MandatoryAuditFirmRotation_SummaryofImpacts.pdf

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  • 8/10/2019 MandatoryAuditFirmRotation_SummaryofImpacts.pdf

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    Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

    Summary of Impacts

    Debate continues, mostly initiated in Europe, about proposals to require companies to change their audit firm after a set period.

    This is being referred to as mandatory audit firm rotation.

    This document sets out some of the views expressed for and against the idea. These views have been collected from published

    studies and public commentary into the debates. The purpose of collating these comments is to provide a simple summary of

    some of the complex views being raised in relation to the issue. The views are not provided to promote any particular view but

    merely to provide information in a clear manner for those wishing to obtain an overview of the issues.

    The views have been summarised in relation to the impact of mandatory audit firm rotation on appearance of independence,

    audit quality, commerciality and markets.

    Impact on the Appearance of Independence

    Views in favour Views not in favour

    The objective of independence is

    more likely achieved if the auditfirm changes on a regular basis. Itgives a clear appearance ofseparation between the audit firmand the company and reduces therisk of bias or familiarity.

    Basic threats can be reduced(self-interest, advocacy,familiarity, intimidation)

    Prevents the auditor beingbeholden to managementfor thecontinuation of the auditrelationship

    Removes managements ability tothreatento remove other servicesfrom auditor in return for keepingthe audit engagement

    Reduces thestream of futurepayments that the audit firm risksshould the auditor disagree withmanagement. Objectivity could bediminished if auditors are afraidthe audit work will jeopardise therelationships between their firmsand the companies they audit

    Prevents the auditorsubconsciously advocatingthecompanys point of view

    In Australia, the signing audit partner, who is responsible for the audit

    opinion, is required to change after a set period (every 5 years for listedentities). This allows independence and objectivity to be maintained inpractice, and is a concept that can be used to support appearance ofindependence (the audit partner signs an audit opinion in their own name)

    Introduces substantial additional cost and complexity for no real benefitother than appearance. It is disruptive to both the auditor and the companyto change auditors on an arbitrary schedule regardless of the companyscircumstancesthe company will have to spend time and money bringing theauditor up to speed

    Adverse effects for other stakeholders in the financial reporting supply chain,such as preparers (cost and inconvenience), regulators (cost andadministration to monitor and regulate rotation) and stakeholders (lack of

    choice and visibility).Little support from engaged market participants. Globally the idea of auditfirm rotation has raised strong opposition:

    90% of letters to a PCAOB debate opposed the idea of mandatory auditfirm rotation

    Many commentators in the European Parliament have voiced concern atthe proposals

    There are alternative and more effective, less costly and less disruptivemethodsto reinforce auditor independence, objectivity and professionalism,such as signing partner rotation, professional standards relating to fee levelsand type of work, and audit committees overview and assessment. Theseoptions provide a framework for independence, objectivity andprofessionalism which can also be tailored to specific entity circumstances.

    Substantial Australian laws and standards are already in placeto addressauditor independence

    Studies of mandatory audit firm rotation are inconclusive on any benefit toactual independence

    Impact on Market Participants

    Views in favour Views not in favour

    Independence is vital togiving an objective opinionwhich is relied upon byinvestors. Firm rotation is

    a measure to achieveindependence

    Audit committee effectiveness is reduced. Forced rotation artificially limits thefreedom of those charged with governance to appoint the audit firm which best meetsthe needs of the company and its stakeholders

    Shareholders will lose ability to understand if there is a reason for change ofauditors. Currently if there is a change, it can signal to shareholders that there may bedispute. If there is mandatory rotation, this signalling will be lost

    Reduces competition and restricts free market forces. Due to the interaction withindependence rules, some firms may be unable to tender at the time of the proposal

  • 8/10/2019 MandatoryAuditFirmRotation_SummaryofImpacts.pdf

    2/2

    Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

    Summary of Impacts

    Debate continues, mostly initiated in Europe, about proposals to require companies to change their audit firm after a set period.

    This is being referred to as mandatory audit firm rotation.

    This document sets out some of the views expressed for and against the idea. These views have been collected from published

    studies and public commentary into the debates. The purpose of collating these comments is to provide a simple summary of

    some of the complex views being raised in relation to the issue. The views are not provided to promote any particular view but

    merely to provide information in a clear manner for those wishing to obtain an overview of the issues.

    The views have been summarised in relation to the impact of mandatory audit firm rotation on appearance of independence,

    audit quality, commerciality and markets.

    Impact on Quality of Work

    Views of those in favour Views of those not in favour

    Increases level of scepticism

    If auditors are more independent, they will apply morescepticism to their work

    No conclusive evidence that mandatory audit firm rotation

    will increase auditor independence hence no link toincreased level of scepticism

    Brings a fresh perspectiveand view to the audit.Auditors will spend more time seeking evidence ratherthan assuming or anticipating results based on priorknowledge

    Any loss in efficiencies gained from past experiencecould be mitigated through enhancedpredecessor/successor auditor communications

    Loss in knowledge adversely impacts quality

    A change in the audit firm means a loss in the knowledge ofthe client, their operations and fundamental business risks.This knowledge is an integral part of a quality audit

    Predecessor communications are not an effective way toobtain knowledge of corporate behaviour

    The rotation of key audit partnersbalances the need for afresh perspective with the need for continuity of knowledgeof the client and inherent risks

    Gives auditors incentives to be more alert, sincethey know that their work will be reviewed by anotherfirm. May pay closer attention to detail and be moresceptical

    Removes tendency to placeexcessive reliance onprior year files

    Auditing standardsgovern the level and extent ofprocedures and the collection of sufficient appropriate auditevidence from a number of sources. Scepticism is requiredunder these auditing standards, and under APES 110.

    Additional regulation is a duplicative and added layer toaddress audit behaviour which is already mandated.

    Commercial Impacts

    Views of those in favour Views of those not in favour

    Provideswider range of audit firms access toaudit opportunities. Mandatory rotation means moreopportunities for firms of all sizes to tender

    Could lead to more companies moving to larger auditfirmsbecause these firms have more resources to get upto speed quickly which will be a key driver in the tenderprocess

    It may make the best qualified audit firmunavailableif,for example, a firm chooses not to tender

    Smaller audit firms may be able to obtain morework in other areas if larger firms restrict providingother services to make themselves available foraudit

    Could reduce qualityif companies move to auditorsoffering lower fees but which dont have necessaryspecialism, geographical spread, or industry knowledge