striking at itwould definitely grab his attention,possibly getting him to react to us instead of vice versa. In effect, we wouldbe launching a sort of spoiling attackto hamstring the enemy until our reinforcements arrive. Moreover, as Capt

The important things are tobe willing and able to shiftquickly when we have found agap and not to beat our headagainst the wall when we’ve runup against a surface.

Gregory D. Stevens explained, an attack on Hamlet with one companycould distract the enemy while we makea move on the bridge with the other.

Option 4: Gofor the bridge. Ifs verylikely that the division attack at 0400tomorrow will have to be scuttled. It’scertain that if the attack does go asscheduled, our battalion won’t heleading it. But that doesn’t lessen theimportance of the bridge. We want todo whatever we can to keep the option

7Th

f attack open. And as weve alreadyjiscussed. as long as the enemy holds

the bridge our divisions situation condnues to deteriorate. lstLt Eric M. Veitsestitnale of the situation in his solu—uon was on the money:

Seizure and control of the bridge “as

the battalion coin m under’s intent andremains the key issue even though hismobile force has been ambushed. Imust fight off the natural reaction tocome to their aid. If I did so. I maybeonly wasting my Marines in a hopeless situation. while failing to preventmore enenw forces from moving southacross the hrtdL’e. Instead. I concentrate On seizing control of the bridge.and alert higher headquarters of mintentions.

Although the two companies underour control were given another mission. the focus of efforts was, and remains the bridge. The battalion com—matider may actually he retrieving thesituation at East Farm and continuinghis attack. But our best estimate is thatthe main attack has failed, and basedon that we should immediately go al—ter the bridge ourselves.

Surfaces and Gaps Again—AnInfiltration Attack

This scenario provides another goodillustration of the concept of surfl3cesand gaps. In the original scenario we

knew that the assembly area was a surrace: we ran head-on into an enemyinfantn unit in the woods. We thoughtthat the East Farm road might he a gap.which we tried to exploit with our motorized and tank units. But we learnedthe hard way that East Farm constitutes another surface. This brings up acouple of valuahle points. The first isthe importance of judgment. A cleverenemy may try to disguise a surface asa gap by luring us into an ambush inthe form of a lire sack. So how do weknow the difference between a gapand a fire sack? There is no easy answer: it’s a function of good inlelligence. reconnaissance, knowing ourenemy. and sound judgment. The second point, which we’ve made repeatedly. is that no situation is certain. Locating gaps is. to a certain exient. aprocess of trial and error—probinguntil we find a weak spot. The important things are to he willing and ableto shift quickly when we have found agap and not to heat our head againstthe wall when we’ve run up against asurface.

We don’t know the situation to thewest, hut it’s not unlikely that the enemy also has forces at West Farm.Since the enemy has been moving vehicles south across the bridge. it’s agood bet that the road between the

bridge and Hamlet is clogged with vehicles and that Hamlet has prohahlbeen occupied.

Where does this leave us? We have aknown surface to the east at EastFarm. We have another knovn surface in the assembly area/Hamlet section. We have an unknown situationin the west, but would not be surprisedif the enemy has a force at West Farm.The enemy seems to control the roadsand road intersections: we have attacked with our vehicular elements byway of the roads and been ambushed.All we have left are our two fool mEan-tn companies—Company F south ofthe assembly area and Company Gnear east hill. Our foot infantn’ companies are best suited to operating awayfrom the roads, where the wooded terrain offers security and concealment.So if we’re going to go afler the bridge.the best bet at this stage seems to he tomove through the woods between thestrong enemy positions. The enemyoccupies the wooded area betweenHamlet and West Farm. which leavesus the area between Hamlet and EastFarm. Company G is in the best position to use this axis. A simultaneoussupporting attack on Hamlet by Company F tould distract the enemy andprotect Company G’s left flank as itmoves to the east around Hamlet.

US MC

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Discussion of Scenario #12

Battle of theGaragiola River

“Thus, those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice himwith something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they await him in ambush.”

—Sun Tzu

“The withdrawal should be thought of as an offensive instrument and exercises be framed to teach how the enemy can belured into a trap, closed by counterstroke or devastating circleof fire.

—B. H. Liddell Hart

Two ApproachesThis scenario suggests two funda

mentally different types of solutions.with two drastically diflerent intendedresults. Based on the latitude ourhigher commander has given us, wecould argue that either. if successful,accomplishes the mission.

• Positional DLfr??SL This is the conventional and modest—some mightargue prudent—approach, by whichwe intend to delay the enemy advance.This approach recognizes the enemy’ssuperior numbers. It involves establishing strong defensive positions alongthe key terrain, creating a defensivebarrier by which we intend to hold upthe enemy’s advance. This approachuses the river as an obstacle to increase our own combat power. Wemay even consider demolishing thebridges if we can get permission. Weintend to keep the enemy on the farside as long as possible and make it ascostly as possible for him to get across.From our defensive positions we wouldabsorb the enemy’s attack frontally andblunt his advance, but we would notdestroy him. Our reserves would counterattack to eject enemy penetrationsand restore threatened areas. By thisapproach we would he surrenderingthe initiative to the enemy and wouldhave to expect that eventually he will

force his way through or around us.This approach therefore accepts thateventually the enemy will get acrossthe river to continue the advance—ourintent is to exact the greatest possiblecost in time and resources losL

Mobile Defrnse/Counrerstroke. Thisis a much bolder and more ambitious

The first ingredient inachieving a decisive victory is

having the courage to try forone. You don’t win greatvictories by trying for modestones.

approach—some would say rash—inwhich the intent is not merely to delayand wear down the enemy, hut to destroy him altogether. It means attacking a regiment with a battalion. By thisapproach, minimal fixing forces to theenemy’s front would fall back underpressure. coaxing the enemy into committing himself to the southern bridgesand drawing the leading enemy elements across. Meanwhile, the bulk ofour force, including all our tanks,would outflank the enemy via theCujo bridge and attack the enemy in

the flank from the north. This approach ignores the natural defensivequalities that the river offers. Wewould still use the river as an obstacle,not to halt the enemy hut, by lettinghis leading element.s across, to split hisforces. As Sun ‘rzu said: “When an advancing enemy crosses water do notmeet him at the water’s edge. It is advantageous to allow half his force tocross and then strike.” This plan hasan inherent risk: for by seeking outright victory with a decisive battle. wealso risk outright defeat.

A Sample FragOThe first approach is fairly straight

forward: the second is less conventional and worth discussing. Therefore. the following is a sample fragmentary order for the latter course ofaction:

Gentlemen, just as we’d hoped, theenemy is walking into our trap. andwe will implement the plan as we’vepreviously discussed. You all remember Hannibal and the battle of LakeTrasimene that we studied at officers’call last month. Well, we’re going toreenact it today. We will grab our enemy by the nose, lead him across theriver, and while lie’s got one foot oneither hank, just when he thinks he isabout to break through. we will crushhim in the flank.

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I iniend to draw the enemy acrossthe river with two companies andcrush him with a flanking attack fromthe north, supported by concentratedartillery and close air support. The initial locus of elf orts is fixing the enemy in the killing zone, shifting to iheflank attack as it commcnces.

L4R Company: Delay the enemyalong the line Tragediu-Androida. India Company: Delay along the coastroad from as lar forward as possible toa comanding position on the heightseast ol the river. Both of you: Hurthim, hut not so badly that he tries anyflanking maneuvers: I want you tokeep him oriented eastward, You’vegot to hold him for at least 90 minutes.

XC: Take Tanks. Kilo. and Limaacross the Cujo bridge and preparebr a coordinated attack on order gen

we want to avoid beingpredictable. By establishing pat-(ems we set ourselves up tobe ambushed. Instead, we wantto be unpredictable, to changeour tactics, to avoid discerniblepatterns.

erally south along the line CujoTraedia. The attack must be ready tokick oft in no more than 90 minutes:the sooner you’re ready, the better.Fonii a tank-infantn company in reserve. I’ll let you know hetlier tocommit it or not: it should he ready toattack along the lines Cujo-Tragediaor Cujo-Androida.

Fire Support Coordinator: As wediscussed, plan to mass fires on-call inthe vicinity of Tragedia, Androida. andthe Tragedia and Garagiola bridges.

Air: A couple of sorties is notenough. Over the next couple of hourswe are going to he destroying one ene’my mechanized regiment. I need everything that flies. I intend to mass allsupporting arms in conjunction wiihthe flanking attack.

To the regimental commander:

As we discussed. Colonel, we have achance to deal the enemy a cmshineblow: he is walking into our trap. Fmimplementing the plan we discussedand will have to commit to a decisivebattle. I need more than my fair shareol support. especially air. And thaitank-infanin’ battalion you’ve gol inresent sure would help.

(The reason for the “on-order” attack in this order is because the timingof the cli i depends on the progress the

enemy makes against our dwng.) Unquestionably, this approach oilers amuch bigger payoff and also involvesa bigger risk. Why should we think itwill work?

BoldnessThe first thing this plan has going

for it is its verv boldness, which, aswe’ve already discussed, is a forcemultiplier. Rommel said: “Bold decisions give the best promise of success.”Certainly Hannibal’s victon’ at LakeTrasimene was hold in the extreme.Had Hannibal’s plan not worked, wewouldn’t consider it hold. it would hereckless. It takes moral courage toadopt a hold plan. and for that reasonthe enemy often does not expect it.

The first ingredient in achieving adecisive victory is having the courageto try for one. You don’t win greatvictories by trying for modest ones—unless your enemy is completely incompetent in which case it probablydoesn’t matter what you do. andyou’ve got little to lose by going ‘or aknockout. If Hannibal had adopted amore “prudent” and “reasonable” planon that .4prfl morning, we wouldn’tstudy Lake Trasimene today as an example of tactical genius.

This does not mean that we shouldswing For the fences even time up. Theconditions must he right—the mis

sion. the terrain, the enemy situation.the capabilities of our own forces.Sometimes, for example, the intent isnot to gain a decisive battle, hut toforestall one—to buy time so thehigher commander can attempt something somewhere else. In that case, allother things being equal, it would he adisservice to the higher commander torisk a decisive defeat by trying for adecisive victory when no such victorywas needed. But what it does mean isthat we shouldn’t pass up the opportunity when it’s there.

PredictabilityThe next thing we have going for us

in this situation is a predictable enemyWe and our enemy have established alittle pattern over the last couple ofweeks, in which he has demonstratedaggressive, head-strong tendencies.Knowing this, we can take advantageof these tendencies by anticipatingwhat our enemy will do and be waitingFor him when he does. As we’ve already mentioned, it’s not a good ideato gamble everything on the enemy’sdoing what we expect. We should heready to exploit the situation if he

does. hut we should also he preparedto deal with the situation if he doesn’t.

For our part what this means is thatwe want to avoid being predictable. Byestablishing palterns we set ourselvesup to he ambushed. Instead, we want

lobe unpredictable, to change our tactics, to avoid discernible patterns. Notonly will it he harder for the enemy tosurprise us. hut it will he easier for usto achieve surprise, since our enemywon’t know what to expect from us. Inthis scenario, since we’ve already established a certain pattern and the enemy has developed sonic idea of whalto expect from us. our element of surprise could he even greater: w&ve set

him up for -a fill.

PreparationAnother advantage we have in this

situation is the opportunity to preparefor the battle. As Maj Michael P.Marletto has pointed out in “The ViewFrom the Other Side: A ConversationWith the Hero of the Garagiola River”(MCG. Jan93). if we’ve waited until 30minutes before the enemy arrives loeven begin thinking about the upcom—mu battle, we’re in trouble. The fict is

our battalion commander should havebeen analyzing the situation as it developed over the last 2 weeks, developing possible courses of action andcontingencies. issuing warning orders.

- - - it’s difficult to overestimate the importance of avoiding the enemy’s front and striking his flanks. . - . those areaswhere the enemy’s attentionisn’t directed, ,,

making defensive preparations and refining his plans.

We have been falling back in theface of enemy pressure for the last 2weeks, buying time. We should makeuse of that time by “shaping” the battlefield, i.e.. thinking in advance ofhow we want things to unfold and howwe hope to achieve an advantage. Wecould reasonably anticipate fallingback across the Garagiola River andcould recognize that the terrain thereoffered the opportunity for a eounterstroke. We had the advantage of being able to choose the battlefield, andbecause it was behind us, we could prepam it while the enemy could not. All

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the shiie We were prepari ig the battle—field for the upcoming baltic. wewould he falling back in such a way aslo draw the enemy mm the trap. ii’ wesucceeded iii getting the enemy to 11111in to the trap as we’d designed it. we’dspring our ambush: if not. se’d continue to fall back until we could createanother opportu nity.

Preparations would include lire support Planning to provide for the coordi—nation and massing of air and groundtires: operations by combat engineers toprepare delënsive works, obstacles, andmi nelields to canalize and temporari

ly. halt enemy forces to make them vulnerable to our fires; coordinating thebarrier plan with the lire plan: and selecting withdrawal routes for our lixing forces and directions of attack forour flanking forces. If time permitted.they would even include a rehearsal(at least with key leaders) to get theliming and coordination down.

As Maj Marletto pointed out, time isa precious commodity shared by bothsides. We have to make the most ofeven second.

FlanksThe linal advantage we have in this

situation is the opportunity, if things

go reasonably well, of striking the enemy’s left flank. Nearly all of the discussions of the previous scenarioshave involved some effort to get at theenemy’s flank, hut we have nevertreated the subject explicitly. We should.because lix-and-flank has been a central theme of this hook. Simple as itsou nds, it’s difficult to overestimatethe importance of avoiding the enemy’s front and striking his flanks.

The enemy’s front is that directionin which his units and weapons arefacing and that direction in which hisattention is focused. Strictly speaking.the flanks are to the sides and the rearto the hack, hut it’s easier simply totIn ilk of them as those areas where theenemy’s attention isn’t directed. Trulydecisive elTects come from attackingthe enemy in flank or rear, because byattacking in that way we save ourselvesby avoiding the enemy’s strength whileat the same time striking him where heis vulnerable. A flanking attack or envelopment has the added psychological efièct of threatening the enemy’slines of communication. Conversely,by striking the enemy frontally wemay batter him, hut unless we haveoverwhelming superiority we’re not

likely to destroy him. In the process.because we’re striking directly into theenemy’s strength. well pay a cost.

We have discussed previously theneed for a fixing frce to complementour flanking force. Unless there is afixing force to distract his attention tothe front, an enemy force like a manwill turn to face a threat to its flank.

It’s been argued that in order to getinto a position to threaten an enemy’sflank or lines of communication wemust often expose our own, and sothere is risk inherent in any flankingmaneuver. In theory this may he true.hut the danger rarely exists equally inpractice. If we have successfully andtruly seized the initiative, we need seldom fear having our flank attacked.The enemy is too busy reacting to usand fearing for his own flank. In thatcase the best hank protection is boldand aggressive action.

If flanks are truly as important us his-tot suggests, why is it that defenderscontinue to deind to the front and attackers continue to attack the enemyfrontally and that the rare flanking attack continues to remain decisive’? Acouple of reasons. FirsL although logicmay tell us to beware our flanks. inilita

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iy units like human beings are naturallyoriented forwards. In order to operateeffectively to the sides or rear. they mustturn to lace that direction. Even though

a commanders judgment may tell himto look for an attack against his flankthe activity to his front will naturallycatch his attention. And second, the

force of friction tends to reduce combat

to the simplest terms, making even the

simplest actions difliculL Compared to

a frontal attack, even a simple single envelopment becomes difficult to execute.Ifs one thing to draw a flanking maneuver on a TDG map: it’s another thingaltogether to execute that maneuver inthe held, But it’s precisely because aflank attack is more difficult to executethat it is less expected and thereforemore effective when pulled ott

When Is a Gap Not a Gap?Answer: When it’s a surface. Our po

sition along the Garagiola River is asurlhce intended to look like a gap. Wewant the enemy to think he can get

through: otherwise he’s less likely to enter the trap we’ve laid. At this stage he isprobably most concerned about seizing

a bridgehead across the river. So. as SunTm’s quote suggests, we oiler the possibility of seizing the bridges intact as

bait. We have a fixing force to the ene

my’s front: hut the intent is not toblock the enemy’s advance, hut ratherto control it. Our ixing force shouldlead the enemy by the nose right intoour killing zone.

Ambush MentalityThe operation we’ve been talking

about amounts to an ambush on a

large scale. It requires us to think of

the defense in different terms than we

usually do. A traditional defense is

thought of as a wall across our front

designed to keep the enemy out As

we’ve said, that approach may blunt

the enemy’s advance hut is unlikely todestroy him. It means meeting himfrontally and absorbing casualties inthe process. Carried to its logical extreme, it results in an indecisive stalemate with two halted opponents facingeach other frontally, as on the WesternFront in World War I. The ambushmentality, on the other hand, thinks ofthe defense as a trap. Instead oltningto keep the enemy out, we try to lurehim in. Remember, an ambush isn’t

A traditional defense isthought of as a wall across ourfront designed to keep the enemy out. - - - The ambush mentality, on the other hand, thinksof the defense as a trap. Insteadof trying to keep the enemy out,we t’ to lure him in.

interested in preserving terrain; it isinterested in destroying that enemyunit that passes through the killing

zone. Instead of positioning ourselvesperpendicular to his direction of attackto block his advance, we position ourselves parallel so to ambush him in theflank as he passes.

Surprise is central to the ambushmentality. Typically we think of sur

prise as belonging to the attacker, hutthe defender can achieve it by con

cealing his presence. making his sur

faces look like gaps, and pouncingwhen the unsuspecting enemy entersthe trap.

HistoricallyInterestingl3c the battalion comman

der used an historical example to describe his commander’s intent, not be-

cause he expected this battle to he anexact replica (since no two battles arealike). hut because the example ofLake Trasimene provided a clear andvivid description of the end result thathe expected. (Fortunately. Lake Trasimene was familiar enough to his subordinates that the example was meaningful.) The battle of Lake Trasimenewas one of Hannibal’s masterpieces.in which the Carthaginian routed asuperior Roman force under the headstrong Flaminius in 217 B.C. Flaminius’legions stood between Hannibal andRome. Rather than attack his enemyon strong dcfinsive terrain of the Roman’s choosing. Hannibal marched hisarmy through the Appenine mountainsaround Saminius’ left flank and thitatened the Roman lines of communications, forcing Fluminius to come tohim. With a small force operating tothe Romans’ front Hannibal lured theenemy into an enclosed basin with thelake to the south and high ground tothe north. His main bod3c hidden inthe hills to the north, ambushed theRomans in the flank. The battle became a rout.

Our well-read battalion commanderhas failed to mention that this situation probably equally resembles Hannibal’s earlier victory at the RiverTrehia. in which he was able to drawthe Romans across the river and striketheir flank before they we able to consolidate. He did not use the river as abarrier to halt the Roman advance.but as a means for disrupting the enemy movement and leaving them vulnerable. In both cases. Hannibal demonstrated the characteristic ability toget his enemy to come to him on histerms. Even though he let the enemymake the first move—or, more accurately perhaps. lured the enemy intomaking the first move—he retainedthe initiative. USMC

Lhemt

to[ank.get.y’sweso

i ngue.

• ittnd;eIed.us

hatold

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77

Discussion of Scenario #8

Battle of the GaragiolaRiver Revisited

“How can any man say what he should do himself if he is ignorant what his adversary is about?”

—Baron Antoine Jomini

“It is an accepted maxim of war, never to do what the enemywishes you to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it avoida battlefield he has reconnoitered and studied and, with evenmore reason,trenched.”

ground that he has fortified and where he is en-

—Napoleon Bonaparte

Know Your EnemyAs with Scenario #10, “Gap at the

Bridge.” this scenario is designed to illustrate the importance of trying to figure out what your enemy is up to andto use that insight to your advantage.The ability to anticipate the enemy’slikely moves can be a decisive advantage. The ability to anticipate is basedon the ability to see a situation throughthe enemy’s eyes. How does knowinghow you solved this scenario from theother side influence your actions?

What’s the Enemy Up To?Despite the fact that we have been

in continuous contact with the enemyfor the last 2 weeks, we have surprisingly little specific intelligence aboutthe current situation. Once again the“fog” of war has descended (literally.in this scenario) to drive home the important point that incomplete information is a defining feature of tacticaldecisionmaking and something wehave to learn to live with.

What do we know for certain? Weknow that the enemy has been fallingback continuously for the last 2 weeks.and therefore seems content to tradespace for time while gradually wearingus down. For the present at least, heseems intent on not becoming decisively engaged. What little current in-

formation we have of enemy dispositions indicates he intends to defendthe riverline. As discussed in the previous scenario, this would he the obvious and logical course of action. Wehave no information about the situation at the Cujo bridge, hut we can assume the enemy has some forces there.The question is how many?

The armored activity near Androida

The ability to anticipate theenemy’s likely moves can be adecisive advantage. The abilityto anticipate is based on theability to see a situation throughthe enemy’s eyes.

could he his reserve—again, fairly predictable and consistent with a defenseof the riverline. The centrally locatedAndroida is key for several reasons.First, from that position the enemyhas good observation of nearly the entire battlefield. Second. Androida andthe connected high ground whichcurves south to the shore dominateboth southern bridges. Third, Androidaalso blocks the main route from the

Cujo bridge. And finally, if the enemywants to shift forces laterally from onebridge to another. Androida is the central huh through which those forcesmust pass. Clearly, no matter whatcourse of action we choose, at a minimum we should target Androida withsupporting arms to obscure the enemy’s observation and disrupt his lateral shifting of forces.

Everything we know of the enemysituation to this point leads us to conclude that the enemy will make a defensive stand along the river Thisshould he a matter of serious concernto us because, based on what we knowof the last scenario, it’s exactly what ahold enemy commander would wantus to conclude if he were actually going to spring an ambush. (I think itmakes the counterstroke/amhush solution to the last scenario even moreappealing in retrospect.)

Regardless of ourestimate of the enemy situation, the terrain ought to setoff warning hells. We ought to recognize. as Hannibal did at Lake Trasimene, that the area immediately eastof Checkpoint 68 is a tailor-made killing zone: a low area devoid of muchcover and concealment penned inand dominated by high ground onthree sides and by water on the fourth.

Even if we’re convinced that the en-

emy lacks the strength, or time, ornerve to launch a counterstroke/ambush From the north, we would hefoolish to move our entire Force intothe basin without taking some measure to secure our left flank—eventhough the prospect of seizing thebridges intact might beckon us into aheadlong rush. Flaminius did exactlythat and suffered ignominious defeat.

Hasty Versus Deliberate CrossingGiven the choice, we would prefer to

make a hasty crossinu—launching directly into the crossing without loss ofmomentum. hopefully seizing one ormore bridges intact and preventing

The object would be tokeep up the speed of the offensive and to strike before the enemy could further strengthen hisdefenses. But the enemy has asay in the matter.

the enemy from disengaginu again.The object would he to keep up thespeed of the offensive and to strike before the enemy could further strengthen his defenses. But the enemy has asay in the matter. If he has tiiade solidpreparations. a hasty crossing may nothe an option. and we will have nochoice hut to plan a deliberate crossing. a complex operation based onthorough planning and preparation. Ifthat’s the case the enemy will probablyhave the option of withdrawing on hisown terms, and we will probably haveto wait until later to get our decisivebattle.

Where To AttackWe want to strike in more than one

place, so that we have multiple options, with the flexibility to reinforcewhichever action shows the most promise. If one crossing faih, we would stillhave another possibility. In otherwords, we don’t want to put all oureggs in one basket We could attack inthe vicinity of all three bridges, whichwould give us the greatest number ofpossible options. However, this woulddisperse us across the greatest frontage. making it difficult to concentratequickly at any one spot, and wouldleave us less in reserve to exploitwhichever attack shows promise. Ideally, we want to design a cheng/ch i move

which catches the enemy between twomutually supporting attacks.

Numerous readers recognized theadvantages of attacking the Cujo bridge.First, it avoids the natural killing zone.Second. it offers the opportunity oftaking the main enemy positions inthe flank. Third. the Cujo bridge issomewhat isolated from the other twoand beyond the range of mutual support And fourth, moving a unit alongthe trail north of the ridge to the Cujoroad—in addition to being the onlymove which is masked from enemyobservation from Androida—will protect our left flank against an enemy attack from that direction. In fact, it mayallow us to take the enemy’s flankingattack in the flank or rear.

In conjunction with an attack onthe Cujo bridge, an attack at theTragedia vice the Garagiola bridgemakes more sense. First, being closerto the Cujo bridge makes it easier forour two wings to reinforce and complement each other. Second, an attackdirectly toward Androida threatens tocrack open the enemy position in general and to cut off enemy forces defending the Cujo bridge in particular.And third. an attack at Garagiola fixesonly the far left of the enemy’s frontleaving his center free to reinforce hisright at Cujo. An attack near Tragedia.on the other hand, is more likely toprevent both the enemy’s center andleft from reinforcing Cujo.

The Garagiola bridge olkrs thefewest advantages, An attack acrossthe river at Garagiola would not directly threaten the enemy’s lines ofcommunication or the forces defending the other bridges. And even afterwed forced a crossing we would still hein a precarious position. surrounded bydominating terrain,

In explanation of his solution. CaptDavid C. Fuquea wrote:

I know we can keep the enemy busyenough to allow Ithe main etiortj toget across the riser at Cujo]. I’m notfoolish enough to think Cujo will beundefended. I am sure that withspeed. firepower from the CIFS Iclosein fire supportj, and a little luck wecan punch through Cujo and roll upthe enemy flank before they get out ofthe box we build around them withfire support. EASCAM [held anittenscatterable mines], and the supportingattack.

The Amphibious Option?Several readers suggested using our

AAVs to turn the enemy’s southern

flank by making a landing on theshore southeast of Garagiola (usuallylaunching the envelopment from Gaiety).Strictly speaking, this does not constitute an amphibious landing—by delinition an attack from ship to shore—hut rather a shore-to-shore operation.Regardless. the idea behind it is to useour ability to move on the water as ameans to avoid the enemys I’ront andget at his flank.

The shore-to-shore option introduces new variables to the problem.What is the military situation on thelake’? Does the enemy have combatcraft? Are there any suitable landingbeaches for our AAVs? Has the enemyplanted obstacles or mines in the surf?Presumably. we would know the answers to these questions. or could findout. Let’s assume that somewhere inthe 4 or 5 kilometers of fiatland east ofthe river mouth there are suitable landing beaches hut that furthersoutheast there are not: the highground appears to descend directly tothe waterline.

One of the great advantages of amphibious operations is the strategicand operational mobility of movement by sea. Generally, we can movelarge numbers of men and equipmentover great distances faster by sea thanby land. But the same mobility advantage does not generally hold at the tactical level, in which the distances areshorter. Our AAVs would he visible to

We want to strike in morethan one place, so that we havemultiple options, nith the flexibilit’ to reinforce whichever actionshows the most promise.

the enemy during the entire move.moving slowly through the water, onexterior lines. Meanwhile. the enemy.motorized and using interior lines.would simply have to face left to meetthe threat (and would have plenty oftime to do so). To have any chance ofsuccess, we would have to conductsuch a landing as part of a fix-and-flank move, in conjunction with afrontal attack against the river to occupy the enemy’s attention.

But even if we were to succeed inmaking the landing in the area directly southeast of the river, the envelopment wouldn’t be deep enough to pose

7,)

much of a threat to the enemy position. We would still he in front of thecommanding terrain at Androida andthe Androida heights. As with an attack across the Garagiola hridge. wewouldn’t directly threaten the enemy’slines of communication. Trying to sellthe idea of an amphibious landing atInchon 10 the Joint Chick in 1950.Gen Douglas MacArthur argued:

The deep envelopment based on surprise. which se’.ers the enemy’s supplylines, is and alttays has been the mostdecisive maneuver of war. A short enveLopment ‘%hich fails to envelop andleaves the enemy’s supply system intact, merely divides your forces and canlead to heavy loss and even jeopardy.

So while the shore-to-shore optiongets points for originality, in this particular case it’s a marginal option.

ConcentrationLiddell Hart wrote that ‘The princi

ples of war could, for brevity, be condensed into a single word—’Concentration.’ “ Likewise FMFM I says:

Concentration is the convergence ofeffort in time and space. It is themeans by which we develop superiori’ty at the decisive Lime and place. Concentration does not apply only tocombat forces. It applies equally to allavailable resources’. fires, aviation, the

intelligence effort logistics, and allother forms of combal support andcombat service support.

Effective concentration may achievedecisive local superiority for a numerically inferior force. The willingness toconcentrate at the decisive place andtime necessitates strict economy andacceptance of risk elsewhere and atother times. To devote means tounnecessary efforts or excessive meansto necessary secondary effoas violatesthe principle of concentration and iswunterpr.iuctn’e to the Iwe objective.

Since war is fluid and opportunitiesfleeting. concentration applies to timeas well as space. We must concentratenot only at the decisive location, hutalso at the decisive moment.

That’s what the concept of the maineffort is all about—focusing the maximum possible force at the decisivetime and place. The aim is not marginal superiority at the critical point, oreven modest superiority, but overwhelming superiority. We’re not interesied in lair fights. but in routs if wecan get them.

How do we gain local superioritywhen the odds are roughly equal orwhen we’re outnumbered? As LiddellHart also pointed out concentration isthe product of dispersion. By keepingdispersed until ihe last momenL tvekeep the enemy guessing as to where

we will strike and thus keep him dispersed. We operate in ways that giveus multiple options. so the enemycan’t concentrate against us. We usespeed and surprise so the enemy can’treact in time. We concentrate quicklyat the critical point while at the sametime using supporting attacks, supporting arms, and other means to prevent the enemy from concentrating.

It’s a challenge to gain local superiority when we’re outnumbered. It’smuch easier when we’ve got overall superiority. such as in this case. Evendiscounting the battalion that the enemy has recently hallered. regiment stillhas another infantry battalion and atank battalion available, As Mr. C.Craig Smith argued in his solution.“We must use them in concert, not inserial sequence. We can create the proverbial horns of a dilemma by attacking strongly in two widely separatedplaces at once.”

His solution to this problem was torequest that higher headquarters useanother battalion to attack the southembridges while we concentrate our entirebattalion against the Cujo bridge—which would still leave regiment onehealthy and one battered battalionwith which to exploit.

us MC

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N 0

piscussion of Scenario #14

Battle of theDadmamian Swamp

“The unquestionable advantages of the interior lines of operations are valid only as long as you retain enough space to advance against one enemy . . . gaining time to beat and pursue him, and then to turn against the other. . . . If this space,however, is narrowed down to the extent that you cannot attack one enemy without running the risk of meeting the otherwho attacks you from the flank or rear; then the strategic advantage of interior lines turns into the tactical disadvantage ofencirclement.”

—Helmuth von Moltke

“For great aims we must dare great things.”—Carl von Clausewitz

ConcentrationThis scenario is similar to “Gap at

the Bridge” in that both require us tohold a bridgehead against enemypressure until Friendly reinforcementscan arrive. As with “Gap at theBridge.” the overall mission is a defensive one, but the means of accomplishing it can he offensive or defensive.We can hunker down and tn to holdout until help arrives, or we can strikeout at the enemy to seize the initiativeand keep him ofT balance. Unlike in‘Gap at the Bridge.” in which the enemy situation was extremely uncertain.in this case we can be fairly certainthat the enemy is converging on uswith two separate forces, each ofwhich is roughly equal to our own.and threatens to catch us in a pincer.

The fundamental question in thisscenario is thus one of concentration.How do we keep the enemy fromachieving it? Most readers recognizedimmediately that we must prevent thejunction or cooperation of the two enemy regiments. Fighting each separately. the odds are roughly even:lighting both together. we are outnumbered two to one.

But the problem is not simply one ofpreventing the enemy from concentrating against us. After we have accomplished that we still have theproblem of focusing every available

ounce of our own combat poweragainst one enemy regiment while using the minimum force necessary tohold off the other. What is the smallestunit we can use to occupy either enemy regiment? A battalion? Less?

We Must Strike FirstThe previous discussion should make

it clear that in this scenario we can’tafford to go on the defensive and

We can’t wait for the enemy to converge on us. By doingthat we iill surrender the initiathe to the enemy and iI1 guarantee that sooner or later wewill become the victims of a major converging attack.

hunker down. Ve can’t wait for the enemy to converge on us. By doing thatwe will surrender the initiative to theenemy and will guarantee that sooneror later we will become the victims ofamajor converging attack, finding ourselves under pressure from two directions at once.

We must strike before the enemy

regiments can converge on us. with theintent of destroying each in turn—orat a minimum, destroying the Ii rst andholding oil Ihe second until help arrives. A hold plan perhaps. hut in myopinion the only one with a reasonable chance of success.

BoldnessAgain, we see the importance of

boldness. Decisively defeating a superior enemy force is a bold and ambitious aim, and as Clausewitz’ quoteat the beginning of this discussion argues. such aims require bold and ambitious plans.

Preparation & Shaping the BattlefieldAs we saw in “Battle of the Gara

giola River.” proper preparation willhe an important element of our success. Once we recognized the possibility that two significant enemy forcescould be converginz on us from different directions, we should have beendoing everything wiilhin our power toprevent their juncture and cooperation. In other words, by delaying oneor the other of the enemy regiments.we want to in to shape the battlefieldsuch that we have the opportunity tolight each separaiely on advantageousterms rather than both simultaneously.

Moreover, by thinking ahead andanticipating a situation like this we

St

give vu rselves more time to prepareour hold stroke. In general. [lie larger aunit. the more tine it requires It) Ppare and implement its plans. I-or onething. it takes longer to disseminatepla is because there are more layers ofcommand. Likewise. it takes longer orcombat iii lo rm at ion to reach the en iii—mandcr. Additionally, it takes longerbr larger U 11 t S to go in 1<) acti on oncethey receive their orders and to changedirections once in acti mA squad reacts faster to a changing situation thana regiment does. CL his in itself is agood reason br puslii tig decision making authority down to lower levels. It

Once we recognized thepossibility that two significantenemy forces could be converging on us from different directions, we should have been doing everything within our powerto prevent their juncture andcooperation. ,,

speeds up lie organization’s ability toact.)

Recognizing the i in porta nce of plan—n i ng does it inca ii taking our timeanti working out even last detail. Theneed H) r mdeq u ate planning is no excuse tor acting slowly and ponderously. What this means is that as time is aprecious commodity, we must get themost out of even in in ute. lIt e time H)preparation is in adva ice: not at the010111 en mr action As B( en Sa in uelB. (iritlitli wrote:

line is the essence in ss .1 r. and wIn Ica deleat mas he balanced h a battlesson, da S and tumurs—esen miii—tiles—i ri itered ass 1’ cam) ites Cr he regained.

Interior Lines and Mobility EqualsSpeed

One thing we have going or us inthis situation is inierior lines ob ctni—mtmnicttmon. The fact ihat we aremnech a ii ized svi I h a good road netss 0 rk

sIt itt t ng our to rces hack and fort Iiwhile the e neim is iiiostk ftmot mobileaccenitiates our mohilit\ advantage.But these advantages are useless ii wedont exploit the in by gen era Ii ng thespeed necessary to facus lirst againstone e IC nv regi ne it and the ii aga i listthe other hetbre the cite ny can tiring

his overall superiority to hear. As VonMolt ke’s quote at the hegi nni ng of tli isdiscussion makes clear, the criticalfactor in operatinu ott i ti te rio r lines isIi avi ng en otigh space and t tile to (tealwith each enemy borce in turn beforethey can together put us on the receiving end of a chnig/ch I maneuver. Thebasic question in this sitttatioti is. “Dowe have enough time and space to defeat one regiment beibre the other ar—rives to catch us in a pincerT’

That’s a difficult question to answer.It will depend on a lot at factors. notleast ofwliicli is how well. how quicklyand htnv aggressively we execute. Ifsi in port ant to retne in her that in the endit all conies down to performatice.Even the most bri] liant plan badly executed will still fail.

A Near-Run Thingflie enemy will also It ave a lot to say

about how things eventual Iv turn out.What’s lie up? How agtzressively willlie act? I-low well will he coordinatethe actions of his two regiments? Whyhas Ins first regiment halted at U utnhy—vi lIe a her ha tte ri tie our ha tta Ii C) n?

Why not exploit that success by pttrsu—ing aggressively? Have we hurt thatregime it worse than we realized? Or isit ihe eneniv’s plan to attack with thesottthern regiment Iirst? If once westrike one regiment the enemy attacksaggressively with the other, lie couldmake tIn ntis difficult for us. If. ott theother Ii a id. the move tne n Ls of Ii is tworegime ii ts aren’t well cooated, wemight pull this off.

Where lb Strike First?Having decided that we must attack.

ss hich regiment do we bbcus againsta id wli ic Ii do we hold oh’.’ Most read —

ers recognized that although we are already conce ntra ted mostly in the tion Ii.we werc prohahlv wiser to tix thenorth em regi mnent and attack the southern regiment. First. the enemy in thenorth is a I ready Ii a I ted a rid (lie re foreposes less of a ii i in tied ia Ic p rob Ic in.Seco id. the creek and woods acrossour rout in the north will livor a de—fensis e or delavi mie action. And I lii rd.as the northern regiment advancessi) tit heast. tli e rd ati stly ii arrow frotiwith riser and swamp on either hank

ill limit the enetiiv’s options amitlierelbre facilitate a delaying aclion.Furthermore, striking Ii rst in the southhas several advantages: First, the terrain around F urburg offers us betteropportunities to strike the enemy’shianks: second. the terrain there is less

suitable to a hiolditig action: and third,the southcrmi regiment is a much greater menace because it is already closerto t lie I) a nski n and Scornton h ridges,is advancing rapitII> and directlytli reatens the bridges a in] our lines ofcotnintinication.

WOl Earl Schuette explained:With the enem regiment to our northcurrently nursing its wounds, thecus of emlort shifts to t lie south and theiresh enemy regiment closing on fur—burg. Ii is necessan- to stop its advancc so us not to threaten our rearand cut us off fronm access to thebridges mm Danskin and Scornion.

Likewise, 2dLt Patrick M. Hughesexplained:

We have the opportunity to defeat theenemy in detail and avoid fghtingboth regiments simultaneously Judging by the first regiments lack ui ptlr—suit of 1st Battalion, it has probablypa uscd in order to reconsol ida te a mlto do some reconnaissance of theDadmam man Creek area. Ihis hiesita—t on and the second regime nt’s rapidads ance dictate that the latter must heour first order of business.

Common solutions thus called forusing a minimal lbrce to occupy thenorthern regimt. while 3d Battalionfixed the southern regiment and twoor more hattal ions moved south tostrike the southern regimenfs leftblank, via the lrehurgFurhurg road oreven around the west side ol’ theswamp.

HistoricallyThis scenario is based loosely on the

hmnnenherg campaign of Auuust-Sep

The need for adequate plan-fling is no excuse for actingslowly and ponderously. ,,

tember IYI4. When Germany invadedFrance according to the SchliehIenMan. Russia came to the aid of Franceby invading German East Prussia.‘l’he German Eight t Ii A rmii which Ii ada purely delinisive niission in Prussia,was caught between RennenkamnpfsRussian First Army advancing frontthe east and Samsonov’s Russian Second Army from the southeast. Although the Masurian Lakes preventedthe junction of the two armies, each ofthem alone outnumhered the German

Eighth Army. After an engagement atGumbinnen in which the Germansgot the worst of it. the panicky German commander Prittwitz was sackedand replaced by the elderly Gen Paulvon Hindenburg. with Gen Eric vonLudendoriT as his chief of staff. Ludendorfi immediately made plans for ahold encircling attack against Samsonovwith forces stripped from the northernwing. leaving only a cavalry divisionto oppose the entire Russian FirstAnny. When Hindenhurg and Ludendorff arrived at Eighth Army headquarters they discovered that the chiefof operations. LtCol Max Hoffman,had already made preparations for thesame concept of operations. Ludendorff wrote:

Gradually during the period from

It’s important to rememberthat in the end it all comes downto performance. Even the most

serve Corps and the 17th Army Corpsfrom their position lacing Rennenkampf. so as to unite them with otherunits of the 8th Army. br a blowagainst the Narew [Second] Army. It

Rennenkampf obliged by advancing slowly, and the result was the destruction of the Russian Second Armyin the Battle of Tannenherg. TheEighth Army then promptly turnedback northeast and defeated the Russian First Army in the Battle of theMasurian Lakes. Russian losses in thetwo battles were about 250.000, compared to about 50.000 for the Germans. Tannenherg is generally considered a classic example of the use ofinterior lines to defeat two enemyforces, each in turn, before they couldconcentrate. usMc

*

24th to 26th August the battle plantook shape in all its details. The greatquestion was whether it would reallybe possible to withdraw the 1st Re-

depended solely on Rennenkampihimself, for if lie knew how to makethe most of his success at Gumbinnenand advance quickly my plan wouldhe unthinkable.

brilliant plan badlywill still fail.

executed

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83

Discussion of ScenariO #15

Battle of Mount Giddy

“Flank attack is the essence of the whole h/stan,’ of war.”—Count Alfred von Schlieffen

“A swift and vigorous transition to attack—the flashing swordof vengeance—is the most brilliant point of the defensive.”

—Carl von Clausewftz

MAGTF OperationsThis scenario is different from all

the others because we command a different type of military organization. aMarine air-ground task force (MAGTF),consi sting of command. ground combataviation combat and combat servicesupport elements. As the MAGTFcommander we are no longer responsible for the detailed tactical employment of units on the ground, We havea ground combat element (GCE) commander whose responsibility that is.Nor are we involved in the detailedemployment of our aviation combatelemeni (ACE) assets; we have anACE commander for that. Rather, weare concerned with the overall integration of all the elements of the MAUTE.In addition, we coordinate operationswith higher headquarters—e.g., a jointtask force (JTF)—and are probably responsible for coordination with the local civilian government and with otheraspects of civil-military’ relations,

The object is to assign missions andprovide guidance to our subordinatecommanders that are sufficiently specific to ensure the accomplishment ofthe mission without treading on theprovince of those subordinates.

What’s the Enemy Up To?Trying to win the war with a bold

and inspired stroke, it looks like. By

seizing the initiative in a secondarytheater, the enemy threatens to preempt the JTF’s major olThnsive to thenorth by endangering key objectivesin the Hf’s rear. So the danger is notjust to our MEB. but to the entiretheater strategy.

The object is to assign missions and proide guidance toour subordinate commanders thatare suffidently specific to ensurethe accomplishment of the mission without treading on the province of those subordinates.

The enemy has completely fooledour intelligence system and duped usinto thinking he was massing in oneplace when he was actually massing inanother. He has managed to concentrate overwhelming superiority (including aviation) at one time andplace while we have remained dispersed. Nol content with a local tacticalsuccess, he has exploited his breakthrough with an eye toward dealing us

a knockout blow’. He seems to havethrown everyt Ii ing lie’s got through thebreach and is racing north, with nothing between him and Brut hut miles ofcoastal desert plain. Sonic of his forceshave turned left toward Nevertheless,probably with the in tent ol’ cutting offthe lines of retreat of our western mostground forces while at the same timeprotecting his own left flank. But hismain effort seems to he toward B rut.

Without question. this is an extremely dangerous situation—perhapseven desperate. A bold, ambitious, andfrom all indications, skilled enemycommander has seized the initiativeand is exploiting it to the fullest. At thesame time, however, if we act quicklyand aggressively ourselves, we havethe opportunity to deal the enemy adecisive counierstroke. Not only that,but we have no alternative.

Is (he Glass Half Full - . .

What was your immediate estimateof the situation as you read this scenario? Bad? Terrible? Desperate’? Or.even as you recognized the seriousness of the situation, did you see opportunity? Was your main impressionthat of a massive penetration of yourfront or of a huge enemy flank waitingto be crushed? The ability to seizeopportunities demands the ability tospot opportunities. sometimes even

where others spot crises. Are you moreconcerned with what the enemy cando to you than with what you want todo to the enemy? The commanderwho is overly concerned about havinglus own flank turned is nt likely to pulloil many envelopments.

This is not to suggest that attitude isall that matters; hut at the same timewe shouldn’t u nderestimate the importance of the commander’s state of’mind, which will he reflected throughout the entire unit. As Hans von Seektwrote: “The will of’ Frederick and Napoleon was a living force in thehumblest grenadier.”

The commander who sees dangerevenwhere he looks and whose aim is

The ability to seize oppor

tunities demands the ability

to spot opportunities, some

times even where others spot

crises.

just to stave oil disaster can expect toaccomplish nothing more than thatand may likely accomplish much less,And conversely, as c’ve previouslydiscussed, the first prerequisite inachieving a great victory is having thenerve to try For one.

Critical Enemy VulnerabilityIn order to have any hope of seizing

the initiative from (lie enemy and re—trievi ng this situation, we’ve got to hithim where it’s going to hurt the mosi.How do we do thai? The natural inclination is to tr to catch his leading elements, which are doing the most damage. Hut this would he striking directlyinto his strength. Moreover, it wouldhe ‘utile—like trying to deal with adam break by trying to scoop up inbuckets all the water ihat has alreadyescaped rather than by trying to plugthe break,

‘The enemy has penetrated deeplyon a very narrow front, and consequently has long, exposed lines ot’communication. In other words, he’sgot a huge flank. Given the distanceshe’s got to travel. he can’t afford tohave his lines cut. That’s what we’vegot to strike,

OptionsSo what arc our options?

Option I: Fall back, reconstitute

front Numerous readers suizuested thatwe Fall back to a subsequent positionfrom which we continue our missionof delaying the enemy. This approachis doomed to failure. The enemy is already behind us and racing north atbreakneck speed. while our own situation is in disarray. How do you get inFront of an enemy who is already pastyou and moves as fast as you do? Youdon’t. While our original mission wasto Forestall a decision on this Frontthis is no longer an option. The enemyis intent on a decisive battle, and atthis point he’s calling the shots. Bypiercing our defense he has forced usto take decisive, and also risky. action.

Option 2: Flank cou,stersrroke: Aswith options covered in the discussions of Scenarios lO and #12. theintent here is to crush an advancingenemy’s flank as he goes by. The difference is that in those scenarios wedid this by design: in this one we areexploiting an dpportunity presentedby the enemy. The way to deal with apenetration such as this is to chop itoff at the base. Sonic of the leading en-cnn forces may get through to Bruthut given the distances involved, if wesuccessfully sever the enemy’s line of’operations. he won’t he able to sustainan organized advance. We can have amuch greater effect by attacking intothe enemy’s flank and rear. The narrow coastal plains, which arc borderedby the sea on one side and mountainson the other. arc a natural bottleneck.If we can pin the enemy there againstthe coast. he will he vulnerable to coordinated massing of our aviation andground forces.

Option 3: rIck frif rcmjorcenwnts.Obviously, we’ll he talking continuously with higher headquarters. appraising our higher commander of thedeveloping situation. As we discussed.this development endangers the entireJTF situation and so is clearly of concern to the JTF commander. Obviously, the JTF commander doesn’t wantto strip forces from his ofl’ensivc to reinForce our area, hut he may feel hehas no choice—he can’t afford to loseBrig and Damoose. His decision willdepend in part on how niuch faith liestill has in our ability to accomplishthe mission. If he does decide to sendreinforcements, he will send the minimum necessary to stave off disaster.

A Sample PlanThe Following is a sample concept

for the employment of the MER based

on Option #2. Notice that it doesn’tprovide detailed assignments for subordinate units within the GCE or Fordetailed operations of the ACE:

My intent is to bottle rite cncm\ up inthe narrow coastal plains and destroyjim there by a coordinated air’groondattack. To do this. I envision a twophase operation. In the first phase. theGCE, supported by the ACE, attackswith all available combat power generatly east and northeast cutting offIns tine of operation. taking him in theflank, and pinning turn against thecoast. Meanwhile, the ACE attemptsto fix the enemy h delaying and dismpting his advance toward Bwt. Initial main effort is the ACE until wecan uet the enemy under control andthe GCE hack into action. In the second phase. the GCE and ACE willlaunch a coordinated attack to destroythe enemy forces trapped along thecoast. The CSSE Iconthat service sup’port element] and ACE are responsible for the defense of Damoose andBrat respectively.

Fix-and-FlankThis plan is yet another example of

the fix-and-flank concept that is so

The commander who seesdanger everywhere he looks andwhose aim is just to stave offdisaster can expect to accomplish nothing more than thatand may likely accomplish muchless,

fundamental to tactics—but with atwist. What makes this example different is the composition of the completiientary Forces. The cli i. or flankingforce, consists of our GCE supportedby the ACE, The cheng. however.doesn’t consist of forces on the ground.hut of the fires of the ACE. It is primarily our aviation firepower that will fixthe enemy force. Although the ACE isat the same time providing some support to the GCE. it is not merely a supporting element, hut has a primanmission of its own. (As the MAGTFcommander well have to give guidance on how much of its assets theACE devotes to its fixing mission andhow much to its mission of supportingthe GCE.) Moreover, it’s conceivablethat the GCE could support the ACE

55

in the accomplishment of the fixingmission, lithe narrow coastal plainsare a bottleneck, we might think aboutproviding a cork by lifting a smallground force (battalion?) by helicopterto establish a blocking position southof Brut. Since we gave responsibilityfor fixing the enemy to the ACE, wemight consider having the small blocking force on the ground working forthe ACE.

Adaptability & FlexibilityThis battle which the enemy has

forced on us is not going to be over ina matter of hours or probably even indays. Were looking at an operationlasting a week or more. in which thesituation is continually going to develop and change. We have to realize that

hatever decision we make in this instance, it is not the final decision. Wewill have to adapt and modift ourplans as the situation develops. issuinti new orders as appropriate. Any solution we develop to this scenarioshould he simple enough that it holdsup under changing conditions andshould be flexible enough that we caneasily adapt it as those conditionschange. As Gen George S. Patton said:

Pta ns must he si inplc and flexible. Ac—luatly they only form a datum planefrom which you build as necessity directs or opportunity offers.

HistoricallyStudents of military history may

recognize this scenario. On a slightlydifferent scale and with modernizedequipment and organization, it isroughly a mirror image of the situa—lion lacing the Turks in Palestine latein World War I. On 21 Septemberl9lN. Gen Sir Edmund Allenhvs in—fanny had just pierced the Turkishfront along the Mediterranean coast atthe Second Battle of Megiddo. His Desert Mounted Corps had “found the Gin gap.” as the cavalt’vmen liked to say,pouring north along the Plain of Sharon and breaking out through the narrow passes above Haifa into the greatPlain of Esdraelon, some 40 miles inthe Turkish rear, headed for Beirut.Nazareth, Deraa. and Damascus. Atthe same time. I E. Lawrence’s ArabForce had swept out of its desert baseat Azrak to cut the Hejaz railway—theTurks’ main line of retreat—and waswaiting in Deraaarrived.

as Allenhy’s cavalry’

Through an elaborate deceptionplan, Allenhy had, over the course ofweeks, simulated the massing of forces

in the Jordan Valley near Jerusalemwhen in fact he was concentratingoverwhelming superiority opposite Megiddo. He commandeered the largesthotel in Jerusalem and established asprawling headquarters there. He movedunits east along dusty trails by daylight and sent them back west undercover of darkness. He established phony assembly areas in the Jordan Valley. The assembly areas which he hadestablished in the west weeks beforewere intentionally much larger thanneeded, so that as more forces concentrated there it was not necessary to expand the assembly areas. He orderedLawrence in the east to procure all theforage he could get his hands on—enough for the needs of an entire

army. So convinced were the Turksthat the attack would conic near Jerusalem. the story goes. that an Indiandeserter who disclosed the true plan tothe Turks on the eve of the offensivewas dismissed by the Turks as an obvious ruse.

The Turks had three “armies” holding the line from the Mediterranean inthe west to Amman in the easL (EachTurkish army was roughly the equivalent of a British corps.) Allenhy’s initial plan was much less ambitiousthan the one he actually executed, involving a shallow envelopment aimedat Nablus which might have destroyedthe Turkish army along the coast butwhich would not have unhinged theentire Turkish position. (Remember:

86

Decisive victories are the result of am-bilious plans.) How did the Turks react to Allenhy’s holder move? Essenually. they did not—or at least their reaction was a clear case of too little, toolate. Their countermove with only onebattalion to bottle up Allenhy’s cavalry divisions in the Plain of Sharon wastoo slow. With their lines of retreat severed at Haifa. Nazareth. and especially Deraa. the Turkish armies cmrnbled. The Battle of Megiddo in the

Any remote chance the Turkshad lay in a bold, decisive, andimmediate stroke, but any chancethey had they surrendered bytheir indecisiveness.

opening act was the only pitched lighting of the entire campaign: the restamounted to a rout In S weeks.Allenhy’s army had advanced 360tniles to Aleppo, captured some 78,000prisoners and 360 guns, and destroyedthe 3 Turkish armies. The Turks suedfor peace.

What could the Turks have done?Perhaps nothing. Arguably. once theDesert Mounted Corps had successfully broken out of the constrictivePlain of Sharon by way of the narrowpasses above Haifa. the issue was settled. Allenhy’s biographer. Gen SirArchibald Wavell, wrote:

The campaign had, in fact, been praclically won before a shot was fired.and Allenhv realized it better thananyone The Turkish armies mayhave stirred a little uneasily on theevening of September IS. 1918, withsome sense of an impending olfen

sivc. but of its imminence and itsweight they had no conception. Fhcirtraditional Ottoman stubbornness andskill in defence were of no avail tothem here. This was to be no soldiers’

battle. hut the manoeuvre of a greatmaster of war.

Any remote chance the Turks hadlay in a hold, decisive, and immediatestroke, hut any chance they had theysurrendered by their indecisiveness.

87

Appendixes

Keen your own orders shod; get them out in time; issue thempersonally by voice if you can. . . . Plans must be simple and flexible. Actually they only form a datum plane from which you build asnecessity directs or opportunity offers.

—Gen George S. Patton

89

Appendix A

Glossary of Tactical TermsIn order to ensure effective communications, it is

important to use terms that are universallyunderstood. The following basic terms are takenfrom Joint. Marine Corps. and U.S. Army doctrinalpublications.

AAdvance Guard—Detachment sent ahead of the mainforce to ensure its uninterrupted advance: to protectthe main body against surprise: to facilitate the advance by removing obstacles and repairing roads andbrigades: and to cover the deployment of the mainbody if it is committed to action. (Joint Pub 1—02)Ambush—A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (FM101—5—1)Assault—The culmination of an attack which closeswith the enemy. (0116—1)Assault Position—That position between the line ofdeparture and the objective in an attack from whichforces assault the objective. (FM 101—5—I)Assembly Area—An area in which a command is assembled preparatory to further action. (Joint Pub I—02)Attach—To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary.The commander of the formation, unit or organizalion receiving the attachment will exercise the samedegree of command and control thereover as he doesover the units and persons organic to his command.(Joint Pub 1—02)Attack Position—The last position occupied by the assault echelon before crossing the line of departure.Job,r Pub 1—02)Attrition—The reduction of effectiveness of a Forcecaused by loss of personnel and materiel. (Joint PubI4i2,Axis of Advance—A line of advance assigned for purposes of control: often a road or a group of roads, ora designated series of locations, extending in the direction of the enemy. (Joint Pub 1—02) Compared todirection of attack.

BHauler—A coordinated series of obstacles designed oremployed to canalize, direct restrict delay or stop themovcment of an opposing force. and to impose additional losses in personnel and equipment on the opposing force. (Joint Pub 1—02)Base of Fire—Fire placed on an enemy force or position to reduce or eliminate the enemy’s capability tointerfere by fire and/or movement with friendly maneuver elements. (FM 101—5—1)Blocking Position—A defensive position so sited as todeny the enemy access to a given area or to preventhis advance in a given direction. (Joint Pub 1—02)Bound—A single movement usually from cover to coy-

er. made by troops. ol’ten under enemy lire. Distancecovered in one movement by a unit advancing bybounds. Woint Pub 1—02)Boundary—Line by which areas of responsibility between adjacent units are defined. Joint Pith 1—02)Bridgehead—An area of ground held or to he gainedon the enemy’s side of an obstacle. (Joint Pub 1—02)Bypass—To move around an obstacle, position orenemy force to maintain the momentum of advance.(Fall 101—5—1)

CCanalize—To restrict operations to a narrow’ zone byuse of existing or reinforcing obstacles or by lire orbombing. (Joint Pub 1—02)Checkpoint—A predetermined point on thc groundused as a means of controlling movement. (Joint Pub1—02)Close Air Support—Air action against hostile targetswhich are in close proximity to friendly forces andwhich requires detailed integration with the lire andmovement of’ those forces. (kim Pub 1—02)Commander’s Intent—Commander’s vision of operations—how he expects to light and what he expectsto accomplish. (FM 101—5—1)Command Post—A unit’s or subunit’s headquarterswhere the commander and the staff perform theiractivities. Gioint Pub 1—02,)Concealment—The protection from observation orsurveillance. (Joint Pub 1—02)Concept of Operations—A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander inorder to accomplish the mission, (Joint Pub 1—02)Normally contains a scheme of maneuver and firesupport plan.Consolidate—To organize and strengthen a newlycaptured position so that it can he used against theenemy. (Joint Pub 1—02)Contain—To stop. hold, or surround the forces of theenemy or to cause the enemy to center activity on agiven front and to prevent his withdrawing any partof his forces for use elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1—02) Alsoholding attack.Counterattack—Attack by part or all of a defendingforce against an enemy attacking force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting offor destroying enemy advance units, and with thegeneral objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of his purpose in attacking. (Joint Pub 1—02)Cover—I. Protection from the effects of fire. 2. Themission assigned a covering force.Covering Fire—Fire used to protect troops when theyare with range of enemy small arms. (Joint Pith 1—02)Covering Force—A force operating apart from themain force for the purpose of intercepting, engaging,delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the enemy before lie can attack the main force. (Joint Pub 1—02)

94)

Cross-Attachment—The exchange of subordinateunits between units for a temporary period. (FM/UI—5—1)

DDecisive Engagement—An engagement in which aunit is considered Fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself In the absence of outsideassistance, the action must he fought to a conclusion.(FM 101-5—1)Defense in Depth—The siting of mutually supportingdefense positions to absorb and progressively weaken attack. prevent initial observations of the wholeposition by the enemy. and to allow the commanderto maneuver his reserve. (Joint Pub I—UI)Defllade—Pmtection from hostile observation and fireprovided by an obstacle such as a hull, ridge or bank.(Joint Pith 1—02)Delaying Action—An operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damageon the enemy without becoming decisively engaged.(Joint Pub 1—02)Deliberate Attack—A type of offensive operationcharacterized by preplanned coordinated employment of’ firepower and maneuver. (Joint Pub 1—02)Compared to hasty attack.Demonstration—An attack or show of force on afront where a decision is not sought, made with theaim of deceiving the enemy. (Joint Pub 1—02) Compared to diversionary attack.Direction of Attack—A specific direction or routethat the main attack or center of mass of the unit willfollow. The unit is restricted, required to attack as indicated. and is not normally allowed to bypass theenemy. (.Ioint Pub 1—02) Compared to axis of advance.

EEnvelopment—An offensive maneuver in which themain attacking force passes around or over the enemy principal defensive positions to secure objectivesto the enemy’s rear. (Joint Pith 1—02) See also turningmovement.

FFeint—A limited-objective attack involving contactwith, the enemy, varying in size from a raid to a supporting attack. Feints are used to cause the enemy toact in three predictable ways”. to employ his reserveimproperly, to shift his supporting fires, or to revealhis defensive fires.Fire and Maneuver—The process of one or more elements establishing a base of fire to engage the enemywhile the other element(s) maneuver to an advantageous position from which to close with and destroyor capture the enemy. (FMFRP 0—14)Fire and Movement—A technique primarily used inthe assault wherein a unit or element advances bybounds or rushes with suhelements alternately moving and providing covering fire for other movingsubelements. Fire and movement may he done by individuals (personnel or vehicles) or units (such asfire teams or squads). Usually, fire and movementare used only when under effective fire from the enemy because it is relatively slow and difficult to control. (FMFRP 0—14)

-

Fire Plan—A tactical plan for using the weapons of’ aunit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated.(Joint Pub 1—02)Fragmentary Order—An abbreviated form of an operation order that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. (JointPub 1—02) Also frag order or FragO.Frontal Attack—An offensive maneuver in which themain action is directed against the front of the enemyforces. (Joint Pub 1—02)

GGap—Any break or breach in the continuity of tactical dispositions beyond small-arms coverage. (FM101—5-I)Guard—A security element whose primary task is toprotect the main force by fighting to gain time, whilealso observing and reporting information. (Joint Pub1—02) Advance guard, flank guard and rear guard. Compa red to screen, cover.

HHasty Attack—An attack in which preparation timeis deliberately traded for speed in order to exploit anopportunity. (Joint Pub 1—02) Compared to deliberateattack.

Infiltration—I. The movement through or into anarea or territory occupied by either friendly or enemytroops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at extendedor irregular intervals.When used in connection withthe enemy. it infers that contact is avoided.(Joint Pub 1—02)

KKilling Zone—An area in which the commanderplans to force the enemy to concentrate so as to destroy him by fire. (Joint Pub 1—02) Also engagementarea.

LLinkup—An operation wherein two friendly forcesjoin together in a hostile area. (0116—1) Linkup point.

1Main Attack—The principal attack or effort intowhich the commander throws the full weight of theoffensive power at his disposal. An attack directedagainst the chief objective of the campaign or battle.(Joint Pub 1—02) Compared to supporting attack.Main Effort—The main or most important task to beperformed in the accomplishment of the overall mission; receives priority of fires and other support. Theterm sometimes refers to the subordinate unit assigned that task. Also focus of effort(s). point of maineffort.Maneuver—Employment of forces on the battlefieldthrough movement in combination with fire or fire potential to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy. (Joint Pub 1—02)Meeting Engagement—A combat action that occurswhen a moving force engages an enemy at anunexpected time and place. (Joint Pub /—02)

1

Mission ‘flepe Order—I. Order issued to lower unitthat includes the accomplish ment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order toa unit to perform a mission without specifying how itis to he accomplished. (Joint Pith 1—02)Mobile Defense—Defense of an urea or position inwhich maneuver is used with organization and utilization of terrain to seize the initiative from the enemy. (Jobit Pith 1—02) Compared to position defense.Movement to Contact—An offensive operation designed to gain or reestablish contact with the enemy.(Joint Pith 1—02) Also advance to contact.

0Objective—The physical object of the action taken.e.g.. a definite tactical feature, the seizure or holding

of which is essential to the commander’s plan. (Joint

Pith 1—02)Objective Rallying Point—A location near an objective from which a patrol launches its final actions inthe objective area and to which it returns afterward.Also 01W.Observation Post—A position from which nilitan’observations are made, or fire directed and adjusted.and which possesses appropriate communications:may he airborne. (Joint Pu/i 1—02) Also OP.Obstacle—Any natural or man-made obstruction

that canalizes, delays, restricts, or diverts movement

of a force: classified as either existing or reinforcing.

(FM 101—5—1) See harder.On-Call Target—A planned target other than ascheduled target on which fire is delivered when requested. (Joint Pub 1—02)Operation Order—A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose ofeffecting the coordinated execution of an operation.(Joint Pub 1—02)Ovenatch—A lactical technique in which one element is positioned to support the movement ofanother element with immediate lire. (FM 101—5—I)

PPatrol—A detachment 01’ Forces sent out for the purpose of gathering information or carrying out a destructive. mopping—up, or security mission. (Join! Pit/i1—02)Pelletration—A form of olTensive which seeks tobreak through the enemy’s defense and disrupt the

defensive system. (Joint Pith 1—02) Also breakthrough.

Position Defense—A type of defense in which thebulk of the delnding force is disposed in selectedtactical localities where the decisive baltic is to hefought. Principal reliance is placed on the ability ofthe forces in the defended localities to maintain theirpositions and to control the terrain between them.(.1cm, Pit/i ]—02 Compared to mobile defense.Pursuit—An offensive operation designed to catch orcut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with theaim of destroying iL (b/nt Pub 1—02)

RRaid—An operation. usually small scale, involving aswift penetration of hostile territory’ to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installa

tions. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission, (Joint Pit/i /—02)Reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to obtain, byvisual observation or other detection methods. itiibrmation about the activities and resources of the enemy. (Joint Pit/i /—02)Reserve—A part of a force, held under the control ofthe commander as a maneuvering force to influencefuture action. (kin! Pit/i 1—02)

SScheduled ‘Target—A planned target on which fire isto he delivered at a specific time. (Joint Pub /—02)Compared to on-call target.Scheme of Maneuver—The tactical plan to he executed by a force in order to seize assigned objectives.(Joint Pub 1—02)Screen—A security clement vhose priman’ task is toobserve, identify and report information, and whichlights only in self-preservation. (Joint Pub l—02tCompared to guard, cover.Sector of Fire—An area required to he covered bylire by an individual, weapon or unit. (Joint Pit/i /—02)Spoiling Attack—A tactical maneuver employed toseriously impair a hostile attack while the enemy isin the process of forming or assembling Fr an attack. (Joint Pit/i I —02)Supporting Attack—An ofknsive operation carriedout in conjunction with a main attack and designedto achieve one or more of the following:

a. deceive the enemy:h. destroy or pin down enemy forces which couldi nterlère with the main attack:c. control grou tid whose occupation by the enemywill hinder the main attack’, ord. force the enemy to commit reserves prematurelyor in an indecisive area. (.Joini Pu/i 1—02)

Suppression—Temporan degradation of the performance of a weapons system or unit below the level needed to fulfill its mission, by an opposing luirce.(Joint Pub /—02) See covering fire.

TTask Organization—I. An oruanizatioti formed toearn out a specilic task, 2. The process of creatingsuch an organization. (OH 6—1)Turning Movement—A variation of the envelopmentin which the attacking force passes around or over theenemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives deep in the enemy’s rear to force the enemy toabandon his position or divert major forces to meetthe threat. (Joint Pith 1—02)

Warning Order—A preliminary notice of an actionor order which is to follow. Gboint Pith /—02)Withdrawai—.4 planned operation in which a forcein contact disengages from an enemy force. (JointPit/i 1—02)

ZZone of Action—A tactical subdivision of’ a largerarea, the responsibility of which is assigned to a tactical unit: generally applied to offensive action. (Jo/utPith 1—02) Compared to sector in the defense.

92

Appendix B

Glossary of Map SymbolsAs with terminology, standardized map symbols improve

our ability to communicate quickly with minimal misunderstanding. Through the use of overlays the commander canquickly and effectively communicate a plan, concept or situation. This appendix provides information for the use ofbasic tactical symbols. For a more detailed discussion ofmap symbols and control measures, see Operational Handbook 6—] or Field Manual 101—5—I.

Depicting the EnemyEnemy units, installations or equipment are depicted one

of three ways: (1) by using color Red on a multicolor overlay, (2) by using double lines where appropriate, or (3) byputting EN to the lower right of the symbol.

Basic SymbolsUnits, Installations, Activities

LogisticalInstallation

Headquarters

______I

Observation Post

Additional Thfonnation.Each basic symbol requircs additional information to describe

the functions or characteristics of that unit, installation or activity.This information is provided in specific locations in and around thebasic symbol, as shown in this example:

i Xj2

- The unit size is located directly on top of the basic symbol. (Battalion)

- The role indicator is provided inside the symbol. (Mechanized Infantn)

- The unique designation is provided directly to the left of the symbol. (1st Battalion)

- mc higher headquarters is provided directly to the right of thesymbol. (2d Marine Regiment)

- Any attachments or detachments are represented by (-) andlor (+)to the upper right of the symbol.

• Unit Si:e

Fire Team 0

Scciion Platoon/Detachment

Rule Indicator

Antitank Light Armor

Air Defense

Atlillcry

Assault Amphibian(AA) Rcconnaissance

Engineer II II I Tank

Infantry MACfE (Marineair-ground task force)

Unit Symhol TestDraw symbols for the following units:

3d PIt, Co G, 2d Bn,2d Mar

Co B, 2nd AssaultAmphibian Bn

BtryC, IstBn, 11th Mar

1st Bn. 4th Mech lnf Regt,22d Div (Enemy)

1st Light Armored Recon Bn1st MarDiv

7th Marine ExpeditionaryBrigade

Unit I I

Squad

Company/Battery

Regiment

Division

Ill

xx

Battalion/Squadron

Brigade

Corps/Force

x

xxx

Light Med Heavy

Weapons and VehiclesBars across the shaft of a weapon indicate size: one for

medium, two for heavy. The base of the shaft indicates thefunction of the weapons system i.e. antitank, air defense,etc. A numeral to the lower right of the symbol can represent number of weapons or pieces of equipment.

Air-Defense Gun

Antitank (AT) Gun J fAT Missile

AT Rocket Launcher IHowitzer *Machinegun/Automatic IWeaponMortar ITank

Mechanized Infantry

Motorized Infantry

*I

93

Movement and Activity

Light Armored VehicleAttack Arrowhead > )>

Main Supporting Feint

Assault Amphibious Vehicle Axis of Advance (Ground)

Axis of Advance (Helibome)

Delaying ActionControl Measures

Points, Areas, and Lines.

Direction of AttackAmbush

Assembly AreaFollow and Support

Attack Position Reconnaissance or Security

Battle or Blocking Position (BP) c::Withdraw

0Battalion Boundary

Checkpoint S

Coordinating Point • Miscellaneous

Antitank Ditch ILinkup Point 5Objective

Fortified Line flJ1JlJ1

Antitank Minefield . . IPhase Line

____________

P1 RED

__________________

PLnE0

Antipersonnel Minefield y • • ITargetI I

Bridge or Gap \../

Wire

Landing Zone

Trace of ForwardDispositions (Friendly)

94

Appendix C

Combat OrdersA word is in order about combat or

ders. They are the means by whichcomma nders at all levels communicate (heir decisions to subordinatesand the means by which you’re required to present your solutions to theTDGs. Depending on the situation.and especially on the amount of timeavailable, the commander’s instructions may take one of several forms.They may he a full operation order—at lower levels often called a five-paragraph order because of its format.They may be a fragmentary order, anabbreviated form of the operation order that contains only the elements ofthe full order essential to the situation.Or. instructions may take the form of awarning order, by which the commander tells his units to prepare for an cx—pecied operation hut not yet to executeit. As with a fragmentary order, thereis no prescribcd format to a warningorder: the commander tells what heknows at the time in order to give hissubordinates whatever information liecan to help them prepare. Once operations have begun. fragmentary ordersand warning orders are the norm. Tomaintain a Ii igh operational tempo.we rely on simple. concise orders issued orally, and we generally try toavoid length3c written orders.

While the format of the order mayhelp to organize information, it is farless important than the contents orsubstance of the order. Regardless offormat, if the order communicates theessential information clearly and forcefully. it’s a good order. The elements ofinformation that an order should convey include:

• Any changes or elements in the situaüon that will significantly influence the actions of the unit.• The mi.csion—what needs to be

needs to be done and what the intended end result of the action is.• The concept of operations—a broaddescription of the overall plan. normally including a scheme of maneurerand afire support plan.• The main effort—the main task orcomponent of the plan around whichthe others revolve and which theothers support.• Tasks to subordinate units—whateach unit is to do. and why.• Any coordinating instructions toensure coordination between subordinate units.

Following the prescribed format often helps to communicate this information. But you shouldn’t become aslave to the format. You should adaptthe format to support your tactics, andnot vice versa. It’s more important toworry about ii’har you’re trying to saythan whether it’s in the proper format.Anyone interested in the precise format for combat orders can find thatinformation in FMF1I! 3—L Cb,nniandand Staff .4crion. or any number ofother doctrinal publications.

For samples of fragmentary’ orders.see the discussions to scenarios #1. S.9. and 12. For an example of a fairlycomplete warning order, see scenario#6. In the July 1992 issue of the MarineC’orp.c Gazette. Maj Dirk J. Vangeisondescribes a system units can use to issue warning orders on a more timelybasis. USMC

done.• The commander v intent—why it

95

Appendix D

U.S. Marine InfantryBattalion Organization

and WeaponsINFANTRY BATtALION

USMC USNQEE ENL QEE £NL44 685 3 66

I

___

IRIFLE COMPANY LWEKPONS COMPANY H&S COMPANY

USMC USMC USMC USNQEE E QEE liL QEE EfAL DEE Efik

6 176 5 175 21 182 3 66

• SUPPLY OFFICER IS SERVICE PLATOON COMMANDER

96

RIFLE COMPANY WEAPONS

Em Iam3 M16A3 RiflesI M203 Grenade LauncherI SAW

1111k Sijsijail LeaderI M16A2

1111k Platoon j4 M16A2

Wnz Platoon6 M240EI Machineguns3 M224 60mm Mortars6 Mk153 SMAWS

WEAPONS COMPANY WEAPONS

Mortar Platoon8 M252 81mm Mortars

Antiamior Platoon24 M47 Dragons8 M220E4 TOW2 (8 HMMVWs)

Heavy Machineun Platoon6 HMMVWS6 M2HB .50 cal Machineguns6 Mk19 40mm Machineguns

97

PLATOON WEAPONS

M16A2 RifleCaliber: 5.56 mmWeight (loaded): 8.8 lbsMax Eff Range: 550 m (point)

800 m (area)Rates of Fire: 45 rpm (semi)

90 rpm (burst)Manufacturer: Fabrique Nadonale, USA

In 1984. the M16A2 replaced the MI6AI as the standard set-vice rifle in the U.S. Marine Corps. It improved on the M l6Al. introduced in 1967. in a number of ways. First, the full auto option was removed andreplaced with a three-round-hurst option. Then, the barrel was made heavier and stifler to give greater accuracy and a new compensator was added to help reduce muzzle climb. Also, the handguard. butt, and gripare made from a stronger material. The M 16A2 commonly uses either a 20- or 30-round magazine and canbe fitted with the M7 bayonet. The MIOA2 remains the primary weapon of the Corp& riflemen.

M203 Grenade launcherCaliber: 40 mmWeight: 3 LbsMax Et’f Range: 150 in (point)

350 in (area)Max Range: 400 mManufacturer: Colt Industries

The M203 grenade launcher is a lightweiuht. single-shot. breech-loaded. pump action, shoulder-firedweapon attached to the M16A2 rifle. There are a total of nine standard 40mm rounds used in the M203: starcluster, star parachute. smoke (ground). smoke (canopy), high explosive, dual purpose. fragmentation. CS. andpractice. The M203 is a multipurpose weapon. allocated on the basis of one per fire team, nine per plaloon.

M249 SAWCaliber: 5.56 mmWeight (loaded w/200 rd box): 22.08 lbsMax Elf Range: 1,000 in

Rates of Fire: 725 1pm (cyclic)85 rpm (sustained)

Manufacturer: Fabdque Nationale

The M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) is a gas-operated. air-cooled. hipod-mounted individualweapon first introduced to the Corps in the mid-l980s. The SAW can accept belt-fed or magazine-loadedammunition, although the M tO 30-round magazine is normally only utilized in an emergency, as it reducesthe weapons performance. The SAW is assigned to the automatic rifleman of each fire team, nine per pla

4

toon.

j COMPANY WEAPONS

M240G MachinegunCaliber: 7.62 mmWeight: 23.9 lbsMax Eff Range: 1,800 mRates of fire: 600 rpm (cyclic)

100 rpm (sustained)Manufacturer: Fabrique Nafionale

The M2400 is a belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled machinegun which is currently coaxiafly mountedwith the M242 25mm chain gun on the Corps’ light armored vehicle (LAV—25s) and the 120mm gun on theMIAI tank. In addition, the M240E1, a spade grip commander’s configuration, is mounted on selectedLAVs. As a result of the M2400’s low mechanical failure rate, the Corps has procured excess weaponsfrom the Army as replacements for the M60E3 and is modifying them so they can be fired with a bipod ormounted on a tripod.

M60E3 MachinegunCaliber: 7.62 nunWeight: 18.5 lbsMax Eff Range: 1,100 mRates of Fire: 550 rpm (cyclic)

100 rpm (sustained)Manufacturer: Saco Defense

The M60E3 replaced earlier models of the venerable M60 general purpose machinegun in 1985. It is abelt-fed, fully automatic, crew-served weapon. Originally introduced in the late l950s. the M60 saw action inthe Vietnam War—lessons learned there were applied to the construction of the M60E3. In order to correctnoted deficiencies, the M60E3 was made lighter, the barrel was made easier to change, the gas system wassimplified, a second pistol grip was added under the hipod. and a double sear notch was added to preventuncontrolled tire. In 1989 the Corps opted for still further improvemenLs to the M60E3 in order to increaseweapon performance, reliability, and maintainability. The M60E3 can he fitted to a tripod or it can be firedfrom its attached hipod. Each rifle company has six M6OE3s located in its weapons platoon. Variants of theM60 are also used on helicopters and on tracked and wheeled vehicles.

M224 MortarCaliber: 60 mmWeight: 44.0 lbs (total)

14.4 lbs (barrel)14.4 lbs (baseplate-M8)15.2 lbs (bipod)

Mm Range: 45 mMax Range: 1,814 mRates of Fire: 30 rpm (maximum)

18 rpm (sustained)Manufacturer: U.S. Arsenals

The 60mm mortar is a lightweight, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, high-angle indirect fire weapon. It canbe fired two different ways: either in the conventional mode with the bipod and standard M7 baseplate setup or in the handheld mode usinti the liuhier weight MS haseplate. The 60mm mortar uses four types ofammunition: high explosive, white phosphorus. illumination, and practice. The high explosive round weighs3.2 lbs. has a range of 1.814 meters. and has a multioption fuze that allows the mortarmen to select eitherhigh airhursi. low airburst. point detonating, or delay. There are three M224s located in the mortar sectionof the weapons platoon in each infantry company.

In

Mk 153 SMAWCaliber: 83 mm41’eight (loaded): 29.01 lbsMax Eff Range: 250 m (HEDP)

500 m (HEAA)Manufacturer: McDonnell Douglas

The shoulder-launched assault weapon (SMAW) is a one-man-operable, smoothbore, fiberglass rocketlauncher with a 6-shot. 9mm spotting rifle attached to the right side of the tube and horesighted with thelauncher. The sight mount. attached to the left side of the launcher, is designed to accommodate either a telescopic sight or the AN/PVS—4 night vision sight. The high explosive, dual purpose (HEDP) rocket (hunkerbuster) will detonate on impact with either a quick or slow time-delay fuze. It is able to penetrate 7 feet ofwood-reinforced hunker. 8 inches of concrete, or I inch of steel armor. The high explosive antiarmor(HEAA) rocket is capable of penetrating 23.4 inches of rolled homogeneous armor. A total of six SMAWsare located in the assault section of the weapons platoon in each rifle company.

M4OAI Scout/Sniper RifleCaliber: 7.62 mmWeight: 14.5 lbsMax Eff Range: 1,000 mManufacturer: Remington Arms

M82AIA SASRCaliber: 12.7 mmWeight: 32.5 lbsMax Eff Range: 1,800 mManufacturer: Barrett

The M82AIA special application seoped rifle (SASR) fires the same round as the M2HB heavymachinegu n and is capable ol accurately reaching ranges and penetrating armor that other rifles cannot.The 12.7mm round is available in armor-piercing. incendiary, or special explosive variations. The MS2AIAcarrtes 10 rounds in a detachable box magazine and is designed to he used primarily against material ratherthan personnel. There is a special allowance for two MS2AIAs for the scout snipers in the S—2 section of theinfantn battalion.

3

The M4OA I nIle is a modified version of the Remington 700 bolt—action rule. It has a heavy barrel for accuracy and is always used with a lOx telescope. The M4OAI has a fiberglass stock and a 5-round integralmagazine. There are eight M4OAI s allocated to the scout snipers in the 5—2 section of the infantry battalion.

(

11)0

21-TB Browning Machinegun,ber: 12.7 mm‘-“t: 128 lbs (total)

60 lbs (receiver group)

24

lbs (barrel)44 lbs (tripod)

fax Eff Range: 1,830 m

:es of Fire: 40 rpm (sustained)450—550 rpm (cyclic)

Tanufacttircr: Saco Defense

11

P The Mkl9 40mm is a belt-fed, air-cooled, blow-back (weapon is operated by the exploding propellantcharge) heavy machinegun. The Mk19 fires three types of rounds: the M383/M384, a high-explosiveantipersonnel round, which can be fuzed for point detonation or graze/impact that has a casualty producing radius of 5 meters; the M430. a high-explosive, dual-purpose (antipersonnel/armor-piercing) round thatcan penetrate 2 inches of steel armor; and the M385 practice round. As noted above, there are six Mkl9s—along with six M2HBs and six HMMWVs—in the heavy machinegun platoon of the weapons company ofeach infantry battalion. Additional Mkl9s without dedicated personnel have been allocated as follows: fourper H&S Co and one with the TOW section in the antiarmor platoon of the weapons company, both withinthe infantry battalion, and eight per regimental headquarters.

The Browning .50 caliber heavy barrel (HB) machinegun is a belt-fed. recoil-operated. air-cooled, crew-operated weapon. The machinegun is capable of flringsingle shotas well as automatic fire.The M2HB firesseven types of ammunition: ball tracer, armor—piercing. incendiary armor—piercing incendianc armor—piercing incendiary tracer, and blank. The .50 caliber is also mounted on tracked and wheeled vehicles. SixM2HB machineguns—along with six Mk19 40mm muchineguns and six high mobility multipurposewheeled vehicles (HMMWVs)—are located in the heavy machinegun platoon of the weapons company ofeach infantry battalion.

The M2HB depicted here is mounted on a HMMWV. The two-man crew may employ the .50 caliber in anumber of ways, to include against light armored vehicles and low-flying enemy aircraft.The Mk19 40mmmachinegun and the M220E4 TOW 2 (both described below) can be mounted similarly on the HMMWV.

FM%

N1k19 MachinegunCaliber: 40 mmWeight: 75.6 lbsMax Eff Range: 1,500 mRates of Fire: 40 rpm (sustained)

325—375 rpm (cyclic)Manufacturcr: Saco Defense

I

M220E4 TOW 2Caliber: 152mmWeight: 252.4 lbs (loaded)

205 lbs (launcher)47.4 lbs (1’OW 2 missile)

Mm Eli Range; 65 mMax Eli Range: 3,750 mManufacturer: Hughes Aircraft

The tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command-link (TOW) euided missile is designed to defeatheavy armor and field fortifications and is manned by a gunner and an assistant. Like the Dragon. theTOW is wire-guided so its course can he altered by the gunner to keep it on target. The TOW 2A missile hasa speed of 200 meters per second. It can he fired 1mm a tripod, mounted on tracked and wheeled vehicles, orused on the AH—IW helicopter. There are 8 TOWs mounted on HMMWVs in the TOW section of theantia rmor platoon of the infantry battalion.

M252 MortarCaliber: 81 mmWeight: 90.5 lbs (total)

35 lbs (barrel)27 lbs (mount)28.5 lbs (baseplale)

Mb Range: 100 mMax Range: 5.733 mRates of Fire: 30 rpm (maximum)

15 rpm (sustained)Manufacturer: Royal Ordnance

The SImm mortar is a high-angle, indirect fire weapon used for close and continuous lire support. TheSI nm mortar uses six types of ammunition: high explosive, white and red phosphorus. illumination, training practice. and training. The M889 high explosive round weighs 9 pounds. has a range of 5.733 meters.and has a burst radius of4O meters. The M252 also has a removable tiring pin that provides greater safety inclearing misrres. There are eight M252s located in the mortar olatoon of the weapons company in each in—fantrv battalion.

M47 DragonCaliber: 114. 3 mmWeight: 31 lbsMm Eli Range: 65 mMax Eli Range: 1,000 in

Manufacturer: McDonnell Douglas

The M47 Dragon is a man-portable. medium-range antiarmor weapon. It fires a sight-guided missilefrom a recoilless launcher that has a smooth, fiberglass barrel. A sensor on the missile tracks its course andrelays signals through the line wires trailed by the missile. Thus, the gunner can adjust the course of themissile while in flight as long as he can see the target. The Dragon II missile covers its maximum range in11.2 seconds. The Dragon has a crew of2. and there are 24 launchers in the antiarmor platoon of the weapons company of an infantry battalion.

I

102

endix E[41

HMM/HMH/HMLA/VMO

Typical Marine &peditionan’ Brigade

IMEB

COMMANDELEMENT

SRIG

DET

GCE

INFANTRYREG IIENT

ACE

MARINE AIRCRAVrGROUP

VMFA/VM FA(AW)/VMA/VMA(AW)

VMAQ/VMGRDETACHMENTS

CSSE

BRIGADE SERVICESUPPORT GROUP

BATFALION

HEADQUARTERSCOMPANY

MARINE AIRCONTROL GROUP

(DETACHMENT)

MOTORTRANSPORTCOMPANY

ARTILLERYBATFALION

MARINE WINGSUPPORT

SQUADRON

LANDING SUPPORTCOMPANY

TAN KCOMPANY

MARINE AVIATIONLOGISTICSSQ U AD RON

SUPPLYCOMPANY

LIGHT ARMOREDRECON

COMPANY

\IAI NTE N ANC ECOMPANY

ASSAULTAMPHIBIANCOMPANY

ENGINEERSUPPORTCOMPANY

CO N’I BATENGINEERCOMPANY

BULK FUELCOMPANY

RECONNAISSANCEPLATOON

COLLECTING ANDCLEARINGCOMPANY

ANTITANK(TOW) PLATOON

SURGICALSUPPORTCOMPANY

DENTALDETAC H M ENT

103

Answers to Unit Symbol Test

...

3dPlt,CoG,2dBn, IKJ G122d Mar

________

Co B, 2d Assault, Amphibian En B 2

BtryC, 1st En, 11th Mar c • 11(En designation not needed;

__________

only 1st En has Btiy C.)

1

______

1st En, 47th Mech Inf Regt,22d Div (Enemy) Or(Div designation not needed;only one 47th Mech Inf Regt.) II

r>.-ci 471L5-”&jEN

1st Light Armored Recon Bn, 1

_____

11st MarDiv

x7th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade 7

104

haAmbush 10, 12. 44, 77, 90

Bigger picture 45, 48, 64

Boldness 8, 63. 68-9, 75, 81, 84-5

Center of gravity 53

Cheng/Ch 1 43. 75. 82, 85

Combat orders 4. 95

Commander’s intent 52. 57. 58. 59, 90

Combined arms 44. 85

Complementary forces 43. 62. 66. 69. 79, 85

Concentration 79. 80. 81. 84

Coordination 44. 49, 57. 67

Counterstroke 70. 74. 84-5

Coup d’oell 2-3

Covering Force 52

Critical vulnerability 18. 26, 45, 53, 60. 64-5, 85

Decisiveness 42. 50, 75, 84-5, 87

Enemy 28. 46. 48. 64, 68. 71-2, 82, 84

Envelopment 76

Exploitation 28, 68, 84-5

Fix-and-flank 43, 47, 70. 76. 85

Firepower 69, 78

Flanks 16. 48. 49, 76-7. 79, 85. 91

Flexibility 45-6. 59-60. 86

Focus of efforts 28. 65, 69. 91

Fragmentary order 42. 63. 66-7, 74-5. 91. 95

Friction 5, 56. 64, 71. 77

Frontal attack 16. 49

Guard 14. 16. 48. 49. 51. 52. 90, 91

Immediate action drills 44

Infiltration 28, 60. 73, 91

Initiative 14. 42. 45. 46. 49, 52. 57. 69, 70. 71.

72-3. 77. 81. 84

Interior lines 69, 72, 82, 83

Lines of operations 65, 76, 85

MAGTF operations 38. 84

Main effort: see focus of efforts

Mission tactics 28, 56-7, 59

Mobility 65-6. 69-70. 72, 82

Multiple options 49. 51. 79

Mutual support 44. 79

OODA loop 61

Opposing wills 71. 82

Patterns 59. 75

Penetration 84-5

Perseverance 71

Predictability 75

Preparation 54. 75. 81-2

Reconnaissance 60

Rehearsal 54, 76

Reserve 66. 69-70

Screen 52

Security 45. 52, 79

SEDA 61

Shaping the battlefield 75-6, 81-2

Simplicity 42.44. 62

Speed 42. 61, 64, 69, 79, 82

Spoiling attack 64

Suppression 42-3. 69

Surfaces and gaps 28, 50. 51. 52. 68. 73. 77

Surprise 54. 62. 75, 86

Terrain 48. 51-2. 69, 78, 79

Time factor 4. 7-8. 42, 51, 54, 75. 76. 79. 62

Uncertainty 7. 9. 50. 59. 64, 73, 78

Warning order 20. 95

los

— -. ‘— —C”l!-fl_KZ. .

I’

r

About the AuthorAn active—duty inlantn’ otlicer for 12 years, .Iohn Schmitt commanded Weap

ons Company. 3d Battalion, 6th Marines and Company A, 2d Light Armored Ve

hicle Battalion. He is the author of Operational Handbook 6—), Ground Combat Op

erations: FMFM I, Warfighti,ig; and FAIFM I—I Campaigning. He has taught at

Marine Corps schools from The Basic School to the Command & Stall College.

His last active duty’ assignment was as the Marine ollicer instructor at the Lniver—

sky ol’ Illinois. A major in the Resene. he currently resides in Champaign. IL,

with his wil’e and two cocker spaniels.

ID?