Not Just for Profitby Marjorie Kelly

02/26/09

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by Marjorie Kelly

forProfitEmerging alternatives to the

shareholder-centric model could helpcompanies avoid ethical mishaps and

contribute more to the world at large.

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When Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bankreceived the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2006, oneendeavor lifted into the limelight was Grameen DanoneFoods Ltd. This was a pathbreaking collaborative en-terprise, launched that year as a 5050 joint venturebetween Groupe Danone the US$16 billion multi-national yogurt maker and the Grameen companiesYunus had cofounded. Yunus called the joint venturea social business, which he said could be a pioneeringmodel for a more humane form of capitalism. AsYunus explained in his book Creating a World withoutPoverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism(PublicAffairs, 2007), a social business is a profit-making company driven by a larger mission. It carriesthe energy and entrepreneurship of the private sector,raises capital through the market economy, and dealswith products, services, customers, markets, expenses,and revenues but with the profit-maximization prin-ciple replaced by the social-benefit principle.

The mission of Grameen Danone Foods is to bringaffordable nutrition to malnourished children inBangladesh with a fortified yogurt, under the brandname Shokti Doi (which means yogurt for power inBengali, the countrys language). It began in October2005, when Franck Riboud, the CEO of GroupeDanone, took Yunus to lunch in Paris. We would liketo find ways to help feed the poor, said Riboud. Yunussuggested the revolutionary joint venture and proposedthat a new structure be invented for it, a hybrid betweennonprofit and for-profit.

Like a conventional business, Grameen Danonemust recover its full costs from operations. Yet, like anonprofit, it is driven by a cause rather than by profit. Ifall goes well, investors will receive only a token 1 percent

annual dividend, with all other profits being plowedback into the business. The ventures primary aim is tocreate social benefits for those whose lives the companytouches. For example, the first Grameen Danone fac-tory, which opened in November 2006, was deliberate-ly built small, as a prototype for community-basedplants that would provide jobs across Bangladesh. Itsjust a tiny little plant, but it has a big message, saidYunus in a speech to the Global Alliance for ImprovedNutrition, the nonprofit organization brought in tomonitor the companys impact on local health. Whilewe make money, we can also do good. Riboud adds,Im deeply convinced that [humanitys] future relies onour ability to explore and invent new business modelsand new types of business corporations.

Yunus and Riboud are not alone in seeing thecritical importance of instilling a purpose other thanshort-term profits at the core of corporate designs. In acelebrated January 2008 speech at the World EconomicForum, Bill Gates called for a new form of creative cap-italism. And around the world largely beneath theradar of mainstream awareness alternative designs arebeing developed that, like Grameen Danone, seamlesslyblend a central social mission with profitable operation.These include the burgeoning microfinance industry,emerging hybrids like nonprofit venture-capital firms,new architectures like Google.org that embody for-profit philanthropy, dual-class shareholding structures,employee-owned companies, the foundation-ownedcorporations of northern Europe, and a variety of coop-eratives on every continent. These models vary enor-mously in size and mission, but they are significant forthe same reason: Together, they represent an evolution-ary step in the development of corporate structure.

Marjorie Kelly(MKelly@Tellus.org) is a seniorassociate with the TellusInstitute in Boston and is writ-ing a book with the workingtitle Economic Genesis, fromwhich this article is adapted.Formerly the editor ofBusiness Ethics, she is acofounder of Corporation20/20 (www.corporation2020.org), a multi-stakeholder net-work working to envision andadvance alternative designs.

Previous pages:Farmers delivering milk toa Grameen Danone yogurtfactory in the village ofBogru, Bangladesh oneof many small communityenterprises established bythis joint venture.

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The Soul of a New DesignFor years, critics of the corporation have argued that theprevailing design of publicly held corporations is innate-ly flawed. That design involves a board that is elected byshareholders with votes allocated proportionately tothe number of shares held whose members thenappoint a semiautonomous CEO as the shareholdersagent, who in turn delegates authority down throughthe ranks. In many ways, this has been a highly effectivemodel. The managerial hierarchy structure, as corpo-rate historian Alfred D. Chandler Jr. called it, has ac-complished more in a short time than any other formthe world has known.

But this shareholder-centric model has also con-tributed over the years to what former Citigroup CEOJohn Reed has called the iron triangle of short-termpressures hedge funds, stock options, and stock ana-lysts that keeps companies narrowly focused on quar-terly profits.

The financial meltdown of 2008 was a direct resultof the pursuit of immediate profit by investmentbankers and mortgage brokers who disregarded theimpact of their actions on customers, on the larger econ-omy, and indeed on stockholders and the company itselfin the long term. Those who wanted to operate withintegrity found it difficult. They were constrained by acorporate design that reinforced the need to make thenumbers by any means possible a design thatbestowed the greatest governance power on short-termshareholders, the stakeholders with the least interest inlong-term performance or the external community.Conventional methods for preventing abuses, such asregulation and criminalizing egregious behavior, areonly partially effective. In the long run, the best way to

get to the root of the problem will be for corporate own-ership and governance design itself to evolve.

If the idea of creating alternative forms of corporateownership and governance is unfamiliar in conversa-tions about the meltdown (or other business abuses), itsbecause the prevailing form of corporate design is gen-erally taken as a given. Under the laws of most countries,its difficult for corporations to adopt any other form.But against the odds, tender green shoots of new com-pany designs are emerging today, and existing alterna-tives are being adapted. Some emerging models are aslikely to be profitable as more conventional companies,and all are more adept at pursuing goals that conven-tional for-profit companies usually fail to reach: treatingcustomers fairly, protecting the environment, creating ahealthy workplace, and supporting the communities inwhich they operate.

Richard Nelson, an economics professor atColumbia University who cofounded the field of evolu-tionary economics, observes that social systems evolvebecause of two kinds of innovation: advances in physicaltechnologies (such as new environmental and energytechnologies), and advances in social technologies (suchas new forms of organization). As these two types ofinnovation influence each other, the governance modelsthat emerge, such as microfinance-related structures,take their place alongside older, more established alter-native models, such as cooperatives, employee-ownedfirms, and government-sponsored enterprises. Thesedesigns can be thought of as emergent new organiza-tional species, occupying a new sector of society that is agreenhouse of design experimentation in which thefuture of our economy may be growing.

One helpful way of thinking about these designs

Some emerging models are as likely tobe profitable as more conventional companies,

and all are more adept at pursuing goalsthat for-profit companies usually fail to reach.

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is as representing a hybrid between the traditional for-profit archetype, which has profit at its nucleus, and thetraditional nonprofit archetype, which has social mis-sion at its nucleus. This type of hybrid has been dubbedthe for-benefit enterprise by Heerad Sabeti, CEOof the TransForms Corporation a North Carolinabased manufacturer of wall decorations with about $2million in revenues, which routinely employs peoplewith disabilities and invests heavily in developing itsworkforce. Sabeti is one of several people who havebegun to explore the parameters of this new archetype.(Another source of exploration is the Corporation 20/20initiative, organized by AllenWhite and me at the TellusInstitute in Boston.) All of these initiatives conceive thenew type of organization with a blended purpose at itscore: serving a living mission and making a profit in theprocess. The essential framework of such a company its ownership, governance, capitalization, and compen-sation structures are designed to support this dualmission. And it is this design that enables companies toescape the pressure to maximize short-term profits andinstead to fulfill a more fundamental purpose of eco-nomic activity: to meet human needs and be of benefitto life.

Future experimentation is inevitable; the fully real-ized for-benefit corporate design with all the rightelements, a design thats capable of replacing the domi-nant model of today may not exist yet. We maybe entering a new era of design diversity, in which dif-ferent designs serve different functions. Today, atleast three broad approaches to for-benefit architectureoffer promising models: stakeholder-owned companies,which put ownership in the hands of nonfinancial stake-holders; mission-controlled companies, which separateownership and profits from control and organizationaldirection; and publicprivate hybrids, where profit-driven and mission-driven design elements are com-bined to create unique structures.

Stakeholder-owned CompaniesThe cooperative model of ownership, which dates to themid-19th century, was conceived as an alternative to theshareholder-based ownership model that developed atroughly the same time.The defining feature of the coop-erative model is that these companies are owned andcontrolled by the members they serve. Members mightbe customers (as in a credit union), producers (as ina farmers cooperative), homeowners (as in a housingco-op), employees, or the community. (There is some

overlap between cooperatives and employee-ownedcompanies, but they are not the same; employees canown corporate shares either through cooperatives or inmore conventional business structures through suchmeasures as employee stock-ownership plans.)

Cooperatives are a globe-spanning phenomenon,with membership now at 800 million people morethan double the total from three decades ago. InColombia, SaludCoop provides health-care services to aquarter of the population. In Spain, the MondragnCorporacin Cooperativa is the nations seventh-largestindustrial concern. More Americans hold membershipsin co-ops than hold stock in the stock market. Whenthey are successful, these stakeholder-owned firms canbe extraordinarily long-lived, with remarkable business

Franck Riboud, CEO of Groupe Danone (left),and Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunusin 2006, announcing the launch of an investmentfund for social businesses and namingGrameen Danone Foods as its first project.

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and social impact: Rabobank Group in the Netherlandsand the Springfield ReManufacturing Corporation inthe Missouri Ozarks are two examples of companiesthat have prospered by drawing on the commitmentand engagement of their shareholdercustomers andshareholderemployees, respectively.

The success of firms owned and governed by stake-holders shows that, contrary to some economic assump-tions, theres nothing innately better about independentshareholders or directors. But stakeholder ownershipalso has its flaws. Cooperatives have failed to match thegrowth of shareholder-owned companies because theylack access to capital (laws governing cooperatives oftenput restrictions on capital returns), and they can fail toretain leaders who perceive less chance of accumulating

personal wealth. On the other hand, when employeeownership is matched with involvement, businesses canachieve results that would be considered near-impossiblein conventional companies.

The Cooperative Regions of Organic ProducersPool (CROPP), better known by its brand nameOrganic Valley, is a producer-owned marketing cooper-ative in La Farge, Wis. CROPP is owned by the 1,200organic family farms that produce the dairy, eggs, andmeat it distributes. The companys mission is to save thefamily farm, which means paying as much as possibleto farmers. We dont have any need for profits muchover 2 percent, says CEO George Siemon. Wed justpay taxes on it. Wed rather give it to the farmers.Though growth has slowed in recent months, for yearsPh

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the company grew 30 to 40 percent per year. With 2007revenues of $433 million, Organic Valley stewards oneof the nations four largest organic brands.

Similarly, the John Lewis Partnership PLC, with6.8 billion (about US$10 billion) in revenues in 2007,has a stated purpose of serving the happiness of itsemployeepartners. It is the largest department storechain in the U.K., and also owns 200 Waitrose super-markets. It is 100 percent owned by its 69,000 staffmembers, among whom all profits are shared each year.It is overseen by an unusual bicameral governancestructure: The company has a traditional board ofdirectors as well as a second employee-based governingbody, the partnership council, directly elected byemployees. The partnership council in turn elects fiveof the 12 board members. The council also influencespolicy and holds management to account, since it hasthe formal power to dismiss the chairman.

Mission-controlled CompaniesA little-appreciated but powerful for-benefit model canbe found among companies that manage to be publiclytraded while keeping control in mission-oriented hands.Take Interface Inc., for example. This Fortune 1000flooring company, with 2007 revenues of $1.1 billion, iswell on its way to meeting its ambitious 2008 pledge ofMission Zero by 2020 a pledge to have zero nega-tive impact on the environment within 12 years. Thismeans eliminating waste and switching entirely torenewable energy, as part of the companys larger visionof being the first company that, as founder and CEORay Anderson puts it, shows the entire industrial worldwhat sustainability is in all its dimensions.

Other publicly traded companies have tried tomake this kind of long-term commitment, but havehad to soften the goal through the ups and downs of thestock market. What supports Interfaces mission is ararely mentioned but vital element in its social architec-ture: a dual-class governance structure that puts super-voting shares in the hands of Anderson and a few othertop executives, giving them control of 72 percent ofvotes for the board, although they own far less than amajority of publicly traded shares. Super-voting sharesare generally unavailable to the public, which insulatesthe company from hostile takeovers. In effect, it allowsInterface to be a mission-controlled enterprise, onewhose governance structure reflects both the need forongoing sufficient profit and a broader social priority.

Mission control allows capital to trade freely, even

as it ensures that the mission is not for sale. It allowsleaders to focus the company so that mission becomesthe focal point while profits are energetically pursued.

There are other companies with publicly tradedstock and revenues greater than $1 billion that aresimilarly mission controlled. They include the family-controlled New York Times Company, with its missionof serving an informed electorate; foundation-controlledNovo Nordisk A/S, a Danish pharmaceutical companywith a mission of defeating diabetes; and trust-controlled Grupo Nueva SA, headquartered in Chile,with a mission of contributing to a sustainable LatinAmerica. Perhaps the most notable recent example ofmission-controlled architecture is Google, which adopt-ed a two-tier stock configuration, vesting power with itsfounders, when it went public in 2004.

In the best of these designs, the missions control ofvoting shares is strengthened by an explicit commitmentto mission in the company charter and in the design ofgovernance procedures. Novo Nordisk, for example, hasadopted an ambitious charter that spells out the com-panys values and commitments, including a commit-ment to ensuring that all products and services make asignificant difference in improving the way people liveand work. Each year the company board must report tothe foundation board on how it is ensuring that opera-tions are economically viable, environmentally sound,and socially fair. The foundation board includes anelectrician, scientists, a physician, and a lab technician,so that participants represent many relevant points ofview. Without design elements like these to keep themission in focus, super-voting share structures run therisk of creating company monarchs unanswerable toanything but their own whims which may or maynot remain benign over the long run.

Mission-controlled architecture can offer a solutionto the challenge that socially responsible companies faceas they struggle to keep their social mission alive afterfounders depart or sell their shares. It is rarely sustain-able for the mission of a company to be embodied in thepersonality of a single individual. Research shows thatonce founders depart, the company mission often shifts and in the absence of thoughtful for-benefit design,the pressure of mainstream cultural norms and financialpractices makes it easiest to revert to short-term resultsas the primary goal.

One of the companies that is most explicit in usingdesign to achieve a mission is the Upstream 21Corporation, a socially responsible holding company

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launched by the social investing firm Portfolio 21Investments in Portland, Ore. This holding companywas set up explicitly to buy local companies in order tobuild natural, social, and economic capital within theregion. Oregon stakeholder law says directors may con-sider the interests of many stakeholders, not just stock-holders, in making decisions, and Upstreams articles ofincorporation adopt language saying directors shall doso. The Upstream design also reconfigures voting rights,giving greater power to hands-on owners (includingemployees) and less power to absentee owners.

The directors duty aspect of this design has sincebeen replicated by more than 130 companies signing onto become B corporations, or beneficial corporations.This model is being promoted by Jay Coen Gilbert andhis colleagues at the nonprofit B Lab in Philadelphia,who aim to create a unified marketing presence and cer-tification process for B corporations. Unfortunately,they did not replicate Upstreams redesign of votingrights in their model. Because virtually all B corpora-tions today are founder controlled, these firms may bevulnerable to losing their mission when the foundersdepart. But as the B corporation model becomes morewidely adopted, a community of practice could emerge similar to the communities of employee-owned com-panies and cooperatives, with their networks of attor-neys and consultants that could help in the evolutionof this promising new model.

Publicprivate HybridsA third school of for-benefit design involves companyarchitectures that deliberately blur the lines between for-profit and nonprofit modes of operation likeGrameen Danone. One powerful model here is being

termed for-profit philanthropy, and it is famouslyembodied by Google.org, a boundary-spanning entitycreated by Google. Google.org currently manages anannual philanthropic budget of $2 billion; the amountis based on Googles initial public offering, whichannounced the companys intention to contribute 1 per-cent of equity and 1 percent of profits to charity.

As Brooklyn Law School Professor Dana BrakmanReiser observed in a recent paper, Google.org is not atraditional foundation but a division of Google, stand-ing alongside the engineering, sales, and finance func-tions, yet tasked with addressing climate change, diseasepandemics, and poverty. By eschewing tax-exempt sta-tus, it gains the running room to combine investmentswith grants as it pursues its ambitious goals drawingfully on Googles staff, technology, and products in theprocess. As Reiser put it, Google.orgs use of an inte-grated for-profit division inaugurates a new model: for-profit philanthropy. The director of Google.org isLarry Brilliant, known both for his business acumen (hecofounded the Whole Earth Lectronic Link [WELL]computer network) and for his medical philanthropy(he was a primary figure in the World HealthOrganizations eradication of smallpox and a cofounderof Seva, a foundation that has brought eyesight to morethan 2 million blind people).

Another cross-sector governance structure involvesnonprofit companies that create for-profit subsidiaries.The Great Neighborhoods Development Corporation(GNDC) in Minneapolis where I serve on the board has ushered in a renaissance in the once-blightedPhillips neighborhood by driving out disreputable bars,drug dealers, and prostitutes and bringing in a businessincubator, health clinic, grocery store, and retail shops.

Novo Nordisks charter includes a commitmentto ensuring that all products and services

make a significant difference in improving theway people live and work.

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Although GNDC is a nonprofit organization, its realestate projects are designed to operate in the black.Were in the business of changing the lives of the poor,and were using real estate business development to doit, says Chief Executive Officer Theresa Carr.

Yet another model in this category would be non-profit venture capital funds such as the Acumen Fund,which raises charitable donations to serve the poor buttakes an investing rather than grant-making approach,offering equity and loans to both for-profit and non-profit organizations that deliver affordable housing,energy, and clean water in South Asia and Africa.

Principles beyond PropertyThere is now enough experience with these three basicschools of design stakeholder-owned companies,mission-controlled companies, and publicprivatehybrids to begin to identify some broad principles atwork. Deeply embedded in them is the aim of deliveringhuman or ecological benefits. A company might be aproducer cooperative designed to save the family farm, apharmaceutical company aiming to defeat disease, anemployee-owned firmmaking the workplace into a com-munity, a microfinance institution seeking to end pover-ty, a development corporation revitalizing the inner city,or a public company laying a path to sustainability. Intangible ways, all aim to benefit life. Social issues are notrelegated to an ethics office in room 201 or left to thewhims of particular leaders, however noble they may be.

All the successful examples embody a view of enter-prises as living systems. Most economists and lawprofessors still view companies primarily as forms ofproperty, owned through their shares. But for-benefitdesign starts with the assumption that companies areorganically evolving entities, living social systems inother words, human communities. And their designreflects that view.

These designs also reflect the added complexity ofthe for-benefit sphere, and the need to encourage inno-vation while safeguarding against potential abuses. Thetrack record in the microfinance sector shows why safe-guards are needed, and why trumpeting good inten-tions, in itself, isnt enough. The original Grameen Bankbusiness model pioneered by Muhammad Yunus alleviating poverty by lending small amounts of moneyto micro-entrepreneurs who then become depositors,allowing communities to recirculate capital led todramatic success in Bangladesh. But it also inspired aninternational microfinance industry, which today has its

own rating agencies, consultants, conferences, institutes,and billions upon billions of dollars in internationallending. Central Asia alone is now home to more than1,000 microfinance institutions. In India, the numberof microfinance clients grew 10-fold over four years, tosurpass 10 million at the end of 2007. As this industrygrew, the mission of the original model was sometimeslost. New microfinance banks dispensed with criticalgovernance features, such as training local lending offi-cers to work closely with teams of borrowers. Instead,many simply lent at the highest rates possible. The resulthas been a new set of abuses. Banco Compartamos SA,a Mexican microbank portraying itself as a gentlerlender to the poor, hugely enriched its initial investorswhen it went public in 2007. Yet it reportedly made thatfortune in part by charging annual interest rates ofalmost 100 percent to illiterate Mexican mothers.

Some may wonder if these alternative designs areintended to promote or lead to socialism, but in fact theconcept of private ownership is deeply intrinsic to them.Instead of doing away with private ownership, thesefirms redesign it. It has been clear since the days of AdolfBerle and Gardiner Means who published theirbreakthrough book, The Modern Corporation andPrivate Property, in 1932 that business ownership isoften separated from its most vital element, control.These designs go further by concentrating control in adeliberately chosen group, selected as stewards of thefirms living mission. Ownership shares can be boughtand sold like property, but controlling shares represent aliving essence that is not for sale or for sale onlyunder restricted conditions.

In the case of Grupo Nueva, control is vested in theVIVA Trust, which is charged in perpetuity with pro-tecting the vision and values of the firm. In describingthe value of the trust, founder Stephan Schmidheinysaid, Now there is an ownership structure that is per-manent, reliable, and committed to the long term, andthat will not be a victim of speculation or personalwhims or the lack of preparedness of a successor; all thisreduces risks for the investor.

In other cases, the mission is preserved through gov-ernance designs that feature nonfinancial stakeholders.At CROPP (Organic Valley), for example, governanceby a central board is supplemented by a network ofregional farmer pools, each with staff support. In stillother cases, for instance, with cooperatives, governancedesign is shaped by laws that stipulate a policy of oneperson, one vote, as contrasted with one share, one vote.

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Diversity is the hallmark of these governance innova-tions. For if capital is the only group with a seat at thetable, capitals view of the corporation is likely to prevail:The company will be seen as a piece of property whoseworth is measured by stock price.

Meeting the MainstreamLeaders of traditional firms may recognize the opportuni-ties in these new forms. They can achieve a broader arrayof goals by adopting a for-profit philanthropic division, asGoogle has, or attempt a socialbusiness joint venture,along the lines of Grameen Danone Foods. They can rap-idly improve their operational excellence through theengagement inherent in employee ownership, as founderand CEO Jack Stack has at Springfield ReManufacturing.A few may even attempt to transition to a mission-controlled design, like that employed by Interface.

Such models will have to overcome long-standing,deeply embedded cultural traditions and legal impera-tives. But as nascent alternatives to the conventionalstructure quietly succeed, options may continue to openin coming years, particularly among business startups.It is the entrepreneurial spirit that has always led theevolution from one age to the next, said Mike Thomas,a former executive with Granite Construction Companywho is now a senior partner at the Monterey Institutefor Social Architecture in Monterey, Calif.

In certain cases, alternative enterprises best servetheir social mission by keeping profits low. On the otherhand, some alternative models can be very economicallycompetitive. Studies have shown, for example, thatemployee-owned firms modestly outperform their peers,and that when these companies have high employeeinvolvement, they do even better. In a 2002 paper, SteenThomsen and Caspar Rose of the Copenhagen BusinessSchool found that foundation-owned firms commonthroughout northern Europe perform no worse thanand even slightly better than traditional firms. The crit-ical difference is that these companies do not set makingmoney apart from other goals; there is no false choicebetween making a profit and fulfilling other missions.The design of the company is aimed at accomplishingmultiple goals at once.

We live in an age when short-term pressures haveallowed speculation to overtake the more traditional,human functions of business. Alternatively designedcompanies offer important lessons in how corporateownership and governance can evolve differently. Andtheyre important in their own right as well, for they are

Resources

Arvind Ashta and Matthew Bush, Ethical Issues in Sustainability,Outreach, and Impact of Microfinance: Lessons in Governance from theBanco Compartamos IPO, 2008, ssrn.com/abstract=1093665: Casestudy review of this Mexican microbank.

John Elkington and Pamela Hartigan, The Power of Unreasonable People:How Social Entrepreneurs Create Markets That Change the World (HarvardBusiness Press, 2008): A guide to social enterprises around the world.

Marjorie Kelly and Allen White, Corporate Design: The MissingBusiness and Public Policy Issue of Our Time, Tellus Institute, November2007, www.corporation2020.org/pdfs/CorporateDesign.pdf: Principles forcorporate architecture accountable to broader societal interests.

Art Kleiner, Jack Stacks Story Is an Open Book, s+b, Fall 2001,www.strategy-business.com/press/article/20088: Profile of the founder ofone of the most innovative cooperatives, Springfield ReManufacturingCorporation.

Riccardo Lotti, Peter Mensing, and Davide Valenti, A CooperativeSolution, s+b, Summer 2006, www.strategy-business.com/press/article/06209: Describes why some of the most successful companies inEurope, including Rabobank and Italys COOP supermarket chain, arestakeholder-owned.

Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 2008, http://works.bepress.com/dana_brakman_reiser/14: Includes an analysis of Googlesboundary-breaking innovations in for-profit philanthropy.

Corey Rosen and Ed Carberry, Ownership Management: Building aCulture of Lasting Innovation (National Center for Employee Ownership,2002): Offers concrete, specific ideas on how to structure plans and getemployees involved in decisions.

Muhammad Yunus, Creating a World without Poverty: Social Businessand the Future of Capitalism (PublicAffairs, 2007): Recounts the foundingof Grameen Danone Foods and outlines the authors concept of socialbusiness.

The Fourth Sector Web site, www.FourthSector.net: Outlines HeeradSabetis concept of for-benefit organizations.

The National Center for Employee Ownership Web site,www.NCEO.org: Authoritative source on employee stock-ownershipplans, equity compensation plans, and ownership culture.

The National Cooperative Business Association Web site,www.NCBA.coop: Has a mission to develop, advance, and protect coop-erative enterprise.

Corporation 20/20 Web site, www.Corporation2020.org: A multi-stake-holder initiative cofounded by author Marjorie Kelly, which aims to devel-op and disseminate corporate designs in which social purpose moves fromthe periphery to the core of the organization.

For more business thought leadership, sign up for s+bs RSS feed atwww.strategy-business.com/rss.

likely to prove better adapted to the cultural and eco-logical demands of the 21st century than the industrialage models they might one day replace. Such businessesmay seem like anomalies today. But they more closelyreflect the priorities that have engendered the longest-lasting businesses throughout human history. +

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