Inconsistency of Inconsistency of AncientAncient SkepticismSkepticism

Renata ZieminskaRenata Zieminska

University of Szczecin, PolandUniversity of Szczecin, Poland

zieminre[at]univ.szczecin.plzieminre[at]univ.szczecin.pl

Sextus Empiricus Sextus Empiricus 2n2nd century d century CECE

Sextus EmpiricusSextus Empiricus’ extant ’ extant worksworks

Outlines of ScepticismOutlines of Scepticism, (PH) , transl. by J. , (PH) , transl. by J. Annas and J. Barnes, CAnnas and J. Barnes, Cambridgeambridge 2000 2000..

Against the LogiciansAgainst the Logicians (M VII-VIII), transl. (M VII-VIII), transl. by Richard Bett, Cby Richard Bett, Cambridgeambridge 2005 2005..

Against the Ethicists Against the Ethicists (M XI)(M XI) transl. by transl. by Richard BettRichard Bett,, Oxford Oxford 1997. 1997.

Against the PhysicistsAgainst the Physicists (M IX-X) and (M IX-X) andAgainst the ProfessorsAgainst the Professors (M I-VI) (M I-VI) areare

accessible in R. Bury’s translation accessible in R. Bury’s translation

Sextus presents arguments Sextus presents arguments thatthat

Our perceptual beliefs are relativeOur perceptual beliefs are relativeWe can not be justified in any belief We can not be justified in any belief

(we are in the trilemma of infinite (we are in the trilemma of infinite regress, reciprocity or dogmatism) regress, reciprocity or dogmatism)

We cannot establish the criterion of We cannot establish the criterion of truthtruth in a rational way in a rational way

We cannot have any valid proofWe cannot have any valid proofThat is why skeptics suspend all That is why skeptics suspend all

judgments (judgments (epochēepochē))

The charge of inconsistencyThe charge of inconsistency

All these arguments suggest that (p) All these arguments suggest that (p) no no thesis is ever rationally preferable to its thesis is ever rationally preferable to its contradictioncontradiction..

We may ask Sextus if he prefers (p) to We may ask Sextus if he prefers (p) to (non-p). (non-p).

Preferring (p) contradicts its content; not-Preferring (p) contradicts its content; not-preferring (p) means the lack of skeptical preferring (p) means the lack of skeptical position. position.

Keeping skepticism in a rational way is Keeping skepticism in a rational way is inconsistent, self-refuting. inconsistent, self-refuting.

Varieties of inconsistencyVarieties of inconsistency

Content inconsistency (clear Content inconsistency (clear contradiction, formal or in content); contradiction, formal or in content);

Action inconsistency (contradiction Action inconsistency (contradiction between words and action); between words and action);

Self-refutation (pragmatic Self-refutation (pragmatic contradiction between act of assertion contradiction between act of assertion and its content).and its content).

Castagnoli: self-refutation is not Castagnoli: self-refutation is not falsification.falsification.

Sextus' aSextus' answer to the nswer to the inconsistency chargeinconsistency charge

(p) is not a thesis accepted as true, (p) is (p) is not a thesis accepted as true, (p) is not even preferred to non-p, because not even preferred to non-p, because there is no rational preference .there is no rational preference .

A skeptic speaks or writes about her own A skeptic speaks or writes about her own impressions without accepting her own impressions without accepting her own words as true (PH 1.4). words as true (PH 1.4).

A skeptic has no beliefs (PH 1.24).A skeptic has no beliefs (PH 1.24). But how to live and philosophize without But how to live and philosophize without

beliefs (beliefs (apraxiaapraxia charge)? charge)?

Three recent ways to defend the Three recent ways to defend the consistency of the Pyrrhonian consistency of the Pyrrhonian

skepticismskepticism(1) allowing a skeptic to have weak (1) allowing a skeptic to have weak

beliefs about things (beliefs about things (M. M. Frede) Frede) (2) allowing philosophy to be (2) allowing philosophy to be

practiced without beliefs, by practiced without beliefs, by disposition and therapy (disposition and therapy (R. R. Hankinson)Hankinson)

(3) taking inconsistency as the effect (3) taking inconsistency as the effect of development from the apprenticeof development from the apprentice skepticskeptic to the mature skeptic ( to the mature skeptic (M. M. McPherran, A. McPherran, A. Bailey, Bailey, H. H. Thorsrud).Thorsrud).

(1) Michael Frede’s (1) Michael Frede’s interpretationinterpretation

Pyrrhonian Pyrrhonian epochēepochē is limited to scientific, is limited to scientific, philosophical beliefs concerning what really is, philosophical beliefs concerning what really is, the real nature of things (see PH 1.13). the real nature of things (see PH 1.13).

EpochēEpochē is limited to strong belief as “active is limited to strong belief as “active acceptance as true”. Weak belief is “merely acceptance as true”. Weak belief is “merely passive acceptance” (Frede 1998, 138). passive acceptance” (Frede 1998, 138).

A skeptic has wA skeptic has weak beliefs about things and can eak beliefs about things and can lead a normal life. Skeptical conclusions lead a normal life. Skeptical conclusions as as weak beliefs weak beliefs can be consistent with can be consistent with epochēepochē ..

Sextus is not a fallibilistSextus is not a fallibilist

Frede interprets Sextus (PH 1.13) consistently Frede interprets Sextus (PH 1.13) consistently and reasonably but ascribes to him weak and reasonably but ascribes to him weak beliefs about things. beliefs about things.

But such an interpretation is not well But such an interpretation is not well supported bysupported by Sextus’ texts (PH 1.15). Sextus Sextus’ texts (PH 1.15). Sextus criticizes Carneades for voluntarily approving criticizes Carneades for voluntarily approving of what is persuasive (PH 1.229) and suggests of what is persuasive (PH 1.229) and suggests that there is no rational preference between that there is no rational preference between appearances appearances

Skeptic can only accept passively Skeptic can only accept passively appearances.appearances.

(2) Philosophy without beliefs (2) Philosophy without beliefs (R.J.Hankinson)(R.J.Hankinson)

Skepticism is a practice (disposition and Skepticism is a practice (disposition and ability) without any beliefs. If so, there is ability) without any beliefs. If so, there is no possibility of inconsistency among a no possibility of inconsistency among a skeptic’s beliefs. skeptic’s beliefs.

Skeptical thinking is a causal involuntary Skeptical thinking is a causal involuntary chain. Premises and conclusions are chain. Premises and conclusions are appearances. appearances. EpochēEpochē is not a second-order is not a second-order belief but a state of mind causally evoked belief but a state of mind causally evoked by equipollent arguments (1995, 229). by equipollent arguments (1995, 229).

Arguments are therapeutic means.Arguments are therapeutic means.

Skepticism without rational Skepticism without rational forceforce

Skepticism Skepticism underunder Hankinson Hankinson's 's interpretationinterpretation turned out to be the turned out to be the passive acceptance of stimuli. passive acceptance of stimuli.

Hankinson’s interpretation cannot Hankinson’s interpretation cannot explain the logical power of skeptical explain the logical power of skeptical arguments. If arguments are so arguments. If arguments are so worthless, why do skeptics devote so worthless, why do skeptics devote so much attention to them?much attention to them?

(3) (3) Development explains Development explains inconsistency (Baileyinconsistency (Bailey, Thorsrud, Thorsrud))

We must distinguish between the mature We must distinguish between the mature skeptic and the developing skeptic (Bailey, skeptic and the developing skeptic (Bailey, 42). 42).

TThe developing skeptic must have many he developing skeptic must have many beliefsbeliefs and accept many arguments and accept many arguments (Bailey, 43). Otherwise, we have no way to (Bailey, 43). Otherwise, we have no way to explain the rejection of natural beliefs and explain the rejection of natural beliefs and suspension of judgmentssuspension of judgments. .

A mature skeptic has no beliefs. "It is A mature skeptic has no beliefs. "It is simply a category mistake to accuse a simply a category mistake to accuse a practice of inconsistency” (Thorsrud, 146). practice of inconsistency” (Thorsrud, 146).

Skepticism is not limited to the Skepticism is not limited to the mature stagemature stage

The developing stage of skepticism is The developing stage of skepticism is the only brand of skepticism suitable the only brand of skepticism suitable for rational discussion. for rational discussion. And it is And it is inconsistent.inconsistent.

Mature skepticism is outside any Mature skepticism is outside any rational discussion, even if it is rational discussion, even if it is consistent in some sense.consistent in some sense.

I will try to demonstrate this with the I will try to demonstrate this with the self-refuting argument against proofs.self-refuting argument against proofs.

Sextus' arguments against Sextus' arguments against proofsproofs

All premises are uncertain, because we All premises are uncertain, because we have no criterion of truth (M 8.356).have no criterion of truth (M 8.356).

Reciprocity between premises and Reciprocity between premises and conclusions (contained in premises and conclusions (contained in premises and sometimes support premises), PH 2.196. sometimes support premises), PH 2.196.

A proof needs another proof to show its A proof needs another proof to show its validity (infinite regress), PH 2.203.validity (infinite regress), PH 2.203.

This suggests that there are no valid This suggests that there are no valid proofs.proofs.

SSelf-refutationelf-refutation charge charge

The argument against proofs either is The argument against proofs either is a proof or is not a proof. If it is not a a proof or is not a proof. If it is not a proof is uncertain, while if it is a proof is uncertain, while if it is a proof, there is a proofproof, there is a proof.. (M 8.465) (M 8.465)

Non-assertion answerNon-assertion answer

Sextus says that he does not accept the Sextus says that he does not accept the conclusion of his argument against proofs conclusion of his argument against proofs and that the argument is only involuntarily and that the argument is only involuntarily persuasive for him at the moment of persuasive for him at the moment of speaking.speaking.

Such answer is the Such answer is the self-cancellationself-cancellation of his of his own conclusion.own conclusion.

Sextus also presents two Sextus also presents two metaphors metaphors of of self-cancellation: the purgative drugs and self-cancellation: the purgative drugs and the ladder.the ladder.

The metaphor of the ladderThe metaphor of the ladder

““Just as it is not impossible for the Just as it is not impossible for the person who has climbed to a high place person who has climbed to a high place by a ladder to knock over the ladder by a ladder to knock over the ladder with his foot after his climb, so it is not with his foot after his climb, so it is not unlikely that the skeptic too, having got unlikely that the skeptic too, having got to the accomplishment of his task by a to the accomplishment of his task by a sort of step-ladder – the argument sort of step-ladder – the argument showing that there is not demonstration showing that there is not demonstration – should do away with this argument” – should do away with this argument” (M 8.481). (M 8.481).

The metaphor of purgative The metaphor of purgative drugsdrugs

Skeptical arguments “can be Skeptical arguments “can be destroyed by themselves, being destroyed by themselves, being cancelled along with what they are cancelled along with what they are applied to, just as purgative drugs do applied to, just as purgative drugs do not merely drain the humours from not merely drain the humours from the body but drive themselves out the body but drive themselves out too along with the humours” (PH 1. too along with the humours” (PH 1. 206).206).

Accepting self-refutation?Accepting self-refutation?

The metaphor of a ladder, is a kind of The metaphor of a ladder, is a kind of acceptance of the acceptance of the self-refutationself-refutation of his of his own conclusion (Hankinson, McPherran and own conclusion (Hankinson, McPherran and others).others).

"Hence he [mature skeptic] can be perfectly "Hence he [mature skeptic] can be perfectly happy about the self-refuting (or as Sextus happy about the self-refuting (or as Sextus prefers to say, self-cancelling) nature of his prefers to say, self-cancelling) nature of his expressions” (Hankinson 1995, 299).expressions” (Hankinson 1995, 299).

Problem: how accepting self-refutation can Problem: how accepting self-refutation can be consistent?be consistent?

L. Castagnoli: Sextus never L. Castagnoli: Sextus never accepts self-refutationaccepts self-refutation

"Sextus "Sextus nevernever accepts, and so much the accepts, and so much the less embraces, the dogmatic charge of less embraces, the dogmatic charge of self-refutation; what is interpreted by self-refutation; what is interpreted by McPherran and many others as an McPherran and many others as an admission of self-refutation is best admission of self-refutation is best reconstructed as a refined dialectical tool reconstructed as a refined dialectical tool that Sextus used that Sextus used againstagainst the dogmatic the dogmatic charges of inconsistency and self-charges of inconsistency and self-refutation” (252). refutation” (252).

Castagnoli's analysis of self-Castagnoli's analysis of self-refutationrefutation

Castagnoli makes distinction between self-Castagnoli makes distinction between self-refutation (refutation (peritropeperitrope) and self-cancelation ) and self-cancelation ((perigrafeperigrafe).).

Self-refutation is the reversal of the Self-refutation is the reversal of the previously accepted thesis. It requires previously accepted thesis. It requires dogmatic assertion. dogmatic assertion.

Self-cancelation is not a reversal, because Self-cancelation is not a reversal, because it is the rejection of one's own assertion. it is the rejection of one's own assertion.

A skeptic does not accept any thesis and A skeptic does not accept any thesis and so so can not reverse her thesis. can not reverse her thesis.

Against CastagnoliAgainst Castagnoli

But, self-cancellation is a very similar But, self-cancellation is a very similar dialectical disaster. A skeptic self-dialectical disaster. A skeptic self-cancells her own words (PH 1.15). cancells her own words (PH 1.15).

Self-cancellation is cutting off any Self-cancellation is cutting off any discussion and rational discourse. It is discussion and rational discourse. It is a dodge to escape from self-refutation. a dodge to escape from self-refutation. It can not be accepted in a rational It can not be accepted in a rational discussion. Castagnoli exempts skeptic discussion. Castagnoli exempts skeptic from the dialectical requirements. from the dialectical requirements.

Inconsistency Inconsistency

If a skeptic takes part in a serious If a skeptic takes part in a serious rational discussion, her thesis „there rational discussion, her thesis „there are no valid proofs” is self-refuting. are no valid proofs” is self-refuting.

Only developing skepticism can be Only developing skepticism can be seriously discussed, and it is, as a seriously discussed, and it is, as a dogmatic position, inconsistent. dogmatic position, inconsistent.

Mature skepticism is outside the Mature skepticism is outside the discussion and outside the problem discussion and outside the problem of inconsistency. of inconsistency.

Inconsistent rationalismInconsistent rationalism

In the case of Sextus Empiricus it is In the case of Sextus Empiricus it is better to accept the basic better to accept the basic inconsistency in his philosophy then inconsistency in his philosophy then treat it as irrationalism.treat it as irrationalism.

SSkkepticism in Sextus’ version seems epticism in Sextus’ version seems most reasonable when we construe it most reasonable when we construe it as an overly ambitious rationalistic as an overly ambitious rationalistic philosophy that falls into philosophy that falls into inconsistency. inconsistency.

LiteratureLiterature Bailey Alan 1990 Pyrrhonean Scepticism and the Self-Bailey Alan 1990 Pyrrhonean Scepticism and the Self-

Refutation Argument, “The Philosophical Quarterly”, vol. 40 Refutation Argument, “The Philosophical Quarterly”, vol. 40 no. 158, 27-44.no. 158, 27-44.

Bett Richard ed. 2010 The Cambridge Companion to Bett Richard ed. 2010 The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, Cambridge University Press.Ancient Scepticism, Cambridge University Press.

Burnyeat Myles, Frede Michael eds. 1998 The Original Burnyeat Myles, Frede Michael eds. 1998 The Original Sceptics: A Controversy Hackett Publishing Company.Sceptics: A Controversy Hackett Publishing Company.

Castagnoli Luca 2010 Ancient Self-Refutation. The Logic Castagnoli Luca 2010 Ancient Self-Refutation. The Logic and History of Self-Refutation Argument…, Cambridge and History of Self-Refutation Argument…, Cambridge University Press.University Press.

Hankinson R.J. 1995 The Sceptics, Routledge.Hankinson R.J. 1995 The Sceptics, Routledge. McPherran Mark, 1987 Skeptical Homeopathy and Self-McPherran Mark, 1987 Skeptical Homeopathy and Self-

refutation, „Phronesis” vol. 32 no 3, 290-328.refutation, „Phronesis” vol. 32 no 3, 290-328. Perin Casey 2010 The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Perin Casey 2010 The Demands of Reason: An Essay on

Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Oxford University Press. Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Oxford University Press. Thorsrud Harald 2009 Ancient Scepticism, University of Thorsrud Harald 2009 Ancient Scepticism, University of

California Press.California Press.