Marrin--Homeland Security Intelligence Just the Beginning--2003

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Stephen Marrin. Homeland Security Intelligence: Just the Beginning. Journal of Homeland

Security. Nov 2003. http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/marrin.htmlReprinted in: Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies. V14. N1. (2004). 43-51.

http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/marrin.html

Homeland Security Intelligence: Just the BeginningStephen Marrin

November 2003Stephen Marrin is an analyst with the General Accounting Offices DefenseCapabilities and Management team in Washington, DC. He is also a

doctoral candidate in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics at the

University of Virginia, specializing in the study of intelligence. Hepreviously served as an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency and

has written many articles on intelligence, including a background papertitled Homeland Security and the Analysis of Foreign Intelligence for the

Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. The viewsexpressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the position of theGeneral Accounting Office or any other U.S. government entity. As required, CIAsPublication Review Board reviewed this paper and has no security objection to its

dissemination, although the review does not confirm the accuracy of the information nor

does it endorse the authors views.

This article is adapted from an 18 March 2003 presentation to the 2003 Counter-Terrorismand Civil Liberties Conference at Central Missouri State University.

The U.S. experience with foreign intelligence indicates that the roles and missions of thefederal governments new domestic intelligence capabilities will likely increase in the future.

The study of foreign intelligence provides a valuable vantage point from which to observeand critique the burgeoning federal domestic surveillance system, because the newdomestic intelligence programs appear to approximate a domestic version of the

longstanding foreign intelligence capabilities. Foreign intelligencewhich entails the covertacquisition of information overseas to protect national securityhas been institutionalized

since 1947, whereas domestic intelligencewhich entails the acquisition of information fromdomestic sources to protect domestic or homeland securityhas historically had minimalinstitutionalization at the federal level.

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the federal government has proposed andimplemented numerous new domestic intelligence programs to bolster its counter-terrorism

capabilities. These domestic intelligence programs run the gamut from increased aerialsurveillance to increased wiretap authority to the creation of passive surveillance systems to

detect the presence of nuclear, chemical, or biological agents. Additional controversial

domestic intelligence programs include the Justice Departments proposed Operation TIPSfor public reporting of suspicious activity, the modification of the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act to increase the use of information acquired in court-approved wiretaps, and

the creation of the Total Information Awareness programsince renamed the TerrorismInformation Awareness programto determine whether large-scale data mining could be afeasible way to track or catch terrorists.
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Concepts developed in the study of foreign intelligence can be applied to domestic

intelligence to provide insight into how the federal governments new domestic intelligence

programs may develop. The study of foreign intelligence indicates that the roles andmissions of domestic intelligence will likely increase for two distinctly different reasons:

The study of foreign intelligence has demonstrated that the purpose of intelligence isto acquire information necessary to apply governmental power with greater precisionand that as the need for application of government power increases, so does the

need for intelligence. Domestically, terrorist threats to homeland security will becountered by government power wielded by various domestic security agencies, andthe newly created domestic intelligence programs will enable them to apply their

powers with greater force and precision. As technological capabilities inevitably grow,

however, threats to homeland security will increase in the future, and the need fordomestic intelligence will increase correspondingly.

The study of foreign intelligence indicates that domestic intelligence capabilitiescreated for homeland security purposes will likely be used for other reasons. Foreignintelligence missions expanded from national security threat perception and warning

to foreign policy support once the benefits of tailored intelligence provision wererealized by policy makers. It is likely that a similar growth in mission will occur in

domestic intelligence as capabilities created for counterterrorism expand to supportgeneric law enforcement as well.

The expanding roles and missions of domestic intelligence agencies will likely pose a threat

to civil liberties. This threat canand shouldbe countered through the incorporation ofoverlapping procedural guidelines and oversight mechanisms at the creation of each newdomestic intelligence program so as to prevent possible future violations of civil liberties.

The Increasing Need for Domestic Intelligence

The U.S. experience with foreign intelligence indicates that homeland security needs willrequire even greater levels of domestic intelligence in the future. Foreign intelligenceindicates that the purpose of intelligenceboth foreign and domesticis to facilitate precise

application of governmental power. Countering terrorism has increased the need to collect

domestic intelligence, but threats to domestic security will increase even more in the futuredue to growth in technological capacities. As the use of power increases to counter these

threats, domestic intelligence capabilities must correspondingly increase so that the poweris applied effectively.

The Purpose of Foreign Intelligence

The purpose of institutionalized foreign intelligence is to provide information to national

security decision makers so that they can use the economic, political, or military power attheir disposal more effectively. To accomplish this purpose, foreign intelligence agencies

covertly acquire, analyze, and disseminate information regarding threats to nationalsecurity.1A covert information acquisition capability supplements overt informationcollection because much of international relations is conducted in secret, and the only wayto apply power effectively in an area where so much is kept secret is by uncovering the

capabilities and intentions of enemies and potential competitors. As intelligence scholar Loch

Johnson observed, Democracies in this perilous world must have a secret service. TheUnited States could well perish at the hands of foreign enemies without the protectionafforded by the eyes and ears of the intelligence community.2
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Controversy over intelligence exists not because of the purpose it serves but because of

ethical concerns regarding how it is collected and pragmatic concerns regarding how it is

used. In 1930, Secretary of State Henry Stimson expressed his opposition to intelligence bysaying, Gentlemen do not read each others mail.3Such ethical objections to foreign

intelligence were quickly overridden in the face of military threats, and during World War IIand the Cold War the United States did not eschew any intelligence capabilities. Even

though opposition to intelligence collection for ethical considerations is now archaic in aworld where almost every country possesses an intelligence service, periodic controversieserupt over the ethics of intelligence collection.4

Additional opposition to intelligence agencies arises from their association with covert action

capabilities. Covert action is the secret use of power, usually consisting of military force,

and some intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, contain a covertaction unit. Covert action is a very different function from the covert collection and analysis

of intelligence information, however, and the functions should be separated for conceptual

clarity because combining the functions obscures the real purposes of intelligence andmakes intelligence as a governmental function guilty by association with controversial

policymaking. As a result, for purposes of this article, intelligence refers to the collectionand analysis of information, but not the covert action capability that is associated with it.

The primary security benefit of intelligence is that it enables power to be applied with

greater precision and with less collateral damage. Properly understood, the role ofintelligence is the collection and analysis of information. Contrary to the popular maxim, the

American experience with foreign intelligence demonstrates that knowledge is not power.Knowledge can make the application of power more effective, but knowledge alone is

powerless. In terms of foreign intelligence, the benefit of intelligence is easiest to illustratein the application of military power. For example, satellite imagery provides military

planners with precise information regarding the location of enemy military installations and

terrorist training camps, and military force can be applied more precisely once thisinformation is provided to bomber pilots or programmed into cruise missiles. The failure of

intelligence to provide correct information also illustrates its importance in applying power

with precision and preventing collateral damage, such as the May 1999 inadvertent bombingof Chinas Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, due to faulty intelligence.5Foreign intelligence can

also assist in the application of economic and political powerfor example, by identifyingeconomic corruption and thereby enabling policy officials to avoid giving humanitarianassistance to corrupt government officials.

The specific roles and missions of strategic foreign intelligence agencies are subject to

debate and change because even though they focus on threats to national security, thedefinitions of both threatand national securityare ambiguous. As Joseph Romm observed,

the phrase national securityhad become so widely used by 1947 that the National Security

Act, which established the National Security Council (and the Central Intelligence

Agency), did not bother to define the term but left it open to broad (ie not purely military)

interpretations.

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He went on to say that the ambiguity inherent in the term nationalsecuritycomes from the inherent subjectivity in determining the threats to any nations

security. Narrow definitions of national security focus tightly on military issues, but broader

definitions can incorporate political, economic, social, and environmental considerations. Asdefinitions of security expand, so do perceptions of threats to national security.

In sum, foreign intelligence exists to provide information to decision makers at all levels ofgovernment so that they can apply the power they have at their disposal more precisely.

Domestic intelligence agencies exist to provide the same service to policymakers who wield
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power domestically. Even though a single agency could collect and analyze intelligence

information both overseas and at home as the Soviet Unions KGB did, in the United States

foreign and domestic intelligence collection are separated from each other to protectdomestic civil liberties. As Stewart Bakerthe former general counsel of the National

Security Agencyobserved, Combining domestic and foreign intelligence functions createsthe possibility that domestic law enforcement will be infected by the secrecy, deception, and

ruthlessness that international espionage requires. Dividing the responsibilities amongdifferent agencies reduces that risk.7

Application to Domestic Intelligence

Domestic intelligence serves the same purpose as foreign intelligenceto enablegovernment power to be applied with greater precisionand is structured in a similar way.

Domestic intelligence is defined as the collection, evaluation, and collation of information

relating to threats to government, including threats to the orderly conduct of governmentbusiness, according to W. Raymond Wannall, former Assistant Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.8As with foreign intelligence, the primary benefit of domesticintelligence is that it allows domestic security agencies to apply their powers of search,

detention, and arrest with greater precision and less collateral damage. For example,informants can provide information leading to the arrest of people suspected of committing

crimes, and wiretaps can provide law enforcement agencies with sufficient information to

arrest suspects before they can carry out criminal or terrorist activities. In addition,domestic intelligence can provide correct information to law enforcement personnel so that

misapplication of powersuch as false arrests and breaking down doors to wrong housesdoes not occur.

Government power in domestic areas is not limited solely to law enforcement, however. As

with foreign policy, domestic policy entails application of economic, political, and socialpower. The difference is that these powers are structured by the U.S. government through

policy-making organizations such as the Social Security Administration and the Departmentof Education. Each department has structured mechanisms for acquiring the information it

needs, but in the domestic context most of this information is not considered intelligencebecause it does not have to be acquired covertly.

The bulk of domestic intelligence in the United States is collected by local law enforcement

agencies in the course of their daily street patrols and other activities.9Most of this

information is not stored or aggregated into broader assessments of criminal activity, andonce the information in case files is used to arrest or prosecute individuals, it is archived ordisposed of according to local guidelines. On the national level, however, the United States

lacks a dedicated domestic intelligence collection and analysis capability akin to that of the

foreign intelligence community or the United Kingdoms MI5.10Instead, domestic policydepartments such as Justice, the Treasury, and Homeland Security contain components that

collect the information that their policy makers and implementers require. Premier among

these intelligence-collecting entities is the FBI.11

The FBIaccording to intelligence scholar Arthur Hulnickis a police service with

investigative powers, with an intelligence component, and its officers are armed and havethe power of arrest. It is hardly a secret service, however, and certainly not a secret

police.12According to the FBIs website, its mission is to uphold the law through the

investigation of violations of federal criminal law; to protect the United States from foreignintelligence and terrorist activities; to provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to

federal, state, local, and international agencies 13To accomplish this mission, the FBI
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collects information on all federal criminal violations that have not been specifically

assigned by Congress to another federal agency, including civil rights; counterterrorism;

foreign counterintelligence; organized crime/drugs; violent crimes and major offenders; andfinancial crime.14Most FBI domestic intelligence functions are related to its

counterintelligence function and consist of identifying, penetrating and neutralizing theforeign intelligence activities directed against a country's national interests, values and

objectives.15

Terrorism has led to an increased need for domestic intelligence, but in the future the threatto homeland security will be even greater due to growth in technology, and as a result therole of domestic intelligence in protecting homeland security will be even greater than it is

today. The threat to security is growing because technological knowledge inevitably diffuses,

and as knowledge increases, greater power is available at less cost and requires the effortsof fewer and fewer people. Technology provides people with toolsintrinsically neither good

nor badthat acquire normative value based on the uses to which they are put.

Technological advances have provided huge benefits in many fieldsincludingcommunications, education, medicine, and food productionbut the same technology that

can be used to create can also be used to destroy. Soon technological advances in areasincluding genetics and nanotechnology will require the re-conceptualization of security.

Biological warfare is bad enough, but biological warfare incorporating genetic engineering isdownright apocalyptic. Information from the human genome could give biological weapons

programs the means to target specific ethnic groupstransform[ing] biological weaponsinto potent tools of ethnic cleansing and terrorism16and reportedly could be developed

within ten years. The threat that this kind of weapon could pose to international peace and

stability is incalculable. Potentially as destructive are micro-machines; nanotechnologytheorists have speculated that once micro-machines are programmable, it will be

theoretically possible for molecular machines to process living matter to make more ofthem, leaving behind a world consisting of gray goo. Other less apocalyptic visions of the

future are possible, but all technological advances lead to greater ability to destroy as wellas create. As technological capabilities get more advanced, the need to monitor smaller and

smaller groups to prevent the development of new weapons by terrorists becomes

increasingly important. In the end, prospects for comprehensive national domesticintelligence collection and exploitation have increased since the 11 September 2001 terroristattacks, and the need in the future may be even greater.

Mission Creep Is Also Highly Likely

The U.S. experience with foreign intelligence demonstrates that, over time, intelligence

capabilities expand and that a similar expansion of domestic intelligence capabilities ishighly likely. Foreign intelligence bureaucracies were permanently established after World

War II to prevent another attack similar to Pearl Harbor, but once they were

institutionalized, their intelligence missions expanded from a focus on national security

tightly defined to foreign policy support more generally. The war on terrorism provides a

similar security rationale for expanding existing national domestic intelligence capabilitiesinto permanent bureaucracies dedicated to domestic intelligence collection and analysis, anda similar growth of mission can be expected.

Expanding Foreign Intelligence Missions17

American officials created a permanent intelligence community to warn policymakers ofthreats to national security. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had such a detrimental

effect on American perceptions of security that after World War II ended, policymakers
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decided to create for the first time in the nations history a permanent bureaucracy intended

to prevent any future surprise attacks or other strategic surprises. Historically, intelligence

capabilities had been organized ad hoc to provide targeted military information tocommanders because losing wars held such disastrous consequences. According to

intelligence scholar Harold Ford, US intelligence efforts [began] impressively with GeorgeWashington and Benjamin Franklin, and many subsequent Presidents had commissioned

small, one-shot intelligence operations, generally in wartime.18

However, Ford observedthat despite these operations, The United States was the last major power to get into the

intelligence analysis business. After all, two great oceans protected America from foreigndangers. Then, too, the United States was differentit did not engage in power politics, orso its citizens thought.

The attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent American involvement in World War II changedthe United States need for and use of intelligence. During World War II, the United States

increased its overseas presence, and this necessitated the creation of a global intelligence

capability commensurate with the United States expanded global role. After World War IIended, American political leaders decided that the United States needed an intelligence

agency capable of integrating disparate pieces of information distributed throughout themilitary and other government agencies to prevent another Pearl Harbor. As a result, in

1947 the Central Intelligence Agency was created to prevent future surprise attacks byfocusing on threats to national security.

Over time a more expansive role for foreign intelligence agencies developed, providing

intelligence to support foreign policymaking more generally rather than limiting the focus tonational security threats. The term national securityis notorious for its ambiguity and

flexibility. During the Cold War, national security could reasonably incorporate all aspectsof foreign and domestic policy. Distinct from pure security considerations, a foreign policy is

a governments attempt to advance its interests internationally. In the case of the United

States, the primary interests are mentioned in the Constitution: Provide for the commondefense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty. To achieve the

goals of greater defense, welfare, or liberty requires the application of powerwhether

military, economic, or politicalinternationally through a foreign policy. During the ColdWar, economic and political matters were interpreted through a security prism, and national

security considerations seemed to incorporate all aspects of foreign policy because of thehuge level of effort required to be prepared to fight World War III. In this heightenedsecurity environment, threats to national security were perceived to arise from all corners,

including economic, military, and political competitors. The foreign intelligence community

made up of the CIA and other agenciesfulfilled its task by monitoring the world as best itcould.19

When the Cold War ended and the primary threat to national security disappeared, it

became obvious that intelligence agencies had expanded their role to provide intelligence

relevant to foreign policy support more generally rather than exclusively for national

security concerns. In the early 1990s, debates over the direction of postCold Warintelligence roles and missions highlighted the importance of changing perceptions of

national security threats. Those who emphasized the primacy of economic matters in the

future wanted the Intelligence Community to focus on economic intelligence. Those whobelieved that interdependence would make the power of states less relevant focused theirattention on other transnational issues, such as narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and the

environment. And those who believed that the United States should focus its power only onnarrowly defined national security threats argued for a smaller, more targeted intelligencecapability.
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Once intelligence collection capabilities are built for one purpose, they canand most likely

willbe used for others. For example, information acquired on a foreign countrys

transportation infrastructure for a defense capabilities study can be adapted to provideassessments of port or rail carrying capacities prior to humanitarian interventions.

Information collected to assess how a foreign leader responds in different national securitysituations can be provided in the form of foreign leader profiles to trade negotiators to

provide an edge in negotiations. Absent a clear security threat and outside the context ofthe Cold War, these activities are more accurately conceived as foreign policy support ratherthan national security threat perception and warning.

National domestic intelligence capabilities will likely expand along a path similar to the oneforeign intelligence has taken.

Application to Domestic Intelligence

Like foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence has been a perennial component of domestic

governance that historically has been institutionalized ad hoc to address specific threats todomestic security. Unlike other countries that established permanent domestic intelligence

agencies to monitor citizen behavior in the face of long-term insurgencies or violent politicalfactions, the United States has had few reasons to institutionalize a national domestic

intelligence capability. As Richard Morgan observed, The first century and a half ofAmerican democracy was marked by intermittent episodes of internal intelligence gathering.

Monitoring dissent, by the federal government at least, was undertaken only in response to

a crisis of the moment; with the passing of the crisis the monitoring ceased, and the federalmachinery that supported it was dismantled or retooled for other tasks.20Permanentdomestic intelligence departmentssuch as the Justice Departments FBIwere originally

created to support federal law enforcement investigations and not to collect intelligence on

security threats per se. The FBI was originally created in 1908 to assist the JusticeDepartments investigation of Congressional corruption.21

During the Cold War, however, domestic intelligence capabilities expanded for reasonssimilar to the expansion in foreign intelligence. According to Morton Halperin, The Cold War

also intensified the practice of government surveillance of persons and groups in America

engaged in lawful political activities. In the name of counterintelligence, the government hassystematically harassed and spied upon disfavored groups: communists in the 1940s and

1950s; civil rights activists, black nationalists, antiwar activists, womens liberationists, and

the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s; and opponents of U.S. policy in Central America andthe Middle East in the 1980s. The government continues to assert that it has an inherentpower to investigate political opponents, wiretap telephones, and even break into homeswithout a warrant under the guise of protecting the nation from foreign agents.22

Domestic intelligence agencies such as the FBI and local police departments curtailed their

activities in the late 1970s because of public opposition to their practices and a backlash

against their abuses. According to intelligence expert Herbert Romerstein, in the mid-1970sthe domestic intelligence collection process began to wither away as local policeintelligence units disbanded or were curtailed. The military ceased its domestic

intelligence collection. Finally, in 1976, the [Attorney General Edward] Levi Guidelines endedmost FBI collection efforts in this area. What little is collected is not subject to sufficient

analysis. Indeed, much of it is intentionally ignored. Therefore the FBI does not provide

policymakers with a clear understanding of the extent and nature of problems within theUnited States, and the FBI itself becomes less and less able to focus its own collectionproperly.23
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The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks highlighted the risk to national security of allowing

domestic intelligence capabilities to wither, and the attacks provided a security rationale

analogous to Pearl Harbor for expanding existing national domestic intelligence capabilitiesinto permanent bureaucracies dedicated to domestic intelligence collection and analysis. In

1990, Morton Halperin warned that the counterterrorism rationale might be used to increasefederal domestic intelligence capabilities when he observed that the national security

apparatus that was put in place to wage the Cold War is now a burgeoning bureaucracy insearch of a new mission.

It is busy identifying new enemies, based on an expanded definition of national security,that justify its continued existence and funding. International terrorism is rapidly

supplanting the communist threat as the primary justification for wholesale deprivations of

civil liberties and distortions of the democratic process. Once governments, guerillamovements, and individuals disliked by the US government are labeled terrorists,

measures such as warrantless searches and wiretaps, restrictions on the right to travel,

speak, and receive information often become acceptable.24

Despite Halperins concerns, however, some increase in domestic intelligence capabilities

seems necessary in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks.

Since 2001 the federal government has made many changes to its security and intelligenceagencies to improve their operations. These changes include the creation of the Department

of Homeland Security and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the incorporation of the

Secret Service into the Department of Homeland Security, the shift of the Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco and Firearms from the Treasury Department to Justice, and the growth in FBIintelligence collection and analysis capabilities. Further institutionalization of the domestic

intelligence capability is also likely and is reflected in proposals to strip the FBI of its

counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence functions, and move them to a new intelligenceagency similar to the British organization MI5.25

Once intelligence capabilities are developed for one purpose, eventually they will be used forother purposes due to pressures to do something. For example, civilian agencies have

accepted assistance from tactical military intelligence systems in the past. The Defense

Departments willingness to offerand law enforcements eagerness to acceptthe use ofan unpiloted aircraft in the search to find the snipers near Washington, DC, in 2002 is but

one example of how tools built for one purpose can find a use once they are on the shelf.

Another occurred in 1993 when naval tactical aircraft flew photographic reconnaissancemissions over the Mississippi River Valley, mapping the extent of flood damage andproviding that information to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other civilauthorities charged with flood relief efforts, according to a Navy study.26

The ability to use counterterrorism surveillance capabilities for general law enforcement

purposes will be a temptation not easily resisted, and such mission expansion may already

be occurring. In February 2003, the New York Timesreported that FBI-led task forceswhose primary duty is stopping al-Qaida and other international groups. have thwartedseveral would-be domestic terrorists in recent months, including specific plans by members

of the Ku Klux Klan and Jewish militants.27The article quoted U.S. Attorney Mary BethBuchanan, who justified this expansion of focus by saying, Domestic terrorism can be

devastating as well. We are continuing to deal with both. While the article highlighted the

security benefits arising from heightened domestic intelligence collection, it also citedintelligence officials [who] point out that even a single individual can wreak mayhem.

By expanding the definition of security threat to encompass foreign individuals acting as
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lone-wolf terrorists and other domestic terrorist groupsincluding neo-Nazi groups,

anarchic environmentalists, and animal liberation groups, it is only a small leap to apply

counterterrorism capabilities to track and catch individual lawbreakers and everydaycriminals.

Over time, technological advancements will only increase domestic surveillance capabilities

and the ability of those in power to ensure domestic security. Technological capabilities existto monitor society at a level only imagined in books like George Orwells 1984, including the

ability to catch all red light runners and speeders, the installment of cameras in publicplaces, the use of biometric devices for authentication, the ability to survey the movementsand behavior of people by passively monitoring [emissions from personal wireless devices

such as mobile phones, cameras, consumer audio devices, smart cards, digital radios and

medical tracking devices] or actively querying the devices they carry,28and soon perhapseven the ability to implant chips as a means of identification or for some other purpose.

Many of these technologies are profiled in Gartner Group reports, along with more prosaic

capabilities such as data mining.29The promise of these technologies is that if they arelinked, the potential exists to track and arrest terrorists in the same way that the military

can target and destroy enemy tanks in a field of operations. The risk of such technologies isthat they could lead to the diminution of personal privacy and the creation of a surveillancestate.30

Beyond security issues, domestic intelligence informationonce collected, centralized, andavailable for use by appropriate authoritiescould be used for purposes other than ensuring

security, such as the targeted distribution of goods and services. In the end, onceinformation is collected, it can be used for purposes other than those initially intended, and

it likely will, because of increased efficiency and effectiveness of policymaking. Domesticintelligence mission creep is highly likely due to the benefits accruing from other uses of theinformation.

Protecting Against Abuse

Insight regarding the likely future development of domestic intelligence capabilities derived

from the study of foreign intelligence gives todays policymakers the ability to create

bulwarks against possible future violations of civil liberties. Domestic intelligence collectionand exploitation capabilities have increased since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks,

and the study of foreign intelligence indicates that these capabilities will likely expand even

further in the future. In and of itself, this expansion of mission may not be a bad thing,because it could increase an individuals security from both terrorism and crime, but theexpansion of missions does pose the greatest single risk of future violation of civil liberties.

With foresight into the pressures that will lead domestic authorities to expand domestic

intelligence programs, the federal government can prevent violations of civil liberties byincorporating an overlapping system of procedural guidelines and oversight into the

domestic intelligence infrastructure at its founding.31William Stephenson conveyed quite

well both the need for and the peril of intelligence:32

Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants can no longer threaten the liberty of any people,

when the function of all nations, however varied their ideologies, will be to enhance life, notto control it. If such a condition is possible, it is in a future too far distant to foresee. Until

that safer, better day, the democracies will avoid disaster, and possibly total destruction,

only by maintaining their defenses.
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Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence is an essential

weapon, perhaps the most important. But it is, being secret, the most dangerous.

Safeguards to prevent its abuse must be devised, revised, and rigidly applied. But, as in allenterprise, the character and wisdom of those to whom it is entrusted will be decisive. Inthe integrity of that guardianship lies the hope of free people to endure and prevail.

Author Contact [email protected]

References

Click on an end note number to return to the article.

1.For articles on the definition and purpose of intelligence, see Michael WarnersWanted: A Definition of Intelligence,Studies in Intelligence(CIA publication), vol. 46, no. 3, 2002, and Thomas F. Troys The Correct Definition ofIntelligence,International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 5, no. 4, winter 19911992, pp. 433454.

2.Loch Johnson, Controlling the CIA: A Critique of Current Safeguards, in Controlling Intelligence, ed. Glenn P. Hastedt(London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 46.

3.James Titus,book reviewofHenry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man by David F. Schmitz,Aerospace Power Journal,summer 2002.

4.For example, in early 2003 controversy sprung up over reports that the U.S. National Security Agency was increasing itsinterception of communications made by United Nations Security Council diplomats. See Colum Lynch, Spying Report NoShock to U.N.,Washington Post, 4 March 2003.

5.For more on the details behind the bombing, see thestatementof Bill Harlow, CIA Director of Public Affairs, 10 April2000.

6.Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press,1993), p. 3.

7.Stewart A. Baker, Should Spies Be Cops?Foreign Policy, vol. 97, winter 19941995, pp. 3652.

8.W. Raymond Wannall, The FBIs Domestic Intelligence Operations: Domestic Security in Limbo,International Journalof Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 4, no. 4, 1991, p. 446.

9.For information on tactical law enforcement intelligence, see Donald O. Schultz and Loran A. Norton, Police OperationalIntelligence (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1968). See also thewebsiteof the International Association of LawEnforcement Intelligence Analysts.

10.For information on strategic domestic intelligence, see Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s, vol. 6, DomesticIntelligence, edited by Roy Godson (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986).

11.For more on FBI intelligence, see John T. Elliff, The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1979).

12.Arthur S. Hulnick, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: The Spies Are Not Cops Problem, International Journal of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 269286.

13.FBI website:General Frequently Asked Questions.

14.Ibid.

15.Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studieshomepage.

16.Ethirajan Anbarasan,Genetic Weapons: A 21st-Century Nightmare?UNESCO Courier, March 1999.
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17.This section borrows some ideas and language from a submission entitled Foreign Policy and Intelligence posted totheH-Diplodiscussion group on 3 March 2002. The same content wasrepostedto Intelforum on 17 March 2002.

18.Harold P. Ford, The US Governments Experience With Intelligence Analysis: Pluses and Minuses,Intelligence andNational Security, vol. 10, no. 4, Oct. 1995, p. 34.

19.U.S. Intelligence Community: Who We Are.

20.Richard E. Morgan, Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring Dissent in America (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1980),p. 16.

21.Ibid., p. 24.

22.Morton H. Halperin and Jeanne M. Woods, Ending the Cold War at Home,Foreign Policy, winter 19901991, p. 136.For more information on domestic intelligence operations during the Cold War, see Frank J. Donner, Protectors of Privilege:Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990); David Wise, The

American Police State: The Government Against the People (New York: Random House, 1976); Frank J. Donner, The Ageof Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of Americas Political Intelligence System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980); andCathy Perkus, ed., Cointelpro: The FBIs Secret War on Political Freedom (New York: Monad Press, 1975).

23.Herbert Romerstein, What Information Should Be Collected and How Should Collection Be Organized, in IntelligenceRequirements for the 1980s, vol. 6, Domestic Intelligence (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 107108. For more

on the constriction of domestic intelligence capabilities, see W. Raymond Wannall, pp. 443473.

24.Morton H. Halperin and Jeanne M. Woods, p. 141.

25.Stuart Taylor Jr., Spying on Terrorists,Government Executive, 13 Jan. 2003.

26.Naval Intelligence Operationsin Naval Intelligence, Naval Doctrine Publication 2.

27.FBI Changes Thwart Domestic Terrorism, Associated Press report, New York Times, 22 Feb. 2003.

28.Nick Jones, Eavesdropping on the Device in Your Pocket, Gartner Group Research Note SPA-15-4727, 27 March2002. See also John Markoff and John Schwartz, Many Tools of Big Brother Are Up and Running, New York Times, 23Dec. 2002.

29.Jackie Fenn,Surveillance and Privacy: Technologies and Opportunities, Gartner Research Report AV-15-9913, 1 April2002; and Alexander Linden, Data Mining: Balancing Benefits Against Privacy Intrusion, Gartner Research Note, 28March 2002.

30.For civil libertarian concerns, see Jay Stanley and Barry Steinhardt,Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The Growth of anAmerican Surveillance Society(New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2003).

31.For examples of guidelines, seeProtecting Americas Freedom in the Information Age(New York: Markle Foundation,2002).

32.William Stevenson,A Man Called Intrepid(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976): a biography of WilliamStephenson (not the author), head of Britains secret service in World War II; he was code -named Intrepid.
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