Managing change: the London taxi cabs case study

Strat. Change 12: 95–108 (2003)Published online in Wiley InterScience(www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/jsc.626

Managing change: the London taxicabs case studyWalter Skok∗ and Michel TissutThe Business School, Kingston University, UK

‘The Knowledge’ is the colloquial term used to describe the examination process that mustbe undertaken by anyone who seeks to become one of London’s world famous ‘black cab’taxi drivers.The examination process:• Has changed little since its introduction in 1851 following the problems associated

with transporting the public from the Great Exhibition in Hyde Park:• Is still essentially based on a series of one-to-one interviews and has been described as

restrictive, inflexible to demand, closed and secretive:• Is affected by the introduction of the Private Hire Vehicles (1998) Act:• Finds the taxi trade in a highly unstable social, economic and political environment,

with many of the key stakeholders calling for reform.This paper describes a study that:• Is concerned with identifying the complex social, political, legal and economic issues

involved in reform, using a stakeholder analysis:• Aims to enhance understanding of the critical issues involved in a far-reaching and

high-profile management of change programme.Copyright 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The taxi industry

With over 23,000 drivers, the HackneyCarriage Trade Taxi Industry (colloquiallyreferred to as the black cab industry) rep-resents one of London’s major institutions(Skok, 2000). Black cab drivers are requiredto go through a formidable examination pro-cess known as ‘The Knowledge’ before theyare granted the Green Badge allowing themto ply for hire anywhere in London. TheKnowledge requires applicants to learn 320‘runs’ linking over 25,000 streets within asix-mile radius of Charing Cross, as well

* Correspondence to: Dr Walter Skok, The BusinessSchool, Kingston University, Kingston Hill, Kingstonupon Thames, Surrey KT2 7LB.E-mail: [email protected]

as places of interest, such as hotels, muse-ums and restaurants. An average twenty-fourmonths is required to obtain the licence, andsometimes considerably longer, as opposedto sixteen months, ten years ago (Kaley,2000). The Yellow Badge requires applicantsto learn 30 ‘runs’, but limits the authorizedarea of work to the suburbs of London. MostKnowledge applicants (i.e. the prospectivecabbies studying for the badges) use the ser-vices of one of London’s seven Knowledgeschools.

The Public Carriage Office (PCO) is respon-sible for the licensing of both vehiclesand drivers, who must be deemed ‘fit andproper’ as required by the London Hack-ney Carriage Act of 1831, which is stillenforced today (Wraight, 1998). In 1999, the

Copyright 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Mar–Apr 2003

96 Walter Skok and Michel Tissut

responsibility for the PCO was transferredfrom the Metropolitan Police Services (MPS)to the Greater London Authority (GLA).

‘The Knowledge’, the examination processfor anyone wishing to become one ofLondon’s famous black cab taxi drivershas to undertake, has gained a worldwidereputation for the very high standard of taxidrivers it produces. The examination processhas changed little since its introduction in1851 following the Great Exhibition in HydePark. It is based on a series of one-to-one interviews, known as ‘Appearances’. Ithas been described as restrictive, inflexibleto demand, closed and secretive (Kaley,unpublished review, 1999).

Such rigidity has enabled, over the past40 years, the development of an entirelyunrestricted and flexible substitute service,the Private Hire Vehicles (PHV), better knownas minicabs. However, increasing safetyconcerns over the use of minicabs led theDepartment of Transport to introduce thePrivate Hire (London) Act 1998, with theview to licensing the unregulated minicabbusiness in London, the only city in the UKwhere licensing for PHV is not mandatory.This in turn has prompted a reform of theKnowledge.

The Knowledge: an examinationprocess under strain

The Public Carriage Office (PCO) knowledgeexamination is deemed an archaic process,which has failed to adapt to modern educa-tional practice over the years (Skok, 2000).Criticisms levelled at the PCO include thefollowing:

• Inability to cope with demand: It now takessome 31/2 years to complete as opposedto approximately 2 years a decade ago.

• Unsound educational standards: Examin-ers have no training or examining qualifi-cations, and are sole judges of candidates’competencies and achievements.

• There is no examination paper and exam-iners are free to ask questions on any route.

Candidates do not receive feedback fromthe PCO regarding their progress.

• The examination process generally failsto assess candidates’ soft or social skillsdirectly related to their trade, i.e. how todeal with the public, crime or emergencysituations.

The reform process

The introduction of the PHV Act 1998 hasprompted many of the key stakeholders tocall for reform and to facilitate a single-tiersystem for the licensing of both black cabsand minicabs. However, other stakeholdersare expressing strong concerns over any suchreform: e.g. black cab drivers are against anyreduction in the established standards, andminicab companies are against what in theirview could be unreasonably high standards.The PHV Association opposes proposals fora single-tier system stating, ‘minicabs requirea different level of knowledge as they do notply for hire’ (Wright, 2000).

The process the industry is currently goingthrough can be deemed extraordinary onmany counts. The scale of the reform is

The process theindustry is currentlygoing through can be

deemed extraordinaryon many counts

phenomenal, as two distinct and originallyseparate projects find themselves havingto be managed simultaneously, with over23,000 black cab drivers as well as 3000‘Knowledge Boys’ involved in the reform,while an estimated 60,000-minicab driversand 2000 operators find themselves subjectto licensing. In parallel, 50 PCO employeesas well as the Metropolitan Police Serviceare involved in aspects of this changeprogramme, aimed at reshaping the Londontaxi industry, worth some £700 million a


London taxi cabs 97

year in value (Williams, 2001). The scopeof the reform is substantial, as a centenaryinstitution becomes a target for in-depthreview, and the well-established HackneyCarriage Trade finds itself in a change processdirectly involving the ‘old enemy’, namely theminicabs.

Skok’s (2000) case study on the Londontaxicab service identified ‘conflict betweensome stakeholders’ leading to ‘difficult nego-tiations between parties’. Indeed, any reformproject of such scale and scope leadsinevitably to the suspicion that some of thestakeholders might try to influence the pro-cess for their own gain, rather than helpingachieve the publicly stated desired outcomes.This paper reports on a study to identifythe complex issues involved in reforming byexamining the views of all major stakehold-ers.

The nature of change

Johnson et al. (1999) offer a holistic rep-resentation of change management throughdefinition of a basic strategic managementprocess as a set of interlinked activities, forwhich a linear representation would there-fore be inadequate. A number of soft sys-tems methods are available to analyse suchunstructured change processes (Rosenheadand Mingers, 2001: Patching, 1990: Friendand Hickling, 1987: Doukidis et al., 1989;Ackermann and Eden, 1994). The specificconstraints of this project, i.e. its exploratorynature, political sensitivity and stakeholderaccess, is taken into consideration in theselection of an appropriate method of analy-sis.

Methodology: sources of Information

• Primary data An investigative analysis ofcomplex human activity focusing on stake-holder actions and perceptions requiresthe identification of all affected parties andto ‘concentrate on [those] who can sup-port or sabotage the process’ (Eden andAckerman, 1998: 120)

• Secondary data Although reform repre-sents a major change programme affectingLondon, few authors have written on thesubject, although The Evening Standardnewspaper has consistently covered thereform process.

Data-gathering methods

Interviews were used for gathering the requi-site information, with the notion of motivesbeing of paramount importance in a highlycharged political context. The interviewframework presented in Figure 1 enabledthe interviews to remain focused on theproject’s main areas of investigation. (Note:the arrows in the figure mapped mental linksbetween questions, thus ensuring flow dur-ing the interview.)

Data analysis

Problem-structuring methods

A soft systems approach was adopted inorder to address a problem domain wherenew legislation finds the taxi-trade in a veryunstable social, economic, legal and politicalenvironment. This highly uncertain problemdomain justifies the use of such methods,which have the capability to evolve withsituations (Patching, 1990).

Cognitive mapping

Doukidis et al. (1989) argue that cognitivemapping, facilitated by the use of DSS(Decision Support Systems) software, helpresearchers to gain a holistic view of thedatabase (i.e. the interview transcripts). Thisis a key requirement in stakeholder analysis.

Data-structuring frameworks

The data-structuring framework used in thisstudy emanates from Eden and Ackerman(1998). Two main factors motivated thischoice. First, Eden’s (1991) prior work oncognitive mapping ensures the integration ofthe corresponding maps into his stakeholder



Knowledge reforminterviews

Stakeholders identification

Problems with existing system

Desired outcome

Influence over process

Describe your company / group ...

What do you refer to as taxi industry?

Who are the other stakeholders?

KnowledgeWhat do you consider wrong with thecurrent Kn system?

Why was a reform necessary?

Are there anydivisions within the industry?

Views on HCT/ PHV...

Knowledge How could the Kn be improved?

Your views on computerisation...

How could the industry be improved?

How do you see the future of the industry?

How are you trying to achieve this?

Your involvement in the process

Is the PCO subject to external pressure?

Are you aware of any lobbying?

How can you influence the process?

One tier / two tier system?

What are the stakeholders trying toachieve?

Are there divisions / disagreements ondesired outcome?

Stakeholders

Stakeholders

Desired outcome

Lobbying

Industry

Figure 1. Interview framework mind Map.

analysis framework. Second, Eden’s structur-ing approach facilitates stakeholder analysisthrough qualitative interviews.

Stakeholders involved in the reform

Cognitive mapping enabled the industry tobe segmented into four main entities:

• Drivers: Drivers for the most part donot associate with any official body. Only30% of them (Linskey, 2000) have anyaffiliation with the London Taxi DriversAssociation (LTDA) deemed to be the mostrepresentative body.

• The London Taxi Board (LTB): There isgeneral agreement that this representsthe interest of the fleet owners, taxicabmanufacturers and radio circuit operators.

• Learners: Knowledge boys and girls andKnowledge schools: Analysis shows thattheir degree of influence and focus ofinterest are distinct from those expressed

by the drivers or the LTB constituentmembers.

• Other groupings: The transfer of responsi-bility for the PCO from the MPS to the GLAresults in the reclassification of the regula-tors and legislators. Political pressures indemocratically elected bodies such as theGLA have as their primary objective theprovision of a quality public service. Thishas implications for the wider public.

Stakeholder influences

The key areas of influence are:

• Political: The context described abovemakes reform particularly sensitive topolitical pressures. The ‘Pre-Greater Lon-don Authority (GLA)’ context, where thePCO was sole decider, makes stakeholderseven more aware of ‘the new opportuni-ties’ (Kaley, 2000). Similarly, for the GLA,‘every voice counts’ (Kaley, 2000).


London taxi cabs 99

• Operational: Within the new politicalcontext, organized stakeholder groups canexert influence, which have the potentialto seriously disrupt London’s notoriouslyfragile transportation system.

• Legal: New legislation is being written,creating opportunities to introduce majorchanges.

• Financial: The PCO operates ‘at nil cost’(Matthews, 2000a) limiting their abilityto commission extensive surveys or test-run innovative approaches thus makingthem reliant on external sources. Financialcapability enables some stakeholders to bepolitically very active through lobbying.

It can be seen from Table 1 that allstakeholders, with the exception of theLearners group, have the capability ofexerting high levels of influence over thereform process. The Drivers group haspotential for maximum influence due inno small part to the considerable numberof members, but suffers from a lack oforganization (Linskey, 2000). Its potential forinfluence remains nevertheless considerable,as black cabs are thought by many to be‘one of the capital’s treasures’ (Transport forLondon Vice-Chairman, Dave Wetzel, 2000).

Similarly, the LTB has considerable poten-tial for high levels of influence, mainly dueto its constituent well-organized professionalbodies (radio circuit operators, the LondonMotor Cab Proprietors and the fleets) as wellas its financial resources. One of its members,Computer Cab, reported pre-tax profits of£702,000 for the first half of 1998 (AndersenConsulting, 1998).

Considerable power is equally held by theLegal group. Although this group is politicallysensitive and has a duty to consult withthe other stakeholders, they have powerto create new legislation: ‘The overridingdecision rests with the licensing authority’(Matthews, 2000a).

Stakeholders: goal classification

In order to provide a framework for the anal-ysis, a table outlining stakeholders’ principal

goals into distinct categories was devisedand is presented in Table 2. Such a classi-fication facilitates an interesting comparisonbetween the various perceptions and posi-tions involved as advocated by Eden andSpender (1998b) who compare shared andnon-shared belief elements in their analyses.

Findings

Six major problem areas have been identifiedwithin the current Knowledge system, aspresented in Tables 3–8. There is generalagreement among all stakeholders that alengthy period of time (from two to threeyears) is required to qualify for the GreenBadge (see Table 3). The PCO is well awareof this situation and makes it a key area forimprovement (Matthews, 2000b). However,there is no general agreement on the factorsthat make it a lengthy process, neither ontheir impact on the taxi trade industry.

A significant number of problems linked tothe inefficient delivery of the test system bythe PCO can be found in the analysis of thedata (see Table 4). Most of these problemswere exposed by Johnson (1989) and arewell known. The key finding is that the PCOnow finds itself in a position where theseproblems have to be addressed, due to thepossibility of judicial review and also to thePHV Act 1998 imposing political pressure onthe PCO to review the current system. Thereis overall agreement among stakeholders asto the weaknesses in the delivery of thetest, which is seen as open to discriminationor abuse (Linskey, 2000). Stakeholders haveidentified the source of these problemsin the one-to-one interviews, but variousviews are expressed on the associated causesand consequences. For the Drivers group,there is a need to improve the level offairness of the interviews, mainly throughbetter skilled examiners and awareness ofthe needs of applicants. The one-to-oneinterviews are seen by this group as anintegral and vital part of the process (Linskey,2000; Kaley, 2000; Williams, 2001). Qualityand fairness therefore represent the mainarea for improvement for the Drivers group.


100 Walter Skok and Michel TissutT

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London taxi cabs 101

Table 3. Problem area 1: test length issues

PCO

/legi

slat

or

Kn

boys

/sch

oo

ls

Dri

vers

Flee

ts

Rad

iota

xis

Ext

ern

alTest length

x x Produces fewer driversthan it should

x x x x x Takes too longx 8 weeks between

application date andintroduction talks

x 7 months betweenapplication and writtentest

x 5 months betweenwritten test failure andre-sit

x x Not enough examinersx x Number of appearances

slot determined bynumber of availableexaminers

x Applicant not givenopportunity to show heis good enough toqualify

x x Unnecessary wait

However, the Drivers group is also awareof the negative impact of the one-to-oneinterviews on the time it takes to completethe process, a situation that essentiallybenefits them (LTDA, 2000).

Conversely, the Learners and LTB groupsview the one-to-one interviews as an elementneeding profound review, or even completeremoval (Kaley, 2000) as they enable thePCO to dictate the pace at which applicantswill go through the process and therefore toregulate the number of licensed drivers.

The PCO agrees about the fallibility of theone-to-one interviews, but does not explicitlyaccept the above-mentioned implications.They identify the main weakness of thesystem in a general lack of ‘soft skillassessment’ qualifications of the examiners(Matthews, 2000b; Bartimote et al., 1998).Several comments were also made about thefact that examiners usually have no formaltraining qualifications.

The Knowledge produces the best taxidrivers in the world, with all stakeholdersagreeing upon this: the drivers and the PCObeing the most adamant. The system is,however, severely criticized by the Learnersgroup (see Table 5), on the basis that someparts of London are not covered by the test,resulting in applicants not learning key areas.However, this has been partly remedied bythe introduction of the new Blue Book (PCO,2002) with a more efficient coverage ofLondon routes.

The commercial problems area producesone of the deepest divisions among stake-holders, as it directly addresses the roleof the Knowledge system in supplying taxidrivers to London (Table 6). The Driversgroup comments on the increasing numberof licences being delivered–1000 licences in1999 against 600 in previous years (Oddy,2000). They also state that the current 24,000licensed drivers in London represent thehighest ever number (Wetzel, 2000). Con-versely the LTB group points out that publicdemand by far outstrips the supply of taxidrivers (Kaley, 2000). The radio taxi companyDial-a-Cab estimates the net increase in taxidrivers at less than 100 a year (Young, 1999)while Computer Cab estimates that there isenough work for another 7000 drivers (Kaley,2000). Both the LTB and Learners groups crit-icize the licensing authorities for creating ashortage of taxis and for not managing thetaxi service quality across London, resultingin the flourishing development of the mini-cab sector (Kaley, 2000; Linskey, 2000). Blackcab drivers are also criticized for focusing oncentral London for work, ‘leaving the rest ofthe capital to minicabs’ (Kaley, unpublishedreview, 1999).

The Drivers group argues strongly thatthere is appropriate taxi availability, exceptfor a few hours on weekend evenings whensupply exceeds demand. They oppose anyincrease in the number of taxi drivers(Oddy, 2000). They also believe the systemis responsible for allowing the growth ofthe minicab industry, through the lack ofimposed regulation upon PHVs.



Table 4. Problem area 2: test delivery issues

PCO

/legi

slat

or

Kn

boys

/sch

oo

ls

Dri

vers

Flee

ts

Rad

iota

xis

Ext

ern

al

Test delivery issues

x x Knowledge test might not withstand judicial reviewx x x PCO solely responsible / can take any decisions

x x x Impossible to license minicab without Knowledge reformx x PCO does not take customer approach

x Single central locationx No flexibility to adapt to applicants’ lifestyle: dictated interview time/date

x x PCO does not ensure maximum drivers go throughx No opportunity for bright students to go faster

x Partly true only / best go quickerx x Knowledge test = high potential for discriminationx x No possibility to check test results

x Character testing is nonsensex Unsuitable people can behave for 15 minutes and end up taxi drivers

x x Knowledge examiners not skilled at all for that kind of assessmentx Best way to test personality

x x x Imbues sense of pride and achievement in individualsx Subjective assessment of other skillsx Examiner’s access to comments from previous examiner

x Massive scope for abusex Candidates are allocated examiners on a random basis

x System open to briberyx System open to discrimination

x Authority to test for Knowledge of ‘obscure origin’x x Still uses Victorian regulationx PCO sets standards: appropriateness of questions?

x x Fit and proper’ definitionx x Examiners: are they qualified for topographical testing?

x No way to check whether they made mistake or not

The system, or more precisely its regula-tor, is criticized by stakeholders for ‘takinga policeman approach’ (Kaley, 2000; Bar-timote et al., 1998), a statement implicitlyconfirmed by the PCO which commentsthat ‘its role is to enforce the regulation’(Matthews, 2000a). The interpretation of theterm ‘policeman approach’ differs accord-ing to the different stakeholder groups.The LTB uses it to refer to the inade-quate management of the taxi industry, asdetailed above. The Drivers group criticizesthe PCO for strictly enforcing regulations forblack cab drivers while showing leniencytowards allegedly ‘law-breaking’ minicabs(McNamara, 2001).

‘The PCO has no obligation for train-ing’ (Matthews, 2000a), a statement actively

criticized by the Learners group (seeTable 7). The LTB group holds a similar view,although arguing that an examining bodyshould ensure that a maximum number ofapplicants are encouraged to go through thesystem (Kaley, 2000). The disproportionatelevel of difficulty between the Yellow andGreen badges (40 runs against 320 runs) ishighlighted by most stakeholders, complain-ing of blatant mismanagement of the industryaccording to the Learners and LTB groups(Linskey, 2000; Kaley, 2000).

The lack of resources is accepted asgiven by all including the PCO (Barti-mote et al., 1998; Matthews, 2000b), pro-ducing a negative impact upon the waythat the Knowledge is administered (seeTable 8).



Table 5. Problem area 3: system quality issues

PCO

/legi

slat

or

Kn

boys

/sch

oo

ls

Dri

vers

Flee

ts

Rad

iota

xis

Ext

ern

al

System quality issues

x Drivers get Green badge notknowing some parts ofLondon

x x Blue book does not cover thewhole of London

X x x x x x Produces the best drivers inthe world

x Only central London benefitsfrom quality drivers

x Test is too difficultx Examination does not adapt

to changes in Londonx Drivers wait so long that their

knowledge starts to decreasex x Does not address service

quality issues

Understanding the change context: areview of the critical issues

Single-tier system

The potential redesign of the industry byimplementing a single-tier system representsthe most controversial element of the reformprocess. The positions of the stakeholders onthis issue have been identified as shown inFigure 2.

Extreme divisions exist between stakehold-ers in their acceptance of a single-tier pro-posal. It has also been seen that the introduc-tion of a single-tier system is highly unlikely.The change agent will therefore have to dealwith the management of a ‘non-change’ event(the non-agreement to a desired outcome)and should carefully evaluate the impact ofthis non-agreement on the attitude towardschange of the two stakeholders advocatingthe introduction of a single-tier system.

Knowledge computerization

The introduction of a computerized versionof the Knowledge test represents both alikely outcome and an important changeelement, thus requiring understanding of

Table 6. Problem area 4: taxi trade commercial issues

PCO

/legi

slat

or

Kn

boys

/sch

oo

ls

Dri

vers

Flee

ts

Rad

iota

xis

Ext

ern

al

Trade commercial impact issues

x x PCO not concerned withcommercial issues / regulatorsonly

x x x x PCO takes policemanapproach

x Job is to enforce regulationx No management of the

industryx x x x Black cabs work central

London onlyx Takes a narrow view of public

safetyx PCO has a non-commercial

viewx Negative impact on

Knowledge administrationx PCO does not want to

integrate both industriesx PCO = bureaucratic machinex x x x Creates shortage of drivers

x x x Responsible for taxi driversupply in London, shouldensure supply

x No shortage of drivers/onlyon weekend nights

x Record number of licencesbeing delivered

x Fleets are disintegrating dueto lack of drivers

x x x x Police target black cabs morethan minicabs

the stakeholders’ positions on the subject,as presented in Figure 3.

Unlike the single-tier proposal mentionedpreviously, introducing computerized test-ing implies implementing concrete change,which in turn will need to be managed.Total opposition to computerization hasbeen identified among the Drivers group anda lesser but non-negligible level of resistancecan also be expected from the PHV group.The change agent should, however, managethese two groups very differently, as the for-mer is against a lowering of the Knowledgestandards and the latter against too high alevel of imposed knowledge. The expectedreaction of stakeholders requires that the



Table 7. Problem area 5: training system issues

PCO

/legi

slat

or

Kn

boys

/sch

oo

ls

Dri

vers

Flee

ts

Rad

iota

xis

Ext

ern

al

Training system issues

x x PCO not concerned withtraining

x No responsibility / obligationfor training

x PCO sets standards withoutregard to training

x x Should ensure max drivers gothrough

x Drivers end up knowing morethan they need

x x x x Disproportionate difficultybetween Yellow and Greenbadge

x No consistency between testand supplied supportingdocuments

change agent consider various change stylesand approaches, which are discussed later inthis section.

Understanding the barriers for andagainst change

Force-field analysis, originally developed byLewin (1958) was used here. It is useful inidentifying barriers to change, along with

Table 8. Problem area 6: PCO resources issues

PCO

/legi

slat

or

Kn

boys

/sch

oo

ls

Dri

vers

Flee

ts

Rad

iota

xis

Ext

ern

al

Human and financialresources issues

x x PCO lacks financial resourcesx x PCO close to full staff levels

and cannot copex x x System wholly dependent on

HR availabilityx PCO does not have IT system

enabling better testimplementation

x Combination of limitedresources creates delays

x Available accommodationslows process down

x x Single central locationx x x No flexibility to adapt to

applicant’s lifestyle: dictatedinterview time/date

x x Knowledge relies only onPCO personnel

facilitators of change (Balogun and Hope,1999: 141). A force-field analysis for thedrivers group is presented as an examplein Figure 4.

Black cab drivers strongly resist change,which they associate with a substantialincrease in the numbers of new taxi

Att

itu

de

Influence

For

Neutral

Against

Low Medium High

PHV LEGAL

LEARNERS

DRIVERS

LTB

Unknown

Figure 2. Stakeholder analysis/one-tier system (adapted from Grundy, 1998).



Att

itu

de

For

Neutral

Against

Low Medium High

PHVDRIVERS

LEGALLEARNERS

LTB

Influence

Figure 3. Stakeholder analysis/Knowledge computerization (adapted from Grundy, 1998).

Drivers Restraints

DRIVERS

Penalised minicabs Loss of income

Solidarity within trade

Threat to one-to-one interviews

Decreased standards of Knowledge

Minicabs currenly suffer frompoor public image

Victorian regulations abolition

Low capacity for change

Increased night fees

Exemption from congestion charges

Figure 4. Drivers group force-field analysis.

drivers on the streets, creating increasedcompetition and a loss of income. Equallythey identify such a reform as leading theminicab industry to improved standards,therefore promoting the development ofanother form of competition. An additionalbarrier to change lies in the solidarity thatexists between black cab drivers, which thechange agent might find very difficult to alter.Substantial foreseen benefits represent themain forces for change; a factor the changeagent might decide to exploit to facilitate theintroduction of change within this group.

Research conclusions:understanding the reform contextThe analysis carried out here reveals thediverse aspects of the potential reforms

under consideration symbolized by therequirement for dual management of theHackney Carriage Trade and PHV specificreforms, as illustrated in Figure 5.

The figure represents the interpretedposition of the stakeholders in the contextof industry change. It is argued that black cabdrivers would like to see the minicab industryremain unregulated, on two counts. First,the presence of ‘cowboy minicabs’ withinthe PHV industry creates well-documentedpublic safety issues. The adverse publicityfollowing any serious incident leads to adisreputable public vision of PHVs, whichlogically benefits black cabs. Second, themain source of competitive advantage for‘the cowboy minicabs’ lies in their low prices,which minimize profits and therefore the



?

Att

itu

de

High

LEGAL

LEARNERS

DRIVERS

LTB

Reform of the Knowledge

InfluenceMediumLow

Against

Neutral

For

Att

itu

de

High

InfluenceMediumLow

Against

Neutral

For

PHV licensing

LTB

DRIVERS

COWBOYS

LEARNERS

LPHVA

LEGAL

Figure 5. Reform project stakeholder analysis.

capacity for investment in improving servicestandards. The main competitors of the blackcabs (the perceived ‘good PHV boys’) alsosuffer from charging low prices, which hindertheir growth. It is therefore argued that blackcab drivers are opposed to the regulation ofthe minicab industry.

Other conclusions from this interpretiveresearch highlight other possible incidencesin the mismanagement of the reform project.The decision to simultaneously reform bothsystems is criticized, as it has provided theHackney Carriage Trade with the opportunityto interfere with PHV licensing and delayits implementation. The initial managementof the PHV reform is also criticised, as ithas created extensive scope for lobbyingby setting undefined requirements to belater met by the PHV industry. For instance,the new legislation requires PHV driversto demonstrate a ‘level of topographicalknowledge’ (PHV Act 1998) without anyfurther definition of ‘level’. Similarly, theAct states that the PCO will determine thestandards vehicles will be expected to meet,and have power to charge for topographicaltesting. It is argued that these ill-definedrequirements have directly contributed to thecreation of delays and divisions.

Another significant conclusion concernsthe perceived absence of a project ‘owner’.Although the PCO is presented as the prin-cipal change agent, the above conclusionsimply that critical decisions are taken at thelegislative level through Parliament. Besides

the unavoidable lobbying, such situationsdirectly affect the perceived capability of thePCO to carry out the reform as well as itsreadiness, as illustrated in Figure 5.

Knowledge reform versus publicservice

One of the planned outcomes of the reformof the Knowledge was the improvement ofpublic services. It is now argued that thecurrent reform takes a narrow view of ‘publicservice’ and focuses on what to change ratherthan why change.

Further research is required in order toanalyse the impact of the proposed changeson what should be the reform paradigm,namely the improvement of London’s trans-port system. It is argued that the reform willresult in a rise in taxi service costs, due toproposed increases in night fares and theimposition of fees and much stricter regu-lations on minicab companies, which willlogically translate into higher prices.

It is commonly perceived that an increasein quality and value can justify an increasein price. This in turn creates the need toassess public expectations of such factors.Can taxi service quality be interpreted interms of safety, convenience, supply, etc.?This important question should be at theheart of the reform of the Knowledge, beforethe need to ‘improve’ the examination system(as demonstrated by the PCO’s self-focusedCIS survey, which prompted the decision to



reform the Knowledge). It does not appearthat the impact of minicab licensing on publicservice was assessed prior to the introductionof the 1998 Act. A price increase has alreadybeen identified as a likely outcome. It isnow argued that a shortage in taxi supplywill result from regulating the PHV industry.According to Linskey (2000) some 40% of allminicab drivers in Leeds were not eligible orchose not to register for the new licensing,‘creating a massive gap in the market’. Whatthen will the percentage be in London? Havethe PCO and the legislator estimated thisfigure and identified a viable solution? Itseems doubtful.

Furthermore, PHV requirements need tobe defined after their impact on the minicabindustry has been assessed. The main charac-teristic of the PHV industry lies in its flexibilityto adapt to demand, enabling the adequateprovision of taxi service during busy periods,such as Christmas or the Wimbledon TennisChampionships for instance. Many minicabdrivers have other sources of employmentand only operate in the PHV industry on apart-time basis. There is therefore a risk thathigh PHV requirements would limit the pro-vision of a taxi service in London, as manypart-time minicab drivers would consider theassociated learning requirements as a deter-rent to becoming licensed.

There is also an identified need for furtherresearch on the impact of the reform onpublic service, as well as the requirementto make public service central to the reformparadigm, irrespective of external pressures.Such research would help to determine thelikelihood of achieving desired futures.

Biographical notes

Walter Skok has been a Principal Lecturerin Business Computing at Kingston Univer-sity’s Business School since 1987, havingpreviously worked as a management con-sultant. With a PhD from the London Schoolof Economics, he is currently involved inInformation Systems (IS) teaching on under-graduate, Masters and Doctoral programmes.He is an advocate of a multi-disciplinary

approach to the subject of IS, believing thatthe introduction of technology should betreated as any other organizational changeprocess. His research interests include: Inter-net start-up projects, IS evaluation and therole of individuals in applying IT to business.He has presented papers at UK and interna-tional conferences, is a Fellow of the BritishComputer Society and Member of the UnitedKingdom Academy of Information Systems.

Michel Tissut is Network Support Managerfor a leading machine tools manufacturerbased in France, with responsibilities rangingfrom technical to commercial support to thecompany’s worldwide subsidiaries. Duringthe last 12 months, he has been involved ina major management of change programmeconcerned with implementing the distribu-tion module of a new Enterprise ResourcePlanning (ERP) system. He completed anMBA at Kingston University in 2002.

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Documents

Managing change: the London taxi cabs case study