Making choices under conflict: The impactof decision frames

Parthasarathy Krishnamurthy & Anish Nagpal

Published online: 2 June 2009# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract How do people make choices when they see two equally positive versustwo equally negative decision alternatives? The cancel-and-focus hypothesis arguesthat when people see options in a sequence, they tend to overweight the uniqueattributes of the first alternative. This leads to the prediction that when both optionsare positive (approach–approach conflict), the first option is preferred more but thatif they are both negative (avoidance-avoidance conflict), the first option is preferredless. Based on recent research, we argue that this finding may be contingent on anunrecognized compatibility confound with the decision frame of choosing versusrejecting. In this research, we argue that the choice biases predicted by the cancel-and-focus hypothesis will be more pronounced when the decision frame (choose/reject) is incompatible with the valence of the alternatives (reject–positive andchoose–negative) because such incompatibility increases processing motivation. Wereport two studies with varying operationalizations of decision conflict which findthat cancel-and-focus effects are more pronounced under incompatibility. Takentogether, these findings suggest that conflict effects are better understood byaccounting for the decision frame as well.

Keywords Decision frame . Decision conflict . Approach–approach .

Avoidance–avoidance . Compatibility

Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51DOI 10.1007/s11002-009-9079-0

Parthasarathy Krishnamurthy and Anish Nagpal contributed equally to the paper.

P. KrishnamurthyDepartment of Marketing and Entrepreneurship, University of Houston, 334 Melcher Hall,Houston, TX 77204, USAe-mail: partha@uh.edu

A. Nagpal (*)Department of Management and Marketing, The University of Melbourne, Level 10, 198Berkeley Street, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australiae-mail: anagpal@unimelb.edu.au

1 Introduction

People experience approach–approach conflict (henceforth, approach conflict) whenthey have to decide between two products that each have unique positive attributes;approaching one option means foregoing the advantages of the other. Likewise, theyexperience avoidance–avoidance conflict (henceforth, avoidance conflict) when theyhave to decide between two products that each have different negative attributes;avoiding one product means living with the unattractive features of the other(Chatterjee and Heath 1996; Dhar and Nowlis 1999; Houston and Sherman 1995;Houston et al. 1989, 1991).

One of the questions in the decision conflict literature is whether the nature of thealternatives systematically influences choice. The cancel-and-focus hypothesis(Houston and Sherman 1995) and the related feature-matching theory (Houston etal. 1991; Tversky 1977) address this question. According to both frameworks, whenpeople are exposed to decision options in a sequential manner, the attributes of thefirst alternative (also referred to as the subject) get overweighted (Houston andSherman 1995; Houston et al. 1989; Tversky 1977). This leads to an elegantprediction; under approach conflict (decisions involving attractive options), the firstoption is chosen more because its positive features are overweighted, and underavoidance conflict (decisions involving unattractive options), the first option ischosen less because its negative features are overweighted (Bruine de Bruin andKeren 2003; Houston and Sherman 1995; Houston et al. 1989, 1991; Kardes andSanbonmatsu 1993; Mantel and Kardes 1999; Sanbonmatsu et al. 1991).

Although the existing literature attributes such effects to the valence of thealternatives, recent research suggests that the decision conflict research may carry aninadvertent confound of the decision frame (Nagpal and Krishnamurthy 2008). Sincemost studies on conflict are typically conducted in the decision frame of choosing(participants are asked to choose options), people look for reasons to choose (Shafir1993; Ganzach 1995; Wedell 1997); reasons to choose are readily available whenevaluating positively valenced alternatives under approach conflict but not availablewhen evaluating negatively valenced alternatives under avoidance conflict. Thus,approach conflict conditions are also compatible with the decision frame of choosingwhereas the avoidance conflict conditions are incompatible with choosing. Nagpaland Krishnamurthy (2008) show that this variation in decision frame compatibilityhas implications for the decision-makers′ motivation and cognitive resources, andthey demonstrate that it is the level of compatibility rather than the conflict valenceper se that influences processing time and decision difficulty.

In the present research, drawing from Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008), weargue that accounting for the compatibility between the decision frame (choosingoptions versus rejecting options) and the valence of the alternatives also allows us toget a better understanding of the effects of decision conflict on choice. We combinethe findings of Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008) regarding the effects ofcompatibility on motivation and effort with the traditional cancel-and-focusexplanations for decision conflict effects on choice to argue that the choice biaseswill be more pronounced when the decision frame is incompatible with the valenceof the alternatives. We report two studies that assess the role of compatibility as afactor in decisions involving conflict.

38 Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51

The remainder of this manuscript is structured as follows. We first hypothesizeabout how accounting for compatibility leads to a replication/modification of thecurrently known effects. We then test our hypotheses in two studies and discussthe results.

2 Effect of decision conflict on choice: Role of compatibility

As already noted, Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008) argue that valence of thealternatives is confounded with compatibility in a choose frame because a chooseframe is compatible with the positive features under approach conflict butincompatible with the negative features under avoidance conflict. Although Nagpaland Krishnamurthy (2008) show that compatibility between conflict and decisionframe influence decision difficulty and decision time, it remains an open question asto whether it has any implications for the choices that people make, as opposed tothe speed of making these choices. To address this question, we must consider whydecision conflict is thought to influence choice in the first place.

The relationship between conflict and choice is addressed in the cancel-and-focus hypothesis and the related feature-matching model (Houston et al. 1991;Houston and Sherman 1995; Tversky 1977). These frameworks have three keyaspects. First, when two decision alternatives are compared, the common featurescancel out, and the focus is on the unique features. Second, as the decisionalternatives are compared, one of them becomes the “subject” of comparison whilethe other becomes the “referent.” This is akin to the reference-dependence model(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979) which suggests that when comparingalternatives, one of them serves as the reference point or anchor against whichother alternatives are compared. Third, the unique features of the subject areoverweighted compared to those of the referent (Houston et al. 1989; Tversky1977). Thus, under approach conflict, the positive features of the subject areoverweighted, leading to increased preference for the subject. By the same logic,under avoidance conflict, there is a decreased preference for the subject because itsnegative features are overweighted causing it to appear less attractive than thereferent1 (Bruine de Bruin and Keren 2003; Houston and Sherman 1995; Houstonet al. 1989, 1991; Kardes and Sanbonmatsu 1993; Mantel and Kardes 1999;Sanbonmatsu et al. 1991).

In the decision conflict literature, Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008) show thatincompatibility between the decision frame and conflict type should trigger greatermotivation and effort to resolve the incompatibility. Further, research also showsthat incompatibility between the stimulus and response increases elaboration andrecall (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). Houston et al. (1987) report that picture-copy incongruence in advertisements increases elaboration and recall of elementsof the advertisement. Separately, cognitive consistency theories such as Balance

1 The question of which of the two alternatives becomes the subject versus referent is determined by theposition of the alternative relative to the instruction to decide (Agostinelli et al. 1986). If the instruction todecide comes before exposure to the alternatives, the first option becomes the subject. It the instructioncomes after exposure to the alternatives, the second alternative becomes the subject. In our studies, thefirst option is the subject.

Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51 3939

Theory (Heider 1946, 1958), Incongruity Theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955),and Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger 1957) also suggest when peopleencounter aspects of their decision environment that are incompatible with eachother, they are motivated to reduce the inconsistency. An increase in the motivationto process information should cause people to be data driven and compare theoptions attribute by attribute (Sanbonmatsu et al. 1991). This attribute-by-attributecomparison process should influence the extent to which features are processed;they should be processed more under incompatibility. If so, its attendant choicebiases, which are based on overweighting of the attributes, should be morepronounced under incompatibility. In fact, this expectation seems to be borne outby the pattern of results observed in the prior literature.

2.1 Past results and hints of role of compatibility

The role of compatibility in decision conflict seems to be supported, indirectly atleast, by the pattern of empirical findings reported in the literature. Recall that thecancel-and-focus hypothesis makes two predictions, first that under approachconflict, the subject will be preferred more than the referent, and second that underavoidance conflict, the subject will be preferred less than the referent. The empiricalsupport for the above two predictions is somewhat mixed.

There are two ways to test the prediction that the subject is preferred moreunder approach conflict and preferred less under avoidance conflict. One way isto test whether the subject is preferred more under approach conflict relative toavoidance conflict. This significant difference in proportion could arise eitherbecause of greater preference for subject in approach conflict or lower preferencefor the same under avoidance conflict. A majority of the studies report thistest (Bruine de Bruin and Keren 2003; Houston and Sherman 1995; Houstonet al. 1989, 1991; Kardes and Sanbonmatsu 1993; Mantel and Kardes 1999;Sanbonmatsu et al. 1991).

The second, more conservative test is to examine if the preference for the subjectis greater than 50% under approach conflict and less than 50% under avoidanceconflict (when order is counterbalanced, and both options are pretested to be equallyattractive). The only study we know of that reports preferences separately forapproach and avoidance conflict reports mixed findings in this regard. Underavoidance conflict, the preference for the subject tends to be lower than 50% aspredicted. However, under approach conflict, the subject and the referent tend to beequally preferred (Houston et al. 1989—experiments 1 and 2).

We believe that these mixed results can be explained through the compatibilitylens in light of the argument that incompatibility increases processing motivation.Given a choose frame (as used in past research), incompatibility in the choose–negative2 condition should trigger greater motivation and effort to resolve theincompatibility (Nagpal and Krishnamurthy 2008). This would result in effortful

2 Since the terms approach and avoidance also connote actions of choosing versus rejecting respectively,instead of using “choose-approach” and “choose-avoidance”, we use the terms “choose-positive” and“choose-negative” which clearly refers to the valence of the alternatives. We thank the reviewer for thissuggestion.

40 Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51

processing, causing the “overweighting aspect” of the cancel-and-focus hypothesisto be invoked to a greater extent under choose–negative than under choose–positive Thus, overweighting of the unique features of the subject will occur to agreater extent in the choose–negative condition. Since these unique features arenegative, overweighting them will cause the subject to appear more unattractivethan the referent. So, choice for the subject will be significantly below 50%.However, compatibility in the choose–positive combination should trigger lessermotivation and effort to process information (Nagpal and Krishnamurthy 2008).Thus, the “overweighing” of the first alternative aspect of cancel-and-focushypothesis will be invoked to a lesser extent, and there will be lesser over-weighting of the features of the subject, so, the subject may not appear to besignificantly more attractive than the referent. This implies that choice for thesubject may not significantly depart from 50%. This prediction is in consistentwith past results.

If the decision-frame-induced compatibility influences choice behavior, as arguedabove, then reversing the decision-frame should also reverse the conditions in whichthe choice effects are observed. Thus, if we employ a reject (vs. a choose) decision-frame, then incompatibility is higher when evaluating two positive alternatives in theapproach conflict condition relative to when evaluating two negative alternatives inthe avoidance conflict condition (Nagpal and Krishnamurthy 2008). This is becausea reject decision frame induces the decision-maker to look for reasons to do so(Shafir 1993; Ganzach 1995; Wedell 1997), which the negative (unattractive)options readily provide. The positive (attractive) options in a reject frame fail toreadily provide reasons to reject, leading to incompatibility. Thus, in the decisionframe of rejecting, the opposite pattern should be observed. Compatibility in thereject–negative combination implies that the features of the subject will beoverweighted to a lesser degree. Thus choice for the subject will not significantlydepart from 50%. However, incompatibility in the reject–positive combination willcause the positive features of the subject to be overweighted to a greater degree. Thissuggests that choice for the subject will significantly depart from 50% in such a waythat it will be significantly favored (proportion of subject will be significantly above50%). Thus, we propose that choice for the subject will significantly depart from50% under incompatibility than under compatibility. Specifically, we hypothesizethat,

H1: In a choose frame, preference for the subject will depart from an even-split(50%) when evaluating two negatively valenced alternatives under avoidanceconflict such that it is significantly disfavored (H1a). In a reject task, preferencefor the subject will depart from an even-split (50%) when evaluating twopositively valenced alternatives under approach conflict such that it issignificantly favored (H1b).

We now present two studies in which we examine the impact of decision frameand conflict type on choice. In study 1, we use stimuli similar to that used in thepast literature to create approach versus avoidance conflict. In study 2, instead ofusing different attributes to trigger approach versus avoidance conflict, we employpositive versus negative attribute framing of the same set of attributes to createconflict.

Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51 4141

3 Study 1

3.1 Participants, design, and procedure

One hundred and forty-four undergraduate college students participated in study 1 inexchange for partial course credit. The design was a 2 (Decision frame: Choose/Reject)×2 (Conflict Type: Approach/Avoidance) × 2 (Order: AutomobileA–AutomobileB/AutomobileB-AutomobileA) between subjects design. Participantslogged onto the website and were assigned to one of the eight conditions dependingon their arrival sequence. The first person was assigned to the first condition, thesecond person to the second, and so on; the ninth person was assigned to the firstcondition again. The first page described the nature of the study which was followedby a page asking for their consent to participate in the research study. Theparticipants were then told that the next two pages contain descriptions of twoautomobiles and that they will be asked to choose or reject one of them. In our study,the first of the two alternatives serves as the subject because the instruction to decidebetween alternatives preceded the presentation of the alternatives (Agostinelli et al.1986). The response of choosing/rejecting was elicited on the last page. Theparticipants were allowed to go back and forth between pages containing thedescription of the alternatives prior to making the decision.

3.2 Independent variables

3.2.1 Decision frame

In the choose condition, participants were instructed to choose one of the options,and in the reject condition, they were instructed to reject one. Furthermore, theresponse scale was framed as “I will choose option: A/B” or “I will reject option:A/B”.

3.2.2 Conflict type

Participants were exposed to either approach or avoidance conflict using uniquepositive versus unique negative attributes. The stimuli were patterned after Houstonet al. (1991). There was one difference; we had six attributes (three unique and threecommon) for each alternative compared to the 8–10 attributes per alternative inHouston et al. (1991). Please refer to the Appendix for a sample of the stimuli.

3.3 Dependent variable

3.3.1 Choice

We recorded the option that was chosen or rejected by the participants. The optionthat appeared first was coded as the subject and the preference for the subject versusthe referent was recorded. In the reject conditions, the preference was measured byreverse coding the alternative picked for rejection.

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3.4 Results

Since there were no order effects, we collapsed across the order. In the choose frame,we expected that the preference for the subject in the approach conflict overavoidance conflict should come from it being disfavored in avoidance rather thanbeing favored in approach. We regressed choice on the decision frame and conflicttype using the PROC Logistic in SAS. There was a significant decision frame×conflict type effect on Choice (χ2=6.29, p<.05); the effects in the choose and rejectframes are analyzed separately.

Choose decision frame To test for H1a, b, we wrote planned contrasts in thelogistic procedure. Consistent with the baseline expectations from the priorliterature, there was greater overall preference for the subject when evaluatingpositive options relative to negative options, 53% vs. 31%, (χ2=3.22, p<0.05 one-tailed). More importantly, consistent with H1a, this difference arose because thesubject was disfavored in the choose–negative condition (31%), and the deviationfrom an even-split was significant, z=–2.37, p<0.05. Thus, incompatibility inducespreference against the subject in the choose–negative condition. However,compatibility in the choose–positive condition fails to provide any benefit for thesubject; the preference for the subject is not significantly greater than an even-split,53%, z=0.34, ns.

Reject decision frame We hypothesized that the preference for the subject in theapproach conflict over avoidance conflict should come from it being favored inapproach rather than being disfavored in avoidance conflict. Again, consistent with thebaseline expectations, there was greater overall preference for the subject whenevaluating positive options relative to negative options, 68% vs. 47%, (χ2=3.08,p<0.05 one-tailed). More importantly, consistent with H1b, this difference arosebecause the preference for the subject was significantly greater than an even-split,z=2.28, p<0.05 in the reject–positive condition. Thus, incompatibility inducespreference for the subject in the reject–positive condition. However, in the reject–negative condition, compatibility fails to induce preference against the subject;the preference for the subject is not significantly lower than an even-split, 47%,z=−0.32, ns.

3.5 Discussion

In study 1, we investigated how compatibility between the decision frame and typeof conflict affects choice. Past research suggests that the preference for the subject isgreater under approach conflict than avoidance conflict. Our findings comport withthese prior results. Furthermore, we find that under a choose decision frame, thisgreater preference for the subject under approach conflict than avoidance conflictcomes from it being disfavored under avoidance rather than it being favored underapproach conflict. However, under a reject decision frame, greater preference for thesubject under approach conflict than avoidance conflict comes from it being favoredin approach rather than being disfavored in avoidance conflict. Thus, compatibility

Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51 4343

between the decision frame and conflict type has a systematic impact onpreferences.3

A limitation of study 1 is that approach and avoidance conflict was induced bydifferent sets of attributes. For example, in approach conflict, the two options hadunique positive attributes such as “powerful engine,” “very reliable,” “goodfinancing available,” “air-conditioning included,” etc. However, in avoidanceconflict, the two options had unique negative attributes such as “hard to find serviceoutlets,” “poor warranty,” “high insurance costs,” etc. Thus, the attributes used tocreate the two types of conflict are different. There is the possibility that the effectsare idiosyncratic to the attributes, resulting in a conflict–attribute confound. Toaddress this concern, in study 2, we created approach and avoidance conflict byframing the same set of attributes positively and negatively.

4 Study 2

4.1 Participants, design, and procedure

One hundred and forty-two undergraduate college students participated in study2 in exchange for partial course credit. The design was a 2 (Decision frame:Choose/Reject)×2 (Conflict Type: Approach/Avoidance) × 2 (Order: Automobi-leA–AutomobileB/AutomobileB-AutomobileA) between subjects design. Theprocedure for study 2 was similar to study 1. The only difference was that weused positive versus negative attribute framing to instantiate approach versusavoidance conflict.

4.2 Independent variables

4.2.1 Conflict type

The type of conflict was instantiated by describing each attribute using eitherpositive attribute framing or negative attribute framing (Levin et al. 1998). Forinstance, the reliability of the car was framed as follows in the approach conflict“The car has a 90% chance of not needing repairs in the first 100,000 miles.” Inavoidance conflict the same attribute was framed negatively as follows, “The carhas a 10% chance of needing repairs in the first 100,000 miles.” Thus, in approachconflict, all attributes of each of the alternatives were described using positiveattribute framing. Likewise, avoidance conflict featured the same set of attributesthat were negatively framed. Please refer to the Appendix for a sample of thestimuli.

3 In order to confirm that the two automobiles were equally attractive or unattractive, we conducted a post-test of the stimuli used in this study. We asked a different set of participants to indicate which automobilewas more attractive, desirable, and appealing on a seven-point scale anchored at Automobile A andAutomobile B. The results showed that the two automobiles were equally attractive, desirable, andappealing (Cronbach′s alpha 0.80, t (39)=.046, ns).

44 Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51

4.2.2 Decision frame

As in study 1, half the participants were asked to choose one of the two cars whilethe other half was asked to reject one.

4.3 Dependent variable

4.3.1 Choice

As in study 1, we recorded the option that was chosen or rejected by the participants.The option that appeared first was coded as the subject and the preference for thesubject versus the referent was recorded. In the reject conditions, the preference wasmeasured by reverse coding the alternative picked for rejection.

4.4 Results

Since there were no order effects, we collapsed across the order. In the choose frame,we expected that the preference for the subject in the approach conflict overavoidance conflict should come from it being disfavored in avoidance rather thanbeing favored in approach. We regressed choice on the decision frame and conflicttype using the PROC Logistic in SAS. There was a significant decision frame×conflict type effect on Choice (χ2=7.07, p<.05); hence, we analyze the choice andreject decision frames separately.

Choose decision frame Planned contrasts in the logistic procedure indicated thatconsistent with the baseline expectations, there was greater overall preference for thesubject when evaluating positive options relative to negative options, 49% vs. 28%,(χ2=3.11, p<0.05 one-tailed). More importantly, consistent with H1a, this differencearose because the subject was disfavored in the choose–negative condition (28%),and the deviation from an even-split was significant, z=–2.70, p<0.05. Thus,incompatibility induces preference against the subject in the choose–negativecondition. However, compatibility in the choose–positive condition fails to provideany benefit for the subject; the preference for the subject is not significantly greaterthan an even-split, 53%, z=0.16, ns.

Reject decision frame We hypothesized that the preference for the subject in theapproach conflict over avoidance conflict should come from it being favored inapproach rather than being disfavored in avoidance conflict. Again, consistent withthe baseline expectations, there was greater overall preference for the subject whenevaluating positive options relative to negative options, 76% vs. 53%, (χ2=4.00,p<0.05). More importantly, consistent with H1b, this difference arose because thepreference for the subject was significantly greater than an even-split, z=3.99,p<0.05 in the approach condition. Thus, incompatibility induces preference for thesubject in the reject–positive condition. However, in the reject–negative condition,compatibility fails to induce preference against the subject; the preference for thesubject is not significantly lower than an even-split, 47%, z=−0.37, ns.

Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51 4545

Thus, we found that effects of compatibility between decision frame and conflicton choice are observed even if we use the same attributes for generating approachversus avoidance conflict.4

5 General discussion

Our core argument is that the type of conflict, approach versus avoidance, mayinteract with the decision frame of choosing versus rejecting, resulting in decisionsituations characterized by compatibility or incompatibility. To assess the potentialrole of compatibility and its effects on choice, we orthogonally varied the type ofconflict (approach/avoidance) and the decision frame (choose/reject). In study 1, wefound that incompatibility systematically affects preference for the subject.Specifically, in a choose frame, preference for the subject was significantly lowerthan 50% only under avoidance conflict but not under approach conflict. In a rejectframe, preference for the subject was higher than 50% only under approach conflictbut not under avoidance conflict. In study 2, we replicated the findings from study 1without varying the attributes used in invoking the conflict. These studies indicatethat although the cancel-and-focus hypothesis is the likely mechanism for predictingpreferences, its impact is greater when there is incompatibility than when there iscompatibility. The key highlight of this paper is that choice involving positive versusnegative alternatives should be understood from the perspective of the compatibilityinduced by the decision frame. Even though our data suggests that decision frameand attribute valence combine to influence how the attribute information isprocessed, there is actually a surprising symmetry in the choose/reject conditions.For instance, in study 2, if we compute the extent by which the choice departs from50% (which should be the case given the counterbalancing), we find that in choose-compatible and reject-compatible conditions, the deviation is 1% and 3%,respectively. However, in the choose-incompatible and reject-incompatible con-ditions, the deviation is 22% and 26%, respectively, suggesting that there may be acommon, compatibility-induced process that transcends task valence.

5.1 Alternative account5

Although our study results are consistent with the idea that task-conflict incompatibilityenhances the cancel-and-focus effects, they do not pin it down as being the uniqueprocess. In fact, there is another account—a first dipositional impression plusconfirmation bias based explanation—that predicts the choice effects observed instudies 1 and 2, without requiring the overweighting of the subject. We detail that below.

Consider the choice between two options that have common positive attributesbut unique negative attributes (incompatibility). Upon seeing the first option(subject), the decision-maker should make an initial assessment of not choosing as

4 In order to confirm that the two automobiles were equally attractive/unattractive, we conducted a post-test of the stimuli used in this study. Similar to study 1, we found that the two automobiles were equallyattractive, desirable, and appealing (Cronbach′s alpha 0.87), t (40)=.076, ns.5 We sincerely thank reviewer 1 for this alternative explanation.

46 Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51

it has negative attributes. Such formations of first impressions have been shown tooccur in the past literature (e.g., McConnell et al. 1994). This would cause thedecision-maker to be favorably predisposed to choosing the referent. Thispredisposition may further introduce a confirmation-bias favoring the referent.Extant research in confirmatory reasoning has demonstrated that consumers interpretinformation in a biased manner towards the product for which they have alreadyhave established a slight preference (Chernev 2001; Klayman 1995; Lord et al. 1979;Russo et al. 1996; Bettman et al. 1998). Thus, the negative first impression of thesubject and possible positive confirmation bias toward the referent might thenincrease the likelihood of choosing the referent

Similarly, in the reject–positive condition, the decision-maker might form apositive impression towards not rejecting the subject. Hence, he will be predisposedto rejecting the referent. Upon encountering the features of the referent, thispredisposition may further introduce a confirmation-bias against the referent,resulting in rejecting the referent. Since both the accounts predict the same patternof choice results, it is important to distinguish between the two explanations in futureresearch to understand the effect of task on moderating the consequences ofapproach versus avoidance conflict.

5.2 Future research and implications

Our research focuses on only one variant of compatibility—that between thedecision frame and conflict type. One can easily imagine other theoreticallyinteresting ways in which compatibility may play a role in choice and mightexacerbate rather than mitigate choice distortion. For example, compatibility canarise between one’s own chronic regulatory focus, i.e., promotion-focus versusprevention-focus, and the valence of the conflict induced by the attributes of theproduct. Past research suggests the valence of the regulatory focuses shifts focus onfeatures that are valence-consistent such that those with promotion-focus overweightpositive information, and vice versa. Thus, compatibility between regulatory focusand conflict valence may enhance the effects observed in the previous literature.

Several possibilities exist regarding potential moderators for the present findings.For example, Dhar and Nowlis (1999) show that time pressure systematically impactsdecision deferral and increases the emphasis paid to the unique features of thealternatives. If this is the case, then canceling and focusing of features and its impacton choice will be moderated by time pressure, which should modify the presentfindings. Alternatively, it is reasonable to argue that under time pressure, the firstacceptable alternative will be chosen no matter what. Hence, under approach conflict,the “subject” might be chosen more often than the “referent” whereas under avoidanceconflict, the “referent” will be chosen more often, regardless of the decision frame; inother words, time pressure might mitigate the role of compatibility.

In this research, as well as in the broader decision theoretic literature, commonattributes of decision options cancel out and are not processed further when making adecision; the unique attributes receive attention and govern preferences. However, usingthe confirmatory-reasoning framework (Lord et al. 1979; Russo et al. 1996; Klayman1995), Chernev (2001) shows that when deciding between two options, consumerstend to evaluate the common features in such a way as to support their already

Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51 4747

established preferences. Also, the impact of common features on preferences seems todepend upon the importance of the unique attributes (Chernev 1997). Thus, thecommon features have a role to play in decision-making and it will be interesting toprobe further.

Another interesting avenue for future research is whether the choice biases exploredin this research extend to the case when consumers evaluate the product optionssimultaneously. In the current article, participants evaluated the options sequentially,which ensured that the first options became the subject of comparison and the secondone became the referent. However, when options are evaluated simultaneously, forexample in the store, will the same choice biases exist? Johar and Creyer (1993) showthat when choices are stimulus-based rather than memory-based, i.e., when bothalternatives are presented simultaneously, these choice biases are attenuated. Similarresearch in the domain of judgment (sequential evaluation) versus choice (jointevaluation) shows that comparable attributes (e.g., price) get overweighted in choice,but enriched attributes (e.g., brand name) get overweighted in judgment (Nowlis andSimonson 1997). Several other studies have also documented systematic differencesbetween choice and judgment (e.g., Billings and Scherer 1988; Ganzach 1995;Montgomery et al. 1994). This distinction between the sequential and simultaneouspresentation of alternatives and its impact on choice is an important one as pastresearch shows that people like the chosen alternative more under sequential choicethan under simultaneous choice (Read and Loewenstein 1995; Simonson 1990).Although in our research we did not measure post-choice evaluation of the chosenalternative, this is an important avenue for future research.

From a practical perspective, it is important to understand the situations underwhich a decision-maker may adopt one frame over the other. Shafir (1993) arguesthat the selection of the decision frame sometimes depends upon the choice set underconsideration. For example, if one had to recommend one option from a set of sixoptions, one might adopt a choose decision frame. However, if one had torecommend five options from a set of six, it is easier to adopt a reject decision frameand drop one option from the six. This suggests that decision frames may be invokedby the information-environment, which in turn, qualifies some of our findings. Whatwe have attempted to do in this research is to underscore the role of compatibility inunderstanding choice effects under decision conflict.

Our research has some potential marketing implications. Our findings, consistentwith prior findings, suggest that the order of exposure to the products influencesconsumer choice. Prior research suggests that if the product choice context is one ofchoosing between attractive or hedonically pleasing products, it pays to be first, butthat if it not pleasing (such as insurance), then it is better to be the second. Ourresearch qualifies that and suggests that the consumers′ decision posture, one ofselecting versus rejecting, can either accentuate or extinguish the serial positioneffect. For example, in comparative advertising contexts, where a firm presents theirown product and that of the competitor′s, it is best to present the advantages of theown product first, competitive product next, and most importantly induce theviewers to thinking in terms of which one they would reject. On the other hand, ifone wants to draw the comparison between the relative disadvantages, it is best topresent the competitive product first, and then one’s own product, and frame thedecision as one of choosing between the two. While this may be relatively more

48 Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51

complex to execute in a medium such as advertising, it is easy to see howsalespeople can be trained to communicate their own and competitor information amanner that takes into consideration both what one focuses on (advantages/disadvantages), the sequencing, and the decision frame. Further, marketers canensure that if they have a pioneering advantage in the marketplace, they should tryand maintain a focal position in the consumers mind by obtaining prominent shelf-place and advertising schedules. This would ensure that their product remains thesubject of comparison when consumers compare their product to the competitors’products, thus increasing the likelihood of greater preference. Also, decision framesof choosing versus rejecting is related to regulatory focus of promotion versusprevention, which is widely acknowledged as an important variation that often stemsfrom consumer characteristics (chronic promotion/prevention focus) as well assituation characteristics such as the nature of the product in question (vacation versusinsurance). Our research suggests that serial-position effects are more likely toemanate when, say, people try to choose between insurance options or reject one ofmany vacation options, and not the other way around.

Appendix

Approach conflict—study 1

Automobile A Automobile B

Poor mileage Poor mileage

Poor warranty Poor warranty

Hard to find service outlets Hard to find service outlets

Very reliable Good financing available

Powerful engine Air conditioning included

Good ratings from a consumer guide Your friend recommended this model

Avoidance conflict—study 1

Automobile A Automobile B

Doesn’t need repairs often Doesn’t need repairs often

Stereo included Stereo included

Prestigious model Prestigious model

Hard to find service outlets High insurance costs

Poor warranty Air conditioning not included

Bad ratings from a consumer guide Has had a lot of factory recalls

Market Lett (2010) 21:37–51 4949

Approach conflict—study 2

Automobile A Automobile B

Repairs: It has a 90% chance of not needing majorrepairs during the first 100,000 miles.

Warranty: This warranty covers 90% of the partsin case of failure or accidents.

Tinted windows: The tint successfully blocks 80%of harmful rays from the sun.

Side airbags: These air bags are effective in savinglives 85 out of 100 times during accidents.

Braking system: The ABS/Traction Control Systemsuccessfully prevents skidding 80% of the time.

Recommendation: 9 out of 10 people who boughtthis car recommend it.

Anti-theft system: It has a 95% success rate in tracingstolen cars within 2 h.

Factory recalls: 97% of the cars rolling out of themanufacturing plant are defect free.

Avoidance conflict—study 2

Automobile A Automobile B

Repairs: It has a 10% chance of needing majorrepairs during the first 100,000 miles.

Warranty: This warranty does not cover 10% of theparts in case of failure or accidents.

Tinted windows: The tint fails to block 20% ofharmful rays from the sun.

Side airbags: These air bags are not effective insaving lives 15 out of 100 times during accidents.

Braking system: The ABS/Traction ControlSystem fails to prevent skidding 20% of the time.

Recommendation: 1 out of 10 people who boughtthis car do not recommend it.

Anti-theft system: It has a 5% failure rate intracing stolen cars within 2 h.

Factory recalls: 3% of the cars rolling out of themanufacturing plant are defective.

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