7/31/2019 Marshall - Pre-Publication Review of Foster on Kant and Skepticism

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(A slightly different version of this review appeared inJournal of the History of Philosophy 47:2 (2009),319-320)

Michael N. Forster. Kant and Skepticism. Princeton Monographs in Philosophy.Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008. Pp. x + 154. Cloth, $29.95.

Kants theoretical philosophy is often read as a response to skeptical challenges raised byhis predecessors. Yet Kant himself explicitly discusses skepticism in relatively fewplaces in his published work, so Michael Forsters focused examination of Kants relationto skepticism is a useful addition to the literature. Forster sets out to distinguish differenttypes of skepticism to which Kant might be responding, determine what responses Kantoffers, and evaluate the strength of those responses.

Perhaps the most valuable part of the book is the opening chapters, where Forsterdistinguishes three kinds of skepticism about metaphysics (veil of perception

skepticism, Humean skepticism, and Pyrrhonian skepticism), and argues that it is amistake to see Cartesian, veil of perception skepticism as a central target of Kants.

Though this point has been made before (e.g. by Karl Ameriks), insufficient attention toit has continued to result in misplaced criticisms of Kants project, and Forsters forceful

reminder is certainly welcome.

The other two types of skepticism, Forster argues, didplay crucial roles in thedevelopment of Kants metaphysical views, with each at some point rousing Kant from aself-described dogmatic slumber. Forster claims that the 1766Dreams of Spirit Seerisa deliberately Pyrrhonian work, and that the equipollence worries about metaphysicsdescribed there persisted into the critical period in the form of the Antinomies. Now,while Forster is certainly right that Pyrrhonism focused on producing equally strongarguments for incompatible claims, this philosophical maneuver is hardly unique to that

school of thought. Not every reductio ad absurdumis usefully labeled Pyrrhonian.What was distinctive about the Pyrrhonian approach was not only its method, but itsultimate aim, namely, that of producing a general suspension of belief. Since Kant neverhad that as his ultimate aim, Forsters historical claim has limited plausibility. Forsters

views about the influence of Humean skepticism on Kant, however, are more compelling.He argues that reflecting on Humes arguments in the mid-1770s did not so much awakenKant to the challenges of accounting for a priori cognition as give him a deeperappreciation of those challenges. Though this interpretation implies that Kantsstatement in the Prolegomenaabout Humes influence is a gross exaggeration, the factthat there is no unambiguous Hume-inspired philosophical revolution in the pre-criticaltexts supports this implication of Forsters view.

Having located what he takes to be the skeptical concerns Kant had in mind, Forster turnsto describing how the critical philosophy attempted to respond on behalf of metaphysics.He claims that Kant reconceived metaphysics as (1) dealing with objects of possibleexperience instead of with the supersensuous realm, while (2) investigating just thoseaspects of the world that are constituted by our own minds and (3) requiringsystematicity. Such a reconception, Forster claims, was intended to save some parts ofmetaphysics (e.g. the causal principle) while allowing the skeptical challenges to

7/31/2019 Marshall - Pre-Publication Review of Foster on Kant and Skepticism

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maintain force against others (e.g. doctrines concerning God), by providing a basis fortranscendental arguments. These arguments, Forster holds, assume the actuality ofexperience and conclude by identifying necessary conditions for experience, conditionsthat in turn require the truth of transcendental idealism.

The second half of the book is devoting to a critique of Kants position, which Forsterholds is ultimately unsatisfactory. He offers several criticisms, of which two areparticularly important. The first is a new version of an argument familiar from JonathanBennetts 1966 book: Kant attempts to explain our synthetic a priori cognition usingclaims concerning what is necessary for experience. These latter claims must be a priori,but are they supposed to be analytic or synthetic? If synthetic, then no explanatoryprogress has been made. But if they are analytic (e.g. analyses of the concept ofexperience), then the resulting claims, if true, could themselves only be analytic.Forsters second main criticism is that Kant uncritically presupposed both the reality ofsubjective experience and the validity of logic in his transcendental arguments, but that itis possible for a determined Pyrrhonist to produce doubts in both areas by appeal to the

fact that various philosophers (such as eliminative materialists and revisionist logicians)have challenged them.

The first of Forsters criticisms poses an important challenge for Kant interpreters, but thesecond amounts to endorsing an argument from authority that, if valid, could be extendedto rule out any philosophical project, for any project (including the Hegelian one to whichForster is partial) makes some assumptions, and there are no assumptions which have notbeen challenged at some point by some philosopher. Unless more specific criticisms canbe found, therefore, the fact that Kant assumed the reality of subjective experience andthe validity of logic is unobjectionable.

On the whole, then, Forsters book is somewhat uneven, but its stronger partsunquestionably warrant attention and careful consideration.

Colin MarshallNew York University