Managing Info Security

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    NSS* Program Strategies

    *Networked Systems Survivability

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    2002 by Carnegie Mellon University3

    Survivable Enterprise ManagementOur mission is to assist organizations in attaining and

    maintaining an acceptable level of information asset protectionby:

    applying information security management practices and

    techniques identifying, initiating, and validating effective survivability

    practices and protection strategies

    Requires acknowledging and establishinginformation survivability as a legitimate, on-going

    business process

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    Agenda

    Beyond Technology Vulnerability Evaluations

    Overview of OCTAVE

    Summary

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    Evaluation Practice in January 1999

    Products and services varied widely.

    Evaluations

    tended to have a technological focus

    were often conducted without a sites direct participation were often precipitated by an event (reactive)

    Evaluation criteria were often inconsistent or undefined.

    Organizations typically did not follow through by

    implementing the results of the evaluation.

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    Need to Expand the SecurityEvaluation Focus

    Both organizational and I/T focused

    Proactive rather than reactive

    Based on organizations unique risk factors

    Inclusive of security policy, practices, procedures

    Foundation for continuous security improvement

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    Organizational Gap

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    You Own YourRisk Risk is unique to each organization.

    Risk is linked to business drivers. All levels of the organization need to be engaged.

    Internal expertise is required.

    External experts can be acquired as needed. Although you can insure for some things, your risks

    cannot be completely outsourced.

    Internal

    Expertise

    External

    Expertise

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    Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, andVulnerability Evaluation

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    Founding Philosophy

    You cannot mitigate all risks.

    Your budget is not limitless. Neither are your other

    resources.

    You cannot prevent all determined, skilled incursions.

    You need to determine the best use of your limitedresources to ensure the survivability of your enterprise.

    enterprise view

    focus on critical few

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    OCTAVE Approach

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    OCTAVE and Risk Management

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    Important Aspects of OCTAVE- 1

    Identifies information security risks that could prevent you

    from achieving your mission - ensuring business continuity.

    Looks at information security enterprise-wide.

    Creates a focused protection strategy

    information asset-driven threat and risk identification

    based on your organizations- unique operational security risks

    - current security practices

    - current organizational and technological weaknesses

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    Important Aspects of OCTAVE - 2

    Enables you to effectively communicate critical

    information security issues.

    Provides a foundation for future security improvements.

    Positions your organization for compliance with data

    security requirements or regulations.

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    OCTAVE Approach

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    OCTAVE Principles

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    OCTAVE Process

    Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation

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    Conducting OCTAVE

    An interdisciplinary team -- composed of:-business or mission-related staff-information technology staff

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    Scoping OCTAVE

    Focus the risk evaluation to look at a cross section of the

    key areas of the enterprise.

    Use the knowledge and expertise across a broad range of

    employees- senior managers

    - operational area managers

    - staff - information technology staff

    Scale the evaluation up or down by changing the scope.

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    OCTAVE Method

    Focused on large-scale organizations

    Is a systematic, context-sensitive method for evaluating risks series of workshops conducted by analysis team

    Defined by method implementation guide (procedures, guidance,

    worksheets, information catalogs) method training Managing Information Security Risks (Addison-Wesleybook)

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    OCTAVE-S

    Currently in pilot testing, this method defines a more

    structured method for evaluating risks in small organizations. requires less security expertise, if any, in analysis team

    analysis team has a full, or nearly full, understanding of

    the organization and what is important uses fill-in-the-blank as opposed to essay style

    Will be defined by detailed procedures for each process

    worksheets and templates for each process

    information catalogs

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    OCTAVE Process

    Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation

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    Phase 1 Questions

    What are your organizations critical information-related

    assets?

    What is important about each critical asset?

    Who or what threatens each critical asset?

    What is your organization currently doing to protect its

    critical assets?

    What weaknesses in policy and practice currently existin your organization?

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    OCTAVE Catalog of Practices -1

    StrategicPractice Areas

    Security

    Awareness

    and Training

    Collaborative

    Security

    Management

    Security

    Management

    Contingency

    Planning/Disaster

    Recovery

    Security

    Strategy

    Security

    Policies and

    Regulations

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    OCTAVE Catalog of Practices -2

    Physical

    Security

    Information

    Technology

    Security

    Staff Security

    Operational

    Practice Areas

    System and Network Management

    System Administration Tools

    Monitoring and Auditing IT SecurityAuthentication and Authorization

    Vulnerability Management

    Encryption

    Security Architecture and Design

    Incident Management

    General Staff

    Practices

    Physical Security Plans

    and Procedures

    Physical Access ControlMonitoring and Auditing

    Physical Security

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    Critical AssetsThe most important assets to the organization

    information systems

    services and applications

    people

    There will be a large adverse impact to the organization if

    the asset is disclosed to unauthorized people. the asset is modified without authorization.

    the asset is lost or destroyed.

    access to the asset is interrupted.

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    Threat ProfileA threat profile contains a range of threat scenarios for a

    critical asset using the following sources of threats: human actors using network access

    human actors using physical access

    system problems

    other problems

    The threat profile is visually represented using asset-based

    threat trees, one for each of the four sources of threats.

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    Threat Properties

    Asset

    Actor

    Motive (optional)

    Access (optional)

    Outcome

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    Human Actors - Network Accessdisclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    deliberate

    outside

    inside

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosuremodification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    accidental

    deliberate

    network

    asset

    accidental

    Note: heavy

    red line

    indicates a

    perceived

    threatasset access actor motive outcome

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    Human Actors - Physical Accessdisclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    accidental

    deliberate

    deliberate

    outside

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosuremodification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    inside

    physical

    asset

    accidental

    asset access actor motive outcome

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    System Problemsdisclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    software defects

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruptiondisclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    malicious code

    asset

    system crashes

    LAN instability

    asset actor outcome

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    Other Problemsdisclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    natural disasters

    asset actor outcome

    ISP unavailable

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruptiondisclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    asset

    telecommunications

    problems or

    unavailability

    power supply

    problems

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    OCTAVE Process

    Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation

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    Phase 2 Questions

    How do people access each critical asset?

    What infrastructure components are related to each

    critical asset? What are the key components of the

    computing infrastructure?

    What technological weaknesses expose your critical

    assets to threats?

    Which technological weaknesses need to be addressed

    immediately?

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    Vulnerability Evaluation Strategy

    Conduct a vulnerability

    evaluation that isfocused on where

    critical assets live

    Make a long-term

    recommendation to eventuallybuild, or contract for, a

    vulnerability management

    capability

    Phase 2 Strategy

    Identify key components and review

    previous evaluation results or

    contract for a vulnerability evaluation

    of those components

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    Vulnerability Evaluations andTools

    Vulnerability evaluation tools identify known weaknesses in technology

    misconfigurations of well known administrative

    functions, such as

    - file permissions on certain files

    - accounts with null passwords

    what an attacker can determine about your systems

    and networks

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    Vulnerability Tools and Practices

    Information

    Technology

    Security

    Operational

    Practice Areas

    System and Network Management

    Monitoring and Auditing IT Security

    Authentication and AuthorizationEncryption

    Vulnerability Management

    System Administration Tools

    Security Architecture and Design

    Incident Management

    General Staff

    Practices

    Staff SecurityPhysical

    Security

    Physical Security Plans

    and Procedures

    Physical Access Control

    Monitoring and Auditing

    Physical Security

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    Threats Driven by Vulnerabilities -1disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    deliberate

    deliberate

    outside

    inside

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosuremodification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    accidental

    network

    asset

    accidental

    asset access actor motive outcome

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    Threats Driven by Vulnerabilities -2disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    software defects

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruptiondisclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    malicious code

    asset actor outcome

    LAN instability

    system crashes

    asset

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    OCTAVE Process

    Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation

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    Phase 3 QuestionsWhat is the potential impact on your organization due to

    each threat? (What are your risks?)

    Which are the highest-priority risks to your organization?

    What policies and practices does your organization need toaddress?

    What can your organization do to recognize, resist, andrecover from its highest-priority risks?

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    Impact on the OrganizationWhen something negative occurs, it can have an impact

    on your company.

    Impact is described using either qualitative or quantitative

    values for several areas of potential impact.

    Values for each area are defined by a set ofevaluation

    criteria.

    Once you define a good set of impact evaluation criteria,

    they tend to remain stable from one evaluation to the next.

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    Impact CriteriaA basic set of impact areas includes:

    reputation/customer confidence

    life/health of customers

    fines/legal penalties

    financial

    productivity other

    Examples: To a hospital, a medium life/health impact is a patient

    death; a high impact is permanently disabling a patient

    $1 million is a low impact to some, a high to others

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    RiskRisk comprises

    an event (a threat scenario) consequence (impact on the organization)

    uncertainty (whether the threat scenario will occur)

    Risks are evaluated to held determine:

    relative priority

    which risks to actually mitigate

    Impact evaluation is required in OCTAVE; qualitative

    probability is being tested in OCTAVE-S.

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    Evaluating Risks disclosuremodification

    loss/destruction High

    interruption Low

    deliberate

    outside

    insidedisclosure Medium

    modification High

    loss/destruction High

    interruption Low

    disclosure

    modification

    loss/destruction

    interruption

    disclosure Mediummodification High

    loss/destruction High

    interruption Low

    accidental

    deliberate

    networkasset

    accidental

    Vulnerability assessment results

    asset access actor motive outcome impact

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    Outputs of OCTAVE

    Defines

    organizationaldirection

    Plans

    designed toreduce risk

    Near-term

    action items

    ProtectionStrategy

    MitigationPlan

    ActionList

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    Putting It All Together

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    From Assets to Mitigation Plans

    Mitigation Plan

    Practices to Improve

    Training and SecurityArchitecture related

    tasks

    Monitoring IT Securityrelated tasks

    Critical

    Asset

    Risks

    Risk A

    Risk B

    Risk C

    Risk D

    Mitigation Approach

    Accept

    Mitigate

    Mitigate

    Defer

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    After OCTAVE

    Steps required to implement the results of this evaluation

    and improve the organizations security posture. getting management sponsorship for security

    improvement

    monitoring implementation of the results of thecurrent evaluation

    expanding the current evaluation, if needed

    scheduling the next information security riskevaluation

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    Summary

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    Findings - 1

    OCTAVE produces usable results at each phase.

    identifying critical assets can change the focus ofmany other activities and alter resource allocations

    surveys alone produce institutional learning

    vulnerability assessments become more useful

    Other interesting results

    one IT department found effective justification for

    increased budgets

    one company used it to start long-term improvements

    in their third-party relations and contracting

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    Findings - 2Workshops produce a strong side effect of team buildingand increased security awareness.

    IT staff realize what users are really doing users have a better appreciation for security measures managers have a better sense of whats really going

    on in the organization

    Some immediate actions that occurred reallocation of information across servers

    removal of private information from web sites immediate purchase of insurance building access restrictions review of arrangements with building managers

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    Keys for Success with theOCTAVE Approach

    Getting senior management sponsorship

    Selecting the right analysis team

    Setting the scope of the evaluation

    Selecting participants (for OCTAVE Method)

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    Some OCTAVE Users -1The Security Working Integrated Project Team (Security

    WIPT), Office of the Assistant Secretary of

    Defense/Health Affairs (OASD/HA), endorses OCTAVE

    as the preferred information security risk assessment to

    prepare for complying with the Administrative

    Simplification subsection of the Health InsurancePortability and Accountability Act of 1996.

    analysis teams have been trained in all international

    regions of the Department of Defense healthcare domain additional teams are scheduled to be trained in 2003

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    Some OCTAVE Users -2

    FirstGov (now the Office of Citizen Services and

    Communication)

    Small companies in Western Pennsylvania

    County government

    Variety of national and international companies and

    consulting organizations are now using all or part of

    OCTAVE

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    Questions?

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    OCTAVE Approach

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    For Additional InformationOCTAVE

    Internet [email protected]

    WWW http://www.cert.org/octave

    Software Engineering InstituteTelephone 412 / 268-5800 Fax 412 / 268-5758

    Internet [email protected]

    U.S. mail Customer RelationsSoftware Engineering InstituteCarnegie Mellon University

    Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890