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MA
RIN
E A
CCID
ENT
INV
ESTI
GAT
ION
BRA
NCH
AC
CID
ENT
REP
OR
T
SERIOUS MARINE CASUALTY REPORT NO 17/2014 JULY 2014
Report on the investigation of
the fire on the main deck of the ro-ro cargo ferry
Corona Seaways
in the Kattegat, Scandinavia
on 4 December 2013
This investigation has been conducted with the co-operation and assistance of the Danish,
Swedish and Lithuanian accident investigation branches.
Extract from
The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping
(Accident Reporting and Investigation)
Regulations 2012 – Regulation 5:
“The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping (Accident
Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 shall be the prevention of future accidents
through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall not be the purpose of an
investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve its objective,
to apportion blame.”
NOTE
This report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 14(14) of the
Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012, shall be
inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purposes is to
attribute or apportion liability or blame.
© Crown copyright, 2014You may re-use this document/publication (not including departmental or agency logos) free of charge in any format or medium. You must re-use it accurately and not in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and you must give the title of the source publication. Where we have identified any third party copyright material you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.
All MAIB publications can be found on our website: www.maib.gov.uk
For all enquiries:Marine Accident Investigation BranchMountbatten HouseGrosvenor SquareSouthampton Email: [email protected] Kingdom Telephone: +44 (0) 23 8039 5500SO15 2JU Fax: +44 (0) 23 8023 2459
SECTION 1 CONTENTS
SECTION 1 – FACTUAL INFORMATION 2
1.1 Particulars of Corona Seaways and accident 21.2 Background – overview of route and cargo shipping procedures 41.3 Narrative 4
1.3.1 Eventsleadinguptothediscoveryofthefire 41.3.2 Fire-fightingatsea 71.3.3 Fire-fightinginHelsingborg 8
1.4 Vesselandcargodamage 81.4.1 Vessel’sstructureandsystemsdamage 81.4.2 Cargo damage 9
1.5 Description and history of primary vehicles 91.5.1 RenaultPremium250.18truck 91.5.2 Renault Mascott-Master van 10
1.6 RenaultPremium250.18truck–overviewofelectricalandenginestartingarrangements 101.6.1 Electrical system 101.6.2 Engine starting arrangements 11
1.7 ExaminationofRenaultPremium250.18truck 121.7.1 Structure 121.7.2 Electricalandmechanicalsystems 12
1.8 ExaminationofRenaultMascott-Mastervan 131.9 Low-pressurefixedCO2fire-extinguishingsystem 131.10 Cargo decks’ ventilation arrangements 151.11 Regulation and guidance 161.12 Similaraccident 16
SECTION 2 – ANALYSIS 17
2.1 Aim 172.2 Causeofthefire 17
2.2.1 RenaultMascott-Mastervan 172.2.2 RenaultPremium250.18truck 17
2.3 Firedevelopment 182.4 Risksofthecarriageofusedvehicles 18
2.4.1 Usedvehicles–fireignitionrisk 182.4.2 Vehiclechecks 182.4.3 Vessel’s safety instructions 19
2.5 Crew’sfire-fightingpractice 192.6 Muster stations 192.7 FunctionalityofthelowpressurefixedCO2 fire-extinguishingsystem 202.8 Cargodeckventilationissues 20
2.8.1 Isolationofventilationsupplies 202.8.2 Operationofcargodeckventilationfans 20
2.9 Drug and alcohol policy and passengers 21
SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 22
3.1 Safetyissuesdirectlycontributingtotheaccidentthathavebeenaddressedorresulted in recommendations 22
3.2 Othersafetyissuesdirectlycontributingtotheaccident 223.3 Safetyissuesnotdirectlycontributingtotheaccidentthathavebeenaddressedor
resulted in recommendations 223.4 Othersafetyissuesnotdirectlycontributingtotheaccident 23
SECTION 4 - ACTIONS TAKEN 24
SECTION 5 - RECOMMENDATIONS 25
FIGURES
Figure 1 - Accident position
Figure 2 - Corona Seaways – general arrangement
Figure 3 - Fire-damagedRenaultPremium250.18truckandRenault Mascott-Master van following their removal from the vessel
Figure 4 - Damaged vehicles and trailers on the main deck
Figure 5 - SchematicofRenaultPremium250.18truckenginestarting arrangements
Figure 6 - Fire damaged engine components
Figure 7 - Schematicofenginestartermotormainsolenoid
Figure 8 - DamagedRenaultPremium250.18truckenginestartermotor main solenoid
Figure 9 - Main deck ventilation jalousie
ANNEXES
Annex A - DFDS/ASInstruction-InformationtoCarCarriersdated28 January 2014
Annex B - DFDSA/AInstruction-InformationtoUnregisteredSecond HandSegmentdated28January2014
Annex C - DFDSA/SInstruction–DeliveryNote,Single/EmptyUnitdated6 January 2014
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AB - Ableseaman
AB - Aktiebolag
A/S - Aktieselskab
BA - Breathing Apparatus
C - Celsius
CCTV - Closed-Circuit-Television
CO2 - CarbonDioxide
COSWP - CodeofSafeWorkingPracticesforMerchantSeamen
CSMM - CompanySafetyManagementManual
DFDS - DetForendeDampskibs-Selskab
FRS - FireandRescueService
hp - horsepower
JRCC - Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre
km - kilometre
m - metre
mm - millimetre
MCA - Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MGN - Marine Guidance Note
nm - nautical mile
OOW - OfficeroftheWatch
Ro-Ro - Rollon,Rolloff
SOLAS - InternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea1974,as amended
SSMM - ShipSafetyManagementManual
t - tonne
UTC - Universal Co-ordinated Time
VHF - VeryHighFrequency
Volt - V
TIMES: All times in this report are UTC+1 unless otherwise stated
TERMS:
Aktiebolag - Swedishlegaltermassociatedwithcompanyliabilityand equivalenttotheEnglish“Limited”.
Aktieselskab - Danishlegaltermassociatedwithcompanyliabilityand equivalenttotheEnglish“Limited”.
Jalousie - Astructurecomprisingaseriesoflouvreswhichcanbe opened or closed for ventilation purposes.
MAFI - TheGermancompanynameMAFIiswidelyusedfordescribinglow, heavy-duty trailers in the freight industry. The name originates from oneofthecompany’sfoundermembers,Martin Fila.
Nearside - Thepartofavehiclewhichisnearesttothekerb(foraleft-handdrive vehicle this is the right-hand side).
Offside - Thepartofavehiclewhichisfurthestfromthekerb(foraleft-hand drive vehicle this is the left-hand side).
1
SYNOPSIS
At0215on4December2013,afirewasdiscoveredonthemaindeckofthero-rocargo ferry Corona Seaways while the vessel was on passage from Fredericia toCopenhagen,Denmark.Thecrewmustered,closedtheventilationlouvres,establishedboundarycoolingandoperatedthefixedCO2fire-extinguishingsystem.Althoughsmokecontinuedtoescapefromthelouvres,steadytemperaturesinthevicinityofthefireindicatedthattheCO2hadbeeneffectiveincontrollingit.At0640,thevesselenteredtheSwedishportofHelsingborg,whereassistancewasprovidedbythelocalFireandRescueService.
The vessel suffered light structural damage and the loss of some minor electrical supplies.Threevehiclesandsixtrailerswereseverelyfire-damagedandothervehiclessufferedminorradiantheatdamage.Thefirewascausedbyanelectricaldefect on one of the vehicles’ engine starting system.
Recommendationstothemanagementcompanyincludeareviewofitsonboardinstructionstotakeaccountoftherevisedproceduressinceintroducedbytheoperator for the carriage of used and unregistered vehicles.
2
SECTION 1 – FACTUAL INFORMATION1.1 PARTICULARS OF CORONA SEAWAYS AND ACCIDENT
SHIP PARTICULARSVessel’s name Corona Seaways
Flag United KingdomClassificationsociety AmericanBureauofShippingIMOnumber 9357597Type Ro-Ro cargo shipRegistered owner SnowdonLeasingCompanyLimitedManager EllingsenShipManagementABConstruction SteelYearofbuild Keellaid20October2006Length overall 187mRegistered length 169.85mGross tonnage 25,609.00Minimum safe manning 12Authorised cargo Passengers and vehicles
VOYAGE PARTICULARSPort of departure Fredericia,DenmarkPort of arrival Copenhagen,Denmark(intended),
Helsinborg,Sweden(actual)Type of voyage ShortinternationalCargo information 170units,10accompaniedManning 19
MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATIONDate and time 4December2013at0215Type of marine casualty or incident SeriousmarinecasualtyLocation of incident 56º08’N011º41’E,59nmwestof
Helsingborg,SwedenPlaceonboard StarboardsideofthemaindeckInjuries/fatalities NoneDamage/environmentalimpact Severedamageto3vehiclesand6trailers.
Smokedamagetomaindeck,heatdamageto 15m2 ofsteeldeckand8longitudinalsbetweenframes131and134.Firedamagetotheforwardmooringwinchsupplycablesand to minor electrical circuits
Shipoperation Onpassage
3
Voyage segment Mid-waterExternal&internalenvironment Cloudy,visibilitygood,windsouth-westerly
force4,waveheight0.5-1.0m,airtemperature7ºC
Personsonboard 19 crew and 10 vehicle drivers
Corona Seaways
4
1.2 BACKGROUND – OVERVIEW OF ROUTE AND CARGO SHIPPING PROCEDURES
Corona SeawayswascharteredbyDetForendeDampskibs-Selskab(DFDS)A/Stooperateanaverage6-daycircular,BalticSeafreightferryroutebetweenFredericiaandCopenhagen,DenmarkandKlaipeda,Lithuania.Kiel,Germanywasoccasionallyincludedintheschedule.Thevessel’spositionwhenthefirewasdiscovered is shown at Figure 1.
Thecargoroutinelyincludeduseddriveableandnon-driveablevehicles,loadedMAFIs,trailers,cartransporters,andagriculturalandheavyplantmachinerypredominantlyforexporttoEasternEurope.Onaverage,about15%ofthevehicleswerepushedortowedonboardbecauseofmechanicaldefects.
Usedvehiclesweresubjecttorandomcheckstodeterminetheirsuitabilityforshipment(i.e.checkingforoilandfuelleaks).Stevedoresloadedthevehiclesandthevessel’screwwereresponsibleforsecuringthem.Onceavehiclewasinposition,theignitionkeywasleftintheignitionbarrelinthe‘stop/park’positioninaccordancewiththeoperator’srequiredprocedures.
1.3 NARRATIVE
1.3.1 Events leading up to the discovery of the fire
At2100on3December2013,Corona Seaways finishedcargoloadingoperationsinFredericia.Atotalof170unitsweretightlystowedinthelowerhold,onthemain,upperandweatherdecks,andontheaccessramps.Thecargoincluded10vehiclesthatwereaccompaniedbytheirdrivers,whowereamixofLatvianandLithuaniannationals.
At2110,withthecargosecuredandallcargospacefansstopped,Corona Seaways sailedforKlaipedaviaCopenhagen.At0130on4December,theon-watchableseaman(AB)informedtheofficerofthewatch(OOW)thathehadcompletedhisfireandsecurityrounds,includingrudimentarychecksofthecargodecks,andthatallwas satisfactory.
At0215,thefiredetectionalarmsystemsoundedonthebridge,indicatingafireinZone12(starboardside)onthemaindeck.TheOOWinformedthemasterandsenttheon-watchABtothemaindecktocarryoutchecks.TheOOWviewedthemaindeckontheClosed-Circuit-Television(CCTV)monitorandsawnoevidenceofafire.TheABopenedthemaindeckportaftdoorbutdidnotenterthespacebecauseofthetightlypackedvehicles.HereportedtotheOOWonhisVeryHighFrequency(VHF)radiothathecouldnotseeanyevidenceofafire,andhethenclosedthedoor.TheOOWinstructedtheABtoreturntothebridgeasthefirealarmsoundedagain.Onenteringthebridge,themasterlookedattheCCTVmonitor.Hesawsmokeand,shortlyafterwards,flames,whichappearedtocomefromvehiclesinthevicinityofframe131onthestarboardsideofthemaindeck(Figure 2). The general alarmwassoundedassmokeandflameswereseentorapidlyincreasebeforetheCCTVcameralensbecameobscured.
5
XAccident position
Kiel
Fredericia
Copenhagen
Helsingborg
Accident position
Klaipeda
Figure 1: Accident position
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llingsenShipManagem
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7
1.3.2 Fire-fighting at sea
Afterarrivingatthemusterstation,twopre-designatedteamsstartedtoclosethemanually operated louvres of the 36 ventilation jalousies located on the upper and weather decks. Because of the high levels of smoke coming from the ventilation openings,somecrewmembershadtodonBreathingApparatus(BA)forprotection.Althoughthelouvreswerereportedclosedtothechiefofficer,aconsiderableamountofsmokecontinuedtoemitfromthem.Inthemeantime,themasterinstructedthechiefengineertopreparethefixedCO2fire-extinguishingsystemfordischarge into the main deck cargo space.
At0225,thechiefofficerreportedtothemasterthattheventilationlouvreshadbeenclosedandthatallpersonnel,withtheexceptionofthefitter,hadbeenaccountedfor.Notknowingthefitter’swhereabouts,themasterdecidedtodelayuseoftheCO2 incasehewasonthemaindeckand,ashewasnotequippedwithaVHFradio,hecouldnotbereadilyaccountedfor.At0230,thefitterarrivedatthemusterstationhavingreportedlybeenclosingupperdeckventilationlouvres.
ThemasterthenapprovedtheinjectionofCO2 into the main deck using the forward CO2 fire-extinguishingsystemcontrolpositionlocatedintheaccommodationsuperstructure.
The10vehicledrivers,whohadconsumedalcoholandwerenowlocatedatthemusterstation,startedtobecomedisruptive.Asthiswasaffectingthechiefofficer’sabilitytomanagetheincident,hedecided,inconsultationwiththemaster,torelocatethemtothepassengerloungefromwheretheycouldbereadilyevacuatedif necessary.
Meanwhile,themasterreportedhissituationtoLyngbyRadio,whotransferredtheinformationtotheDanishJointRescueCo-ordinationCentre(JRCC)atBrabrand.At0248,theGermanFederalNavycorvetteBraunschweig offered to assist in evacuatingthecrewifthisbecamenecessary.
Bynow,Corona Seaways’upperdeckwasbeingboundary-cooledusingwaterfromopenfirehydrants.At0300,thechiefofficerinstructedtheupperdeckwaterdrenchingsystemtobeoperatedasheconsideredthatthiswouldbeamoreeffective method of cooling the deck.
At0310,thechiefengineeradvisedthemasterthattheCO2 storage tank contents gaugewasregisteringabout12t.Thissuggestedthatonly9tonnes(t)ofthe21.3tofCO2storedinthetankhadbeenreleasedintothemaindeckinsteadoftherequired19.8t.Unsureofthetruesituation,themasterauthorisedthechiefengineertooperate the system once more from the forward control position.
FollowingthesecondreleaseofCO2,themaster,inconsultationwiththechiefofficerandchiefengineer,determinedthatthefireappearedtobeundercontrolasnootherfiredetectorshadoperatedandthetemperatureontheupperdeck,abovethefire,hadnotincreased.
Inthemeantime,arrangementsweremadeforCorona SeawaystoberthatHelsingborg,Sweden.Accordingly,co-ordinationoftheemergencywastransferredtotheSwedishJRCCbasedinGothenburg.
8
At0400,thechiefengineeradvisedthemasterthatthecontentsgaugeindicatedthatover10tofCO2 was still remaining in the storage tank. The master authorised thechiefengineertomanuallyoperatethesystemfromtheCO2 storage tank compartment,whichhedid,leavingthedischargevalvetothemaindeckfullyopen.
Ashorttimelater,thefiredetectionsystemalarmagainsounded,indicatingafireintheupperdeckforwardstaircase,whichprovidedaccesstothemaindeckviaaslidingwatertightdoor.ThechiefofficersentaBAteamtoinvestigate.TheBAteamreportedthatsmokewaswispingthroughthedoorsealbutthatthedoorwascoldtothetouch,indicatingthatthefirehadnotspreadtotheforwardsectionofthemaindeck.
1.3.3 Fire-fighting in Helsingborg
At0445,aSwedishcoastguardlaunch,equippedwithaninfra-redthermalimagingcamera,scannedCorona Seaways andconfirmedthattemperaturesweresteady,indicatingthattheuseofCO2hadbeeneffectiveincontrollingthefire.
At0640,Corona Seaways wassecuredalongside704berthatHelsingborg.The10vehicledriversandsurpluscrewwereevacuatedbytheFireandRescueService(FRS)whileaharbourtugboundary-cooledthevessel’ssidewithwaterusingitsfire-fightingmonitor.
Followingabriefingbythechiefengineer,FRSpersonnelenteredthemaindeckthroughtheportaftdoorat0704.However,theirprogresswashamperedbypoorvisibility,restrictedaccessbetweenthestowedvehiclesandtheneedtoextendandre-laythefire-fightinghoses.
At0805,someofthemaindeckexhaustfanswerestartedtohelpimprovevisibility.At0914,itwasagreedtolowerthemaindeckaccessrampanddischargesomeofthecargotoprovidetheFRSaccesstotheseatofthefire.Thevesselwasre-positionedtoallowtheramptobesafelylocatedonthequaysideand,at1208,cargo unloading started. Following access to and dampening down of the main deck,theFRSdeclaredthefireoutat1325.At2110,afterfurtherdampeninganumberof‘hotspots’,theFRSpassedresponsibilityformonitoringthefirescenetothe vessel’s crew.
FollowingrepairsatnearbyLandskrona,Corona Seaways re-entered service on 29 December2013.
1.4 VESSEL AND CARGO DAMAGE
1.4.1 Vessel’s structure and systems damage
Themajorityofthestructuraldamagewaslocatedabovethefireontheundersideoftheupperdeckbetweenframes131and134.Approximately15m2 of the steel deck requiredreplacing,asdidsevenslightlydistortedlongitudinaldeckheadstiffeners.
Electricalcablingsupplyingtheforwardmooringwinch,lighting,ballasttankventilationpipeheatingandfiredetectionequipmentwasfire-damaged.OtherthansootcontaminationofthefixedCO2fire-extinguishingsystemnozzles,nomechanical or pipework systems were affected.
9
1.4.2 Cargo damage
ThetwovehiclesatthelocusofthefirewereaRenaultPremium250.18truckanda Renault Mascott-Master van that it was carrying; these are termed the primary vehicles and were totally destroyed (Figure 3).TheywerepositionedinLane8andadjacent to frame 131 on the main deck.
ARenaultPremium410cabunitlocatedalongsideandinboardoftheprimaryvehicles,inLane7,sufferedseverefiredamagetoitsnearside.Two3-axletrailerunits,eachcarryingtwotrailers,positionedinLanes7and8anddirectlyaftoftheprimaryvehicleswerealsobadlyfire-damaged.Eighteenofthetrailertyreshadbeentotallyconsumedbythefire.Otherunitsforwardoftheprimaryvehiclessuffered minor radiant heat damage (Figure 4).
1.5 DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF PRIMARY VEHICLES
1.5.1 Renault Premium 250.18 truck
Manufacturedin1996,theleft-handsidedriveRenaultPremium250.18truckwasfittedwitha6-cylinder,250horsepower(hp)turbo-chargeddieselengine.Thecargocompartment sides and roof were made from light aluminium sheeting and the deck from aluminium checker plate laid over plywood sheeting. There was a rear-mounted electrically operated steel ramp.
FromFebruary2013until28November2013,thetruckwaslocatedatausedvehicledealershipbasedinChristiansfeld,Denmark.Duringthisperiod,itsenginewasreportedtohavebeenoccasionallystartedusingaportablebatterypackasthetruck’sbatterieshadbeenremoved.
Figure 3:Fire-damagedRenaultPremium250.18truckandRenaultMascott-Mastervanfollowingtheirremoval from the vessel
Renault Mascott-Master van
Renault Premium 250.18truck
10
AttheendofNovember2013,thetruckwaspurchasedbyLithuanian-basedUABAmerijaforimporttoLithuania.On1December2013,two12volt(V)batterieswerefittedtothetruck.Itwasthendriven240kmtoFredericia,arrivingthefollowingdayafterpickinguptheRenaultMascott-MastervaninSkjern,Denmark.Thetruckanditsvancargowereleftattheportovernighttoawaitloadingbythestevedoresthefollowing afternoon.
1.5.2 Renault Mascott-Master van
Therear-wheeldriveRenaultMascott-Mastervanwasmanufacturedin2005.Itwasfittedwitha63hpnaturallyaspiratedengine,drop-downwoodensidesandasmallhydraulicallypoweredcranepositionedimmediatelybehindthecab.ItsufferedenginefailurewhenitwaslastruninaboutDecember2012,afterwhichthecylinderhead was removed.
1.6 RENAULT PREMIUM 250.18 TRUCK – OVERVIEW OF ELECTRICAL AND ENGINE STARTING ARRANGEMENTS
1.6.1 Electrical system
A schematic of the electrical and engine starting arrangements is at Figure 5. The 24Velectricalsystemwasprovidedbytwo12Vbatteries,connectedinseries,whichwerelocatedonaplatformbehindthefrontoffsidewheelarch.Powerwas
Figure 4: Damaged vehicles and trailers on the main deck
Renault 410 cabunit
RenaultPremium250.18truck and Renault Mascott-Master van
Trailers
11
distributedthroughabatteryrotaryisolatingswitch.Afusedprotectedelectricalsupplyforoperatingtherearrampwasarrangedtoby-passthemainisolatingswitch.
Whentheignitionkeywasremovedorinthe‘stop/park’position,anumberoffusedcircuitsremainedlive,includingthoseforthetachograph,hazardwarninglightsandcentrallockingsystem.Non-fusedcircuitsthatremainedliveincludedsuppliesto/fromtheremoteenginestartsolenoid,enginepre-heatsolenoidandenginestartermotormainsolenoid,anditsconnectiontothealternatoroutputsupply.
1.6.2 Engine starting arrangements
Whenthegearboxwasintheneutralposition,theneutralswitchwasclosed,whichcompletedtheearthcircuitfortheremoteenginestartsolenoidcoil.Whentheignitionkeywasturnedtothe‘start’position,theremoteenginestartsolenoidwasenergisedthroughwire205,whichclosedthecircuittoprovidepowerthroughwire
Figure 5:SchematicofRenaultPremium250.18truckenginestartingarrangements
Engine starter motor and main solenoid
Remote enginestart solenoid
24V supply from ignition switch
205
Neutralswitchongearbox
21
24V supply from remote engine start solenoid
Battery rotary isolating switch Fused suppliesSupplytorearramp
Connection from alternator
12
21toenergisetheenginestartermotormainsolenoid.Whenenergised,theenginestartermotorsolenoidconnectedthebattery24Vsupplytothestartermotorwhichturned the engine over.
Asecondsolenoidwasfittednexttotheremotestartingsolenoidtoprovide24Vpower to two resistance-type engine pre-heaters. These were positioned in the engine air intake manifold to assist in engine starting in cold conditions. The pre-heatersolenoidwasactivatedbyadriver-operatedswitchonthedashboardwhich was fed from the ignition circuit when the ignition was turned on.
Thevehiclewasalsofittedwithathree-element,resistance-typedieselfueloilpre-heater.Theheater,whichwasfittedtotheoffsidetopoftheengineblock,wasautomatically activated once the engine was running.
1.7 EXAMINATION OF RENAULT PREMIUM 250.18 TRUCK
1.7.1 Structure
Theinternalcomponentsofthetruck’scabweretotallyconsumed.Althoughthetruck’signitionkeybarrelwaspartiallymelted,thekeywasfoundinthebarrelinthe‘stop/park’position.
Fiveofthesixfittedtyresandthesparetyrewerealsoconsumed.Mostofthetruck’soffsideglassfibrecabfrontandwinddeflectoronthecabroofhadburntaway,ashadabout60%ofthetruck’soffsideandabout30%ofthenearsidealuminium cargo compartment shell. A large amount of the truck’s cargo compartmentaluminiumcheckerfloorplatehadalsomelted.However,abouta2.5msectionoftheoffsidechassisrailandtheairbrakereservoirswereundamagedwiththepaintschemebeingunaffected.Asimilarpatternwasnotedonthenearsideexceptthatthefrontofthefueltankprotectiveplasticfacinghadmelted;however,aquantityofdieseloilfuelremainedinthetank.
1.7.2 Electrical and mechanical systems
Mostofthevehicle’selectricalcableinsulationwasmissingandthebatterycasingshadpartiallymelted.Oneofthebattery’spositivecableshadbecomedisconnectedandtherewasevidenceofpartialmeltingoftheleadterminalposts.Thebatteryisolatingswitchwasfoundtobeinthe‘on’position,indicatingthatthebatterywasnot isolated.
The rear part of the engine’s aluminium rocker cover had melted and the upper partofthealuminiumengineintakemanifoldhadbeenburntaway,exposingthepre-heaters (Figure 6). The diesel oil fuel unit had melted. The three heating elementswerestillconnectedtotheirelectricalcables,althoughthemainsupplyelectricalcableconnectionwasloose,withabouta3mmgapbetweenthenutandconnectiontab.Thebatterymainsupplycableinsulationhadbeendestroyedandthecablehadweldedtothechassis.
Themainterminalpostoftheenginestartermotormainsolenoidwasfoundtobeextremelyloose.TheendBakelite-typecapappearedbrittle,andtherewerecopperglobulesinthevicinityofthestartermotor.
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Ondismantlingthesolenoid,themaincontactpostconnectingthesolenoidtothebatteryseparatedfromtheendcap,whichexposedheavyarcingdamagetotheinternalsurfaces.Themaincontactshadsufferedsignificantsparkerosionandpitting.Themovingcontacthadseparatedfromitscarrier,meltedcopperglobuleswerefoundinthebodyofthesolenoid,andthealternatorconnectingcablehadmelted through (Figures 7 and 8).
Theremoteenginestartsolenoidwasdismantledandfoundtobefullyworking.However,theenginepre-heatsolenoidironcorewasfoundseizedwithintheelectro-magneticarmature,andthecontactswereinthe‘open’position.Continuitytestingconfirmedtherewasnoelectricalpathacrossthecontacts.
1.8 EXAMINATION OF RENAULT MASCOTT-MASTER VAN
Thevan’scabwastotallydestroyedaswereallofthetyresandthehingeddrop-downsides.Thevan’sfueltankcradlewasinplacebuttherewasnoevidenceofthefueltank.Itisunclearwhetherthetankwasfittedatthetime.Theenginestartingbatteryhadpartiallymeltedandthecableshadbeendisconnected,probablyatthetimethattheenginecylinderheadhadbeenremoved.Therewasalso other loose steel framework in the van’s cargo area.
1.9 LOW-PRESSURE FIXED CO2 FIRE-EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM
Corona Seaways wasfittedwithaDanfoss-Semcolow-pressurefixedCO2fire-extinguishingsystem.TheCO2 was held in a 21.3t capacity storage tank located in theCO2 storagecompartmentinthevessel’sportquarter.Thecompartmentwasequippedforlocaloperationofthesystem.Thesystemcouldalsobeoperated
Figure 6: Fire damaged engine components
Air intake manifold pre-heaters
Inletmanifold
Startermotor
Startermotormain solenoid
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Figure 7:Schematicofenginestartermotormainsolenoid
Electro-magnetic coil 24Vsupplyfrom/tobattery Supplyfromalternator
Return spring
24V supply to starting motorMoving contactHeavydutycontacts
Ironplunger
1
1
1
Figure 8:DamagedRenaultPremium250.18truckenginestartermotormainsolenoid
Sparkerosiondamage
Moving contact
Cableconnectingalternator
Copperglobule
24V electro-magnetic coilIronplunger
Arcingdamagetosolenoidbody
Supplytostarter motor terminal
24Vsupplyfrombattery
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from the remote operating station in the forward superstructure. Each of the compartments displayed a comprehensive system mimic diagram and operating instructions.
ThetimeddischargeratewasdesignedtoachievethecorrectCO2 concentration bycompartmentvolumetoextinguishafire.Thefollowingcompartmentswereprotected: engine room; emergency generator room; separator room; paint store (between0.3and4tofCO2wererequiredover2minutes);lowerholdandmaindeck(9and19.8trespectivelyover15minutes).
1.10 CARGO DECKS’ VENTILATION ARRANGEMENTS
Therewasatotalof38maindeckventilationjalousies.Sixwerelocatedonthestarboardsideoftheupperdeckand15oneachoftheportandstarboardsidesoftheweatherdeck.Thejalousiesservingthemaindeckwereeasilyidentifiablebyayellow-paintedstripacrosstheirmiddlesection1. Each jalousie comprised 11 manuallyoperatedlouvresfittedwithrubbersealingstrips(Figure 9).
There were also two automatically operated jalousies on the upper deck level at the portandstarboardcornersofthesuperstructure.Thesewerelinkedtothefirealarmsystemandservedboththemainandupperdecks.
The 14 fans servicing the main deck were controlled from the cargo control room. Onewasadedicatedexhaustfan,threeweresupplyfansandtheremainderweredual-purposesupplyandexhaustfans.
Itwasnormalpracticetostopallcargodeckventilationfansonceloadingwascompleted.
1 Jalousiesservingthelowerholdandtheupperdeckwereidentifiedbyayellow-paintedstripontheirlowerandupper sections respectively
Figure 9: Main deck ventilation jalousie
1.5cmgapbetweeneachlouvre
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1.11 REGULATION AND GUIDANCE
TheInternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea1974,asamended(SOLAS)ChapterII-2–Fireprotection,firedetectionandfireextinction,Regulation20,paragraph3.1.2.2states:
‘In cargo ships, ventilation fans shall normally be run continuously whenever vehicles are on board. ….’.
Theinstructionisreiteratedinparagraph8.7ofMarineGuidanceNote(MGN)341(M)Ro-RoShipsVehicleDecks–AccidentstoPersonnel,PassengerAccessandtheCarriageofMotorVehicles,whichstates:
‘…. ventilation systems serving the vehicle decks should be in operation during any loaded voyage……’
TheCodeofSafeWorkingPracticesforMerchantSeamen(COSWP)–Chapter32Ro-Ro Ferries paragraph 32.3.2 also covers the need to run ventilation fans while vehiclesareonboard.Section32.7–InspectionofVehiclesstates:
‘Before being accepted for shipment, every freight vehicle should be inspected externally by a competent and responsible person or persons to check that it is in a satisfactory condition for shipment….’
TheMaritimeandCoastguardAgency’s(MCA)publication-TheCodeofPractice–Roll-On/Roll-OffShips–StowageandSecuringofVehicles,Section1.1identifiesthat a principal source of danger to ships and persons is the unsatisfactory condition ordesignofvehiclespresentedforshipment.Section2.2states:
‘Before being accepted for shipment, every freight vehicle should be inspected externally by a responsible person or persons appointed by the ship owner, the ship manager and/or the master, to check that it is in a satisfactory condition for shipment.’
1.12 SIMILAR ACCIDENT
At0153on23April2013,afirewasdiscoveredonNo3cargodeckoftheLithuanianregistered,andDFDSA/Soperated,passengerro-rocargoferryVictoria Seaways while on passage from Kiel to Klaipeda. Atthetime,therewere37crewand309passengersonboard.Thefirewasdealtwithbythecrewandwasdeclaredtobeextinguishedat0400.Thecargoincludedsecond-handcarsforexporttoLithuania.Sixcarsandacartransporterweredestroyedinthefirebuttherewerenoinjuries or structural damage to the vessel.
TheLithuanian-ledinvestigationidentifiedthatthefirewascausedbyanelectricalfault on a second-hand car that was in poor condition.
Thereportincludedarecommendationtotheeffectthatbatteriesofsecond-handcarsshouldbedisconnectedandthatconfirmatorychecksshouldbemadebythevessel’s crew.
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SECTION 2 – ANALYSIS
2.1 AIM
Thepurposeoftheanalysisistodeterminethecontributorycausesandcircumstancesoftheaccidentasabasisformakingrecommendationstopreventsimilar accidents occurring in the future.
2.2 CAUSE OF THE FIRE
2.2.1 Renault Mascott-Master van
Anumberofpotentialcausesofthefirewereexamined.TheRenaultMascott-Mastervanwasconsidered.However,itsenginecylinderheadhadbeenremovedandthebatterywasdisconnected.Astherewasnoviableignitionsourceonthevan,itisnotconsideredtobetheoriginofthefire.
2.2.2 Renault Premium 250.18 truck
TheRenaultPremium250.18truckhadbeendrivenabout240kmbeforearrivingatFredericia and then onto the vessel. Neither the drivers nor stevedores reported any mechanical,electricalorinstrumentationissues.However,thetruckhadnotbeendriven for the previous 11 months and there was no evidence that any checks had beencarriedouttoproveitsroadworthinessorgeneralsafety,includingtheintegrityof its electrical and mechanical systems.
Thetruckwaslasheddownabout8hoursbeforethefirewasdiscovered.Ithadonlybeenrunforashorttimeduringloading,andthechancesofthefirestartingfromresidualheatfromtheengine,exhaustorturbo-chargerwerenegligible.
Althoughoneofthetruck’spositivebatterycableswasdisconnectedandthebatterieswereheavilyfire-damaged,therewasnoevidenceofarcinginthisarea.Cablestotheremoteenginestartandenginepre-heatsolenoids,whichwereintheimmediatevicinity,werevirtuallyundamagedandcanthereforebediscountedasthecauseofthefire.Itisconsideredthatthebatterycablebecamedisconnectedastheterminalpostmeltedandreducedindiameter,whichreleasedthecablesecuringclamp.
Alltheevidence,includingtheareaofhighheatenergyandtheburningandheavyradiantheatdamagetotheengineandtothefrontofthecab,indicatedthattheseatofthefirewaslocatedaroundtheupperhalfoftheengine.Theenginestartermotormainsolenoidwasseverelydamagedbyinternalarcing,whichhaddestroyedthemovingcontact.Astheenginepre-heatsolenoidwasdefective,theairchargecouldnotbepre-heatedandtheenginewouldhavebeendifficulttostart:therewasanecdotalevidencethattheenginehadtoberepeatedlycrankedovertostartit.Itisprobablethattheinternalarcinganddamagetotheenginestartermotormainsolenoid’sfixedandmovingcontactswereinitiallyduetorepeatedattemptstostarttheengine.Thiswouldhaveresultedinacontinualcurrentflowintheheavydutycablefromthebatterywhichwouldhaveremainedlivedespitetheignitionswitchbeinginthe‘stop/park’position.Overtime,continualarctrackingwithinthesolenoidwouldhavecausedfurtherdamageand,togetherwiththehighcurrentflow
18
experiencedduringenginestarting,wouldhavecausedthecabletooverheat,ignitetheinsulationandinitiatethefire.Astheinsulationburnt,thenowbarecablewouldhaveshorted,causingfurthersparksandforittoweldagainstthechassis.
2.3 FIRE DEVELOPMENT
Oncethefirehadstartedontheengine,itconsumedinsulation,plasticfittingsandrubberhoses,andspreadintothecababoveandforwardtodestroytheglassfibrecabfront.The‘V’shapedburnpatternattherearofthecabindicatedthatthefirespreadupwards.Asthefireignitedthetruck’styres,theheatwouldhaveintensified,causingthefiretomoveaftandengulfthevananditstyres,andmeltthetruck’saluminiumcheckerplateflooring.Thelocationofthepartiallyopenventilationlouvres on Corona Seaways’ upper deck was such that as the vessel made headway,aslightoverpressurewascreatedforward,resultinginaforwardtoaftair-flowonthemaindeck.Thiswouldexplainwhythevehiclesforwardofthetrucksufferedonlyminordamageandthosebehindwereengulfedinthefire.Whiletherewasverylittleflammablematerialonthesixtrailersinvolved,theirtyreswouldhaveaddedsignificantlytothegeneratedheatenergy.
2.4 RISKS OF THE CARRIAGE OF USED VEHICLES
Thecarriageofusedvehiclesandequipmentthatdonothaveappropriateroadworthinesscertificationandwhosehistoryandconditionareunknown,bringsincreased risks when compared with the carriage of well maintained vehicles that are in regular use.
2.4.1 Used vehicles – fire ignition risk
ThevehiclesroutinelyshippedonDFDSA/S’sBalticSearoutehadoftenbeenlaidupforlongperiodsduringwhichelectricalinsulationcouldbecomebrittle,componentscouldseize,andsealsonfuelandoilsystemscouldbecomeineffective,allcontributingtoanincreasedfirerisk.Electricalsystemsthathavebeenidleandarethenconnectedtochargedbatteriesareparticularlyvulnerable.Theproceduretoleavetheignitionkeyinthe‘stop/park’positiondidlittletoreducetheriskasmanycircuitsstillremainedlive.Whiletherewereotherpotentialsourcesofignition,includingengineandturbo-chargerresidualheattransfer,anddiscardedlitcigarettesandheatingequipmentleftinthecab,theprominentriskwaselectricallybased.Ifthebatteryhadbeentotallyisolated,theriskwouldhavebeenconsiderablyreduced.
2.4.2 Vehicle checks
FollowingacarfireonboardtheLithuanianregisteredro-roferryVictoria Seaways on23April2013,DFDSA/Sintroducedprocedurestoreducetheriskoffire.Theseincludedremovingthebattery,prohibitingthecarriageofsparefuelorflammables,andrequiringthevehicle’ssystemstobeleak-free.However,theinstructionappliedonly to used vehicles carried on designated car transporters.
Theinstructionwasre-iteratedbythemaster’sundated‘UnsafeCargo’noticedisplayedinseverallocationsonboard,includingthecargocontrolroom.Inaddition,thenoticestatedthatforused,self-movingvehicles(notjustthosecarriedon
19
designatedcartransporters)loadedonboard,thebatterywastobedisconnectedorisolatedbyaswitch,onlyaminimalamountoffuelwastobecarried(approximately5litres),andthehandbrakewastobeengaged.
DriversofdesignatedcartransporterssignedaDFDSA/Schecksheettostatethattherequisiteshippingconditionshadbeencompliedwith.However,anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatDFDSA/Scontractors,whoshouldhavebeenverifyingthis,onlyoccasionallycarriedoutchecks,butnodocumentedevidencewasidentifiedorcouldbeprovidedtocorroboratethis.
Furthermore,contrarytotheMCA’sCodeofPracticetherewasnoevidencethatthevessel’s crew made any vehicle electrical system isolations or other vehicle safety checks.Indeed,itwouldbeverydifficultforcrewtosafelyisolateorremovebatteryconnections in addition to their routine tasks of loading and securing the vehicles.
2.4.3 Vessel’s safety instructions
Thevessel’sShipSafetyManagementManual(SSMM)SectionSM11-11–CargoOperations,providedgeneralinstructionsonstowing,lashing,ballastingandsafetyprecautions. Corona Seaways also held risk assessments covering lashing and unlashingcargo,ro-rocargooperations,andtheloading/unloadingofextraordinarycargo.However,neithertheSSMMnortheriskassessmentsprovidedguidanceonthespecificrisksassociatedwiththecarriageofusedvehiclesandequipment.
2.5 CREW’S FIRE-FIGHTING PRACTICE
TheOOW’sdecisiontosendtheon-watchABtocheckthestatusofthemaindeckafterthefirstfirealarmwasreasonableandappropriate.HehadnoindicationofafireontheCCTVmonitor,andheneededtoclarifythesituation.TheABalsoreasonablyoptedtocheckthemaindeckfromthedoor.HadtheABventuredbetweentheclosely-packedcargotowardstheseatofthefirehemighthavebecometrappedwhenthefirerapidlyescalated,asobservedbythemasterontheCCTV monitor.
Thepromptuseoftheupperdeckhydrantsand,later,thedrenchingsystemtoboundarycooltheareaabovethefirewasalsowellconsideredandhelpedtolimitstructuraldamageandthepotentialspreadofthefire.
ThespeedatwhichthefiredevelopedgavenoopportunitytofightitwithanythingotherthanthefixedCO2fire-extinguishingsystem.Itwasthereforeoftheutmostimportancethatoncethecompartmentwascloseddownthesystemwasused,withoutdelay,tomaximisethechanceofsuccess.
Overall,thefire-fightingeffortwaswellconsidered,effectiveandsafelymanaged.
2.6 MUSTER STATIONS
Whilethecrewwerepromptlyorderedtotheirmusterstationsfollowingtheoutbreakofthefire,itwas15minutesbeforethechiefofficerwasabletoreporttothebridgethatthecrewhadbeenfullyaccountedfor.TheCO2 systemwasreadytobeusedafter10minutes,buttherewasa5minutedelayindischargingthegasbecausethefitter’swhereaboutswereunknown.Thisallowedthefiretodevelopanddemonstrates the importance of the crew reporting to their muster station promptly.
20
Inothercircumstances,thedelaycouldhavebeencritical.Manycompaniesissueallcrewmemberswithportableradiostoeasecommunicationproblems.Hadthefitterbeenequippedwitharadio,hecouldhavebeenquicklyaccountedfor.
2.7 FUNCTIONALITY OF THE LOW PRESSURE FIXED CO2 FIRE-EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM
AlthoughtherewasconfusionabouttheactualamountofCO2 discharged onto the maindeckduetotheinformationindicatedonthestoragetankcontentsgauge,thedecisionstore-injectCO2weresensiblyjudged.
On6December,theCO2systemwasservicedbyWilhemsenShipsService.Thesystemwasre-chargedandunderwentacomprehensiverangeofchecks,includingconfirmationthatthestoragetankcontentsgaugewasworkingcorrectly.However,therewasnoexplanationforwhythesystemapparentlyfailedtodischargetheallottedquantityofCO2asdesigned.ItisvitallyimportantthatthecrewhavetotalconfidenceintheCO2systemasthereisnobackupfixedfire-extinguishingsystemfor the cargo decks.
2.8 CARGO DECK VENTILATION ISSUES
2.8.1 Isolation of ventilation supplies
ItisimportantthatacompartmentisfullycloseddownbeforeCO2 isinjectedbothtoreduceanyinflowofoxygenfeedingthefireandtoensurethecorrectconcentrationofCO2ismaintainedtoextinguishafire.AlthoughCO2 is denser than air and will taketimetodissipatethroughventilators,thetighteracompartmentissealedthebetterthechanceofsuccess.
Whiletheventilationlouvreswerereportedclosed,smokecontinuedtoemitfromthemformostoftheincident.Oninvestigation,itwasfoundthattherewasamisunderstandingonboardonhowtolockthelouvresinthe‘closed’position.Notallcrewwereawarethattwopersonswererequiredoroftheneedtorotatetheoperatingspindlepasttheapparent‘closed’pointtolockthelouvresshutagainstthecamsystem.Itwasalsonotedthatthevessel’sTrainingManualdidnotcovertheprocess.
Duringtrials,itwasfoundthattherewasanaveragegapofabout1.5cmbetweeneachoftheelevenlouvresineachofthe34,1-metrewidejalousieswhenthelouvreswereinthe‘closed’butnot‘locked’position.Thisequatedtoaholeofapproximately5m2 throughwhichCO2 couldescape,orair(oxygen)couldbedrawnin.
2.8.2 Operation of cargo deck ventilation fans
Flammablevapoursthatevolvefromvehiclesstowedonro-rocargodeckscreateaninherentfirerisk.Duringtheinvestigation,itwasnotedthatitwasusualpracticeon Corona Seaways forthecargofanstobestoppedoncecargooperationswerecompleted.SOLAS,COSWPandMGN341(M)highlighttheneedforventilationtobemaintainedwhilevehiclesareonboardtoremovevapoursandsominimisetheriskoffire.
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2.9 DRUG AND ALCOHOL POLICY AND PASSENGERS
The management company’s drug and alcohol policy was set out in Document CSMM02-06oftheCompanySafetyManagementManual.Thepolicycoveredthecompany’sshorepersonnelandcrew,butnotpassengers.
Itisdifficulttodevelopapolicypreventingvehicledrivers/passengersfrombringingalcoholonboardforpersonalconsumption.Thecontrolofvehicledrivers/passengersthathaveconsumedalcoholrequirescarefulmanagement,especiallyduringanemergency.Thechiefofficerstruckanappropriatebalanceinremovingthemfromthemusterstationtothepassengerloungewheretheyweresafe,couldbeeasilyevacuatedandwerenotdisruptivetothemanagementoftheemergency.
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SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS
3.1 SAFETY ISSUES DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Therewasnoevidencethatanycheckshadbeencarriedouttoprovethetruck’sroadworthinessorgeneralsafety,includingtheintegrityofitselectricalandmechanical systems. [2.2.2]
2. Thecarriageofusedvehiclesandequipmentthatdonothaveappropriateroadworthinesscertificationandwhosehistoryandconditionareunknownbringsincreased risks when compared to the carriage of well maintained vehicles that are in regular use. [2.4]
3. DFDSA/S’sfireriskcontrolmeasuresintroducedafterthefireonboardVictoria Seaways applied only to used vehicles carried on designated car transporters. There was no documented evidence that these control measures were carried out. [2.4.2]
4. ContrarytothespiritoftheMCA’sCodeofPracticeandthemaster’s‘UnsafeCargo'notice,therewasnoevidencethatthevessel’screwcarriedoutvehiclesafetychecks. [2.4.2]
5. NeithertheSSMMnortheonboardriskassessmentscoveredthecarriageofusedvehiclesandequipment.[2.4.3]
3.2 OTHER SAFETY ISSUES DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT2
1. Theenginestartermotormainsolenoidwasseverelydamagedbyinternalarcing,which had destroyed the moving contact. [2.2.2]
2. Theheavydutycableconnectingthebatterytotheenginestartermotormainsolenoid was live and permitted unintended electrical arcing inside the solenoid which,togetherwithhighcurrentflowexperiencedduringenginestarting,causedthecabletooverheatandinitiatethefire.[2.2.2]
3. Thedefectiveenginepre-heatsolenoidpreventedtheairchargefrombeingpre-heated,makingtheenginedifficulttostart.[2.2.2]
3.3 SAFETY ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS
1. InjectionofCO2intothemaindeckwasdelayed,allowingthefiretodevelop,becauseittooktimetoestablishthefitter’swhereaboutsduringthecrewmuster.[2.6]
2. ThereasonwhytheCO2fire-extinguishingsystemapparentlyfailedtodischargetheallottedquantityofCO2asdesignedremainsunexplained.[2.7]
2 Thesesafetyissuesidentifylessonstobelearned.Theydonotmeritasafetyrecommendationbasedonthisinvestigationalone.However,theymaybeusedforanalysingtrendsinmarineaccidentsorinsupportofafuture safety recommendation.
23
3. The main deck ventilation louvres were not fully closed and some of the crew were unawarehowtocorrectlyoperatethem.Thisallowedair(oxygen)tofeedthefireandpotentiallyaffectedtheCO2concentrationlevelsneededtoextinguishthefire.[2.8.1]
4. Thecargodeckventilationfanswerenotoperatedasrequiredbythecurrentregulations.Thisincreasedthefireriskduetothepotentialbuild-upofflammablevapoursfromvehicles.[2.8.2]
3.4 OTHER SAFETY ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT3
1. Vehicledrivers/passengerswhohadconsumedalcoholweredisruptiveandstartedtoaffectthechiefofficer’smanagementoftheincident.[2.9]
3 Thesesafetyissuesidentifylessonstobelearned.Theydonotmeritasafetyrecommendationbasedonthisinvestigationalone.However,theymaybeusedforanalysingtrendsinmarineaccidentsorinsupportofafuture safety recommendation
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SECTION 4 - ACTIONS TAKEN
Ellingsen Ship Management AB has:
• DevelopedriskassessmentDE45-14-Ro-RoCargoOperation“ScrapVehicle”.
• Inrespecttotheventilationsystem:
◦ Developed risk assessment DE46-14 - Cargo and Engine Louvre Monthly Performance Test.
◦ Introduceda4-monthlymaintenanceitemtocheckthefulloperationoftheventilation louvres and to conduct a watertightness check.
◦ Provided instructions and illustrations on how to correctly operate the ventilation louvres for inclusion in the ship’s Training Manual Part 3.
• Instructedallvessels’masterstohighlighttheimportanceofpromptmusteringinanemergencyduringmonthlySafetyCommitteeMeetings.
DFDS A/S has:
• Promulgatedthefollowingrevisedprocedures,whichincludefullisolationofbatteriesandtheirterminals,andchecksforoilandoilleaks,toimprovethesafecarriage of used and unregistered vehicles:
◦ ‘InformationtoCarCarriers’dated28January2014(Annex A).
◦ ‘InformationtoUnregisteredSecondHandSegment’dated28January2014 (Annex B).
• Introducedasystemofsignedchecksbyatechnicianaspartofits‘Instruction–DeliveryNote,Single/EmptyUnits’dated6January2014,toensurecustomercompliance with the conditions of carriage (Annex C).
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SECTION 5 - RECOMMENDATIONS
Ellingsen Ship Management AB is recommended to:
2014/127 Reviewitsonboarddocumentationandthe‘UnsafeCargo’noticetotakeinto accountDFDSA/S’srevisedproceduresforthecarriageofusedand unregistered vehicles:
◦ ‘InformationtoCarCarriers’dated28January2014.
◦ ‘InformationtoUnregisteredSecondHandSegment’dated28 January 2014.
2014/128 Takeappropriateactionto:
◦ Ensure that cargo deck ventilation fans are run in accordance with current regulations.
◦ InvestigatewhytheCO2fire-extinguishingsystemapparentlyfailedtodischargetheallottedquantityofCO2 as designed.
Safetyrecommendationsshallinnocasecreateapresumptionofblameorliability
Annex A
DFDS/AS Instruction - Information to Car Carriers dated 28 January 2014
Safety precautions to be taken prior loading Car Carrier onboard the vessel 28.01.2014
Dear Customer,
DFDS A/S is committed to providing the best possible service to our customers and
to ensuring the comfort and safety of all passengers and crewmembers on board
our vessels. With that in mind, we are taking this opportunity to update all
customers using the routes in the Baltic Sea of the following mandatory safety
measures to be taken whenever second hand and/or damaged vehicles loaded on
Car Carriers are to be shipped.
To minimise the risk of fire accidents, it is your responsibility to ensure
that, apart from the previously introduced safety precautions (please refer
yourself to DFDS’ Newsletter dd. 29.04.2013), the following measures are
also to be taken prior to shipment:
- The batteries are completely disconnected - all cables
- The battery terminals are properly isolated
- The batteries have no visible damage
All Car Carriers with second hand and/or damaged vehicles will be inspected in the
port of loading and, based on the facilities available at the individual ports and on
the routes, an inspection fee will be imposed.
Any Car Carriers that do not comply with these essential requirements will not be
accepted for carriage on our vessels.
Your continuing co-operation in helping us to provide a safe travelling environment
is very much appreciated. If you have any questions, please contact your local
DFDS Seaways representative.
Sincerely yours,
DFDS A/S
Safety precautions
Annex B
DFDS A/A Instruction - Information to Unregistered Second Hand Segment dated 28 January 2014
Safety precautions to be taken prior loading onboard the vessel 28.01.2014
Dear customer,
DFDS A/S is committed in providing the best possible service to our customers and
to ensure the comfort and safety of all passengers and crew members on board our
vessels. With that in mind, we are taking the opportunity to update all customers
using the routes in the Baltic Sea of the following mandatory safety measures to be
taken whenever unregistered second hand and /or damages vehicles are to be
shipped.
To minimize the risk of fire accidents, DFDS will arrange for an pre-
shipment inspection of all vehicles within the segment mentioned above,
where the following measures will be carried out:
- The battery cables are disconnected completely
- The battery terminals are properly isolated
- The vehicle itself is determined in general condition not
compromising any safety requirements
All unregistered second hand vehicles, or other units carrying similar vehicles will be
inspected in the port of loading and, based on the facilities available at the
individual ports and on the routes, an inspection fee and/or a handling fee will be
imposed.
Any unregistered second hand vehicle that do not comply with these essential
requirements will not be accepted for carriage on our vessels.
Your continuing co-operation in helping us to provide a safe travelling environment
is very much appreciated. If you have any questions, please contact your local
DFDS Seaways representative.
Sincerely yours,
DFDS A/S
Safety precautions
Annex C
DFDS A/S Instruction – Delivery Note, Single/Empty Unit dated 6 January 2014
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