Managerial Practices That Enhance Innovation

7/30/2019 Managerial Practices That Enhance Innovation

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This article offers insight into how innovation is successfully accomplished bycomparing the treatment of new ideas in high- and low-innovation organizations.

Managerial PracticesThat Enhance Innovation

Andre L. DelbecqPeter K. Mills

J novation is widely held to be a vital compo-nent of a healthy organization. After all, it isinnovation that enables an organization to re-spond to changing markets and thus retain itscompetitiveness.

The nature of innovation has beenthe focus of many studies during the past twodecades, yet a reliable model for successful in-novation has not emerged. This is due in partto the highly individual nature of the subject:Every innovation is by definition unique. Forexample, on the individual level, cosmopoli-tans (those with an orientation that goes be-yond their organizations) and locals areearly adopters of different kinds of innova-tions, according to Marshall Becker. Interest-

24 ingly, Thomas Robertson and Yuram Wind

found that those business units in which cos-mopolitans and locals jointly make deci-sions are most like ly to adopt innovations.Moreover, Walter Adams and Joel Dirlamfound that relatively unsuccessful firms havebeen leaders with respect to some innova-tions. Michael Tushman noted that some ef-fective innovating teams rely on boundaryspanners to keep the other members in-formed, but other studies by Tushman andRobert Katz also found that teams relying onboundary spanners were less effective thanwhen members kept themselves up-todateand performed their own boundary-spanningactivi ty. Finally, even the size of the organiza-tion, in studies done by Edwin Mansfield, couldnot be correlated with successful innovation.


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In the midst of this theoretical con-fusion, useful lessons for the practicing man-ager are often lost. The purpose of this artic leis to offer insight into some basic characteris-tics of both high- and low-innovation organi-zations.

Over the past three years we havetested selected theses regarding innovation-enhancing practices with several hundredmanagers in high-technology firms andhealth-services organizations. At this pointwe have come to a reasonable consensus re-garding some practical processes thatmanagers can put into place in most organi-zations. These processes are the focus of thisarticle.

We make no pretense that theseprocesses are all a manager needs to knowabout innovation or that they serve as solepredictors of success or failure in innovation.They are, simply, actions that the managersin our sample of high-technology product-producing and service-providing organiza-tions believe are within the capability of mostmanagers to implement and that in both the-ory and practice help increase rates of suc-cessful innovation.

Before we begin, let us briefly defineour terms. Innovation is a signif icant changewithin the organization or its line of servicesor products that (a) requires a substantial ad-justment in functions and/or structures, and(b) is successfully introduced, decided upon,and incorporated into the organization. Assuch it differs from incremental change (in-volving minimal disruption, usually withincurrent tradition) and invention (whichmight not become institutionalized).

The process of innovation in organizations isdependent on the interaction among threevariables: the motivation to innovate, the ob-

stacles against innovation, and the number ofresources available to overcome or neutralizesuch obstacles. To make sense out of the inno-vation process, it is helpful to divide innova-tion into a sequence of phases based on Her-bert Simons model of decision making.Successful innovation usually follows a se-quence such as the following:

l Idea generation. A preliminary conceptof an innovation is developed by an advocatewithin the organization.

l Preliminary analysis. A preliminaryfeasibility study is undertaken to see whetherthe innovation is desirable, achievable, andadvantageous for the organization.

l Decision to adopt. A formal decision isreached to commit resources to the inno-vation.

l Implementation. Over time, the innova-tion is institutionalized as a permanentchange in the organization and/or its outputs.

This sequence of events varies insuccess stories. However, our purpose here isto be prescriptive, and since this outline is thepreferred sequence in high-innovation or-ganizations, we will follow it in presentingnorms for structure and process. We wil l doso by describing how low-innovation andhigh-innovation organizations manage eachphase; in the process we will present prescrip-tive norms for successful innovation.

During the past three years weasked several hundred managers to tell us asuccess story, an innovation that they suc-ceeded in incorporating into their organiza-tion, or a failure story, an innovation theystil l felt was technically correct but that wasnot successfully introduced. Following theirdescriptions of successesand failures, we ana-lyzed the processes that either were presentand explained part of the success, or were ab-sent but could have been implemented to pre-vent or mitigate failures. Thus the normsevolved out of dialogue, and while they areconsistent with many research findings, they 25


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Andre L. Delbecq is dean of the Leavey Schoolof Business and Administratio n at the Univer-sity of Santa Clara, in California. He receivedhis B.B.A. cum laude from the University ofToledo and earned his M.B.A . and doctoratefrom Indiana University.

For a numb er of years his research has fo-cused on three topics: m anagerial decision-making techniques for strategic planning, thedevelopment of new products and technologies,and organizational design for facilitating inno-vation. He is the author of the Nomin al GroupTechnique and the Program Plann ing Model,both of which have been widely adopted forfacilitating decision making and planning.

Delbecq is currently involved in studies ofinnovation in the high-technology industries inSilicon Valley. He sits on several corporateboards and is chairman of the board of direc-tors of Nutech, a nuclear engineering servicescompany in San lose. He has served on theBoard of Governors and as chairman of thePublic Managem ent Division and the Organiza-tion and Managem ent Theory Division of theAcademy of Managem ent and currently chairsthe Manageria l Consultation Division. He hasbeen elected f ellow of the Academy in recogni-tion of his outstanding contributions in re-search, scholarship, and service.

Peter K. Mills is an assistant professor in theLeavey School of Business and Administrationat the University of Santa Clara, in California.He received his doctorate from the Universityof California at Irvine.

Mills research interests are the design of ser-vice organizations, the pricing of power in or-ganizations, and innovation.

represent summary judgments rather thanconventional data and have been generalizedfurther for the purposes of this article.

PROCESS PHASE ONE: IDEA GENERATIONAND IN IT IAL MANDATE

The ways in which ideas were acted upon inlow- and high-innovation organizations weremarkedly different and reflected two verydifferent structural contexts.

Low-Innovation OrganizationsThe process of idea generation and the man-ner in which the idea for innovation was ini-tially pursued in low-innovation organiza-tions are revealed in this typical failure story:

A professional or technical member of the organiza-tion sees an opportunity to combine a problem thatclients or customers often complain about with atechnical answer that he or she believes the organiza-tion could provide as a product or service. He or shepresents the idea to the immed iate supervisor, who isvaguely encouraging. Emotion ally the employee feelsthe superior is supportive but cautious because ofcompeting demands for resources. No special fundsare available for innovation, but maybe a smallamount of money can be scrimped together from theline budget. Let me talk to the top brass, the super-visor says. Later, very modest funding is made availa-ble, but top-rn-ment support regarding the proj-ect is still vague. Because of the limit ed funds, theadvocate and one or two colleagues attempt to de-velop the innovation largely by working overtime.Meanw hile, the advocate feels some anger when a petidea of another colleague-perceived by the advocateas a closer friend o f the manager-receives greatersupport. Further, he or she notices that managem entalso finds line-budget funds for another recom-mendati on - made by a powerful clique - that is lesscontroversial and closer to company tradition.

In the eyes of the advocate, chang-ing market conditions and customer require-ments could have validated the legitimacy ofthe suggested innovation if he or she had re-


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ceived sufficient support. However, starvedfor resources and obliged to work on the in-novation largely as overload, he or she be-comes discouraged and either lets the projectfade for lack of attention, leaves the organiza-tion and develops the project as an en-trepreneur, or joins a competitive organiza-tion in which the innovation is more likely tobe favorably received.

The failure stories are filled withthemes of ambivalent support, inadequate re-sources during the fragile, initial periods ofdevelopment, constant efforts to sel l andjustify increased need for resources (withconcomitant personal risk), infighting overresources, and decisions based on politicalconnections as opposed to unbiased assess-ment of alternative recommendations for in-novation. While belief and enthusiasm carrythe advocate forward for a period of time,frustration, a sense of betrayal, and lack ofsufficient funds wi ll often lead to one of thewithdrawal scenarios already described.Technical inadequacy is seldom the explana-tion given for project failure.

In summary, in low-innovation or-ganizations:

l Sponsorship is obtained by seeking re-sources through line managers primarilyresponsible for supporting existing activities.

l Risks are assumed solely by the advo-

cate; he or she must often accept under-resourcing, since permission and support de-pend on the patronage of managers who maysee the request as outside normal budgets,or even as a nuisance.

. The degree of organizational support as-signed to a project generally is perceived asbased on the values and interests of a domi-nant coalit ion rather than on the objectivemerit of the project.

l Insufficient startup funds are allocatedby squeezing token resources from linebudgets and thus make innovation directlycompetitive with existing activities.

l Decisions on startups of innovations oc-cur randomly as individuals get ideas,whether or not the decision fits in with aplanning cycle or the project is advantageousrelative to other potential innovations.

Incredible as it seems, this is themanagerial context described by the ma-jori ty of respondents to whom we talkedabout innovation in the average, complexorganization.

High-Innovation OrganizationsThe stories in high-innovation organizationsshow the innovation advocates operating in anentirely different structural context. Individ-uals in these organizations indicated that spe-

[l]nnovafion in organizafions is dependentonfhe inferacfion among fhree variables: themofivafion to innovate, fhe obsfaclesagainst innovafion, and the numberof resourcesavailable . . .I 27


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cial funds are set aside specifically to supportinnovation. Sometimes the fund is formallylabeled venture capital or research and de-velopment. Sometimes it is simply a discre-tionary fund. But money is availab le that isintended sole ly for the purpose of stimulatingnew activi ties. The money cannot be foldedinto line budgets. Further, the fund is ear-marked for real innovation; changes withintradition are expected to be funded by linebudgets.

In these organizations line man-agers are not the decision makers with whomthe advocate deals. A special committeereviews proposals for innovations at regularintervals. The majority of these decisionmakers are individuals not responsible forcurrent operations; they often are outside ad-viso rs and consultants. Sometimes innova-tion is relegated to a subcommittee of an ex-ternal advisory group or board of directors.At other times, those in charge of innovationsimply are a collection of organization wisemen. While line management is usual ly rep-resented on the committee by one or two indi-viduals, the dominant membership is not

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vested, since they are not managers of exist-ing operations.

The review group often spends con-siderable time doing its own environmentalsurveillance, and is particularly sensitive tonew developments in the economy and themarket, among competitors, and in new tech-nological developments. The review bodysees ts mandate as the expenditure of venturefunds in a manner responsive to newchallenges in the aggregate environment, notonly in support of proposals that strengthenexisting operations. Its decisions are not per-ceived as token largesse to pay off creative in-dividuals. Rather, the review group fundsfeasibility studies as strategic decisions sig-naling an organizational commitment to re-spond to changes in the environment. The re-view body does not pay for the self-servingprojects of prima donnas. By assigning oneof its own members to work with the advo-cate and his or her project group in designingand carrying out a feasibility study, the com-mittee guarantees that the study is an organi-zation project-as opposed to EngineerSmiths or Dr. Joness project.

The stories of managers from high-innovation organizations include referencesto R&D funds, venture capital, comparativeproposal review, shared organizational spon-sorship, and adequate funds for feasibilitystudies, as well as describe a clear point atwhich the feasib ility-study group must reportback to obtain a formal decision to implement.

In summary, the managerial processof high-innovation organizations in earlystages of idea generation and approval ischaracterized by:

l Separate funds for innovation.l Periodic reviews of informal proposals

by a committee separate from line man-agement .

l Clearly mandated feasibility studieswith adequate funds.


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l Project groups to undertake the feasibil-ity studies that are enlarged to include oneor more opinion leaders other than theadvocate.

Not radical medicine, yet thesepractices are stil l absent from many contem-porary organizations.

None of the above practices dimin-ish the importance of the original advocate orhis or her belief, motivation, or energy. With-out the advocate-the primary ingredient -innovation seldom succeeds. But what thesepractices provide is adequate support andsponsorship so that a realistic feasibilitystudy is possible without excessive overload,impoverished support, inadequate sponsor-ship, or excessive political sniping. Thesepractices dont afford lavish support, but theydo help achieve the support and sponsorshipnecessary to move creativity toward inno-vation.

Implementation of most of theabove practices was within the power of theCEOs and division managers with whom wetalked. In most organizations in which theywere not in force, managers felt that thesepractices could be successfully introduced;that their absence was due simply to over-sight rather than intrinsic organizational bar-riers. Most managers felt they could persuadetheir organizations to begin such practices ifevidence of their value was available.

Finally, a word of caution. Innova-tion-enhancing practices in phase one shouldbe kept relatively informal. Research, such asthe work of Thomas Allen and Herbert Men-zel, shows that informal interpersonal com-munication is a primary means of disseminat-ing innovations and other important newideas. The best proposals are four- to six-pageconcept documents. The most effectiveprocesses are distinctly nonbureaucratic. Di-alogue and shared judgment are at the core.Paperwork is minimal.

PROCESS PHASE Two: FEASIBILITY STUDYTODEFINE THE MARKET NEED AND EXPLOREPCYI-ENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The scope of a feasibility study makes all thedifference in determining real customer needsand how those needs most adequately can bemet.

Lozu-Innovation OrganizationsThe essential error made by low-innovationorganizations when preparing a feasibilitystudy is parochialism. For example, often theadvocate -with one or two colleagues -wil ldetermine the demand for a new idea by specu-lating among themselves and adding onlyselective data that support their concept ofthe market. In effect, their feasibil ity study islargely an intellectual simulation, conductedbehind closed doors and utilizing limiteddata.

Not surprisingly, the result of suchfeasibility studies often include these class icerrors:

l Overestimation of demand, so that reve-

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nue expectations are entirely unrea listic.l Underestimation of differences within

the market, so that flexib le designs withdifferentiated modifications desired by dif-ferent consumers are not considered.

l Overly complex designs, attractive tothe engineering sophisticate but intimidatingto the uninitiated.

l Inadequate consideration of the orienta-tion and training (and little or no considera-tion of the marketing) required to introducethe product to all but a small number of earlyadopters.

In effect, technical adequacy (if notsuperiority) is substituted for market analysisand client sensitivity.

High-Innovation OrganizationsIn high-innovation organizations, closenessto the average potential user is the key. In fact,the entire feasibility-s tudy team lives with asample of potential customers by making useof a variety of involvement techniques: fieldvisi ts, focus groups, in-depth interviews, andso forth. Further, a large number of organiza-tional boundary spanners not formally apart of the feasib ility-study group (sales,

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technical service, management) are also quer-ied in the product-definition phase. Almostall innovation success stories include radicalredefinition of the product or serv ice as a re-sult of taking into account the real world ofthe average potential customer. Making theproduct or service the customer real ly wants(rather than the product or service the en-gineer thinks the customer wants) often callsfor substantial conceptual reorientation bythe feasib ility-study team.

Similarly, cosmopolitanism isbrought to bear on the solution contained inthe proposed product or service. Since the in-novation is new to the organization, suc-cessful feasibility-study teams reach deeplyfor ideas from noncompetitive companies inrelated fields, study previous design successesand failures, and talk with a broad sample ofcreative thinkers, both within and outsidetheir own company, who are not part of thefeasib ility-study team. In a word, search be-havior, as Herbert Simon would label it,substitutes for creative speculation. Transfer-rable lessons are less costly than reinventingthe wheel.

In summary, feasib ility studies inhigh-innovation organizations include:

l Extensive and intensive interaction withclients and organizational boundary span-ners, which often result in a reconceptualiza-tion of the product or service.

l Contacts within and outside the firmthat help the study team incorporate a flexiblecore design that can (over time) permit vari -able models to appeal to variable clientgroupings, and realistically approximateproduction costs based on the experience ofothers who produced related products orservices.

Al l of this might seem to be a simpleextrapolation of a basic marketing orienta-tion. One must remember, however, that theindividuals involved in product developmentare often not from marketing. The key is to


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structure a feasib ility study that brings thedesign team as close to market realities as akey marketing person might be. Successfu lmanagers of innovation guide the feasib ilitystudy group through a real world exposureand sensitization process, which inevitablyresults in a reconceptualization of both theproduct and real customer wants and the de-sign and manufacturing requirements -based on the insight and experience of indi-viduals outside the design team.

PROCESS PHASE TH REE: DECISION TO ADOPT

It would seem that this third phase is the sim-plest. The group completing the feasib ilitystudy presents a proposal to managementbased on the study and gets a go or no godecision. In fact, this phase is subject to thegreatest number of stumbling blocks.

Low-Innovation OrganizarionsBelow is a list of just some of the adoptionproblems found in low-innovation organiza-tions:

l The advocate is isolated from thefeasib ility-study group and is forced tonegotiate one-on-one with a single superior.This creates a situation in which power andpersona lity rather than the data from thefeasibility study, determine the resources al-located to the project.

. The advocate receives no formal com-mitment from the organization. Tentativepermission to proceed is given, with equallytentative resource allocations that may bewithdrawn later as new resource or politicalpressures emerge. Normally the advocateleaves the organization under these condi-tions.

l The go-ahead is given without clearanceof the necessary resources. The projectwithers from insufficient support.

l The advocate is inflexib le in negotiation,insisting on the rightness of the feasib ilitystudy. Since no modifications are negotiated,the project is vetoed even though most peoplefeel the core idea is correct.

l A powerful cri tic becomes an outspokengunslinger, and management backs off sup-port, even though the cri tic does not repre-sent a majority opinion among reviewers.

l The proposal stalls in committee untilpeople lose interest or the window of oppor-tunity closes.

High-lnnovation OrganizationsIn high-innovation organizations, the resultsof the feasibility study are first reviewed in-formally but always are followed up with aformal dec ision. Thus an opportunity existsfor early dialogue, with time and support forbuilding modifications into the proposal toincrease potential for organizational accep-tance. This interactive review process is nei-ther a one-shot, go or no go review of a fi-nal proposal nor an endless review process. Itis normally a one- to three-meeting sequence.

The reviewers role is to help makeproposals more feasible and not an opportu-

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nity to play critic. Reviewers have an obliga-tion to see to fruition a number of proposalsso that the overa ll innovation effort is notstultified.

Since consensus is rare, some for-mal voting mechanism (such as ratings, rank-ings, or gradings) is used to aggregate thereview committees judgment. No single re-viewer, as a minority critic, can veto anyproject. He or she, however, can simply regis-ter a dissenting - but not necessar ily overrid-ing - opinion.

Advocates from the feasib ility-study group expect to incorporate modifica-tions and do not demand that the purity ofthe original proposal be maintained. Mutualadjustment rather than hard bargainingamong study group members is the norm.These adjustment, decisions are arrived atthrough group dialogue (both the reviewergroup and advocate group are involved) toavoid petty personality conflic ts and powergames.

Projects that need more than mini-mum resources to be done well are not put onstarvation diets that doom them to a slowdeath. A critica l mass of human and financialsupport is essential to success. Projects arereviewed periodically within a common timeframe to allow for quality comparisons.

The decision to adopt moves the

proposal forward with a clear organizationalcommitment to the implementation designand makes the risk an organizational one.The advocate does not carry the entire bur-den of possible failure on his or her shoul-ders. Should the results of implementation bedisappointing, the advocate is not used as ascapegoat. The project was, after all, a sharedorganizational judgment. Indeed, in excellentcompanies good humor and reassignmentwith full dignity follow the failure of riskyprojects.

PROCESS PHASE FOUR: IMPLEMENTATION

One might think that at this stage implemen-tation is automatic. After all, hasnt the feasi-bili ty study and design provided an actionplan ready to be carried out? Of course, it isnot that simple.

Low-Innovation OrganizationsTwo reasons cited for failure in the storiesfrom low-innovation organizations areunder-resourcing (which we have already ad-dressed) and its opposite: trying an immedi-ate, large-scale, direct implementation.

This error i s not organizational hes-itance. Rather, it is a delusion of grandeur:

Projects that need more than minimum resourcesto be done well are not put on itarvationdiets that doom them to a slow death. Acritical mass of human and financial

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Lets implement directly, immediately, andon a large scale. Lets commit a great amountof resources to assure success.n Unfortu-nately, the assumption of predictabi lity uponwhich a direct implementation is based is al-most always a fantasy. When the inevitableglitches occur, or when performance is un-favorable, the error is compounded as the or-ganization throws more money at the prob-lem to save face, even in light of negativeevaluation feedback.

This tendency to rush. in prema-turely with direct, large-scale implementa-tion efforts seems to be the resul t of a strongpsychological urge to remove the cognitivedissonance associated with risk taking. Itturns out to be exactly the wrong strategymost of the time and doubles the tendency forlater scapegoating, since a great amount ofresources were squandered before adequatefeasibil ity data were obtained.

High-Innovation OrganizationsHigh-innovation organizations, by contrast,begin with a small, controlled pilot studyconducted by early adopters. The enthusiasmof early adopters (who often are advocates)allows them to be patient with glitches and tocontribute to as well as support the necessaryproduct modifications and organizationaladaptation needed for new innovations. Inthe worst possib le scenario -a test thatproves to be a failure-a small pilot studypermits the organization to withdraw the in-novation with little loss of either face or re-sources, since commitment is limited in a pi-lot. In other words, pilot studies helpmaintain the attitude that the init ial im-plementation is clearly experimental and theresults will require further modifications be-fore direct, large-scale implementation canoccur.

Even where the results are favora-ble, considerable qualification must occur

during the pilot as a prelude to later large-scale implementation. For example, in asmall-scale pilot:

l The product or service is debugged inthe supportive atmosphere of early adoptorswho want the innovation to succeed, are pa-tient with trial-and-error learning, and as-sist in problem solving to work out glitches.

l The types of training materials, supportservices, instructional manuals, and so forth,that will be needed become clear. Time isavailable to develop these materials for cus-tomers. Further, service manuals can be pre-pared to specify practices necessary to dealwith weaker or more eccentric aspects of evena good first-generation product or service.Modifications are made to make the productor service more user friendly.

l Experimentation leads to variations indesign that can be offered in later productgenerations and wi ll enlarge the range of op-tions available to different users, thus enlarg-ing the potential market.

l Estimates of service and assistance re-quirements develop so that maintenance andservice cost estimates will be realistic.

The pilot allows for organizationaladaptation and market research, which sup-port later technological transfer and broad-scale marketing. It is always difficult to findthe golden mean between adequate testingtime and organizational adaptation and lostmarket opportunity. However, only onechange is given to make a first impression;rushing in with a poorly performing productand inadequate support for customer orienta-tion, maintenance, and service may provedeadly.

SUMMARYIn high-innovation organizations, specialfunds earmarked for research and develop-ment are used to support experimental activi- 33


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t ies. A special comm ittee accepts or rejects aninnovators proposal and underta kes a feasi-bil ity study. The feasibil ity-study team uses amarketing orientation to determine if a realcustomer need exists and how it may best bemet. By the t ime a proposal reaches the adop-tion stage , the advo cates original idea hasbeen modified by input from study-groupmem bers. The project is given an adequatefunding level and is monitored and auditedon a regular basis. Finally, implementationtakes place first on a small scale so that, in theevent of failure, a minimum amount of re-sources will be lost.

Essentially, successful innovationdepends on a companys will ingness to com-mit the necessary t ime, mon ey, and leader-ship to research and development. In the sim-plest terms, the difference between high-and low-innovation organizations is that thelatter are willing to follow up and followthrough on behalf of new ideas.

SEL ECTED B I BL I OGRAPHY

Two classics deal with innovation as a process. Thefirst is the major work by Everett R ogers t it ledDiffusion of Innovations (Free Press at Glencoe,1962). Two decades have passed since its publica-tion, but this book stil l offers the most lucid por-trayal of innovation as a phased change that occursover time . On the organizational side, Gerald Zalt-man et al.s book titled lnnoua tions in Organizu-tions (John Wiley & Sons, 1973) gives particular at-tention to the relationship between managementstructure and the change process. T his is ourfavorite source book for understanding the inter-play between structure and process -or phases ininnovation.

The following sources deal with or-ganizational factors in innovation: Innovation,

Integration, and Marginality: A Survey of Physi-cians (American Sociological Review, October1960), by Herbert Menzel; The Speed of Responseof Firms to New Techniques, (Quarterly Journalof Economics , May 1963), by Edwin Mansfield;and Big Steel, Inventio n, and Innovation (Quar-terly ~ournaf of Economics , May 1966), by WalterAdams and Joel Dir lam.

Examples of studies that have further ex-plored the idea of cosmopolitanism in innovationare Sociometr ic Location and Innovativeness:Reformulation and Extension o f the DiffusionModel (American Sociological Review, April1970), by Marshall Becker; Hospital Adoption ofInnovation: The Role of Integration into ExternalInformational Environments (Journal of Healthand Social Beha vior, April 1978), by John Kim-berly; Organizational Cosmopo litanism and In-novativeness (Academy of Management Journal,June 1983), by Thomas Robertson and YuramWind; and A Contingent Approach to Strategyand Tac tics in Project Planning (American Plan-ning Assoc iation Journal, April 1979), by JohnBryson and Andre Delbecq.

Two important studies on informationprocessing and innovation are External Comm u-nication and Project Performance: An Investiga-tion into the Role of Gatekeepers (ManagementScience, November 1980), by Michael Tushmanand Robert Katz; Communication Across Or-ganizational Bound aries: Special Boundary R olesin the Innovation Process (Administrative ScienceQuarterly, December 1977), by Michael Tushma n;and Managing the Flow of Technology (MIT Press,1977), by Thoma s Allen.

Finally, The New Science of ManagementDecision (Harper & Row , 1960), by Herbert Simonand Determinants of Innovation in Organiza-tions (American Polit ical Science Review, March1969), by Lawrence Mohr are pertinent works ondecision m aking and innovation.

If you wish to make photocopies or obtain reprintsof this or other articles in ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS,

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Managerial Practices That Enhance Innovation