9
201 5J Non-state Actors and Legal Accowtability IgJ NON-STATE ACTORS AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY Thorbjøm Waal Lundsgaard. ABSTRACT As a branch ofpublíc internatíonã.l law, human rights law has historicalll, been state-centric, with governments and public authorities traditionalþ understood as íts exclwive subjects- However, in rccent decades, stemmiig from various developments, there has increasingþ been pressure on humai rtghts law towards thepossìble relaxationor extension ofth¡s norm to include also certain non-state actors Q,\SA)- NSAs include non_governmental organizations Q'[GOs), paramilitary groups, terrorists, national liberation movements, intergovernmental organizations a.nd priva.îe actors genet alþ, including busíness enîities. Taking the lattel, and particularly tñe case'of multinational corporations (MNCs), ds itsfocus, this article wìùrtrst preseit evidence ofthe trend ofíncreasing applicatton to MNCs ofhuman rtghts law norms and standards. From this basis, it will then ørgue that while this trend entails q degree ofreconceptualizotion, given the historical restrictìon of human righß law to states as mentioned above, ìt is still incomptete wiih signifcant gaps,whîch means that MNCs as non-state a.ctors are iotyetfulty accountable to human rights standards. On the other hand, in conciusion, it will argue that expectations that MNCs shoutd or wilt be helcl accotmtable by identical mechanisms and to an identìcal sta.ndard as are state actols are probably mispløced. Human rights law and advocates should røther accept more diversity in these areas infuture, wìth the onset ofíts application to nin_ stûte actors than was the case before- I. INTRODUCTION As a branch ofpublic international law, human ríghts law has historicalþ been state- centric, with govemments and public authorities kaditionally understood as its exciusive subjects. However, in recent decades, stemming from various developments, there has increasingly been pressure on hwrìan rights law towards the iossible relaxation or extension of this norm to inclurie also certain ûon-state u"totr çt isA¡. _ * University ofAgder, Kristiasand, Nomay, æd Oxford Brookes University, Oxfqd, United. Kingdorr- Email: < [email protected]>. 183

Lundsgaard, Thorbjørn Waal. 2015. ‘Non-State Actors and Legal Accountability’, East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights, Vol. 21 (1), 183-191

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Page 1: Lundsgaard, Thorbjørn Waal. 2015. ‘Non-State Actors and Legal Accountability’, East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights, Vol. 21 (1), 183-191

201 5J Non-state Actors and Legal Accowtability IgJ

NON-STATE ACTORS AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITYThorbjøm Waal Lundsgaard.

ABSTRACT

I 84 East Aftican Journal of Peace & Humnn Rights [Vol 21: I

NSAs ìnclude non-govenìmental organizations (NGOs), paramilitary groups, tenorists,

national liberation movements, intergovemmental organizatíons and private actors

generally, including business entities.l Taking the latter, and particularly the case ofmultinationai co¡porations (MNCs), as its focus, this article will first present evidence

of trend. of increasing application to MNCs of human rights law norms and standards.

From this basis, ìf'ttill tnen argue that while this trend entails a degree ofreconceptualization, given the historical restriction of human dghts iar¡/ to statgs lsmentioned above, it is stiil incomplete with significant gaps. This means that MNCs

as non-state actors are not yet fuþ accountabie to human rights sfand¿rds'

On tle other hand, in conclusion, it will argue that expectations that MNCs

should or will be held accountable by identical mechanisms and to an identical standa¡d

as are state actofs are probably misplaced. Fluman rights iaw and advocates should

rather accept more divirsity in these areas in future, with the onset ofits application to

non-state actors, than \¡r'as the case before.

II. INCREASING APPLICATION OF TIUIVIAN RIGHTS NORMS TO NON-

STATES ACTORS: TI{E CASE OF MNCS

During the 1 990s, many NGOs campaigned against negative impacts on individuals.and

"o**Liti"* ,"sultingfiom the activities of MNCs as well as from business activities

sponsored by development actors such as international {inancial institutions' and

pìesented tn"h i-pu"tt as human rights violations o¡ abuses'2 MNCs were boycotted

ty .onru-"r. foinon-compliance with labour staldaxds in production facilities indlveloping countries.3 Intemational organizations were also subjected to pressure: the

lVorld Bãk withdrew lending for a tiquefied gas project in Nigeria when Ken Saro'Wiwa was executed, in rvhich Shell was implicated.a

Gradualþthis perspective was also inte$ated into expert opinion and academic

l. L.oETTEANDI.BANIEKÀZ,TNTERNATIONALHuMANRIGIITSLAVfANDPRACTTCE(IEDN'

cA¡4BRrDcE uNIwRstrY PRrss 2013), 657.

2. See for example, ÀMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN R]GHTS PREICIPLES FOR COMPANIES, A1

'NDEX: Àcr 70101/98; see ãlso, A. Clapham, Non-State lc,ort, in INTERNATI.NAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw'

(D. Moeckli et a1., e6, z0l0), 57 4.

3. R. HrcctNs, PRoBLEMS AND PROCESS INTERNAîIONAL LAW AND HOW lVE USE tT (1995)' 37.

4.C.Gunduz,FlumanRightsandDevelopment:TheWorldBank'sNeedfolaconsist€ntApproach, (Developmeni StodieslnstTtute,London ScÀool ofEconomics andPolitical Scimce,2004), 18.

184

As a branch ofpublíc internatíonã.l law, human rights law has historicalll,been state-centric, with governments and public authorities traditionalþunderstood as íts exclwive subjects- However, in rccent decades, stemmiigfrom various developments, there has increasingþ been pressure on humairtghts law towards thepossìble relaxationor extension ofth¡s norm to includealso certain non-state actors Q,\SA)- NSAs include non_governmentalorganizations Q'[GOs), paramilitary groups, terrorists, national liberationmovements, intergovernmental organizations a.nd priva.îe actors genet alþ,including busíness enîities. Taking the lattel, and particularly tñe case'ofmultinational corporations (MNCs), ds itsfocus, this article wìùrtrst preseitevidence ofthe trend ofíncreasing applicatton to MNCs ofhuman rtghts lawnorms and standards. From this basis, it will then ørgue that while this trendentails q degree ofreconceptualizotion, given the historical restrictìon ofhuman righß law to states as mentioned above, ìt is still incomptete wiihsignifcant gaps,whîch means that MNCs as non-state a.ctors are iotyetfultyaccountable to human rights standards. On the other hand, in conciusion, itwill argue that expectations that MNCs shoutd or wilt be helcl accotmtable byidentical mechanisms and to an identìcal sta.ndard as are state actols areprobably mispløced. Human rights law and advocates should røther acceptmore diversity in these areas infuture, wìth the onset ofíts application to nin_stûte actors than was the case before-

I. INTRODUCTION

As a branch ofpublic international law, human ríghts law has historicalþ been state-centric, with govemments and public authorities kaditionally understood as itsexciusive subjects. However, in recent decades, stemming from various developments,there has increasingly been pressure on hwrìan rights law towards the iossiblerelaxation or extension of this norm to inclurie also certain ûon-state u"totr çt isA¡.

_ * University ofAgder, Kristiasand, Nomay, æd Oxford Brookes University, Oxfqd, United.

Kingdorr- Email: < [email protected]>.

183

Page 2: Lundsgaard, Thorbjørn Waal. 2015. ‘Non-State Actors and Legal Accountability’, East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights, Vol. 21 (1), 183-191

201 5J Non-state Actors and Legal Accowtability IgJ

NON-STATE ACTORS AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITYThorbjøm Waal Lundsgaard.

ABSTRACT

I 84 East Aftican Journal of Peace & Humnn Rights [Vol 21: I

NSAs ìnclude non-govenìmental organizations (NGOs), paramilitary groups, tenorists,national liberation movements, intergovemmental organizatíons and private actorsgenerally, including business entities.l Taking the latter, and particularly the case ofmultinationai co¡porations (MNCs), as its focus, this article will first present evidenceof trend. of increasing application to MNCs of human rights law norms and standards.From this basis, ìf'ttill tnen argue that while this trend entails a degree ofreconceptualization, given the historical restriction of human dghts iar¡/ to statgs lsmentioned above, it is stiil incomplete with significant gaps. This means that MNCsas non-state actors are not yet fuþ accountabie to human rights sfand¿rds'

On tle other hand, in conclusion, it will argue that expectations that MNCsshould or will be held accountable by identical mechanisms and to an identical standa¡das are state actofs are probably misplaced. Fluman rights iaw and advocates shouldrather accept more divirsity in these areas in future, with the onset ofits application tonon-state actors, than \¡r'as the case before.

II. INCREASING APPLICATION OF TIUIVIAN RIGHTS NORMS TO NON-STATES ACTORS: TI{E CASE OF MNCS

During the 1 990s, many NGOs campaigned against negative impacts on individuals.and

"o**Liti"* ,"sultingfiom the activities of MNCs as well as from business activitiessponsored by development actors such as international {inancial institutions' andpìesented tn"h i-pu"tt as human rights violations o¡ abuses'2 MNCs were boycottedty .onru-"r. foinon-compliance with labour staldaxds in production facilities indlveloping countries.3 Intemational organizations were also subjected to pressure: thelVorld Bãk withdrew lending for a tiquefied gas project in Nigeria when Ken Saro'Wiwa was executed, in rvhich Shell was implicated.a

Gradualþthis perspective was also inte$ated into expert opinion and academic

l. L.oETTEANDI.BANIEKÀZ,TNTERNATIONALHuMANRIGIITSLAVfANDPRACTTCE(IEDN'cA¡4BRrDcE uNIwRstrY PRrss 2013), 657.

2. See for example, ÀMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN R]GHTS PREICIPLES FOR COMPANIES, A1

'NDEX: Àcr 70101/98; see ãlso, A. Clapham, Non-State lc,ort, in INTERNATI.NAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw'

(D. Moeckli et a1., e6, z0l0), 57 4.3. R. HrcctNs, PRoBLEMS AND PROCESS INTERNAîIONAL LAW AND HOW lVE USE tT (1995)' 37.

4.C.Gunduz,FlumanRightsandDevelopment:TheWorldBank'sNeedfolaconsist€ntApproach, (Developmeni StodieslnstTtute,London ScÀool ofEconomics andPolitical Scimce,2004), 18.

184

As a branch ofpublíc internatíonã.l law, human rights law has historicalll,been state-centric, with governments and public authorities traditionalþunderstood as íts exclwive subjects- However, in rccent decades, stemmiigfrom various developments, there has increasingþ been pressure on humairtghts law towards thepossìble relaxationor extension ofth¡s norm to includealso certain non-state actors Q,\SA)- NSAs include non_governmentalorganizations Q'[GOs), paramilitary groups, terrorists, national liberationmovements, intergovernmental organizations a.nd priva.îe actors genet alþ,including busíness enîities. Taking the lattel, and particularly tñe case'ofmultinational corporations (MNCs), ds itsfocus, this article wìùrtrst preseitevidence ofthe trend ofíncreasing applicatton to MNCs ofhuman rtghts lawnorms and standards. From this basis, it will then ørgue that while this trendentails q degree ofreconceptualizotion, given the historical restrictìon ofhuman righß law to states as mentioned above, ìt is still incomptete wiihsignifcant gaps,whîch means that MNCs as non-state a.ctors are iotyetfultyaccountable to human rights standards. On the other hand, in conciusion, itwill argue that expectations that MNCs shoutd or wilt be helcl accotmtable byidentical mechanisms and to an identìcal sta.ndard as are state actols areprobably mispløced. Human rights law and advocates should røther acceptmore diversity in these areas infuture, wìth the onset ofíts application to nin_stûte actors than was the case before-

I. INTRODUCTION

As a branch ofpublic international law, human ríghts law has historicalþ been state-centric, with govemments and public authorities kaditionally understood as itsexciusive subjects. However, in recent decades, stemming from various developments,there has increasingly been pressure on hwrìan rights law towards the iossiblerelaxation or extension of this norm to inclurie also certain ûon-state u"totr çt isA¡.

_ * University ofAgder, Kristiasand, Nomay, æd Oxford Brookes University, Oxfqd, United.Kingdorr- Email: < [email protected]>.

183

Page 3: Lundsgaard, Thorbjørn Waal. 2015. ‘Non-State Actors and Legal Accountability’, East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights, Vol. 21 (1), 183-191

201 5J Non-stqte Actars and Legal Accountability 1gs

contributions.s For example, according to a 200g report by the Intemationalcommission of Jurists, an MNC should be held legally acõounta6le for gross huma¡rights abuses ifit: i) enables specific abuses to occur; ii) exacerbates speõific abuses;

or iii) facilitates specific abuses.6

Intemational organizations alrdtheirhumanrights mechanisms aiso responded

to this development. In 2000, rhe United Nations (JN) Global Compáct was

establíshed, including amongst its ten principles that " I . Businesses should support and

respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights" and "2. Buiinessesshould make sure they are not complicit with human rights abuses.',?

The Universal Declaration on Human Righrs (UDHR), in its preamble

prociaims the humanrights it contains "...as ¿ common standa¡dof achievemènt forallpeoples and all nations, to the end that every índividual and every organ ofsociety...shall strive... to secure their universal and effective recopition and

observaac-e, both among the peoples of Member States tlemselves and among thepeoples of territories under theirjurisdiction."s with point of depar¡¡re in this text and

the uN charter,e in 2003, the united Natíons sub-commission ior the promotion and

Protection of Human Rights adopted a set of Norms on the Responsibilities ofTransnational corporations and oîher Business Enterprises with Regard to HumanRights (tke Draft Norms).

The Draft Nornis stated that, ". ..transnational corporations a¡rd other business

enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respec! ensure

respect ofandprotect human rights."ro They thus imposed on business entities the same

human rights "obligations under international law as those addressed to states, namely

to promote, respect and fulfilI human rìghts."rt

5. See for exâmple, M.K. ADDO HUMAN RIG¡¡IS STANDAR¡S ./\ND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF

TRANSNATToNAL coRpoRATtoNs (1 999).6. REpoRToFTHEn¡TERNATIoNALcoMWssIoNoFJITRISTSEXpERTLEcAr¡ANELòNcorcogere

COMPLICITY IN INTERNÀTIONAI CRIMÐS, IORPORATE COMPLICITY & LECA-I- ACCOINTABILITY, VOL 1:

FACING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAT PATH., (2008), 9, 27.

7. u.frED NATroNs cLoBAL coMpAcr, THE TEN pRINcIpLEs (201 l).8. Universl Ðeclaration ofHumm Rights, adopted 10 December l94g UNGA Res 217 A(IIf

(IDHR), heamble (emphasis added).

9. A¡ts. 1,2,55,56.10 NormsontheResponsibilitiesofTransnationalCorporationsmdOtherBusinessEnretprises

with Regild to Humm Riehrs, A (l).I l- oËTTE & BANTEKAZ, supra note I, at 666.

185

1 86 East African Jownøl of Peace & Humnn Ríghts [Vol 2 1 : I

TheDraftNormswerenotadoptedbythetJrenl.INHumanRightsCommission.l2 However,soonafterwards,anewmandateoftheSpecialRepresgntativg

of rl" ñ S""t"tary General on Businçss and Human Rights was established. The work

ofthe mandate hoider, Prof. John Ruggie, led in 201 I to the endorsement by the IIN

HumanRìghtsCorrncilofasetofGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRighß.

ÀrguuUty,itrese Guicting principles give ãffect to the same basic princþle behinl the

Orãft Norms, i.e. that human rig^hts nõrms should apply as conduct standards for MNCs

and other businesses, even if'tñe Guiding Principles take a different approach tban did

the UN Draft Nomrs in the way this priÀcip1e was formulated'l3

The uN Guiding principles^(Gpsi are based on a "tlrree-pillar" framework.

This comprises firstly, tÈe state ãuty io protect agatnst business-related h.man rights

abuses; t-he tJNGPs detail how states should take appropriate steps to Pt*9nt'

irrrr"rrigut., punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislaúon'

."go1utt.r"*d udjudication;La it clearly sets out expectations thatMNCs respecthuman

iiihtst, and "rrs.üË

that laws regulating businesses "enable business respect for human

rights."r6Underthesecondpillar,thecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthum-anrights,

MNCs must.....avoid infrrngtng on thå human rights of olhers and should address

ad'¡erse human rights impactJwiih which they are involved;"ì7 and in relation to weak

,r",", i.". situatioãs wheie domestic law does not live up to fundamental human rights,

MNCsshould...'.honortheprinciplesofìnternationailyrecognizedhumanrightswhen

faced with confl icting requirements."ls

The third pillar emphasizes that effective remedies should be accessible to

victìms for businesi-related Luman rights abuses, through state-basedjudicial and non-

12. P. Alston, The 'Not-a-Cat' Syndrome, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RICHTS' (P'

Alston, 2005), 33.13. .'EE, REPORT O¡ TTIE SPECTAL REPRESEI.TIATWE OF THE SECRETARY GENER-AT ON TEE ISSI]E

OFHII1\4ANRICHTSANDTRANSNATIONALCORPORATIONS'{NDOTHERBUSINESSENTERPRISES'JOHNRUGGIE'

(2i Mæch 2011).

I-IN Doc. AÆIRC/l?/31.14. J.G. RUcGlE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES oN BUsINEss ANÐ trLrMAN RIGHTS: IMTLEMENTING THE

fTNTTED NATTONS 'POOrUar, *rru"i Ño *¡t"ot' t*otptoRK' ( I 6 JtfNT 20 I I )', GUIDINC ¡RTNCIPLE 1 '

15. 1d, Cuiding PrìnciPle 2'

16. ,1d., Guiding PrinciPle 3.

17. 1d., Guiding PrinciPle l1I 8. 1d., Guiding PrinciPle 23 (b)'

186

Page 4: Lundsgaard, Thorbjørn Waal. 2015. ‘Non-State Actors and Legal Accountability’, East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights, Vol. 21 (1), 183-191

201 5J Non-stqte Actars and Legal Accountability 1gs

contributions.s For example, according to a 200g report by the Intemationalcommission of Jurists, an MNC should be held legally acõounta6le for gross huma¡rights abuses ifit: i) enables specific abuses to occur; ii) exacerbates speõific abuses;or iii) facilitates specific abuses.6Intemational organizations alrdtheirhumanrights mechanisms aiso respondedto this development. In 2000, rhe United Nations (JN) Global Compáct wasestablíshed, including amongst its ten principles that " I . Businesses should support andrespect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights" and "2. Buiinessesshould make sure they are not complicit with human rights abuses.',?The Universal Declaration on Human Righrs (UDHR), in its preambleprociaims the humanrights it contains "...as ¿ common standa¡dof achievemènt forallpeoples and all nations, to the end that every índividual and every organ ofsociety...shall strive... to secure their universal and effective recopition andobservaac-e, both among the peoples of Member States tlemselves and among thepeoples of territories under theirjurisdiction."s with point of depar¡¡re in this text andthe uN charter,e in 2003, the united Natíons sub-commission ior the promotion andProtection of Human Rights adopted a set of Norms on the Responsibilities ofTransnational corporations and oîher Business Enterprises with Regard to HumanRights (tke Draft Norms).

The Draft Nornis stated that, ". ..transnational corporations a¡rd other businessenterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respec! ensurerespect ofandprotect human rights."ro They thus imposed on business entities the samehuman rights "obligations under international law as those addressed to states, namelyto promote, respect and fulfilI human rìghts."rt

5. See for exâmple, M.K. ADDO HUMAN RIG¡¡IS STANDAR¡S ./\ND THE RESPONSIBILITY OFTRANSNATToNAL coRpoRATtoNs (1 999).6. REpoRToFTHEn¡TERNATIoNALcoMWssIoNoFJITRISTSEXpERTLEcAr¡ANELòNcorcogereCOMPLICITY IN INTERNÀTIONAI CRIMÐS, IORPORATE COMPLICITY & LECA-I- ACCOINTABILITY, VOL 1:FACING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAT PATH., (2008), 9, 27.7. u.frED NATroNs cLoBAL coMpAcr, THE TEN pRINcIpLEs (201 l).8. Universl Ðeclaration ofHumm Rights, adopted 10 December l94g UNGA Res 217 A(IIf(IDHR), heamble (emphasis added).9. A¡ts. 1,2,55,56.10 NormsontheResponsibilitiesofTransnationalCorporationsmdOtherBusinessEnretpriseswith Regild to Humm Riehrs, A (l).I l- oËTTE & BANTEKAZ, supra note I, at 666.

185

1 86 East African Jownøl of Peace & Humnn Ríghts [Vol 2 1 : I

TheDraftNormswerenotadoptedbythetJrenl.INHumanRightsCommission.l2 However,soonafterwards,anewmandateoftheSpecialRepresgntativgof rl" ñ S""t"tary General on Businçss and Human Rights was established. The workofthe mandate hoider, Prof. John Ruggie, led in 201 I to the endorsement by the IINHumanRìghtsCorrncilofasetofGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRighß.ÀrguuUty,itrese Guicting principles give ãffect to the same basic princþle behinl theOrãft Norms, i.e. that human rig^hts nõrms should apply as conduct standards for MNCsand other businesses, even if'tñe Guiding Principles take a different approach tban didthe UN Draft Nomrs in the way this priÀcip1e was formulated'l3

The uN Guiding principles^(Gpsi are based on a "tlrree-pillar" framework.This comprises firstly, tÈe state ãuty io protect agatnst business-related h.man rightsabuses; t-he tJNGPs detail how states should take appropriate steps to Pt*9nt'irrrr"rrigut., punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislaúon'."go1utt.r"*d udjudication;La it clearly sets out expectations thatMNCs respecthumaniiihtst, and

"rrs.üË that laws regulating businesses "enable business respect for human

rights."r6Underthesecondpillar,thecorporateresponsibilitytorespecthum-anrights,

MNCs must.....avoid infrrngtng on thå human rights of olhers and should addressad'¡erse human rights impactJwiih which they are involved;"ì7 and in relation to weak,r",", i.". situatioãs wheie domestic law does not live up to fundamental human rights,MNCsshould...'.honortheprinciplesofìnternationailyrecognizedhumanrightswhenfaced with confl icting requirements."ls

The third pillar emphasizes that effective remedies should be accessible tovictìms for businesi-related Luman rights abuses, through state-basedjudicial and non-

12. P. Alston, The 'Not-a-Cat' Syndrome, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RICHTS' (P'Alston, 2005), 33.

13. .'EE, REPORT O¡ TTIE SPECTAL REPRESEI.TIATWE OF THE SECRETARY GENER-AT ON TEE ISSI]EOFHII1\4ANRICHTSANDTRANSNATIONALCORPORATIONS'{NDOTHERBUSINESSENTERPRISES'JOHNRUGGIE'(2i Mæch 2011).I-IN Doc. AÆIRC/l?/31.

14. J.G. RUcGlE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES oN BUsINEss ANÐ trLrMAN RIGHTS: IMTLEMENTING THE

fTNTTED NATTONS 'POOrUar, *rru"i Ño *¡t"ot' t*otptoRK' ( I 6 JtfNT 20 I I )', GUIDINC ¡RTNCIPLE 1 '15. 1d, Cuiding PrìnciPle 2'16. ,1d., Guiding PrinciPle 3.17. 1d., Guiding PrinciPle l1I 8. 1d., Guiding PrinciPle 23 (b)'

186

Page 5: Lundsgaard, Thorbjørn Waal. 2015. ‘Non-State Actors and Legal Accountability’, East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights, Vol. 21 (1), 183-191

201 5l Non-state Actors and Legal Accmntability I 87

judicial mechanisms, and non-state based mechanisms.re since 20il, otherintemational organizations have integrated the uNGps into their own søndarìsaddressed to comp¡niss, fo¡ sa¿mple, the organisation for Economic co-operation anãDeveþment(OECD)'s Guidelines forMultinationalEnterprises,2owhile àtemationalfinancial institutions such as the Intemational Finance corporation have claimed to dothe s¿me. In Europe, both the European union and comcil of Europe have adopeàformal statements of support for the LlNGps.

Since 201 1, LrN treaty monitoring bodies, especially the {rN committee on theRights of the child and the IIN Economic and sociãl Rights committee,

"n"o,r.ug"áby the ûNGPs, have increasingly addressed busi¡esses *d tn"it responsibilltiesTàrhuman rights.2Ì There are also indications that treaty bodies are giving etrect to thisprinciple extraterritorially: for exampie, the uN cornmittee on Ecãnomic, Social andcultural Rights recently recommended to Norway that it must ensure its invesûnents

i" foreign companies in third countries are " . . . subject to a comprehensive human rightsimpact assessment" and take "...measures to pievent human rights

"ont uu"oti*,

abroad !y corporations which have their main offices under thejurisdiction ofthe StateParty.*,,

III. GAPS IN ACCOUNTABILITY FOSR HUMAN RIGIITS ABUSES By

Against the above normative developments, there are still numerous gaps inaccormtability of MNCs for human rights abuses in practice. According to Bãriekas,in this regard there are three outstanrting issues: i) intemational treatiesãii to imposeobligatíons on MNCs; ii) independent subsidiaries are not govemed by the corpårateand othe¡ laws of the home state of the MNC; and iii) terms of contracis between host

19. 1d., GuidingPrinciple 22.20. OECD(2011),OECDGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises,OECDpublishing3.

21. committee on the Rights of the child, IrN. Doc. cRC/ciGClr6, cener¿r commeniño. l6

!2-911) S" state obligations regading rhe impacr ofthe business sector on children's rights', (1? Aprii2ol3); committee on Economic, social æd cultunl.Rights, uN. Doc. Elc.l2lzorlll, ilz iuù zoirl,'Statement on the obligations of States prties regarding the corpomte sector and economic, social aíácultüal rights'.

22. comnittee m Economic, Social md cultural Rights, 'concluding observations on the fifthperiodic report ofNomay', (Advæce unedited venion), (29 Nãvember 2013),8/c.l2NoRrco/5, pæ.6.

ItB East African Journal of Peace & Hwøn Rights [Vol 21:1

states and MNCs can be written in ways that have-n9e3t{: imnacts ol hr¡man rights''?3

"'- -- io rhis can be added t the Intemational Criminal Cou¡t (ICC). A¡ticle 25 (1)

of the Rome Statute limits the Court's jurisdiction to natural persons' excluding

.åmorate liabiliw for crimes within its jurisdiction' despíte tle case for cr1-":.9f

;öä ä;ilårrv "J""r""¿

uv the ICi anl others, as noted above. In practice, this

ir";ï;,r"";ii" atnational level iith regardto domestic intemational criminal statutes

ä#ä;r;;;Tråî"r,.#¿"rpite rËefactthat'com'licity'(i.e. aiding andabetting

the criminal acts of anothef) ir uLi*" in the laws of most countries tfuoughout the

world.2sThiscont¡astscle*ty*itt'tr'"t.galpositionandincreasingpracticetowards

individual liability of naturaí persons, dr exampte under Article 3 of the Geneva

Conventions,whi"nuppiv ¿,tíg uãtã"onlt"t' ut evident inthe caseof Doe &Kadic

v. Karadzic inthe U¡te¿ Staies Ëourt of Appeaís' where the court held that*Karadzic

may be found liable for g""oiid",- ;t' å*"t''on¿ oimes agaìnst humanity in his

Þrivate caPacitY."26t"'^" -;í;"piona1ly, MNCs have been held legaþ accormrable for human rights

uurrr.r. orìgiããäy ""u","¿* pt"t"ct trade shþs frãm pirates'2? the United States Ali€n

Tort Claims Act had been ,"ti"¿ oo in recenf years.tg allow foreigners to file a civil

claim in aU.S. dlst ict coort ior a to* committ"ã n violation of either international law

ãr " u.sltt""ty

' ior""r.fui"uses tmder ACTA inciuded Doe v' WOCAL Corp''

where it was formd thú "i;;;;;l "oüa w hetd tíable on the basiß of aiding and.

abexing under the A\CA ¡;;-;;";;"'noi ¡t l'o"' about and substantialþ assisted

througi practical encouragement or support''te

23. oÊTrE & BANTEKAZ. flpra r,ote 1' at 663'

24. R.c.TnoMpsoNo"oi.iorotorri*,CoNfiVfERCE,CRIMEANDCoNFLICT:LECALREMEDIES

FoR pRïvATE sEcroR ,r*rr,t" ,o* ã*ù BREAcHES oF INTERNATIoNAT LAw' A suRvEY oF sD(rEEN

totnr.*lçs, uxr.¡rlvE slJlvtMARY, FAFo' (2006)' 16'

25. Id.,at17.26' Kadic v. Kradzio: opinion of znd Cifcuil fe: Subþc1 Mattq JuÌisdictiofÌ, United st¿tes

C"t t tf epp""it, Second Circuit, dpiniàn by: Jon O' Nemm' Chief Judse' paa 2'

27 r'Btay' Arnac'^eí:päi;'¿tÃi"n;n to Risto''e*ommenß: Petroleum and Mining

Companies,in NA.TURAL RrsouncËs ¡Np v¡o"ÉNr coNFLIcr: o?TIoNs ANÞ AcrIoNs @- Collier & I'

Bmnon ed),306."^ *- -

is. Alien Tor Claims Acr (ATCA) of l?89' z8 U S Code 6 I ?50'

29' R. Chmbrs, n" u'äà'i"'í"-*t' t*rty"1t2"¡^41!ne Devetoping Law-on C*12':t:

comDlicitvinHumonn¡ent,au""iiíilllrîä*iøit"erief(2ó05)'castmcentreforHummRightsLa; Mo;ash Univeßity lAustualia], at 15'

188187

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201 5l Non-state Actors and Legal Accmntability I 87

judicial mechanisms, and non-state based mechanisms.re since 20il, otherintemational organizations have integrated the uNGps into their own søndarìsaddressed to comp¡niss, fo¡ sa¿mple, the organisation for Economic co-operation anãDeveþment(OECD)'s Guidelines forMultinationalEnterprises,2owhile àtemationalfinancial institutions such as the Intemational Finance corporation have claimed to dothe s¿me. In Europe, both the European union and comcil of Europe have adopeàformal statements of support for the LlNGps.Since 201 1, LrN treaty monitoring bodies, especially the {rN committee on theRights of the child and the IIN Economic and sociãl Rights committee,

"n"o,r.ug"áby the ûNGPs, have increasingly addressed busi¡esses *d tn"it responsibilltiesTàrhuman rights.2Ì There are also indications that treaty bodies are giving etrect to thisprinciple extraterritorially: for exampie, the uN cornmittee on Ecãnomic, Social andcultural Rights recently recommended to Norway that it must ensure its invesûnentsi" foreign companies in third countries are " . . . subject to a comprehensive human rightsimpact assessment" and take "...measures to pievent human rights

"ont uu"oti*,abroad !y corporations which have their main offices under thejurisdiction ofthe StateParty.*,,

III. GAPS IN ACCOUNTABILITY FOSR HUMAN RIGIITS ABUSES By

Against the above normative developments, there are still numerous gaps inaccormtability of MNCs for human rights abuses in practice. According to Bãriekas,in this regard there are three outstanrting issues: i) intemational treatiesãii to imposeobligatíons on MNCs; ii) independent subsidiaries are not govemed by the corpårateand othe¡ laws of the home state of the MNC; and iii) terms of contracis between host

19. 1d., GuidingPrinciple 22.20. OECD(2011),OECDGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises,OECDpublishing3.21. committee on the Rights of the child, IrN. Doc. cRC/ciGClr6, cener¿r commeniño. l6!2-911) S" state obligations regading rhe impacr ofthe business sector on children's rights', (1? Aprii2ol3); committee on Economic, social æd cultunl.Rights, uN. Doc. Elc.l2lzorlll, ilz iuù zoirl,'Statement on the obligations of States prties regarding the corpomte sector and economic, social aíácultüal rights'.22. comnittee m Economic, Social md cultural Rights, 'concluding observations on the fifthperiodic report ofNomay', (Advæce unedited venion), (29 Nãvember 2013),8/c.l2NoRrco/5, pæ.6.

ItB East African Journal of Peace & Hwøn Rights [Vol 21:1

states and MNCs can be written in ways that have-n9e3t{: imnacts ol hr¡man rights''?3"'- -- io rhis can be added t the Intemational Criminal Cou¡t (ICC). A¡ticle 25 (1)

of the Rome Statute limits the Court's jurisdiction to natural persons' excluding.åmorate liabiliw for crimes within its jurisdiction' despíte tle case for cr1-":.9f;öä ä;ilårrv

"J""r""¿ uv the ICi anl others, as noted above. In practice, this

ir";ï;,r"";ii" atnational level iith regardto domestic intemational criminal statutesä#ä;r;;;Tråî"r,.#¿"rpite rËefactthat'com'licity'(i.e. aiding andabettingthe criminal acts of anothef) ir uLi*" in the laws of most countries tfuoughout theworld.2sThiscont¡astscle*ty*itt'tr'"t.galpositionandincreasingpracticetowardsindividual liability of naturaí persons, dr exampte under Article 3 of the GenevaConventions,whi"nuppiv ¿,tíg uãtã"onlt"t' ut evident inthe caseof Doe &Kadicv. Karadzic inthe U¡te¿ Staies Ëourt of Appeaís' where the court held that*Karadzicmay be found liable for g""oiid",- ;t' å*"t''on¿ oimes agaìnst humanity in hisÞrivate caPacitY."26t"'^" -;í;"piona1ly,

MNCs have been held legaþ accormrable for human rightsuurrr.r. orìgiããäy

""u","¿* pt"t"ct trade shþs frãm pirates'2? the United States Ali€n

Tort Claims Act had been ,"ti"¿ oo in recenf years.tg allow foreigners to file a civilclaim in aU.S. dlst ict coort ior a to* committ"ã n violation of either international lawãr

" u.sltt""ty

' ior""r.fui"uses tmder ACTA inciuded Doe v' WOCAL Corp''

where it was formd thú "i;;;;;l "oüa

w hetd tíable on the basiß of aiding and.abexing under the A\CA ¡;;-;;";;"'noi ¡t l'o"' about and substantialþ assistedthrougi practical encouragement or support''te

23. oÊTrE & BANTEKAZ. flpra r,ote 1' at 663'24. R.c.TnoMpsoNo"oi.iorotorri*,CoNfiVfERCE,CRIMEANDCoNFLICT:LECALREMEDIESFoR pRïvATE sEcroR ,r*rr,t" ,o* ã*ù BREAcHES oF INTERNATIoNAT LAw' A suRvEY oF sD(rEEN

totnr.*lçs, uxr.¡rlvE slJlvtMARY, FAFo' (2006)' 16'25. Id.,at17.26' Kadic v. Kradzio: opinion of znd Cifcuil fe: Subþc1 Mattq JuÌisdictiofÌ, United st¿tes

C"t t tf epp""it, Second Circuit, dpiniàn by: Jon O' Nemm' Chief Judse' paa 2'27 r'Btay' Arnac'^eí:päi;'¿tÃi"n;n to Risto''e*ommenß: Petroleum and Mining

Companies,in NA.TURAL RrsouncËs ¡Np v¡o"ÉNr coNFLIcr: o?TIoNs ANÞ AcrIoNs @- Collier & I'Bmnon ed),306."^ *- -

is. Alien Tor Claims Acr (ATCA) of l?89' z8 U S Code 6 I ?50'29' R. Chmbrs, n" u'äà'i"'í"-*t' t*rty"1t2"¡^41!ne Devetoping Law-on C*12':t:

comDlicitvinHumonn¡ent,au""iiíilllrîä*iøit"erief(2ó05)'castmcentreforHummRightsLa; Mo;ash Univeßity lAustualia], at 15'

188

187

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2AI5l Non-state Actors and Legal Accountability lgg

Many autlors had highlighted the us Alien Tort claims Acr as a shíningexample ofpossibilities for improved accountabilìty through law of complicl*.ilË-îlthe special Representative had asserted in 2006 tlat'.unãer customary i"iJ*","i"r"i1a\¡/'

-eqergrlg practice and expert opinion increasingry do suggest trti

""rp"i"tiî"'.may be held liable for committing, or for compliclty in, ihe most n"i"o"r l**n .lnlì-uiojli:.* amounting to intemational crimes, inõluding genocide, ,luu"ry, fr,råìitrafticking, forced labor, tortre and some crimes against huiranitv.*1 rio*"í"io" iiApril 2013, in the case of Kíobel v. shelt relating to executions of enti.onm"oáactivists by the Nigerian authorities while helping shell secure its operations in theNiger De1ø, the us supreme court, effectively extinguishing ACTA as a to.rt"ìiaccountability, ruled in a 9-0 judgment that victims of human rights abuses in whichcorporate actors were allegedly complicit could not seekjustice in us courts under theAiien Tort claims Act of 1789 (ATCA; Kiobel v. Royai Dutch petroleum. 2013).

, Such issues appeax to be systemic aod not restricted to individualjurisdictions"B_ ¿_sed on 40 cases ofalleged corporate involvement in gross human riglts atuses from

{itrerent geographical regions, a new study publishedby the uN office of the Highcommissioner for Human Rights has also found that 'þresent arrangements iorpreventing, detecting and remedying cases of business involvemcnt in gross humanrights abuses are not working well: victims ù: many cases fail to get effeJtive redress,States face un-eveo pattems of use of remedial mechanisms, anã companies have tooperate ìn an environmeni of great legal uncertainty and lack a level pþing field.',3,

j g0 East African Journal of Peace & Hurun Rìghts [Yol 21 : I

as highlighted above address the responsibility_t9_Iespect human rights to business

äoirä, ñ-. U"enrepeatedlyreaff*medby theLrN Human Rights Council resolutions

îi""lOn, and recintþ by a Declaration of the Council of Europe Council of

ú¡rl"tr.rí Adoption ofñational Action Plans on business andhuman rights based on

tfre Grriding frinàiples also provides emerging evidence of state practice'34

Mãr"ov"., it can be said that the {lNGPs' articulation of a "corporate

,"rponribiliry to i"rp""t" human rights is in itself an ìmpofiant reconceptualization'

rhå oraft Nonns as noted expressed an obligation on businesses "to pr-omote, secufe

the fulfillment of, respect, enåure respect ofãnd protect human rights"35 which w_ould

;;"" p*;"*p""í"s ,,in thl sho"s,'of ihe state in terms of the scope of obligation. Even

äÌr{Ñ¿t, iri specific locations, carry out statelike fi:nctions' such as providing

;;;";'*d häafth infrastructure,3o ãs NSAs they are "entities that do not exe¡cise

g"r"irÀ*Of frnctions or whose áonduct carmot be described as possessing I Public

""*";'" Recognizing this, the Guiding Principles appear to have innovated a new

level or form ofõbligatìon, formulated as "responsibility," which entails only tbe parts

"iri"t"r' ,.obligation-s" under human rights laws appropriate to corporations' restricted

f"g"i-ãr¿"r";'"d social ftrnctions, i.e. iefrainingfrom abuses and avoiding complicity.

ontheotherhand,regardingPillarlofthel.rNFramework,itmightbesaidthis

reaffirms states as the princiial t rb]""tt of intemational law, with "Violations of the

oltig;ion to ptotect follow[ing] from the failure of States ' ' '"38 But here too' pressure

i;;r;;;r*på"üzation and exiËnsion is in evidence. For exampie, it has been claimed

that: .,The obligation to protect includes the søte's responsibility to ensufe that pfivate

*tlti", o, indiîiduals, including transnational corporations over which they exercis-e

jurisdiction, do not deprive lnàìilduals of their economic, social and cultural rights"'3e

Based on the above evidence, can ít be said that international human rights law has beenre-concepfualized to enable MNCs, as non-state actoß, to be held account¿ble forhirnan rights violations?

Firstþ, it should be acknowledged that most of the positive developmentsidenfified are ¿t the level of "soft law." However, the IrN Guiãing principles, which

IV. CONCLUSION

30. Clqham, supra note 2, al 57 5.31. J.G. Ruggie, coMMissloN oN HUMAN RICHTS, 'pROMOrroN AND PROTECTfON OF HUMAN

RICIiTS,'INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATTVE OF TFIESECRÉTARY-CENERAL ON THE ISSUE O¡H[¡\4ÀN RIGHTSANDTRANSNATTONALCORPORATIONS ANÞOTHER BUSJNESS ÊNTERPRISES, E/CN.4/2006/97(22 Febmary 2006), 15-16.

32. oHcH& sruDy oN DoMEsrc L.A,w p.EtvrEDrEs (2014),

189

33. COL"¡{CILOFEUROPE"'DECLARATIONOFTHECOMMITTEEÔFMINISTERSONTHEUNGUTDII¡G

pRINcIpLEs oN BUSINESS AND ÉUMAN RIGHTS', (ADoPTED 16 APRIL 2014)'

34. oHcH& srATE NÀTIoNALAcrIoN PLANS (2014)'

35. NotuvsoNTHER¡SP0NSIBILTTIESoFTRANSNATIoNAI-coR?oRATIoNSANDoTHERBUSINESS

ENTERPRISES wlTH REGARD TO TruMÄN RICHTS, PREAMBLE'

36. A.cATTo,MULTINATIoNATEN|ERPzuSÉSANDHUMAI{RIGHTS:oBLIGATIoNSUNDEREULAW

AND TNTERNATIoNAL LAw (20 I I ) 4.

37. oETTE & BAN-|EKAZ,supra îote l, at 657'

38. CE3CÂ. Uw Ooc. írc.izlccil8,'General comment No. 18,'Ihe Right to work" Adopted

on 24 November 2005, Para. 35.

39. THEMAASTRICHTGUIDELINES oNvIoLAfioNsoFEcoNoMIc'soclAl-At\DcuLTuRArRlclrrs'

1998, para. 18.

190

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2AI5l Non-state Actors and Legal Accountability lgg

Many autlors had highlighted the us Alien Tort claims Acr as a shíningexample ofpossibilities for improved accountabilìty through law of complicl*.ilË-îlthe special Representative had asserted in 2006 tlat'.unãer customary i"iJ*","i"r"i1a\¡/' -eqergrlg

practice and expert opinion increasingry do suggest trti ""rp"i"tiî"'.may be held liable for committing, or for compliclty in, ihe most n"i"o"r l**n .lnlì-uiojli:.* amounting to intemational crimes, inõluding genocide, ,luu"ry, fr,råìitrafticking, forced labor, tortre and some crimes against huiranitv.*1 rio*"í"io" iiApril 2013, in the case of Kíobel v. shelt relating to executions of enti.onm"oáactivists by the Nigerian authorities while helping shell secure its operations in theNiger De1ø, the us supreme court, effectively extinguishing ACTA as a to.rt"ìiaccountability, ruled in a 9-0 judgment that victims of human rights abuses in whichcorporate actors were allegedly complicit could not seekjustice in us courts under theAiien Tort claims Act of 1789 (ATCA; Kiobel v. Royai Dutch petroleum. 2013).

, Such issues appeax to be systemic aod not restricted to individualjurisdictions"B_ ¿_sed on 40 cases ofalleged corporate involvement in gross human riglts atuses from{itrerent geographical regions, a new study publishedby the uN office of the Highcommissioner for Human Rights has also found that 'þresent arrangements iorpreventing, detecting and remedying cases of business involvemcnt in gross humanrights abuses are not working well: victims ù: many cases fail to get effeJtive redress,States face un-eveo pattems of use of remedial mechanisms, anã companies have tooperate ìn an environmeni of great legal uncertainty and lack a level pþing field.',3,

j g0 East African Journal of Peace & Hurun Rìghts [Yol 21 : I

as highlighted above address the responsibility_t9_Iespect human rights to businessäoirä, ñ-. U"enrepeatedlyreaff*medby theLrN Human Rights Council resolutionsîi""lOn, and recintþ by a Declaration of the Council of Europe Council ofú¡rl"tr.rí Adoption ofñational Action Plans on business andhuman rights based ontfre Grriding frinàiples also provides emerging evidence of state practice'34

Mãr"ov"., it can be said that the {lNGPs' articulation of a "corporate,"rponribiliry to i"rp""t" human rights is in itself an ìmpofiant reconceptualization'rhå oraft Nonns as noted expressed an obligation on businesses "to pr-omote, secufethe fulfillment of, respect, enåure respect ofãnd protect human rights"35 which w_ould

;;"" p*;"*p""í"s ,,in thl sho"s,'of ihe state in terms of the scope of obligation. EvenäÌr{Ñ¿t, iri specific locations, carry out statelike fi:nctions' such as providing;;;";'*d häafth infrastructure,3o ãs NSAs they are "entities that do not exe¡ciseg"r"irÀ*Of frnctions or whose áonduct carmot be described as possessing I Public""*";'" Recognizing this, the Guiding Principles appear to have innovated a newlevel or form ofõbligatìon, formulated as "responsibility," which entails only tbe parts

"iri"t"r' ,.obligation-s" under human rights laws appropriate to corporations' restricted

f"g"i-ãr¿"r";'"d social ftrnctions, i.e. iefrainingfrom abuses and avoiding complicity.ontheotherhand,regardingPillarlofthel.rNFramework,itmightbesaidthis

reaffirms states as the princiial t rb]""tt of intemational law, with "Violations of the

oltig;ion to ptotect follow[ing] from the failure of States ' ' '"38 But here too' pressurei;;r;;;r*på"üzation and exiËnsion is in evidence. For exampie, it has been claimedthat: .,The obligation to protect includes the søte's responsibility to ensufe that pfivate*tlti", o, indiîiduals, including transnational corporations over which they exercis-ejurisdiction, do not deprive lnàìilduals of their economic, social and cultural rights"'3eBased on the above evidence, can ít be said that international human rights law has beenre-concepfualized to enable MNCs, as non-state actoß, to be held account¿ble forhirnan rights violations?

Firstþ, it should be acknowledged that most of the positive developmentsidenfified are ¿t the level of "soft law." However, the IrN Guiãing principles, which

IV. CONCLUSION

30. Clqham, supra note 2, al 57 5.31. J.G. Ruggie, coMMissloN oN HUMAN RICHTS, 'pROMOrroN AND PROTECTfON OF HUMANRICIiTS,'INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATTVE OF TFIESECRÉTARY-CENERAL ON THE ISSUE O¡H[¡\4ÀN RIGHTSANDTRANSNATTONALCORPORATIONS ANÞOTHER BUSJNESS ÊNTERPRISES, E/CN.4/2006/97(22 Febmary 2006), 15-16.32. oHcH& sruDy oN DoMEsrc L.A,w p.EtvrEDrEs (2014),

189

33. COL"¡{CILOFEUROPE"'DECLARATIONOFTHECOMMITTEEÔFMINISTERSONTHEUNGUTDII¡GpRINcIpLEs oN BUSINESS AND ÉUMAN RIGHTS', (ADoPTED 16 APRIL 2014)'34. oHcH& srATE NÀTIoNALAcrIoN PLANS (2014)'35. NotuvsoNTHER¡SP0NSIBILTTIESoFTRANSNATIoNAI-coR?oRATIoNSANDoTHERBUSINESS

ENTERPRISES wlTH REGARD TO TruMÄN RICHTS, PREAMBLE'

36. A.cATTo,MULTINATIoNATEN|ERPzuSÉSANDHUMAI{RIGHTS:oBLIGATIoNSUNDEREULAWAND TNTERNATIoNAL LAw (20 I I ) 4.

37. oETTE & BAN-|EKAZ,supra îote l, at 657'38. CE3CÂ. Uw Ooc. írc.izlccil8,'General comment No. 18,'Ihe Right to work" Adopted

on 24 November 2005, Para. 35.39. THEMAASTRICHTGUIDELINES oNvIoLAfioNsoFEcoNoMIc'soclAl-At\DcuLTuRArRlclrrs'

1998, para. 18.

190

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24151 Non-stateAcîorsandLegalAccomtabílíry 1gI

even extra-territorially, and that "states must cooperate to ensure tlat non_state acto."do not impair the øoyment of the economic, sociar and cultural ¡g¡t, or ävpeßons."ao

. Does accormtability require that these new h'man rights norms are expressedin a hurnan rights and business treaty, setting direct obligationr on t.*.outiãoäbusinesses? This view has been voiced, but John Ruggie, the fomrer uN sp""i"iRepresentative on Business and Human Rights, has argued that it "takes time rô, *"major new initiative to ta"ke root,'*1 and that "complex clusters of different bodies ofnational and intemational 1aw,'r2 render it unlikeiy tlat such a treaty could betransformed into "meaningful legal action."a3 such challenges are also noticed by zerkrvho says that it is unclear whether a "close convergence of legal standarás andprbcedures is a desirable, let alone feasible, project."a while this debate continues, itseems reasonable to expec! with these autlors, thatjust as NSAs are not identical tostâtes, neither will accountability for their abuses of human righTs look identical tomodels deveþed historically for states.

40. MAASTRTCHT pRINcIpLEs oN EXrRÂTERRIToRL4.L oBLIcATIoNs oF srATEs lN Tt{E ARE¡ oFEcoNoMrc, soctALAND CULTURAL Rrcrils (29 FEBRUARY 201,,2j,pan 9.

41. J.G.Ruggie,lUNBwinessandHumanRíghtsTreaty?,tssuEBRtEt,Zglanwry2014,x2.

42. Id.,3.43. 1d.,3.44. J.ZERK,CORPORATELIÀBILITYFORGROSSHUMANRICHTSABUSES:TOWARDSAFÆRNRAND

MoRE EFFEcrrlT sYsrEM oF DoMEsrIc LÀw Rrìr,ßDIEs (20 I 4), RÊPoRT ÞREPAR¡Ð FoR THE oF¡IcE oF THEUN H]GH CoT,(VISSIoNER FoR HUMAN RIGHTS, IO.

191