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(A slightly different version of this review appeared inJournal
of the History of Philosophy 47:2 (2009),319-320)
Michael N. Forster. Kant and Skepticism. Princeton Monographs in
Philosophy.Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008. Pp.
x + 154. Cloth, $29.95.
Kants theoretical philosophy is often read as a response to
skeptical challenges raised byhis predecessors. Yet Kant himself
explicitly discusses skepticism in relatively fewplaces in his
published work, so Michael Forsters focused examination of Kants
relationto skepticism is a useful addition to the literature.
Forster sets out to distinguish differenttypes of skepticism to
which Kant might be responding, determine what responses
Kantoffers, and evaluate the strength of those responses.
Perhaps the most valuable part of the book is the opening
chapters, where Forsterdistinguishes three kinds of skepticism
about metaphysics (veil of perception
skepticism, Humean skepticism, and Pyrrhonian skepticism), and
argues that it is amistake to see Cartesian, veil of perception
skepticism as a central target of Kants.
Though this point has been made before (e.g. by Karl Ameriks),
insufficient attention toit has continued to result in misplaced
criticisms of Kants project, and Forsters forceful
reminder is certainly welcome.
The other two types of skepticism, Forster argues, didplay
crucial roles in thedevelopment of Kants metaphysical views, with
each at some point rousing Kant from aself-described dogmatic
slumber. Forster claims that the 1766Dreams of Spirit Seerisa
deliberately Pyrrhonian work, and that the equipollence worries
about metaphysicsdescribed there persisted into the critical period
in the form of the Antinomies. Now,while Forster is certainly right
that Pyrrhonism focused on producing equally strongarguments for
incompatible claims, this philosophical maneuver is hardly unique
to that
school of thought. Not every reductio ad absurdumis usefully
labeled Pyrrhonian.What was distinctive about the Pyrrhonian
approach was not only its method, but itsultimate aim, namely, that
of producing a general suspension of belief. Since Kant neverhad
that as his ultimate aim, Forsters historical claim has limited
plausibility. Forsters
views about the influence of Humean skepticism on Kant, however,
are more compelling.He argues that reflecting on Humes arguments in
the mid-1770s did not so much awakenKant to the challenges of
accounting for a priori cognition as give him a deeperappreciation
of those challenges. Though this interpretation implies that
Kantsstatement in the Prolegomenaabout Humes influence is a gross
exaggeration, the factthat there is no unambiguous Hume-inspired
philosophical revolution in the pre-criticaltexts supports this
implication of Forsters view.
Having located what he takes to be the skeptical concerns Kant
had in mind, Forster turnsto describing how the critical philosophy
attempted to respond on behalf of metaphysics.He claims that Kant
reconceived metaphysics as (1) dealing with objects of
possibleexperience instead of with the supersensuous realm, while
(2) investigating just thoseaspects of the world that are
constituted by our own minds and (3) requiringsystematicity. Such a
reconception, Forster claims, was intended to save some parts
ofmetaphysics (e.g. the causal principle) while allowing the
skeptical challenges to
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maintain force against others (e.g. doctrines concerning God),
by providing a basis fortranscendental arguments. These arguments,
Forster holds, assume the actuality ofexperience and conclude by
identifying necessary conditions for experience, conditionsthat in
turn require the truth of transcendental idealism.
The second half of the book is devoting to a critique of Kants
position, which Forsterholds is ultimately unsatisfactory. He
offers several criticisms, of which two areparticularly important.
The first is a new version of an argument familiar from
JonathanBennetts 1966 book: Kant attempts to explain our synthetic
a priori cognition usingclaims concerning what is necessary for
experience. These latter claims must be a priori,but are they
supposed to be analytic or synthetic? If synthetic, then no
explanatoryprogress has been made. But if they are analytic (e.g.
analyses of the concept ofexperience), then the resulting claims,
if true, could themselves only be analytic.Forsters second main
criticism is that Kant uncritically presupposed both the reality
ofsubjective experience and the validity of logic in his
transcendental arguments, but that itis possible for a determined
Pyrrhonist to produce doubts in both areas by appeal to the
fact that various philosophers (such as eliminative materialists
and revisionist logicians)have challenged them.
The first of Forsters criticisms poses an important challenge
for Kant interpreters, but thesecond amounts to endorsing an
argument from authority that, if valid, could be extendedto rule
out any philosophical project, for any project (including the
Hegelian one to whichForster is partial) makes some assumptions,
and there are no assumptions which have notbeen challenged at some
point by some philosopher. Unless more specific criticisms canbe
found, therefore, the fact that Kant assumed the reality of
subjective experience andthe validity of logic is
unobjectionable.
On the whole, then, Forsters book is somewhat uneven, but its
stronger partsunquestionably warrant attention and careful
consideration.
Colin MarshallNew York University
