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8/10/2019 Marriage as an association of social classes in a low fertility rate society.pdf
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FILOLOKI FAKULTET U BEOGRADU
Marriage as an association of social classes in a low
fertility rate society
Sawako Shirahase
Predmet: Savremene studije kulture I
Zadatak 1: Prikaz
Doktorand: Dragana Aneli
Broj dosijea: 13085/D
Datum predaje: 29. XI 2014.
8/10/2019 Marriage as an association of social classes in a low fertility rate society.pdf
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Nowadays plenty of data show that Japan's society is characterized by low fertility rate
as well as postponement and avoidance of marriage. The purpose of this chapter is to look
into the disturbing trends. The author hopes to find answers to the following questions: who
gets married in Japan and to whom, and in what way are marriages related to class formation?
To accomplish that, the author deals with population shifts first.
The statistics show that, in order to mantain the population at a steady level, Japan's
total fertility rate should be 2.08. Although the Japanese believed that things could not get
worse than in 1989 when the fertility rate fell to 1.57, they suffered a real shock in 2005 when
they found out that the fertility rate stood at 1.32. It is thus more than obvious that an
enormous demographic shift is taking place in Japan today, as well as in many other social
systems. However, the main problem really is not a decline in the overall population, but the
very structure of the population because demography is not just a matter of counting people. It
deals with the question of society members' distribution and quality of their lives, so it is only
logical to look at the household as the basic unit of consumption. The author has found that
the most striking changes in household composition in Japan are an increase in households
with one member only and the number of people who never get married. Be that as it may, a
household based on a married couple still remains the dominant style of households.
Having dealt with these rather general findings, the author then looks at the declining
fertility rate and extreme aging of population in more detail. The constant decline in the
fertility rate leads to a striking increase in the age of the overall population and the imbalance
between generations. However, the growing number of old people is only one aspect of the
aging population problem; the equally important index is the increase in life expectancy.
Increasing life expectancy means that individual members of the elderly population will
continue to be in that population for a longer period of time. That raises the question who and
in what way is going to look after them, which is not only a macro-level problem, but a
micro-level one, affecting individual lives.
So why do the Japanese have more older people than children? The author found two
main underlying factors: the increasing number of unmarried people and a decline in fertility
among those who did get married. From the 1950s onwards both men and women have shown
a striking tendency to marry later in life. Interestingly, until the late 1980s, there were more
unmarried women than men, but the number of men who never got married has started to
climb seriosly since then. Although the number of unmarried men in their forties and fifties is
not yet high, these groups show a tendency to grow fastest.
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In regard to a decline in fertility among married couples, many married couples decide
to have less children, and since the 1990s, this has had a huge impact on the broader
demographic picture. In spite of that, childless couples still remain a very small minority,
even though the total percentage slightly increased from 1977 to 2005. On the other hand,
three-child families have shown a sudden decline in recent years. Interestingly enough, the
reason for married couples having less children is not because they do not want to, but
because they cannot. There are many reasons that prevent couples from having as many
children as they would wish, and one of the most common is the high cost of child-rearing
and education. However, that does not mean that more children are born in financially stable
families, quite the contrary, high-income families show fastest decline in the number of
children.
Let us not forget that reproductiveness in Japan is largely governed by class factors,
which leads us to the question of class match or mismatch between the sexes. The author's
opinion is that the influence of educational achievements on marriage as a class association
has been a significant factor for many decades. With the decline of arranged marriages and
the growing dominance of love marriages, family lineage ceased to be an important factor in
marriage decisions. Despite the apparent dominance of love marriages, there are still great
changes in the Japanese marriage market (Shida et al., 2000). For instance, from 1985 to
2005, low-educated Japanese men in their twenties and thirties showed the highest rate of
increase in non-marriage; the mid-education group also showed a rise, especially from 1985
to 1995; the high-education group, in contrast, showed the smallest rate of increase. As for
women, the change in non-marriage rates is roughly the same no matter the education level,
showing the overall decline in non-marriage.
Changes in non-marriage rate by class origin also show some striking findings. For
instance, the unskilled manual class shows the smallest increase in non-marriage rate; the
skilled manual class exhibited an increased non-marriage rate; the highest non-marriage rate
was detected among women of the professional-managerial class and the skilled manual class.
The reason for the significant increase among aforementioned class of women is that they are
no longer under the social pressure to get married at, say 23 or 24, which has become widely
accepted.
In regard to marriage timing, the clearest trend is the lengthening of the period from
completing education to marriage among men in the low-education group. The mid-education
group of men also showed a slight lengthening of that period, while highly-educated menactually showed a shortening of the period from graduation to marriage from 1995 to 2005. In
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the case of women, all three groups showed a slight decline in graduation-to-marriage period
but, what is even more interesting, the proportion of people staying unmarried increased,
while those who did get married tended to do so more quickly.
The authors opinion that the influence of educational achievements on marriage as a
class association has been a significant factor for many decades was supported by the
statistics. In terms of occupation as well as education, the Japanese tend to marry like. The
highly-educated people tend to meet their future marriage partners in the same higher
education institutions; by contrast, the low-education group is more likely to find their future
spouses in the neighborhood or through parental or sibling connections. One of the reasons for
that is the impact of parental educational credentials and the self-reported standard of living.
The highest self-reported standard of living was among respondents whose parents both had
high levels of education, and the lowest was among those whose parents both had low levels
of education. However, that does not imply that highly educated and wealthy couples have
more children; they have the fewest children and spend the most on bringing up each of them.
In contrast, couples where both partners had low levels of education had the most children
and spent the least on bringing up each of them. It may be therefore confirmed that the
combination of educational levels in a married couple in Japan is indeed an important factor
influencing the education of the next generation and the transmission and perpetuation of
parental class status.
This chapter looked into the reasons for Japans low fertility and postponement and
avoidance of marriage. Although the author himself admits that he has not substantiated more
than just a basic level of analyses, his findings are notably valuable and can be used for a
more comprehensive research.