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etinPage 1Markets

Outline Liberalization Wholesale Market Retail Market Time-of-use Prices

Prof. Metin Çakanyıldırım used various resources to prepare this document for teaching/training. To use this in your own course/training, please obtain permission from Prof. Çakanyıldırım.

If you find any inaccuracies, please contact metin@utdallas.edu for corrections.Updated in Spring 2019

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etinPage 2In Support of Liberalized Markets

Liberalization (deregulation) in Electricity Sector. Regions: US is large with different time zones, climates and legal systems. It is impossible

for a single entity to manage the entire grid (which is not synchronously connected anyway). Long-Distances: Distances are long so transmission losses are high. This leads to

consumption of what is locally produced. New trend is to locally produce and consume: Micro grids.

Inefficiencies are revealed by markets: In a vertically integrated sector, it is hard to find out losses at a power plant or a sales division. When markets are employed, transactions (transfer prices) between a buyer and seller allow us to easily assess the profitability of a buyer/seller.

Innovation can be fueled by market competition. Competition is stronger among independent parties while it is nonexistent in a vertically integrated sector.

Customer choice: Utility profits cannot be guaranteed at the expense of customers. Efficient markets should drive costs down, should not they?

What & how to deregulate? Deregulate the Wholesale market between generators and retailers Deregulate the Retail market between retailers and

Residential, Commercial, Industrial Establish a strong system operator and efficient markets

Price resources well, especially scarce ones Be aware of gaming the system: Creating scarcity in real time to be paid more

Transmission scarcity: CA did not price congestion among some zones in real-time Generation scarcity, coming up.

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etinPage 3

Liberalize in a single step (England-Wales) or multiple steps (NordPool see nordpoolspot.com) Which configuration is preferred eventually?

Liberalizing the Market

In 3, distribution company (Disco) remains as the only connection between generators and customers. Variations:

In a slightly more extensive model, IPPs can sign large contracts with industrial customers; common in Germany circa 2010.

In PJM (Pennsylvania-NJ-Maryland), the wholesale market settlement process includes solving the unit commitment problem (when a plant/generator should be on and off).

Most importantly, the responsibility, authority and independence of system operator (SO). More responsibility and authority drive towards integrated system. Less responsibility and authority drive towards gaming and system reliability issues.

Customers

Generator

Distribution

WholesalerTransmitter

IPP

Customers

Distribution

WholesalerTransmitter

IPP IPPIPP IPP

Customers

Wholesale MarketTransmission Lines

Genco Genco

GencoGenco Genco

Disco

Customers CustomersCustomers

Disco Disco

Customers1 2

3

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etinPage 4

Often liberalization starts in the upstream to protect downstream consumers from its pitfalls.

Liberalization Steps for the Electricity System

Corporatization: From state owned enterprise to profit-seeking company or non-profit organization. Emphasis on own cost and revenue; Deemphasize subsidies and tax income. A system of transfer prices and service level agreements for the services within enterprise. Public service as a constraint rather than objective.

Ring fencing: Isolating some portions of the industry or companies to maintain their stability while the other parts of the industry goes through liberalization. E.g., Oncor (distribution company) is ring-fenced from Energy Future Holdings.

Forced divestment and fragmentation often includes privatization: Public offering: Individuals, investors, institutions can buy a share of a corporatized piece. Private (trade) sale: Government sells a corporatized piece directly to a single company or a conglomerate.

Integration with other industries such as Natural Gas, Oil, Coal, Construction, Banks, Investors. Retail (including metering, billing) deregulation.

Corporatization

Unbundling

Ring fencing

Privatization

Forced divestmentfragmentation

Deregulate Reregulate

Unbundle

Consolidate

Integration withother industries

Arrival of banks

Retail deregulation

Revise

Fragment

Integrate

FunctionalAccountingLegalOwnership

PriceGrid stabilityInterruptionsEconomic sustainabilityEnvironmental aspectsElectrificationUniversal serviceDisruption recovery

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etinPage 5

Adam Smith: Individuals pursuing their own objectives can benefit their society. o He did not say: individualism always benefits the society.

Electricity markets need to be watched out for inadequate production in real time Electricity is critical for life Electricity cannot be stored

Markets can offer side-payments to generators to motivate them to bid more and/or at lower price CAISO (California Independent System Operator) and MISO (Midcontinent Independent System Operator) JP Morgan Ventures Energy Cooperation (JPMVEC) engaged in 12 types of improper bidding strategies. “JPMVEC will pay a civil penalty of $285 million to the U.S. Treasury and disgorge $125 million in unjust

profits. The first $124 million of the disgorged profits will go to ratepayers in … California .... The other $1 million will go to ratepayers in the Midcontinent ...”

• July 30, 2013 FERC news release, “FERC, JPMorgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penalties, Disgorgement to Ratepayers,” http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.VC8CUKPD9aQ

Regulators are to detect market manipulation and avoid it: Federal regulator in USA: FERC (http://www.ferc.gov). State regulator in TX: ERCOT (http://www.ercot.com). Fully independent (in design) regulators: Includes civil servant regulators not affiliated with a ministry.

CREG (http://www.creg.be/fr/index.html), EMRA (http://www.emra.org.tr), HEO (http://www.mekh.hu/en/), OFGEM (https://www.ofgem.gov.uk).

Ministerial adviser regulators: Regulator is affiliated with a ministry (such as Department of Energy) and only suggests a policy, but cannot formulate or enforce one. CRE (http://www.cre.fr in France), EC (http://www.st.gov.my in Malaysia), ERU (http://www.eru.cz/en/o-uradu in Czech Republic).

Self regulation: Industry regulates itself. BNetzA (http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de).

Economic Support for a Regulator

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etinPage 6

Demand Depends on Season and Day but in a Certain Way

Demand depends on the season, day of the week, time of day During winters, two load peaks: about 7:00 and 19:00. During

summers, single peak: about 16:00. Fall/Spring demands are low and they are called shoulder seasons. Heating and cooling consume more electrical energy than others.

Since demand is seasonal, so are trading contracts: August daytime delivery to ERCOT interconnection

16 daytime hours 7:00-23:00 are peak hours; 8 night hours: 23:00-7:00 are off-peak hours.

Power products are defined by shorthand that refer to time blocks:7x24 refers to 24 hours during a week; 5x16 and 7x16 refer to peak hours during workdays and a week; 5x8 and 7x8 refer to off peak hours during workdays and a week.

Hours ofa week

Same seasondifferent days

Differentseasons

Find a differencebetween figures

M T W Th Sa Su

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etinPage 7

Wholesale MarketDay-ahead

FuturesReal-time

Spot

Wholesale MarketDay-ahead

Wholesale MarketReal-time

Wholesale Market

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etinPage 8

Wholesale Market with a Single BuyerDay by Day – Hour by Hour

Bids to sell

Amount MWh

Price $/MWh

TN-En 100 60

Luminant 50 70

Luminant 50 80

TN-En 100 90

Dynamo 80 100

Dynamo 80 110

Luminant 40 120

Retailer Offerto buy

Amount MWh

Price $/MWh

TN-Wholesaler ≤ 530 100

Supply for 8-9 am, 5th of the next monthOrdered by increasing price

Demand for 8-9 am, 5th of next month

Customers

Distribution

WholesalerTransmitter

Bids to sell in the wholesale market come from multiple independent power producers.

There is a single wholesaler that buys from multiple IPPs and sell to customers.

Supp

lyD

eman

d

IPP

IPP IPPIPP

IPP

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etinPage 9Wholesale Market with a Single Buyer

50

100

150

10050 200150 300250 400350 450 500

$/MWh

MWh

TN-WholesalerDynamoDynamo

TN-En

TN-En

LuminantLuminant

Luminant

Accepted Quantity380 MWh

Wholesale Market Price

Single buyer TN-Wholesaler is critical in determination of the market price and accepted quantity (of energy). Wholesaler actually fixes the market price and accepted quantity follows from the market price.

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etinPage 10

Wholesale Market with a Single Buyer Offering Less

50

100

150

10050 200150 300250 400350 450 500

$/MWh

MWh

TN-WholesalerDynamo

Dynamo

TN-En

TN-En

LuminantLuminant

Luminant

Accepted Quantity300 MWh

Wholesale Market Price

If TN-Wholesaler offers $90/MWh, IPP Dynamo will sell nothing. SO (system operator) monitors the setting of the market price. Generators as Speculators: As noted by Thomas and Thea (Merit’14), generators can buy at a low

price in the Forward Wholesale market to sell it later at a higher price in the Forward/Spot Market.

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etinPage 11Wholesale Market with Multiple Buyers

Bids to sell

Amount MWh

Price $/MWh

TX-En 100 60

Luminant 50 70

Luminant 50 80

TX-En 100 90

Dynamo 80 100

Dynamo 80 110

Luminant 40 120

Retailer Offersto buy

Amount MWh

Price $/MWh

Relergy 50 170

Green Mntn 60 160

JcPenney 90 150

Airports 100 130

TXU 30 120

DART 30 110

Cirro 70 100

Prosper Coop. 40 90

Terralex 60 80

Demand for 8-9 am, 5th of next monthOrdered by decreasing price

Supp

ly s

ame

as b

efor

e

Dem

and

from

Dis

cos

Customers

Wholesale MarketTransmission Lines

Genco Genco

GencoGenco Genco

Disco

Customers CustomersCustomers

Disco Disco

Customers

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etinPage 12Wholesale Market with Multiple Buyers

50

100

150

200

10050 200150 300250 400350 450 500

$/MWh

MWh

ProsperTerralex

CirroDART

TXUAirports

JcPenneyGreen Mntn

Relergy

DynamoDynamo

TX-En

TX-En

LuminantLuminant

Luminant

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etinPage 13

Wholesale Market with Multiple BuyersMarket Price and Accepted Quantity

50

100

150

200

10050 200150 300250 400350 450 500

$/MWh

MWh

ProsperTerralex

CirroDART

TXUAirports

JcPenneyGreen Mntn

Relergy

Wholesale Market Price

Accepted Quantity380 MWh

DynamoDynamo

TX-En

TX-EnLuminant

Luminant

Luminant

TX-En earns $10/MWh

TX-En earns $40/MWh

SO(System Operator) determines accepted offers, bids and hence wholesale market price.

SO settles the market but does not profit from it.

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etinPage 14Manipulation by a Ghost Retailer

50

100

150

200

10050 200150 300250 400350 450 500

$/MWh

MWh

ProsperTerralex

CirroDART

TXUAirports

JcPenneyGreen Mntn

Relergy

Wholesale Market Price

Accepted Quantity400 MWh

DynamoDynamo

TX-En

TX-EnLuminant

Luminant

LuminantLumi

Lumi wants 20 MWhat $110/MWH

Luminant earns $40/MWh or $10*50 more

Luminant earns $40/MWh or $10*50 more

Lumi is a subsidary of Luminant. Lumi wants 20 MWh at $110/MWh.This will later be sold at $80/MWh.

Loss from this transaction: $600=20*30.Gain from pulling market price up: $1000

Motivation for manipulation: $400

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etinPage 15

Need for (Managed) Markets What if supply

– Scarcity: TX-En cannot provide 100 MWh at $90/MWh because of an unplanned maintenance at a plant? – Abundance: Airport authority needs less energy than forecast because a major airline is downsizing?

If lucky, deductions cancel out. Otherwise suppose Airport authority needs 10 MWh more due to increased heating/cooling needs.

This creates an imbalance in real time. Supply and demand imbalances in real time are common:

– Inaccurate demand forecasts– Failures in the generators or in the grid

Wholesale markets are settled several days in advance so only spot markets can be used to mitigate imbalances in real time.

Imbalances (brownouts) have so extreme consequences that their mitigation cannot be left to an unaccountable spot market. An accountable SO instead manages the spot market and is responsible for imbalances / blackouts.

Actual demandin 𝑇𝑇 for 𝑇𝑇Distribution

of supplyin 𝑡𝑡 for T

𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇.

Time = 𝑡𝑡

Actual supplyin 𝑇𝑇 for 𝑇𝑇

Time = 𝑇𝑇

Distribution of demandin 𝑡𝑡 for 𝑇𝑇

Real timemismatch𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡=several

days or hours

Future (Wholesale) Market matches distributions Spot Market matches actualsMWh

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etinPage 16

Market Manipulation Tactics Withholding or Market Starvation

– Physical Withholding: The price of a commodity increases with its scarcity. Pull (buy and store the commodity) from the market with an intention of raising its price.

» E.g., generators scheduling maintenance during peak periods in CAISO in the 2000s.» E.g., transmission companies overscheduling transmission to create an appearance of congestion.» E.g., Apple makes iPhones unavailable even at their launch.

– Economical Withholding: The supplier of the commodity offers a high-priced bid to sell. The bid is not accepted and the market price materializes at a higher value than it would otherwise. If the supplier has multiple bids (energy from nuclear and gas plants), the supplier can make enough revenue from accepted bids even after forgoing a few bids by pricing them high.

Information manipulation– Pump-and-dump: Giving excessively positive signals to the market about a certain product before selling that product.

» E.g., Plano commercial real estate market after the announcement of Toyota Headquarter’s move. Index manipulation by arranging quantities (amount and price)

– False reporting price or trade level: The price and volume of the after-hours or bilateral trades can be misreported. This happens when a market participant reports fictitious transactions to an index.

» E.g., interest rate underreporting by major banks to LIBOR (London interbank offered rate)– Wash trading: To increase the traded volume, the same amount is sold and bought by the same participants in a short while.– Round-trip trading: To increase the volume, the seller of a commodity agrees to buy it back later. Round-trip trading can have two or

more participants. Index manipulation by setting the time of the trade

– Marking the close: Trade towards the end of the day to affect the closing price. Closing price can be pulled up or pushed down. A holder of a contract based on closing price has incentive to manipulate it.

» Brian Hunter, Amaranth Advisors bought large long positions in Nymex NG contracts, which he sold rapidly during the contract’s final settlement period with the intent of pushing down the gas settlement price. He engaged in this behavior while he concurrently held larger short positions (contract to sell gas at a fixed price at ICE) in financial look-alike contracts, principally on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), which benefited from a lower Nymex NG price.

– Banging the open: Trade at the beginning of the day to affect the opening price or to set the early-prices as reference prices for the future. Early trades signal information about a commodity to the other participants.

» Pages 125-128 of 5. Market Manipulation in A Handbook of Energy Market Basics by staff at the Division of Energy Oversight at FERC, July 2012.

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etinPage 17JPM is a Market Manipulator

or Not? JPMVEC (JPM Ventures Energy Cooperation) is a JP Morgan’s subsidiary with a strong interest to own power plants:

– JPMVEC is not authorized to operate power plants but it acquired the control of 31 by 2010 through» 2008 Bear Stearns acquisition suggested/forced by the Fed came with 27 power plants.

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York gave JPMorgan a letter stating that “any assets or activities acquired from Bear Stearns that JPMorgan is not currently permitted to own or engage in shall be treated as permissible assets or activities for a period of two years.”

» 2010 Huntington acquisitions and RBS/Sempra acquisitions, each came with 2 power plants – June 20, 2010: After requests from JPM, the Fed eventually authorized JPM to enter into tolling (plant rental)

agreements, energy management contracts, and long-term supply contracts with power plants, but declined to authorize JPM to take direct ownership of a power plant, as an impermissible mixing of banking and commerce.

– February 23, 2011, JPMorgan notified the Fed that … JPMorgan intended to assert merchant banking authority to continue owning them [power plants]. In Fall of 2014, JPM still owned the plants.

JPM’s Houston office was run by Francis Dunleavy reporting to Blythe Masters, head of JPM Commodities. They hired John Bartholomew from Southern California Edison, he was a key designer of the bidding strategies.

– “On April 29, 2010, Mr. Bartholomew’s resume made its way to … Mr. Dunleavy… On his resume, he stated that he had identified a “flaw in the market mechanism … causing CAISO to misallocate millions of dollars.”

– Strategy: Submit low-priced winning bids to the wholesale market: E.g., Bid $60/MWh when cost is $65/MWh. CAISO/MISO’s make-whole payment mechanism: Compensate generators at above-market prices to provide an

incentive for plant owners to participate in the bidding auctions. – “JPMVEC used the make-whole payments in connection with its bidding strategies to more than make up for the

money it lost at market rates, frequently receiving, in the end, twice its costs plus the same market payments that other market participants received, without adding any grid reliability benefits.”

– E.g., Market price=$62/MWh, JPMVEC receives $62 not $60 per MWh. It also receives twice the cost = $130. JPMVEC operated plants in CAISO and MISO and is alleged by FERC

– “to make profits from power plants that were usually out of the money in the marketplace.” – JPMVEC’s schemes caused California and Michigan to pay ~ $124 million in “excessive” payments to JPM.

» Pages 340-346 of “Section VI. JP Morgan Chase” in Wall Street Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities. This senate report released by Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations chaired by Carl Levin and John McCain on Nov 20-21, 2014.

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etinPage 18

From Wholesale Market to Spot Market Several hours before the time block (for which transactions are considered), wholesale market

closes. This is called “gate closure”. At the gate closure, sellers and buyers report their position to the SO:

– Sellers: TX-En to produce 200 MWh; Luminant to produce 100 MWh; Dynamo to produce 80 MWh.– Buyers: Relergy to buy 50 MWh; Green Mntn to buy 60 MWh; JcPenney to buy 90 MWh; Airports to buy

100 MWh; TXU to buy 30 MWh; DART to buy 30 MWh; Cirro wanted to buy 70 MWh but can get only 20 MWh at $100/MWh.

Sellers (generators) also provide bids to increase production or offers to decrease production.– Dynamo has two units each at 80 MWh; one is scheduled (to be used) and the other is idle.– Dynamo bids for the idle unit 80 MWh at $105/MWh to the SO.– Dynamo offers to decrease the scheduled 80 MWh production at the operational unit down to at least 10

MWh if the SO pays $20/MWh. It wants to keep the unit on at 10MWh or above to avoid a shutdown. Buyers (retailers) provide bids to decrease demand or offers to increase demand.

– Cirro offers to buy 50 MWh more at $105/MWh.– Cirro bids to decrease its demand down to 0 MWh if it is offered $30/MWh. In this case, Cirro might be

thinking of satisfying its demand from another resource where the spread is less than $30/MWh.

SO matches 50 MWh extra capacity bid of Dynamo the offer of Cirro. Cirro pays $50*105 to Dynamo in the spot market. Note that matching of extra capacity with extra demand

is through the SO. Buyer and seller cannot engage in a bilateral transaction in real time. If there is excess demand, ERCOT orders shut downs – phone calls to industrial facilities.

SO Managed

SpotMarket

- Contractual positions from Wholesale Market- Bids to increase production / decrease demand- Offers to decrease production / increase demand- Updated customer demand forecast

Accepted bids and offers

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etinPage 19

Retail MarketDay-ahead

FuturesReal-time

Spot

Retail MarketDay-ahead

Retail MarketReal-time

Retail Market

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etinPage 20Retail Market

Wholesale MarketTransmission Lines

Genco Genco

GencoGenco Genco

Retail MarketDistribution Lines

Retailer

Customers

RetailerRetailerRetailer Retailer

CustomersCustomers

• Retailers buy electricity in the wholesale market and sell it in the retail market.• Electricity price in the wholesale market depends a lot on the demand. It is about $20-30/MWh when demand is at medium levels. It can grow to several hundred, even $1000/MWh with the demand. • The cap on the wholesale price is increased to $4,500/MWh from $3,500/MWh in Ercot region in April 2012.

For about 1000 hours price was above $50

Source: 2010 State of the Market Report for the Ercot Wholesale Electricity Markets.

www.potomaceconomics.com/markets_monitored/ERCOT365*24=8768

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etinPage 21Retailers are Subject to Volatile Input Price

What should retailers do?

Wholesale price

Freq

uenc

y

Retailer

Traditionally, constant prices for residential customers and some time-of-use

(ToU) prices for industrial customers.Retailer faces risk in wholesale prices.

Retail price

Freq

uenc

y Retailer can pass the same or less

risk to consumers.

Is your electricity retailer an insurance company?

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etinPage 22

Attempting to Brand Electricity in Retail Markets

Electricity has been considered to be a commodity (standard product)– Competition in commodity markets is based solely on price (no other differentiating product feature)– Price-based competition drives prices towards costs and reduces profit margin

Branding a product is creating different product features that are valued by consumers– E.g., Double Ristretto Venti, Half-soy nonfat decaf organic chocolate brownie iced vanilla, Double-shot gingerbread

frappuccino, Extra hot, With foam whipped cream upside down, Double-blended one sweet‘n low and one nutrasweet, and Ice

Electricity retailers find it challenging to brand electricity– Electricity seems to lack many differentiating product features– Consumer perception of features is weak and unclear

» Weak perception: What would be the increase in your monthly bill if the price of electricity increases by 1 cent / kWh?» Unclear perception: Czech consumers think of nuclear power as green power

“I was born … where they built the first nuclear power station in Czech Republic and that is the best air in the Czech Republic.” p.156

Towards branding electricity, some differentiating product features Price

– Seasonal– Time-of-use– Index-based: Price depends on the price of a commodity such as coal or natural gas

Fuel type: Coal, Gas (low emission), Nuclear (no emission), Renewable Contract terms:1 – 60 months Early termination fees: none or some. Distribution costs Special project costs For m

ore

on b

rand

ing a

nd it

s im

plem

enta

tion

in Ic

eland

, N

orw

ay,

Esto

nia,

Polan

d, C

zech

Rep

ublic

see

: F.

Lar

sen.

Ene

rgy

Bran

ding

.20

17. P

algra

ve M

acm

illan

.

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etinPage 23Seasonal Prices: Monthly

Demand during the summer is high and during the winter is low. Georgia Power Standard Rate Residential Contract

www.georgiapower.com/residential/rate-plans/standard-service.cshtml

Summer Season High DemandWinter Season Low Demand

9.6

4.6

8.6

7.6

6.6

5.6 Base Price

Winter &Summer

ForConsuming

More

ForConsuming

A Lot

SummerQuantity Induced

“Premium”$/kWh

36.24=650*5.574716.74=350*4.781732.42=350*9.2614

650 1000

16

32

48

64

52.98=36.24+16.7468.66=36.24+32.42

kWhBase Rate

ConsumeMore

ConsumeA Lot

$

ForConsuming

More

ForConsuming

A Lot

WinterQuantity Induced

“Discount”

80

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etinPage 24Extreme, Intermediate and Implementable

Retailer Prices: Hourly Traditionally retailers have charged a constant (over both year and day) price to consumers.

– Since they were integrated with power generators, wholesale price and its variability were not apparent.– Deregulation of markets have revealed wholesale price variability.

A retailer may charge the wholesale price to the consumers by passing all the price risk to consumers. – Wholesale price increases to $1000 per MWh in Ercot area or more during summer time. This extreme price

plan can bankrupt some consumers. An intermediate pricing strategy is to blend wholesale price with a constant price.

– To make this strategy implementable, keep it constant during peak and off-peak hours.

0

$ / kWh0.20

0.16

0.12

0.08

0.04

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24=0

Constant price=Traditional Retailer Price

Intermediate price

Wholesale price

Time-of-use

Implementable price

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etinPage 25What would you (consumer)

do with ToU prices? Suppose your utility is charging two prices:

– Plan A: $0.08/kWh until noon and $0.12/kWh afterwards – Plan B: $0.06/kWh until noon and $0.14/kWh afterwards – Plan C: $0.04/kWh during until noon and $0.16/kWh afterwards– Plan D: Free nights offer of TXU and high dollars otherwise

Your activities are

ConsumekWh Plan A Plan B Plan C

Air conditioning 25 No change No change AM

Charge car 20 AM AM AM

Lighting 6 No change No change No change

Gaming, TV, Internet surfing 5 No change AM AM

Laundry (washing/drying) 4 AM AM AM

Cooking (range top, oven) 3 PM PM ?

Running dishwasher 3 PM ? ?

Industrial customers responded to ToU prices. Residential customer prices in TX might be too low to change habits!

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etinPage 26Summary

Day-ahead Real-time

Wholesale MarketDay-ahead

Wholesale MarketReal-time

Wholesale Market

Retail MarketDay-ahead

Retail MarketReal-time

Retail Market

Visible Hand of a Regulator over Markets

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etinPage 27References

Based on - Liberalisation, Deregulation and Regulation. Chapter 4 of Electricity Markets. C. Harris, 2006.- Fundamentals of Power System Economics. D. Kirschen and G. Strbac, 2010.- Reevaluation of Vertical Integration and Unbundling in Restructured Electricity Markets. Chapter 1 in

Competitive Electricity Markets, ed., F.P. Sioshansi, 2008.- Wall Street Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities. This senate report released by Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations chaired by Carl Levin and John McCain on Nov 20-21, 2014. - A Handbook of Energy Market Basics by staff at the Division of Energy Oversight at FERC, July 2012.- A Framework for the Analysis of Market Manipulation. S.D. Ledgerwood and P.R. Carpenter. 2012.

Review of Law and Economics, Vol.8, Iss.1: 253-295.